1. Luciano P. Canedo v. Kampilan Security & DetectiveAgency Inc.
G.r no. 479326, July 31,2013
Facts:
Luciano, a security guard, was an employee of KSD and assigned at NAGA POWER
BARGE 102 NATIONAL POWER CORP. For not wearing a uniform on duty he was
reported, and was issued a certification from his agency. Hence, as reported by the
client, Canedo was terminated.
CAnedo was put on Floating Status and within 6 mos. After he was pulled out from NPC,
he filed for illegal dismissal. He alleged that he was illegally dismissed due to the
existence of the word “TERMINATED” from the certification issued to him.
Issue: WON there is illegal dismissal.
Held:
There was no illegal dismissal. In illegal dismissal cases, while the employer has the
burden to prove that the termination was for a valid cause or authorized cause, the
employee must first establish by substantial evidence the fact of dismissal from service.
Petitioner cannot simply rely on the piece of document(certification) since the fact of
dismissal must be evidence by positive and overt acts of an employer indicating an
intention to dismiss. He was not terminated but only on floating status.
Floating status is lawful but can ripen into constructive dismissal when it goes beyond
the six-month period maximum.
2. LIBCAP MARKETING CORP. v. LANNY JEAN B. BANQUIL
G.R NO. 192011, June 30, 2014
Facts: Lanny Jean Baquial is the accounting clerk of Petitioner. She deposited
the 2 daily collection using a single validated bank deposit slip. Hence, there is a
missing amount of P1437.00. Petitioner deducted said amount to repondent’s
salary.
Two notice of administration was sent to her but she failed to attend
because of financial issue, the conference being held in ILO-ILo and because she
just gave birth at that time.
After suspension, she was terminated on the ground of dishonesty,
embezzlement, in efficiency and for commission of an act inconsistent with the
standard of LIBCAPS.
Issues:
1. Won there was denial of due process.
2. Won respondent is entitle to financial assistance.
Held:
1. Yes. there was denial of due process. Respondent was pre-judged even prior to
the start of investigation. It was evident by deducting the missing amount of
P1437.00 from her salary. In doing so, the petitioners have made it clear that
they considered respondent as the individual responsible for embezzlement;
thus, in petitioner’s eyes, respondent was adjudged even before she could be
tried; the payroll deductions being her penalty and her recompense.
2. Yes, respondent is entitled to financial assistance.
The law and jurisprudence allow the award of nominal damages in favor of an
employee in case where a valid cause for dismissal exists but the employer fails
to observe due process in dismissing the employee, financial assistance is
granted as a measure of equity or social justice, and is in the nature r take the
place of severance compensation.
3. Grace Marine Shipping Corporation v. Aron Alarcon
G.R No. 201356, September 9, 2015
Facts: Aron Alarcon was messman onboard of the vessel of petitioner. During the nine
months contract, he maintained messroom sanitation by using strong cleaning chemical
substances. As such, he was repatriated for developing Psoriasis. In the Philippines, he
was again checked by two company physicians and was declared already fit to render
work. However, he went to a private physician and was diagnosed unfit to work and
which may require a lifetime treatment.
Hence, respondent filed for recovery for permanent total disability benefits.
Issue: won respondent is suffering from permanent total disability to be entitled to
indemnity.
Held:
Yes. Respondent is suffering from permanent total disability.
An employees’ disability becomes permanent and total when so declared by the
company designated physician, or in case of absence of such declaration of fitness or
permanent total disability, upon the lapse of he 12-140 day treatment period.
Moreover, respondent’s Psoriasis and nummular eczema, which have not been cured are
work connected and thus compensable.
4. TABUK MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE v. MAGDALENA DUCLAN
G.R NO.2003005, MARCH 14, 2010
FACTS: Magdalena Duclan is the cashier of petitioner, a cooperative engage in
investment and lending business. TAMPCO introduced Special investment Loans to its
borrowers and clients. However, the Coop. issued resolution 28 to limit the grant of SIL
to Php5 million due to report that the highest individual loan amounts to P14 million,
and it affects the TAMPCO’S ability to grant loans to other members.
Despite said resolution, SIL was still granted to FALGUI and KOTOKEn. As a
result, BA 55 was issued to halt completely the SIL. But still SIL was then again granted
in the names of FALGUI and KOTOKEn.
As a cashier responsible for the issuance of the SIL, Duclan was suspended for
15 days and was required to replace the 6 million missing amount.
During investigation Duclan was required to give her answer. After several
hearings, it was concluded that DUCLAn abuse her discretion in the grant of loans. She
was then recommended for immediate suspension.
