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242 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Ilano vs. Court of Appeals

*
G.R. No. 104376. February 23, 1994.

ARTEMIO G. ILANO, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF

APPEALS and MERCEDITAS (sic) S. ILANO, represented
by her mother, LEONCIA DE LOS SANTOS, respondent.

Family Relations; Paternity and Filiation; Illegitimate

Children; Support.—Under the then prevailing provisions of the
Civil Code, illegitimate children or those who are conceived and
born out of wedlock were generally classified into two groups: (1)
Natural, whether actual or by fiction, were those born outside of
lawful wedlock of parents who, at the time of conception of the
child, were not disquali-

_______________

* SECOND DIVISION.

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Ilano vs. Court of Appeals

fied by any impediment to marry each other (Article 119, old Civil
Code; Article 269, new Civil Code) and (2) Spurious, whether
incestuous, adulterous or illicit, were those born of parents who,
at the time of conception, were disqualified to marry each other on
account of certain legal impediments. Since petitioner had a
subsisting marriage to another at the time Merciditas was
conceived, she is a spurious child. In this regard, Article 287 of
the Civil Code provides that illegitimate children other than
natural in accordance with Article 269 and other than natural
children by legal fiction are entitled to support and such
successional rights as are granted in the Civil Code. The Civil
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Code has given these rights to them because the transgressions of

social conventions committed by the parents should not be visited
upon them. They were born with a social handicap and the law
should help them to surmount the disadvantages facing them
through the misdeeds of their parents.
Same; Same; Same; Same; An unrecognized spurious child
has no rights from his parents or to their estate.—Before Article
287 can be availed of, there must first be a recognition of
paternity either voluntarily or by court action. This arises from
the legal principle that an unrecognized spurious child like a
natural child has no rights from his parents or to their estate
because his rights spring not from the filiation or blood
relationship but from his acknowledgement by the parent. In
other words, the rights of an illegitimate child arose not because
he was the true or real child of his parents but because under the
law, he had been recognized or acknowledged as such a child. The
relevant law on the matter is Article 283 of the Civil Code. While
the aforementioned provision speaks of the obligation of the
father to recognize the child as his natural child, for the purpose
of the present case, petitioner is obliged to recognize Merciditas as
his spurious child. This provision should be read in conjunction
with Article 289 of the Civil Code which provides: “Art. 289.
Investigation of the paternity or maternity of (other illegitimate)
children x x x is permitted under the circumstances specified in
articles 283 and 284.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Evidence; Last paragraph of Art.
283 of the Civil Code permits hearsay and reputation evidence
with respect to illegitimate children.—The last paragraph of
Article 283 contains a blanket provision that practically covers all
the other cases in the preceding paragraphs. “Any other evidence
or proof that the defendant is the father is broad enough to render
unnecessary the other paragraphs of this article. When the
evidence submitted in the action for compulsory recognition is not
sufficient to meet the requirements of the first three paragraphs,
it may still be enough under the last paragraph.

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Ilano vs. Court of Appeals

This paragraph permits hearsay and reputation evidence, as

provided in the Rules of Court, with respect to illegitimate
filiation.

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PETITION for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

     Ernesto P. Pangalangan for petitioner.
     Eduardo S. Rodriguez for private respondent.

NOCON, J.:

After the great flood, man was commanded to go forth, be

fertile, multiply and fill the earth. Others did not heed the
sequence of this command because they multiply first and
then go. Corollarily, it is now commonplace for an
abandoned illegitimate offspring to sue his father for
recognition and support.
The antecedent facts are narrated in the trial court’s
decision, as follows:
Leoncia first met petitioner Artemio G. llano while she
was working as secretary to Atty. Mariano C. Virata.
Petitioner was one of the clients of Atty. Virata. On several
occasions, she and petitioner took lunch together. In less
than a year’s time, she resigned from her work.
Sometime in 1957, Leoncia, then managing a business of
her own as Namarco distributor, met petitioner again who
was engaged in the same business and they renewed
acquaintances. Since then, he would give her his unsold
allocation of goods. Later, he courted her for more than four
years. Their relationship became intimate and with his
promise of marriage, they eloped to Guagua, Pampanga in
April, 1962. They stayed at La Mesa Apartment, located
behind the Filipinas Telephone Company branch office, of
which he is the president and general manager. He came
home to her three or four times a week.
The apartment was procured by Melencio Reyes, Officer-
in-Charge of the Filipinas Telephone Company branch
office. He also took care
1
of the marketing and paid rentals,
light and water bills. Unable to speak the local dialect,
Leoncia was

