Art. 36.

A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.

TITLE III

RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE

Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and
support. (109a)

Art. 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of disagreement, the court shall decide.

The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter should live abroad or there are other valid and compelling
reasons for the exemption. However, such exemption shall not apply if the same is not compatible with the solidarity of the
family. (110a)

Art. 70. The spouses are jointly responsible for the support of the family. The expenses for such support and other conjugal
obligations shall be paid from the community property and, in the absence thereof, from the income or fruits of their separate
properties. In case of insufficiency or absence of said income or fruits, such obligations shall be satisfied from the separate
properties. (111a)

Art. 71. The management of the household shall be the right and the duty of both spouses. The expenses for such management shall
be paid in accordance with the provisions of Article 70. (115a)

Art. 72. When one of the spouses neglects his or her duties to the conjugal union or commits acts which tend to bring danger,
dishonor or injury to the other or to the family, the aggrieved party may apply to the court for relief. (116a)

Art. 73. Either spouse may exercise any legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity without the consent of the other.
The latter may object only on valid, serious, and moral grounds.

In case of disagreement, the court shall decide whether or not:

(1) The objection is proper; and

(2) Benefit has occurred to the family prior to the objection or thereafter. If the benefit accrued prior to the objection, the resulting
obligation shall be enforced against the separate property of the spouse who has not obtained consent.

The foregoing provisions shall not prejudice the rights of creditors who acted in good faith.

Chapter 3. Effect of Parental Authority

Upon the Persons of the Children

Art. 220. The parents and those exercising parental authority shall have with the respect to their unemancipated children on wards
the following rights and duties:

(1) To keep them in their company, to support, educate and instruct them by right precept and good example, and to provide for
their upbringing in keeping with their means;

(2) To give them love and affection, advice and counsel, companionship and understanding;

(3) To provide them with moral and spiritual guidance, inculcate in them honesty, integrity, self-discipline, self-reliance, industry
and thrift, stimulate their interest in civic affairs, and inspire in them compliance with the duties of citizenship;

(4) To furnish them with good and wholesome educational materials, supervise their activities, recreation and association with
others, protect them from bad company, and prevent them from acquiring habits detrimental to their health, studies and morals;

(5) To represent them in all matters affecting their interests;

(6) To demand from them respect and obedience;

(7) To impose discipline on them as may be required under the circumstances; and

(8) To perform such other duties as are imposed by law upon parents and guardians. (316a)

Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the
acts or omissions of their unemancipated children living in their company and under their parental authority subject to the
appropriate defenses provided by law. (2180(2)a and (4)a )

Art. 222. The courts may appoint a guardian of the child's property or a guardian ad litem when the best interests of the child so
requires. (317)

Art. 223. The parents or, in their absence or incapacity, the individual, entity or institution exercising parental authority, may
petition the proper court of the place where the child resides, for an order providing for disciplinary measures over the child. The
child shall be entitled to the assistance of counsel, either of his choice or appointed by the court, and a summary hearing shall be
conducted wherein the petitioner and the child shall be heard.

However, if in the same proceeding the court finds the petitioner at fault, irrespective of the merits of the petition, or when the
circumstances so warrant, the court may also order the deprivation or suspension of parental authority or adopt such other measures
as it may deem just and proper. (318a)

Art. 224. The measures referred to in the preceding article may include the commitment of the child for not more than thirty days
in entities or institutions engaged in child care or in children's homes duly accredited by the proper government agency.

The parent exercising parental authority shall not interfere with the care of the child whenever committed but shall provide for his
support. Upon proper petition or at its own instance, the court may terminate the commitment of the child whenever just and
proper. (391a)

Chapter 4. Effect of Parental Authority Upon

the Property of the Children

Art. 225. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise legal guardianship over the property of the unemancipated common child
without the necessity of a court appointment. In case of disagreement, the father's decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial
order to the contrary.

Where the market value of the property or the annual income of the child exceeds P50,000, the parent concerned shall be required
to furnish a bond in such amount as the court may determine, but not less than ten per centum (10%) of the value of the property
or annual income, to guarantee the performance of the obligations prescribed for general guardians.

A verified petition for approval of the bond shall be filed in the proper court of the place where the child resides, or, if the child
resides in a foreign country, in the proper court of the place where the property or any part thereof is situated.

The petition shall be docketed as a summary special proceeding in which all incidents and issues regarding the performance of the
obligations referred to in the second paragraph of this Article shall be heard and resolved.

The ordinary rules on guardianship shall be merely suppletory except when the child is under substitute parental authority, or the
guardian is a stranger, or a parent has remarried, in which case the ordinary rules on guardianship shall apply.
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC March 4, 2003

RE: PROPOSED RULE ON DECLARATION OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF VOID MARRIAGES AND ANNULMENT
OF VOIDABLE MARRIAGES

RESOLUTION

Acting on the letter of the Chairman of the Committee on Revision of the Rules of Court submitting for this Court's
consideration and approval the Proposed Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages, the Court Resolved to APPROVE the same.

The Rule shall take effect on March 15, 2003 following its publication in a newspaper of general circulation not later than
March 7, 2003

March 4, 2003

Davide, C.J. Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio
Morales, Callejo, Sr. and Azcuna
Ynares-Santiago, on leave
Corona, on official leave

RULE ON DECLARATION OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF VOID MARIAGES AND ANNULMENT OF VOIDABLE

MARRIAGES

Section 1. Scope - This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages and annulment of voidable
marriages under the Family Code of te Philippines.

The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily.

Section 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.

(a) Who may file. - A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife.
(n)

(b) Where to file. - The petition shal be filed in the Family Court.

(c) Imprecriptibility ofaction or defense. - An Action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage shall not
prescribe.

(d) What to allege. - A petition under Article 36 of Family Code shall specially allege te complete facts showing the either or both
parties were psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential marital obligations of marriages at the time of the
celebration of marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its celebration.

The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological incapacity at the time
of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need not be alleged.

Section 3. Petition for annulment of voidable marriages. -

(a) Who may file. - The following persons may file a petition for annulment of voidable marriage based on any of the grounds under
article 45 of the Family Code and within the period herein indicated:

(1) The contracting party whose parent, or guardian, or person exercising substitute parental authority did not give his or her
consent, within five years after attaining the age of twenty-one unless, after attaining the age of twenty-one, such party freely
cohabitated with the other as husband or wife; or the parent, guardian or person having legal charge of the contracting party , at
any time before such party has reached the age of twenty-one;

(2) The sane spouse who had no knowledge of the other's insanity; or by any relative, guardian, or person having legal charge of
the insane, at any time before the death of either party; or by the insane spouse during the a lucid interval or after regaining sanity,
provided that the petitioner , after coming to reason, has not freely cohabited with the other as husband or wife;

(3) The injured party whose consent was obtained by fraud, within five years after the discovery of the fraud, provided that said
party, with full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, has not freely cohabited with the other as husband or wife;

(4) The injured party whose consent was obtained by force, intimidation, or undue influence, within five years from the time the
force intimidation, or undue influence disappeared or ceased, provided that the force, intimidation, or undue influence having
disappeared or ceased, said party has not thereafter freely cohabited with the other as husband or wife;

(5) The injured party where the other spouse is physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other and such
incapability continues and appears to be incurable, within five years after the celebration of marriage; and

(6) Te injured party where the other party was afflicted with a sexually-transmissible disease found to be serious and appears to be
incurable, within five years after the celebration of marriage.

(b) Where to file. - The petition shall be filed in the Family Court.

Section 4. Venue. - The Petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or city where the petitioner or the respondent has
been residing for at least six months prior to the date of filing. Or in the case of non-resident respondent, where he may be found
in the Philippines, at the election of the petitioner.

Section 5. Contents and form of petition. - (1) The petition shall allege the complete facts constituting the cause of action.

(2) It shall state the names and ages of the common children of the parties and specify the regime governing their property relations,
as well as the properties involved.

If there is no adequate provision in a written agreement between the parties, the petitioner may apply for a provisional order
for spousal support, the custody and support of common children, visitation rights, administration of community or conjugal
property, and other matters similarly requiringurgent action.

(3) It must be verified and accompanied celebration of marriage. (b) Where to file.-The petition shall be filed in the Family Court.

Section 4. Venue. - The petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or city where the petitioner or the respondent has
been residing for at least six months prior to the date of filing, or in the case of a non-resident respondent, where he may be found
in the Philippines at the election of the petitioner.

Section 5. Contents and form of petition. - (1) The petition shall allege the complete facts constituting the cause of action.

(2) it shall state the names and ages of the common children of the parties and specify the regime governing their property relations,
as well as the properties involved.

If there is no adequate provision in a written agreement between the parties, the petitioner may apply for a provisional order
for spousal support, custody and support of common children, visitation rights, administration of community or conjugal property,
and other matters similarly requiring urgent action.

(3) it must be verified and accompanied by a certification against forum shopping. The verification and certification must be signed
personally by me petitioner. No petition may be filed solely by counsel or through an attorney-in-fact.
 If the petitioner is in a foreign country, the verification and certification against forum shopping shall be authenticated by the
duly authorized officer of the Philippine embassy or legation, consul general, consul or vice-consul or consular agent in said
country.

(4) it shall be filed in six copies. The petitioner shall serve a copy of the petition on the Office of the Solicitor General and the
Office of the City or Provincial Prosecutor, within five days from the date of its filing and submit to the court proof of such service
within the same period.

Failure to comply with any of the preceding requirements may be a ground for immediate dismissal of the petition.

Section 6. Summons. - The service of summons shall be governed by Rule 14 of the Rules of Court and by the following rules:

(1) Where the respondent cannot be located at his given address or his whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained by
diligent inquiry, service of summons may, by leave of court, be effected upon him by publication once a week for two consecutive
weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines and in such places as the court may order In addition, a copy of the
summons shall be served on the respondent at his last known address by registered mail or any other means the court may deem
sufficient.

(2) The summons to be published shall be contained in an order of the court with the following data: (a) title of the case; (b) docket
number; (c) nature of the petition; (d) principal grounds of the petition and the reliefs prayed for; and (e) a directive for the
respondent to answer within thirty days from the last issue of publication.

Section 7. Motion to dismiss. - No motion to dismiss the petition shall be allowed except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter or over the parties; provided, however, that any other ground that might warrant a dismissal of the case may be
raised as an affirmative defense in an answer.

Section 8. Answer. - (1) The respondent shall file his answer within fifteen days from service of summons, or within thirty days
from the last issue of publication in case of service of summons by publication. The answer must be verified by the respondent
himself and not by counsel or attorney-in-fact.

(2) If the respondent fails to file an answer, the court shall not declare him or her in default.

(3) Where no answer is filed or if the answer does not tender an issue, the court shall order the public prosecutor to investigate
whether collusion exists between the parties.

Section 9. Investigation report of public prosecutor. - (1) Within one month after receipt of the court order mentioned in paragraph
(3) of Section 8 above, the public prosecutor shall submit a report to the court stating whether the parties are in collusion and serve
copies thereof on the parties and their respective counsels, if any.

(2) If the public prosecutor finds that collusion exists, he shall state the on the finding of collusion within ten days from receipt of
a copy of a report The court shall set the report for hearing and If convinced that the parties are in collusion, it shall dismiss the
petition.

(3) If the public prosecutor reports that no collusion exists, the court shall set the case for pre-trial. It shall be the duty of the public
prosecutor to appear for the State at the pre-trial.

Section 10. Social worker. - The court may require a social worker to conduct a case study and submit the corresponding report at
least three days before the pre-trial. The court may also require a case study at any stage of the case whenever necessary.

Section 11. Pre-trial. -

(1) Pre-trial mandatory. - A pre-trial is mandatory. On motion or motu proprio, the court shall set the pre-trial after the last pleading
has been served and filed, or upon receipt of the report of the public prosecutor that no collusion exists between the parties.
(2) Notice of pre-trial. - (a) The notice of pre-trial shall contain:

(1) the date of pre-trial conference; and

(2) an order directing the parties to file and serve their respective pre-trial briefs in such manner as shall ensure the receipt thereof
by the adverse party at least three days before the date of pre-trial.

(b) The notice shall be served separately on the parties and their respective counsels as well as on the public prosecutor. It shall be
their duty to appear personally at the pre-trial.

(c) Notice of pre-trial shall be sent to the respondent even if he fails to file an answer. In case of summons by publication and the
respondent failed to file his answer, notice of pre-trial shall be sent to respondent at his last known address.

Section 12. Contents of pre-trial brief. - The pre-trial brief shall contain the following:

(a) A statement of the willingness of the parties to enter into agreements as may be allowed by law, indicating the desired terms
thereof;

(b) A concise statement of their respective claims together with the applicable laws and authorities;

(c) Admitted facts and proposed stipulations of facts, as well as the disputed factual and legal issues;

(d) All the evidence to be presented, including expert opinion, if any, briefly stating or describing the nature and purpose thereof;

(e) The number and names of the witnesses and their respective affidavits; and

(f) Such other matters as the court may require.

Failure to file the pre-trial brief or to comply with its required contents shall have the same effect as failure to appear at the
pre-trial under the succeeding paragraphs.

Section 13. Effect of failure to appear at the pre-trial. - {a) If the petitioner fails to appear personally, the case shall be dismissed
unless his counsel or a duly authorized representative appears in court and proves a valid excuse for the non-appearance of the
petitioner.

(b) If the respondent has filed his answer but fails to appear, the court shall proceed with the pre-trial and require the public
prosecutor to investigate the non-appearance of the respondent and submit within fifteen days thereafter a report to the court stating
whether his non-appearance is due to any collusion between the parties. If there Is no collusion, the court shall require the public
prosecutor to intervene for the State during the trial on the merits to prevent suppression or fabrication of evidence.

Section 14. Pre-trial conference. -At the pre-trial conference, the court:

(a) May refer the issues to a mediator who shall assist the parties in reaching an agreement on matters not prohibited by law.

The mediator shall render a report within one month from referral which, for good reasons, the court may extend for a period
not exceeding one month.

(b) In case mediation is not availed of or where it fails, the court shall proceed with the pre-trial conference, on which occasion it
shall consider the advisability of receiving expert testimony and such other makers as may aid in the prompt disposition of the
petition.

Section 15. Pre-trial order. - {a) The proceedings in the pre-trial shall be recorded. Upon termination of the pre-trial, the court
shall Issue a pre-trial order which shall recite in detail the matters taken up In the conference, the action taken thereon, the
amendments allowed on the pleadings, and except as to the ground of declaration of nullity or annulment, the agreements or
admissions made by the parties on any of the matters considered, including any provisional order that may be necessary or agreed
upon by the parties.

(b) Should the action proceed to trial, the order shall contain a recital of the following;

(1) Facts undisputed, admitted, and those which need not be proved subject to Section 16 of this Rule;

(2) Factual and legal issues to be litigated;

(3) Evidence, including objects and documents, that have been marked and will be presented;

(4) Names of witnesses who will be presented and their testimonies in the form of affidavits; and

(5) Schedule of the presentation of evidence.

(c) The pre-trial order shall also contain a directive to the public prosecutor to appear for the State and take steps to prevent collusion
between the parties at any stage of the proceedings and fabrication or suppression of evidence during the trial on the merits.

(d) The parlies shall not be allowed to raise issues or present witnesses and evidence other than those stated in the pre-trial order.

The order shall control the trial of the case, unless modified by the court to prevent manifest injustice.

(e) The parties shall have five days from receipt of the pre-trial order to propose corrections or modifications.

Section 16. Prohibited compromise. - The court-shall not allow compromise on prohibited matters, such as the following:

(a) The civil status of persons;

(b) The validity of a marriage or of a legal separation;

(c) Any ground for legal separation;

(d) Future support;

(e) The jurisdiction of courts; and

(f) Future legitime.

Section 17. Trial. - (1) The presiding judge shall personally conduct the trial of the case. No delegation of the reception of evidence
to a commissioner shall be allowed except as to matters involving property relations of the spouses.

(2) The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of marriage must be proved. No judgment on the pleadings,
summary judgment, or confession of judgment shall be allowed.

(3) The court may order the exclusion from the courtroom of all persons, including members of the press, who do not have a direct
interest in the case. Such an order may be made if the court determines on the record that requiring a party to testify in open court
would not enhance the ascertainment of truth; would cause to the party psychological harm or inability to effectively communicate
due to embarrassment, fear, or timidity; would violate the right of a party to privacy; or would be offensive to decency or public
morals.

(4) No copy shall be taken nor any examination or perusal of the records of the case or parts thereof be made by any person other
than a party or counsel of a party, except by order of the court.
Section 18. Memoranda. - The court may require the parties and the public prosecutor, in consultation with the Office of the
Solicitor General, to file their respective memoranda support of their claims within fifteen days from the date the trial is terminated.
It may require the Office of the Solicitor General to file its own memorandum if the case is of significant interest to the State. No
other pleadings or papers may be submitted without leave of court. After the lapse of the period herein provided, the case will be
considered submitted for decision, with or without the memoranda.

