Terms and conditions for employment in CS

Oath of allegiance: Article IX-B , Section 4 Article XI, Section 18

ARTICLE IX-B

B. THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

Section 1.

1. The civil service shall be administered by the Civil Service Commission composed of a
Chairman and two Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at
the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, with proven capacity for public
administration, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the elections
immediately preceding their appointment.

2. The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of
the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those
first appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for seven years, a Commissioner for five years,
and another Commissioner for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any
vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member
be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.

Section 2.

1. The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the
Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters.

2. Appointments in the civil service shall be made only according to merit and fitness to be
determined, as far as practicable, and, except to positions which are policy-determining,
primarily confidential, or highly technical, by competitive examination.

3. No officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause
provided by law.
 4. No officer or employee in the civil service shall engage, directly or indirectly, in any
electioneering or partisan political campaign.

5. The right to self-organization shall not be denied to government employees. (6) Temporary
employees of the Government shall be given such protection as may be provided by law.

Section 3. The Civil Service Commission, as the central personnel agency of the Government, shall
establish a career service and adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency, integrity,
responsiveness, progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil service. It shall strengthen the merit and
rewards system, integrate all human resources development programs for all levels and ranks, and
institutionalize a management climate conducive to public accountability. It shall submit to the
President and the Congress an annual report on its personnel programs.

Section 4. All public officers and employees shall take an oath or affirmation to uphold and defend
this Constitution.

Section 5. The Congress shall provide for the standardization of compensation of government
officials and employees, including those in government-owned or controlled corporations with
original charters, taking into account the nature of the responsibilities pertaining to, and the
qualifications required for, their positions.

Section 6. No candidate who has lost in any election shall, within one year after such election, be
appointed to any office in the Government or any Government-owned or controlled corporations or
in any of their subsidiaries.

Section 7. No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any
public office or position during his tenure. Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary
functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the
Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including Government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.

Section 8. No elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional, double, or
indirect compensation, unless specifically authorized by law, nor accept without the consent of the
Congress, any present, emolument, office, or title of any kind from any foreign government. Pensions
or gratuities shall not be considered as additional, double, or indirect compensation.

ARTICLE XI SECTION 4
Section 4. The present anti-graft court known as the Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and exercise its
jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law.
ARTICLE XI SECTION 18
Section 18. Public officers and employees owe the State and this Constitution allegiance at all times and any public
officer or employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant of another country
during his tenure shall be dealt with by law.

MERIT SYSTEM
[G.R. No. 123708. June 19, 1997]

CSC v. Salas, G.R. No. 123708, June 19, 1997

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING
CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. RAFAEL M. SALAS, respondent.

DECISION
REGALADO, J.:

The present petition for review on certiorari seeks to nullify the decision of the Court of
Appeals, dated September 14, 1995, in CA-G.R. SP No. 38319 which set aside Resolution No.
92-1283 of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) and ordered the reinstatement of herein
private respondent Rafael M. Salas with full back wages for having been illegally dismissed by
the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR), but without prejudice to the
filing of administrative charges against him if warranted. [1]

The records disclose that on October 7, 1989, respondent Salas was appointed by the
PAGCOR Chairman as Internal Security Staff (ISS) member and assigned to the casino at the
Manila Pavilion Hotel. However, his employment was terminated by the Board of Directors of
PAGCOR on December 3, 1991, allegedly for loss of confidence, after a covert investigation
conducted by the Intelligence Division of PAGCOR. The summary of intelligence information
claimed that respondent was allegedly engaged in proxy betting as detailed in the affidavits
purportedly executed by two customers of PAGCOR who claimed that they were used as
gunners on different occasions by respondent. The two polygraph tests taken by the latter
also yielded corroborative and unfavorable results.
On December 23, 1991, respondent Salas submitted a letter of appeal to the Chairman and
the Board of Directors of PAGCOR, requesting reinvestigation of the case since he was not
given an opportunity to be heard, but the same was denied. On February 17, 1992, he
appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) which denied the appeal on the
ground that, as a confidential employee, respondent was not dismissed from the service but
his term of office merely expired. On appeal, the CSC issued Resolution No. 92-1283 which
affirmed the decision of the MSPB. [2]

Respondent Salas initially went to this Court on a petition for certiorari assailing the
propriety of the questioned CSC resolution. However, in a resolution dated August 15,
1995, the case was referred to the Court of Appeals pursuant to Revised Administrative
[3]

Circular No. 1-95 which took effect on June 1, 1995.

 On September 14, 1995, the court of Appeals rendered its questioned decision with the
finding that herein respondent Salas is not a confidential employee, hence he may not be
dismissed on the ground of loss of confidence. In so ruling, the appellate court applied the
"proximity rule" enunciated in the case of Grio, et al. vs. Civil Service Commission, et al. . It
[4]

likewise held that Section 16 of Presidential Decree No. 1869 has been superseded and
repealed by Section 2(1), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution.
Hence this appeal, which is premised on and calls for the resolution of the sole
determinative issue of whether or not respondent Salas is a confidential employee.
Petitioners aver that respondent Salas, as a member of the Internal Security Staff of
PAGCOR, is a confidential employee for several reasons, viz.:

(1) Presidential Decree No. 1869 which created the Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation expressly provides under Section 16 thereof that all employees of the casinos
and related services shall be classified as confidential appointees;

(2) In the case of the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et
al., The Supreme Court has classified PAGCOR employees as confidential appointees;
[5]

(3) CSC Resolution No. 91-830, dated July 11, 1991, has declared employees in casinos and
related services as confidential appointees by operation of law; and

(4) Based on his functions as a member of the ISS, private respondent occupies a confidential
position.

Whence, according to petitioners, respondent Salas was not dismissed from the service
but, instead, his term of office had expired. They additionally contend that the Court of
Appeals erred in applying the "proximity rule" because even if Salas occupied one of the
lowest rungs in the organizational ladder of PAGCOR, he performed the functions of one of
the most sensitive positions in the corporation.
On the other hand, respondent Salas argues that it is the actual nature of an employee's
functions, and not his designation or title, which determines whether or not a position is
primarily confidential, and that while Presidential Decree No. 1869 may have declared all
PAGCOR employees to be confidential appointees, such executive pronouncement may be
considered as a mere initial determination of the classification of positions which is not
conclusive in case of conflict, in light of the ruling enunciated in Tria vs. Sto. Tomas, et al.
[6]

We find no merit in the petition and consequently hold that the same should be, as it is
hereby, denied.
Section 2, Rule XX of the Revised Civil Service Rules, promulgated pursuant to the
provisions of Section 16(e) of Republic Act No. 2260 (Civil Service Act of 1959), which was
then in force when Presidential Decree No. 1869 creating the Philippine Amusement and
Gaming Corporation was passed, provided that "upon recommendation of the Commissioner,
the President may declare a position as policy-determining, primarily confidential, or highly
technical in nature." It appears that Section 16 of Presidential Decree No. 1869 was
predicated thereon, with the text thereof providing as follows:

"All positions in the corporation, whether technical, administrative, professional or

managerial are exempt from the provisions of the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations,
and shall be governed only by the personnel management policies set by the Board of
Directors. All employees of the casinos and related services shall be classified as 'confidential'
appointees."

On the strength of this statutory declaration, petitioner PAGCOR terminated the services
of respondent Salas for lack of confidence after it supposedly found that the latter was
engaged in proxy betting. In upholding the dismissal of respondent Salas, the CSC ruled that
he is considered a confidential employee by operation of law, hence there is no act of
dismissal to speak of but a mere expiration of a confidential employee's term of office, such
that a complaint for illegal dismissal will not prosper in this case for lack of legal basis.
In reversing the decision of the CSC, the Court of Appeals opined that the provisions of
Section 16 of Presidential Decree No. 1869 may no longer be applied in the case at bar
because the same is deemed to have been repealed in its entirety by Section 2(1), Article IX-B
of the 1987 Constitution. This is not completely correct. On this point, we approve the more
[7]

logical interpretation advanced by the CSC to the effect that "Section 16 of PD 1869 insofar as
it exempts PAGCOR positions from the provisions of Civil Service Law and Rules has been
amended, modified or deemed repealed by the 1987 Constitution and Executive Order No.
292 (Administrative Code of 1987)."
However, the same cannot be said with respect to the last portion of Section 16 which
provides that "all employees of the casino and related services shall be classified as
'confidential appointees.'" While such executive declaration emanated merely from the
provisions of Section 2, Rule XX of the implementing rules of the Civil Service Act of 1959, the
power to declare a position as policy-determining, primarily confidential or highly technical
as defined therein has subsequently been codified and incorporated in Section 12(9), Book V
of Executive Order No. 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987. This later enactment only
[8]

serves to bolster the validity of the categorization made under Section 16 of Presidential
Decree No. 1869. Be that as it may, such classification is not absolute and all-encompassing.
Prior to the passage of the aforestated Civil Service Act of 1959, there were two
recognized instances when a position may be considered primarily confidential: Firstly, when
the President, upon recommendation of the Commissioner of Civil Service, has declared the
position to be primarily confidential; and, secondly in the absence of such declaration, when
by the nature of the functions of the office there exists "close intimacy" between the
appointee and appointing power which insures freedom of intercourse without
embarrassment or freedom from misgivings of betrayals of personal trust or confidential
matters of state.
[9]

At first glance, it would seem that the instant case falls under the first category by virtue
of the express mandate under Section 16 of Presidential Decree No. 1869. An in-depth
analysis, however, of the second category evinces otherwise.
 When Republic Act No. 2260 was enacted on June 19, 1959, Section 5 thereof provided
that "the non-competitive or unclassified service shall be composed of positions expressly
declared by law to be in the non-competitive or unclassified service or those which are policy-
determining, primarily confidential, or highly technical in nature." In the case of Piero, et al.
vs. Hechanova, et al., the Court obliged with a short discourse there on how the phrase "in
[10]

nature" came to find its way into the law, thus:

"The change from the original wording of the bill (expressly declared by law x x x to be policy-
determining, etc.) to that finally approved and enacted ('or which are policy-determining,
etc. in nature') came about because of the observations of Senator Taada, that as originally
worded the proposed bill gave Congress power to declare by fiat of law a certain position as
primarily confidential or policy-determining, which should not be the case. The Senator urged
that since the Constitution speaks of positions which are 'primarily confidential, policy-
determining, or highly technical in nature', it is notwithin the power of Congress to declare
what positions are primarily confidential or policy-determining. 'It is the nature alone of the
position that determines whether it is policy-determining or primarily confidential.' Hence,
the Senator further observed, the matter should be left to the 'proper implementation of the
laws, depending upon the nature of the position to be filled', and if the position is 'highly
confidential' then the President and the Civil Service Commissioner must implement the law.

To a question of Senator Tolentino, 'But in positions that involved both confidential matters
and matters which are routine, x x x who is going to determine whether it is primarily
confidential?' Senator Taada replied:

'SENATOR TAADA: Well, at the first instance, it is the appointing power that determines that:
the nature of the position. In case of conflict then it is the Court that determines whether the
position is primarily confidential or not" (Italics in the original text).

Hence the dictum that, at least since the enactment of the Civil Service Act of 1959, it is the
nature of the position which finally determines whether a position is primarily confidential,
policy-determining or highly technical. And the court in the aforecited case explicitly decreed
that executive pronouncements, such as Presidential Decree No. 1869, can be no more than
initial determinations that are not conclusive in case of conflict. It must be so, or else it would
then lie within the discretion of the Chief Executive to deny to any officer, by executive fiat,
the protection of Section 4, Article XII (now Section 2[3], Article IX-B) of the Constitution. In
[11]

other words, Section 16 of Presidential Decree No. 1869 cannot be given a literally stringent
application without compromising the constitutionally protected right of an employee to
security of tenure.
The doctrinal ruling enunciated in Piero finds support in the 1935 Constitution and was
reaffirmed in the 1973 Constitution, as well as in the implementing rules of Presidential
Decree No. 807, or the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines. It may well be observed that
[12]

both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions contain the provision, in Section 2, Article XII-B
thereof, that "appointments in the Civil Service, except as to those which are policy-
determining, primarily confidential, or highly technical in nature, shall be made only
according to merit and fitness, to be determined as far as practicable by competitive
examination." Corollarily, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 2260 states that "the non-competitive
or unclassified service shall be composed of positions expressly declared by law to be in the
non-competitive or unclassified service or those which are policy-determining, primarily
confidential, or highly technical in nature." Likewise, Section 1 of the General Rules in the
implementing rules of Presidential Decree No. 807 states that "appointments in the Civil
Service, except as to those which are the policy-determining, primarily confidential, or highly
technical in nature, shall be made only according to merit and fitness to be determined as far
as practicable by competitive examination." Let it here be emphasized, as we have
accordingly italicized them, that these fundamental laws and legislative or executive
enactments all utilized the phrase "in nature" to describe the character of the positions being
classified.
The question that may now be asked is whether the Piero doctrine -- to the effect that
notwithstanding any statutory classification to the contrary, it is still the nature of the
position, as may be ascertained by the court in case of conflict, which finally determines
whether a position is primarily confidential, policy-determining or highly technical -- is still
controlling with the advent of the 1987 Constitution and the Administrative Code of
1987, Book V of which deals specifically with the Civil Service Commission, considering that
[13]

from these later enactments, in defining positions which are policy-determining, primarily
confidential or highly technical, the phrase "in nature" was deleted. [14]

We rule in the affirmative. The matter was clarified and extensively discussed during the
deliberations in the plenary session of the 1986 Constitutional Commission on the Civil
Service provisions, to wit:

"MR. FOZ. Which department of government has the power or authority to determine
whether a position is policy-determining or primarily confidential or highly technical?