________________

1 Exhs. “A,” “A-1,” “A-2,” “A-3” and “A-4”.

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provided also by Melencio with a maid by the name of

Nena. Petitioner used to give her P700.00 a month for their
expenses at home.
In June, 1962, Leoncia, who was conceiving at that time,
was fetched by petitioner and they transferred to San Juan
St., Pasay City. In October, 1962, she delivered a still-born
female child at the Manila Sanitarium.
2
The death
certificate was signed by petitioner. Thereafter, while they
were living at Highway 54, Makati, private respondent
Merciditas S. llano was born on December 30, 1963 also at
the Manila Sanitarium. Her birth was recorded as
Merciditas de los Santos llano, child of3 Leoncia Aguinaldo
de los Santos and Artemio Geluz Ilano. Leoncia submitted
receipt issued by the Manila Sanitarium to show that she
was confined there from December 30, 1963 4
until January
2, 1964 under the name Mrs. Leoncia llano.
The support by petitioner for Leoncia and Merciditas
was sometimes in the form of cash personally delivered5
by
him, thru Melencio,6 thru Elynia (niece of Leoncia) or thru
Merciditas herself; and sometimes in the form of a check 7
like Manila Banking Corporation Check No. 81532, the
signature appearing thereon having been identified by
Leoncia as that of petitioner because he often gives her
checks 8which he issues at home and saw him sign the
checks. Both petitioner and his daughter admitted
9
that the
check and signature are those of the former.
During the time that petitioner and Leoncia were living
as husband and wife, he showed concern as the father of
Merciditas. When Merciditas was in Grade I at the St.
Joseph Parochial School, he signed10 her Report Card for the
fourth and fifth grading periods as her parent. Those
signatures were both identified by Leoncia and Merciditas
because he signed them at

________________

2 Exhs. “B” and “B-1”.

3 Exh. “C”.
4 Exhs. “D” and “D-1”.
5 Exhs. “E-2,” “E-3,” and “E-6”.
6 TSN, May 17, 1974, pp. 40-41.
7 Exh. “G”.
8 TSN, July 18, 1973, p. 49.
9 TSN, October 17, 1977, p. 53; TSN, October 9, 1978, p. 19.
10 Exhs. “H,” “H-1” and “H-2”.

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Ilano vs. Court of Appeals

11
their residence in their presence and of Elynia. Since
Merciditas started to have discernment,12he was already the
one whom she recognized as her Daddy. He treated her as
a father would to his child. He would bring home candies,
toys, and anything a child enjoys. He would take her 13for a
drive, eat at restaurants, and even cuddle her to sleep.
When petitioner ran as a candidate in the Provincial
Board of Cavite, he gave Leoncia his picture with the
following 14dedication: “To Nene, with best regards,
Temiong.”
In May, 1963, Ruth Elynia Mabanglo, niece of Leoncia,
lived with Leoncia and petitioner. She accompanied her
aunt when she started having labor pains in the morning of
December 30, 1963. Petitioner arrived after five o’clock in
the afternoon. When the nurse came to inquire about the
child, Leoncia was still unconscious so it was from
petitioner that the nurse sought the information. Inasmuch
as it was already past seven o’clock in the evening, the
nurse promised to return the following morning for his
signature. However, he left an instruction to give the birth
certificate to Leoncia for her signature, as he was leaving
early the following morning.
Prior to the birth of Merciditas, Elynia used to
accompany her aunt and sometimes with petitioner in his
car to the Manila Sanitarium for prenatal check-up. At
times, she used to go to his office at 615 Sales St., Sta.
Cruz, Manila, upon his instructions to get money as
support and sometimes he would send notes of explanation 15
if he cannot come which she in turn gave to her aunt.
They stayed at 112 Arellano St., then at Sta. Cruz, Manila
in 1966 before they finally transferred to Gagalangin in
1967. Petitioner lived with them up to June, 1971 when he
stopped coming home.
Petitioner’s defense was a total and complete denial of
any relationship with Leoncia and Merciditas. He disowned
the handwritten answers and signatures opposite column
16 of the death