Section 19. Decision. - (1) If the court renders a decision granting the petition, it shall declare therein that the decree of absolute
nullity or decree of annulment shall be issued by the court only after compliance with Article 50 and 51 of the Family Code as
implemented under the Rule on Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of Properties.

(2) The parties, including the Solicitor General and the public prosecutor, shall be served with copies of the decision personally or
by registered mail. If the respondent summoned by publication failed to appear in the action, the dispositive part of the decision
shall be published once in a newspaper of general circulation.

(3) The decision becomes final upon the expiration of fifteen days from notice to the parties. Entry of judgment shall be made if no
motion for reconsideration or new trial, or appeal Is filed by any of the parties the public prosecutor, or the Solicitor General.

(4) Upon the finality of the decision, the court shall forthwith issue the corresponding decree if the parties have no properties.

If the parties have properties, the court shall observe the procedure prescribed in Section 21 of this Rule.

The entry of judgment shall be registered in the Civil Registry where the marriage was recorded and In the Civil Registry
where the Family Court'granting the petition for declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of marriage is located.

Section 20. Appeal. -

(1) Pre-condition. - No appeal from the decision shall be allowed unless the appellant has filed a motion for reconsideration or new
trial within fifteen days from notice of judgment.

(2) Notice of appeal. - An aggrieved party or the Solicitor General may appeal from the decision by filing a Notice of Appeal within
fifteen days from notice of denial of the motion for reconsideration or new trial. The appellant shall serve a copy of the notice of
appeal on the adverse parties.

Section 21. Liquidation, partition and distribution, custody, support of common children and delivery of their presumptive
iegltimes. - Upon entry of the judgment granting the petition, or, in case of appeal, upon receipt of the entry of judgment of the
appellate court granting the petition, the Family Court, on motion of either party, shall proceed with the liquidation, partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses, including custody, support of common children and delivery of their presumptive
legitimes pursuant to Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial
proceedings.

Section 22. Issuance of Decree of Declaration of Absolute Nullity or Annulment of Marriage." (a) The court shall issue the Decree
after;

(1) Registration of the entry of judgment granting the petition for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage in the Civil
Registry where the marriage was celebrated and in the Civil Registry of the place where the Family Court is located;

(2) Registration of the approved partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, in the proper Register of Deeds where
the real properties are located; and

(3) The delivery of the children's presumptive legitimes in cash, property, or sound securities.

(b) The court shall quote in the Decree the dispositive portion of the judgment entered and attach to the Decree the approved deed
of partition.
 Except in the case of children under Articles 36 and 53 of the Family Code, the court shall order the Local Civil Registrar to
issue an amended birth certificate indicating the new civil status of the children affected.

Section 23. Registration and publication of the decree; decree as best evidence. - (a) The prevailing party shall cause the
registration of the Decree in the Civil Registry where the marriage was registered, the Civil Registry of the place where the Family
Court is situated, and in the National Census and Statistics Office. He shall report td the court compliance with this requirement
within thirty days from receipt of the copy of the Decree.

(b) In case service of summons was made by publication, the parties shall cause the publication of the Decree once in a newspaper
of general circulation.

(c) The registered Decree shall be the best evidence to prove the declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of marriage and shall
serve as notice to third persons concerning the properties of petitioner and respondent as well as the properties or presumptive
legitimes delivered to their common children.

Section 24. Effect of death of a party; duty of the Family Court or Appellate Court. - (a) In case a party dies at any stage of the
proceedings before the entry of judgment, the court shall order the case closed and terminated, without prejudice to the settlement
of the estate in proper proceedings in the regular courts.

(b) If the party dies after the entry of judgment of nullity or annulment, the judgment shall be binding upon the parties and their
successors in interest in the settlement of the estate in the regular courts.

Section 25. Effectlvity. - This Rule shall take effect on March 15, 2003 following its publication in a newspaper of general
circulation not later than March 7, 2003.

(INSERT OCA CIRCULAR NO. 63-2019)

G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995

LEOUEL SANTOS, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIA ROSARIO BEDIA-SANTOS, respondents.

VITUG, J.:

Concededly a highly, if not indeed the most likely, controversial provision introduced by the Family Code is Article 36 (as amended
by E.O. No. 227 dated 17 July 1987), which declares:

Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.

The present petition for review on certiorari, at the instance of Leouel Santos ("Leouel"), brings into fore the above provision
which is now invoked by him. Undaunted by the decisions of the court a quo1 and the Court of Appeal,2 Leouel persists in
beseeching its application in his attempt to have his marriage with herein private respondent, Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos ("Julia"),
declared a nullity.

It was in Iloilo City where Leouel, who then held the rank of First Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, first met Julia. The meeting
later proved to be an eventful day for Leouel and Julia. On 20 September 1986, the two exchanged vows before Municipal Trial
Court Judge Cornelio G. Lazaro of Iloilo City, followed, shortly thereafter, by a church wedding. Leouel and Julia lived with the
latter's parents at the J. Bedia Compound, La Paz, Iloilo City. On 18 July 1987, Julia gave birth to a baby boy, and he was christened
Leouel Santos, Jr. The ecstasy, however, did not last long. It was bound to happen, Leouel averred, because of the frequent
interference by Julia's parents into the young spouses family affairs. Occasionally, the couple would also start a "quarrel" over a
number of other things, like when and where the couple should start living independently from Julia's parents or whenever Julia
would express resentment on Leouel's spending a few days with his own parents.

On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the United Sates of America to work as a nurse despite Leouel's pleas to so dissuade her.
Seven months after her departure, or on 01 January 1989, Julia called up Leouel for the first time by long distance telephone. She
promised to return home upon the expiration of her contract in July 1989. She never did. When Leouel got a chance to visit the
United States, where he underwent a training program under the auspices of the Armed Forces of the Philippines from 01 April up
to 25 August 1990, he desperately tried to locate, or to somehow get in touch with, Julia but all his efforts were of no avail.

Having failed to get Julia to somehow come home, Leouel filed with the regional trial Court of Negros Oriental, Branch 30, a
complaint for "Voiding of marriage Under Article 36 of the Family Code" (docketed, Civil Case No. 9814). Summons was served
by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in Negros Oriental.

On 31 May 1991, respondent Julia, in her answer (through counsel), opposed the complaint and denied its allegations, claiming, in
main, that it was the petitioner who had, in fact, been irresponsible and incompetent.

A possible collusion between the parties to obtain a decree of nullity of their marriage was ruled out by the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor (in its report to the court).

On 25 October 1991, after pre-trial conferences had repeatedly been set, albeit unsuccessfully, by the court, Julia ultimately filed
a manifestation, stating that she would neither appear nor submit evidence.

On 06 November 1991, the court a quo finally dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.3

Leouel appealed to the Court of Appeal. The latter affirmed the decision of the trial court.4
The petition should be denied not only because of its non-compliance with Circular 28-91, which requires a certification of non-
shopping, but also for its lack of merit.

Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very least to communicate with him, for more than five years are
circumstances that clearly show her being psychologically incapacitated to enter into married life. In his own words, Leouel asserts:

. . . (T)here is no leave, there is no affection for (him) because respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos failed all these years to
communicate with the petitioner. A wife who does not care to inform her husband about her whereabouts for a period of five years,
more or less, is psychologically incapacitated.

The family Code did not define the term "psychological incapacity." The deliberations during the sessions of the Family Code
Revision Committee, which has drafted the Code, can, however, provide an insight on the import of the provision.

Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:

xxx xxx xxx

Art. 36. . . .

(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or
judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential
marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration.

On subparagraph (7), which as lifted from the Canon Law, Justice (Jose B.L.) Reyes suggested that they say "wanting in sufficient
use," but Justice (Eduardo) Caguioa preferred to say "wanting in the sufficient use." On the other hand, Justice Reyes proposed that
they say "wanting in sufficient reason." Justice Caguioa, however, pointed out that the idea is that one is not lacking in judgment
but that he is lacking in the exercise of judgment. He added that lack of judgment would make the marriage voidable. Judge (Alicia
Sempio-) Diy remarked that lack of judgment is more serious than insufficient use of judgment and yet the latter would make the
marriage null and void and the former only voidable. Justice Caguioa suggested that subparagraph (7) be modified to read:

"That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to discharge the essential
marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration."

Justice Caguioa explained that the phrase "was wanting in sufficient use of reason of judgment to understand the essential nature
of marriage" refers to defects in the mental faculties vitiating consent, which is not the idea in subparagraph (7), but lack of
appreciation of one's marital obligations.

Judge Diy raised the question: Since "insanity" is also a psychological or mental incapacity, why is "insanity" only a ground for
annulment and not for declaration or nullity? In reply, Justice Caguioa explained that in insanity, there is the appearance of consent,
which is the reason why it is a ground for voidable marriages, while subparagraph (7) does not refer to consent but to the very
essence of marital obligations.

Prof. (Araceli) Baviera suggested that, in subparagraph (7), the word "mentally" be deleted, with which Justice Caguioa concurred.
Judge Diy, however, prefers to retain the word "mentally."

Justice Caguioa remarked that subparagraph (7) refers to psychological impotence. Justice (Ricardo) Puno stated that sometimes a
person may be psychologically impotent with one but not with another. Justice (Leonor Ines-) Luciano said that it is called selective
impotency.

Dean (Fortunato) Gupit stated that the confusion lies in the fact that in inserting the Canon Law annulment in the Family Code, the
Committee used a language which describes a ground for voidable marriages under the Civil Code. Justice Caguioa added that in
Canon Law, there are voidable marriages under the Canon Law, there are no voidable marriages Dean Gupit said that this is
precisely the reason why they should make a distinction.
Justice Puno remarked that in Canon Law, the defects in marriage cannot be cured.

Justice Reyes pointed out that the problem is: Why is "insanity" a ground for void ab initio marriages? In reply, Justice Caguioa
explained that insanity is curable and there are lucid intervals, while psychological incapacity is not.

On another point, Justice Puno suggested that the phrase "even if such lack or incapacity is made manifest" be modified to read
"even if such lack or incapacity becomes manifest."

Justice Reyes remarked that in insanity, at the time of the marriage, it is not apparent.

Justice Caguioa stated that there are two interpretations of the phrase "psychological or mentally incapacitated" — in the first one,
there is vitiation of consent because one does not know all the consequences of the marriages, and if he had known these completely,
he might not have consented to the marriage.

Prof. Bautista stated that he is in favor of making psychological incapacity a ground for voidable marriages since otherwise it will
encourage one who really understood the consequences of marriage to claim that he did not and to make excuses for invalidating
the marriage by acting as if he did not understand the obligations of marriage. Dean Gupit added that it is a loose way of providing
for divorce.

Justice Caguioa explained that his point is that in the case of incapacity by reason of defects in the mental faculties, which is less
than insanity, there is a defect in consent and, therefore, it is clear that it should be a ground for voidable marriage because there is
the appearance of consent and it is capable of convalidation for the simple reason that there are lucid intervals and there are cases
when the insanity is curable. He emphasized that psychological incapacity does not refer to mental faculties and has nothing to do
with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to marriage.

On psychological incapacity, Prof. (Flerida Ruth P.) Romero inquired if they do not consider it as going to the very essence of
consent. She asked if they are really removing it from consent. In reply, Justice Caguioa explained that, ultimately, consent in
general is effected but he stressed that his point is that it is not principally a vitiation of consent since there is a valid consent. He
objected to the lumping together of the validity of the marriage celebration and the obligations attendant to marriage, which are
completely different from each other, because they require a different capacity, which is eighteen years of age, for marriage but in
contract, it is different. Justice Puno, however, felt that psychological incapacity is still a kind of vice of consent and that it should
not be classified as a voidable marriage which is incapable of convalidation; it should be convalidated but there should be no
prescription. In other words, as long as the defect has not been cured, there is always a right to annul the marriage and if the defect
has been really cured, it should be a defense in the action for annulment so that when the action for annulment is instituted, the
issue can be raised that actually, although one might have been psychologically incapacitated, at the time the action is brought, it
is no longer true that he has no concept of the consequence of marriage.

Prof. (Esteban) Bautista raised the question: Will not cohabitation be a defense? In response, Justice Puno stated that even the
bearing of children and cohabitation should not be a sign that psychological incapacity has been cured.

Prof. Romero opined that psychological incapacity is still insanity of a lesser degree. Justice Luciano suggested that they invite a
psychiatrist, who is the expert on this matter. Justice Caguioa, however, reiterated that psychological incapacity is not a defect in
the mind but in the understanding of the consequences of marriage, and therefore, a psychiatrist will not be a help.

Prof. Bautista stated that, in the same manner that there is a lucid interval in insanity, there are also momentary periods when there
is an understanding of the consequences of marriage. Justice Reyes and Dean Gupit remarked that the ground of psychological
incapacity will not apply if the marriage was contracted at the time when there is understanding of the consequences of marriage.5

Judge Diy proposed that they include physical incapacity to copulate among the grounds for void marriages. Justice Reyes
commented that in some instances the impotence that in some instances the impotence is only temporary and only with respect to
a particular person. Judge Diy stated that they can specify that it is incurable. Justice Caguioa remarked that the term "incurable"
has a different meaning in law and in medicine. Judge Diy stated that "psychological incapacity" can also be cured. Justice Caguioa,
however, pointed out that "psychological incapacity" is incurable.
Justice Puno observed that under the present draft provision, it is enough to show that at the time of the celebration of the marriage,
one was psychologically incapacitated so that later on if already he can comply with the essential marital obligations, the marriage
is still void ab initio. Justice Caguioa explained that since in divorce, the psychological incapacity may occur after the marriage, in
void marriages, it has to be at the time of the celebration of marriage. He, however, stressed that the idea in the provision is that at
the time of the celebration of the marriage, one is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations,
which incapacity continues and later becomes manifest.

Justice Puno and Judge Diy, however, pointed out that it is possible that after the marriage, one's psychological incapacity become
manifest but later on he is cured. Justice Reyes and Justice Caguioa opined that the remedy in this case is to allow him to remarry.6

Justice Puno formulated the next Article as follows:

Art. 37. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated, to comply with
the essential obligations of marriage shall likewise be void from the beginning even if such incapacity becomes manifest after its
solemnization.

Justice Caguioa suggested that "even if" be substituted with "although." On the other hand, Prof. Bautista proposed that the clause
"although such incapacity becomes manifest after its solemnization" be deleted since it may encourage one to create the
manifestation of psychological incapacity. Justice Caguioa pointed out that, as in other provisions, they cannot argue on the basis
of abuse.

Judge Diy suggested that they also include mental and physical incapacities, which are lesser in degree than psychological
incapacity. Justice Caguioa explained that mental and physical incapacities are vices of consent while psychological incapacity is
not a species of vice or consent.

Dean Gupit read what Bishop Cruz said on the matter in the minutes of their February 9, 1984 meeting:

"On the third ground, Bishop Cruz indicated that the phrase "psychological or mental impotence" is an invention of some
churchmen who are moralists but not canonists, that is why it is considered a weak phrase. He said that the Code of Canon Law
would rather express it as "psychological or mental incapacity to discharge . . ."

Justice Caguioa remarked that they deleted the word "mental" precisely to distinguish it from vice of consent. He explained that
"psychological incapacity" refers to lack of understanding of the essential obligations of marriage.

Justice Puno reminded the members that, at the last meeting, they have decided not to go into the classification of "psychological
incapacity" because there was a lot of debate on it and that this is precisely the reason why they classified it as a special case.

At this point, Justice Puno, remarked that, since there having been annulments of marriages arising from psychological incapacity,
Civil Law should not reconcile with Canon Law because it is a new ground even under Canon Law.

Prof. Romero raised the question: With this common provision in Civil Law and in Canon Law, are they going to have a provision
in the Family Code to the effect that marriages annulled or declared void by the church on the ground of psychological incapacity
is automatically annulled in Civil Law? The other members replied negatively.

Justice Puno and Prof. Romero inquired if Article 37 should be retroactive or prospective in application.

Justice Diy opined that she was for its retroactivity because it is their answer to the problem of church annulments of marriages,
which are still valid under the Civil Law. On the other hand, Justice Reyes and Justice Puno were concerned about the avalanche
of cases.

Dean Gupit suggested that they put the issue to a vote, which the Committee approved.

The members voted as follows:

(1) Justice Reyes, Justice Puno and Prof. Romero were for prospectivity.

(2) Justice Caguioa, Judge Diy, Dean Gupit, Prof. Bautista and Director Eufemio were for retroactivity.

(3) Prof. Baviera abstained.

