PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
DEAN SOL MAWIS
Created by: Kolyn M. Gervacio, 1 A
II. Effect and Application of laws
A. When Law Takes Effect
National Civil Code 2
o Article 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall
take effect one-year after publication.
EFFECTIVITY OF THE CIVIL CODE. The 1950 Civil Code of the Philippines took
effect on August 30, 1950. 2 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS LAW
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 200. Article 2 of the Civil Code has been expressly
amended by Executive Order No. 200 dated June 18, 1987 issued by
President Corazon Aquino during the time of her revolutionary
government. Hereunder is the text of the said executive order:
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 200 PROVIDING FOR THE PUBLICATION OF LAWS
EITHER IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE OR IN A NEWSPAPER OF GENERAL CIRCULATION IN
THE PHILIPPINES AS A REQUIREMENT FOR THEIR EFFECTIVITY.
WHEREAS, Article 2 of the Civil Code partly provides that “laws shall take effect
after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official
Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided x x x’’;
WHEREAS, the requirement that the laws to be effective only a publication thereof
in the Official Gazette shall suffice has entailed some problems, a point recognized
by the Supreme Court in Tañada, et al. v. Tuvera, et al., (G.R. No. 63915, December
29, 1986) when it observed that “there is much tobe said of the view that the
publication need not be made in the Official Gazette, considering its erratic release
and limited readership’’;
WHEREAS, it was likewise observed that “undoubtedly, newspapers of general
circulation could better perform the function of communicating the laws to the
people as such periodicals are more easily available, have a wide circulation,
and come out regularly”; and WHEREAS, in view of the foregoing premises Article 2
of the Civil Code should accordingly be amended so that laws to be
effective must be published either in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation in the country; NOW, THEREFORE, I, CORAZON C.
AQUINO, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the
Constitution, do hereby order:
SECTION 1. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of
their publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided.
SECTION 2. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 386, otherwise known as the “Civil Code of
the Philippines,” and all other laws inconsistent with this Executive Order are
hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
Revised Administrative Code (RAC) Sec. 18-24
Chapter 5: OPERATION AND EFFECT OF LAWS
o Sec. 18. When Laws Take Effect. - Laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days
following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation, unless it is otherwise provided.
o Sec. 19. Prospectivity. - Laws shall have prospective effect unless the contrary
is expressly provided.
o
o Sec. 20. Interpretation of Laws and Administrative Issuances. - In the
interpretation of a law or administrative issuance promulgated in all the official
languages, the English text shall control, unless otherwise specifically provided. In
case of ambiguity, omission or mistake, the other texts may be consulted.
o Sec. 21. No Implied Revival of Repealed Law. - When a law which expressly
repeals a prior law itself repealed, the law first repealed shall not be thereby
revived unless expressly so provided.
o Sec. 22. Revival of Law Impliedly Repealed. - When a law which impliedly
repeals a prior law is itself repealed, the prior law shall thereby be revived, unless
the repealing law provides otherwise.
o Sec. 23. Ignorance of the Law. - Ignorance of the law excuses no one from
compliance therewith.
o Chapter 6
o OFFICIAL GAZETTE
o Sec. 24. Contents. - There shall be published in the Official Gazette all
legislative acts and resolutions of a public nature; all executive and administrative
issuances of general application; decisions or abstracts of decisions of the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, or other courts of similar rank, as may
be deemed by said courts of sufficient importance to be so published; such
documents or classes of documents as may be required so to be published by
law; and such documents or classes of documents as the President shall
determine from time to time to have general application or which he may
authorize so to be published.
o The publication of any law, resolution or other official documents in the Official
Gazette shall be prima facie evidence of its authority.
B. Ignorance of the law
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Article 3. Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith. (2)
REASON. The legal precept that “ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance
therewith” is founded not only on expediency and policy but on necessity (Zulueta v.
Zulueta, 1 Phil.254; U.S. v. Gray, 8 Phil. 506; U.S. v. Deloso, 11 Phil. 180; Delgado v.
Alonso, 44 Phil. 739). That every person knows the law is a conclusive presumption
(Tañada v. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446). When a law is passed by Congress, duly approved by
the President of the Philippines, properly published, and consequently becomes effective
pursuant to its effectivity clause or to some provision of a general law on the effectivity
of statutes, the public is always put on constructive notice of the law’s existence and
effectivity. This is true even if a person has no actual knowledge of such law. To allow a
party to set up as a valid defense the fact that he has no actual knowledge of a law which
he has violated is to foment disorder in society. However,
Article 3 applies only to mandatory and prohibitory laws (Consunji v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 137873, April 20, 2001).