________________

11 TSN, July 18, 1973, p. 57; TSN, October 1, 1973, p. 28.

12 TSN, October 18, 1974, pp. 28-29.
13 TSN, October 18, 1974.
14 Exh. “1.”
15 Exhs. “E,” “E-1” “E-2,” “E-3” and “E-4”.

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certificate of a female child surnamed llano, although in

column 13 thereof opposite father’s name the typewritten
name, Artemio G. llano, appears. He also denied the
following: all the notes alleged to have been received from
him by Elynia for delivery to Leoncia; the signatures
appearing in Merciditas’ Report Card; and being the source
of a photo of himself with a handwritten dedication. He
admitted that Manila Banking Corporation Check No.
81532 including the signature is his. He was sick on
December
16
30, 1963 and was hospitalized on January 7,
1964. He does 17
not understand why this case was filed
against him.
Melencio admitted that he was the one who procured the
apartment for Leoncia, leased it in his name, paid the
rentals and bought the necessities therefor. He and Leoncia
lived together and shared the same bed. They later
transferred to San Juan St., Pasay City and to Highway 54,
Makati. He stopped visiting her in March or April, 1963
because he planned to get married with another which he
eventually did in September, 1963.
Diosdado Datu, fish vendor, usually delivered to the
apartment fishes ordered by Melencio which were received
by Leoncia.
Nilda llano Ramos, daughter of petitioner, does not
know Leoncia; neither has she been brought to their family
home in Imus, Cavite, On December 30, 1963, her father
was at their home because he got sick on December 25,
1963 and was advised to have a complete bed rest. Her
father was hospitalized on January 7, 1964. She denied
that her father was at the Manila Sanitarium on December
30, 1963; that he fetched a certain woman on January 2,
1964, at the Manila Sanitarium because he was at their
home at that time, and that her father lived with a certain
woman in 1963 up to June, 1971 because all this time he
was living with them in Imus, Cavite. He was working and
reporting to the office everyday and when he goes to
Guagua or Manila on business, her mother or brother goes
with him.
Victoria J. llano, petitioner’s wife, further corroborated
the previous testimonies about petitioner’s sickness on
December 30, 1963 and hospitalization on January 7, 1964.

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It could not be true that her husband, during the years

1963 to 1968, lived three (3)

________________

16 TSN, October 9, 1978, p. 13.

17 TSN, December 11, 1978, p. 25.

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Ilano vs. Court of Appeals

times a week with a certain Leoncia de los Santos because

her husband never slept out of their house and that in his
capacity as President and Chairman of the Board of the
Filipinas Telephone Company he does not go to Guagua
even once a year because they have a branch manager,
Melencio Reyes.
After weighing the contradictory testimonies and
evidence of the parties, the trial court was not fully
satisfied that petitioner is the father of Merciditas, on the
basis of the following:

1) petitioner and Leoncia were not in cohabitation

during the period of Merciditas’ conception;
2) testimony of Melencio that he frequented the
apartment where Leoncia was living, took care of
all the bills and shared the same bed with her;
3) the birth certificate of Merciditas was not signed by
petitioner;
4) petitioner denied his signature in the monthly
report card of Merciditas; and
5) there is no clear and sufficient showing that
support was given by petitioner to Merciditas.

Thus, it rendered
18
judgment on April 4, 1981 dismissing the
complaint.
Fortunately for private respondent, respondent Court of
Appeals did not share the same view as the trial court. A
review of the testimonial and documentary evidence
adduced by private respondent led respondent court to the
firm conclusion that petitioner is her father, entitling her
to support. The dispositive portion of its decision dated
December 17, 1991 reads:

“WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is REVERSED and

judgment is hereby rendered declaring plaintiff MERCEDITAS S.
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ILANO as the duly acknowledged and recognized illegitimate

child of defendant ARTEMIO G. ILANO with all the rights
appurtenant to such status.
Defendant is directed to pay the plaintiff support in arrears at
the rate of EIGHT HUNDRED (P800.00) PESOS a month from
the date of the filing of the complaint on August 16, 1972 up to
August 15, 1975; ONE THOUSAND (P1,000.00) PESOS a month
from August 16, 1975 to August 15, 1978; ONE THOUSAND
THREE HUNDRED

_______________

18 Records, p. 693.

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Ilano vs. Court of Appeals

(P1,300.00) PESOS a month from August 18, 1978 to August 15,

1981; and ONE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED (P1,500.00) a
month from August 16, 1981 up to the time she reached the age of
majority on December 30, 1984.
Defendant is further ordered to pay the plaintiff the sum of
P10,000.00 as attorney’s
19
fees plus the costs.
SO ORDERED.”

The motion for reconsideration

20
was denied in the resolution
dated February 26, 1992.
Hence, the present petition.
We shall resolve the following pertinent errors allegedly
committed by respondent court:

1) in awarding “back support” even in the absence of

recognition or of a judgment declaring petitioner
father of Merciditas with finality;
2) in not ruling that an adulterous child cannot file an
action for recognition; and
3) in deciding matters of substance manifestly against
established decisions of this Court.