Justice Caguioa suggested that they put in the prescriptive period of ten years within which the action for declaration of nullity of
the marriage should be filed in court. The Committee approved the suggestion.7

It could well be that, in sum, the Family Code Revision Committee in ultimately deciding to adopt the provision with less specificity
than expected, has in fact, so designed the law as to allow some resiliency in its application. Mme. Justice Alicia V. Sempio-Diy,
a member of the Code Committee, has been quoted by Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo in Salita vs. Hon. Magtolis (G.R. No. 106429,
13 June 1994); thus:8

The Committee did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear that the giving of examples would limit the
applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the Committee would like the judge to interpret the
provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and
by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision
was taken from Canon Law.

A part of the provision is similar to Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law,9 which reads:

Canon 1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:

1. who lack sufficient use of reason;

2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment concerning essentila matrimonial rights and duties, to be given and
accepted mutually;

3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage. (Emphasis supplied.)

Accordingly, although neither decisive nor even perhaps all that persuasive for having no juridical or secular effect, the
jurisprudence under Canon Law prevailing at the time of the code's enactment, nevertheless, cannot be dismissed as impertinent
for its value as an aid, at least, to the interpretation or construction of the codal provision.

One author, Ladislas Orsy, S.J., in his treaties, 10 giving an account on how the third paragraph of Canon 1095 has been framed,
states:

The history of the drafting of this canon does not leave any doubt that the legislator intended, indeed, to broaden the rule. A strict
and narrow norm was proposed first:

Those who cannot assume the essential obligations of marriage because of a grave psycho-sexual anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam
psychosexualem) are unable to contract marriage (cf. SCH/1975, canon 297, a new canon, novus);

then a broader one followed:

. . . because of a grave psychological anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam psychicam) . . . (cf. SCH/1980, canon 1049);

then the same wording was retained in the text submitted to the pope (cf. SCH/1982, canon 1095, 3);

finally, a new version was promulgated:

because of causes of a psychological nature (ob causas naturae psychiae).

So the progress was from psycho-sexual to psychological anomaly, then the term anomaly was altogether eliminated. it would be,
however, incorrect to draw the conclusion that the cause of the incapacity need not be some kind of psychological disorder; after
all, normal and healthy person should be able to assume the ordinary obligations of marriage.

Fr. Orsy concedes that the term "psychological incapacity" defies any precise definition since psychological causes can be of an
infinite variety.

In a book, entitled "Canons and Commentaries on Marriage," written by Ignatius Gramunt, Javier Hervada and LeRoy Wauck, the
following explanation appears:

This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of marriage. Some psychosexual
disorders and other disorders of personality can be the psychic cause of this defect, which is here described in legal terms. This
particular type of incapacity consists of a real inability to render what is due by the contract. This could be compared to the
incapacity of a farmer to enter a binding contract to deliver the crops which he cannot possibly reap; (b) this inability to commit
oneself must refer to the essential obligations of marriage: the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual
help, the procreation and education of offspring; (c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality. The mere
difficulty of assuming these obligations, which could be overcome by normal effort, obviously does not constitute incapacity. The
canon contemplates a true psychological disorder which incapacitates a person from giving what is due (cf. John Paul II, Address
to R. Rota, Feb. 5, 1987). However, if the marriage is to be declared invalid under this incapacity, it must be proved not only that
the person is afflicted by a psychological defect, but that the defect did in fact deprive the person, at the moment of giving consent,
of the ability to assume the essential duties of marriage and consequently of the possibility of being bound by these duties.

Justice Sempio-Diy 11 cites with approval the work of Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Marriage
Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch 1), who opines that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a)
gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be
incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the
marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were
otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.

It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including, and most importantly, the deliberations of the Family
Code Revision Committee itself, that the use of the phrase "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Code has not been
meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low
intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio Baluma's "Void and Voidable Marriages in the Family Code
and their Parallels in Canon Law," quoting from the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder by the American Psychiatric
Association; Edward Hudson's "Handbook II for Marriage Nullity Cases"). Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and
construed independently of, but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated,
"psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive
of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so
expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and
render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological
incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter intensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. This pschologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does
not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is
implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the
void marriage to be "legitimate."

The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound mind or concealment
of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to
Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the marriage,
they become mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions of the Code, however, do
not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and severity of
the disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity.

Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every circumstance that may have some bearing on the degree,
extent, and other conditions of that incapacity must, in every case, be carefully examined and evaluated so that no precipitate and
indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily decreed. The well-considered opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, and persons with
expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even desirable.

Marriage is not an adventure but a lifetime commitment. We should continue to be reminded that innate in our society, then
enshrined in our Civil Code, and even now still indelible in Article 1 of the Family Code, is that —

Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man a woman entered into in accordance with law for the
establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the
property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code. (Emphasis supplied.)

Our Constitution is no less emphatic:

Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and
actively promote its total development.

Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State. (Article XV,
1987 Constitution).

The above provisions express so well and so distinctly the basic nucleus of our laws on marriage and the family, and they are doubt
the tenets we still hold on to.

The factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at all, can come close to the standards required to decree a nullity of
marriage. Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his present situation. Regrettably, neither
law nor society itself can always provide all the specific answers to every individual problem.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997

CHI MING TSOI, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI, respondents.

TORRES, JR., J.:

Man has not invented a reliable compass by which to steer a marriage in its journey over troubled waters. Laws are seemingly
inadequate. Over time, much reliance has been placed in the works of the unseen hand of Him who created all things.

Who is to blame when a marriage fails?

This case was originally commenced by a distraught wife against her uncaring husband in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
(Branch 89) which decreed the annulment of the marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. Petitioner appealed the
decision of the trial court to respondent Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 42758) which affirmed the Trial Court's decision
November 29, 1994 and correspondingly denied the motion for reconsideration in a resolution dated February 14, 1995.

The statement of the case and of the facts made by the trial court and reproduced by the Court of Appeals1 its decision are as
follows:

From the evidence adduced, the following acts were preponderantly established:

Sometime on May 22, 1988, the plaintiff married the defendant at the Manila Cathedral, . . . Intramuros Manila, as evidenced by
their Marriage Contract. (Exh. "A")

After the celebration of their marriage and wedding reception at the South Villa, Makati, they went and proceeded to the house of
defendant's mother.

There, they slept together on the same bed in the same room for the first night of their married life.

It is the version of the plaintiff, that contrary to her expectations, that as newlyweds they were supposed to enjoy making love, or
having sexual intercourse, with each other, the defendant just went to bed, slept on one side thereof, then turned his back and went
to sleep . There was no sexual intercourse between them during the first night. The same thing happened on the second, third and
fourth nights.

In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place where they can enjoy together during their first week as husband and wife,
they went to Baguio City. But, they did so together with her mother, an uncle, his mother and his nephew. They were all invited by
the defendant to join them. [T]hey stayed in Baguio City for four (4) days. But, during this period, there was no sexual intercourse
between them, since the defendant avoided her by taking a long walk during siesta time or by just sleeping on a rocking chair
located at the living room. They slept together in the same room and on the same bed since May 22, 1988 until March 15, 1989.
But during this period, there was no attempt of sexual intercourse between them. [S]he claims, that she did not: even see her
husband's private parts nor did he see hers.

Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examinations to Dr. Eufemio Macalalag, a urologist at the Chinese General
Hospital, on January 20, 1989.

The results of their physical examinations were that she is healthy, normal and still a virgin, while that of her husband's examination
was kept confidential up to this time. While no medicine was prescribed for her, the doctor prescribed medications for her husband
which was also kept confidential. No treatment was given to her. For her husband, he was asked by the doctor to return but he never
did.
The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not show his penis. She said, that she had
observed the defendant using an eyebrow pencil and sometimes the cleansing cream of his mother. And that, according to her, the
defendant married her, a Filipino citizen, to acquire or maintain his residency status here in the country and to publicly maintain
the appearance of a normal man.

The plaintiff is not willing to reconcile with her husband.

On the other hand, it is the claim of the defendant that if their marriage shall be annulled by reason of psychological incapacity, the
fault lies with his wife.

But, he said that he does not want his marriage with his wife annulled for several reasons, viz: (1) that he loves her very much; (2)
that he has no defect on his part and he is physically and psychologically capable; and, (3) since the relationship is still very young
and if there is any differences between the two of them, it can still be reconciled and that, according to him, if either one of them
has some incapabilities, there is no certainty that this will not be cured. He further claims, that if there is any defect, it can be cured
by the intervention of medical technology or science.

The defendant admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual
contact between them. But, the reason for this, according to the defendant, was that everytime he wants to have sexual intercourse
with his wife, she always avoided him and whenever he caresses her private parts, she always removed his hands. The defendant
claims, that he forced his wife to have sex with him only once but he did not continue because she was shaking and she did not like
it. So he stopped.

There are two (2) reasons, according to the defendant , why the plaintiff filed this case against him, and these are: (1) that she is
afraid that she will be forced to return the pieces of jewelry of his mother, and, (2) that her husband, the defendant, will consummate
their marriage.

The defendant insisted that their marriage will remain valid because they are still very young and there is still a chance to overcome
their differences.

The defendant submitted himself to a physical examination. His penis was examined by Dr. Sergio Alteza, Jr., for the purpose of
finding out whether he is impotent . As a result thereof, Dr. Alteza submitted his Doctor's Medical Report. (Exh. "2"). It is stated
there, that there is no evidence of impotency (Exh. "2-B"), and he is capable of erection. (Exh. "2-C")

The doctor said, that he asked the defendant to masturbate to find out whether or not he has an erection and he found out that from
the original size of two (2) inches, or five (5) centimeters, the penis of the defendant lengthened by one (1) inch and one centimeter.
Dr. Alteza said, that the defendant had only a soft erection which is why his penis is not in its full length. But, still is capable of
further erection, in that with his soft erection, the defendant is capable of having sexual intercourse with a woman.

In open Court, the Trial Prosecutor manifested that there is no collusion between the parties and that the evidence is not fabricated."2

After trial, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:

ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered declaring as VOID the marriage entered into by the plaintiff with the defendant on
May 22, 1988 at the Manila Cathedral, Basilica of the Immaculate Conception, Intramuros, Manila, before the Rt. Rev. Msgr.
Melencio de Vera. Without costs. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City. Let another
copy be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Manila.

SO ORDERED.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.

Hence, the instant petition.

Petitioner alleges that the respondent Court of Appeals erred:

I

in affirming the conclusions of the lower court that there was no sexual intercourse between the parties without making any findings
of fact.

II

in holding that the refusal of private respondent to have sexual communion with petitioner is a psychological incapacity inasmuch
as proof thereof is totally absent.

III

in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the private respondent to have sex with each other constitutes
psychological incapacity of both.

IV

in affirming the annulment of the marriage between the parties decreed by the lower court without fully satisfying itself that there
was no collusion between them.

We find the petition to be bereft of merit.

Petitioner contends that being the plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-89-3141, private respondent has the burden of proving the allegations
in her complaint; that since there was no independent evidence to prove the alleged non-coitus between the parties, there remains
no other basis for the court's conclusion except the admission of petitioner; that public policy should aid acts intended to validate
marriage and should retard acts intended to invalidate them; that the conclusion drawn by the trial court on the admissions and
confessions of the parties in their pleadings and in the course of the trial is misplaced since it could have been a product of collusion;
and that in actions for annulment of marriage, the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved.3

Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court reads:

Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. — Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of
the adverse party's pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. But in actions for annulment
of marriage or for legal separation the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved.

The foregoing provision pertains to a judgment on the pleadings. What said provision seeks to prevent is annulment of marriage
without trial. The assailed decision was not based on such a judgment on the pleadings. When private respondent testified under
oath before the trial court and was cross-examined by oath before the trial court and was cross-examined by the adverse party, she
thereby presented evidence in form of a testimony. After such evidence was presented, it be came incumbent upon petitioner to
present his side. He admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no
sexual intercourse between them.

To prevent collusion between the parties is the reason why, as stated by the petitioner, the Civil Code provides that no judgment
annulling a marriage shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment (Arts. 88 and 101[par. 2]) and
the Rules of Court prohibit such annulment without trial (Sec. 1, Rule 19).

The case has reached this Court because petitioner does not want their marriage to be annulled. This only shows that there is no
collusion between the parties. When petitioner admitted that he and his wife (private respondent) have never had sexual contact
with each other, he must have been only telling the truth. We are reproducing the relevant portion of the challenged resolution
denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, penned with magisterial lucidity by Associate Justice Minerva Gonzaga-
Reyes, viz:

The judgment of the trial court which was affirmed by this Court is not based on a stipulation of facts. The issue of whether or not
the appellant is psychologically incapacitated to discharge a basic marital obligation was resolved upon a review of both the
documentary and testimonial evidence on record. Appellant admitted that he did not have sexual relations with his wife after almost
ten months of cohabitation, and it appears that he is not suffering from any physical disability. Such abnormal reluctance or
unwillingness to consummate his marriage is strongly indicative of a serious personality disorder which to the mind of this Court
clearly demonstrates an 'utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage' within the meaning of
Article 36 of the Family Code (See Santos vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995). 4

Petitioner further contends that respondent court erred in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the private
respondent to have sex with each other constitutes psychological incapacity of both. He points out as error the failure of the trial
court to make "a categorical finding about the alleged psychological incapacity and an in-depth analysis of the reasons for such
refusal which may not be necessarily due to physchological disorders" because there might have been other reasons, — i.e., physical
disorders, such as aches, pains or other discomforts, — why private respondent would not want to have sexual intercourse from
May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989, in a short span of 10 months.

First, it must be stated that neither the trial court nor the respondent court made a finding on who between petitioner and private
respondent refuses to have sexual contact with the other. The fact remains, however, that there has never been coitus between them.
At any rate, since the action to declare the marriage void may be filed by either party, i.e., even the psychologically incapacitated,
the question of who refuses to have sex with the other becomes immaterial.

Petitioner claims that there is no independent evidence on record to show that any of the parties is suffering from phychological
incapacity. Petitioner also claims that he wanted to have sex with private respondent; that the reason for private respondent's refusal
may not be psychological but physical disorder as stated above.

We do not agree. Assuming it to be so, petitioner could have discussed with private respondent or asked her what is ailing her, and
why she balks and avoids him everytime he wanted to have sexual intercourse with her. He never did. At least, there is nothing in
the record to show that he had tried to find out or discover what the problem with his wife could be. What he presented in evidence
is his doctor's Medical Report that there is no evidence of his impotency and he is capable of erection.5 Since it is petitioner's claim
that the reason is not psychological but perhaps physical disorder on the part of private respondent, it became incumbent upon him
to prove such a claim.

If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is
senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal.
Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual
intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity. 6

Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "To procreate children based on the universal principle
that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage." Constant non- fulfillment of this obligation
will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the
parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.

As aptly stated by the respondent court,

An examination of the evidence convinces Us that the husband's plea that the wife did not want carnal intercourse with him does
not inspire belief. Since he was not physically impotent, but he refrained from sexual intercourse during the entire time (from May
22, 1988 to March 15, 1989) that he occupied the same bed with his wife, purely out of symphaty for her feelings, he deserves to
be doubted for not having asserted his right seven though she balked (Tompkins vs. Tompkins, 111 Atl. 599, cited in I Paras, Civil
Code, at p. 330). Besides, if it were true that it is the wife was suffering from incapacity, the fact that defendant did not go to court
and seek the declaration of nullity weakens his claim. This case was instituted by the wife whose normal expectations of her
marriage were frustrated by her husband's inadequacy. Considering the innate modesty of the Filipino woman, it is hard to believe
that she would expose her private life to public scrutiny and fabricate testimony against her husband if it were not necessary to put
her life in order and put to rest her marital status.

We are not impressed by defendant's claim that what the evidence proved is the unwillingness or lack of intention to perform the
sexual act, which is not phychological incapacity, and which can be achieved "through proper motivation." After almost ten months
of cohabitation, the admission that the husband is reluctant or unwilling to perform the sexual act with his wife whom he professes
to love very dearly, and who has not posed any insurmountable resistance to his alleged approaches, is indicative of a hopeless
situation, and of a serious personality disorder that constitutes psychological incapacity to discharge the basic marital covenants
within the contemplation of the Family Code.7

While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity (Art.
68, Family Code), the sanction therefor is actually the "spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal
mandate or court order" (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno 120 Phil. 1298). Love is useless unless it is shared with another. Indeed, no man
is an island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say "I could not have cared less." This is so because an ungiven self is an
unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but himself. In the natural order, it is sexual intimacy which brings spouses wholeness and
oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of
procreation and ensures the continuation of family relations.

It appears that there is absence of empathy between petitioner and private respondent. That is — a shared feeling which between
husband and wife must be experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion.
Marital union is a two-way process. An expressive interest in each other's feelings at a time it is needed by the other can go a long
way in deepening the marital relationship. Marriage is definitely not for children but for two consenting adults who view the
relationship with love amor gignit amorem, respect, sacrifice and a continuing commitment to compromise, conscious of its value
as a sublime social institution.