Article 3 is a necessary consequence of the mandatory provision that all laws must be
published. Without such notice and publication, there will be no basis for the application
of the maxim “ignorantia legis non excusat.’’ It would be the height of injustice to punish
or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which
he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one (Tañada v.Tuvera, 136 SCRA
27).
C. Retroactivity of Laws
National Civil Code 4
o Article 4. Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided. (3)
NON-RETROACTIVITY OF LAWS. Laws have no retroactive effect, unless the
contrary is provided, for it is said that the law looks to the future and has no
retroactive effect unless the legislature may have given that effect to some legal
provisions, and that statutes are to be construed as having only prospective
operation, unless the purpose and intention of the legislature to give them a
retrospective effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the
language used, and that, in case of doubt, the same must be resolved against the
retrospective effect (Buyco v. PNB, 2 SCRA 682; Lazaro v. Commissioner of
Customs, 17 SCRA 37; Universal Corn Products, Inc. vs. Rice and Corn Board, 20
SCRA 1048; Cebu Portland Cement Co. vs. CIR, 25 SCRA 789).
o RETROACTIVE APPLICATION. Well-settled is the principle that while the
legislature has the power to pass retroactive laws which do not impair the
obligation of contracts, or affect injuriously vested rights, it is equally true that
statutes are not to be construed as intended to have a retroactive effect so as to
affect the pending proceedings, unless such intent is expressly declared or clearly
and necessarily implied from the language of the enactment (Espiritu v. Cipriano,
55 SCRA 533).
o The following are instances when a law may be given retroactive effect:
1. When the law expressly provides for retroactivity. Thus, the Family
Code of the Philippines which became effective on August 3, 1988 specially
provides in Article 256 thereof that the said code “shall have retroactive effect
insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance
with the Civil Code or other laws.”
2. When the law is curative or remedial. Since curative laws are not
within constitutional inhibitions or retrospective legislation impairing the
obligation of contracts or disturbing vested rights, statutes of a curative nature
which are necessarily retrospective must be given a retrospective operation by
the courts (25 RCL 790). The legislature has power to pass healing acts which do
not impair the obligations of contracts nor interfere with vested rights. They are
remedial by curing defects and adding to the means of enforcing existing
obligations. The rule in regard to curative statutes is that if the thing omitted or
failed to be done, and which constitutes the defect sought to be removed or
make harmless, is something which the legislature might have dispensed with by
previous statutes, it may do so by subsequent ones. If the irregularity consists in
doing some act, or doing it in the mode which the legislature might have made
immaterial by an express law, it may do so by a subsequent one (Government v.
Municipality of Binalonan, 32 Phil. 634). Retroactive operation will more readily
be ascribed to legislation that is curative or legalizing than to legislation which
may disadvantageously, though legally, affect past relations and transactions
(People v. Zeta, L-7140, December 22, 1955).
Hence, in Development Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 96
SCRA 342, where there were some questions as to the legality of the purchase of
certain lots acquired by the DBP pursuant to Republic Act No. 85 and where
Congress enacted Republic Act No. 3147 precisely to correct any invalidity as to
the said acquisition, the Supreme Court observed and ruled:
“It may be stated, as a general rule, that curative statutes are forms of
‘retrospective legislation which reach back on past events to correct errors or
irregularities and to render valid and effective attempted acts which would
otherwise be ineffective for the purpose the parties intended.’ They are intended
to enable persons to carry into effect that which they have designed and
intended, but which has failed of expected legal consequences by reason of
some statutory disability or irregularity in their action. They, thus make valid that
which, before enactment of the statute, was invalid. There cannot be any doubt
that one of the purposes of Congress when it enacted Republic Act No. 3147, by
amending Section 13 of Republic Act No. 85, was to erase any doubt regarding
the legality of the acquisition by the DBP of the 159 lots from the PHHC for the
housing project which it intended to establish for its employees who did not yet
have houses of their own. This is obvious from the fact that Republic Act No.