Petitioner argues that since the complaint against him has

been dismissed by the trial court, therefore, there was
absolutely no obligation on his part to give support to
Merciditas. It would have been only from the date of the
judgment of the trial court that support should have
commenced, if so granted. Under the law in force when the
complaint was filed, an adulterous child cannot maintain

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an action for compulsory recognition. In order that the

birth certificate may constitute a voluntary recognition, it
must be signed by the father. Equivocal act, such as
signing under the caption “parent” in the report card, is not
sufficient. Merciditas has never been to the family home of
petitioner at Imus, Cavite; nor introduced to his family; nor
brought around town by him, treated as his child,
introduced to other people as his child, led people to believe
that she was part of his family.
The petition utterly lacks merit.
Under the then prevailing provisions of the Civil Code,
illegiti-

________________

19 Rollo, p. 55.
20 Rollo, p. 58.

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Ilano vs. Court of Appeals

mate children or those who are conceived and born out of

wedlock were generally classified into two groups: (1)
Natural, whether actual or by fiction, were those born
outside of lawful wedlock of parents who, at the time of
conception of the child, were not disqualified by any
impediment to marry each other (Article 119, old Civil
Code; Article 269, new Civil Code) and (2) Spurious,
whether incestuous, adulterous or illicit, were those born of
parents who, at the time of conception, were disqualified to21
marry each other on account of certain legal impediments.
Since petitioner had a subsisting 22marriage to another at
the time Merciditas was conceived, she is a spurious child.
In this regard, Article 287 of the Civil Code provides that
illegitimate 23children other than natural in accordance with
Article 269 and other than natural children by legal
fiction are entitled to support and such successional rights
as are granted in the Civil Code. The Civil Code has given
these rights to them because the transgressions of social
conventions committed by the parents should not be visited
upon them. They were born with a social handicap and the
law should help them to surmount the disadvantages 24
facing them through the misdeeds of their parents.
However, before Article 287 can 25 be availed of, there must
first be a recognition of paternity either voluntarily or by
court action. This arises from the legal principle that an
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unrecognized spurious child like a natural child has no

rights from his parents or to their estate because his rights
spring not from the filiation or blood relationship but from
his acknowledgement by the parent. In other words, the
rights of an illegitimate child arose not because he was the
true or real child of his parents but because

________________

21 Castro, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. Nos. 50974-75, May 31,
1989, 173 SCRA 656.
22 TSN, March 5, 1979, p. 6.
23 ART. 269. x x x. Children born outside wedlock of parents who, at the
time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any
impediment to marry each other, are natural.
24 Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines
by Arturo M. Tolentino, 1983 Edition, p. 615 citing Commission, p. 89.
25 Paterno, et al. v. Paterno, et al., G.R. No. L-23060, June 30, 1967, 20
SCRA 585.

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under the law,26

he had been recognized or acknowledged as
such a child. The relevant law on the matter is Article 283
of the Civil Code, which provides:

“ART. 283. In any of the following cases, the father is obliged to

recognize the child as his natural child:

(1) In cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when the period

of the offense coincides more or less with that of the
conception;
(2) When the child is in continuous possession of status of a
child of the alleged father by the direct acts of the latter or
of his family;
(3) When the child was conceived during the time when the
mother cohabited with the supposed father;
(4) When the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that
the defendant is his father.”

While the aforementioned provision speaks of the

obligation of the father to recognize the child as his natural
child, for the purpose of the present case, petitioner is
obliged to recognize Merciditas as his spurious child. This

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provision should be read in conjunction with Article 289 of

the Civil Code which provides:

“ART. 289. Investigation of the paternity or maternity of (other

illegitimate) children x x x is permitted under the circumstances
specified in articles 283 and 284.”

In reversing the decision of the trial court, respondent

court found, as it is likewise our finding, that private
respondent’s evidence to establish her filiation with and
the paternity of petitioner is too overwhelming to be
ignored or brushed aside by the highly improbable and
fatally flawed testimony of Melencio and the inherently
weak denials of petitioner:

“Significantly, the Court a quo believed that plaintiff’s mother

and defendant carried an intimate relations. It nonetheless was
not

_______________

26 Castro, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., supra, citing Alabat v. Vda. de Alabat,
21 SCRA 1479 [1967]; Mise v. Rodriguez, 95 Phil. 396 [1954]; Magallanes, et al. v.
Court of Appeals, et al., 95 Phil. 795 [1954]; Canales v. Arrogante, et al., 91 Phil. 6
[1952]; Malonda v. Malonda, 81 Phil. 149 [1948]; Buenaventura v. Urbano, et al., 5
Phil. 1 [1905]; and Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA 439 [1985].