This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled
vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but sustain the studied judgment of respondent appellate court.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING PREMISES , the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 29, 1994 is hereby
AFFIRMED in all respects and the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely new ground (in addition to those enumerated in the Civil Code) to
assail the validity of a marriage, namely, "psychological incapacity." Since the Code's effectivity, our courts have been
swamped with various petitions to declare marriages void based on this ground. Although this Court had interpreted the
meaning of psychological incapacity in the recent case of Santos vs. Court of Appeals, still many judges and lawyers find
difficulty in applying said novel provision in specific cases. In the present case and in the context of the herein assailed
Decision of the Court of Appeals, the Solicitor General has labelled — exaggerated to be sure but nonetheless expressive of
his frustration — Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in the world." Hence, this Court in addition to resolving
the present case, finds the need to lay down specific guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the
Family Code.

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 challenging the January 25, 1993 Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 34858 affirming in toto the May 14, 1991 decision of the Regional Trial Court of La
Trinidad,3 Benguet, which declared the marriage of respondent Roridel Olaviano Molina to Reynaldo Molina void ab initio, on
the ground of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family Code.

The Facts

This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing by respondent Roridel O. Molina of a verified petition for declaration
of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Essentially, the petition alleged that Roridel and Reynaldo were married on April
14, 1985 at the San Agustin Church4 in Manila; that a son, Andre O. Molina was born; that after a year of marriage, Reynaldo
showed signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and a father since he preferred to spend more time with his peers
and friends on whom he squandered his money; that he depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was never honest with
his wife in regard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them; that sometime in February 1986, Reynaldo was
relieved of his job in Manila, and since then Roridel had been the sole breadwinner of the family; that in October 1986 the couple
had a very intense quarrel, as a result of which their relationship was estranged; that in March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job
in Manila and went to live with her parents in Baguio City; that a few weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their child, and had
since then abandoned them; that Reynaldo had thus shown that he was psychologically incapable of complying with essential
marital obligations and was a highly immature and habitually quarrel some individual who thought of himself as a king to be served;
and that it would be to the couple's best interest to have their marriage declared null and void in order to free them from what
appeared to be an incompatible marriage from the start.

In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could no longer live together as husband and wife,
but contended that their misunderstandings and frequent quarrels were due to (1) Roridel's strange behavior of insisting on
maintaining her group of friends even after their marriage; (2) Roridel's refusal to perform some of her marital duties such as
cooking meals; and (3) Roridel's failure to run the household and handle their finances.

During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following were stipulated:

1. That the parties herein were legally married on April 14, 1985 at the Church of St. Augustine, Manila;

2. That out of their marriage, a child named Albert Andre Olaviano Molina was born on July 29, 1986;

3. That the parties are separated-in-fact for more than three years;

4. That petitioner is not asking support for her and her child;
5. That the respondent is not asking for damages;

6. That the common child of the parties is in the custody of the petitioner wife.

Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own testimony and that of her friends Rosemarie Ventura and Maria Leonora
Padilla as well as of Ruth G. Lalas, a social worker, and of Dr. Teresita Hidalgo-Sison, a psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital
and Medical Center. She also submitted documents marked as Exhibits "A" to "E-1." Reynaldo did not present any evidence as he
appeared only during the pre-trial conference.

On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The appeal of petitioner was denied by the Court
of Appeals which affirmed in toto the RTC's decision. Hence, the present recourse.

The Issue

In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that "the Court of Appeals made an erroneous and incorrect interpretation of the phrase
'psychological incapacity' (as provided under Art. 36 of the Family Code) and made an incorrect application thereof to the facts of
the case," adding that the appealed Decision tended "to establish in effect the most liberal divorce procedure in the world which is
anathema to our culture."

In denying the Solicitor General's appeal, the respondent Court relied5 heavily on the trial court's findings "that the marriage
between the parties broke up because of their opposing and conflicting personalities." Then, it added it sown opinion that "the Civil
Code Revision Committee (hereinafter referred to as Committee) intended to liberalize the application of our civil laws on personal
and family rights. . . ." It concluded that:

As ground for annulment of marriage, We view psychologically incapacity as a broad range of mental and behavioral conduct on
the part of one spouse indicative of how he or she regards the marital union, his or her personal relationship with the other spouse,
as well as his or her conduct in the long haul for the attainment of the principal objectives of marriage. If said conduct, observed
and considered as a whole, tends to cause the union to self-destruct because it defeats the very objectives of marriage, then there is
enough reason to leave the spouses to their individual fates.

In the case at bar, We find that the trial judge committed no indiscretion in analyzing and deciding the instant case, as it did, hence,
We find no cogent reason to disturb the findings and conclusions thus made.

Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these discussions of the Court of Appeals.

The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that "opposing and conflicting personalities" is not equivalent to psychological incapacity,
explaining that such ground "is not simply the neglect by the parties to the marriage of their responsibilities and duties, but
a defect in their psychological nature which renders them incapable of performing such marital responsibilities and duties."

The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals6 this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled that "psychological incapacity
should refer to no less than a mental (nor physical) incapacity . . . and that (t)here is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the
law has been to confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition
must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated." Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage
Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila,7 Justice Vitug wrote that "the psychological incapacity must be characterized by
(a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."

On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. It
appears to us to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations.
Mere showing of "irreconciliable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is
not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must
be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (nor physical) illness.

The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her husband could nor get along with each other. There had been
no showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability. The expert testimony of Dr. Sison
showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility, not psychological incapacity. Dr. Sison testified:8

COURT

Q It is therefore the recommendation of the psychiatrist based on your findings that it is better for the Court to annul (sic) the
marriage?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q There is no hope for the marriage?
A There is no hope, the man is also living with another woman.

Q Is it also the stand of the psychiatrist that the parties are psychologically unfit for each other but they are psychologically fit with
other parties?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q Neither are they psychologically unfit for their professions?
A Yes, Your Honor.
The Court has no more questions.

In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged personality traits were constitutive of psychological incapacity existing
at the time of marriage celebration. While some effort was made to prove that there was a failure to fulfill pre-nuptial impressions
of "thoughtfulness and gentleness" on Reynaldo's part of being "conservative, homely and intelligent" on the part of Roridel, such
failure of expectation is nor indicative of antecedent psychological incapacity. If at all, it merely shows love's temporary blindness
to the faults and blemishes of the beloved.

During its deliberations, the Court decided to go beyond merely ruling on the facts of this case vis-a-vis existing law and
jurisprudence. In view of the novelty of Art. 36 of the Family Code and the difficulty experienced by many trial courts interpreting
and applying it, the Court decided to invite two amici curiae, namely, the Most Reverend Oscar V. Cruz,9 Vicar Judicial (Presiding
Judge) of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, and Justice Ricardo C. Puno, 10 a
member of the Family Code Revision Committee. The Court takes this occasion to thank these friends of the Court for their
informative and interesting discussions during the oral argument on December 3, 1996, which they followed up with written
memoranda.

From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36
of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution
and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the
Family, 11 recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.

The Family Code 12 echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes the permanence,
inviolability and solidarity

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity
must be psychological — not physical. although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince
the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such
incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis, 13 nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature explained. Expert
evidence may be given qualified psychiatrist and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the
illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time,
but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or
even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such
incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the
exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and
prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as
an essential obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The
illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, nor a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words,
there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband
and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision
Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:

The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to
causes of psychological nature. 14

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our
people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decision of such appellate
tribunal. Ideally — subject to our law on evidence — what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.

This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious
interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church — while remaining independent, separate and apart
from each other — shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the
family as the inviolable base of the nation.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No
decision shall he handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly
staring therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with
the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed
submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor
vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.

In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we have already ruled to grant the petition. Such ruling becomes even more cogent
with the use of the foregoing guidelines.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage of Roridel
Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.

SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 126010. December 8, 1999]

LUCITA ESTRELLA HERNANDEZ, petitioner vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MARIO C. HERNANDEZ, Respondents.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision1 of the Court of Appeals, dated January 30, 1996, affirming the decision
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Tagaytay City, dated April 10, 1993, which dismissed the petition for annulment of marriage
filed by petitioner.

Petitioner Lucita Estrella Hernandez and private respondent Mario C. Hernandez were married at the Silang Catholic Parish Church
in Silang, Cavite on January 1, 1981 (Exh. A).2 Three children were born to them, namely, Maie, who was born on May 3, 1982
(Exh. B),3 Lyra, born on May 22, 1985 (Exh. C),4 and Marian, born on June 15, 1989 (Exh. D).5

On July 10, 1992, petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Tagaytay City, a petition seeking the annulment of
her marriage to private respondent on the ground of psychological incapacity of the latter. She alleged that from the time of their
marriage up to the time of the filing of the suit, private respondent failed to perform his obligation to support the family and
contribute to the management of the household, devoting most of his time engaging in drinking sprees with his friends. She further
claimed that private respondent, after they were married, cohabited with another woman with whom he had an illegitimate child,
while having affairs with different women, and that, because of his promiscuity, private respondent endangered her health by
infecting her with a sexually transmissible disease (STD). She averred that private respondent was irresponsible, immature and
unprepared for the duties of a married life. Petitioner prayed that for having abandoned the family, private respondent be ordered
to give support to their three children in the total amount of P9,000.00 every month; that she be awarded the custody of their
children; and that she be adjudged as the sole owner of a parcel of land located at Don Gregorio Subdivision I in Bo. Bucal,
Dasmarias, Cavite, purchased during the marriage, as well as the jeep which private respondent took with him when he left the
conjugal home on June 12, 1992.6

On October 8, 1992, because of private respondents failure to file his answer, the trial court issued an order directing the assistant
provincial prosecutor to conduct an investigation to determine if there was collusion between the parties.7 Only petitioner appeared
at the investigation on November 5, 1992. Nevertheless, the prosecutor found no evidence of collusion and recommended that the
case be set for trial.8

Based on the evidence presented by the petitioner, the facts are as follows: 9

Petitioner and private respondent met in 1977 at the Philippine Christian University in Dasmarias, Cavite. Petitioner, who is five
years older than private respondent, was then in her first year of teaching zoology and botany. Private respondent, a college
freshman, was her student for two consecutive semesters. They became sweethearts in February 1979 when she was no longer
private respondents teacher. On January 1, 1981, they were married.

Private respondent continued his studies for two more years. His parents paid for his tuition fees, while petitioner provided his
allowances and other financial needs. The family income came from petitioners salary as a faculty member of the Philippine
Christian University. Petitioner augmented her earnings by selling Tupperware products, as well as engaging in the buy-and-sell
of coffee, rice and polvoron.

From 1983 up to 1986, as private respondent could not find a stable job, it was agreed that he would help petitioner in her businesses
by delivering orders to customers. However, because her husband was a spendthrift and had other women, petitioners business
suffered. Private respondent often had smoking and drinking sprees with his friends and betted on fighting cocks. In 1982, after the
birth of their first child, petitioner discovered two love letters written by a certain Realita Villena to private respondent. She knew
Villena as a married student whose husband was working in Saudi Arabia. When petitioner confronted private respondent, he
admitted having an extra-marital affair with Villena. Petitioner then pleaded with Villena to end her relationship with private
respondent. For his part, private respondent said he would end the affairs, but he did not keep his promise. Instead, he left the
conjugal home and abandoned petitioner and their child. When private respondent came back, however, petitioner accepted him,
despite private respondents infidelity in the hope of saving their marriage.
Upon the recommendation of a family friend, private respondent was able to get a job at Reynolds Philippines, Inc. in San Agustin,
Dasmarias, Cavite in 1986. However, private respondent was employed only until March 31, 1991, because he availed himself of
the early retirement plan offered by the company. He received P53,000.00 in retirement pay, but instead of spending the amount
for the needs of the family, private respondent spent the money on himself and consumed the entire amount within four months of
his retirement.

While private respondent worked at Reynolds Philippines, Inc., his smoking, drinking, gambling and womanizing became worse.
Petitioner discovered that private respondent carried on relationships with different women. He had relations with a certain Edna
who worked at Yazaki; Angie, who was an operator of a billiard hall; Tess, a Japayuki; Myrna Macatangay, a secretary at the Road
Master Drivers School in Bayan, Dasmarias, Cavite, with whom he cohabited for quite a while; and, Ruth Oliva, by whom he had
a daughter named Margie P. Oliva, born on September 15, 1989 (Exh. E). 10 When petitioner confronted private respondent about
his relationship with Tess, he beat her up, as a result of which she was confined at the De la Salle University Medical Center in
Dasmarias, Cavite on July 4-5, 1990 because of cerebral concussion (Exh. F).11

According to petitioner, private respondent engaged in extreme promiscuous conduct during the latter part of 1986. As a result,
private respondent contracted gonorrhea and infected petitioner. They both received treatment at the Zapote Medical Specialists
Center in Zapote, Bacoor, Cavite from October 22, 1986 until March 13, 1987 (Exhs. G & H). 12

Petitioner averred that on one occasion of a heated argument, private respondent hit their eldest child who was then barely a year
old. Private respondent is not close to any of their children as he was never affectionate and hardly spent time with them.

On July 17, 1979, petitioner entered into a contract to sell (Exh. J)13 with F & C Realty Corporation whereby she agreed to buy
from the latter a parcel of land at the Don Gregorio Heights Subdivision I in Bo. Bucal, Dasmarias, Cavite and placed a partial
payment of P31,330.00. On May 26, 1987, after full payment of the amount of P51,067.10, inclusive of interests from monthly
installments, a deed of absolute sale (Exh. K)14 was executed in her favor and TCT No. T-221529 (Exh. M)15 was duly issued.

According to petitioner, on August 1, 1992, she sent a handwritten letter16 to private respondent expressing her frustration over the
fact that her efforts to save their marriage proved futile. In her letter, petitioner also stated that she was allowing him to sell their
owner-type jeepney17 and to divide the proceeds of the sale between the two of them. Petitioner also told private respondent of her
intention to file a petition for the annulment of their marriage.

It does not appear that private respondent ever replied to petitioners letter. By this time, he had already abandoned petitioner and
their children. In October 1992, petitioner learned that private respondent left for the Middle East. Since then, private respondents
whereabouts had been unknown.

Ester Alfaro, petitioners childhood friend and co-teacher at the Philippine Christian University, testified during the hearing on the
petition for annulment. She said that sometime in June 1979, petitioner introduced private respondent to her (Alfaro) as the formers
sweetheart. Alfaro said she was not impressed with private respondent who was her student in accounting. She observed private
respondent to be fun-loving, spending most of his time with campus friends. In November 1980, when petitioner asked Alfaro to
be one of the secondary sponsors at her forthcoming wedding, Alfaro wanted to dissuade petitioner from going through with the
wedding because she thought private respondent was not ready for married life as he was then unemployed. True enough, although
the couple appeared happy during the early part of their marriage, it was not long thereafter that private respondent started drinking
with his friends and going home late at night. Alfaro corroborated petitioners claim that private respondent was a habitual drunkard
who carried on relationships with different women and continued hanging out with his friends. She also confirmed that petitioner
was once hospitalized because she was beaten up by private respondent. After the first year of petitioners marriage, Alfaro tried to
talk to private respondent, but the latter accused her of meddling with their marital life. Alfaro said that private respondent was not
close to his children and that he had abandoned petitioner.18

On April 10, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision 19 dismissing the petition for annulment of marriage filed by petitioner. The
pertinent portion of the decision reads:20

The Court can underscore the fact that the circumstances mentioned by the petitioner in support of her claim that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated to marry her are among the grounds cited by the law as valid reasons for the grant of legal separation
(Article 55 of the Family Code) - not as grounds for a declaration of nullity of marriages or annulment thereof. Thus, Article 55 of
the same code reads as follows:
Art. 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following grounds:

(1) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the
petitioner;

(5) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent;

(8) Sexual infidelity or perversion;

(10) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than one year.

If indeed Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines, which mentions psychological incapacity as a ground for the declaration
of the nullity of a marriage, has intended to include the above-stated circumstances as constitutive of such incapacity, then the same
would not have been enumerated as grounds for legal separation.

In the same manner, this Court is not disposed to grant relief in favor of the petitioner under Article 46, paragraph (3) of the Family
Code of the Philippines, as there is no dispute that the gonorrhea transmitted to the petitioner by respondent occurred sometime in
1986, or five (5) years after petitioners marriage with respondent was celebrated in 1981. The provisions of Article 46, paragraph
(3) of the same law should be taken in conjunction with Article 45, paragraph (3) of the same code, and a careful reading of the
two (2) provisions of the law would require the existence of this ground (fraud) at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
Hence, the annulment of petitioners marriage with the respondent on this ground, as alleged and proved in the instant case, cannot
be legally accepted by the Court.