3147 was enacted on July 17, 1961, at a time when the legality of the acquisition
of the lots by the DBP for its housing project was under question. It is therefore a
curative statute to render valid the acquisition by the DBP of the 159 lots from
the PHHC.’’ Also, laws which regulate the registration of instruments affecting
titles to land may be held to apply to deeds dated before as well as after their
enactment when a reasonable time is given within which the effect of such
statutes, as applied to existing conveyances, may be avoided and rendered
harmless in respect to vested rights (25 RCL 790).
3. When the law is procedural. When a statute deals with procedure
only, prima facie, it applies to all actions — those which have accrued or pending
and future actions. Thus, a law prescribing the form of pleadings will apply to all
pleadings fi led after its enactment, although the action is begun before that time
(25 RCL 791). Also, it has been held that while changes in substantive law or
Supreme Court judicial doctrines interpreting the application of a particular law
may not be applied retroactively, especially when prejudice will result to the
party that has followed the earlier law or judicial doctrine (People v. Licera, 65
SCRA 270), that principle does not obtain in remedial or procedural law (Araneta
v. Doronilla, 72 SCRA 113, citing Aguillon v. Director of Lands, 17 Phil. 507-508;
Hosana v. Diomano and Dioman, 56 Phil. 741, 745-746; Guevara v. Laico, 64 Phil.
150; Laurel v. Misa, 76 Phil. 372, 378; People v. Sumilang, 77 Phil. 764, 765, 766).
This is especially true in the Philippines where it is within the power of the
Supreme Court to excuse failure to literally observe any rule under the Rules of
Court to avoid possible injustice, particularly in cases where the subject matter is
of considerable value and the judgment being appealed from is, by its nature,
reasonably open to possible modification, if not reversal (Araneta v. Doronila, 72
SCRA 413).
4. When the law is penal in character and favorable to the accused.
Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code specifically provides that penal laws shall
have retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is
not a habitual criminal, although at the time of the publication of such laws a
final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same. Article
62 of the Revised Penal Code provides that a person shall be deemed a habitual
delinquent, if within a period of ten years from the date of his release or last
conviction of the crime of serious or less serious physical injuries, Robo, Hurto,
Estafa, or falsification, he is found guilty of any said crimes a third time or
oftener.
National Civil Code 2252-2269
o TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS
o Art. 2252. Changes made and new provisions and rules laid down by this Code
which may prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the
old legislation shall have no retroactive effect. For the determination of the
applicable law in cases which are not specified elsewhere in this Code, the
following articles shall be observed: (Pars. 1 and 2, Transitional Provisions).
o Art. 2253. The Civil Code of 1889 and other previous laws shall govern rights
originating, under said laws, from acts done or events which took place under
their regime, even though this Code may regulate them in a different manner, or
may not recognize them. But if a right should be declared for the first time in this
Code, it shall be effective at once, even though the act or event which gives rise
thereto may have been done or may have occurred under prior legislation,
provided said new right does not prejudice or impair any vested or acquired
right, of the same origin. (Rule 1)
o Art. 2254. No vested or acquired right can arise from acts or omissions which are
against the law or which infringe upon the rights of others. (n)
o Art. 2255. The former laws shall regulate acts and contracts with a condition or
period, which were executed or entered into before the effectivity of this Code,
even though the condition or period may still be pending at the time this body of
laws goes into effect. (n)
o Art. 2256. Acts and contracts under the regime of the old laws, if they are valid in
accordance therewith, shall continue to be fully operative as provided in the
same, with the limitations established in these rules. But the revocation or
modification of these acts and contracts after the beginning of the effectivity of
this Code, shall be subject to the provisions of this new body of laws. (Rule 2a)
o Art. 2257. Provisions of this Code which attach a civil sanction or penalty or a
deprivation of rights to acts or omissions which were not penalized by the former
laws, are not applicable to those who, when said laws were in force, may have
executed the act or incurred in the omission forbidden or condemned by this
Code. If the fault is also punished by the previous legislation, the less severe
sanction shall be applied. If a continuous or repeated act or omission was
commenced before the beginning of the effectivity of this Code, and the same
subsists or is maintained or repeated after this body of laws has become
operative, the sanction or penalty prescribed in this Code shall be applied, even
though the previous laws may not have provided any sanction or penalty
therefore. (Rule 3a)
o Art. 2258. Actions and rights which came into being but were not exercised
before the effectivity of this Code, shall remain in full force in conformity with
the old legislation; but their exercise, duration and the procedure to enforce
them shall be regulated by this Code and by the Rules of Court. If the exercise of
the right or of the action was commenced under the old laws, but is pending on
the date this Code takes effect, and the procedure was different from that
established in this new body of laws, the parties concerned may choose which
method or course to pursue. (Rule 4)
o Art. 2259. The capacity of a married woman to execute acts and contracts is
governed by this Code, even if her marriage was celebrated under the former
laws. (n)
o Art. 2260. The voluntary recognition of a natural child shall take place according
to this Code, even if the child was born before the effectivity of this body of laws.