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satisfied that defendant is the father of the plaintiff because it is

not convinced that her mother and defendant were in cohabitation
during the period of her conception, and took into account the
testimony of Melencio S. Reyes who frequented the apartment
where Leoncia de los Santos was living and who positively
testified that he took care of all the bills and that he shared the
same bed with plaintiff’s mother.
The court a quo completely ignored the fact that the apartment
at Guagua was rented by the defendant, and that Melencio Reyes,
who was a mere employee and godson of the defendant with a
monthly salary of P560.00 was a mere subaltern of the latter, and
only frequented the place upon instruction of the defendant to
take care of the needs of the plaintiff.
As pointed out by appellant, Leoncia and Artemio stayed in an
apartment at the back of the Guagua Telephone System owned by
and of which Artemio was the General Manager (TSN, p. 46,
8/18/73) and Melencio was the Officer-in-Charge in the absence of

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Artemio whose residence and main office was in Cavite. There, for
the first time, Leoncia met Melencio (TSN, pp. 3-4, 1/25/74). The
apartment in Guagua was rented in the name of Melencio. As
Leoncia does not speak the Pampango dialect (TSN, p. 50,
8/18/73), Artemio gave Leoncia the instruction to call upon
Melencio for whatever Leoncia needs (TSN, pp. 11-12, 1/25/74).
Thus, it was Melencio who procured all the supplies and services
needed in the apartment for which procurement Melencio gives to
Leoncia the corresponding receipts of payment for liquidations of
cash advances Artemio or the Guagua Telephone System or
Leoncia herself, gives to Melencio (Exh. A, A-1 to 14; TSN, p. 32,
8/13/73; TSN, pp. 7, 12 and 14, 1/25/74).
At the Guagua apartment, Artemio would visit Leoncia three
or four times a week and sleeps there (TSN, p. 47, 8/13/73).
Artemio was giving Leoncia an allowance of P700.00 a month
(TSN, p. 38, 7/18/73). Leoncia got pregnant and Artemio found it
difficult to commute between Cavite and Guagua so that in June
1962, Artemio transferred
Leoncia to Calle San Juan, Pasay City (TSN, pp. 19-20,
7/18/73) where they were known as husband and wife (id. p. 41).
In leaving Guagua for San Juan, Pasay City, Leoncia was fetched
by Artemio in a car driven by Artemio himself. (pp. 9-11,
Appellant’s Brief)
Even as Artemio and Leoncia lived and transferred to several
places heretofore mentioned, Melencio continued to be a trusted
man Friday of Artemio who would deliver notes (Exh. “F”, “F-1”
and “F-3”) and money from Artemio to Leoncia. For reference,
among the notes identified by Leoncia as having come from
defendant were the following:

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VOL. 230, FEBRUARY 23, 1994 253

Ilano vs. Court of Appeals

‘Exh. “F-1”

‘Dear Ne,

Magsimula akong makausap ni Gracing ay nagkaroon ako ng

diferencia sa paa at ngayon ay masakit pa.
‘Si Miling ay ngayon lamang nakarating dito kung hindi ka
aalis diyan ay si Miling na lamang and utusan mo sa Makati
kung may kailangan ka dian.
Sgn.’     
‘Mayroon akong nakitang bahay na mayayari malapit sa
municipio ng Makati. Ipakikita ko sa iyo kung papayag ka.

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‘Sabihin mo kay Miling kung hindi ka aalis diyan bukas ay

pupunta ako.
‘Walang makitang bahay sa San Juan.
Sgn.’     

Exh. “F-2”

‘Ne, sa Viernes ay pupunta ako dian marami akong ginagawa.

Sgn.’     

Exh. “F-3”

‘Ne, si Miling ay bukas pupunta dito ay sa tanghali ay pupunta

ako diyan (11:30 am) Wala akong pera ngayon kaya bukas na,
Sigurado yon.
Sgn.’     

Exh. “F-4”

‘Dear Ne, Pacencia ka na at hindi ako nakapaglalakad gawa ng

mataas ang dugo, kaya minsan-minsan lamang ako makapunta
sa oficena.’
‘Ibigay mo ang bayad sa bahay sa Sabado ng umaga, pipilitin
kong makarating dian sa Jueves.
Sgn.’     