Duclan was then again suspended from November 8 to December 31, 20014 and
was obliged to collect the missing amount from the unauthorized grants of SIL, failure to
do so would result to her termination. Unable to collect P1.5 million pesos, she was
dismissed.
Issue: Won there was illegal dismissal.
Held: There was no Illegal Dismissal.
Under article 282 of the Labor Code, the ER may terminate the services of its employees
for the latter’s serious misconduct or willful disobedience of its or its representative’s
lawful orders. And for willful disobedience to constitute a ground, it is required that:
a. The conduct of the employee must be willful or intentional;
b. The order the employee violated must have been reasonable, lawfully made
known to the employee, and must pertain to the duties that she had been
engaged to discharged.
Despite the issuance of Bas 28 and 55, respondent still granted SIL. Hence, she willfully
and repeatedly defied a necessary, reasonable and lawful directive of the BOD, which
was made known to them and which they were expected to know and follow as a
necessary consequence of their respective positions in the cooperative.
5. RENO FOODS,INC. v. NLRC
G.R NO. 116462
FACTS: Noel Catanjos, a utility worker of petitioner alleged that he was verbally
informed of his termination. Despite repeated pleas of Noel’s parents he was never
allowed to return to work. On June 18, 1992, or 2 yrs. And 5 mos. After he was
allegedly dismissed, he filed for illegal dismissal.
Petitioner as defense invoked that the principle of laches is applicable,
Issue: WON the principle of laches is applicable.
Held:
No there is no merit on the claim of laches.
Laches is a doctrine of equity while prescription is based on law. Our courts are basically
court of law not courts of equity. Thus, laches cannot be invoked to resist the
enforcement of an existing legal right.
An action for reinstatement by reason of illegal dismissal is one based on an injury to be
complainants right which should be brought with 4 years from the time of his dismissal
pursuant to article 146 of the civil code.
The dismissal case was filed within the 4 years prescriptive period.
6. GVM SECURITY and PROTECTIVE AGENCY v. NLRC
G.R NO.102157, JULY 23, 1993
FACTS: Private respondent is 64 years old, security guard of petitioner. He filed for
resignation as he was going to put up his own little business. He received P6,650.00 and
executed a quitclaim and on May 5, 1988, he filed for monetary claims including
retirement pay.
On their part, petitioner alleged they do not have a company policy/bargaining
agreement on employees’ retirement benefits.
Issue: WON an employee who voluntarily retire is entitled to retirement benefits.
Held:
No. in the case of LLora MOTORS INC. v. DRILON, under art. 287, entitlement of
employees to retirement benefits must be specifically granted under existing laws, a
collective bargaining agreement or employment contract or an established employment
policy.
In the present case, private respondent is not asking for retirement benefits due him
under the Social Security Law, he does not claim that there is a CBA or others
applicable, contract or an established company policy, granting him retirement benefits.
Hence, not entitled to retirement benefits.
7. GIRLY ICO. V. SYSTEM TECHNOLGY INSTITUTE (STI)
G.r no 185100, July 9, 2014
Facts: Petitioner, a multi-awarded employee, is the Chief Operating Officer (COO) of
STI-MAKATI. However, a merger was executed between STI and STI-MAKATI. Such that
there was a change in the structural plan.
GIRLY ICO who was then a COO was then appointed as Compliance Manager, a newly
created office. Her previous position was then occupied by one FERNANDEZ.
ICO then alleged that her appointment to the new position was illegal because the said
creation of her current position was contrived and fabricated.
Issue: WON the transfer of an employee to a newly created position which does not
exist in the structural plan is a constructive dismissal.
Held:
Yes. There is constructive Dismissal. Petitioner became the subject of an illegal
constructive Dismissal in the guise of transfer.
When another employee is soon after appointed to a position which the employer claims
has been abolished, while the employee who had to vacate the same is transferred
against her will to a potion which does not exist in the corporate structure, there is
evidently a case of illegal constructive dismissal.
8. PROTECTIVE MAXIMUM SECURITY AGENCY, INC.,
vs.
CELSO E. FUENTES
G.R. No. 169303, February 11, 2015
Facts: Celso E. Fuentes, a security guard by Protective designated at Post 33. On July
20, 2000, NPA ransacked Post 33 and took some firearms, Agency-issued uniforms and
personal items. On the same day, Fuentes and his fellow security guards reported the
raid to the PNP.
However, a complaint for robbery committed by a band against Fuentes was filed due to
the affidavit of Lindo, Jr. and Cempron that Fuentes conspired and acted in consort with
the New People’s Army basing.
