MERRIT vs GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS action in his favor, or extend its liability to any cause not previously

d its liability to any cause not previously recognized. It

-carol- merely gives a remedy to enforce a preexisting liability and submits itself to the
jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense.
TOPIC: STATE LIABILITY (DEFINITION OF AGENT) It being quite clear that Act No. 2457 does not operate to extend the Government's
liability to any cause not previously recognized, the substantive law touching the
defendant's liability for the negligent acts of its officers, agents, and employees as
FACTS:
stated in Paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code reads:
E. Merritt was riding on a motorcycle going toward the western part of Calle Padre
“The state is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent, but not when the
Faura at a speed of 10 to 12 miles an hour. Upon crossing Taft Avenue, the General
damage should have been caused by the official to whom properly it pertained to do
Hospital ambulance, upon reaching said avenue, turned suddenly and unexpectedly
the act performed, in which case the provisions of the preceding article shall be
into the right side of Taft Avenue, without having sounded any whistle or horn and by
applicable.”
which movement it struck the plaintiff.
The responsibility of the state is limited by article 1903 to the case wherein it acts
By reason of the resulting collision, the plaintiff was so severely injured. According to
through a special agent (SPECIAL AGENT – one who receives a definite and fixed
the various merchants who testified as witnesses, the plaintiff's mental and physical
order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special
condition prior to the accident was excellent, and that after having received the injuries
official) so that in representation of the state and being bound to act as an agent
that have been discussed, his physical condition had undergone a noticeable
thereof, he executes the trust confided to him. This concept does not apply to any
depreciation. Before the accident he was considered as one of the best constructors of
executive agent who is an employee of the acting administration and who on his own
wooden buildings and he could not now earn even a half of the income that he had
responsibility performs the functions which are inherent in and naturally pertain to his
secured for his work because he had lost 50 per cent of his efficiency – he could no
office and which are regulated by law and the regulations."
longer, as he had before done, climb up ladders and scaffoldings to reach the highest
parts of the building. Hence, the State (the Government of the Philippine Islands) is only liable, according to
the above quoted decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, for the acts of its agents,
Thereafter, Act No. 2457, (effective February 3, 1915) was issued and authorized E.
officers and employees when they act as special agents within the meaning of
Merritt to bring suit against the Government of the Philippine Islands and authorized
paragraph 5 of article 1903, supra, and that the chauffeur of the ambulance of the
the Attorney-General of said Islands to appear in said suit. Section 1 of the said Act
General Hospital was not such an agent.
provides that “E. Merritt is hereby authorized to bring suit in the Court of First Instance
of the city of Manila against the Government of the Philippine Islands in order to fix the
responsibility for the collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General
Hospital, and to determine the amount of the damages, if any, to which Mr. E. Merritt PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS VS INTERMEDIATE
is entitled on account of said collision, and the Attorney-General of the Philippine APPELLATE COURT
Islands is hereby authorized and directed to appear at the trial on the behalf of the -cy-
Government of said Islands, to defendant said Government at the same.”

ISSUE: Whether or not the Government is legally liable for the damages resulting from TOPIC: STATE LIABILITY (GOV’T OWNED or CONTROLLED
a tort committed by an agent or employee of the Government? CORPS)
HELD: FACTS:

NO. The Government of the Philippine Islands having been "modeled after the Federal The case arose from a collision of a passenger express train of defendant Philippine
and State Governments in the United States," must look on the decisions of the high National Railways, (PNR) coming from San Fernando, La Union and bound for Manila
courts of that country for aid in determining the purpose and scope of Act No. 2457. and a passenger bus of Baliwag Transit, Inc. which was on its way to Hagonoy,
Bulacan, from Manila.
In the United States the rule that the state is not liable for the torts committed by its
officers or agents whom it employs, except when expressly made so by legislative Upon reaching the railroad crossing at Barrio Balungao, Calumpit, Bulacan, the
enactment is well settled. By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity Baliwag Transit bus got stalled and was hit by PNR’s express train causing damages
from suit. It does not thereby concede its liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of
to the bus and its passengers, eighteen (18) of whom died and fifty-three (53) others had done just that and made a signal to proceed when he did not see any oncoming
suffered physical injuries. train. Plaintiff's bus drivers and conductors are enjoined to observe such a
precautionary measure in seminars conducted by the company.
Baliwag Transit, alleging that the proximate cause of the collision was the negligence
and imprudence of defendant PNR and its locomotive engineer, Honorio Cirbado, in The evidence disclosed that the train was running fast because by his own testimony,
operating its passenger train in a busy intersection without any bars, semaphores, the train engineer had testified that before reaching the station of Calumpit the
signal lights, flagman or switchman to warn the public of approaching train that terrain was downgrade and levelled only after passing the Calumpit bridge the
would pass through the crossing, filed the instant action for damages against tendency of the train, coming from a high point is to accelerate as the gravity will
defendants. The defendants, in their Answer traversed the material allegation of the necessarily make it so, especially when it is pulling seven coaches loaded with goods
Complaint and as affirmative defense alleged that the collision was caused by the and passengers.
negligence, imprudence and lack of foresight of plaintiff's bus driver, Romeo Hughes.
Contributory negligence may not be ascribed to the bus driver. It was evident that he
PNR’s contention: The proximate and immediate cause of the collision was the had taken the necessary precautions before passing over the railway track. If the bus
negligence of the bus driver because the driver did not make a stop before ascending was hit, it was for reasons beyond the control of the bus driver because he had no
the railtrack. He did not heed the warning or shoutings of bystanders and passengers place to go; there were vehicles to his left which prevented him in swerving towards
and proceeded in traversing the railtrack at a fast speed. The bus driver was in fact that direction, his bus stalled in view of the obstructions in his front where a sand and
violating Section 42(d) of R.A. 4136, otherwise known as the Land Transportation and gravel truck stopped because of a jeep maneuvering into a garage up front. All the
Traffic Code for failure to "stop, look, and listen" at the intersection, before crossing wheels at the bus have already passed the rail portion of the track and only the rear
the railtrack. It is incumbent upon him to take the necessary precautions at the portion of the bus' body occupied or covered the railtrack. This was evident because
intersection because the railroad track is in itself a warning; and the bus driver the part of the bus hit by the train was the rear since the bus fell on a nearby ditch.
ignored such a warning and must assume the responsibility for the result of the Otherwise, if the bus was really hit in mid-body, the bus could have been halved into
motion taken by him two because of the force of the impact.

The failure of the Philippine National Railways to put a cross bar, or signal light,
flagman or switchman, or semaphores is evidence of negligence and disregard of the
ISSUES: safety of the public, even if there is no law or ordinance requiring it, because public
Who between the driver Romeo Hughes of Baliuag Transit, Incorporated and safety demands that said devices or equipments be installed, in the light of aforesaid
jurisprudence. In the opinion of this Court the X sign or the presence of "STOP,
the train engineer Honorio Cabardo of PNR was negligent or whether or not
LOOK, LISTEN" warnings would not be sufficient protection of the motoring public as
both are negligent?
well as the pedestrians, in the said intersection

RULING: FLORENTINA A. GUILATCO, petitioner, vs. CITY OF DAGUPAN,

and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
The instant case the State divested itself of its sovereign capacity when it -zyka-
organizedthe PNR which is no diferent from its predecessor, the Manila Railroad Company. The PNR
did not become immune from suit. It did not remove itself from theoperation of
articles 1732 to 1766 of the Civil Code on common carriers.
TOPIC: STATE LIABILITY (MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS)

The correct rule is that not all government entities, whether corporate ornoncorporate, FACTS:
are immune from suits. immunity from suit is determined by thecharacter of the objects for which
the entity was organized. -0n July 25, 1978, herein plaintiff, a Court Interpreter of Branch III, CFI--Dagupan City,
while she was about to board a motorized tricycle at a sidewalk located at Perez Blvd.
In this case, it was shown by Baliwag Transit that the bus driver Romeo Hughes took (a National Road, under the control and supervision of the City of Dagupan) accidentally
the necessary precautions in traversing the track. fell into a manhole located on said sidewalk, thereby causing her right leg to be
fractured.
The bus driver had stopped before traversing the track and in fact asked the
conductor to alight and made a "Look and Listen" before proceeding; the conductor
- As a result thereof, she had to be hospitalized, operated on, confined from July 25 to CA: REVERSED THE DECISION
August 3, 1978 (or for a period of 16 days). She also incurred hospitalization,
medication and other expenses. - on the ground that no evidence was presented by the plaintiff- appellee to prove that
the City of Dagupan had "control or supervision" over Perez Boulevard.
- during the period of her confinement in said two hospitals, plaintiff suffered severe
or excruciating pain not only on her right leg which was fractured but also on all parts
HENCE, THIS PETITION.
of her body. The pain has persisted even after her discharge from the hospital.

- Despite her discharge from the Hospital plaintiff is presently still wearing crutches and ISSUE: whether or not control or supervision over a national road by the City of
the Court has actually observed that she has difficulty in locomotion. From the time of Dagupan exists, in effect binding the city to answer for damages in accordance with
the mishap on July 25, 1978 up to the present, plaintiff has not yet reported for duty article 2189 of the Civil Code. [WON CITY OF DAGUPAN IS LIABLE]
as court interpreter, as she has difficulty of locomotion in going up the stairs of her
office, located near the city hall in Dagupan City. HELD:

- She earns at least P 720.00 a month consisting of her monthly salary and other means The liability of public corporations for damages arising from injuries suffered by
of income, but since July 25, 1978 up to the present she has been deprived of said pedestrians from the defective condition of roads is expressed in the Civil Code as
income as she has already consumed her accrued leaves in the government service. follows:
She has lost several pounds as a result of the accident and she is no longer her former
jovial self, she has been unable to perform her religious, social, and other activities Article 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for
which she used to do prior to the incident. damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by
reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public
PLAINTIFF FILED ACTION FOR RECOVERY OF DAMAGES AGAINST RES. CITY buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision.
OF DAGUPAN
It is not even necessary for the defective road or street to belong to the province, city
Defendant Alfredo Tangco, City Engineer of Dagupan City: or municipality for liability to attach. The article only requires that either control or
supervision is exercised over the defective road or street.
- admitted the existence of said manhole along the sidewalk in Perez Blvd., admittedly
a National Road in front of the Luzon Colleges. He also admitted that said manhole In the case at bar, this control or supervision is provided for in the charter of Dagupan
(there are at least 11 in all in Perez Blvd.) is owned by the National Government and and is exercised through the City Engineer who has the following duties:
the sidewalk on which they are found along Perez Blvd. are also owned by the National
Government. But as City Engineer of Dagupan City, he supervises the maintenance of Sec. 22. The City Engineer--His powers, duties and compensation-
said manholes or drainage system and sees to it that they are properly covered, and There shall be a city engineer, who shall be in charge of the
the job is specifically done by his subordinates, Mr. Santiago de Vera (Maintenance department of Engineering and Public Works. He shall receive a
Foreman) and Engr. Ernesto Solermo salary of not exceeding three thousand pesos per annum. He shall
have the following duties:
-expressly admitted that in his capacity as ex-officio Highway Engineer for Dagupan
City he exercises supervision and control over National roads, including the Perez Blvd. (j) He shall have the care and custody of the public system of
where the incident happened. waterworks and sewers, and all sources of water supply, and shall
control, maintain and regulate the use of the same, in accordance
The city contends that Perez Boulevard, where the fatal drainage hole is located, is with the ordinance relating thereto; shall inspect and regulate the
a national road that is not under the control or supervision of the City of Dagupan. use of all private systems for supplying water to the city and its
Hence, no liability should attach to the city. It submits that it is actually the Ministry of inhabitants, and all private sewers, and their connection with the
Public Highways that has control or supervision through the Highway Engineer which, public sewer system.
by mere coincidence, is held concurrently by the same person who is also the City
Engineer of Dagupan. The same charter of Dagupan also provides that the laying out, construction and
improvement of streets, avenues and alleys and sidewalks, and regulation of the use
TRIAL COURT: CITY OF DAGUPAN LIABLE FOR DAMAGES thereof, may be legislated by the Municipal Board. Thus the charter clearly
indicates that the city indeed has supervision and control over the sidewalk THE MUNICIPALITY OF SAN JUAN, METRO
where the open drainage hole is located.
MANILA, Petitioners,
The express provision in the charter holding the city not liable for damages or injuries
vs.
sustained by persons or property due to the failure of any city officer to enforce the THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, LAURA BIGLANG-AWA,
provisions of the charter, cannot be used to exempt the city, as in the case at bar. METROPOLITAN WATERWORKS AND SEWERAGE SYSTEM
(MWSS), and KWOK CHEUNG, Respondent.
The charter only lays down general rules regulating the liability of the city. On the other
hand article 2189 applies in particular to the liability arising from "defective streets,
-em-
public buildings and other public works."
TOPIC: STATE LIABILITY (MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS)
CITY ENGR CONTENTION:
Facts:

The City Engineer, Mr. Alfredo G. Tangco, admits that he exercises control or
supervision over the said road. But the city can not be excused from liability by the Under a "Contract For Water Service Connections" entered into by and between the
argument that the duty of the City Engineer to supervise or control the said provincial Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) and Kwok Cheung as sole
road belongs more to his functions as an ex-officio Highway Engineer of the Ministry of proprietor of K.C. Waterworks System Construction (KC, for short), the former engaged
Public Highway than as a city officer. This is because while he is entitled to an the services of the latter to install water service connections. On 20 May 1988, KC was
honorarium from the Ministry of Public Highways, his salary from the city government given a Job Order by the South Sector Office of MWSS to conduct and effect
substantially exceeds the honorarium. excavations at the corner of M. Paterno and Santolan Road, San Juan, Metro Manila, a
national road, for the laying of water pipes and tapping of water to the respective
houses of water concessionaires.
SC: We do not agree.

That same day, KC dispatched five (5) of its workers under Project Engineer Ernesto
Alfredo G. Tangco "(i)n his official capacity as City Engineer of Dagupan, as Ex- Officio Battad, Jr. to conduct the digging operations in the specified place. The workers
Highway Engineer, as Ex-Officio City Engineer of the Bureau of Public Works, and, last installed four (4) barricades made up of two-inch thick GI pipes welded together, 1.3
but not the least, as Building Official for Dagupan City, receives the following monthly meters wide and 1.2 meters high, at the area where the digging is to take place. The
compensation. This function of supervision over streets, public buildings, and other digging operations started at 9 o’clock in the morning and ended at about 3 o’clock in
public works pertaining to the City Engineer is coursed through a Maintenance Foreman the afternoon. The workers dug a hole one (1) meter wide and 1.5 meters deep, after
and a Maintenance Engineer. Although these last two officials are employees of the which they refilled the excavated portion of the road with the same gravel and stone
National Government, they are detailed with the City of Dagupan and hence receive excavated from the area. At that time, only ¾ of the job was finished in view of the
instruction and supervision from the city through the City Engineer. fact that the workers were still required to re-excavate that particular portion for the
tapping of pipes for the water connections to the concessionaires.
There is, therefore, no doubt that the City Engineer exercises control or
supervision over the public works in question. Hence, the liability of the city Meanwhile, between 10 o’clock and 11 o’clock in the evening of 31 May 1988, Priscilla
to the petitioner under article 2198 of the Civil Code is clear. Chan was driving her Toyota Crown car with Plate No. PDK 991 at a speed of thirty
(30) kilometers per hour on the right side of Santolan Road towards the direction of
Pinaglabanan, San Juan, Metro Manila. With her on board the car and seated on the
right front seat was Assistant City Prosecutor Laura Biglang-awa. The road was flooded
as it was then raining hard. Suddenly, the left front wheel of the car fell on a manhole
where the workers of KC had earlier made excavations. As a result, the humerus on
the right arm of Prosecutor Biglang-awa was fractured. Thereupon, Priscilla Chan
contacted Biglang-awa’s husband who immediately arrived at the scene and brought
his wife to the Cardinal Santos Hospital.

Dispatched to the scene of the accident to conduct an investigation thereof, Pfc. Felix
Ramos of the Traffic Division of the San Juan Police Station, upon arriving thereat, saw
Priscilla Chan’s car already extracted from the manhole and placed beside the a controlling factor, it being sufficient that a province, city or municipality has control
excavated portion of the road. According to this police officer, he did not see any or supervision thereof. This, we made clear in City of Manila vs. Teotico, et al.
barricades at the scene when he arrived less than an hour later. A Traffic Accident
Investigation Report3 was thereafter prepared and signed by Pfc. Ramos. At any rate, under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary for the liability
therein established to attach that the defective roads or streets belong to the province,
At the hospital, the attending physician, after having performed a close reduction and city or municipality from which responsibility is exacted. What said article requires is
application of abduction splint on Biglang-awa, placed a plastic cast on her right arm. that the province, city or municipality have either "control or supervision" over said
Barring complications, the injury she suffered was expected to heal in four (4) to six street or road. x x x
(6) weeks, although she must revisit her doctor from time to time for check-up and
rehabilitation. It is argued, however, that under Section 149, [1][z] of the Local Government Code,
petitioner has control or supervision only over municipal and not national roads, like
Biglang-awa filed before the Regional Trial Court at Pasig, Metro Manila a complaint for Santolan Road.
damages against MWSS, KC, the Municipality of San Juan and a number of San Juan
municipal officials. Sadly, petitioner failed to take note of the other provisions of Section 149 of the same
Code, more particularly the following:
The RTC held that the Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila and the Metropolitan
Waterworks and Sewerage System jointly and severally liable to the plaintiff [Biglang- Section 149. Powers and Duties. – (1) The sangguniang bayan shall:
awa]
(bb) Regulate the drilling and excavation of the ground for the laying of gas, water,
The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC sewer, and other pipes; the building and repair of tunnels, sewers, drains and other
similar structures; erecting of poles and the use of crosswalks, curbs and gutters
In denying liability for the subject accident, petitioner essentially anchored its defense therein, and adopt measures to ensure public safety against open canals, manholes,
on two provisions of laws, namely: (1) Section 149, [1][z] of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, live wires and other similar hazards to life and property, and provide just compensation
otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1983; and (2) Section 8, Ordinance or relief for persons suffering from them; (Underscoring supplied)
82-01, of the Metropolitan Manila Commission.
Clear it is from the above that the Municipality of San Juan can "regulate" the drilling
Petitioner maintains that under Section 149, [1][z] of the Local Government Code,6 it and excavation of the ground for the laying of gas, water, sewer, and other pipes within
is obliged to provide for the construction, improvement, repair and maintenance of its territorial jurisdiction.
only municipal streets, avenues, alleys, sidewalks, bridges, parks and other public
places. Ergo, since Santolan Road is concededly a national and not a municipal road, it Doubtless, the term "regulate" found in the aforequoted provision of Section 149 can
cannot be held liable for the injuries suffered by Biglang-awa on account of the accident only mean that petitioner municipality exercises the power of control, or, at the very
that occurred on said road. least, supervision over all excavations for the laying of gas, water, sewer and other
pipes within its territory.