(n)
o Art. 2261. The exemption prescribed in Article 302 shall also be applicable to any
support, pension or gratuity already existing or granted before this Code
becomes effective. (n)
o Art. 2262. Guardians of the property of minors, appointed by the courts before
this Code goes into effect, shall continue to act as such, notwithstanding the
provisions of Article 320. (n)
o Art. 2263. Rights to the inheritance of a person who died, with or without a will,
before the effectivity of this Code, shall be governed by the Civil Code of 1889, by
other previous laws, and by the Rules of Court. The inheritance of those who,
with or without a will, die after the beginning of the effectivity of this Code, shall
be adjudicated and distributed in accordance with this new body of laws and by
the Rules of Court; but the testamentary provisions shall be carried out insofar as
they may be permitted by this Code. Therefore, legitimes, betterments, legacies
and bequests shall be respected; however, their amount shall be reduced if in no
other manner can every compulsory heir be given his full share according to this
Code. (Rule 12a)
o Art. 2264. The status and rights of natural children by legal fiction referred to in
article 89 and illegitimate children mentioned in Article 287, shall also be
acquired by children born before the effectivity of this Code. (n)
o Art. 2265. The right of retention of real or personal property arising after this
Code becomes effective, includes those things which came into the creditor's
possession before said date. (n)
o Art. 2266. The following shall have not only prospective but also retroactive
effect:
(1) Article 315, whereby a descendant cannot be compelled, in a criminal
case, to testify against his parents and ascendants;
(2) Articles 101 and 88, providing against collusion in cases of legal
separation and annulment of marriage;
(3) Articles 283, 284, and 289, concerning the proof of illegitimate
filiation;
(4) Article 838, authorizing the probate of a will on petition of the
testator himself;
(5) Articles 1359 to 1369, relative to the reformation of instruments;
(6) Articles 476 to 481, regulating actions to quiet title;
(7) Articles 2029 to 2031, which are designed to promote compromise.
(n)
o Art. 2267. The following provisions shall apply not only to future cases but also to
those pending on the date this Code becomes effective:
(1) Article 29, Relative to criminal prosecutions wherein the accused is
acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond
reasonable doubt;
(2) Article 33, concerning cases of defamation, fraud, and physical
injuries. (n)
o Art. 2268. Suits between members of the same family which are pending at the
time this Code goes into effect shall be suspended, under such terms as the court
may determine, in order that compromise may be earnestly sought, or, in case of
legal separation proceedings, for the purpose of effecting, if possible, a
reconciliation. (n)
o Art. 2269. The principles upon which the preceding transitional provisions are
based shall, by analogy, be applied to cases not specifically regulated by them.
(Rule 13a)
Revised Penal Code 22
o Art. 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws. — Penal Laws shall have a retroactive
effect insofar as they favor the persons guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual
criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at
the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced
and the convict is serving the same.
Family Code 256
o Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or
impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
D. Mandatory or Prohibitory Laws
National Civil Code 5
o Article 5. Acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws
shall be void, except when the law itself authorizes their validity. (4a)
o MANDATORY AND PROHIBITORY LAWS. A mandatory provision of law is one the
omission of which renders the proceeding or acts to which it relates generally
illegal or void. Thus, prescriptive periods provided by the law for fi ling particular
suits are mandatory in character. For instance, the Family Code provides, among
others, that the husband, in order to impugn the legitimacy of a child, must file a
case within one year from the knowledge of the birth of the child or its recording
in the civil register, if he should live within the same municipality where the birth
took place or was recorded. Should the husband fi le the case beyond the one-
year period, such case will be dismissed.