FR. BERNAS: The initial decision is made by the legislative body or by the executive department,
but the final decision is done by the court. The Supreme Court has constantly held that whether
or not a position is policy-determining, primarily confidential or highly technical, it is
determined not by the title but by the nature of the task that is entrusted to it. For instance, we
might have a case where a position is created requiring that the holder of that position should
be a member of the Bar and the law classifies this position as highly technical. However, the
Supreme Court has said before that a position which requires mere membership in the Bar is
not a highly technical position. Since the term 'highly technical' means something beyond the
ordinary requirements of the profession, it is always a question of fact.

MR. FOZ. Does not Commissioner Bernas agree that the general rule should be that the merit
system or the competitive system should be upheld?

FR. BERNAS. I agree that that it should be the general rule; that is why we are putting this as
an exception.

MR. FOZ. The declaration that certain positions are policy-determining, primarily confidential
or highly technical has been the source of practices which amount to the spoils system.
FR. BERNAS. The Supreme Court has always said that, but if the law of the administrative
agency says that a position is primarily confidential when in fact it is not, we can always
challenge that in court. It is not enough that the law calls it primarily confidential to make it
such; it is the nature of the duties which makes a position primarily confidential.

MR. FOZ. The effect of a declaration that a position is policy-determining, primarily

confidential or highly technical as an exception is to take it away from the usual rules and
provisions of the Civil Service Law and to place it in a class by itself so that it can avail itself of
certain privileges not available to the ordinary run of government employees and officers.

FR. BERNAS. As I have already said, this classification does not do away with the requirement
of merit and fitness. All it says is that there are certain positions which should not be
determined by competitive examination.

For instance, I have just mentioned a position in the Atomic Energy Commission. Shall we
require a physicist to undergo a competitive examination before appointment? Or a
confidential secretary or any position in policy-determining administrative bodies, for that
matter? There are other ways of determining merit and fitness than competitive
examination. This is not a denial of the requirement of merit and fitness" (Italics supplied). [15]

It is thus clearly deducible, if not altogether apparent, that the primary purpose of the
framers of the 1987 Constitution in providing for the declaration of a position as policy-
determining, primarily confidential or highly technical is to exempt these categories from
competitive examination as a means for determining merit and fitness. It must be stressed
further that these positions are covered by security of tenure, although they are considered
non-competitive only in the sense that appointees thereto do not have to undergo
competitive examinations for purposes of determining merit and fitness.
In fact, the CSC itself ascribes to this view as may be gleaned from its questioned
resolution wherein it stated that "the declaration of a position is primarily confidential if at
all, merely exempts the position from the civil service eligibility requirement." Accordingly,
the Piero doctrine continues to be applicable up to the present and is hereby maintained. Such
being the case, the submission that PAGCOR employees have been declared confidential
appointees by operation of law under the bare authority of CSC Resolution No. 91-830 must
be rejected.
We likewise find that in holding that herein private respondent is not a confidential
employee, respondent Court of Appeals correctly applied the "proximity rule" enunciated in
the early but still authoritative case of De los Santos vs. Mallare, et al., which held that:
[16]

"Every appointment implies confidence, but much more than ordinary confidence is reposed
in the occupant of a position that is primarily confidential. The latter phrase denotes not only
confidence in the aptitude of the appointee for the duties of the office but primarily close
intimacy which ensures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from
misgivings of betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of state. x x x" (Emphasis
supplied).
 This was reiterated in Piero, et al. vs. Hechanova, et al., supra, the facts of which are
substantially similar to the case at bar, involving as it did employees occupying positions in
various capacities in the Port Patrol Division of the Bureau of Customs. The Court there held
that the mere fact that the members of the Port Patrol Division are part of the Customs police
force is not in itself a sufficient indication that their positions are primarily confidential. After
quoting the foregoing passage from De los Santos, it trenchantly declared:

"As previously pointed out, there are no proven facts to show that there is any such close
intimacy and trust between the appointing power and the appellees as would support a
finding that confidence was the primary reason for the existence of the positions held by
them or for their appointment thereto. Certainly, it is extremely improbable that the service
demands any such closed trust and intimate relation between the appointing official and, not
one or two members alone but the entire Customs patrol (Harbor Police) force, so that every
member thereof can be said to hold 'primarily confidential' posts". (Stress supplied).

It can thus be safely determined therefrom that the occupant of a particular position could
be considered a confidential employee if the predominant reason why he was chosen by the
appointing authority was, to repeat, the latter's belief that he can share a close intimate
relationship with the occupant which ensures freedom of discussion, without fear of
embarrassment or misgivings of possible betrayal of personal trust or confidential matters of
state. Withal, where the position occupied is remote from that of the appointing authority, the
element of trust between them is no longer predominant. [17]

Several factors lead to the conclusion that private respondent does not enjoy such "close
intimacy" with the appointing authority of PAGCOR which would otherwise place him in the
category of a confidential employee, to wit:
1. As an Internal Security Staff member, private respondent routinely

a. performs duty assignments at the gaming and/or non-gaming areas to prevent

irregularities, misbehavior, illegal transactions and other anomalous activities among the
employees and customers,

b. reports unusual incidents and related observations/information in accordance with

established procedures for infractions/mistakes committed on the table and in other areas;

c. coordinates with CCTV and/or external security as necessary for the prevention,
documentation or suppression of any unwanted incidents at the gaming and non-gaming
areas;

d. acts as witness/representative of Security Department during chips inventory, refills,

yields, card shuffling and final shuffling;

e. performs escort functions during the delivery of table capital boxes, refills and shoe boxes
to the respective tables, or during transfer of yields to Treasury. [18]
 Based on the nature of such functions of herein private respondent and as found by
respondent Court of Appeals, while it may be said that honesty and integrity are primary
considerations in his appointment as a member of the ISS, his position does not involve "such
close intimacy" between him and the appointing authority, that is, the Chairman of PAGCOR,
as would ensure "freedom from misgivings of betrayals of personal trust." [19]

2. Although appointed by the Chairman, ISS members do not directly report to the Office of the Chairman
in the performance of their official duties. An ISS members is subject to the control and supervision of an Area
Supervisor who, in turn, only implements the directives of the Branch Chief Security Officer. The latter is
himself answerable to the Chairman and the Board of Directors.Obviously, as the lowest in the chain of
command, private respondent does not enjoy that "primarily close intimacy" which characterizes a
confidential employee.
3. The position of an ISS member belongs to the bottom level of the salary scale of the corporation, being
in Pay Class 2 level only, whereas the highest level is Pay Class 12.

Taking into consideration the nature of his functions, his organizational ranking and his
compensation level, it is obviously beyond debate that private respondent cannot be
considered a confidential employee. As set out in the job description of his position, one is
struck by the ordinary, routinary and quotidian character of his duties and
functions.Moreover, the modest rank and fungible nature of the position occupied by private
respondent is underscored by the fact that the salary attached to it is a meager P2,200.00 a
month.There thus appears nothing to suggest that private respondents's position was
"highly" or much less, "primarily" confidential in nature. The fact that, sometimes, private
respondent may handle ordinarily "confidential matters" or papers which are somewhat
confidential in nature does not suffice to characterize his position as primarily confidential. [20]

In addition, the allegation of petitioners that PAGCOR employees have been declared to be
confidential appointees in the case of Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation vs. Court
of Appeals, et al., ante, is misleading. What was there stated is as follows:

"The record shows that the separation of the private respondent was done in accordance with
PD 1869, which provides that the employees of the PAGCOR hold confidential
positions. Montoya is not assailing the validity of that law. The act that he is questioning is
what he calls the arbitrary manner of his dismissal thereunder that he avers entitled her to
damages under the Civil Code." (Italics ours).

Thus, the aforecited case was decided on the uncontested assumption that the private
respondent therein was a confidential employee, for the simple reason that the propriety of
Section 16 of Presidential Decree No. 1869 was never controverted nor raised as an issue
therein. That decree was mentioned merely in connection with its provision that PAGCOR
employees hold confidential positions. Evidently, therefore, it cannot be considered as
controlling in the case at bar. Even the fact that a statute has been accepted as valid in cases
where its validity was not challenged does not preclude the court from later passing upon its
constitutionality in an appropriate cause where that question is squarely and properly
raised. Such circumstances merely reinforce the presumption of constitutionality of the law. [21]

WHEREFORE, the impugned judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby

AFFIRMED in toto.
 SO ORDERED.

PAGCOR v. Rilloraza, G.R. No. 141141, June 25, 2001

SECOND DIVISION[G.R. No. 141141. June 25, 2001]
PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR), petitioner,
vs. CARLOS P. RILLORAZA, respondent.

DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari praying for the reversal of the Decision
dated August 31, 1999[1] as well as the Resolution dated November 29, 1999, rendered by the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 51803.
The facts are undisputed:
On November 5, 1997, administrative charges for dishonesty, grave misconduct, conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and loss of confidence, were brought against
respondent Carlos P. Rilloraza, a casino operations manager of petitioner PHILIPPINE
AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR). Respondent allegedly committed the
following acts:

Summary description of charge(s):

Failure to prevent an irregularity and violations of casino and regulations committed by co-
officers during his shift on October 9, 1997.

1. During his shift of 6:00 a.m.2:00 p.m. on October 9, 1997, four (4) personal checks with a total value of
Pesos: Five Million (P5,000,000) were issued by a small-time financier/player and were facilitated by a
COM with the Treasury Division which enabled the small-time financier/player to withdraw and
receive said amount. The facilitation of the checks was not authorized by the Senior Branch Manager
(SBM) or the Branch Manager for Operations (BMO) and the COM who facilitated the checks was not
on duty then.
2. He even facilitated one (1) of the personal checks with a value of Pesos: Five Hundred Thousand
(P500,000.00).
3. He failed to stop a top-ranking officer from placing bets over and above the allowable limit of P5,000.00
per deal, he failed to stop the same officer from playing in the big tables and lastly, he allowed the
same officer to play beyond the allowable time limit of 6:00 a.m.

Respondent duly filed his answer during an investigation conducted by petitioners

Corporate Investigation Unit. He narrated the events that transpired:

When I reported for my 6:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. shift, on October 9, that morning I saw BM
RICHARD SYHONGPAN beside TABLE #22 (BB) sitting at a coffee table inside Area 3. While
inside the Area 3, GAM RENE QUITO approached me with a check worth P500,000.00
requested by a customer for endorsement to the Treasury. Since Ive been out of Manila
branch for 2 years and Ive just been recalled to this branch for only more than 3 weeks, Im
not quite familiar with the systems and I dont know this customer. I immediately approached
COM CARLOS GONZALES, who at that time was still around, to verify regarding the said check
and his immediate reply was ITS OKAY AND GOOD AND IT WAS GUARANTEED BY BM
SYHONGPAN. In fact, I reconfirmed it again with COM GONZALES since he is more familiar
with the systems and customers, he answered me the same. So I gave the approval to GAM
QUITO for endorsement. When I went in the office, I instructed OOS GILBERT CABANA to
beep SBM VIC ADVINCULA and BMO DARIO CORDERO to call office ASAP because I wanted to
relay this matter to them and there were no reply from both of them. I instructed OOS
CABANA to send messages again to SBM & BMO, but still I received no reply. It was until after
noontime that BMO CORDERO returned my call and I reported the incident to him.When I
was at home at around 3:30 p.m. SBM ADVINCULA returned my call and I reported the
incident. I also relayed the incident to SBM REYES.

While during my rounds, I went down to the New VIP area and there I saw BM SYHONGPAN
sitting at TABLE #3(BB) and he was holding house cards at that time. I approached and
stopped him but he reacted that the bet was not his but to a CUSTOMERS. I took his words
because as a subordinate, I respected him as one of our superior who very well know all our
companys policy esp. that an officer is not allowed to play at BIG table and are only allowed to
bet with a maximum of P5,000.00 only. So I believe it was not his bet but the said
customer. At that time there was no way for me to stop the game because I saw the said
customer, named MS. CORAZON CASTILLO, whom I dont know her [sic] since I was out of
Manila Branch 2 years, and whom BM SYHONGPAN was referring to as the player, has a lot of
chips worth about P7 Million in front of her and was betting P1.5M on the banker side which
was over the maximum table limit by P500,000.00. I know we are allowed to authorize
approval by raising the betting limits as per request of the playing customers.

After the game, the chips were encashed and I instructed GAM J. EUGENIO to accompany BM
SYHONGPAN to his room because he was too drunk. When I was doing my rounds again, thats
how I found out from rumors within the gaming areas that this MS. CASTILLO was used by
BM SYHONGPAN and COM GONZALES to played [sic] in behalf of them the whole time. And I
also learned that there were four checks endorsed during my shift which I facilitated only one
check worth P500,000.00 after I verified and confirmed it with COM GONZALES. With regards
to the other 3 checks, I have no knowledge about it since they, BM SYHONGPAN and COM
GONZALES, kept it a secret from me. When GAM EUGENIO returned from the room of BM
SYHONGPAN he handed me some cash, which according to him, was given by BM
SYHONGPAN as BALATO. I did not accept the money because at that moment I was so mad
that they involved me beyond my innocence since I am new in the branch. I then instructed
GAM EUGENIO to return the money to BM SYHONGPAN. (sic)

Finding Rillorazas explanation unsatisfactory, the PAGCOR Board handed down a

Resolution on December 2, 1997 dismissing respondent and several others from PAGCOR, on
the grounds of dishonesty, grave misconduct and/or conduct prejudicial to the best interest
of the service and loss of confidence, effective December 5, 1997. The Board also denied
respondents motion for reconsideration in a Resolution dated December 16, 1997.
 Respondent appealed to the Civil Service Commission. On November 20, 1998, the
Commission issued Resolution No. 983033,[2] the dispositive portion of which provides, to wit:

WHEREFORE, the appeal of Carlos P. Rilloraza is hereby dismissed. However, the Commission
finds appellant guilty only of Simple Neglect of Duty and metes out upon him the penalty of
one month and one day suspension. The assailed Resolution of PAGCOR Board of Directors is
thus modified.