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which, on January 30, 1996, rendered its decision affirming the decision of the trial
court. Citing the ruling in Santos v. Court of Appeals,21 the Court of Appeals held:22

It is clear in the above law and jurisprudence that the psychological incapacity of a spouse, as a ground for declaration of nullity of
marriage, must exist at the time of the celebration of marriage. More so, chronic sexual infidelity, abandonment, gambling and use
of prohibited drugs are not grounds per se, of psychological incapacity of a spouse.

We agree with the Solicitor General that petitioner-appellant failed to prove that her respondent-husband was psychologically
incapacitated at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Certainly, petitioner-appellants declaration that at the time of their
marriage her respondent-husbands character was on the borderline between a responsible person and the happy-go-lucky, could
not constitute the psychological incapacity in contemplation of Article 36 of the Family Code. In fact, petitioner-appellant herself
ascribed said attitude to her respondent-husbands youth and very good looks, who was admittedly several years younger than
petitioner-appellant who, herself, happened to be the college professor of her respondent-husband. Petitioner-appellant even
described her respondent-husband not as a problem student but a normal one (p. 24, tsn, Dec. 8, 1992).

The acts and attitudes complained of by petitioner-appellant happened after the marriage and there is no proof that the same have
already existed at the time of the celebration of the marriage to constitute the psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the
Family Code.

Hence, this petition. Petitioner contends that the respondent Court of Appeals erred

I. IN FINDING THAT THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT TO COMPLY WITH HIS
ESSENTIAL MARITAL OBLIGATIONS DID NOT EXIST FROM THE TIME OF THE CELEBRATION OF THE
MARRIAGE.

II. IN RULING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT WAS NOT PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO COMPLY WITH
HIS ESSENTIAL MARITAL OBLIGATIONS.

III. IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT DENYING THE AWARD OF PERMANENT CUSTODY OF
THE CHILDREN TO PETITIONER.
IV. IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT DENYING THE PRAYER FOR ISSUANCE OF AN ORDER
REQUIRING PRIVATE RESPONDENT TO GIVE SUPPORT TO THE THREE CHILDREN IN THE AMOUNT OF P3,000.00
PER CHILD.

V. IN NOT DECLARING THE REAL PROPERTY ACQUIRED BY PETITIONER AS HER EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY.

The issue in this case is whether or not the marriage of petitioner and private respondent should be annulled on the ground of private
respondents psychological incapacity.

Petitioner alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that petitioner failed to show that private respondents psychological
incapacity existed at the time of the celebration of the marriage. She argues that the fact that the acts of incapacity of private
respondent became manifest only after the celebration of their marriage should not be a bar to the annulment of their marriage.

Art. 36 of the Family Code states:

A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.23

In Santos v. Court of Appeals,24 we held:

Psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive
of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so
expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and
render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological
incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law
does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion
is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of
the void marriage to be legitimate.

The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound mind or concealment
of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to
Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the
marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions of the Code,
however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and
severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity.

Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every circumstance that may have some bearing on the degree,
extent, and other conditions of that incapacity must, in every case, be carefully examined and evaluated so that no precipitate and
indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily decreed. The well-considered opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, and persons with
expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even desirable.

In the instant case, other than her self-serving declarations, petitioner failed to establish the fact that at the time they were married,
private respondent was suffering from a psychological defect which in fact deprived him of the ability to assume the essential duties
of marriage and its concomitant responsibilities. As the Court of Appeals pointed out, no evidence was presented to show that
private respondent was not cognizant of the basic marital obligations. It was not sufficiently proved that private respondent was
really incapable of fulfilling his duties due to some incapacity of a psychological nature, and not merely physical. Petitioner says
that at the outset of their marriage, private respondent showed lack of drive to work for his family. Private respondents parents and
petitioner supported him through college. After his schooling, although he eventually found a job, he availed himself of the early
retirement plan offered by his employer and spent the entire amount he received on himself. For a greater part of their marital life,
private respondent was out of job and did not have the initiative to look for another. He indulged in vices and engaged in
philandering, and later abandoned his family. Petitioner concludes that private respondents condition is incurable, causing the
disintegration of their union and defeating the very objectives of marriage.
However, private respondents alleged habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment do not by themselves
constitute grounds for finding that he is suffering from a psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. It
must be shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which make private respondent completely unable to
discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, and not merely due to private respondents youth and self-conscious feeling
of being handsome, as the appellate court held. As pointed out in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals:25

The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity
must be psychological not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince
the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such
incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis (citing Salita
v. Magtolis, supra) nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

Moreover, expert testimony should have been presented to establish the precise cause of private respondents psychological
incapacity, if any, in order to show that it existed at the inception of the marriage. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage rests upon petitioner. The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as
the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family.26 Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor
of the validity of the marriage.27

We, therefore, find no reason to reverse the ruling of respondent Court of Appeals whose conclusions, affirming the trial courts
finding with regard to the non-existence of private respondents psychological incapacity at the time of the marriage, are entitled to
great weight and even finality.28 Only where it is shown that such findings are whimsical, capricious, and arbitrary can these be
overturned.

The conclusion we have reached makes it unnecessary for us to pass upon petitioners contentions on the issue of permanent custody
of children, the amount for their respective support, and the declaration of exclusive ownership of petitioner over the real property.
These matters may more appropriately be litigated in a separate proceeding for legal separation, dissolution of property regime,
and/or custody of children which petitioner may bring.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 136490. October 19, 2000.]

BRENDA B. MARCOS, Petitioner, v. WILSON G. MARCOS, Respondent.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of a marriage, may be established by the totality of evidence
presented. There is no requirement, however, that the respondent should be examined by a physician or a psychologist as a
conditio sine qua non for such declaration.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the July 24, 1998 Decision 1 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R CV No. 55588, which disposed as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, the contested decision is set aside and the marriage between the parties is hereby declared valid." 2

Also challenged by petitioner is the December 3, 1998 CA Resolution denying her Motion for Reconsideration.

Earlier, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) had ruled thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, the marriage between petitioner Brenda B. Marcos and respondent Wilson G. Marcos, solemnized on
September 6, 1982 in Pasig City is declared null and void ab initio pursuant to Art. 36 of the Family Code. The conjugal
properties, if any, is dissolved [sic] in accordance with Articles 126 and 129 of the same Code in relation to Articles 50, 51 and
52 relative to the delivery of the legitime of [the] parties’ children. In the best interest and welfare of the minor children, their
custody is granted to petitioner subject to the visitation rights of respondent" .chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

"Upon finality of this Decision, furnish copy each to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig City where the marriage was
solemnized, the National Census and Statistics Office, Manila and the Register of Deeds of Mandaluyong City for their
appropriate action consistent with this Decision.

"SO ORDERED."cralaw virtua1aw library

The Facts

The facts as found by the Court of Appeals are as follows

"It was established during the trial that the parties were married twice: (1) on September 6, 1982 which was solemnized by Judge
Eriberto H. Espiritu at the Municipal Court of Pasig (Exh. A); and (2) on May 8, 1983 which was solemnized by Rev. Eduardo L.
Eleazar, Command Chaplain, at the Presidential Security Command Chapel in Malacañang Park, Manila (Exh. A-1). Out of their
marriage, five (5) children were born (Exhs. B, C, D, E and F).

"Appellant Wilson G. Marcos joined the Armed Forces of the Philippines in 1973. Later on, he was transferred to the Presidential
Security Command in Malacañang during the Marcos Regime. Appellee Brenda B. Marcos, on the other hand, joined the
Women’s Auxiliary Corps under the Philippine Air Force in 1978. After the Edsa Revolution, both of them sought a discharge
from the military service.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

"They first met sometime in 1980 when both of them were assigned at the Malacañang Palace, she as an escort of Imee Marcos
and he as a Presidential Guard of President Ferdinand Marcos. Through telephone conversations, they became acquainted and
eventually became sweethearts.
"After their marriage on September 6, 1982, they resided at No. 1702 Daisy Street, Hulo Bliss, Mandaluyong, a housing unit
which she acquired from the Bliss Development Corporation when she was still single.

"After the downfall of President Marcos, he left the military service in 1987 and then engaged in different business ventures that
did not however prosper. As a wife, she always urged him to look for work so that their children would see him, instead of her, as
the head of the family and a good provider. Due to his failure to engage in any gainful employment, they would often quarrel and
as a consequence, he would hit and beat her. He would even force her to have sex with him despite her weariness. He would also
inflict physical harm on their children for a slight mistake and was so severe in the way he chastised them. Thus, for several times
during their cohabitation, he would leave their house. In 1992, they were already living separately.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw
1ibrary

"All the while, she was engrossed in the business of selling "magic uling" and chicken. While she was still in the military, she
would first make deliveries early in the morning before going to Malacañang. When she was discharged from the military
service, she concentrated on her business. Then, she became a supplier in the Armed Forces of the Philippines until she was able
to put up a trading and construction company, NS Ness Trading and Construction Development Corporation.

"The ‘straw that broke the camel’s back’ took place on October 16, 1994, when they had a bitter quarrel. As they were already
living separately, she did not want him to stay in their house anymore. On that day, when she saw him in their house, she was so
angry that she lambasted him. He then turned violent, inflicting physical harm on her and even on her mother who came to her
aid. The following day, October 17, 1994, she and their children left the house and sought refuge in her sister’s house.

"On October 19, 1994, she submitted herself [to] medical examination at the Mandaluyong Medical Center where her injuries
were diagnosed as contusions (Exh. G, Records, 153).chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

"Sometime in August 1995, she together with her two sisters and driver, went to him at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong to look for
their missing child, Niko. Upon seeing them, he got mad. After knowing the reason for their unexpected presence, he ran after
them with a samurai and even [beat] her driver.

"At the time of the filing of this case, she and their children were renting a house in Camella, Parañaque, while the appellant was
residing at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong.

"In the case study conducted by Social Worker Sonia C. Millan, the children described their father as cruel and physically
abusive to them (Exh. UU, Records, pp. 85-100).

"The appellee submitted herself to psychologist Natividad A. Dayan, Ph. D., for psychological evaluation (Exh. YY, Records, pp.
207-216), while the appellant on the other hand did not.

"The court a quo found the appellant to be psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations mainly because of his
failure to find work to support his family and his violent attitude towards appellee and their children, . . . 3

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Reversing the RTC, the CA held that psychological incapacity had not been established by the totality of the evidence presented.
It ratiocinated in this wise:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Essential in a petition for annulment is the allegation of the root cause of the spouse’s psychological incapacity which should
also be medically or clinically identified, sufficiently proven by experts and clearly explained in the decision. The incapacity
must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage and shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. It must also be grave enough to bring about the disability of the parties to assume the essential obligations of marriage
as set forth in Articles 68 to 71 and Articles 220 to 225 of the Family Code and such non-complied marital obligations must
similarly be alleged in the petition, established by evidence and explained in the decision.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

"In the case before us, the appellant was not subjected to any psychological or psychiatric evaluation. The psychological findings
about the appellant by psychiatrist Natividad Dayan were based only on the interviews conducted with the appellee. Expert
evidence by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists is essential if only to prove that the parties were or any one of them
was mentally or psychically ill to be truly incognitive of the marital obligations he or she was assuming, or as would make him or
her . . . unable to assume them. In fact, he offered testimonial evidence to show that he [was] not psychologically incapacitated.
The root cause of his supposed incapacity was not alleged in the petition, nor medically or clinically identified as a psychological
illness or sufficiently proven by an expert. Similarly, there is no evidence at all that would show that the appellant was suffering
from an incapacity which [was] psychological or mental — not physical to the extent that he could not have known the
obligations he was assuming: that the incapacity [was] grave, ha[d] preceded the marriage and [was] incurable." 4

Hence, this Petition. 5

Issues

In her Memorandum, 6 petitioner presents for this Court’s consideration the following issues:chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

"I. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals could set aside the findings by the Regional Trial Court of psychological
incapacity of a respondent in a Petition for declaration of nullity of marriage simply because the respondent did not subject
himself to psychological evaluation .

II. Whether or not the totality of evidence presented and the demeanor of all the witnesses should be the basis of the
determination of the merits of the Petition." 7

The Court’s Ruling

We agree with petitioner that the personal medical or psychological examination of respondent is not a requirement for a
declaration of psychological incapacity. Nevertheless, the totality of the evidence she presented does not show such incapacity.

Preliminary Issue:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Need for Personal Medical Examination

Petitioner contends that the testimonies and the results of various tests that were submitted to determine respondent’s
psychological incapacity to perform the obligations of marriage should not have been brushed aside by the Court of Appeals,
simply because respondent had not taken those tests himself. Petitioner adds that the CA should have realized that under the
circumstances, she had no choice but to rely on other sources of information in order to determine the psychological capacity of
respondent, who had refused to submit himself to such tests.cralaw : red

In Republic v. CA and Molina, 8 the guidelines governing the application and the interpretation of psychological incapacity
referred to in Article 36 of the Family Code 9 were laid down by this Court as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire
Article on the Family, recognizing it ‘as the foundation of the nation.’ It decrees marriage as legally ‘inviolable,’ thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be ‘protected’ by the state.

2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity
must be psychological — not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must
convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have
known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example
of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis,
nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at ‘the time of the celebration’ of the marriage. The evidence must show that the
illness was existing when the parties exchanged their ‘I do’s.’ The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such
time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or
even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such
incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the
exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and
prescribing medicine to cure them but not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an
essential obligation of marriage.

5. Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
Thus, ‘mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts’ cannot be accepted as root causes.
The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other
words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband
and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied
marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No
decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly
stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with
the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed
submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi
contemplated under Canon 1095." 10chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court in Santos v. Court of Appeals: 11
"psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." The foregoing
guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause
may be "medically or clinically identified." What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the
party’s psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.

Main Issue:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Totality of Evidence Presented

The main question, then, is whether the totality of the evidence presented in the present case — including the testimonies of
petitioner, the common children, petitioner’s sister and the social worker — was enough to sustain a finding that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated.

We rule in the negative. Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that respondent failed to provide material support to the
family and may have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion of
psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his "defects" were already present at the inception of the
marriage or that they are incurable.

Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact that he had lost his job and was not gainfully employed for a
period of more than six years. It was during this period that he became intermittently drunk, failed to give material and moral
support, and even left the family home.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said period and not to the inception of the marriage. Equally important,
there is no evidence showing that his condition is incurable, especially now that he is gainfully employed as a taxi driver.

Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes
therefor manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the
marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume. These marital obligations are those provided under Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225
of the Family Code.

Neither is Article 36 to be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but
on physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity,
abandonment and the like. 12 At best, the evidence presented by petitioner refers only to grounds for legal separation, not for
declaring a marriage void.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Because Article 36 has been abused as a convenient divorce law this Court laid down the procedural requirements for its
invocation in Molina. Petitioner, however, has not faithfully observed them.

In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage for failure of petitioner to show that the alleged psychological
incapacity is characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability; and for her failure to observe the guidelines in
outlined in Molina.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and assailed Decision AFFIRMED, except that portion requiring personal medical
examination as a conditio sine qua non to a finding of psychological incapacity. No costs.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 189121 July 31, 2013

AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON, JENNETH QUIAZON and MARIA JENNIFER QUIAZON, Petitioners,

vs.
MA. LOURDES BELEN, for and in behalf of MARIA LOURDES ELISE QUIAZON, Respondent.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed pursuant to Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, primarily assailing the 28
November 2008 Decision rendered by the Ninth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88589,1 the decretal portion
of which states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision dated March 11, 2005, and the Order
dated March 24, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 275, Las Piñas City are AFFIRMED in toto. 2

The Facts

This case started as a Petition for Letters of Administration of the Estate of Eliseo Quiazon (Eliseo), filed by herein respondents
who are Eliseo’s common-law wife and daughter. The petition was opposed by herein petitioners Amelia Garcia-Quaizon (Amelia)
to whom Eliseo was married. Amelia was joined by her children, Jenneth Quiazon (Jenneth) and Maria Jennifer Quiazon (Jennifer).

Eliseo died intestate on 12 December 1992.

On 12 September 1994, Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon (Elise), represented by her mother, Ma. Lourdes Belen (Lourdes), filed a
Petition for Letters of Administration before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City. 3 In her Petition docketed as SP
Proc. No. M-3957, Elise claims that she is the natural child of Eliseo having been conceived and born at the time when her parents
were both capacitated to marry each other. Insisting on the legal capacity of Eliseo and Lourdes to marry, Elise impugned the
validity of Eliseo’s marriage to Amelia by claiming that it was bigamous for having been contracted during the subsistence of the
latter’s marriage with one Filipito Sandico (Filipito). To prove her filiation to the decedent, Elise, among others, attached to the
Petition for Letters of Administration her Certificate of Live Birth 4 signed by Eliseo as her father. In the same petition, it was
alleged that Eliseo left real properties worth ₱2,040,000.00 and personal properties worth ₱2,100,000.00. In order to preserve the
estate of Eliseo and to prevent the dissipation of its value, Elise sought her appointment as administratrix of her late father’s estate.