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“The address ‘Ne’ in the beginning of these notes refer to Leoncia

whose nickname is ‘Nene’ but which Artemio shortens to ‘Ne’.
Miling is the nickname of Melencio. The ‘Gracing” mentioned in
Exh. ‘F-1’ refer to Gracia delos Santos, a sister-in-law of Leoncia
who was with Artemio when Leoncia was removed from the
hospital during the birth of Merciditas.’ (pp. 17-19, Appellant’s
Brief). These tiny bits of evidence when pieced together
ineluctably gives lie to defendant’s diversionary pretense that it
was with Melencio S. Reyes with whom the mother lived with
during her period of conception.
The attempt of Melencio S. Reyes to show that he was the lover
of Leoncia being in the apartment and sharing together the same
bedroom and the same bed hardly inspires belief.
x x x      x x x      x x x.
Undoubtedly, the role played by Melencio S. Reyes in the
relationship between Leoncia and appellant (sic) was that of a
man Friday although appellant (sic) would not trust him to the
hilt and unwittingly required him to submit to Leoncia an

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accounting of his expenditures (Exhs. A, A-1 to A-14) for cash

advances given to him by Leoncia, Artemio or Guagua Telephone
System which would not have been the case, if it were true that
there was an intimate relationship between him and plaintiff’s
mother.
Evidently, following the instruction of his employer and
Godfather, Melencio foisted on the court a quo the impression
that he was the lover and paramour of Leoncia but since there
was really no such relationship, he could not state the place in
San Juan or Highway 54 where he took Leoncia, nor how long
they stayed there belying his pretence27
(sic) of an intimate
relationship with piaintiff’s mother.”

Having discredited the testimonies of petitioner and

Melencio, respondent court then applied paragraph (2) of
Article 283:

The court a quo did not likewise consider the evidence as

sufficient to establish that plaintiff was in continuous possession
of status of a child in view of the denial by appellee of his
paternity, and there is no clear and sufficient evidence that the
support was really given to plaintiff’s mother. The belated denial
of paternity after the action has been filed against the putative
father is not the denial that would destroy the paternity of the
child which had already been recognized by defendant by various
positive acts clearly evidencing that he is plaintiff’s father. A
recognition once validly made is irrevocable. It cannot be
withdrawn. A mere change of mind would be incompatible with
the

_______________

27 Rollo, pp. 43-49.

255

VOL. 230, FEBRUARY 23, 1994 255

Ilano vs. Court of Appeals

stability of the civil status of person, the permanence of which

affects public interest. Even when the act in which it is made
should be revocable, the revocation of such act will not revoke the
recognition itself (1 Tolentino, pp. 579-580, 1983 Ed.).
To be sure, to establish ‘the open and continuous possession of
the status of an illegitimate child,’ it is necessary to comply with
certain jurisprudential requirements. ‘Continuous’ does not,
however, mean that the concession of status shall continue
forever but only that it shall not be of an intermittent character
while it continues (De Jesus vs. Syquia, 58 Phil. 866). The
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possession of such status means that the father has treated the
child as his own, directly and not through others, spontaneously
and without concealment though without publicity (since the
relation is illegitimate) (J.B.L. Reyes and R.C. Puno, Outline of
Philippine Civil Law, Vol. 1, 1964 ed., pp. 269-270 citing Coquia
vs. Coquia, CA 50, O.G. 3701). There must be a showing of the
permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the child
as his own, by continuous and clear manifestation of paternal
affection and care. (Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. 1,
1983 ed., p. 602). (Mendoza vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 86302,
September 24, 1991.)
It was Artemio who made arrangement for the delivery of
Merceditas (sic) at the Manila Sanitarium and Hospital. Prior to
the delivery, Leoncia underwent prenatal examination
accompanied by Artemio (TSN, p. 33, 5/17/74). After delivery, they
went home to their residence at EDSA in a car owned and driven
by Artemio himself (id. p. 36).
Merceditas (sic) bore the surname of ‘Ilano’ since birth without
any objection on the part of Artemio, the fact that since
Merceditas (sic) had her discernment she had always known and
called Artemio as her ‘Daddy’ (TSN, pp. 28-29, 10/18/74); the fact
that each time Artemio was at home, he would play with
Merceditas (sic), take her for a ride or restaurants to eat, and
sometimes sleeping with Merceditas (sic) (id. p. 34) and does all
what a father should do for his child—bringing home goodies,
candies, toys and whatever he can bring her which a child enjoys
which Artemio gives to Merceditas (sic) (TSN, pp. 38-39, 5/17/74)
are positive evidence that Merceditas (sic) is the child of Artemio
and recognized by Artemio as such. Special attention is called to
Exh. “E-7” where Artemio was telling Leoncia the need for a ‘frog
test’ to know the status of Leoncia.
Plaintiff pointed out that the support by Artemio for Leoncia
and Merceditas (sic) was sometimes in the form of cash personally
delivered to her by Artemio, thru Melencio, thru Elynia (Exhs. “E-
2” and “E-3”, and “D-6”), or thru Merceditas (sic) herself (TSN, p.
40, 5/17/74) and sometimes in the form of a check as the Manila
Banking Corporation Check No. 81532 (Exh. “G”) and the
signature appearing therein which