The Commission denied petitioners motion for reconsideration in Resolution No. 990465
dated February 16, 1999.[3]
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the resolution of the Commission.[4] The
appellate court ordered petitioner to reinstate private respondent with payment of full
backwages plus all tips, bonuses and other benefits accruing to his position and those
received by other casino operations managers for the period starting January 5, 1998 until his
actual reinstatement. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,[5] which was denied by the
appellate court in the assailed resolution of November 29, 1999.[6]
Hence, the instant petition.
PAGCOR avers that:
I

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT FAILED AND REFUSED TO

CONSIDER THAT RESPONDENT WAS A CONFIDENTIAL APPOINTEE OR EMPLOYEE
WHOSE TERM HAD EXPIRED BY REASON OF LOSS OF CONFIDENCE.
II

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE CSC RESOLUTIONS
MODIFYING THE PENALTY METED OUT ON RESPONDENT FROM DISMISSAL TO
SUSPENSION, DESPITE THE GRAVITY OR SERIOUSNESS OF THE OFFENSES COMMITTED
BY THE LATTER ON ACCOUNT OF THE EXTRAORDINARY RESPONSIBILITIES AND
DUTIES REPOSED IN THE RESPONDENT BY VIRTUE OF HIS POSITION.

The wellspring of stability in government service is the constitutional guarantee of

entrance according to merit and fitness and security of tenure, viz:
xxx xxx xxx

(2) Appointments in the civil service shall be made only according to merit and fitness to be
determined, as far as practicable, and, except to positions which are policy-determining,
primarily confidential, or highly technical, by competitive examination.

(3) No officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause
provided by law.[7]

xxx xxx xxx

In the case at bar, we are basically asked to determine if there is sufficient cause to warrant
the dismissal, not merely the suspension, of respondent who, petitioner maintains, occupies a
primarily confidential position. In this connection, Section 16 of Presidential Decree No.
1869[8] provides:

Exemption.All positions in the Corporation, whether technical, administrative, professional or

managerial are exempt from the provisions of the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations,
and shall be governed only by the personnel management policies set by the Board of
Directors. All employees of the casinos and related services shall be classified as Confidential
appointee.

Petitioner argues that pursuant to the aforequoted provision, respondent is a primarily

confidential employee. Hence, he holds office at the pleasure of the appointing power and
may be removed upon the cessation of confidence in him by the latter. Such would not
amount to a removal but only the expiration of his term. However, there should be no
lingering doubt as to the true import of said Section 16 of P.D. No. 1869. We have already
definitively settled the same issue in Civil Service Commission v. Salas,[9] to wit:

In reversing the decision of the CSC, the Court of Appeals opined that the provisions of Section
16 of Presidential Decree No. 1869 may no longer be applied in the case at bar because the
same is deemed to have been repealed in its entirety by Section 2(1), Article IX-B of the 1987
Constitution. This is not completely correct. On this point, we approve the more logical
interpretation advanced by the CSC to the effect that Section 16 of PD 1869 insofar as it
exempts PAGCOR positions from the provisions of Civil Service Law and Rules has been
amended, modified or deemed repealed by the 1987 Constitution and Executive Order No.
292 (Administrative Code of 1987).

However, the same cannot be said with respect to the last portion of Section 16 which
provides that all employees of the casino and related services shall be classified as
confidential appointees. While such executive declaration emanated merely from the
provisions of Section 2, Rule XX of the Implementing Rules of the Civil Service Act of 1959, the
power to declare a position as policy-determining, primarily confidential or highly technical
as defined therein has subsequently been codified and incorporated in Section 12(9), Book V
of Executive Order No. 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987. This later enactment only
serves to bolster the validity of the categorization made under Section 16 of Presidential
Decree No. 1869. Be that as it may, such classification is not absolute and all-encompassing.

Prior to the passage of the aforestated Civil Service Act of 1959, there were two recognized
instances when a position may be considered primarily confidential: Firstly, when the
President, upon recommendation of the Commissioner of Civil Service, has declared the
position to be primarily confidential; and, secondly, in the absence of such declaration, when
by the nature of the functions of the office there exists close intimacy between the appointee
and appointing power which insures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or
freedom from misgivings of betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of state.
At first glance, it would seem that the instant case falls under the first category by virtue of
the express mandate under Section 16 of Presidential Decree No. 1869. An in-depth analysis,
however, of the second category evinces otherwise.

When Republic Act No. 2260 was enacted on June 19, 1959, Section 5 thereof provided that
the non-competitive or unclassified service shall be composed of positions expressly declared
by law to be in the non-competitive or unclassified service or those which are policy-
determining, primarily confidential, or highly technical in nature. In the case of Piero, et al. vs.
Hechanova, et al., the Court obliged with a short discourse there on how the phrase in
nature came to find its way into the law, thus:

The change from the original wording of the bill (expressly declared by law x x x to be policy-
determining, etc.) to that finally approved and enacted (or which are policy determining,
etc. in nature) came about because of the observations of Senator Taada, that as originally
worded the proposed bill gave Congress power to declare by fiat of law a certain position as
primarily confidential or policy-determining, which should not be the case. The Senator urged
that since the Constitution speaks of positions which are primarily confidential, policy-
determining or highly technical in nature, it is not within the power of Congress to declare
what positions are primarily confidential or policy-determining. It is the nature alone of the
position that determines whether it is policy-determining or primarily confidential. Hence,
the Senator further observed, the matter should be left to the proper implementation of the
laws, depending upon the nature of the position to be filled, and if the position is highly
confidential then the President and the Civil Service Commissioner must implement the law.

To a question of Senator Tolentino, But in positions that involved both confidential matters
and matters which are routine, x x x who is going to determine whether it is primarily
confidential? Senator Taada replied:

SENATOR TAADA: Well, at the first instance, it is the appointing power that determines
that: the nature of the position. In case of conflict then it is the Court that determines whether
the position is primarily confidential or not. xxx

Hence the dictum that, at least since the enactment of the Civil Service Act of 1959, it is the
nature of the position which finally determines whether a position is primarily confidential,
policy-determining or highly technical. And the Court in the aforecited case explicitly decreed
that executive pronouncements, such as Presidential Decree No. 1869, can be no more than
initial determinations that are not conclusive in case of conflict. It must be so, or else it would
then lie within the discretion of the Chief Executive to deny to any officer, by executive fiat, the
protection of Section 4, Article XII (now Section 2[3], Article IX-B) of the Constitution. In other
words, Section 16 of Presidential Decree No. 1869 cannot be given a literally stringent
application without compromising the constitutionally protected right of an employee to
security of tenure. [italics supplied]

The doctrinal ruling enunciated in Piero finds support in the 1935 Constitution and was
reaffirmed in the 1973 Constitution, as well as in the implementing rules of Presidential
Decree No. 807, or the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines. It may well be observed that
both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions contain the provision, in Section 2, Article XII-B
thereof, that appointments in the Civil Service, except as to those which are policy-
determining, primarily confidential, or highly technical in nature, shall be made only
according to merit and fitness, to be determined as far as practicable by competitive
examination. Corollarily, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 2260 states that the non-competitive
or unclassified service shall be composed of positions expressly declared by law to be in the
non-competitive or unclassified service or those which are policy-determining, primarily
confidential, or highly technical in nature. Likewise, Section 1 of the General Rules in the
implementing rules of Presidential Decree No. 807 states that appointments in the Civil
Service, except as to those which are policy-determining, primarily confidential, or highly
technical in nature, shall be made only according to merit and fitness to be determined as far
as practicable by competitive examination. Let it be here emphasized, as we have accordingly
italicized them, that these fundamental laws and legislative or executive enactments all
utilized the phrase in nature to describe the character of the positions being classified.

The question that may now be asked is whether the Piero doctrineto the effect that
notwithstanding any statutory classification to the contrary, it is still the nature of the
position, as may be ascertained by the court in case of conflict, which finally determines
whether a position is primarily confidential, policy-determining or highly technicalis still
controlling with the advent of the 1987 Constitution and the Administrative Code of 1987,
Book V of which deals specifically with the Civil Service Commission, considering that from
these later enactments, in defining positions which are policy-determining, primarily
confidential or highly technical, the phrase in nature was deleted.

We rule in the affirmative. The matter was clarified and extensively discussed during the
deliberations in the plenary session of the 1986 Constitutional Commission on the Civil
Service provisions, to wit:

MR. FOZ: Which department of government has the power or authority to determine whether a position is
policy-determining or primarily confidential or highly technical?
FR. BERNAS: The initial decision is made by the legislative body or by the executive department, but the final
decision is done by the court. The Supreme Court has constantly held that whether or not a position is policy-
determining, primarily confidential or highly technical, it is determined not by the title but by the nature of the
task that is entrusted to it. For instance, we might have a case where a position is created requiring that the
holder of that position should be a member of the Bar and the law classifies this position as highly
technical. However, the Supreme Court has said before that a position which requires mere membership in
the Bar is not a highly technical position. Since the term highly technical means something beyond the
ordinary requirements of the profession, it is always a question of fact.
MR. FOZ: Does not Commissioner Bernas agree that the general rule should be that the merit system or the
competitive system should be upheld?
FR. BERNAS: I agree that that should be the general rule; that is why we are putting this as an exception.
MR. FOZ: The declaration that certain positions are policy-determining, primarily confidential or highly
technical has been the source of practices which amount to the spoils system.
FR. BERNAS: The Supreme Court has always said that, but if the law of the administrative agency says that a
position is primarily confidential when in fact it is not, we can always challenge that in court. It is not
enough that the law calls it primarily confidential to make it such; it is the nature of the duties which makes a
position primarily confidential.
 MR. FOZ: The effect of a declaration that a position is policy-determining, primarily confidential or highly
technicalas an exceptionis to take it away from the usual rules and provisions of the Civil Service Law and
to place it in a class by itself so that it can avail itself of certain privileges not available to the ordinary run
of government employees and officers.
FR. BERNAS: As I have already said, this classification does not do away with the requirement of merit and
fitness. All it says is that there are certain positions which should not be determined by competitive
examination.

For instance, I have just mentioned a position in the Atomic Energy Commission. Shall we
require a physicist to undergo a competitive examination before appointment? Or a
confidential secretary or any position in policy-determining administrative bodies, for that
matter? There are other ways of determining merit and fitness than competitive
examination. This is not a denial of the requirement of merit and fitness.

It is thus clearly deducible, if not altogether apparent, that the primary purpose of the framers
of the 1987 Constitution in providing for the declaration of a position as policy-determining,
primarily confidential or highly technical is to exempt these categories from competitive
examination as a means for determining merit and fitness. It must be stressed further that
these positions are covered by security of tenure, although they are considered non-competitive
only in the sense that appointees thereto do not have to undergo competitive examinations for
purposes of determining merit and fitness. [italics supplied]

In fact, the CSC itself ascribes to this view as may be gleaned from its questioned resolution
wherein it stated that the declaration of a position as primarily confidential if at all, merely
exempts the position from the civil service eligibility requirement. Accordingly,
the Piero doctrine continues to be applicable up to the present and is hereby maintained. Such
being the case, the submission that PAGCOR employees have been declared confidential
appointees by operation of law under the bare authority of CSC Resolution No. 91-830 must
be rejected.

Justice Regalados incisive discourse yields three (3) important points: first, the
classification of a particular position as primarily confidential, policy-determining or highly
technical amounts to no more than an executive or legislative declaration that is not
conclusive upon the courts, the true test being the nature of the position. Second, whether
primarily confidential, policy-determining or highly technical, the exemption provided in the
Charter pertains to exemption from competitive examination to determine merit and fitness
to enter the civil service. Such employees are still protected by the mantle of security of
tenure. Last, and more to the point, Section 16 of P.D. 1869, insofar as it declares all positions
within PAGCOR as primarily confidential, is not absolutely binding on the courts.
Considerations vary so as to make a position primarily confidential. Private secretaries
are indisputably primarily confidential employees.[10] Those tasked to provide personal
security to certain public officials have also been deemed to hold primarily confidential
positions[11] for obvious reasons: the former literally are responsible for the life and well-
being of the latter. Similar treatment was accorded to those occupying the posts of city legal
officer[12] and provincial attorney,[13] inasmuch as the highly privileged nature of the lawyer-
client relationship mandates that complete trust and confidence must exist betwixt them.
National interest has also been adjudged a factor, such that the countrys permanent
representative to the United Nations was deemed to hold her post at the pleasure of the Chief
Executive.[14]
As casino operations manager, Rillorazas duties and responsibilities are:
JOB SUMMARY: The Casino Operations Manager directs, controls and supervises the Operations Division
of the branch. He reports directly to the Branch Manager or to the Branch Manager for Operations in
Metro Manila branches.

DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES:

1. Formulates marketing programs and plans of action for branch gaming operations in order to optimize
revenue.
2. Institutes and maintains a healthy, organized, mentally alert, and highly motivated human resource for
effective and efficient branch gaming operations performance.
3. Takes measures to maintain and uphold the integrity of the casino games.
4. Reviews, analyzes, and evaluates gaming table and slot machine operations reports, including income
performance.
5. Submits periodic reports to the Branch Manager.
6. Directs the opening and closing of gaming table and slot machine areas.
7. Directs the setting-up, closure or suspension of operations of gaming tables and slot machine units
when deemed necessary.
8. Controls the requisition, storage, and issuance of playing cards, gaming equipment and paraphernalia,
operations keys, and accountable receipts and slips.
9. Ensures that gaming operations personnel adhere to the established House Rules, company policies
and procedures.
10. Ensures that quality and efficient service is extended to casino patrons in accordance with the
established House Rules, company policies and procedures.
11. Directs and controls all activities of the Card Shuffling Center and the Card Distribution Room.
12. Issues directives, memoranda, and other official communications on branch gaming operations
matters.
13. Directs the daily and periodic performance evaluation of operations personnel.
14. Requires written statements from operations personnel regarding disputes, reported irregularities
and violations of House Rules, company policies and procedures.
15. Issues or recommends disciplinary sanctions against delinquent operations personnel, as well as
commendations to deserving ones.
16. Upon the Branch Managers approval, issues preventive suspension to erring employees pending
investigation.
17. Effects immediate changes in House Rules when deemed necessary, subject to management review.
18. Approves table refill, chip yield, and dropbox yield transactions, as well as the payment for
progressive link super jackpot awards.
19. Directs the cancellation of progressive link super jackpot combinations.
20. Signs chip checks in behalf of the Branch Manager.
 21. Approves complimentary food and beverages to deserving players and evaluates the same for the
possible extension of other amenities.
22. Settles disputes arising from gaming operations that have not been effectively settled by gaming
managers and supervisors, and enforces decisions on the interpretation of House Rules, company
policies, and procedures.
23. Recommends to the Branch Manager the banning of undesirable players.
24. Orders the removal of customers or employees from the table gaming (sic) and slot machine area for
justifiable reasons.
25. Implements contingency plans in case of emergencies to ensure the security and safety of customers
and staff.
26. Acts on customer complaints, suggestions, and observations.
27. Chairs the Branch Infractions Committee, the Variance Committee, and other ad hoc committees of the
Operations Division.
28. Represents the Operations Division in Branch Management panel meetings.
29. Apprises the Branch Manager of any incident of doubtful nature and of developments that require his
immediate attention.
30. Performs other duties as may be designated by the Branch Manager.

Undoubtedly, respondents duties and responsibilities call for a great measure of both
ability and dependability. They can hardly be characterized as routinary, for he is required to
exercise supervisory, recommendatory and disciplinary powers with a wide latitude of
authority. His duties differ markedly from those we previously ruled as not primarily
confidential: for instance, PAGCORs Internal Security Staff;[15] Management and Audit Analyst I
of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau;[16] a Special Assistant to the Governor
of the Central Bank;[17] the Legal Staff of the Provincial Attorney;[18] members of the Customs
Police;[19] the Senior Executive Assistant, Clerk I, Supervising Clerk I and Stenographer; [20] and
a Provincial Administrator.[21] In this sense, he is a tier above the ordinary rank-and-file in that
his appointment to the position entails faith and confidence in his competence to perform his
assigned tasks. Lacking, therefore, is that amplitude of confidence reposed in him by the
appointing power so as to qualify his position as primarily confidential. Verily, we have
observed that:

[i]ndeed, physicians handle confidential matters. Judges, fiscals and court stenographers
generally handle matters of similar nature. The Presiding and Associate Justices of the Court
of Appeals sometimes investigate, by designation of the Supreme Court, administrative
complaints against judges of first instance, which are confidential in nature. Officers of the
Department of Justice, likewise, investigate charges against municipal judges. Assistant
Solicitors in the Office of the Solicitor General often investigate malpractice charges against
members of the Bar. All of these are confidential matters, but such fact does not warrant the
conclusion that the office or position of all government physicians and all Judges, as well as
the aforementioned assistant solicitors and officers of the Department of Justice are primarily
confidential in character.[22]

We further note that a casino operations manager reports directly to the Branch Manager
or, in Metro Manila branches, to the Branch Manager for Operations. It does not appear from
the record to whom the Branch Manager (or the Branch Manager for Operations, as the case
may be) reports. It becomes unmistakable, though, that the stratum separating the casino
operations manager from reporting directly to the higher echelons renders remote the
proposition of proximity between respondent and the appointing power. There is no showing
of that element of trust indicative of a primarily confidential position, as we defined it in De
los Santos v. Mallare,[23] to wit:

Every appointment implies confidence, but much more than ordinary confidence is reposed
in the occupant of a position that is primarily confidential. The latter phrase denotes not only
confidence in the aptitude of the appointee for the duties of the office but primarily close
intimacy which insures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from
misgivings of betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of state.

Necessarily, the point of contention now is whether there was cause for the respondents
separation from the service. On this point, having analyzed both parties arguments, we find
that the Civil Service Commission did not err in declaring that Rilloraza was liable only for
simple neglect of duty. In the first place, there is no evidence to sustain a charge of
dishonesty. As the latter term is understood, it implies a:

Disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity. Lack of

honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness;
disposition to defraud, deceive or betray.[24]

In the case at bar, respondents explanation fails to evince an inclination to lie or deceive,
or that he is entirely lacking the trait of straightforwardness. We concur with the appellate
courts finding, thus:

Available proof unmistakably demonstrate that upon seeing BM Syhongpan playing at Table
No. 3BB, respondent Rilloraza at once, told him to stop. However, Syhongpan explained that
he was merely playing for a customer, Ms. Corazon Castillo who was seated also at the
table. After observing the large number of chips in front of Ms. Castillo estimated at around
P7M, respondent became convinced of the clarification given by Branch Manager Syhongpan
and he must have relied also on the word of said top ranking PAGCOR official whose
representation must ordinarily be accepted and accorded respect and credence by a
subordinate like him. xxx

More importantly, the PAGCOR Adjudication Committee concluded that respondent actually
attempted to stop the game where Syhongpan was playing which was even utilized as basis
by the PAGCOR Board in dismissing respondent. xxx

xxx xxx xxx xxx

The allegation that respondent Rilloraza allowed Syhongpan to place bets over and above the
allowable limit of P5,000.00 per deal is not anchored on a correct premise. Respondent
Rilloraza has steadfastly maintained that he is of the belief that BM Syhongpan is not playing
for himself but for Ms. Castillo. Thus, if Syhongpan is merely acting for the real casino player,
then the policy of not allowing any PAGCOR official to bet beyond P5,000.00 has no
application. Respondent Rilloraza believed in good faith that the bet was not BM Syhongpans
but of Ms. Castillo and should not be unduly punished for his honest belief. The same reason
exists for the claim that respondent allowed BM Syhongpan to play beyond 6:00 a.m. This
is non sequitur since Rilloraza never entertained the idea that Syhongpan was the gambler.

Lastly, if only to consummate respondents alleged dishonesty and grave misconduct by

corruptly profiting from said incident, he could have easily pocketed the balato given by
Syhongpan, but he never did, and in fact, returned the money. xxx

xxx xxx xxx xxx

On the facilitation of the swap of a P500,000.00 personal check for chips, this Court, after
considering the parties involved and the circumstances of the case, believes that respondent
Rilloraza has judiciously performed all the acts necessary to protect the interests of PAGCOR
and has acted as a prudent and reasonable man. It is evident that respondent had the
authority to approve the exchange of checks for gambling chips. In the exercise of such
discretion, We find that the approval by Rilloraza of the exchange was done with caution and
circumspect [sic]. When he was approached by GAM Quito for endorsement of said personal
checks per request of a customer, he immediately approached COM Gonzales to verify the
check who assured him that the check was good and in fact guaranteed by Mr. Syhongpan,
Davao City Branch Manager of PAGCOR. To be sure, he even reconfirmed the same with
Gonzales as he is more familiar with the systems and the customers since he has been
recalled to the branch for only three (3) weeks. After approving the endorsement, he
immediately tried to contact SBM Advincula and BMO Cordero, to notify them of his action
but none of them called back. In the afternoon, both returned the call and were informed by
respondent of the exchange of the chips for the check and presumably, the former ratified or
acquiesced to the action of respondent since there was no objection or complaint about the
matter. xxx

These same findings negate the conclusion that respondent is guilty of misconduct or
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. In Manuel v. Calimag, Jr.,[25] we defined
misconduct, thus:

Misconduct in office has been authoritatively defined by Justice Tuazon in Lacson v. Lopez in
these words: Misconduct in office has a definite and well-understood legal meaning. By
uniform legal definition, it is a misconduct such as affects his performance of his duties as an
officer and not such only as affects his character as a private individual. In such cases, it has
been said at all times, it is necessary to separate the character of the man from the character
of the officer x x x. It is settled that misconduct, misfeasance, or malfeasance warranting
removal from office of an officer, must have direct relation to and be connected with the
performance of official duties amounting either to maladministration or willful, intentional
neglect and failure to discharge the duties of the office x x x.

Differently propounded in Canson v. Garchitorena, et al.,[26] misconduct is any unlawful

conduct on the part of a person concerned in the administration of justice prejudicial to the
rights of parties or to the right determination of the cause. It generally means wrongful,
improper or unlawful conduct motivated by a premeditated, obstinate or intentional
purpose. The term, however, does not necessarily imply corruption or criminal intent. On the
other hand, the term gross connotes something out of all measure; beyond allowance; not to
be excused; flagrant; shameful. From the facts given, absent is that element of intent to do
wrong against petitioner.
CSC Resolution No. 991936 dated August 31, 1999 classifies simple neglect of duty as a
less grave offense punishable as a first offense by suspension of one (1) month and one (1)
day to six (6) months.[27] In the imposition of the proper penalty, Section 54 thereof provides,
as follows: (a) the minimum of the penalty shall be imposed where only mitigating and no
aggravating circumstances are present; (b) the medium of the penalty shall be imposed
where no mitigating and aggravating circumstances are present; and (c) the maximum of the
penalty shall be imposed where only aggravating and no mitigating circumstances are
present. In turn, the circumstances that may be properly considered are:

Section 53. Extenuating, Mitigating, Aggravating, or Alternative Circumstances. In the

determination of the penalties to be imposed, mitigating, aggravating and alternative
circumstances attendant to the commission of the offense shall be considered.

The following circumstances shall be appreciated:

a. Physical illness
b. Good faith
c. Taking undue advantage of official position
d. Taking undue advantage of subordinate
e. Undue disclosure of confidential information
f. Use of government property in the commission of the offense
g. Habituality
h. Offense is committed during office hours and within the premises of the office or building
i. Employment of fraudulent means to commit or conceal the offense
j. Length of service in the government
k. Education, or
l. Other analogous circumstances

Nevertheless, in the appreciation thereof, the same must be invoked or pleaded by the proper
party, otherwise, said circumstances shall not be considered in the imposition of the proper
penalty. The Commission, however, in the interest of substantial justice may take and
consider these circumstances.

We find that the Civil Service Commission, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, correctly
attributed good faith on the part of respondent. Accordingly, the modified penalty imposed by
the Civil Service Commission on the respondent which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
was proper under the premises.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated August
31, 1999 as well as the Resolution dated November 29, 1999, rendered by the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 51803 are hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Cadiente vs. Santos, 142 SCRA 280 (1986)

G.R. No. L-35592 June 11, 1986

MEDARDO AG. CADIENTE, petitioner,

vs.
LUIS T. SANTOS, City Mayor of Davao City, MAXIMINO ASISTIDO, City Treasurer of Davao City, FELIX N. PEPITO,
City Auditor of Davao City, and ATTY. VICTOR CLAPANO, respondents.

ALAMPAY, J.:

Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao City, Branch I, in Civil Case No.
7571, entitle Ag. Cadierte vs. Mayor Luis T. Santos, et al." promulgated on August 23, 1972, which dismissed the petition
for mandamus, quo warranto, with preliminary injunction filed by herein petitioner.

On September 13, 1971, petitioner Cadiente was appointed by then Mayor Elias B. Lopez as City Legal Officer of Davao
City. The appointment was duly attested to and/or approved as "permanent" by the Civil Service Commission under
Section 24(b) of R.A. 2260. On January 6, 1972, the new and then incumbent City Mayor Luis T. Santos, herein
respondent, sent a letter (Annex "H" to the Petition, p. 43, Rollo) to the petitioner advising the latter that his services as
City Legal Officer of Davao City "are dispensed with effective upon receipt of said letter" on the ground that the position
of City Legal Officer was primarily confidential in nature. This was the opinion rendered by the City Fiscal of Davao City
on January 6, 1972, after being requested to submit his legal opinion on said matter. Respondent City Mayor appointed
respondent Atty. Victor Clapano as City Legal Officer on January 6, 1972 to take effect on said date.

Petitioner appealed to the Civil Service Commission on January 7, 1982, which rendered its decision in its lst
Indorsement dated March 2, 1972, therein holding that the termination, removal and/or dismissal of petitioner is
"without cause and without due process" and that the position of City Legal Officer "is not included among those
positions enumerated in Sec. 5 of R.A. 2260 as belonging to the non-competitive service." Subsequently, on April 7, 1972,
the City Council of Davao City passed Resolution No. 210, series of 1972, therein considering and recognizing herein
petitioner Atty. Medardo Ag. Cadiente, as the rightful City Legal Officer of Davao City (Rollo, pp. 54-58). Despite this
resolution, the public respondents in this case who are the City Mayor, the City Treasurer, and the City Auditor of Davao
City, still declined and refused to recognize petitioner as the one entitled to the disputed position of City Legal Officer of
Davao City.