While was Fuentes was detained, he alleged that he was "mauled and tied up by the
security officers of [Protective]." To preserve proof of these claims, Fuentes had pictures
taken of his injuries while in custody and acquired a medical certificate detailing his
injuries. But On August 15, 2001, the OPP of dismissed due to lack of Probable cause.
Fuentes , right after the criminal complaint was dismissed, demanded to return to work
but he was refused entry on the ground that he was a member of the NPA and that his
position had already been filled up by another security guard.
Hence, On March 14, 2002, Fuentes filed the Complaint "for illegal dismissal, non-
payment of salaries, overtime pay, premium pay for holiday and rest day, 13th month
pay, service incentive leave and damages against Protective.
On their part petitioner alleged that Fuentes abandoned his work and that he only filed
for illegal dismissal after 6 mos.
Issue:
1. WON Fuentes abandoned his work to constitute legal dismissal.
Held:
1. The absence of respondent does not constitute abandonment.
Abandonment constitutes a just cause for dismissal because "the law in protecting the
rights of the laborer, authorizes neither oppression nor self-destruction of the
employer." The employer cannot be compelled to maintain an employee who is remiss in
fulfilling his duties to the employer, particularly the fundamental task of reporting to
work.
However in the case of Agabon v. National Labor Relations Commission, this court
discussed the concept of abandonment: Abandonment is the deliberate and unjustified
refusal of an employee to resume his employment. It is a form of neglect of duty,
hence, a just cause for termination of employment by the employer. For a valid finding
of abandonment, these two factors should be present: (1) the failure to report for work
or absence without valid or justifiable reason; and (2) a clear intention to sever
employer-employee relationship, with the second as the more determinative factor
which is manifested by overt acts from which it may be deduced that the employees has
no more intention to work. The intent to discontinue the employment must be shown by
clear proof that it was deliberate and unjustified.
In the present case, According to petitioner, respondent’s actions constitute a failure to
report to work without a valid and justifiable reason. The respondent’s failure to return
to work was justified because of his detention and its adverse effects. Moreover, while in
the custody of the police, he suffered physical violence in the hands of its employees.
Thus, the intervening period when respondent failed to report for work, from
respondent’s prison release to the time he actually reported for work, was justified.
Since there was a justifiable reason for respondent’s absence, the first element of
abandonment was not established.
For the second element, Petitioner alleges that since respondent "vanished" and failed to
report immediately to work, he clearly intended to sever ties with petitioner.
However, respondent reported for work after August 15, 2001, when the criminal
Complaint against him was dropped but petitioner refused to allow respondent to
resume his employment because petitioner believed that respondent was a member of
the New People’s Army and had already hired a replacement.
Respondent’s act of reporting for work after being cleared of the charges against him
showed that he had no intention to sever ties with his employer.
Thus, respondent’s actions showed that he intended to resume working for petitioner.
The second element of abandonment was not proven, as well.
9. COLEGIO DE SAN JUAN DE LETRAN-CALAMBA,
vs.
ENGR. DEBORAH P. TARDEO
G.R. No. 190303 ,July 9, 2014
Facts: Respondent was employed as a full-time faculty member of the petitioner since 1985.
She manifested her intention to attend the 30th National Physics Seminar workshop and asked
for financial assistance. However as found out during the pre-audit the respondent’s letter
request was altered.
During the investigation respondent raised as a defense her good faith in omitting some parts
of the PPS Seminar.
Hence, she was found guilty of Dishonesty and serious misconduct and meted out a penalty
of suspension for one semester.
Issue:
1. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COMMITTED DISHONESTY AND SERIOUS
MISCONDUCT IN KNOWINGLY SUBMITTING A MATERIALLY ALTERED DOCUMENT TO
SUPPORT HER FUNDING REQUEST
HELD: No.
Misconduct is defined as improper and wrongful conduct. It is the transgression of some
established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in
character, and implies wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment. Of course, ordinary
misconduct would not justify the termination of the services of an employee. The law is
explicit that the misconduct should be serious.
Under Article 282 of the labor Code, the misconduct, to be just cause for termination, must
be serious. This implies that it must be of such grave and aggravated character and not
merely trivial or unimportant.
As amplified by jurisprudence, the misconduct must (1) be serious; (2) relate to the
performance of the employee’s duties; and (3) show that the employee has become unfit to
continue working for the employer.20
There is no basis for the allegation that respondent’s act constituted serious misconduct that
warrants the imposition of penalty of suspension. Indeed, considering the fact that before the
act complained of, respondent has been rendering service untarnished for 23 years, it is not
easy to conclude that for ₱600.00, respondent would willfully and for wrongful intentions omit
portions of the documents taken from the PPS website. In other words, as found by the
Voluntary Arbitrator and the Court of Appeals, there is no substantial proof of petitioner's
allegation of malicious conduct against respondent.