256

256 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Ilano vs. Court of Appeals

was identified by Leoncia as that of Artemio because Artemio

often gives her checks and Artemio would write the check at home
and saw Artemio sign the check (TSN, p. 49, 7/18/73). Both

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Artemio and Nilda admitted that the check and signature were
those of Artemio (TSN, p. 53, 10/17/77; TSN, p. 19, 10/9/78).
During the time that Artemio and Leoncia were living as
husband and wife, Artemio has shown concern as the father of
Merceditas (sic). When Merceditas (sic) was in Grade 1 at the St.
Joseph Parochial School, Artemio signed the Report Card of
Merceditas (sic) (Exh. “H”) for the fourth and fifth grading
period(s) (Exh. “H-1” and “H-2”) as the parent of Merceditas (sic).
Those signatures of Artemio where both identified by Leoncia and
Merceditas (sic) because Artemio signed Exh. “H-1” and “H-2” at
their residence in the presence of Leoncia, Merceditas (sic) and of
Elynia (TSN, p. 57, 7/18/73; TSN, p. 28, 10/1/73). x x x.
x x x      x x x      x x x.
When Artemio run as a candidate in the Provincial Board of
Cavite Artemio gave Leoncia his picture with the following
dedication: To Nene, with best regards, Temiong”. (Exh. “1”). (pp.
19-20, Appellant’s Brief)
The mere denial by defendant of his signature is not sufficient
to offset the totality of the evidence indubitably showing that the
signature thereon belongs to him. The entry in the Certificate of
Live Birth that Leoncia and Artemio was falsely stated therein as
married does not mean that Leoncia is not appellee’s daughter.
This particular entry was caused to be made by Artemio himself
in order to avoid embarrassment.
It is difficult to believe that plaintiff’s mother, who is a mere
dressmaker, had long beforehand diabolically conceived of a plan
to make it appear that defendant, who claims to be a total
stranger, was the father of her child, and 28
in the process falsified
the latter’s signatures and handwriting.”

Granting ex gratia argumenti that private respondent’s

evidence is not sufficient proof of continuous possession of
status of a spurious child, respondent court applied next
paragraph (4) of Article 283:

“x x x plaintiff’s testimonial and documentary evidence x x x (is)

too replete with details that are coherent, logical and natural
which cannot be categorized as mere fabrications of an inventive
and malicious mind of which Leoncia de los Santos was not shown
to possess.

_______________

28 Rollo, pp. 50-53.

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The natural, logical and coherent evidence of plaintiff from the

genesis of the relationship between Leoncia and appellee, their
living together as husband and wife in several places, the birth of
the first still-born child, the circumstances of plaintiff’s birth, the
act of appellee in recognizing and supporting plaintiff, find ample
support from the testimonial and documentary evidence which
leaves no room to reasonably doubt his paternity which may not
be infirmed by his belated denials.
Notably, the court a quo did not consider plaintiff’s evidence as
lacking in credibility but did not deem them as convincing proof
that defendant is the father since the Certificate of live Birth was
not signed by appellee and since the monthly report card is not
sufficient to establish recognition, considering the denial of the
defendant of his signature appearing thereon.
While defendant’s signature does not appear in the Certificate
of Live Birth, the evidence indubitably disclose(s) that Leoncia
gave birth on December 30, 1963 to Merceditas (sic) at 4:27 p.m.
at the Manila Sanitarium. Artemio arrived at about 5:00 (TSN, p.
25, 5/17/74). At about 7:00 p.m., a nurse came (id., p. 26) who
made inquiries about the biodata of the born child. The inquiries
were directed to Artemio in the presence of Elynia who heard the
answers of Artemio which the nurse took down in a sheet of paper
(id. p. 28). The inquiries were about the name of the father,
mother and child. After the interview the nurse told them that the
information has to be recorded in the formal form and has to be
signed by Artemio (id., p. 30) but because there is no office, as it
was past 7:00 p.m. the nurse would just return in the morning for
Artemio’s signature. Artemio gave the instruction to the nurse to
give the biodata to Leoncia for her signature as he was leaving
very early the following morning as in fact Artemio left at 5:00
a.m. of December 31, 1963 (id. p. 33). Artemio stayed in the
hospital in the evening of December 30, 1963 (id. p. 26). As
pointed out in Castro vs. Court of Appeals, 173 SCRA 656:

‘The ruling in Roces vs. Local Civil Registrar of Manila (102 Phil. 1050
[1958] and Berciles v. Government Service Insurance System (128 SCRA
53 [1984]) that if the father did not sign in the birth certificate, the
placing of his name by the mother, doctor, registrar, or other person is
incompetent evidence of paternity does not apply to this case because it
was Eustaquio himself who went to the municipal building and gave all
the data about his daughter’s birth. x x x.’

x x x the totality of the evidence, as pointed to above, is more

than sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt that appellee
is the father of the plaintiff Merceditas (sic) Ilano.