Meanwhile, in an Indorsement (Annex "O" to the Petition, p. 59) dated February 8, 1972, the Civil Service Commission
returned the appointment of respondent Clapano to respondent City Mayor with the information that said office (Civil
Service Commission) "overlooked the fact that the appointee was more than 57 years old at the time of his appointment
and, therefore, authority for his appointment be first secured from the Office of the President pursuant to Section 6 of
R.A. 728, as reinforced by Section 5, Civil Service Rule IV, which states that "no person shall be appointed or reinstated in
the service if he is already 57 years of age, unless the President of the Philippines ... determines that he possesses special
qualifications and his services are needed.

Petitioner thus filed with the Court of First Instance of Davao City, Branch I, Civil Case No. 7571, for mandamus, quo
warranto with preliminary injunction against the herein respondents, praying therein that: (a) respondent City Mayor
be ordered to reinstate and/or allow him to continue performing his duties and functions as City Legal Officer of Davao
City; (b) the appointment of respondent Clapano be declared illegal and invalid; and (c) respondents City Mayor, City
Treasurer, and City Auditor be ordered to pay him all his salaries, wages, allowances, emoluments an other benefits due
him as City Legal Officer from the time of his illegal dismissal until the termination of the suit. On August 23, 1972, the
trial court rendered its decision dismissing the aforestated case, as it ruled that:

The positions of Municipal Attorney, Provincial Attorney and City Legal Officer are by their very nature,
primarily confidential, and therefore, belong to the non-competetive service under paragraph 1, section
5, Republic Act 2260, as amended, because the functions attached to the offices require the highest trust
and confidence of the appointing authority on the appointee....

The approval of, and attestation to the appointment of petitioner Cadiente as permanent under Section
24(b) of R.A. 2260, as amended, by the Commissioner of Civil Service did not make the appointment
permanent and the position fall under the competetive service. If, as the Court has found, the position is
primarily confidential, petitioner Cadiente held office at the pleasure of respondent Mayor and the
position belongs to the non-competitive service.

Motion for reconsideration of said decision having been denied in an Order dated September 23, 1972, the present
petition to compel reinstatement and payment of back salaries, was filed with this Court on October 7, 1972. In the
Resolution of this Court dated December 28, 1972, said petition was given due course.

In resolving the merits of the instant case, We find as an undeniable fact that the position of a City Legal Officer is one
which is "primarily confidential". This Court held in the case of Claudio vs. Subido, L-30865, August 31, 1971, 40 SCRA
481, that the position of a City Legal Officer is one requiring that utmost confidence on the part of the mayor be extended
to said officer. The relationship existing between a lawyer and his client, whether a private individual or a public officer,
is one that depends on the highest degree of trust that the latter entertains for the counsel selected. As stated in the case
of Pinero vs. Hechanova, L-22562, October 22, 1966, 18 SCRA 4176 (citing De los Santos vs. Mallaare 87 Phil. 289), the
phrase primarily confidential' "denotes not only confidence in the 'aptitude of the appointee for the duties of the office but
primarily close intimacy which insures freedom of intercourse, without embarrassment on freedom from misgivings of
betrayals of personal trust on confidential matters of state. (Emphasis supplied).

The tenure of officials holding primarily confidential positions ends upon loss of confidence, because their term of office
lasts only as long as confidence in them endures; and thus their cessation involves no removal (Corpus vs. Cuaderno, L-
23721, March 31, 1965, 13 SCRA 591-596). When such confidence is lost and the officer holding such position is
separated from the service, such cessation entails no removal but an expiration of his term. In the case of Hernandez vs.
Villegas, L-17287, June 30, 1965, 14 SCRA 548, it was held—

It is to be understood of course that officials and employees holding primarily confidential positions
continue only for so long as confidence in them endures. The termination of their official relation can be
justified on the ground of loss of confidence because in that case their cessation from office involves no
removal but merely the expiration of the term of office-two different causes for the termination of
official relations recognized in the Law of Public Officers.

In the case at bar, when the respondent City Mayor of Davao terminated the services of the petitioner, he was not
removed or dismissed. There being no removal or dismissal it could not, therefore, be said that there was a violation of
the constitutional provision that "no officer or employee in the civil service shall be suspended or dismissed except for
cause as provided by law" (Article XII-B, Section 1(3), 1973 Constitution).

The matter of expiration of a term of an officer holding a primarily confidential position, as distinguished from a removal
or dismissal, was further explained by this Court, in the case of Ingles vs. Mutuc, L-20390, November 29, 1960, 26 SCRA
171, in this wise:

When an incumbent of a primarily confidential position holds office at the pleasure of the appointing
power, and the pleasure turns into a displeasure, the incumbent is not removed or dismissed from
office-his term merely expires, in much the same way as an officer, whose right thereto ceases upon
expiration of the fixed term for which he had been appointed or elected, is not and cannot be deemed
removed or dismissed therefrom, upon expiration of said term.
 The main difference between the former the primarily confidential officer-and the latter is that the
latter's term is fixed or definite, whereas that of the former is not pre-fixed, but indefinite, at the time of
his appointment or election, and becomes fixed and determined when the appointing power expresses
its decision to put an end to the services of the incumbent. When this event takes place, the latter is not
removed or dismissed from office-his term merely expired,

The foregoing merely elaborates what this Court, speaking thru Justice J.B.L. Reyes, stressed in the case Corpus vs.
Cuaderno, L-23721, March 31, 1965, 13 SCRA 591. In said case We stated that:

The tenure of officials holding primarily confidential positions ends upon loss of confidence, because
their term of office lasts only as long as confidence in them endures, and thus their cessation involves no
removal.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Grino v. CSC, 194 SCRA 458 (1991); Grino v. CSC, 194 SCRA 458 (1991);

G.R. No. 91602 February 26, 1991

HONORABLE SIMPLICIO C. GRIÑO, SIXTO P. DEMAISIP, SANTOS B. AGUADERA, MANUEL B. TRAVIÑA and MANUEL
M. CASUMPANG, petitioners,
vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, TEOTIMO ARANDELA, CIRILO GELVEZON, TEODULFO DATO-ON, and NELSON
GEDUSPAN, respondents.

Sixto P. Demaisip for petitioners.

Rex C. Muzones for private respondents.
Thelma A. Panganiban-Gaminde, Rogelio C. Limare and Normita M. Llamas-Villanueva for Civil Service Commission.

GANCAYCO, J.:

The main issue in this petition is whether or not the position of a provincial attorney and those of his legal subordinates
are primarily confidential in nature so that the services of those holding the said items can be terminated upon loss of
confidence.

The facts of this case are simple.

Petitioner Sixto Demaisip was the first appointed Provincial Attorney of Iloilo. He held this position from April 3, 1973
up to June 2, 1986 when he offered to resign and his resignation was accepted by the then Acting Governor. In his
resignation letter, petitioner Demaisip recommended the elevation of respondent Teotimo Arandela from Senior Legal
Officer to Provincial Attorney. OIC Governor Licurgo Tirador later on decided to appoint respondent Arandela as the
Provincial Attorney. Respondent Cirilo Gelvezon, on the other hand, was promoted from Legal Officer II to Senior Legal
Officer. Respondents Teodolfo Dato-on and Nelson Geduspan were appointed to the position of Legal Officer II.

On February 2, 1988, petitioner Simplicio Griño assumed office as the newly elected governor of Iloilo. One month later,
he informed respondent Arandela and all the legal officers at the Provincial Attorney's Office about his decision to
terminate their services. In his letter, petitioner Griño made mention of an article pertaining to the Iloilo office of the
Provincial Attorney which appeared in the Panay News and which "undermined that trust and confidence" that he
reposed on them. Petitioner Demaisip was reappointed by Governor Griño as the Provincial Attorney, The latter, on the
other hand, arranged the replacements of the other legal officers. Respondent Cirilo Gelvezon was replaced by petitioner
Santos Aguadera, respondent Nelson Geduspan was replaced by petitioner Manuel Casumpang and petitioner Manuel
Traviña took the place of respondent Teodolfo Dato-on.

On March 15, 1988, petitioner Governor Griño formally terminated the services of the respondents herein on the ground
of loss of trust and confidence. This action taken by the governor was appealed by respondents to the Merit Systems
Protection Board of the Civil Service Commission.

On March 9, 1989, the Merit Systems Board issued an Order declaring the respondents' termination illegal and ordering
that they be immediately restored to their positions with back salaries and other emoluments due them. This was
appealed by petitioner Griño to the Civil Service Commission.

In Resolution No. 89-736 dated October 9, 1989, the Civil Service Commission affirmed the Order of the Merit Systems
Protection Board, and directed that the respondents be restored to their former legal positions and be paid back salaries
and other benefits.

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the above-mentioned Decision of the Civil Service Commission. The
motion was denied on December 7, 1989 in Resolution No. 89-920.

Hence, this petition for review whereby petitioners seek the reversal of Resolution No. 89-736 of the Civil Service
Commission and Resolution No. 89-920 which denied the Motion for Reconsideration.

We shall first discuss whether the position of a provincial attorney is primarily confidential so that the holder thereof
may be terminated upon loss of confidence.

In Cadiente vs. Santos, 1 this Court ruled that the position of a city legal officer is undeniably one which is primarily
confidential in this manner:

In resolving the merits of the instant case, We find as an undeniable fact that the position of a City Legal Officer is
one which is "primarily confidential." This Court held in the case of Claudio vs. Subido, L-30865, August 31,
1971, 40 SCRA 481, that the position of a City Legal Officer is one requiring that utmost confidence on the part of
the mayor be extended to said officer. The relationship existing between a lawyer and his client, whether a
private individual or a public officer, is one that depends on the highest degree of trust that the latter entertains
for the counsel selected. As stated in the case of Pinero vs. Hechanova, L-22562, October 22, 1966, 18 SCRA 417
(citing De los Santos vs. Mallare, 87 Phil. 289), the phrase "primarily confidential" "denotes not only confidence
in the aptitude of the appointee for the duties of the office but primarily close intimacy which insures freedom of
intercourse, without embarrassment or freedom from misgivings of betrayals of personal trust on confidential
matters of state. (Emphasis supplied.)

The tenure of officials holding primarily confidential positions ends upon loss of confidence, because their term
of office lasts only as long as confidence in them endure; and thus their cessation involves no removal (Corpus
vs. Cuaderno, L-23721, March 31, 1965, 13 SCRA 591-596). When such confidence is lost and the officer holding
such position is separated from the service, such cessation entails no removal but an expiration of his term. In
the case of Hernandez vs. Villegas, L-17287, June 30, 1965, 14 SCRA 548, it was held —

It is to be understood of course that officials and employees holding primarily confidential positions continue
only for so long as confidence in them endures. The termination of their official relation can be justified on the
ground of loss of confidence because in that case their cessation from office involves no removal but merely the
expiration of the term of office — two different causes for the termination of official relations recognized in the
Law of Public Officers.

In the case at bar, when the respondent City Mayor of Davao terminated the services of the petitioner, he was
not removed or dismissed. There being no removal or dismissal it could not, therefore, be said that there was a
 violation of the constitutional provision that "no officer or employee in the civil service shall be suspended or
dismissed except for cause as provided by law" (Article XII-B, Section 1 (3), 1973 Constitution).

The matter of expiration of a term of an officer holding a primarily confidential position, as distinguished from a
removal or dismissal, was further explained by this Court, in the case of Ingles vs. Mutuc, L-20390, November 29,
1960, 26 SCRA 171, in this wise:

When an incumbent of a primarily confidential position holds office at the pleasure of the appointing power, and
the pleasure turns into a displeasure, the incumbent is not removed or dismissed from office — his term merely
expires, in much the same way as an officer, whose right thereto ceases upon expiration of the fixed term for
which he had been appointed or elected, is not and cannot be deemed removed or dismissed therefrom, upon
expiration of said term.

The main difference between the former — the primary confidential officer — and the latter is that the latter's
term is fixed or definite, whereas that of the former is not pre-fixed, but indefinite, at the time of his
appointment or election, and becomes fixed and determined when the appointing power expresses its decision
to put an end to the services of the incumbent. When this event takes place, the latter is not removed or
dismissed from office — his term merely expired.

The foregoing merely elaborates what this Court, speaking thru Justice J.B.L. Reyes, stressed in the case Corpus
vs. Cuaderno, L-23721, March 31, 1965, 13 SCRA 591. In said case We stated that:

The tenure of officials holding primarily confidential positions ends upon loss of confidence, because their term
of office lasts only as long as confidence in them endures, and thus their cessation involves no removal. 2

In Besa vs. Philippine National Bank, 3 where petitioner, who was the Chief Legal Counsel with the rank of Vice President
of the respondent Philippine National Bank, questioned his being transferred to the position of Consultant on Legal
Matters in the Office of President, this Court, considering said position to be primarily confidential held —

It cannot be denied of course that the work of the Chief Legal Counsel of respondent Bank, as of any lawyer for
that matter, is impressed with a highly technical aspect. As had been pointed out, however, it does not mean that
thereby a client is precluded from substituting in his stead another practitioner. That is his right; Ms decision to
terminate the relationship once made is impressed with the attribute of finality. The lawyer cannot be heard to
complain; it is enough that his right to compensation earned be duly respected.

In that sense, it is equally clear that where the position partakes of the attributes of being both technical and
confidential, there can be no insistence of a fixed or a definite term if the latter aspect predominates. To
paraphrase the language of the Chief Justice in the opinion previously cited, the incumbent of a primarily
confidential position, as was the case of petitioner, should realize that at any time the appointing power may
decide that his services are no longer needed. As thus correctly viewed, Corpus v. Cuaderno cannot be read as
lending support to petitioner's efforts to retain his position as Chief Legal Counsel of respondent Bank, contrary
to its wishes as so explicitly declared in its Resolution No. 1053.