We must emphasize that under paragraph [1][bb] of Section 149, supra, of the Local
Issue: Government Code, the phrases "regulate the drilling and excavation of the ground for
the laying of gas, water, sewer, and other pipes", and "adopt measures to ensure public
Whether or not the Municipality of San Juan is liable. safety against open canals, manholes, live wires and other similar hazards to life and
property", are not modified by the term "municipal road". And neither can it be fairly
inferred from the same provision of Section 149 that petitioner’s power of
regulation vis-à-vis the activities therein mentioned applies only in cases where such
activities are to be performed in municipal roads. To our mind, the municipality’s
Held: liability for injuries caused by its failure to regulate the drilling and excavation of the
ground for the laying of gas, water, sewer, and other pipes, attaches regardless of
Yes. Jurisprudence teaches that for liability to arise under Article 21898 of the Civil Code, whether the drilling or excavation is made on a national or municipal road, for as long
ownership of the roads, streets, bridges, public buildings and other public works, is not as the same is within its territorial jurisdiction.
QUEZON CITY GOVERNMENT AND ENGINEER RAMIR J. TIAMZON, stress the point that sufficient and adequate precautionary signs were placed at
VS. Matahimik Street. If indeed signs were placed thereat, how then could it be explained
that according to the report even of the policeman, none was found at the scene of the
FULGENCIO DACARA accident.
-gaddi-
The provisions of Article 2189 of the New Civil Code capsulizes the
TOPIC: STATE LIABILITY (MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS) responsibility of the city government relative to the maintenance of roads and bridges
since it exercises the control and supervision over the same. Failure of the defendant
to comply with the statutory provision found in the subject-article is tantamount to
FACTS: negligence per se which renders the City government liable. Harsh application of the
law ensues as a result thereof but the state assumed the responsibility for the
Sometime on February 28, 1988 at about 1:00 A.M, Fulgencio Dacara, Jr., maintenance and repair of the roads and bridges and neither exception nor exculpation
son of Fulgencio P. Dacara, Sr. and owner of Toyota Corolla Sedan, while driving the from liability would deem just and equitable.
said vehicle, rammed into a pile of earth/street diggings found at Matahimik St., Quezon
City, which was then being repaired by the Quezon City government. As a result, WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
Dacarra, Jr. allegedly sustained bodily injuries and the vehicle suffered extensive
damage for it turned turtle when it hit the pile of earth.
GENSON VS. ADARLE
Dacara, Sr. filed a Complaint for damages against the Quezon City and Engr.
Ramir Tiamzon before the Regional Trial Court. Defendants admitted the occurrence
-belhur-
of the incident but alleged that the subject diggings was provided with a mound of soil
and barricaded with reflectorized traffic paint with sticks placed before or after it which
TOPIC: STATE LIABILITY (PUBLIC OFFICERS)
was visible during the incident. In short, defendants claimed that they exercised due FACTS:
care by providing the area of the diggings all necessary measures to avoid accident.
Hence, the reason why Fulgencio Dacara, Jr. fell into the diggings was precisely  Arturo Arbatin was the successful bidder in the sale at public auction of junk
because of the latter’s negligence and failure to exercise due care. and other unserviceable government property located at the compound of the
Highway District Engineer's Office of Roxas City. Private respondent
RTC rendered its Decision. The evidence proffered by the complainant (herein Eduardo Adarle was hired as a laborer by Arbatin to gather and take away
respondent) was found to be sufficient proof of the negligence of herein petitioners. scrap iron from the said compound.
Under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, the latter were held liable. The CA agreed with  While the private respondent was tying a cable to a pile of scrap iron to be
the RTC’s finding that petitioners’ negligence was the proximate cause of the damage loaded on a truck inside the premises of the compound, and while the bucket
suffered by respondent. of the payloader driven by Ramon Buensalido was being raised, the bucket
suddenly fell and hit Adarle on the right back portion of his head just below
ISSUE: W/N the proximate cause of the accident is the negligence of the the nape of his neck. Adarle was rushed to the St. Anthony Hospital,
petitioners. (YES) Roxas City. According to the medical certificate issued by the attending
physician, the private respondent suffered injuries.
 The medical certificate also reported that: The patient recovered the use of
Proximate cause is defined as any cause that produces injury in a natural his urinary bladder and was able to defecate 2 months after surgery. He is
and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, such that the paralyzed from the knee down to his toes. He can only sit on a wheel chair.
result would not have occurred otherwise. The above residual damage is permanent 2nd to the injury incurred by Mr.
Adarle, he is still confined in the Hospital.
The unanimity of the CA and the trial court in their factual ascertainment that  The private respondent instituted the action for damages against
petitioners’ negligence was the proximate cause of the accident bars us from Arbatin, his employer; Buensalido, the payloader operator; Candelario
supplanting their findings and substituting these with our own. Petitioners have not Marcelino, the civil engineer; and petitioner, the Highway District Engineer.
shown that they are entitled to an exception to this rule.  The trial court found that, with the exception of the petitioner, all of the
defendants were present at the Highway's compound when the accident
As aptly discussed in the lower court’s finding, contrary to the testimony of occurred. However, it still adjudged the petitioner liable for damages because
the witnesses for the defense that there were signs, gasera which was buried so that the petitioner was supposed to know what his men do with their government
its light could not be blown off by the wind and barricade, none was ever presented to
 equipment within an area under his supervision. The Intermediate of Public Highways; that due to their negligence in not providing the ferry
Appellate Court which affirmed the decision of the trial court boat with safety devices, one of his auto-trucks, while being transported
from one bank to the other, fell into the river and was submerged in water
ISSUE: WHETHER PETITIONER CAN USE AS HIS DEFENSE THE NON- for over 30 hours.
SUABILITY OF THE STATE PRINCIPLE TO ESCABLE LIABILITY FROM
DAMAGES
 That as a consequence thereof, he suffered damages.
HELD: NO. It is a well-entrenched rule in this jurisdiction, embodied in
Article 2180 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, that the State is liable  Defendant Felix Hilario, on his own behalf, filed his answer denying the
only for torts caused by its special agents, specially commissioned to material allegations of the complaint and alleging as a special defense, that
carry out the acts complained of outside of such agent's regular duties he is working only under the instructions of his superiors.

 We hold that the petitioner's Identification as the Highway District

 Defendants (Baldonilo, Balato, and Cebuano) filed Motion to dismiss on the
Engineer in the complaint filed by the private respondent did not result
ground that the complaint states no cause of action and that they are not
in the said complaint's becoming a suit against the government
or state. the real parties in interest.
 "The fact that the duties and positions of the defendants are indicated
does not mean that they are being sued in their official capacities,  The remaining defendant Florencio Brazas filed motion to dismiss claiming
especially as the present action is not one against the Government." that plaintiff has no cause of action because they are being sued in their
Furthermore, the accident in the case at bar happened on a non- official capacities and therefore the claim for damages should be directed
working day and there was no showing that the work performed against the State.
on that day was authorized by the government. While the
equipment used belongs to the Government, the work was private in  Lower court dismissed the complaint. Plaintiff has prosecuted the appeal
nature, for the benefit of a purchaser of junk. directly to the Supreme Court.
 Since the evidence fails to establish petitioner Genson's presence
when the payloader's bucket fell on the head of Mr. Adarle, any liability ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court is correct in dismissing the complaint.
on his part would be based only on his alleged failure to exercise proper
supervision over his subordinates. HELD: NO
 At any rate, we see no malice, bad faith, or gross negligence on
the part of Genson to hold him liable for the acts of Buensalido and  Although the Government is the one operating the ferry boat, from which
Arbatin. plaintiffs’ truck fell, because of the absence of safety devices, the plaintiff
has elected to sue the defendant-employees personally for their negligent
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court is hereby acts under the doctrine of quasi-delict.
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint against Jesus Genson is
DISMISSED.
 ARTICLE 2180 provides for the liability of an employer for the tortious acts
of his employees. This, however, does not exempt the employees from
personal liability, especially if there are no persons having direct supervision
PEDRO TY BELIZAR VS. FLORENCIO BRAZAS over them, or if there is proof of negligence on their part.
-jeanelle-
 The injured party can bring an action directly against the author of the
TOPIC: STATE LIABILITY (PUBLIC OFFICERS) negligent act or omission although he may sue as joint defendants such
author and the person responsible for him.
FACTS:
 The fact that the duties and positions of the defendants are indicated does
 Petitioner Pedro Belizar filed a complaint against Florencio Brazas, Felix
not mean that they are being sued in their official capacities, especially as
Hilario and Lucio Baldonilo.
the present action is not one against the Government.
 Petitioner alleged that he is operating the Samar Express Transit; that
 In this case, the dismissal of the complaint is not justified.
defendants are being sued in their capacity as employees of the Bureau
 EDUARDO VARELA, Petitioner,
vs. Varela was sued in his personal capacity, not in his official capacity. In the complaint,
MA. DAISY REVALEZ, the employees stated that, "due to the illegal acts of the Defendant, Plaintiffs suffered
-joy- mental torture and anguish, sleepless nights, wounded feelings, besmirched reputation
and social humiliation." The State can never be the author of illegal acts.
TOPIC: STATE LIABILITY (PUBLIC OFFICERS)
The complaint merely identified Varela as the mayor of Cadiz City. It did not
FACTS: categorically state that Varela was being sued in his official capacity. The identification
and mention of Varela as the mayor of Cadiz City did not automatically transform the
Petitioner Eduardo G. Varela (Varela) was the mayor of Cadiz City. He created a
action into one against Varela in his official capacity. The allegations in the complaint
reorganization committee. On 22 September 1998, he submitted to the Sangguniang
determine the nature of the cause of action.
Panlungsod of Cadiz City the committee’s "Proposed Reorganizational Structure and
Staffing Pattern of Cadiz City." On the same day, 22 September 1998, the Sangguniang
Panlungsod approved without modification and without hearing the proposal. The EMILIA ALZUA and IGNACIO ARNALOT vs. E. FINLEY
Sangguniang Panlungsod passed Resolution No. 98-112 authorizing and appropriating JOHNSON
funds for the reorganization of the city government. Resolution No. 98-112 declared all -ron-
positions in the city government vacant, except elective positions and positions in the
city and assistant city treasurer. On 15 October 1998, Varela signed Resolution No. 98- TOPIC: STATE LIABILITY (PUBLIC OFFICERS)
112.
Facts:
Varela gave notices of termination to the city government employees, informing them
that their employment would end at the close of business hours on 31 December 1998. This is an appeal from a judgment of the CFI of Manila, sustaining a demurrer to the
The employees opposed and questioned the legality of Resolution No. 98-112. Varela complaint filed in this action on the ground that the facts stated therein do not
ignored them. constitute a cause of action.

The complaint dismissed by CFI charges the defendant Johnson, an associate justice
of the SC of the Phil. Islands, with corruption and misconduct in office of the gravest
Varela again gave notices of termination to the city government employees, informing character.
them that their employment would end at the close of business hours on 31 December
1998. On 4 January 1999, the employees tried to report for work but were barred from The damages which plaintiff Alzua seeks to recover are alleged to have resulted from
entering their offices. the entry by the court of an alleged erroneous judgment in a former action to which
Alzua was a party defendant. The alleged error is attributed to the alleged false and
misleading statement of the facts of the case which is set out in the written opinion
upon which the judgment of the court was based.
RTC declared Resolution No. 98-112 void and ordered Varela to pay the government
employees The complaint charges the defendant, the writer of that opinion:

 with having willfully, maliciously, and in bad faith, perverted and misstated
the facts set out therein to deceive the other members of the court to whom
Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the RTC’s 20 June 2001 Decision. The Court
the opinion was submitted for signature
of Appeals held that Varela was personally liable for the payment of moral damages,
 and that this was but one of series of malicious and wrongful acts whereby
attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and court appearance fees.
the defendant succeeded in deceiving his associates, and induced them to
sign the order directing the entry of the alleged erroneous judgment.