Claiming that the venue of the petition was improperly laid, Amelia, together with her children, Jenneth and Jennifer, opposed the
issuance of the letters of administration by filing an Opposition/Motion to Dismiss.5 The petitioners asserted that as shown by his
Death Certificate, 6 Eliseo was a resident of Capas, Tarlac and not of Las Piñas City, at the time of his death. Pursuant to Section
1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court,7 the petition for settlement of decedent’s estate should have been filed in Capas, Tarlac
and not in Las Piñas City. In addition to their claim of improper venue, the petitioners averred that there are no factual and legal
bases for Elise to be appointed administratix of Eliseo’s estate.

In a Decision8 dated 11 March 2005, the RTC directed the issuance of Letters of Administration to Elise upon posting the necessary
bond. The lower court ruled that the venue of the petition was properly laid in Las Piñas City, thereby discrediting the position
taken by the petitioners that Eliseo’s last residence was in Capas, Tarlac, as hearsay. The dispositive of the RTC decision reads:

Having attained legal age at this time and there being no showing of any disqualification or incompetence to serve as administrator,
let letters of administration over the estate of the decedent Eliseo Quiazon, therefore, be issued to petitioner, Ma. Lourdes Elise
Quiazon, after the approval by this Court of a bond in the amount of ₱100,000.00 to be posted by her. 9

On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto in the 28 November 2008 Decision 10 rendered by the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R.CV No. 88589. In validating the findings of the RTC, the Court of Appeals held that Elise was able to prove that Eliseo
and Lourdes lived together as husband and wife by establishing a common residence at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar
Village, Las Piñas City, from 1975 up to the time of Eliseo’s death in 1992. For purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of
Eliseo’s estate, the Court of Appeals upheld the conclusion reached by the RTC that the decedent was a resident of Las Piñas City.
The petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution 11 dated 7 August 2009.

The Issues

The petitioners now urge Us to reverse the assailed Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution on the following grounds:

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THAT ELISEO QUIAZON WAS A RESIDENT OF LAS
PIÑAS AND THEREFORE, THE PETITION FOR LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION WAS PROPERLY FILED WITH THE
RTC OF LAS PIÑAS;

II. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THAT AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON WAS NOT
LEGALLY MARRIED TO ELISEO QUIAZON DUE TO PREEXISTING MARRIAGE; AND

III. THE COURT OF APPEALS OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT ELISE QUIAZON HAS NOT SHOWN ANY INTEREST
IN THE PETITION FOR LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION.12

The Court’s Ruling

We find the petition bereft of merit.

Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the estate of a decedent should be filed
in the RTC of the province where the decedent resides at the time of his death:

Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. – If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death,
whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First
Instance now Regional Trial Court in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign
country, the Court of First Instance now Regional Trial Court of any province in which he had estate. The court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The
jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall
not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction
appears on the record. (Emphasis supplied).

The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term
"resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the
statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules – Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of
Court is of such nature – residence rather than domicile is the significant factor.13 Even where the statute uses word "domicile" still
it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. 14 Some cases make a distinction between the terms
"residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning
as the term "inhabitant."15 In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal,
actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. 16 It signifies physical presence in a place and actual
stay thereat.17 Venue for ordinary civil actions and that for special proceedings have one and the same meaning.18 As thus defined,
"residence," in the context of venue provisions, means nothing more than a person’s actual residence or place of abode, provided
he resides therein with continuity and consistency.19

Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for affirming the ruling of the RTC that the
venue for the settlement of the estate of Eliseo was properly laid in Las Piñas City. It is evident from the records that during his
lifetime, Eliseo resided at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City. For this reason, the venue for the
settlement of his estate may be laid in the said city.

In opposing the issuance of letters of administration, the petitioners harp on the entry in Eliseo’s Death Certificate that he is a
resident of Capas, Tarlac where they insist his estate should be settled. While the recitals in death certificates can be considered
proofs of a decedent’s residence at the time of his death, the contents thereof, however, is not binding on the courts. Both the RTC
and the Court of Appeals found that Eliseo had been living with Lourdes, deporting themselves as husband and wife, from 1972
up to the time of his death in 1995. This finding is consistent with the fact that in 1985, Eliseo filed an action for judicial partition
of properties against Amelia before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 106, on the ground that their marriage is void for being
bigamous.20 That Eliseo went to the extent of taking his marital feud with Amelia before the courts of law renders untenable
petitioners’ position that Eliseo spent the final days of his life in Tarlac with Amelia and her children. It disproves rather than
supports petitioners’ submission that the lower courts’ findings arose from an erroneous appreciation of the evidence on record.
Factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the appellate court, must be held to be conclusive and binding upon this Court.21

Likewise unmeritorious is petitioners’ contention that the Court of Appeals erred in declaring Amelia’s marriage to Eliseo as void
ab initio. In a void marriage, it was though no marriage has taken place, thus, it cannot be the source of rights. Any interested party
may attack the marriage directly or collaterally. A void marriage can be questioned even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the
marriage.22 It must be pointed out that at the time of the celebration of the marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, the law in effect was the
Civil Code, and not the Family Code, making the ruling in Niñal v. Bayadog23 applicable four-square to the case at hand. In Niñal,
the Court, in no uncertain terms, allowed therein petitioners to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of their father’s marriage
to therein respondent after the death of their father, by contradistinguishing void from voidable marriages, to wit:

Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only
during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the
marriage had been perfectly valid. That is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where
the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may attack a void
marriage.24

It was emphasized in Niñal that in a void marriage, no marriage has taken place and it cannot be the source of rights, such that any
interested party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally without prescription, which may be filed even beyond the lifetime
of the parties to the marriage.25

Relevant to the foregoing, there is no doubt that Elise, whose successional rights would be prejudiced by her father’s marriage to
Amelia, may impugn the existence of such marriage even after the death of her father. The said marriage may be questioned directly
by filing an action attacking the validity thereof, or collaterally by raising it as an issue in a proceeding for the settlement of the
estate of the deceased spouse, such as in the case at bar. Ineluctably, Elise, as a compulsory heir, 26 has a cause of action for the
declaration of the absolute nullity of the void marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, and the death of either party to the said marriage does
not extinguish such cause of action.

Having established the right of Elise to impugn Eliseo’s marriage to Amelia, we now proceed to determine whether or not the
decedent’s marriage to Amelia is void for being bigamous.

Contrary to the position taken by the petitioners, the existence of a previous marriage between Amelia and Filipito was sufficiently
established by no less than the Certificate of Marriage issued by the Diocese of Tarlac and signed by the officiating priest of the
Parish of San Nicolas de Tolentino in Capas, Tarlac. The said marriage certificate is a competent evidence of marriage and the
certification from the National Archive that no information relative to the said marriage exists does not diminish the probative
value of the entries therein. We take judicial notice of the fact that the first marriage was celebrated more than 50 years ago, thus,
the possibility that a record of marriage can no longer be found in the National Archive, given the interval of time, is not completely
remote. Consequently, in the absence of any showing that such marriage had been dissolved at the time Amelia and Eliseo’s
marriage was solemnized, the inescapable conclusion is that the latter marriage is bigamous and, therefore, void ab initio. 27

Neither are we inclined to lend credence to the petitioners’ contention that Elise has not shown any interest in the Petition for
Letters of Administration.

Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court lays down the preferred persons who are entitled to the issuance of letters of
administration, thus:

Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. — If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are
incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:

(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as
such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or
unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for
administration or to request that administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal
creditors, if competent and willing to serve;

(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other person as the court may select.

Upon the other hand, Section 2 of Rule 79 provides that a petition for Letters of Administration must be filed by an interested
person, thus:

Sec. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. — A petition for letters of administration must be filed by an interested
person and must show, so far as known to the petitioner:

(a) The jurisdictional facts;

(b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs, and the names and residences of the creditors, of the decedent;

(c) The probable value and character of the property of the estate;

(d) The name of the person for whom letters of administration are prayed.

But no defect in the petition shall render void the issuance of letters of administration.

An "interested party," in estate proceedings, is one who would be benefited in the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim
against the estate, such as a creditor. Also, in estate proceedings, the phrase "next of kin" refers to those whose relationship with
the decedent Is such that they are entitled to share in the estate as distributees. 28

In the instant case, Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be benefited by the distribution of Eliseo’s estate, is deemed to be an
interested party. With the overwhelming evidence on record produced by Elise to prove her filiation to Eliseo, the petitioners’
pounding on her lack of interest in the administration of the decedent’s estate, is just a desperate attempt to sway this Court to
reverse the findings of the Court of Appeals. Certainly, the right of Elise to be appointed administratix of the estate of Eliseo is on
good grounds. It is founded on her right as a compulsory heir, who, under the law, is entitled to her legitimate after the debts of the
estate are satisfied.29 Having a vested right in the distribution of Eliseo’s estate as one of his natural children, Elise can rightfully
be considered as an interested party within the purview of the law.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals assailed 28
November 2008 Decision and 7 August 2009 Resolution, arc AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 130087. September 24, 2003]

DIANA M. BARCELONA,, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS and TADEO R. BENGZON, respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

The Petition for Review before us assails the 30 May 1997 Decision 1 as well as the 7 August 1997 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43393. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Order 2 dated 21 January 1997 of the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City, Branch 106, in Civil Case No. Q-95-24471. The Regional Trial Court refused to dismiss private respondents
Petition for Annulment of Marriage for failure to state a cause of action and for violation of Supreme Court Administrative Circular
No. 04-94. The assailed Resolution denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.

The Facts

On 29 March 1995, private respondent Tadeo R. Bengzon (respondent Tadeo) filed a Petition for Annulment of Marriage against
petitioner Diana M. Barcelona (petitioner Diana). The case was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-95-23445 (first petition) before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87.3 On 9 May 1995, respondent Tadeo filed a Motion to Withdraw Petition which
the trial court granted in its Order dated 7 June 1995.

On 21 July 1995, respondent Tadeo filed anew a Petition for Annulment of Marriage against petitioner Diana. This time, the case
was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-95-24471 (second petition) before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 106 (trial
court).

Petitioner Diana filed a Motion to Dismiss the second petition on two grounds. First, the second petition fails to state a cause of
action. Second, it violates Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94 (Circular No. 04-94) on forum shopping. Respondent
Tadeo opposed the Motion to which petitioner Diana filed Additional Arguments in Support of the Motion.

The trial court, through Judge Julieto P. Tabiolo, issued on 18 September 1996 an Order (first order) deferring resolution of the
Motion until the parties ventilate their arguments in a hearing. Petitioner Diana filed a motion for reconsideration. However, the
trial court, through Pairing Judge Rosalina L. Luna Pison, issued on 21 January 1997 an Order (second order) denying the motion.
In denying the motion for reconsideration, Judge Pison explained that when the ground for dismissal is the complaints failure to
state a cause of action, the trial court determines such fact solely from the petition itself. Judge Pison held that contrary to petitioner
Dianas claim, a perusal of the allegations in the petition shows that petitioner Diana has violated respondent Tadeos right, thus
giving rise to a cause of action. Judge Pison also rejected petitioner Dianas claim that respondent Tadeo is guilty of forum shopping
in filing the second petition. Judge Pison explained that when respondent Tadeo filed the second petition, the first petition (Civil
Case No. Q-95-23445) was no longer pending as it had been earlier dismissed without prejudice.

Petitioner Diana filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus before the Court of Appeals assailing the trial courts
first order deferring action on the Motion and the second order denying the motion for reconsideration on 14 February 1997. The
Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and denied the motion for reconsideration.

Hence, this petition.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals agreed with petitioner Diana that the trial court in its first order erred in deferring action on the Motion until
after a hearing on whether the complaint states a cause of action. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals pointed out that the trial courts
second order corrected the situation since in denying the motion for reconsideration, the trial court in effect denied the Motion. The
appellate court agreed with the trial court that the allegations in the second petition state a cause of action sufficient to sustain a
valid judgment if proven to be true.
The Court of Appeals also held that there was no violation of Circular No. 04-94. To determine the existence of forum shopping,
the elements of litis pendentia must exist or a final judgment in one case must amount to res judicata in the other. In this case, there
is no litis pendentia because respondent Tadeo had caused the dismissal without prejudice of the first petition before filing the
second petition. Neither is there res judicata because there is no final decision on the merits.

Issues

In her Memorandum, petitioner Diana raises the following issues:

I. WHETHER THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE SECOND PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE SUFFICIENTLY
STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION;

II. WHETHER RESPONDENT TADEO VIOLATED SUPREME COURT ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 04-94 IN
FAILING TO STATE THE FILING OF A PREVIOUS PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE, ITS TERMINATION
AND STATUS.4

The Courts Ruling

The petition has no merit.

Sufficiency of Cause of Action

Petitioner Dianas contention that the second petition fails to state a cause of action is untenable. A cause of action is an act or
omission of the defendant in violation of the legal right of the plaintiff.5 A complaint states a cause of action when it contains three
essential elements: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises; (2) an obligation of the
defendant to respect such right; and (3) the act or omission of the defendant violates the right of the plaintiff. 6cräläwvirtualibräry

We find the second petition sufficiently alleges a cause of action. The petition sought the declaration of nullity of the marriage
based on Article 36 of the Family Code.7 The petition alleged that respondent Tadeo and petitioner Diana were legally married at
the Holy Cross Parish after a whirlwind courtship as shown by the marriage contract attached to the petition. The couple established
their residence in Quezon City. The union begot five children, Ana Maria, born on 8 November 1964; Isabel, born on 28 October
1968; Ernesto Tadeo, born on 31 March 1970; Regina Rachelle born on 7 March 1974; and Cristina Maria born in February 1978.
The petition further alleged that petitioner Diana was psychologically incapacitated at the time of the celebration of their marriage
to comply with the essential obligations of marriage and such incapacity subsists up to the present time. The petition alleged the
non-complied marital obligations in this manner:

xxx

5. During their marriage, they had frequent quarrels due to their varied upbringing. Respondent, coming from a rich family, was a
disorganized housekeeper and was frequently out of the house. She would go to her sisters house or would play tennis the whole
day.

6. When the family had crisis due to several miscarriages suffered by respondent and the sickness of a child, respondent withdrew
to herself and eventually refused to speak to her husband.

7. On November 1977, the respondent, who was five months pregnant with Cristina Maria and on the pretext of re-evaluating her
feelings with petitioner, requested the latter to temporarily leave their conjugal dwelling. She further insisted that she wanted to
feel a little freedom from petitioners marital authority and influences. The petitioner argued that he could occupy another room in
their conjugal dwelling to accommodate respondents desire, but no amount of plea and explanation could dissuade her from
demanding that the petitioner leave their conjugal dwelling.

8. In his desire to keep peace in the family and to safeguard the respondents pregnancy, the petitioner was compelled to leave their
conjugal dwelling and reside in a condominium located in Greenhills.
 9. This separation resulted in complete estrangement between the petitioner and the respondent. The petitioner waived his right to
the conjugal dwelling in respondents favor through an extrajudicial dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains. The separation
in fact between the petitioner and the respondent still subsists to the present time.

10. The parties likewise agreed on the custody and support of the children. The extrajudicial dissolution of conjugal partnership of
gains is hereto attached as Annex C and taken as an integral part hereof.

11. The respondent at the time of the celebration of their marriage was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
obligation of marriage and such incapacity subsisted up to and until the present time. Such incapacity was conclusively found in
the psychological examination conducted on the relationship between the petitioner and the respondent.

12. Under Article 36 of the Family Code, the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent is void ab initio and needs to be
annulled. This petition is in accordance with Article 39 thereof.

xxx.8cräläwvirtualibräry

The second petition states the ultimate facts on which respondent bases his claim in accordance with Section 1, Rule 8 of the old
Rules of Court.9 Ultimate facts refer to the principal, determinative, constitutive facts upon the existence of which the cause of
action rests. The term does not refer to details of probative matter or particulars of evidence which establish the material
elements.10cräläwvirtualibräry

Petitioner Diana relies mainly11 on the rulings in Santos v. Court of Appeals12 as well as in Republic v. Court of Appeals and
Molina.13 Santos gave life to the phrase psychological incapacity, a novel provision in the Family Code, by defining the term in
this wise:

xxx psychological incapacity should refer to no less than mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive
of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so
expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and
render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological
incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. xxx.

Molina additionally provided procedural guidelines to assist the courts and the parties in cases for annulment of marriages grounded
on psychological incapacity.14cräläwvirtualibräry

Petitioner Diana argues that the second petition falls short of the guidelines set forth in Santos and Molina. Specifically, she
contends that the second petition is defective because it fails to allege the root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity. The
second petition also fails to state that the alleged psychological incapacity existed from the celebration of the marriage and that it
is permanent or incurable. Further, the second petition is devoid of any reference of the grave nature of the illness to bring about
the disability of the petitioner to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Lastly, the second petition did not even state the
marital obligations which petitioner Diana allegedly failed to comply due to psychological incapacity.