The question now is — should the ruling in Cadiente be made applicable to a provincial attorney? According to the
petitioners, Cadiente must be applied because by the nature of the functions of a provincial attorney and a city legal
officer, their positions are both primarily confidential. Respondents, on the other hand, maintain that since the Civil
Service Commission has already classified the position of private respondent Arandela as a career position and certified
the same as permanent, he is removable only for cause, and therefore Cadiente is not applicable.

We agree with the petitioners and answer the question earlier propounded in the affirmative. A city legal officer
appointed by a city mayor to work for and in behalf of the city has for its counterpart in the province a provincial
attorney appointed by the provincial governor. In the same vein, a municipality may have a municipal attorney who is to
be named by the appointing power. The positions of city legal officer and provincial attorney were created under
Republic Act No. 5185 which categorized them together as positions of "trust", to wit:
 Sec. 19. Creation of positions of Provincial Attorney and City Legal officer. — To enable the provincial and city
governments to avail themselves of the full time and trusted services of legal officers, the positions of provincial
attorney and city legal officer may be created and such officials shall be appointed in such manner as is provided
for under Section four of this Act. For this purpose the functions hitherto performed by the provincial and city
fiscals in serving as legal adviser and legal officer for civil cases of the province and city shall be transferred to
the provincial attorney and city legal officer, respectively. (Emphasis supplied.) 4

By virtue of Republic Act No. 5185, both the provincial attorney and city legal officer serve as the legal adviser and legal
officer for the civil cases of the province and the city that they work for. Their services are precisely categorized by law
to be "trusted services."

A comparison of the functions, powers and duties of a city legal officer as provided in the Local Government Code with
those of the provincial attorney of Iloilo would reveal the close similarity of the two positions. Said functions clearly
reflect the highly confidential nature of the two offices and the need for a relationship based on trust between the officer
and the head of the local government unit he serves. The "trusted services" to be rendered by the officer would mean
such trusted services of a lawyer to his client which is of the highest degree of trust. 5

The fact that the position of respondent Arandela as provincial attorney has already been classified as one under the
career service and certified as permanent by the Civil Service Commission cannot conceal or alter its highly confidential
nature. As in Cadiente where the position of the city legal officer was duly attested as permanent by the Civil Service
Commission before this Court declared that the same was primarily confidential, this Court holds that the position of
respondent Arandela as the provincial attorney of Iloilo is also a primarily confidential position. To rule otherwise would
be tantamount to classifying two positions with the same nature and functions in two incompatible categories. This
being the case, and following the principle that the tenure of an official holding a primarily confidential position ends
upon loss of confidence, 6 the Court finds that private respondent Arandela was not dismissed or removed from office
when his services were terminated. His term merely expired.

The attorney-client relationship is strictly personal because it involves mutual trust and confidence of the highest
degree, irrespective of whether the client is a private person or a government functionary. 7 The personal character of
the relationship prohibits its delegation in favor of another attorney without the client's consent. 8

However, the legal work involved, as distinguished from the relationship, can be delegated. 9 The practice of delegating
work of a counsel to his subordinates is apparent in the Office of the Provincial Attorney wherein it can be gleaned from
the power granted to such officer to exercise administrative supervision and control over the acts and decision of his
subordinates. 10

It is therefore possible to distinguish positions in the civil service where lawyers act as counsel in confidential and non-
confidential positions by simply looking at the proximity of the position in question in relation to that of the appointing
authority. Occupants of such positions would be considered confidential employees if the predominant reason they were
chosen by the appointing authority is the latter's belief that he can share a close intimate relationship with the occupant
which measures freedom of discussion, without fear of embarrassment or misgivings of possible betrayal
of personal trust on confidential matters of state. 11

This implies that positions in the civil service of such nature would be limited to those not separated from the position of
the appointing authority by an intervening public officer, or series of public officers, in the bureaucratic hierarchy. This
is an additional reason why the positions of "City Legal Officer" and "Private Secretary to the President" were considered
primarily confidential by the Court. 12 On the other hand, a customs policeman serving in the Harbor Patrol, in relation to
the Commissioner of Customs, and an executive assistant, stenographer, or clerk in the Office of the President, were not
considered so by the Court.13

There is no need to extend the professional relationship to the legal staff which assists the confidential employer above
described. Since the positions occupied by these subordinates are remote from that of the appointing authority, the
element of trust between them is no longer predominant. The importance of these subordinates to the appointing
authority now lies in the contribution of their legal skills to facilitate the work of the confidential employee. At this level
of the bureaucracy, any impairment of the appointing authority's interest as a client, which may be caused through the
breach of residual trust by any of these lower-ranked lawyers, can be anticipated and prevented by the confidential
employee, as a reasonably competent office head, through the exercise of his power to "review,
approve, reverse, or modify" their acts and decisions. 14 At this level, the client can be protected without need of imposing
upon the lower-ranked lawyers the fiduciary duties inherent in the attorney-client relationship. Hence, there is now no
obstacle to giving full effect to the security of tenure principle to these members of the civil service.

Thus, with respect to the legal assistants or subordinates of the provincial attorney namely, Cirilo Gelvezon, Teodolfo
Dato-on and Nelson Geduspan, the Cadiente and Besa rulings cannot apply. To recall, said cases specifically dealt with
the positions of city legal officer of the city and chief legal counsel of the PNB. There was no reference to their legal staff
or subordinates. As head of their respective departments, the city legal officer, the provincial attorney or the PNB chief
legal counsel cannot be likened to their subordinates. The latter have been employed due to their technical
qualifications. Their positions are highly technical in character and not confidential, so they are permanent employees,
and they belong to the category of classified employees under the Civil Service Law. Thus, the items of Senior Legal
Officer and Legal Officer II remain permanent as classified by the Civil Service Commission. Consequently, the holders of
the said items, being permanent employees, enjoy security of tenure as guaranteed under the Constitution.

This notwithstanding, petitioners contend that respondents are estopped from protesting the termination of their
services because of their actions which, if taken together, would allegedly reveal that they have accepted their
termination, such as: applying for clearances, not remaining in office and signing their payroll for March 15, 1988
acknowledging therein that their appointment "terminated/expired."

We cannot agree with petitioners in this regard. The respondents did the above-mentioned acts because their services
were actually dispensed with by petitioner Governor Griño. As a consequence of their termination, they could not
remain in office and as required of any government employee who is separated from the government service, they had
to apply for clearances. However, this did not mean that they believed in principle that they were validly terminated. The
same should not prevent them from later on questioning the validity of said termination.

The facts clearly show that respondents protested their termination with the Civil Service Commission within a month
from the time of their termination. The Court holds that the said protest was filed within a reasonable period of time.

WHEREFORE, and in view of the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED with respect to the position of provincial attorney
of Iloilo. Respondent Teotimo Arandela is hereby ordered to vacate said position upon the finality of this Decision. The
Decision of the respondent Civil Service Commission pertaining to respondents Cirilo Gelvezon, Teodolfo Dato-on and
Nelson Geduspan is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Triba v. Sto. Tomas, 199 SCRA 833 (1991);

Tria v. Sto. Tomas, 199 SCRA 833 (1991)
(Di sya Triba, Tria dapat. Tsk. Si Sir talaga minamali tayo)

EN BANC

G.R. No. 85670 July 31, 1991

ROGELIO A. TRIA petitioner,

vs.
CHAIRMAN PATRICIA A. STO. TOMAS, CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, RET. BRIG. GEN. JOSE T. ALMONTE, RET. COL.
ERNESTO P. RAVINA and RET. GEN. MIGUEL M. VILLAMOR, respondents.

Florosco P. Fronda for petitioner.

FELICIANO, J.:p

Petitioner Rogelio A. Tria had been employed with the Bureau of Intelligence and Investigation later renamed Finance
Ministry Intelligence Bureau (FMIB) now known as the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) of the
Department of Finance, Region 5, Legaspi City, as a Management and Audit Analyst I, a position expressly described in
the letter of appointment as "confidential." 1 The appointment was signed by Pelagio A. Cruz, Lieutenant General, AFP (Ret)
Commissioner, FMIBI." 2

On 27 September 1984, petitioner wrote a confidential report to the FMIB Deputy Commissioner detailing the
nonfeasance of a FMIB lawyer assigned to Region 5. Petitioner's report recommended the lawyer's replacement "With a
competent and able lawyer to handle the cases brought to his attention." 3 On 14 October 1986, petitioner submitted
another confidential report, addressed to the Deputy Executive Secretary, Office of the President, this time concerning Col.
Jackson P. Alparce (Ret.). FMIB Region 5 Director.

On 20 October 1986, petitioner filed an application for vacation leave for 100 working days, covering the period 1
November 1986 to 30 April 1987. Petitioner sought to take advantage of a Civil Service circular which allows employees
who propose to seek interim employment abroad, to go on prolonged leave of absence without pay without being
considered separated from the service. 4 The application was approved by his immediate supervisor and Chief, Intelligence
and Investigation Service, Col. Ruperto Amistoso (Ret.), and the personnel officer, Col. Domingo Rodriguez (Ret.), both based in
the Region 5 office of the FMIB.

On 23 October 1986, when petitioner was already in Manila attending to the processing of his travel papers, a
Memorandum was sent to him in Legaspi City from the FMIB Central Office in Quezon City by respondent Assistant FMIB
Commissioner Brig. Gen. Miguel Villamor (Ret.), referring to the confidential report sent out to the Office of the
President. The Memorandum in part stated:

Be reminded that as an agent of FMIB, it is inherent in your duties to report to the Commissioner or
other authorities of FMIB of any irregularity committed by employees/officials in that Region [5] to
enable them to take appropriate action/investigation and/or disciplinary action.

However, it appears that you opted to submit said report directly to the Office of the President,
Malacañang which adversely affected the Bureau's image and placed the Commissioner in an embarrasing
position.

In view thereof, you are required to submit your explanation in writing within five (5) working days from
receipt hereof why no disciplinary action should be taken against you for non-compliance with office
rules and regulations. 5

Since petitioner had failed to receive and hence to respond to the above Memorandum, another Memorandum from
Quezon City dated 17 November 1986 was issued, this time by respondent Col. Ernesto Rabina (Ret.), Chief,
Administrative Service, FMIB, reminding petitioner of his duty to submit the required written explanation. That
Memorandum went on to state:

Be informed further that your application for sick [should have been vacation] leave dated October 22,
1986 . . . has been disapproved pursuant to Sec. 16 of Civil Service Rule No. XVI which reads thus: "Leave
of absence for any reason other than serious illness must be contingent upon the needs of the service."

Inasmuch as your services in that Region [5] is (sic) needed, you are directed to report for work thereat
within ten (10) working days from the date of this Memorandum otherwise, this office will be constrained
to drop you from the rolls of FMIB for prolonged/unauthorized absence and non-compliance with office
rules and regulations. 6

Petitioner, however, had already left the country on 26 October 1986, and was unable to comply with the express
directives of the second Memorandum. He was therefore considered to be on absence without official leave (AWOL).
This prolonged absence, as well as his failure to explain his sending out the confidential report to Malacañang, prompted
respondent EIIB Commissioner Brig Gen. Jose Almonte (Ret.) to issue Letter-Order No. 06-87 dated 12 January 1987
informing petitioner of the termination of his services retroactive to "1 November 1986 for continuous absence without
official leave and for loss of confidence." 7

It was upon his return to the country sometime in May 1987 that petitioner came to know of the abovementioned
Letter-Order and of the two Memoranda. In a letter dated 20 May 1987 to respondent Almonte, petitioner asked for
reinstatement, stating that his application for vacation leave had been approved by his immediate chief and the
personnel officer. With respect to the confidential report he had addressed to the Deputy Executive Secretary, petitioner
explained:

. . . I would like to state that the reason why I submitted my report to the Office of the President is
precisely to protect the image of the bureau. Earlier, I handed a report to the then Deputy Commissioner
Mendoza regarding said irregularities committed sometime in 1984-85, particularly by Atty. Geronga, R-5
and Director Col. Alfarce No investigation was undertaken inspite of my report. In the meanwhile, the
FMIB-R-5 always appeared in the local newspaper regarding the unscrupulous behavior of the director
which not only affects the good image of our organization but also of the subordinates of the office. Thus,
I felt in goodfaith that the matter should be brought to the attention of the Deputy Executive Secretary of
Malacañang so that appropriate action can be taken for the good of the service. I submit that I did this in
my honest belief that it is my duty to do so as a public servant and a loyal member of this organization.

. . . I reiterate that the same was done in good faith and not for any selfish motive. 8

Reinstatement was, however, denied by respondent Rabina in a letter dated 11 August 1987, which in part read:

xxx xxx xxx

Be informed that Commissioner, EIIB has directed the Investigation & Prosecution Office this bureau to
conduct a brief investigation on your case and the established facts show that this office committed no
injustice. Your violation of office rules and regulations were the grounds for your termination for loss of
confidence. 9

Petitioner's request for payment of the cash equivalent of his accrued leave credits corresponding to a total of
179 days was also denied by respondent Villamor on the ground that:

. . . Section 6 of the Civil Service rules and laws provides that IX . . . the removal for cause of an official or
employee shall carry with it forfeiture of . . . other benefits arising from his employment. 10

Petitioner then filed a petition for review with prayer for reinstatement and backwages before respondent Civil Service
Commission ("Commission") which the Commission denied. Respondent Commission held that the grant of petitioner's
application for vacation leave, notwithstanding the accumulation of sufficient leave credits, was discretionary on the
part of respondent Rabina, the approving official, citing In re: Nicolasura Victor (CSC Res. No. 88-251) dated 25 May 1988
and Section 20 of the Revised Civil Service Rules which read:

Leave of absence for any reason other than the serious illness of an officer or employee . . . must be
contingent upon the needs of the service. 11

Having failed to get reconsideration, petitioner came to this Court on the present Petition for Certiorari.