Issue: W/N Petitioner should be held personally liable for damages as he is sued in his Complaint also charges defendant with allegedly striking out with pen and ink of the
official capacity and not personal capacity word "affirmed" and the substitution therefor of the word "revoked" in the original
order directing entry of judgment in the earlier case, and the issuance by him, at the
Held: yas. He is sued in his personal capacity
same time, of directions to the clerk of the court to suspend the execution of the order 3. The complaint itself, read together with the exhibits and court records which
thus amended, until the further order of the court. are incorporated therein, sets forth facts which clearly demonstrate that the
charges of official misconduct and wrongdoing directed against the
As necessary corollary to the surmises, conjectures, and specific charges of wrongdoing defendant in the complaint are not well founded. Court holds also, in
set out in the complaint, if these charges are well founded, the four members of this this connection, that the allegations in the complaint of malice, bad faith, and
court whose signatures are attached to that opinion together with that of the intent on the part of the defendant to injure the plaintiff are not sustained,
defendant, must have signed the opinion with no personal knowledge of the contents and on the contrary are directly controverted, by the specific averments of
of the record submitted to them for adjudication, and without having read the briefs of facts set out in the complaint when read together with the court records
counsel, relying wholly upon the alleged false and misleading statement of the facts specially referred to therein. Court concludes, therefore, that proof of the
prepared by the defendant as the basis for the judgment which it is alleged was material and relevant facts well pleaded in the complaint would not
erroneously entered by the court. sustain the charges of bad faith, malice, and wicked intent set out
Plaintiff contends that the judgment of CFI sustaining the demurrer should be reversed therein, which on plaintiff's own theory of the case must be shown to exist
because, if the truth of the allegations contained in the complaint be admitted, it she can establish a cause of action.
appears that she suffered damages, actual and special, amounting to some P65,000 as 1st Ground (THIS IS OUR TOPIC – STATE LIABILITY)
the result of the entry of an erroneous judgment against her for the sum of P12,000
by the SC of the P.I. in a certain action to which she was a party defendant, to satisfy The Court might, perhaps, rely upon the reasoning of the concurring opinion in the
which she was compelled, to sell certain valuable real estate at a great sacrifice; and case of Forbes vs. Chuoco Tiaco, wherein the writer undertakes to establish that
because this erroneous judgment was rendered by the SC of the P.I. as a result of the "whenever and wherever a judge of a court of superior jurisdiction exercises judicial
unlawful and malicious intervention of the defendant in the various proceedings had in functions, he will not personally liable in civil damages for the result of the actions,"
this court leading up to its entry. and that "the test of judicial liability is not jurisdiction, but such liability depends wholly
upon the nature of the question which is being determined when the error complained
Issue: of is committed by the court. If such question is one of determination of which requires
 Whether or not the defendant Justice Johnson acted within its acting within the exercise of judicial functions, the judge is not liable, even though there is in reality
the limits of his legal powers and jurisdiction in doing the various acts an absolute failure of jurisdiction over the subject matter."
mentioned in the complaint. (Yes) Court holds that under the law as it now exists in these Islands judges of superior and
 Whether or not he could be held liable for damages for such acts. (No) general jurisdiction are not liable to respond in civil action for damages for what they
Ruling: may do in the exercise of their judicial functions when acting within their legal powers
and jurisdiction.
Court holds that the demurrer to the complaint was properly sustained by the
CFI, based on several grounds, each of which is sufficient in itself to sustain the action This restricted statement of the rule of judicial liability in civil actions is universally
of the trial judge. asserted by the text-writers, and is a settled principle of law as applied by the courts
of England and the United States. It need not no citation of authorities to sustain it,
1. Admitting the truth of all the allegation set out in the complaint, of and we shall not burden the body of this opinion with the arguments which are
official misconduct and wrong doing, and of malice, bad faith, and advanced in its support. But the grounds of public policy on which it rests, can be
intent to injure the plaintiff contained therein, the defendant, quoted from Mr. Cooley's work on Torts; and an extensive citation from the opinion of
nevertheless, is not liable to respond in a civil action for the damages the Supreme Court of the US written by Chief Justice Field in the case of Bradley vs.
which it is alleged were occasioned thereby. (THIS IS OUR TOPIC – Fisher, in which the rule is discussed at length.
STATE LIABILITY)
2. The complaint itself, read together with the exhibits and court records which There can be no argument to demonstrate that the defendant was acting within the
are incorporated therein, clearly discloses that the judgment, out of which limits of his legal powers and jurisdiction in taking part in the adjudication of the appeals
plaintiff claims that the alleged damages sprung, was not in the two cases referred to in the complaint.
erroneously entered as alleged in the complaint, and therefore that the The only question, as to the legal powers and jurisdiction of the defendant to do the
plaintiff has no claim for damages against the defendant; in other words, that various acts mentioned in the complaint which need be considered, arises in connection
the facts set out in the complaint do not constitute a cause of action. with his action in amending the order directing the entry of judgment in the earlier case
referred to in the complaint, and in giving directions to the clerk of the court not to
execute the original order nor the order as amended until the further order of the court. CADIZ vs HON. PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC (Br.48), PUERTO
The complaint expressly alleges that all of these acts were done during the judicial PRINCESA CITY
vacation of the court in the year 1907. But at the time the defendant was acting as
vacation justice, designated to remain on duty during the vacation period of the year
-carol-
1907, with full legal powers and jurisdiction to each an all of these acts if the court
TOPIC: STATE LIABILITY (PUBLIC OFFICERS)
itself would have had such powers and jurisdiction to do them when in regular session.
FACTS: The Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors, then composed of
The allegations of the complain, were done by the defendant, in the exercise of his
petitioners, received an administrative complaint filed by Lilia T. Ventura and
judicial functions, as a justice of the SC of the P.I., a court of superior and general
Concepcion Tabang against respondent Atty. Glenn C. Gacott for gross misconduct,
jurisdiction; and it clearly appearing from the complaint, that in doing each and all of
deceit, and gross dishonesty. The IBP Board designated petitioner Lydia A. Navarro
the acts complained of, he was acting in the limits of his legal powers and jurisdiction;
(Navarro) as Commissioner to investigate the case.
it follows, as of course, that he cannot be held to respond in this action for the damages
which it is alleged were occasioned thereby, since judges of superior and general Commissioner Navarro summoned the parties to a mandatory conference and required
jurisdiction are not liable to respond in civil actions for damages for what they may do them afterwards to submit their position papers. Based on these, Navarro submitted
in the exercise of judicial functions when acting within legal powers and jurisdiction. her Report and Recommendation to the IBP Board for its approval. After deliberation,
the IBP Board adopted Commissioner Navarro's findings but increased the
The rule of liability. - If the question is one which a judge, qualified in the
recommended penalty of six months suspension from the practice of law to disbarment.
average way for position occupied by the offending judge or for a similar
The IBP Board then transmitted their report to this Court.
judicial position, would regard as a real question, then it is one whose
determination requires the exercise of judicial functions. But if it is one so The Court remanded the case to the IBP Board for further proceedings in order to give
clear that a judge, qualified as aforesaid, would not regard as a real question, the parties the chance to fully present their case. The Court said the investigating
then it is one whose determination does not require the exercise of judicial commissioner should have subpoenaed and examined the witnesses of the parties
functions. In the former case,. the judge is not liable; in the latter, he is. considering the gravity of the charge against Atty. Gacott. Navarro rendered her report
(Forbes vs. Chuoco Tiaco, 16 Phil. Rep., 534.) based solely on the position papers and affidavits of the witnesses without the benefit
of exhaustive hearing.
In the discussion of the doctrine of immunity of judicial officers from civil liability,
nothing therein is to be understood as giving to them the power to act with partially, While the IBP Board was complying with the Court's directive, Atty. Gacott filed a
or maliciously, or corruptly, or arbitrarily, or oppressively without fear that they may be complaint for (actual, moral, and corrective) damages against the board's sitting
called to account for such conduct. No judge, however high his rank may be, is above members before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Puerto Princesa City, Palawan.
or beyond the law which it is his high office to administer. Indeed, we would deem it Answering the complaint, the IBP Board raised the affirmative defense of failure of the
our duty to be the first to take the necessary preliminary steps looking to the suspension complaint to state a cause of action and filed a motion to dismiss the case on that
and removal from office of the defendant, by impeachment of otherwise, if we were of ground.
opinion that the charges of misconduct in office preferred against him had any
foundation in fact; and we would not allow the sun to set upon this day's session of RTC: Denied the motion; the IBP Board then elevated the case to the Court of Appeals
the court without having issued the necessary for the institution of criminal proceedings on special civil action for certiorari.
against him if we had reason to believe that there are any grounds for the criminal
charges set forth in the complaint. CA: Denied the petition, pointing out that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of
discretion. The IBP Board had other plain and speedy remedy, like proceeding to trial
2nd Ground (OMITTED) in the case and appealing in the event of failure of the RTC to dismiss the action.

3rd Ground (OMITTED) ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in failing to rule that the Supreme Court's remand
of the disbarment case to the IBP Board for examination of the witnesses, cannot serve
The judgement of CFI, sustaining the demurrer and dismissing the complaint, should as basis for the latter's complaint for damages against the members of that board?
be affirmed with the costs of this instance against the appellant.
HELD: YES. The petitioner IBP Board members are correct in claiming that Atty.
Gacott's complaint states no cause of action. The IBP Commissioner and Board of
Governors in this case merely exercised delegated powers to investigate the complaint
against Atty. Gacott and submit their report and recommendation to the Court. They
cannot be charged for honest errors committed in the performance of their quasi- this Court in Gan v. Court of Appeals,23 thus:
judicial function. And that was what it was in the absence of any allegation of specific
factual circumstances indicating that they acted maliciously or upon illicit consideration. One who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without
If the rule were otherwise, a great number of lower court justices and judges whose time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger,
acts the appellate courts have annulled on ground of grave abuse of discretion would is not guilty of negligence if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection
be open targets for damage suits. Complaint for damages against petitioners is may appear to have been a better method unless the emergency in which he finds
dismissed for failure to state a cause of action. himself is brought about by his own negligence.

Under Section 37 of Republic Act No. 4136, as amended, otherwise known as the
Land Transportation and Traffic Code, motorists are mandated to drive and operate
MARIKINA AUTOLINE TRANSPORT CORP. VS PEOPLE vehicles on the right side of the road or highway:
-cy-
SEC. 37. Driving on right side of highway. – Unless a different course of action is
TOPIC: CASES ON PRESUMPTION required in the interest of the safety and the security of life, person or property, or
because of unreasonable difficulty of operation in compliance herewith, every person
FACTS:
operating a motor vehicle or an animal-drawn vehicle on a highway shall pass to the
Erlinda V. Valdellon is the owner of a two-door commercial apartment located at No. right when meeting persons or vehicles coming toward him, and to the left when
31 Kamias Road, Quezon City. The Marikina Auto Line Transport Corporation (MALTC) overtaking persons or vehicles going the same direction, and when turning to the left
is the owner-operator of a passenger bus with Plate Number NCV-849. Suelto, its in going from one highway to another, every vehicle shall be conducted to the right
employee, was assigned as the regular driver of the bus. of the center of the intersection of the highway.

At around 2:00 p.m. on October 3, 1992, Suelto was driving the aforementioned Section 35 of the law provides, thus:
passenger bus along Kamias Road, Kamuning, Quezon City, going towards Epifanio
de los Santos Avenue (EDSA). The bus suddenly swerved to the right and struck the Sec. 35. Restriction as to speed.—(a) Any person driving a motor vehicle on a
terrace of the commercial apartment owned by Valdellon located along Kamuning highway shall drive the same at a careful and prudent speed, not greater nor less
Road. Valdellon demanded payment of P148,440.00 to cover the cost of the damage than is reasonable and proper, having due regard for the traffic, the width of the
to the terrace. The bus company and Suelto offered a P30,000.00 settlement which highway, and of any other condition then and there existing; and no person shall
Valdellon refused. drive any motor vehicle upon a highway at such a speed as to endanger the life, limb
and property of any person, nor at a speed greater than will permit him to bring the
Valdellon filed a criminal complaint for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to vehicle to a stop within the assured clear distance ahead.
property against Suelto. Valdellon also filed a separate civil complaint against Suelto
and the bus company for damages. Suelto maintained that, in an emergency case, he In relation thereto, Article 2185 of the New Civil Code provides that "unless there is
was not, in law, negligent. Both the trial court and the CA ruled in against the proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been
petitioners. negligent, if at the time of mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation." By his own
admission, petitioner Suelto violated the Land Transportation and Traffic Code when
ISSUE: he suddenly swerved the bus to the right, thereby causing damage to the property of
Whether or not the sudden emergency rule applies in the case at bar. private respondent.