National Civil Code 17
o Article 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public
instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they
o are executed. When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or
consular officials of the Republic of the Philippines in a foreign country, the
solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be observed in their execution.
o Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have
for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be
rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or
conventions agreed upon in a foreign country. (11a)
E. Waiver of rights
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o Article 6. Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public policy,
morals or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by
law.
o WAIVER. Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right (Castro v. Del
Rosario, 19 SCRA 196). Waivers are not presumed, but must be clearly and
convincingly shown, either by express stipulation or acts admitting no other
reasonable explanation (Arrieta v. National Rice and Corn Corporation, 10 SCRA
79). It is essential that a right, in order that it may be validly waived, must be in
existence at the time of the waiver (Ereneta v. Bezore, 54 SCRA 13) and it must
be exercised by a duly capacitated person actually possessing the right to make
the waiver. It is an act of understanding that presupposes that a party has
knowledge of its rights, but chooses not to assert them. It must be generally
shown by the party claiming a waiver that the person against whom the waiver is
asserted had at the time knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of
the party’s rights or of all material facts upon which they depended. Where one
lacks knowledge of a right, there is no basis upon which waiver of it can rest.
Ignorance of material fact negates waiver, and waiver cannot be established by a
consent given under a mistake or misapprehension of fact (Consunji v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 137873, April 20, 2001).
o A person makes a knowing and intelligent waiver when that person knows that a
right exists and has adequate knowledge upon which to make an intelligent
decision. Waiver requires a knowledge of the facts basic to the exercised of the
right waived, with an awareness of its consequences. That a waiver is made
nowingly and intelligently must be illustrated on the record or by evidence
(Consunji v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 137873, April 20, 2001).
o PROHIBITION AGAINST WAIVER. Waivers cannot be made if they are contrary to
law, public order, public policy, morals or good customs, or prejudicial to a third
person with a right recognized by law. Hence, in Gongon vs. Court of Appeals, 32
SCRA 412, the Supreme Court held that the preferential rights of tenants under
Commonwealth Act No. 539 to purchase a public land cannot be validly waived;
as such waiver was against public policy. Pertinently, the Supreme Court said:
o On the second issue, petitioner’s position is that his preferential right could not
be validly waived, such waiver being against public policy. Under Article 6 of the
New Civil Code, “rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law,
public order, public policy, morals or good customs, or prejudicial to a third
person with a right recognized by law.”
o The old Civil Code (Art. 4) carried a similar provision, although it mentioned only
public interest or public order. That Commonwealth Act No. 539 lays down a
public policy there can be no doubt. In the case of Juat v. Land Tenure
Administration, G.R. No. L-17080, January 28, 1961, this Court, thru Mr. Justice
Felix Angelo Bautista, ruled in this wise: “x x x it may also be stated that the
avowed policy behind the adoption of such a measure is, as aptly observed by
the Court of Appeals, to provide the landless elements of our population with
lots upon which to build their homes and small farms which they can cultivate
and from which they can derive livelihood without being beholden to any man
(Pascual v. Lucas, 51 O.G., No. 4, p. 2429), such measure having been adopted in
line with the policy of social justice enshrined in our Constitution to remedy and
cure the social unrest caused by the concentration of landed estates in the hands
of a few by giving to the landless elements a piece of land they call their own.”
Being contrary to public policy, the alleged waiver of his right made by herein
petitioner should be considered null and void. Likewise, it has been held that the
signing by a disabled employee of a satisfaction receipt does not constitute a
waiver; the law does not consider as valid any agreement to receive less
compensation than the worker is entitled to recover under the law (Franklin
Baker Co. of the Philippines v. Alillana, 21 SCRA 1247). Also, it has been held that
the acceptance of benefits such as separation pay and terminal leave benefits
would not amount to estoppel or waiver of right of employee to contest his
illegal dismissal (San Miguel v. Cruz, 31 SCRA 819).
o Rights, protections, and advantages conferred by statutes may be generally
waived. Where, however, the object of a statute is to promote great public
interests, liberty and morals, it cannot be defeated by any private stipulation
(Griffith v. New York L. Ins Co., 101 Cal. 627, cited in 25 RCL 781). Hence, since
marriage is a social institution greatly affected by public interest and the purity of
which is a basic concern of the state, a private agreement between a husband
and a wife providing that they consent or allow the commission of adultery or
concubinage by the other spouse, as the case may be, thereby waiving their
rights to live with each other, is a void agreement or a void waiver of rights as the
same is contrary to public interest and morals.
National Civil Code 2035
o Art. 2035. No compromise upon the following questions shall be valid:
(1) The civil status of persons;
(2) The validity of a marriage or a legal separation;
(3) Any ground for legal separation;
(4) Future support;
(5) The jurisdiction of courts;
(6) Future legitime. (1814a)