258

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Ilano vs. Court of Appeals

As elucidated in Mendoza vs. Court of Appeals, Supra:

x x x      x x x      x x x
‘x x x although Teopista has failed to show that she was in open and
continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child of Casimiro,
we find that she has nevertheless established that status by another
method.
‘What both the trial court and the respondent did not take into
account is that an illegitimate child is allowed to establish his claimed
filiation by “any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
laws,” according to the Civil Code, x x x. Such evidence may consist of his
baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible in which his
name has been entered, common reputation respecting his pedigree,
admission by silence, the testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds of
29

proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.’ ”

The last paragraph of Article 283 contains a blanket

provision that practically covers all the other cases in the
preceding paragraphs. “Any other evidence or proof that
the defendant is the father is broad enough to render
unnecessary the other paragraphs of this article. When the
evidence submitted in the action for compulsory recognition
is not sufficient to meet the requirements of the first three
paragraphs,30 it may still be enough under the last
paragraph. This paragraph permits hearsay and
reputation evidence, as provided 31
in the Rules of Court, with
respect to illegitimate filiation.
As a necessary consequence of the finding that private
respondent is the spurious child of petitioner, she is
entitled to support. In awarding support to her, respondent
court took into account the following:

“The obligation to give support shall be demandable from the time

the person who has a right to recover the same needs it for
maintenance, but it shall not be paid except from the date of
judicial

________________

29 Rollo, pp. 49-50; 53-54.

30 Navarro v. Bacalla, G.R. No. 20607, October 14, 1965, 15 SCRA 114.
31 Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines by
Arturo M. Tolentino, 1983 Edition, pp. 607-608.

259

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VOL. 230, FEBRUARY 23, 1994 259

Ilano vs. Court of Appeals

or extrajudicial demand. (Article 203, Family Code of the

Philippines.)
The complaint in this case was filed on August 14, 1972.
Plaintiff, having been born on December 30, 1963, was about nine
(9) years old at the time and was already of school age spending
about P400.00 to P500.00 a month for her school expenses alone,
while defendant was earning about P10,000.00 a month. She
attained the age of majority on December 30, 1984 (Article 234,
Supra). She is therefore entitled to support in arrears for a period
of twelve (12) years four (4) months and fourteen (14) days, which
is hereby fixed at P800.00 a month for the first three (3) years;
and considering the declining value of the peso as well as her
needs as she grows older, at a graduated increase of P1,000.00 a
month for the next three (3) years; P1,300.00 a month for the
succeeding three (3) years; and P1,500.00 a month for the last
three (3) years, four (4) months and fourteen (14) days until she
attained the age of majority.
This being an action for legal support, the award of attorney’s
fees is appropriate under Article 2208 (6) of the Civil Code.
Moreover, the court deems it just and equitable under the given
facts and circumstances that32 attorney’s fees and expenses of
litigation should be recovered.”

We concur with the foregoing disposition, in the absence of

proof that it was arrived at arbitrarily.
The other allegation of petitioner that the appeal was
prosecuted almost ten years after the decision of the trial
court was rendered does not deserve any consideration
because it appears
33
that it is being raised for the first time
in this petition.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The
decision of the Court of Appeals dated December 17, 1991
and its resolution dated February 26, 1992 are
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

          Narvasa (C.J., Chairman), Padilla, Regalado and

Puno, JJ., concur.

Petition denied; Assailed decision and resolution

affirmed.

________________

32 Rollo, pp. 54-55.

33 Cordero v. Cabral, G.R. No. 36789, July 25, 1983, 123 SCRA 532.

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260

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Gaco vs. National Labor Relations Commission

Notes.—The mother is in the best position to know

whether petitioner was really her son (Chua Keng Giap vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 158 SCRA 18 [1988]).
Illegitimate children have rights of the same nature as
legitimate and adopted children (Dempsey vs. Regional
Trial Court, Br. LXXV, Olongapo City, 164 SCRA 384
[1988]).

——o0o——

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