RULING: However, the trial court correctly rejected petitioner Suelto’s defense, in light of his
contradictory testimony vis-à-vis his Counter-Affidavit submitted during the
preliminary investigation:
No!!

It was the burden of petitioners herein to prove petitioner Suelto’s defense that he In addition to this, the accused has made conflicting statements in his counter-
acted on an emergency, that is, he had to swerve the bus to the right to avoid affidavit and his testimony in court. In the former, he stated that the reason why he
colliding with a passenger jeep coming from EDSA that had overtaken another vehicle swerved to the right was because he wanted to avoid the passenger jeepney in front
and intruded into the lane of the bus. The sudden emergency rule was enunciated by of him that made a sudden stop. But, in his testimony in court, he said that it was to
avoid a passenger jeepney coming from EDSA that was overtaking by occupying his According to Rolly Orpilla, a witness and one of the bus passengers, Pleyto tried to
lane. Such glaring inconsistencies on material points render the testimony of the overtake Esguerra’s tricycle but hit it instead. Pleyto then swerved into the left opposite
witness doubtful and shatter his credibility. Furthermore, the variance between lane. Coming down the lane, some fifty meters away, was a southbound Mitsubishi
testimony and prior statements renders the witness unreliable. Such inconsistency Lancer car, with Plate No. PRS 941, driven by Arnulfo Asuncion. The car was headed
results in the loss in the credibility of the witness and his testimony as to his for Manila with some passengers. Seated beside Arnulfo was his brother-in-law, Ricardo
prudence and diligence. Lomboy, while in the back seat were Ricardo’s 18-year old daughter Carmela and her
friend, one Rhino Daba. PRBL Bus No. 1539 smashed head-on the car, killing Arnulfo
and Ricardo instantly. Carmela and Rhino suffered injuries, but only Carmela required
As already maintained and concluded, the severe damages sustained could not have
hospitalization.
resulted had the accused acted as a reasonable and prudent man would. The accused
was not diligent as he claims to be. What is more probable is that the accused had to
On November 29, 1995, herein respondents, as pauper-litigants, filed an action
swerve to the right and hit the commercial apartment of the plaintiff because he
for damages against PRBL and its driver, Pleyto, with the RTC of Dagupan
could not make a full stop as he was driving too fast in a usually crowded street. City.

Moreover, if the claim of petitioners were true, they should have filed a third-party
Petitioners PRBL and Ernesto Pleyto both claimed:
complaint against the driver of the offending passenger jeepney and the
owner/operator thereof.
-that the bus was running slowly at the time of the accident. They pointed out that Bus
No. 1539 had been inspected by driver Pleyto and examined by a mechanic prior to the
Petitioner Suelto’s reliance on the sudden emergency rule to escape conviction for the
trip, in accordance with the company’s standard operating procedure. It was found in
crime charged and his civil liabilities based thereon is, thus, futile.
good working condition. Pleyto claimed that while cruising along the highway at
Gerona, Tarlac, he noticed Esguerra’s tricycle and followed it at a safe distance after
ERNESTO PLEYTO and PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, he was unable to overtake it. Suddenly and without warning, the tricycle stopped in
INC., petitioners, vs. MARIA D. LOMBOY and CARMELA the middle of the road. Pleyto stepped on the brakes and the bus lost speed. But, since
it skidded towards the direction of the tricycle, he swerved the bus to the other lane to
LOMBOY, respondents. avoid hitting it, only to collide with the Manila-bound Mitsubishi car.
-zyka-
TRIAL COURT: RENDERED JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OT THE PLAINTIFFS
TOPIC: CASES ON PRESUMPTION
-found Pleyto negligent and lacking in precaution when he overtook the tricycle with
PARTIES: complete disregard of the approaching car in the other lane. It found the testimony of
Rolly Orpilla credible and persuasive as against Pleyto’s self-serving and unbelievable
testimony.
Petitioner Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. (PRBL), with principal office at Tarlac
City, Tarlac, is a public carrier, engaged in carrying passengers and goods for a fare. It
serviced various routes in Central and Northern Luzon. Petitioner Ernesto Pleyto was a - found that Pleyto should have been more prudent in overtaking a tricycle, considering
bus driver employed by PRBL at the time of the incident in question. that it was drizzling, the road was slippery, and another vehicle was approaching from
the opposite direction. The RTC found that Pleyto had clearly violated traffic rules and
regulations, and thus was negligent under Article 2185 of the Civil Code of the
Respondent Maria D. Lomboy of Calasiao, Pangasinan, is the surviving spouse of
Philippines because petitioner Pleyto failed to present any proof to rebut the
the late Ricardo Lomboy.
presumption. The lower court likewise held co-petitioner PRBL equally liable
under Article 2180 of the Civil Code for its failure to show that it had
FACTS: maintained proper supervision of its employees notwithstanding strict
standards in employee selection.
At approximately 11:30 a.m. of May 16, 1995, PRBL Bus No. 1539, with Plate No. CVD
556, driven by petitioner Pleyto, was traveling along MacArthur Highway in Gerona, CA: AFFIRMED DECISION
Tarlac bound for Vigan, Ilocos Sur. It was drizzling that morning and the macadam
road was wet. Right in front of the bus, headed north, was the tricycle with Plate No.
-found petitioner PRBL liable as owner of the bus and as employer of Pleyto pursuant
CX 7844, owned and driven by one Rodolfo Esguerra.
to Article 2180 of the Civil Code, for its failure to observe the required diligence in its
supervision of its employees and the safe maintenance of its buses. In modifying the petitioner Pleyto before his hiring as a driver by PRBL. However, no
award of damages, the appellate court took note of the amounts that were duly documentary evidence was presented to prove that petitioner PRBL
supported by receipts only. exercised due diligence in the supervision of its employees, including Pleyto.

PET’S MR DENIED Citing precedents, the Court of Appeals opined,

HENCE, THIS PETITION.
"in order that the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees
ISSUE: WON PETITIONERS WERE ABLE TO REBUTT THE PRESUMPTION OF may be deemed sufficient and plausible, it is not enough for the employer to emptily
NEGLIGENCE UNDER 2180 invoke the existence of company guidelines and policies on hiring and supervision. As
the negligence of the employee gives rise to the presumption of negligence on the part
HELD: NO of the employer, the latter has the burden of proving that it has been diligent not only
in the selection of employees but also in the actual supervision of their work. The mere
allegation of the existence of hiring procedures and supervisory policies without
The negligence and fault of appellant driver is manifest. Indeed, petitioner Pleyto
anything more is decidedly not sufficient to overcome such presumption. (Metro Manila
violated traffic rules and regulations when he overtook the tricycle despite the presence
Transit Corp. vs. CA.
of an oncoming car in the other lane. Article 2185 of the Civil Code lays down the
presumption that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of
the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. As found by both the Court of The trial court ratiocinated:
Appeals and the trial court, petitioners failed to present any convincing proof rebutting
such presumption. Indeed, the testimony of the said two witnesses of the PRBL would impress one to
believe that the PRBL has always exercised the strictest standard of selecting its
A driver abandoning his proper lane for the purpose of overtaking another vehicle in employees and of maintaining its vehicles to avoid injury or damage to the life and limb
an ordinary situation has the duty to see to it that the road is clear and not to proceed of people on the road whether of its own passengers or pedestrians or occupants or
if he cannot do so in safety. When a motor vehicle is approaching or rounding a curve, other vehicles. It has not however, shown to the satisfaction of the Court that it has
there is special necessity for keeping to the right side of the road and the driver does maintained proper supervision of its employees, especially drivers while in the actual
not have the right to drive on the left-hand side relying upon having time to turn to the operation of its buses. While it has a list of procedures and testing when it comes to
right if a car approaching from the opposite direction comes into view. recruitment and another list of what should be done with its buses before they are
allowed to run on the road, it has no list of procedures and duties to be followed by a
driver while he is operating a vehicle to prevent injury to persons and damage to
The Court of Appeals found PRBL liable for Pleyto’s negligence pursuant to Article 2180
property. Neither has it proved to the Court that there are people employed by it to
in relation to Article 217614of the Civil Code. Under Article 2180, when an injury is
supervise its drivers so that it can be seen to it that all the safety procedures to prevent
caused by the negligence of a servant or an employee, the master or employer is
accident or damage to property or injury to people on the road have been in place. It
presumed to be negligent either in the selection or in the supervision of that employee.
is in this aspect of supervising its employees where this Court has found the defendant
This presumption may be overcome only by satisfactorily showing that the
PRBL deficient."
employer exercised the care and the diligence of a good father of a family in
the selection and the supervision of its employee.
PRBL had failed to rebut the presumption of negligence on its part.
In fine, when the employee causes damage due to his own negligence while performing
his own duties, there arises the juris tantum presumption that the employer is
negligent, rebuttable only by proof of observance of the diligence of a good father of
a family. Thus, in the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to
examine them as to their qualifications, experience and service records. With respect
to the supervision of employees, employers must formulate standard operating
procedures, monitor their implementation and impose disciplinary measures for
breaches thereof. These facts must be shown by concrete proof, including
documentary evidence.

In the present case, petitioners presented several documents in evidence to

show the various tests and pre-qualification requirements imposed upon
 THE HEIRS OF REDENTOR COMPLETO AND ELPIDIO ABIAD, ISSUE: (1) Whether the CA erred in finding that Completo was the one who
VS. caused the collision.
(2) Whether Abiad failed to prove that he observed the diligence of
SGT. AMANDO C. ALBAYDA, JR. a good father of the family
-gaddi-
I. NO.