Petitioner challenges his dismissal as being arbitrary. The propriety of petitioner's alleged unlawful removal boils down
to the question of whether or not an employee holding a position considered as "primarily confidential" may be
dismissed on grounds of "loss of confidence" by the appointing authority on the basis of the employee's having gone on
unauthorized leave of absence and of his having filed a confidential report on one of his superiors directly with the Office
of the President.

We begin with the proposition that the effects of characterizing a position as "primarily confidential" are two-fold:
firstly, such characterization renders inapplicable the ordinary requirement of filling up a position in the Civil Service on
the basis of merit and fitness as determined by competitive examinations; and secondly, while the 1987 Constitution
does not exempt such positions from the operation of the principle set out in Article IX (B), Section 2 (3) of the same
Constitution that "no officer or employee of the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided
by law," the "cause provided by law" includes "loss of confidence." 12 It is said to be a settled rule that those holding
primarily confidential positions "continue for so long as confidence in them endures. Their termination can be justified on the
ground of loss of confidence because in that case their cessation from office involves no removal but the expiration of their
term of office. 13 Notwithstanding the refined distinction between removal from office and expiration of the term of a public
officer, the net result is loss of tenure upon loss of confidence on the part of the appointing power.

A position in the Civil Service may be considered primarily confidential: (1) when the President of the Philippines, upon
recommendation of the Civil Service Commission, has declared that position to be primarily confidential; or (2) when
the position, given the character of the duties and functions attached to it, is primarily confidential in nature. 14 All
positions in the EIIB were apparently declared as "highly confidential" by former President Marcos in Letter of
Implementation No. 71, dated 4 September 1978, which reads in part as follows:

Pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1458, dated June 11, 1978, and letter dated August 18, 1978 of the
President/Prime Minister creating the Bureau of Intelligence and Investigation (BII) [now the EIIB], the
following directives are hereby issued for immediate implementation by the new Bureau:

xxx xxx xxx

4. The Commissioner of the BII with the approval of the Ministry of Finance, is hereby instructed to
organize and appoint his staff . . . All positions in the BII are highly confidential in nature and incumbents
thereof may be removed for loss of confidence by appropriate authority. 15

When one examines, however, the actual duties and functions of petitioner as a "Management and Audit Analyst I" in the
FMIB, as set out in the job description of that position, one is struck by the ordinary and day to day character of such
duties and functions:

Prepares required survey materials, work plans and schedules; gathers data and makes investigations
and analyzes (sic) of administrative problems relating to organization, personnel and procedure;
supplements data gathered by interviewing heads of office or private individuals or by observing actual
operations; examines and analyzes reorganization proposals in the light gathered and facts observed;
analyzes causes of inefficiency or lack of economy, undertakes required study and research; prepares
survey reports and write (sic) drafts of tentative organization plans, discusses and justifies such plans to
supervisor and appropriate bodies; maintains close liaison work with head of offices or organizations
studies operational methods and procedures of the organization to simplify the work and improve
efficiency; studies and recommends measures to insure industrial safety and prevention of
accidents; supervises the installation of management control devices; assists in the compilation, analysis
and interpretation of important statistics for use of management.16 (Emphasis Supplied)

It is thus useful to recall that in Piñero v. Hechanova, 17 the Court, speaking through J.B.L. Reyes, J., said:

It is plain that, at least since the enactment of the 1959 Civil Service Act (R.A. 2260), it is the nature of
the position which finally determines whether a position is primarily confidential, policy determining or
highly technical. Executive pronouncements can be no more than initial determinations that are not
conclusive in case of conflict. And it must be so, or else it would then lie within the discretion of the Chief
Executive to deny to any officer, by executive fiat the protection of section 4, Article XII, of the
Constitution. 18 (Citation omitted; emphasis partly in the original and partly supplied)

The above doctrine was reiterated and relied upon in Borres v. Court of Appeals. 19 It is also important to note that
the concept constitutive of "primarily confidential" positions has been narrowly drawn by this Court. Thus, in De los
Santos v. Mallare, 20 the Court said, through Mr. Justice Pedro Tuason:

. . . [T]hree specified classes of positions — policy determining, primarily confidential and highly
technical — are excluded from the merit system and dismissal at pleasure of officers and employees
appointed therein is allowed by the Constitution. These positions involve the highest degree of
 confidence, or are closely bound up with and dependent on other positions to which they are
subordinate, or are temporary in nature. It may truly be said that the good of the service itself demands
that appointments coming under this category be terminable at the will of the officer that makes them.

xxx xxx xxx

Every appointment implies confidence, but much more than ordinary confidence is reposed in the
occupant of a position that is primarily confidential. The latter phrase denotes not only confidence in the
aptitude of the appointee for the duties of the office but primarily close intimacy which insures freedom of
[discussion and delegation and reporting] without embarrassment or freedom from misgivings of betrayals
of personal trust or confidential matters of state. . . . . 21

The positions which this Court has in the past characterized as "primarily confidential" include: private
secretaries of public functionaries; 22 a security officer assigned as bodyguard of the person of a public officer and
responsible for taking security measures for the safety of such official, 23 City Legal Officer of Davao City vis-a-vis the
Davao City Mayor; 24 Provincial Attorney of Iloilo Province vis-a-vis the Governor of Iloilo Province. 25 It is also
instructive to refer to some of the positions which the Court has refused to designate as "primarily confidential:" e.g.,
members of the Customs Police Force or Port Patrol; 26 Special Assistant to the Governor of the Central Bank, in charge
of the Export Department; 27 Senior Executive Assistant, Clerk I and Supervising Clerk I and stenographer in the Office
of the President. 28

It is evident that the duties of petitioner related to the study and analysis of organizational structures and procedures,
with the end in view of making recommendations designed to increase the levels of efficiency and coordination within
the organization so analyzed. Moreover, the modest rank and fungible nature of the position occupied by petitioner, is
underscored by the fact that the salary attached to it was no more than P1,500.00 a month at the time he went on leave
(October, 1986). There thus appears nothing to suggest that petitioner's position was "highly" or even "primarily
confidential" in nature. The fact that petitioner may, sometimes, handle "confidential matters" or papers which are
confidential in nature, does not suffice to characterize their positions as primarily confidential. 29

Accordingly, we believe and so hold that petitioner Tria's particular position of "Management and Audit Analyst I" is not
a "primarily confidential" position so as to render him removable upon, or the expiration of his term of office concurrent
with, "loss of confidence" on the part of the appointing power who, as already noted, was the then Commissioner of the
FMIB.

If petitioner Tria was not legally removable upon "loss of confidence" on the part of the FMIB Commissioner, was there
nonetheless legal cause provided by law for his dismissal from the service?

We believe that the constitutional prohibition against suspension or dismissal of an officer or employee of the Civil
Service "except for cause provided by law" is a guaranty of both procedural and substantive due process. Procedural due
process requires that suspension or dismissal come, as a general rule, only after notice and hearing. 30 In the case at bar,
as already noted, the EIIB issued a Memorandum to petitioner, after he was already in Manila, requiring him to explain why no
disciplinary action should be taken against him for having submitted a report directly to the Office of the President,
Malacañang, 'which adversely affected the bureau's image and placed the Commissioner in an embarrassing position," which
Memorandum was not received by petitioner. However, after his return from abroad and upon request of petitioner, another
investigation was conducted by the EIIB where petitioner had an opportunity to explain his side of the matter. The Court
considers that, under the circumstances of this case the subsequent investigation constituted substantial compliance with the
demands of procedural due process.

Substantive due process requires, among other things, that an officer or employee of the Civil Service be suspended or
dismissed only "for cause," a phrase which, so far as concerns dismissals of public officers not holding positions which
are "policy determining, highly technical or primarily confidential," has acquired, according to this Court, the following
"well-defined concept."

It means for reasons which the law and sound policy recognize as sufficient warrant for removal, that
is, legal cause, and not merely causes which the appointing power in the exercise of discretion may deem
sufficient. It is implied that officers may not be removed at the mere will of those vested with the power of
removal or without cause. Moreover, the cause must relate to and effect the administration of the office,
 and must be restricted to something of a substantial nature directly affecting the rights and interests of
the public. 31

In the instant case, we have noted earlier that petitioner was charged with violation of official rules and regulations
consisting more specifically, of:. (1) having gone on an extended unauthorized leave of absence; (2) having bypassed
official channels in transmitting a report concerning alleged misfeasance or non-feasance on the part of a superior
officer of the EIIB directly to the Office of the President through the Deputy Executive Secretary, rather than through the
respondent EIIB Commissioner.

It is true that petitioner was probably precipitate in taking off for abroad before his application for vacation leave was
formally approved by the FMIB Central Office in Quezon City. We must, however, take into account the circumstance that
his application for leave without pay had been approved or indorsed for approval by his immediate superior in the
FMIB, Region 5 Office, where petitioner was assigned, and so petitioner was not completely without basis in believing
that the formal approval of his application in the FMIB Central Office would follow as a matter of course. It is pertinent to
point out that his immediate superiors in the Region 5, FMIB Office were the persons in the best position to ascertain
whether his presence in the Regional office during the period covered by his application for leave without pay was really
demanded by imperious exigencies of the service. The record is bare of any indication what those exigencies were, at
that particular time. There is also no showing that the FMIB actually suffered any prejudice by reason of the non-
availability of the services of petitioner during his leave without pay. Petitioner was, it should be recalled, a
"Management and Audit Analyst," a humble rank separated by many ranks from the appointing power, the FMIB
Commissioner. It thus appears to the Court that, on balance, the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service was
unduly harsh in the case of petitioner; that suspension for thirty (30) days would have been more than adequate
punishment for precipitately going on leave without pay prior to formal approval of his leave by the Central Office of the
FMIB; and that the real and efficient cause of his dismissal from the service was the fact that he had bypassed official
channels in rendering the confidential report addressed to the Deputy Executive Secretary, Office of the President,
concerning the then Regional Director of FMIB, Region 5.

After careful consideration, we believe and so hold that, in the circumstances of this case, that act of petitioner did not
constitute lawful cause for his dismissal from the service. We believe, on the contrary, that petitioner's case is covered
by the rule in Gray v. De Vera. 32 Benjamin A. Gray was Secretary of the Board of Directors of the People's Homesite and
Housing Corporation ("PHHC"). He sent a telegram to President Carlos P. Garcia reading as follows:

Aye suggest complete revamp PHHC Board's top members should not usurp management functions
(comma) should willingly attend meetings (comma) should not grab as quotas dwelling awards despite
applicants of long standing (comma) should not divide among themselves emergency positions (comma)
should create positions only in case of necessity and not because they want to accommodate their
useless men (comma) and should respect civil service
law. 33

On the following day, the PHHC Board of Directors terminated Gray's services "on account of loss of confidence
due to treachery or disloyalty to the Board." In holding that Gray had been unlawfully dismissed and in ordering
his reinstatement with backwages, this Court held:

The removal of Board Secretary Gray from the primarily confidential position to which he had been
permanently appointed was illegal in view of the following considerations:

(1) There was no lawful cause for removal. The sending of the telegram of January 12, 1959 to President
Carlos P. Garcia suggesting a complete revamp of the Board of Directors of the PHHC due to the Board's
acts of management and misconduct, the most serious of which was that the Directors were grabbing as
'quotas dwelling awards despite applicants of long standing,' was an act of civic duty. The telegram was a
privileged communication presumably made in good faith and capable of being substantiated by evidence.

According to the testimony of Director Manuel T. Leelin the act of Board Secretary Gray in sending the
telegram of January 12,1959 to the President of the Philippines was an act of treachery or disloyalty to
the Board. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

 We cannot agree, for the following reasons:

First. As pointed out, the sending of the telegram to the President of the Philippines was an act of civic
duty. The telegram was a privileged communication presumably sent in good faith and capable of being
proved by evidence.

Second. The position of secretary to the board of a government corporation was declared by the
President in Executive Order No. 399 primarily confidential in nature with the obvious intent that the
position be filled by an appointee of unquestioned honesty and integrity. Hence, the act of Board Secretary
Gray in reporting to the President the Board's act of mismanagement and misconduct was in consonance
with the honesty and integrity required for the position.

Assuming that Gray owed loyalty to the Board, that loyalty was in the interest of good
government and not in the personal interest of the Directors to the extent of concealing the shenanigans of
the Board. . . . 34

In the case at bar, we note that petitioner sent his confidential (and presumably sealed) report to an office having overall
administrative supervision and control over the FMIB (i.e., the Office of the President); the report was not, in other
words, sent either to the media or to an office or agency having no administrative jurisdiction over the public official or
office complained of. That report was a privileged communication and the author thereof enjoys the benefit of the
presumption that he acted in good faith. The respondents have not alleged that petitioner acted with malice in fact. We
do not believe that petitioner's act constituted serious misconduct but rather, on the contrary, was an act of personal
and civic courage by which petitioner exhibited his loyalty to the FMIB as an institution and ultimately to the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines.