Subsequent to Santos and Molina, the Court adopted the new Rules on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (new Rules).15 Specifically, Section 2, paragraph (d) of the new Rules provides:

SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages

x x x.

(d) What to allege. A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specifically allege the complete facts showing that either or
both parties were psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage at the time of
the celebration of marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its celebration.

The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of
the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need not be alleged. (Emphasis supplied)
Procedural rules apply to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their passage. 16 The obvious effect of the new Rules
providing that expert opinion need not be alleged in the petition is that there is also no need to allege the root cause of the
psychological incapacity. Only experts in the fields of neurological and behavioral sciences are competent to determine the root
cause of psychological incapacity. Since the new Rules do not require the petition to allege expert opinion on the psychological
incapacity, it follows that there is also no need to allege in the petition the root cause of the psychological incapacity.

Science continues to explore, examine and explain how our brains work, respond to and control the human body. Scientists still do
not understand everything there is to know about the root causes of psychological disorders. The root causes of many psychological
disorders are still unknown to science even as their outward, physical manifestations are evident. Hence, what the new Rules require
the petition to allege are the physical manifestations indicative of psychological incapacity. Respondent Tadeos second petition
complies with this requirement.

The second petition states a cause of action since it states the legal right of respondent Tadeo, the correlative obligation of petitioner
Diana, and the act or omission of petitioner Diana in violation of the legal right. In Dulay v. Court of Appeals,17 the Court held:

In determining whether the allegations of a complaint are sufficient to support a cause of action, it must be borne in mind that the
complaint does not have to establish or allege the facts proving the existence of a cause of action at the outset; this will have to be
done at the trial on the merits of the case (Del Bros Hotel Corporation v. CA, supra). If the allegations in a complaint can furnish a
sufficient basis by which the complaint can be maintained, the same should not be dismissed regardless of the defenses that may
be assessed by the defendants (Rava Devt Corp. v. CA, 211 SCRA 152 [1992] citing Consolidated Bank & Trust Corporation v.
Court of Appeals, 197 SCRA 663 [1991]). To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the complaint must show
that the claim for relief does not exist rather than that a claim has been defectively stated or is ambiguous, indefinite or
uncertain (Azur v. Provincial Board, 27 SCRA 50 [1969]). xxx. (Emphasis supplied)

A defendant moving to dismiss a complaint on the ground of lack of cause of action hypothetically admits all the factual averments
in the complaint.18 Given the hypothetically admitted facts in the second petition, the trial court could render judgment over the
case.

Forum Shopping

Similarly untenable is petitioner Dianas contention that the second petitions certificate of non-forum shopping which does not
mention the filing of the first petition and its dismissal without prejudice violates Circular No. 04-94.19 Petitioner Diana refers to
this portion of Circular No. 04-94-

1. The plaintiff, Petitioner, applicant or principal party seeking relief in the complaint, petition, application or other initiatory
pleading shall certify under oath in such original pleading, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed
therewith, to the truth of the following facts and undertakings: (a) he has not theretofore commenced any other action or
proceeding involving the same issues in the Supreme court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency; (b) to the
best of his knowledge, no action or proceeding is pending in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or
agency; (c) if there is any such action or proceeding which is either pending or may have been terminated, he must state the
status thereof; and (d) if he should thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency, he undertakes to report that fact within five (5) days therefrom
to the court or agency wherein the original pleading and sworn certification contemplated herein have been
filed.20cräläwvirtualibräry

Petitioner Diana points out that respondent Tadeo did not disclose in his certificate of non-forum shopping that he had previously
commenced a similar action based on the same grounds with the same prayer for relief. The certificate of non-forum shopping
should have stated the fact of termination of the first petition or its status.

The Court has consistently held that a certificate of non-forum shopping not attached to the petition or one belatedly filed or one
signed by counsel and not the party himself constitutes a violation of the requirement. Such violation can result in the dismissal of
the complaint or petition. However, the Court has also previously held that the rule of substantial compliance applies to the contents
of the certification.21cräläwvirtualibräry

In Roxas v. Court of Appeals,22 the Court squarely addressed the issue of whether the omission of a statement on the prior filing
and dismissal of a case involving the same parties and issues merits dismissal of the petition. In Roxas, the Court ruled:
xxx an omission in the certificate of non-forum shopping about any event that would not constitute res judicata and litis
pendentia as in the case at bar, is not fatal as to merit the dismissal and nullification of the entire proceedings considering that the
evils sought to be prevented by the said certificate are not present. It is in this light that we ruled in Maricalum Mining Corp. v.
National Labor Relations Commission that a liberal interpretation of Supreme Court Circular No. 04-94 on non-forum shopping
would be more in keeping with the objectives of procedural rules which is to secure a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of
every action and proceeding.

The dismissal of the first petition precluded the eventuality of litis pendentia. The first petitions dismissal did not also amount to res
judicata. Thus, there is no need to state in the certificate of non-forum shopping in the second petition (Civil Case No. Q-95-24471)
about the prior filing and dismissal of the first petition (Civil Case No. Q-95-23445).

The first petition was dismissed without prejudice at the instance of respondent Tadeo to keep the peace between him and his grown
up children. The dismissal happened before service of answer or any responsive pleading. Clearly, there is no litis pendentia since
respondent Tadeo had already withdrawn and caused the dismissal of the first petition when he subsequently filed the second
petition. Neither is there res judicata because the dismissal order was not a decision on the merits but a dismissal without prejudice.

Circular No. 04-94,23 now Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, must be interpreted and applied to achieve its
purpose. The Supreme Court promulgated the Circular to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice. The Circular
should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective or the goal of all
rules of procedure which is to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as possible.24cräläwvirtualibräry

A final word. We are ever mindful of the principle that marriage is an inviolable social institution and the foundation of the family
that the state cherishes and protects.25 In rendering this Decision, this Court is not prejudging the main issue of whether the marriage
is void based on Article 36 of the Family Code. The trial court must resolve this issue after trial on the merits where each party can
present evidence to prove their respective allegations and defenses. We are merely holding that, based on the allegations in the
second petition, the petition sufficiently alleges a cause of action and does not violate the rule on forum shopping. Thus, the second
petition is not subject to attack by a motion to dismiss on these grounds.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The assailed Decision dated 30 May 1997 as well as the Resolution dated 7 August 1997
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43393 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 152577 September 21, 2005

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners,

vs.
CRASUS L. IYOY, Respondent.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented
by the Office of the Solicitor General, prays for the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62539,
dated 30 July 2001,1 affirming the Judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 22, in Civil Case No. CEB-
20077, dated 30 October 1998,2 declaring the marriage between respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy null and void
on the basis of Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines.

The proceedings before the RTC commenced with the filing of a Complaint 3 for declaration of nullity of marriage by respondent
Crasus on 25 March 1997. According to the said Complaint, respondent Crasus married Fely on 16 December 1961 at Bradford
Memorial Church, Jones Avenue, Cebu City. As a result of their union, they had five children – Crasus, Jr., Daphne, Debbie,
Calvert, and Carlos – who are now all of legal ages. After the celebration of their marriage, respondent Crasus discovered that Fely
was "hot-tempered, a nagger and extravagant." In 1984, Fely left the Philippines for the United States of America (U.S.A.), leaving
all of their five children, the youngest then being only six years old, to the care of respondent Crasus. Barely a year after Fely left
for the U.S.A., respondent Crasus received a letter from her requesting that he sign the enclosed divorce papers; he disregarded the
said request. Sometime in 1985, respondent Crasus learned, through the letters sent by Fely to their children, that Fely got married
to an American, with whom she eventually had a child. In 1987, Fely came back to the Philippines with her American family,
staying at Cebu Plaza Hotel in Cebu City. Respondent Crasus did not bother to talk to Fely because he was afraid he might not be
able to bear the sorrow and the pain she had caused him. Fely returned to the Philippines several times more: in 1990, for the
wedding of their eldest child, Crasus, Jr.; in 1992, for the brain operation of their fourth child, Calvert; and in 1995, for unknown
reasons. Fely continued to live with her American family in New Jersey, U.S.A. She had been openly using the surname of her
American husband in the Philippines and in the U.S.A. For the wedding of Crasus, Jr., Fely herself had invitations made in which
she was named as "Mrs. Fely Ada Micklus." At the time the Complaint was filed, it had been 13 years since Fely left and abandoned
respondent Crasus, and there was no more possibility of reconciliation between them. Respondent Crasus finally alleged in his
Complaint that Fely’s acts brought danger and dishonor to the family, and clearly demonstrated her psychological incapacity to
perform the essential obligations of marriage. Such incapacity, being incurable and continuing, constitutes a ground for declaration
of nullity of marriage under Article 36, in relation to Articles 68, 70, and 72, of the Family Code of the Philippines.

Fely filed her Answer and Counterclaim4 with the RTC on 05 June 1997. She asserted therein that she was already an American
citizen since 1988 and was now married to Stephen Micklus. While she admitted being previously married to respondent Crasus
and having five children with him, Fely refuted the other allegations made by respondent Crasus in his Complaint. She explained
that she was no more hot-tempered than any normal person, and she may had been indignant at respondent Crasus on certain
occasions but it was because of the latter’s drunkenness, womanizing, and lack of sincere effort to find employment and to
contribute to the maintenance of their household. She could not have been extravagant since the family hardly had enough money
for basic needs. Indeed, Fely left for abroad for financial reasons as respondent Crasus had no job and what she was then earning
as the sole breadwinner in the Philippines was insufficient to support their family. Although she left all of her children with
respondent Crasus, she continued to provide financial support to them, as well as, to respondent Crasus. Subsequently, Fely was
able to bring her children to the U.S.A., except for one, Calvert, who had to stay behind for medical reasons. While she did file for
divorce from respondent Crasus, she denied having herself sent a letter to respondent Crasus requesting him to sign the enclosed
divorce papers. After securing a divorce from respondent Crasus, Fely married her American husband and acquired American
citizenship. She argued that her marriage to her American husband was legal because now being an American citizen, her status
shall be governed by the law of her present nationality. Fely also pointed out that respondent Crasus himself was presently living
with another woman who bore him a child. She also accused respondent Crasus of misusing the amount of ₱90,000.00 which she
advanced to him to finance the brain operation of their son, Calvert. On the basis of the foregoing, Fely also prayed that the RTC
declare her marriage to respondent Crasus null and void; and that respondent Crasus be ordered to pay to Fely the ₱90,000.00 she
advanced to him, with interest, plus, moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, and litigation expenses.
After respondent Crasus and Fely had filed their respective Pre-Trial Briefs,5 the RTC afforded both parties the opportunity to
present their evidence. Petitioner Republic participated in the trial through the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu. 6

Respondent Crasus submitted the following pieces of evidence in support of his Complaint: (1) his own testimony on 08 September
1997, in which he essentially reiterated the allegations in his Complaint; 7 (2) the Certification, dated 13 April 1989, by the Health
Department of Cebu City, on the recording of the Marriage Contract between respondent Crasus and Fely in the Register of Deeds,
such marriage celebration taking place on 16 December 1961;8 and (3) the invitation to the wedding of Crasus, Jr., their eldest son,
wherein Fely openly used her American husband’s surname, Micklus.9

Fely’s counsel filed a Notice,10 and, later on, a Motion,11 to take the deposition of witnesses, namely, Fely and her children, Crasus,
Jr. and Daphne, upon written interrogatories, before the consular officers of the Philippines in New York and California, U.S.A,
where the said witnesses reside. Despite the Orders12 and Commissions13 issued by the RTC to the Philippine Consuls of New York
and California, U.S.A., to take the depositions of the witnesses upon written interrogatories, not a single deposition was ever
submitted to the RTC. Taking into account that it had been over a year since respondent Crasus had presented his evidence and that
Fely failed to exert effort to have the case progress, the RTC issued an Order, dated 05 October 1998,14 considering Fely to have
waived her right to present her evidence. The case was thus deemed submitted for decision.

Not long after, on 30 October 1998, the RTC promulgated its Judgment declaring the marriage of respondent Crasus and Fely null
and void ab initio, on the basis of the following findings –

The ground bearing defendant’s psychological incapacity deserves a reasonable consideration. As observed, plaintiff’s testimony
is decidedly credible. The Court finds that defendant had indeed exhibited unmistakable signs of psychological incapacity to comply
with her marital duties such as striving for family unity, observing fidelity, mutual love, respect, help and support. From the
evidence presented, plaintiff adequately established that the defendant practically abandoned him. She obtained a divorce decree
in the United States of America and married another man and has establish [sic] another family of her own. Plaintiff is in an
anomalous situation, wherein he is married to a wife who is already married to another man in another country.

Defendant’s intolerable traits may not have been apparent or manifest before the marriage, the FAMILY CODE nonetheless allows
the annulment of the marriage provided that these were eventually manifested after the wedding. It appears to be the case in this
instance.

Certainly defendant’s posture being an irresponsible wife erringly reveals her very low regard for that sacred and inviolable
institution of marriage which is the foundation of human society throughout the civilized world. It is quite evident that the defendant
is bereft of the mind, will and heart to comply with her marital obligations, such incapacity was already there at the time of the
marriage in question is shown by defendant’s own attitude towards her marriage to plaintiff.

In sum, the ground invoked by plaintiff which is defendant’s psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital
obligations which already existed at the time of the marriage in question has been satisfactorily proven. The evidence in herein case
establishes the irresponsibility of defendant Fely Ada Rosal Iyoy, firmly.

Going over plaintiff’s testimony which is decidedly credible, the Court finds that the defendant had indeed exhibited unmistakable
signs of such psychological incapacity to comply with her marital obligations. These are her excessive disposition to material things
over and above the marital stability. That such incapacity was already there at the time of the marriage in question is shown by
defendant’s own attitude towards her marriage to plaintiff. And for these reasons there is a legal ground to declare the marriage of
plaintiff Crasus L. Iyoy and defendant Fely Ada Rosal Iyoy null and void ab initio.15

Petitioner Republic, believing that the afore-quoted Judgment of the RTC was contrary to law and evidence, filed an appeal with
the Court of Appeals. The appellate court, though, in its Decision, dated 30 July 2001, affirmed the appealed Judgment of the RTC,
finding no reversible error therein. It even offered additional ratiocination for declaring the marriage between respondent Crasus
and Fely null and void, to wit –

Defendant secured a divorce from plaintiff-appellee abroad, has remarried, and is now permanently residing in the United States.
Plaintiff-appellee categorically stated this as one of his reasons for seeking the declaration of nullity of their marriage…

…
Article 26 of the Family Code provides:

"Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and
(6), 36, 37 and 38.

"WHERE A MARRIAGE BETWEEN A FILIPINO CITIZEN AND A FOREIGNER IS VALIDLY CELEBRATED AND A
DIVORCE IS THEREAFTER VALIDLY OBTAINED ABROAD BY THE ALIEN SPOUSE CAPACITATING HIM OR HER
TO REMARRY, THE FILIPINO SPOUSE SHALL LIKEWISE HAVE CAPACITY TO REMARRY UNDER PHILIPPINE
LAW."

The rationale behind the second paragraph of the above-quoted provision is to avoid the absurd and unjust situation of a Filipino
citizen still being married to his or her alien spouse, although the latter is no longer married to the Filipino spouse because he or
she has obtained a divorce abroad. In the case at bench, the defendant has undoubtedly acquired her American husband’s citizenship
and thus has become an alien as well. This Court cannot see why the benefits of Art. 26 aforequoted can not be extended to a
Filipino citizen whose spouse eventually embraces another citizenship and thus becomes herself an alien.

It would be the height of unfairness if, under these circumstances, plaintiff would still be considered as married to defendant, given
her total incapacity to honor her marital covenants to the former. To condemn plaintiff to remain shackled in a marriage that in
truth and in fact does not exist and to remain married to a spouse who is incapacitated to discharge essential marital covenants, is
verily to condemn him to a perpetual disadvantage which this Court finds abhorrent and will not countenance. Justice dictates that
plaintiff be given relief by affirming the trial court’s declaration of the nullity of the marriage of the parties. 16

After the Court of Appeals, in a Resolution, dated 08 March 2002, 17 denied its Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner Republic
filed the instant Petition before this Court, based on the following arguments/grounds –

I. Abandonment by and sexual infidelity of respondent’s wife do not per se constitute psychological incapacity.

II. The Court of Appeals has decided questions of substance not in accord with law and jurisprudence considering that the Court
of Appeals committed serious errors of law in ruling that Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code is inapplicable to the case at
bar.18

In his Comment19 to the Petition, respondent Crasus maintained that Fely’s psychological incapacity was clearly established after
a full-blown trial, and that paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code of the Philippines was indeed applicable to the marriage
of respondent Crasus and Fely, because the latter had already become an American citizen. He further questioned the personality
of petitioner Republic, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, to institute the instant Petition, because Article 48 of the
Family Code of the Philippines authorizes the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to the trial court, not the Solicitor General, to
intervene on behalf of the State, in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages.