TOPIC: CASES ON PRESUMPTION It was proven by a preponderance of evidence that Completo failed to exercise
reasonable diligence in driving the taxicab because he was over-speeding at the time
FACTS: he hit the bicycle ridden by Albayda. Such negligence was the sole and proximate cause
of the serious physical injuries sustained by Albayda. Completo did not slow down even
Respondent Amando C. Albayda, Jr. is a Master Sergeant of the Philippine when he approached the intersection. It was also proven that Albayda had the right of
Air Force. Redentor Completo Completo, now represented by his heirs, was the taxi way, considering that he reached the intersection ahead of Completo.
driver of a Toyota Corolla owned and operated by co-petitioner Elpidio Abiad. Albayda
and Completo figured in an accident along an intersection in Villamor Air Base. Albayda The bicycle occupies a legal position that is at least equal to that of other
filed a complaint for damages before the RTC. vehicles lawfully on the highway, and it is fortified by the fact that usually more will be
required of a motorist than a bicyclist in discharging his duty of care to the other
The amended complaint alleged that while Albayda was on his way to the because of the physical advantages the automobile has over the bicycle.
office to report for duty, riding a bicycle, the taxi driven by Completo bumped and
sideswiped him, causing serious physical injuries. At the slow speed of ten miles per hour, a bicyclist travels almost fifteen feet
per second, while a car traveling at only twenty-five miles per hour covers almost thirty-
In his answer to the amended complaint, Completo alleged that he was seven feet per second, and split-second action may be insufficient to avoid an accident.
carefully driving the taxicab along 8th Street, VAB, when suddenly he heard a strange It is obvious that a motor vehicle poses a greater danger of harm to a bicyclist than
sound from the rear right side of the taxicab. When he stopped to investigate, he found vice versa. Accordingly, while the duty of using reasonable care falls alike on a motorist
Albayda lying on the road and holding his left leg. He immediately rendered assistance and a bicyclist, due to the inherent differences in the two vehicles, more care is required
and brought Albayda to Philippine Air Force General Hospital for emergency treatment. from the motorist to fully discharge the duty than from the bicyclist. Simply stated, the
Completo also asserted that he was an experienced driver who, in accordance with physical advantages that the motor vehicle has over the bicycle make it more
traffic rules and regulations and common courtesy to his fellow motorists, had already dangerous to the bicyclist than vice versa.
reduced his speed to twenty (20) kilometers per hour even before reaching the
intersection. In contrast, Albayda rode his bicycle at a very high speed, causing him to The trial court's finding that Completo failed to exercise reasonable care to
suddenly lose control of the bicycle and hit the rear door on the right side of the taxicab. avoid collision with Albayda at the intersection gives rise to liability on the part of
The deep indentation on the rear right door of the taxicab was caused by the impact Completo, as driver, and his employer Abiad. The responsibility of two or more persons
of Albayda's body that hit the taxicab after he had lost control of the bicycle; while the who are liable for quasi-delict is solidary. The civil liability of the employer for the
slight indentation on the right front door of the taxicab was caused by the impact of negligent acts of his employee is also primary and direct, owing to his own negligence
the bike that hit the taxicab after Albayda let go of its handles when he had lost control in selecting and supervising his employee. The civil liability of the employer attaches
of it. Completo maintained that Albayda had no cause of action. The accident and the even if the employer is not inside the vehicle at the time of the collision.
physical injuries suffered by Albayda were caused by his own negligence.
II. YES.
Abiad testified that, aside from being a soldier, he was also a franchise holder
of taxicabs and passenger jeepneys. When Completo applied as a driver of the taxicab, In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examine
Abiad required the former to show his bio-data, NBI clearance, and driver's license. them as to their qualifications, experience, and service records. On the other hand,
Completo never figured in a vehicular accident since the time he was employed. Abiad with respect to the supervision of employees, employers should formulate standard
averred that Completo was a good driver and a good man. Being the operator of operating procedures, monitor their implementation, and impose disciplinary measures
taxicab, Abiad would wake up early and personally check all the taxicabs for breaches thereof. To establish these factors in a trial involving the issue of vicarious
liability, employers must submit concrete proof, including documentary evidence.
The trial court rendered a decision in favor of the Albayda and against the
Completo. The CA affirmed the trial court. Abiad testified that before he hired Completo, he required the latter to show
his bio-data, NBI clearance, and driver's license. Abiad likewise stressed that Completo
was never involved in a vehicular accident prior to the instant case, and that, as
operator of the taxicab, he would wake up early to personally check the condition of On 24 April 1995, petitioners Genaro, Llanillo, Dignadice, and the heirs of
the vehicle before it is used. Antero5 instituted a complaint for damages based on quasi-delict against respondents
Bedania and de Silva.
The protestation of Abiad to escape liability is short of the diligence required
under the law. Abiad's evidence consisted entirely of testimonial evidence, and the On 5 December 2000, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioners. The
unsubstantiated and self-serving testimony of Abiad was insufficient to overcome the trial court found Bedania grossly negligent for recklessly maneuvering the truck by
legal presumption that he was negligent in the selection and supervision of his driver. making a sudden U-turn in the highway without due regard to traffic rules and the
safety of other motorists. The trial court also declared de Silva grossly negligent in the
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed. selection and supervision of his driver, Bedania.

According to the trial court, there is a presumption that a person driving a motor vehicle
SOFIA M. GUILLANG, represented by SUSAN GUILLANG- has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic
CABATBAT, REYNALDO, GERARDO, BIENVENIDO, DAWNA, regulation.8 In this case, the trial court found that the Traffic Accident Investigation
and NELLIE, all surnamed GUILLANG, GENARO GUILLANG, Report (report),9 corroborated by the testimonies of the witnesses, showed that the
truck committed a traffic violation by executing a U-turn without signal lights. The trial
JOSE DIGNADICE, and ALVIN LLANILLO, Petitioners, court also said that Bedania’s gross negligence raised the legal presumption that de
vs. Silva, as Bedania’s employer, was negligent in the selection and supervision of his
RODOLFO BEDANIA and RODOLFO DE SILVA, Respondents. employees. The trial court said that, under Articles 217615 and 218016 of the Civil Code,
-em- de Silva’s liability was based on culpa aquiliana which holds the employer primarily
liable for tortious acts of his employees, subject to the defense that he exercised all
the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his
TOPIC: CASES ON PRESUMPTION employees.

Facts: The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision and said that the trial court
overlooked substantial facts and circumstances which, if properly considered, would
On 25 October 1994, at about 5:45 in the afternoon, petitioner Genaro M. Guillang justify a different conclusion and alter the results of the case. The Court of Appeals
(Genaro) was driving his brand new Toyota Corolla GLI sedan with conduction sticker concluded that the collision was caused by Genaro’s negligence. The Court of Appeals
no. 54-DFT (car) along Emilio Aguinaldo Highway (highway) in Cavite. Genaro, Antero declared that the truck arrived at the intersection way ahead of the car and had already
Guillang (Antero), Felipe Jurilla, Jose Dignadice (Dignadice), and Alvin Llanillo (Llanillo) executed the U-turn when the car, traveling at a fast speed, hit the truck’s side. The
had all just left from Golden City, Dasmariñas, Cavite, and were on their way to Manila. Court of Appeals added that considering the time and the favorable visibility of the road
At the other side of the highway, respondent Rodolfo A. Bedania (Bedania) was driving and the road conditions, Genaro, if he was alert, had ample time to react to the
a ten-wheeler Isuzu cargo truck with plate no. CAC-923 (truck) towards Tagaytay City. changing conditions of the road. The Court of Appeals found no reason for Genaro not
The truck was owned by respondent Rodolfo de Silva (de Silva). to be prudent because he was approaching an intersection and there was a great
possibility that vehicles would be traversing the intersection either going to or from
Orchard Golf Course. The Court of Appeals said Genaro should have slowed down upon
Along the highway and the road leading to the Orchard Golf Course, Bedania negotiated
reaching the intersection. The Court of Appeals concluded that Genaro’s failure to
a U-turn. When the truck entered the opposite lane of the highway, Genaro’s car hit
observe the necessary precautions was the proximate cause of Antero’s death and the
the right portion of the truck. The truck dragged Genaro’s car some five meters to the
injuries of the petitioners.
right of the road.

Issue:
As a consequence, all the passengers of the car were rushed to the De La Salle
University Medical Center in Dasmariñas, Cavite for treatment. Because of severe
injuries, Antero was later transferred to the Philippine General Hospital. However, on 3 Whether or not Genaro was negligent.
November 1994, Antero died due to the injuries he sustained from the collision. The
car was a total wreck while the truck sustained minor damage.

Held:
No. Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the interest of had the right of way over the truck that was making a U-turn. Clearly, the truck
another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances encroached upon the car’s lane when it suddenly made the U-turn.
justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. In Picart v. Smith,25 we held
that the test of negligence is whether the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act The Court of Appeals also concluded that Bedania made the U-turn at an intersection.
used that reasonable care and caution which an ordinary person would have used in Again, this is not supported by the evidence on record. The police sketch37 does not
the same situation. indicate an intersection and only shows that there was a road leading to the Orchard
Golf Course near the place of the collision. Furthermore, U-turns are generally not
The conclusion of the Court of Appeals that Genaro was negligent is not supported by advisable particularly on major streets.38 Contrary to Videna’s testimony, it is not
the evidence on record. In ruling that Genaro was negligent, the Court of Appeals gave normal for a truck to make a U-turn on a highway. We agree with the trial court that if
weight and credence to Videna’s testimony. However, we find that Videna’s testimony Bedania wanted to change direction, he should seek an intersection where it is safer to
was inconsistent with the police records and report that he made on the day of the maneuver the truck. Bedania should have also turned on his signal lights and made
collision. First, Videna testified that the car was running fast and overtook another sure that the highway was clear of vehicles from the opposite direction before executing
vehicle that already gave way to the truck.26 But this was not indicated in either the the U-turn.
report or the police records. Moreover, if the car was speeding, there should have been
skid marks on the road when Genaro stepped on the brakes to avoid the collision. But The finding of the Court of Appeals that it was not yet dark when the collision occurred
the sketch of the accident showed no skid marks made by the car. 27 Second, Videna is also not supported by the evidence on record. The report stated that the daylight
testified that the petitioners came from a drinking spree because he was able to smell condition at the time of the collision was "darkness."39
liquor.28 But in the report,29 Videna indicated that the condition of Genaro was
"normal." Videna did not indicate in the report that Genaro "had been drinking liquor"
Contrary to the conclusion of the Court of Appeals, the sheer size of the truck does not
or that Genaro "was obviously drunk." Third, Videna testified that when he arrived at
make it improbable for the truck to execute a sudden U-turn. The trial court’s decision
the scene, Bedania was inside his truck.30 This contradicts the police records where
did not state that the truck was traveling at a fast speed when it made the U-turn. The
Videna stated that after the collision Bedania escaped and abandoned the
trial court said the truck made a "sudden" U-turn, meaning the U-turn was made
victims.31 The police records also showed that Bedania was arrested by the police at
unexpectedly and with no warning, as shown by the fact that the truck’s signal lights
his barracks in Anabu, Imus, Cavite and was turned over to the police only on 26
were not turned on.
October 1994.32

Clearly, Bedania’s negligence was the proximate cause of the collision which claimed
Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, unless there is proof to the contrary, a person
the life of Antero and injured the petitioners. Proximate cause is that which, in the
driving a vehicle is presumed negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient, intervening cause,
any traffic regulation.
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.40 The cause
of the collision is traceable to the negligent act of Bedania for if the U-turn was executed
In this case, the report33 showed that the truck, while making the U-turn, failed to with the proper precaution, the mishap in all probability would not have happened. The
signal, a violation of traffic rules. The police records also stated that, after the collision, sudden U-turn of the truck without signal lights posed a serious risk to oncoming
Bedania escaped and abandoned the petitioners and his truck.34 This is another motorists. Bedania failed to prevent or minimize that risk. The truck’s sudden U-turn
violation of a traffic regulation.35 Therefore, the presumption arises that Bedania was triggered a series of events that led to the collision and, ultimately, to the death of
negligent at the time of the mishap. Antero and the injuries of petitioners.