Considerations of fundamental public policy thus compel us to hold that petitioner was dismissed without lawful cause
and must, therefore, be reinstated to the position he previously held or, If that position is no longer available, to some
other position in the EIIB of equivalent rank and emoluments. In addition, petitioner is entitled to payment of his
backwages (basic salary plus allowances, if any computed from the time of his return from his leave of absence, minus an
amount equivalent to one-month's backwages representing the appropriate penalty for petitioner's infraction of
ordinary office rules.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is hereby GRANTED DUE COURSE, the Comments filed by respondents are
hereby CONSIDERED as their Answers to the Petition and Resolutions Nos. 88-150 and 88-787 of public respondent
Civil Service Commission as well as Letter-Order No. 06-87 of public respondent EIIB Commissioner, are hereby
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Public respondents are hereby ORDERED to reinstate forthwith petitioner to his former
position, or to a position of equivalent rank and compensation, and to pay him the backwages, allowances and other
benefits lawfully due him counted from May 1987, when he returned to the country from his leave of absence, until
actual reinstatement, less one month's backwages. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Griño-Aquino,
Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.

Corpus vs. Cuaderno, 15 SCRA 591 (1965)

G.R. No. L-23721 March 31, 1965

R. MARINO CORPUS, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
MIGUEL CUADERNO, SR., ET AL., respondents-appellants.

Juan T. David and Rosauro Alvarez for petitioner-appellant.

Nat. M. Balboa, G. B. Guevarra, F. E. Evangelista and C. B. Angeles for respondents-appellants.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Not satisfied with the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, in its Civil Case No. 41226, both the above-named
petitioner and respondents interposed their respective appeals to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, however,
certified the said appeals to this Court to avoid splitting them, it appearing that, while the Court of Appeals has
jurisdiction over the respondents' appeal, the amount in controversy in the petitioner's appeal (P574,000.00) in
damages and attorneys' fees, is beyond the jurisdiction of the said appellate court.

The essential facts are as follows: On 7 March 1958, the petitioner-appellant, R. Marino Corpus, then holding the position
of "Special Assistant to the Governor, In Charge of the Export Department" of the Central Bank, a position declared by
the President of the Philippines on 24 January 1957 as highly technical in nature, and admitted as such by both the
present litigants, was administratively charged by several employees in the export department with dishonesty,
incompetence, neglect of duty, and/or abuse of authority, oppression, conduct unbecoming of a public official, and of
violation of the internal regulations of the Central Bank.

On 18 March 1958, the Monetary Board suspended the petitioner from office effective on said date and created a three-
man investigating committee composed of Atty. Guillermo de Jesus, chairman; and Atty. Apolinar Tolentino, Assistant
Fiscal of the City of Manila, and Professor Gerardo Florendo, senior attorney of the Central Bank, members. In its final
report dated 5 May 1959, the investigating committee, "after most extensive hearings in which both complainants and
respondent were afforded all the opportunity to submit their evidence, and after a most exhaustive and conscientious
study of the records and evidence submitted in the case," made the following conclusion and recommendation:

(1) In view of the foregoing, the Committee finds that there is no basis upon which to recommend disciplinary
action against respondent, and, therefore, respectfully recommends that he be immediately reinstated.

Nevertheless, on 20 July 1959, the Monetary Board approved the following resolution:

After an exhaustive and mature deliberation on the report of the aforesaid fact-finding committee in conjunction
with the entire records of the case and representations of both complainants and respondent, through their
respective counsel; and, further, after a thorough review of the service record of the respondent, particularly the
various cases presented against him, object of Monetary Board Res. No. 1527 dated August 30, 1955, which all
involves fitness, discipline, etc. of respondent; and moreover, upon formal statement of the Governor that he has
lost confidence in the respondent as Special Assistant to the Governor and In-Charge of the Export Department
(such position being primarily confidential and highly technical in nature), the Monetary Board finds that the
continuance of the respondent in the service of the Central Bank would be prejudicial to the best interests of the
Central Bank and, therefore, in accordance with the provisions of Section 14 of the Bank Charter, considers the
respondent R. Marino Corpus, resigned as of the date of his suspension.

Corpus moved for the reconsideration of the above resolution, but the Board denied it, after which he filed an action
for certiorari, mandamus, quo warranto, and damages, with preliminary injunction, with the Court of First Instance of
Manila. The said court, after trial, rendered judgment declaring the Board resolution null and void, and ordering, among
others, the reinstatement of the herein petitioner and awarding him P5,000.00 as attorney's fees. As aforesaid, both the
petitioner and the respondents appealed the judgment.

Per its resolution, the premises of the board in dismissing the petitioner are: (1) its deliberation of the report of the
committee, the records of the case and the representations of the parties; (2) the service record of the petitioner,
particularly the various cases against him in 1955; and (3) loss of confidence by the Governor, with the implied
concurrence of the Monetary Board. No specific findings were made; it is, therefore, evident that the petitioner was
removed on the third ground, since he was neither removed for guilt of the charges against him in the administrative
complaint nor on account of his previous cases in 1955 because he had suffered the corresponding penalty imposed
upon him on the counts for which he was then found guilty, and because he was thereafter promoted in salary and to the
position in question by the Monetary Board on recommendation of the Governor. 1äwphï1.ñët

The appeal of the Central Bank and its Monetary Board is planted on the proposition that officers holding highly
technical positions may be removed at any time for lack of confidence by the appointing power, and that such power of
removal is implicit in section 1, Art. XII, of the Constitution:
 Section 1. A Civil Service embracing all branches and subdivisions of the Government shall be provided by law.
Appointments in the Civil Service, except as to those which are policy-determining, primarily confidential or
highly technical in nature, shall be made only according to merit and fitness, to be determined as far as
practicable by competitive examination.

It is argued that for the three classes of position referred to in the constitutional disposition (policy-determining,
primarily confidential and highly technical), lack of confidence of the one making the appointment constitutes sufficient
and legitimate cause of removal.

We find the appeal of the Central Bank authorities to be clearly untenable.

In the first place, the loss of confidence ground, on which the dismissal is sought to be predicated, is a clear and evident
afterthought resorted to when the charges, subject matter of the investigation, were not proved or substantiated. The
Monetary Board nowhere stated anything in the record which the committee failed to consider in recommending
exoneration from the charges; it nowhere pointed to any substantiation of the charges; it, therefore, relied only on the
statement of the loss of confidence made by Governor Cuaderno. We find in the particular set of facts herein that the
alleged loss of confidence is clearly a pretext to cure the inability of substantiating the charges upon which the
investigation had proceeded.

The court, therefore, cannot rely on the so-called "loss of confidence" as a reason for dismissal. And inasmuch as the
charges against petitioner were unsubstantiated, that leaves no other alternative but to follow the mandate that —

No public officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by
law (Sec. 4, Art. XII, Constitution of the Phil.)

Since in the interest of the service reasonable protection should be afforded civil servants in positions that are by their
nature important, such as those that are "highly technical," the Constitutional safeguard requiring removal or
suspension to be "for cause as provided by law" at least demands that their dismissal for alleged "loss of confidence" if at
all allowed, be attended with prudence and deliberation adequate to show that said ground exists.

In the second place, the argument for the Monetary Board ignores the self-evident fact that the constitutional provisions
merely constitute the policy-determining, primarily confidential, and highly technical positions as exceptions to the rule
requiring appointments in the Civil Service to be made on the basis of merit and fitness as determined from competitive
examinations (sec. 1, supra) (Jover vs. Borra, 49 O.G. [No. 7] 2755), but that the Constitution does not exempt such
positions from the operation of the principle emphatically and categorically enunciated in section 4 of Article XII, that —

No officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law.

and which recognizes no exception. The absolute rule thus propounded is repeated almost verbatim in Sec. 132 of the
Central Bank Charter (Rep. Act 265) that provides in equally absolute terms that —

No officer or employee of the Central Bank subject to the Civil Service Law or regulations shall be removed or
suspended except for cause as provided by law.

It is well to recall here that the Civil Service Law in force (Rep. Act No. 2260) divides positions into three categories:
competitive or classified; non-competitive or unclassified service; and exempt service, the last being expressly excluded
from the scope of the Civil Service Act (sec. 3, R.A. 2260). In view of sections 3 and 5 of the same law, providing that —

SEC 3. Positions embraced in the Civil Service.—The Philippine Civil Service shall embrace all branches,
subdivisions and instrumentalities of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations,
...

SEC. 5. The non-competitive service.—The non-competitive or unclassified service shall be composed of positions
expressly declared by law to be in the non-competitive or unclassified service or those which are policy-
determining, primarily confidential or highly technical in nature. (R.A. 2260)
it is indisputable that the plaintiff Corpus is protected by the Civil Service law and regulations as a member of the non-
competitive or unclassified service, and that his removal or suspension must be for cause recognized by law (Unabia vs.
Mayor, 53 Off. Gaz. 132; Arcel vs. Osmeña, L-14956, Feb. 27, 1961; Garcia vs. Executive Secretary, L-19748, September
13, 1962).

The tenure of officials holding primarily confidential positions (such as private secretaries of public functionaries) ends
upon loss of confidence, because their term of office lasts only as long as confidence in them endures; and thus their
cessation involves no removal. But the situation is different for those holding highly technical posts, requiring special
skills and qualifications. The Constitution clearly distinguished the primarily confidential from the highly technical, and
to apply the loss of confidence rule to the latter incumbents is to ignore and erase the differentiation expressly made by
our fundamental charter. Moreover, it is illogical that while an ordinary technician, say a clerk, stenographer, mechanic,
or engineer, enjoys security of tenure and may not be removed at pleasure, a highly technical officer, such as an
economist or a scientist of avowed attainments and reputation, should be denied security and be removable at any time,
without right to a hearing or chance to defend himself. No technical men worthy of the name would be willing to accept
work under such conditions. Ultimately, the rule advocated by the Bank would demand that highly technical positions be
filled by persons who must labor always with an eye cocked at the humor to their superiors. It would signify that the so-
called highly technical positions will have to be filled by incompetents and yes-men, who must rely not on their own
qualifications and skill but on their ability to curry favor with the powerful. The entire objective of the Constitution in
establishing and dignifying the Civil Service on the basis of merit would be thus negated.

Of course, a position may be declared both highly technical and confidential, as the supreme interests of the state may
require. But the position of plaintiff-appellant Corpus is not of this category.

The decision in De los Santos vs. Mallare, 87 Phil. 289, relied upon by the appellant Bank, is not applicable since said case
involved the office of city engineer that the court expressly found to be "neither primarily confidential, policy-
determining nor highly technical" (at p. 297, in fine).

Turning now to the appeal of plaintiff R. Marino Corpus. The latter complains first against the allowance of only
P5,000.00 attorney's fees by the court below stressing that the stipulation of facts between the parties clearly recites
that Corpus had agreed to pay his attorney P20,000.00 as fees. It is to be noted, however, that the agreement between
client and lawyer cannot bind the other party who was a stranger to the fee contract. While the Civil Code allows a party
to recover reasonable counsel fees by way of damages, such fees must lie primarily in the discretion of the trial court,
and no abuse of that discretion is here shown. The same thing can be said as to plaintiff's recovery of moral damages; the
trial court was evidently not satisfied that such damages were adequately proved and on the record, we do not believe
we would be warranted in interfering with its judgment.

The claim for exemplary damages must presuppose the existence of the circumstances enumerated in Articles 2231 and
2232 of the Civil Code. That is essentially a question of fact that lies within the province of the court a quo, and we do not
believe that in opining that the position of Corpus was one dependent on confidence, the defendant Monetary Board
necessarily acted with vindictiveness or wantonness, and not in the exercise of honest judgment.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed without special pronouncement as to costs.

Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.

Bengzon, C.J., and Bautista Angelo, J., took no part.

Separate Opinions

BENGZON, J.P., J., concurring:

I agree with the decision because, as stated therein, in this particular case the so-called "loss of confidence" is a clear
afterthought resorted to only when the charges subject-matter of the investigation could not be substantiated. The
resolution of the Monetary Board considering the petitioner resigned, stated that his position was "highly technical," as
declared by the President, thereby noticeably seeking to put it within a category where "loss of confidence" operates to
terminate the employment. Furthermore, a reference to former charges against petitioner which had already been
disposed of prior to his promotion, obviously provides no apparent basis for the stand therein taken. As a result, the
alleged "loss of confidence" cannot be relied upon as a reason for petitioner's dismissal. This point , I believe, suffices to
affirm the decision of the court a quo with respect to respondents' appeal.

A ruling on the far-reaching question of whether or not "loss of confidence" is a lawful ground for dismissal from a highly
technical position in the Civil Service should, to my mind, await the instance when it is absolutely required in deciding a
case. A further discussion could then be pursued on: (1) a highly technical position that involves utmost confidence, e.
g., that of a scientist in an Atomic Energy Research Office dealing with secrets that affect the security of the State; (2) the
rule as to policy-determining positions; and (3) whether Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution speaks of "policy-
determining, primarily confidential or highly technical in nature" disjunctively or together.

Consequently, I reserve my view as to whether incumbents of highly technical positions in the Civil Service may or may
not be removed for "loss of confidence" in a proper case, and I concur with the decision in all other respects.

Zaldivar, J., concurs.

Appointment and designation of elective/appointive officials: Article IX-B, Section 7; Article VII, Section
13; Article VI, Section 13

Article IX-B, Section

Section 7. No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any
public office or position during his tenure. Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary
functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the
Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including Government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.

Article VII Section 13

Section 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or
assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or
employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly, practice
any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or
in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.

The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the President
shall not, during his tenure, be appointed as Members of the Constitutional Commissions, or the
Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or
offices, including government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.

Article VI Section 13
Section 13. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or employment in the
Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he be appointed to any
office which may have been created or the emoluments thereof increased during the term for which he was
elected.