10. MA. CHARITO C. GADIA vs.
SYKES ASIA, INC./ CHUCK SYKES/ MIKE HINDS/ MICHAEL HENDERSON
G.R. No. 209499, January 28, 2015
Facts: Sykes Asia and Alltel Communications, Inc. entered into a contract. To
accommodate the needs and demands of Alltel clients for its postpaid and prepaid
services, Sykes Asia hired petitioners as customer service representatives, team leaders,
and trainers for the Alltel Project.
However, Alltel manifested its intent to terminate all support services provided by Sykes
Asia related to the Alltel Project. As a result, Sykes Asia sent each of the petitioners an
end-of-life notices, informing them of their dismissal from employment due to the
termination of the Alltel Project.
Aggrieved, petitioners filed for illegal dismissal.
As a defense, respondents averred that petitioners were not regular employees but
merely project-based employees, and as such, the termination of the Alltel Project
served as a valid ground for their dismissal. Such was expressly indicated in petitioners’
respective employment contracts that their positions are "project-based" and thus, "co-
terminus to the project."
Issue: Won the dismissal was valid.
Held: yes, the dismissal was valid.
In Omni Hauling Services, Inc. v. Bon, A project employee is assigned to a project
which begins and ends at determined or determinable times. Unlike regular employees
who may only be dismissed for just and/or authorized causes under the Labor Code, the
services of employees who are hired as "project[-based] employees" may be lawfully
terminated at the completion of the project.
According to jurisprudence, the principal test for determining an employee to be
considered project-based is that: (a) the employee was assigned to carry out a specific
project or undertaking; and (b) the duration and scope of which were specified at the
time they were engaged for such project.
In this case, records reveal that Sykes Asia adequately informed petitioners of their
employment status at the time of their engagement, as evidenced by the latter’s
employment contracts which similarly provide that they were hired in connection with
the Alltel Project, and that their positions were "project-based and as such is co-
terminus to the project."
In this light, the CA correctly ruled that petitioners were indeed project-based
employees, considering that: (a) they were hired to carry out a specific undertaking, i.e.,
the Alltel Project; and (b) the duration and scope of such project were made known to
them at the time of their engagement, i.e., "co-terminus with the project."
When the Alltel Project was terminated, petitioners no longer had any project to work
on, and hence, Sykes Asia may validly terminate them from employment.
11. BRENT SCHOOL, INC
vs.
RONALDO ZAMORA
G.R. No. L-48494 February 5, 1990
Facts: Doroteo R. Alegre was the athletic director by Brent School, Inc. with a contract
fixed at a specific term for its existence for five (5) years from the date of execution of
the agreement.
Three months before the expiration of the stipulated period Alegre was informed of his
termination of service. The stated ground for the termination was "completion of
contract, expiration of the definite period of employment." Hence, Alegre accepted the
amount of P3,177.71, and signed a receipt therefor containing the phrase, "in full
payment of services for the period May 16, to July 17, 1976 as full payment of contract."
However, at the investigation conducted by a Labor Conciliator of said report of
termination of his services, Alegre protested the announced termination of his
employment. He argued that although his contract did stipulate that the same would
terminate on July 17, 1976, since his services were necessary and desirable in the usual
business of his employer, and his employment had lasted for five years, he had acquired
the status of a regular employee and could not be removed except for valid cause
Issues: won the provision for fix term was valid making the dismissal of Alegre valid.
Held: Respondent Alegre’s contract of employment with Brent School having lawfully
terminated with and by reason of the expiration of the agreed term of period thereof, he
is declared not entitled to reinstatement.
Accordingly, and since the entire purpose behind the development of legislation
culminating in the present Article 280 of the Labor Code clearly appears to have been,
as already observed, to prevent circumvention of the employee's right to be secure in
his tenure, the clause in said article indiscriminately and completely ruling out all written
or oral agreements conflicting with the concept of regular employment as defined
therein should be construed to refer to the substantive evil that the Code itself has
singled out: agreements entered into precisely to circumvent security of tenure. It
should have no application to instances where a fixed period of employment was agreed
upon knowingly and voluntarily by the parties, without any force, duress or improper
pressure being brought to bear upon the employee and absent any other circumstances
vitiating his consent, or where it satisfactorily appears that the employer and employee
dealt with each other on more or less equal terms with no moral dominance whatever
being exercised by the former over the latter. Unless thus limited in its purview, the law
would be made to apply to purposes other than those explicitly stated by its framers; it
thus becomes pointless and arbitrary, unjust in its effects and apt to lead to absurd and
unintended consequences.