The evidence presented in this case also does not support the conclusion of the Court We agree with the trial court that de Silva, as Bedania’s employer, is also liable for the
of Appeals that the truck had already executed the U-turn before the impact occurred. damages suffered by petitioners. De Silva failed to prove that he exercised all the
If the truck had fully made the U-turn, it should have been hit on its rear.36 If the truck diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employees.
had already negotiated even half of the turn and is almost on the other side of the
highway, then the truck should have been hit in the middle portion of the trailer or
cargo compartment. But the evidence clearly shows, and the Court of Appeals even
declared, that the car hit the truck’s gas tank, located at the truck’s right middle portion,
which disproves the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the truck had already
executed the U-turn when it was hit by the car.

Moreover, the Court of Appeals said that the point of impact was on the lane where
the car was cruising. Therefore, the car had every right to be on that road and the car
 Cang vs. Cullen  We hold that the trial court correctly found that it was Saycon who caused the
-belhur- accident and, as such, he cannot recover indemnity for his injury. On the other
hand, respondent, as Saycon’s employer, was also negligent and failed to
TOPIC: CASES ON PRESUMPTION exercise the degree of diligence required in supervising her employee.
Consequently, she cannot recover from petitioners what she had paid for the
FACTS: treatment of her employee’s injuries.

 The claim for damages was precipitated by a vehicular accident involving a WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Petition is
taxicab bearing Plate No. GVG-672, owned by petitioner Stephen Cang GRANTED.
and driven by petitioner George Nardo, and a motorcycle owned by
respondent Herminia Cullen and driven by Guillermo Saycon.
 Respondent, as employer, out of compassion, paid all of Saycon’s hospital and
medical expenses amounting to ₱185,091.00. She also alleged that due to the LUZ PALANCA TAN vs. JAM TRANSIT, INC.
injuries Saycon sustained, he was unable to work. For humanitarian reasons, -jeanelle-
respondent had given Saycon an amount equivalent to his wages from
October 31, 1996 to May 30, 1997. She also gave Saycon ₱2,000.00 per month TOPIC: CASES ON PRESUMPTION
from June 1997 until he was able to return to work.
 Respondent filed a Complaint for damages against petitioners. After trial, the FACTS:
RTC ruled in petitioners’ favor. CA reversed.
 Petitioner Luz Tan alleged that she was the owner of a passenger-type
ISSUE: WHETHER SAYCON WAS NEGLIGENT jitney. That on March 14, 1997 at around 5:00 am, the said jitney figured in
an accident at an intersection along Maharlika Highway, as it collided with a
HELD: YES. JAM Transit passenger bus bound for Manila. The bus was driven by Eddie
 Saycon was in clear violation of this provision at the time of the accident. Dimayuga.
Corollarily, Article 2185 of the Civil Code states:
 Art. 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person  At the time of the collision, the jitney was loaded with quail eggs and duck
driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he eggs (balut and salted eggs). It was driven by Alexander Ramirez. Tan
was violating any traffic regulation. alleged that Dimayuga was reckless, negligent, imprudent and not observing
 The Civil Code characterizes negligence as the omission of that diligence traffic rules and regulations, causing the bus to collide with the jitney. The
required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the jitney turned turtle and the cargo of eggs was destroyed. Ramirez and his
circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place. Negligence, as it helper were injured.
is commonly understood, is conduct that creates an undue risk of harm to
others. It is the failure to observe that degree of care, precaution and vigilance  JAM Transit, in its Answer, admitted ownership of the subject passenger bus
that the circumstances justly demand. It is the omission to do something and that Dimayuga was under its employ. However, it denied the allegations
which a reasonable man, guided by considerations that ordinarily regulate the
in the Complaint, and claimed that the accident occurred due to the gross
conduct of human affairs, would do, or doing something that a prudent and
negligence of Ramirez.
reasonable man would not do.
 To determine whether there is negligence in a given situation, this Court laid
down this test: Did defendant, in doing the alleged negligent act, use  As to their testimonies, petitioner alleged that the JAM passenger was
that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person overtaking on the left, while on the testimony of respondent, the jitney was
would have used in the same situation? If not, the person is guilty of overtaking on the right. *
negligence.
 Based on the foregoing test, we can conclude that Saycon was negligent.  RTC – applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, it found that the JAM
In the first place, he should not have been driving alone. The law clearly passenger bus driver at fault as he was then violating a traffic regulation
requires that the holder of a student-driver’s permit should be when the collision took place. RTC ruled in favor of Tan.
accompanied by a duly licensed driver when operating a motor vehicle.
Further, there is the matter of not wearing a helmet and the fact that he was  Court of Appeals – Reversed RTC’s ruling.
speeding. All these prove that he was negligent.
 It dismissed the complaint on the ground that there was nothing on record and supervision of his employee.
that supported the RTC’s finding that the JAM passenger bus was overtaking
Tan’s jitney. That there was no mention that the JAM passenger bus was  In this case, aside from the testimony of Dimayuga, JAM did not present any
over speeding or that it was overtaking the jitney; and that there was no other evidence, whether documentary or testimonial, in its favor. The
evidence as to who between Ramirez and Dimayuga was negligent in presumption of negligence as Dimayuga’s employer stands and at it is, thus,
connection with the vehicular accident. That the doctrine res ipsa loquitur solidarily liable for the damages sustained by petitioner.
can only be invoked when direct evidence is nonexistent or not accessible.
Decision of Court of Appeals REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
ISSUE: Who is Liable? JAM TRANSIT

HELD: LAMBERT S. RAMOS, Petitioner,

vs.
 Although there was no direct evidence that the JAM passenger bus was
overtaking the vehicles running along the right lane of the highway form the
C.O.L. REALTY CORPORATION, Respondent.
left lane, the available evidence readily points to such fact. There were two -joy-
continuous yellow lines at the center of the highway, which meant that no
vehicle on the said area should overtake another on either side of the road. TOPIC: CASES ON PRESUMPTION

The double yellow center lines regulation, which this Court takes judicial FACTS:
notice of as an internationally recognized pavement regulation, was precisely
intended to avoid accidents along highways, such as what happened in this
On or about 10:40am of 8 March 2004, along Katipunan Ave, cr. Rajah Matanda St.,
case. (RA No. 4136 Land Transportation and Traffic Code) QC, a vehicular accident took place between a Toyota Altis Sedan, owned by petitioner
C.O.L. Realty Corporation, and driven by Aquilino and a Ford Expedition, owned by
 It was also observed that the area of collision was an intersection. Section Ramos and driven by Rodel, . A passenger of the sedan, one Estela sustained injuries.
41(e) of RA. No. 4136, likewise, prohibits overtaking or passing any other She was immediately rushed to the hospital for treatment.
vehicle proceeding in the same direction at any intersection of highways,
among others. (C.O.L. Realty) averred that its driver, Aquilino, was slowly driving the Toyota Altis car
at a speed of five to ten kilometers per hour along Rajah Matanda Street and has just
Thus, by overtaking the left lane, Dimayuga was not only violating the crossed the center lane of Katipunan Avenue when (Ramos’) Ford Espedition violently
double yellow center liners regulations, but also the prohibition on rammed against the car’s right rear door and fender. With the force of the impact, the
overtaking at highway intersections. Consequently, negligence can be sedan turned 180 degrees towards the direction where it came from.
attributed ONLY to him, which negligence was the proximate cause of the
injury sustained by petitioner. This prima facie finding of negligence was not Petitioner demanded from respondent reimbursement for the expenses incurred in the
sufficiently rebutted or contradicted by Dimayuga. repair of its car and the hospitalization of Estela in the aggregate amount of
P103,989.60. The demand fell on deaf ears prompting (C.O.L. Realty) to file a
 The liability of Dimayuga is solidary with JAM pursuant to Article 2176, in Complaint for Damages based on quasi-delict before the Metropolitan Trial Court of
relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Metro Manila (MeTC), Quezon City.

Whenever an employee’s negligence causes damage or injury to another, Ramos denied liability for damages insisting that it was the negligence of Aquilino,
there instantly arises a presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to (C.O.L. Realty’s) driver, which was the proximate cause of the accident. (Ramos)
exercise diligence of a good father of a family in the selection or supervision maintained that the sedan car crossed Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda Street
of its employees. despite the concrete barriers placed thereon prohibiting vehicles to pass
through the intersection.
To avoid liability for a quasi-delict committed by its employee, an employer
must overcome the presumption, by presenting convincing proof that he Metc and RTC Dismissed
exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection
CA - Aquilino was negligent in crossing Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda Street  As they came upon a junction where the highway connected with the road
since, as per Certification of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) leading to Tabagon, they were hit by a passenger bus driven by [Petitioner]
dated November 30, 2004, such act is specifically prohibited. Gregorio Pestaño and owned by [Petitioner] Metro Cebu Autobus Corporation,
which had tried to overtake them, sending the motorcycle and its passengers
Barricades were precisely placed along the intersection of Katipunan Avenue and Rajah hurtling upon the pavement.
Matanda Street in order to prevent motorists from crossing Katipunan Avenue.  Both Sumayang and Romagos were rushed to the hospital where Sumayang
Nonetheless, Aquilino crossed Katipunan Avenue through certain portions of was pronounced dead on arrival. Romagos died from his injuries the day after.
the barricade which were broken, thus violating the MMDA rule.
Apart from the institution of criminal charges against Pestaño, Respondent Sps
Sumayang, as heirs of Ananias Sumayang, filed this civil action for damages against
ISSUE: W/N AQUILINO IS NEGLIGENT Pestaño, as driver of the passenger bus that rammed the deceased's motorcycle, Metro
Cebu, as owner and operator of the said bus, and Perla Compania de Seguros, as
HELD: YAS. Without doubt, his negligence is established by the fact that he insurer of Metro Cebu.
violated a traffic regulation.
Upon motion of Petitioner, Judge ordered the consolidation of the said. Joint trial of
the two cases thereafter ensued, where the following assertions were made:

Article 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving  Respondent Spouses rely mainly on the testimonies of Ignacio Neis, Pat.
a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any Aquilino Dinoy and Teotimo Sumayang, father of the deceased.
traffic regulation. o Neis declared that as the motorcycle approached the junction, the
driver with his left arm to indicate that he was taking the Tabagon
Road; that the motorcycle did turn left but as it did so, it was bumped
by an overspeeding bus; that the force of the impact threw
(C.O.L. Realty) admitted that there were barricades along the intersection of Katipunan
Sumayang and Romagos about 14 meters away. The motorcycle was
Avenue and Rajah Matanda Street. The barricades were placed thereon to caution
badly damaged as it was dragged by the bus.
drivers not to pass through the intersecting roads. This prohibition stands even if, as
o Pat. Dinoy testified that he found Sumayang and Romagos lying on
(C.O.L. Realty) claimed, the "barriers were broken" at that point creating a small gap
the road bleeding and badly injured; that he requested the driver of
through which any vehicle could pass. What is clear to Us is that Aquilino recklessly
a PU vehicle to take them to a hospital. He acknowledged that he
ignored these barricades and drove through it.
met at the scene Neis who informed him that he saw the incident.
Aquilino’s act of crossing Katipunan Avenue via Rajah Matanda constitutes negligence  On the contrary, Pestaño blamed Sumayang for the accident. He testified
because it was prohibited by law. that when he first blew the horn the motorcycle which was about 15 or 20
meters ahead went to the right side of the highway that he again blew the
horn and accelerated in order to overtake the motorcycle; that when he was
just one meter behind, the motorcycle suddenly turned left towards the
GREGORIO PESTAÑO and METRO CEBU AUTOBUS Tabagon Road and was bumped by his bus; that he was able to apply his
CORPORATION vs. break only after the impact.
o Pestaño's testimony was corroborated by Ireneo Casilia who declared
Spouses TEOTIMO SUMAYANG and PAZ C. SUMAYANG that he was one of the passengers of the bus; that the motorcycle
-ron- suddenly turned left towards Tabagon Road without giving any signal
to indicate its maneuver; that the bus was going at 40 kph when the
TOPIC: CASES ON PRESUMPTION accident occurred.
 To substantiate its defense of bonos pater familias petitioner corporation
Facts:
recalled to the witness box Pestaño who explained how his driving experience
 At around 2:00 PM of August 9, 1986, Ananias Sumayang was riding a and ability were tested by the company before he was hired. He further
motorcycle along the national highway in Ilihan, Tabagon, Cebu. Riding with declared that the management gave regular lectures to drivers and conductors
him was his friend Manuel Romagos. touching on various topics like speeding, parking, loading and treatment of
passengers, and that before he took to the road at 2:30 AM of that day he
 checked together with the mechanic the tires, brake, signal lights as well as employees and in the proper care of its vehicles. It had thus failed to conduct its
the tools to be brought along. He did the same thing before commencing his business with the diligence required by law.
return trip from Hagnaya, San Remegio later in the day.
o Its maintenance supervisor, Agustin Pugeda, Jr., and its manager, Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision and Resolution AFFIRMED. Cost against
Alfonso Corominas, Jr. corroborated Pestaño's testimony. petitioners.

Lower court found petitioners Pestaño negligent. It was shown that Pestaño negligently
attempted to overtake the motorcycle at a dangerous speed as they were coming upon
AÑONUEVO vs COURT OF APPEALS
a junction in the road, and as the motorcycle was about to turn left towards Tabagon.
The court likewise found Metro Cebu directly and primarily liable, along with Pestaño, -carol-
the latter's employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The CA affirmed respondent's
liability but raised the granted indemnity to 50k. TOPIC: CASES ON PRESUMPTION

Issue: FACTS: Villagracia was traveling along Boni Avenue on his bicycle, while Añonuevo,
was traversing the opposite lane and driving his Lancer car. The car was owned by
Whether or not Metro Cebu is liable for being negligent in the selection or supervision Procter and Gamble Inc., the employer of Añonuevo's brother, Jonathan. Añonuevo
of its employee Pestaño. (Yes) was in the course of making a left turn towards Libertad Street when the collision
occurred. Villagracia sustained serious injuries as a result, which necessitated his
Ruling: hospitalization several times in 1989, and forced him to undergo four (4) operations.
The Petition has no merit. Villagracia then instituted an action for damages against Procter and Gamble Phils.,
The CA agreed with the trial court that the vehicular collision was caused by Pestaño's Inc. and Añonuevo before the RTC. He had also filed a criminal complaint against
negligence when he attempted to overtake the motorcycle. As a professional driver Añonuevo before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong, but the latter was
operating a public transport bus, he should have anticipated that overtaking at a subsequently acquitted of the criminal charge.
junction was a perilous maneuver and should thus have exercised extreme caution. Añonuevo insists that Villagracia's own fault and negligence serves to absolve the
Factual findings of the CA affirming those of the trial court are conclusive and binding former of any liability for damages. Añonuevo points out that Villagracia's bicycle had
on this Court. Petitioners failed to demonstrate that this case falls under any of the no safety gadgets such as a horn or bell, or headlights, as invoked by a 1948 municipal
recognized exceptions to this rule. Indeed, the issue of negligence is basically factual ordinance nor was it duly registered with the Office of the Municipal Treasurer, as
and, in quasi-delicts, crucial in the award of damages. required by the same ordinance.

Petitioners aver that the CA was wrong in attributing the accident to a faulty Añonuevo claims that Villagracia violated traffic regulations when he failed to register
speedometer and in implying that the accident could have been avoided had this his bicycle or install safety gadgets thereon. He posits that Article 2185 of the New Civil
instrument been properly functioning. Code applies by analogy. The provision reads:

This contention has no factual basis. Under Articles 2180 and 2176 of the Civil Code, Article 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving
owners and managers are responsible for damages caused by their employees. When a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any
an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or an employee, the master or traffic regulation.
employer is presumed to be negligent either in the selection or in the supervision of RTC: Rendered a judgment against Procter and Gamble and Añonuevo, ordering them
that employee. This presumption may be overcome only by satisfactorily showing that to pay Villagracia the necessary damages.
the employer exercised the care and the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and the supervision of its employee. CA: Affirmed the decision of the RTC. It was Añonuevo's vehicle which had struck
Villagracia; Añonuevo had enough warning to control his speed; and he failed to
The CA said that allowing Pestaño to ply his route with a defective speedometer showed exercise the ordinary precaution, care and diligence required of him in order that the
laxity on the part of Metro Cebu in the operation of its business and in the supervision accident could have been avoided.
of its employees. The negligence alluded to here is in its supervision over its driver, not
in that which directly caused the accident. The fact that Pestaño was able to use a bus ISSUE: Whether or not Article 2185 should apply to non-motorized vehicles in order
with a faulty speedometer shows that Metro Cebu was remiss in the supervision of its to make Villagracia presumptively negligent?
HELD: NO. Añonuevo is solely responsible for the accident. The Civil Code  Ahead of the Cadillac was a caretela. Defendant’s driver did not notice it
characterizes negligence as the omission of that diligence which is required by the until he was about eight (8) meters away. Instead of slowing down behind
nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the the caretela defendant’s driver veered to the left with the intention of
time and of the place. passing by the caretela but in doing so its rear bumper caught the ream of
the caretela’s left wheel wrenching it off. Defendant’s car skidded obliquely
It cannot be denied that the statutory purpose for requiring bicycles to be equipped to the other end and collided with the on-coming vehicle of the plaintiff. The
with headlights or horns is to promote road safety and to minimize the occurrence of plaintiff on his part, slackened his speed and tried to avoid the collision by
road accidents involving bicycles. However, it was also proven that Añonuevo was veering to the right but the collision occurred just the same injuring the
speeding as he made the left turn, and such negligent act was the proximate cause of plaintiff and members of his family.
the accident.  Plaintiff brought an action for damages against both the driver and owner of
the Cadillac car. There was no question that defendant’s driver was
The absence of proper lights on a bicycle at night, as required by statute or ordinance, negligent and liable.
may constitute negligence barring or diminishing recovery if the bicyclist is struck by a
motorist as long as the absence of such lights was a proximate cause of the collision. ISSUE:
However, the absence of such lights will not preclude or diminish recovery if the scene
of the accident was well illuminated by street lights, or if substitute lights were present Whether or not defendant Yu Khe Thai, owner of the car, who was in the car, was
which clearly rendered the bicyclist visible, if the motorist saw the bicycle in spite of solidarily liable with the driver under Art. 2184, of the Civil Code.
the absence of lights thereon, or if the motorist would have been unable to see the
bicycle even if it had been equipped with lights. RULING:
The violation of a traffic statute must be shown as the proximate cause of the injury,
The applicable law is Article 2184 of the Civil Code. Under the said provision, if the
or that it substantially contributed thereto.
causative factor was the driver’s negligence, the owner of the vehicle who was
By Añonuevo's own admission, he had seen Villagracia at a good distance of 10 meters. present is likewise held liable if he could have prevented the mishap by the exercise
Had he been decelerating, as he should, as he made the turn, Añonuevo would have of due diligence. The basis of the master’s liability in civil law is not respondent
superior but rather the relationship of paterfamilias. The theory is that ultimately the
had ample opportunity to avoid hitting Villagracia. Moreover, the fact that Añonuevo
negligence of the servant, if known to the master and susceptible of
had sighted Villagracia before the accident would negate any possibility that the
timely correction by him, reflects his own negligence if he fails to correct it in order to
absence of lights on the bike contributed to the cause of the accident. prevent injury or damage.
To hold a person as having contributed to his injuries, it must be shown that he
performed an act that brought about his injuries in disregard of warnings or signs of Negligence on the part of the owner, if any, must be sought in the immediate setting
an impending danger to health and body. and circumstances of the accident, that is, in his failure to detain the driver from
pursuing a course which not only gave him clear notice of the danger but also
sufficient time to act upon it. We do not see that such negligence may be imputed.
CAEDO et al vs. YU KHE THAI and RAFAEL BERNARDO The car, as has been stated, was not running at an unreasonable speed. The road
-cy- was wide and open, and devoid of traffic that early morning. There was no reason for
the car owner to be in any special state of alert. He had reason to rely on the skill
and experience of his driver. He became aware of the presence of the carretela when
TOPIC: CASES ON PRESUMPTION his car was only twelve meters behind it, but then his failure to see it earlier did not
constitute negligence, for he was not himself at the wheel. And even when he did see
FACTS: it at that distance, he could not have anticipated his driver’s sudden decision to pass
the carretela on its left side in spite of the fact that another car was approaching from
 Plaintiff Caedo was driving his Mercury car at about 5:30 in the morning of the opposite direction. The time element was such that there was no reasonable
March 24, 1958 along E. de los Santos Ave., in the vicinity of San Lorenzo opportunity for Yu Khe Thai to assess the risks involved and warn the driver
Village bound for the airport. Several members of his family were in the car. accordingly. The thought that entered his mind, he said, was that if he sounded a
 Coming from the opposite direction was the Cadillac car of defendant Yu Khe sudden warning it might only make the other man nervous and make the situation
Thai driven by his driver Rafael Bernardo. The two cars were traveling at a worse. It was a thought that, wise or not, connotes no absence of that
moderate speed with their headlights on. due diligence required by law to prevent the misfortune. Under the facts the owner of
the car was not liable.