After having reviewed the records of this case and the applicable laws and jurisprudence, this Court finds the instant Petition to be
meritorious.

The totality of evidence presented during trial is insufficient to support the finding of psychological incapacity of Fely.

Article 36, concededly one of the more controversial provisions of the Family Code of the Philippines, reads –

ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.

Issues most commonly arise as to what constitutes psychological incapacity. In a series of cases, this Court laid down guidelines
for determining its existence.
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,20 the term psychological incapacity was defined, thus –

". . . [P]sychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
cognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which,
as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity
and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
"psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is
celebrated…21

The psychological incapacity must be characterized by –

(a) Gravity – It must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a
marriage;

(b) Juridical Antecedence – It must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations
may emerge only after the marriage; and

(c) Incurability – It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.22

More definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines were handed
down by this Court in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,23 which, although quite lengthy, by its significance, deserves to
be reproduced below –

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution
and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family,
recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution
at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and
solidarity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity
must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince
the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known
the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such
incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless
such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be
given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the
illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time,
but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or
even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such
incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the
exercise of a profession or employment in a job…

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The
illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words,
there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband
and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts…

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No
decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly
stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with
the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed
submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor
vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.24

A later case, Marcos v. Marcos,25 further clarified that there is no requirement that the defendant/respondent spouse should be
personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage based on
psychological incapacity. Such psychological incapacity, however, must be established by the totality of the evidence presented
during the trial.

Using the guidelines established by the afore-mentioned jurisprudence, this Court finds that the totality of evidence presented by
respondent Crasus failed miserably to establish the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife Fely; therefore, there is no basis
for declaring their marriage null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines.

The only substantial evidence presented by respondent Crasus before the RTC was his testimony, which can be easily put into
question for being self-serving, in the absence of any other corroborating evidence. He submitted only two other pieces of evidence:
(1) the Certification on the recording with the Register of Deeds of the Marriage Contract between respondent Crasus and Fely,
such marriage being celebrated on 16 December 1961; and (2) the invitation to the wedding of Crasus, Jr., their eldest son, in which
Fely used her American husband’s surname. Even considering the admissions made by Fely herself in her Answer to respondent
Crasus’s Complaint filed with the RTC, the evidence is not enough to convince this Court that Fely had such a grave mental illness
that prevented her from assuming the essential obligations of marriage.

It is worthy to emphasize that Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines contemplates downright incapacity or inability to
take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations; not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the
part of the errant spouse.26 Irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, physical
abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment, by themselves, also do not warrant a finding of
psychological incapacity under the said Article.27

As has already been stressed by this Court in previous cases, Article 36 "is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the
marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even
before the celebration of marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume."28

The evidence may have proven that Fely committed acts that hurt and embarrassed respondent Crasus and the rest of the family.
Her hot-temper, nagging, and extravagance; her abandonment of respondent Crasus; her marriage to an American; and even her
flaunting of her American family and her American surname, may indeed be manifestations of her alleged incapacity to comply
with her marital obligations; nonetheless, the root cause for such was not identified. If the root cause of the incapacity was not
identified, then it cannot be satisfactorily established as a psychological or mental defect that is serious or grave; neither could it
be proven to be in existence at the time of celebration of the marriage; nor that it is incurable. While the personal examination of
Fely by a psychiatrist or psychologist is no longer mandatory for the declaration of nullity of their marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code of the Philippines, by virtue of this Court’s ruling in Marcos v. Marcos,29 respondent Crasus must still have complied
with the requirement laid down in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina30 that the root cause of the incapacity be identified as
a psychological illness and that its incapacitating nature be fully explained.
In any case, any doubt shall be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage. 31 No less than the Constitution of 1987 sets the
policy to protect and strengthen the family as the basic social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. 32

II

Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines is not applicable to the case at bar.

According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines –

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad
by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine
law.

As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one of the couple getting married is a Filipino citizen
and the other a foreigner at the time the marriage was celebrated. By its plain and literal interpretation, the said provision
cannot be applied to the case of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained her divorce, she was
still a Filipino citizen. Although the exact date was not established, Fely herself admitted in her Answer filed before the RTC that
she obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus sometime after she left for the United States in 1984, after which she married her
American husband in 1985. In the same Answer, she alleged that she had been an American citizen since 1988. At the time she
filed for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and pursuant to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws on family rights and duties, status, condition, and legal capacity,
even when she was already living abroad. Philippine laws, then and even until now, do not allow and recognize divorce between
Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could not have validly obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus.

III

The Solicitor General is authorized to intervene, on behalf of the Republic, in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity
of marriages.

Invoking Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines, respondent Crasus argued that only the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
assigned to the RTC may intervene on behalf of the State in proceedings for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriages;
hence, the Office of the Solicitor General had no personality to file the instant Petition on behalf of the State. Article 48 provides
–

ART. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that the
evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.

That Article 48 does not expressly mention the Solicitor General does not bar him or his Office from intervening in proceedings
for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriages. Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of
1987, appoints the Solicitor General as the principal law officer and legal defender of the Government. 33 His Office is tasked to
represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation,
proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers. The Office of the Solicitor General shall constitute the law
office of the Government and, as such, shall discharge duties requiring the services of lawyers. 34

The intent of Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines is to ensure that the interest of the State is represented and protected
in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages by preventing collusion between the parties, or the fabrication
or suppression of evidence; and, bearing in mind that the Solicitor General is the principal law officer and legal defender of the
land, then his intervention in such proceedings could only serve and contribute to the realization of such intent, rather than thwart
it.

Furthermore, the general rule is that only the Solicitor General is authorized to bring or defend actions on behalf of the People or
the Republic of the Philippines once the case is brought before this Court or the Court of Appeals. 35 While it is the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal who actively participates, on behalf of the State, in a proceeding for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage
before the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor General takes over when the case is elevated to the Court of Appeals or this Court. Since
it shall be eventually responsible for taking the case to the appellate courts when circumstances demand, then it is only reasonable
and practical that even while the proceeding is still being held before the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor General can already
exercise supervision and control over the conduct of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal therein to better guarantee the protection of
the interests of the State.

In fact, this Court had already recognized and affirmed the role of the Solicitor General in several cases for annulment and
declaration of nullity of marriages that were appealed before it, summarized as follows in the case of Ancheta v. Ancheta36 –

In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals [268 SCRA 198 (1997)], this Court laid down the guidelines in the interpretation and
application of Art. 48 of the Family Code, one of which concerns the role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the State:

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No
decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly
stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with
the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed
submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor
vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095. [Id., at 213]

This Court in the case of Malcampo-Sin v. Sin [355 SCRA 285 (2001)] reiterated its pronouncement in Republic v. Court of
Appeals [Supra.] regarding the role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the
State…37

Finally, the issuance of this Court of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages,38 which became effective on 15 March 2003, should dispel any other doubts of respondent Crasus as to the authority of
the Solicitor General to file the instant Petition on behalf of the State. The Rule recognizes the authority of the Solicitor General to
intervene and take part in the proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages before the RTC and on appeal to
higher courts. The pertinent provisions of the said Rule are reproduced below –

Sec. 5. Contents and form of petition. –

(4) It shall be filed in six copies. The petitioner shall serve a copy of the petition on the Office of the Solicitor General and the
Office of the City or Provincial Prosecutor, within five days from the date of its filing and submit to the court proof of such service
within the same period.

Sec. 18. Memoranda. – The court may require the parties and the public prosecutor, in consultation with the Office of the Solicitor
General, to file their respective memoranda in support of their claims within fifteen days from the date the trial is terminated. It
may require the Office of the Solicitor General to file its own memorandum if the case is of significant interest to the State. No
other pleadings or papers may be submitted without leave of court. After the lapse of the period herein provided, the case will be
considered submitted for decision, with or without the memoranda.

Sec. 19. Decision. –

(2) The parties, including the Solicitor General and the public prosecutor, shall be served with copies of the decision personally or
by registered mail. If the respondent summoned by publication failed to appear in the action, the dispositive part of the decision
shall be published once in a newspaper of general circulation.

(3) The decision becomes final upon the expiration of fifteen days from notice to the parties. Entry of judgment shall be made if no
motion for reconsideration or new trial, or appeal is filed by any of the parties, the public prosecutor, or the Solicitor General.

Sec. 20. Appeal. –

(2) Notice of Appeal. – An aggrieved party or the Solicitor General may appeal from the decision by filing a Notice of Appeal
within fifteen days from notice of denial of the motion for reconsideration or new trial. The appellant shall serve a copy of the
notice of appeal on the adverse parties.
Given the foregoing, this Court arrives at a conclusion contrary to those of the RTC and the Court of Appeals, and sustains the
validity and existence of the marriage between respondent Crasus and Fely. At most, Fely’s abandonment, sexual infidelity, and
bigamy, give respondent Crasus grounds to file for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code of the Philippines, but not
for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the same Code. While this Court commiserates with respondent Crasus
for being continuously shackled to what is now a hopeless and loveless marriage, this is one of those situations where neither law
nor society can provide the specific answer to every individual problem. 39

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62539, dated 30
July 2001, affirming the Judgment of the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 22, in Civil Case No. CEB-20077, dated 30 October 1998, is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

The marriage of respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy remains valid and subsisting.
G.R. No. 127358 March 31, 2005

NOEL BUENAVENTURA, Petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ISABEL LUCIA SINGH BUENAVENTURA, respondents.

x-------------------x

G.R. No. 127449 March 31, 2005

NOEL BUENAVENTURA, Petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ISABEL LUCIA SINGH BUENAVENTURA, Respondents.

DECISION

AZCUNA, J.:

These cases involve a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage, which was filed by petitioner Noel Buenaventura on July
12, 1992, on the ground of the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife, Isabel Singh Buenaventura, herein respondent. After
respondent filed her answer, petitioner, with leave of court, amended his petition by stating that both he and his wife were
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. In response, respondent filed an amended
answer denying the allegation that she was psychologically incapacitated. 1

On July 31, 1995, the Regional Trial Court promulgated a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1) Declaring and decreeing the marriage entered into between plaintiff Noel A. Buenaventura and defendant Isabel Lucia Singh
Buenaventura on July 4, 1979, null and void ab initio;

2) Ordering the plaintiff to pay defendant moral damages in the amount of 2.5 million pesos and exemplary damages of 1 million
pesos with 6% interest from the date of this decision plus attorney’s fees of P100,000.00;

3) Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant expenses of litigation of P50,000.00, plus costs;

4) Ordering the liquidation of the assets of the conjugal partnership property[,] particularly the plaintiff’s separation/retirement
benefits received from the Far East Bank [and] Trust Company[,] by ceding, giving and paying to her fifty percent (50%) of the
net amount of P3,675,335.79 or P1,837,667.89 together with 12% interest per annum from the date of this decision and one-half
(1/2) of his outstanding shares of stock with Manila Memorial Park and Provident Group of Companies;

5) Ordering him to give a regular support in favor of his son Javy Singh Buenaventura in the amount of P15,000.00 monthly,
subject to modification as the necessity arises;

6) Awarding the care and custody of the minor Javy Singh Buenaventura to his mother, the herein defendant; and

7) Hereby authorizing the defendant to revert back to the use of her maiden family name Singh.

Let copies of this decision be furnished the appropriate civil registry and registries of properties.

SO ORDERED.2
Petitioner appealed the above decision to the Court of Appeals. While the case was pending in the appellate court, respondent filed
a motion to increase the P15,000 monthly support pendente lite of their son Javy Singh Buenaventura. Petitioner filed an opposition
thereto, praying that it be denied or that such incident be set for oral argument. 3

On September 2, 1996, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution increasing the support pendente lite to P20,000.4 Petitioner filed
a motion for reconsideration questioning the said Resolution. 5

On October 8, 1996, the appellate court promulgated a Decision dismissing petitioner’s appeal for lack of merit and affirming in
toto the trial court’s decision.6 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied. From the abovementioned Decision,
petitioner filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari.

On November 13, 1996, through another Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the
September 2, 1996 Resolution, which increased the monthly support for the son. 7 Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari to
question these two Resolutions.

On July 9, 1997, the Petition for Review on Certiorari8 and the Petition for Certiorari9 were ordered consolidated by this Court.10

In the Petition for Review on Certiorari petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals decided the case not in accord with law and
jurisprudence, thus:

1. WHEN IT AWARDED DEFENDANT-APPELLEE MORAL DAMAGES IN THE AMOUNT OF P2.5 MILLION AND
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES OF P1 MILLION, WITH 6% INTEREST FROM THE DATE OF ITS DECISION, WITHOUT ANY
LEGAL AND MORAL BASIS;

2. WHEN IT AWARDED P100,000.00 ATTORNEY’S FEES AND P50,000.00 EXPENSES OF LITIGATION, PLUS COSTS,
TO DEFENDANT-APPELLEE, WITHOUT FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS;

3. WHEN IT ORDERED PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT NOEL TO PAY DEFENDANT-APPELLEE ONE-HALF

OR P1,837,667.89 OUT OF HIS RETIREMENT BENEFITS RECEIVED FROM THE FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST CO.,
WITH 12% INTEREST THEREON FROM THE DATE OF ITS DECISION, NOTWITHSTANDING THAT SAID
RETIREMENT BENEFITS ARE GRATUITOUS AND EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY OF NOEL, AND ALSO TO DELIVER TO
DEFENDANT-APPELLEE ONE-HALF OF HIS SHARES OF STOCK WITH THE MANILA MEMORIAL PARK AND THE
PROVIDENT GROUP OF COMPANIES, ALTHOUGH SAID SHARES OF STOCK WERE ACQUIRED BY NOEL BEFORE
HIS MARRIAGE TO RESPONDENT ISABEL AND ARE, THEREFORE, AGAIN HIS EXCLUSIVE PROPERTIES; AND

4. WHEN IT AWARDED EXCLUSIVE CARE AND CUSTODY OVER THE PARTIES’ MINOR CHILD TO DEFENDANT-
APPELLEE WITHOUT ASKING THE CHILD (WHO WAS ALREADY 13 YEARS OLD AT THAT TIME) HIS CHOICE AS
TO WHOM, BETWEEN HIS TWO PARENTS, HE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE CUSTODY OVER HIS PERSON. 11

In the Petition for Certiorari, petitioner advances the following contentions:

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT REFUSED TO SET RESPONDENT’S
MOTION FOR INCREASED SUPPORT FOR THE PARTIES’ SON FOR HEARING.12

THERE WAS NO NEED FOR THE COURT OF APPEALS TO INCREASE JAVY’S MONTHLY SUPPORT OF P15,000.00
BEING GIVEN BY PETITIONER EVEN AT PRESENT PRICES.13

IN RESOLVING RESPONDENT’S MOTION FOR THE INCREASE OF JAVY’S SUPPORT, THE COURT OF APPEALS
SHOULD HAVE EXAMINED THE LIST OF EXPENSES SUBMITTED BY RESPONDENT IN THE LIGHT OF
PETITIONER’S OBJECTIONS THERETO, INSTEAD OF MERELY ASSUMING THAT JAVY IS ENTITLED TO A P5,000
INCREASE IN SUPPORT AS SAID AMOUNT IS "TOO MINIMAL."14

LIKEWISE, THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE GIVEN PETITIONER AN OPPORTUNITY TO PROVE HIS
PRESENT INCOME TO SHOW THAT HE CANNOT AFFORD TO INCREASE JAVY’S SUPPORT. 15
With regard to the first issue in the main case, the Court of Appeals articulated:

On Assignment of Error C, the trial court, after findings of fact ascertained from the testimonies not only of the parties particularly
the defendant-appellee but likewise, those of the two psychologists, awarded damages on the basis of Articles 21, 2217 and 2229
of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

Thus, the lower court found that plaintiff-appellant deceived the defendant-appellee into marrying him by professing true love
instead of revealing to her that he was under heavy parental pressure to marry and that because of pride he married defendant-
appellee; that he was not ready to enter into marriage as in fact his career was and always would be his first priority; that he was
unable to relate not only to defendant-appellee as a husband but also to his son, Javy, as a father; that he had no inclination to make
the marriage work such that in times of trouble, he chose the easiest way out, that of leaving defendant–appellee and their son; that
he had no desire to keep defendant-appellee and their son as proved by his reluctance and later, refusal to reconcile after their
separation; that the aforementioned caused defendant-appellee to suffer mental anguish, anxiety, besmirched reputation, sleepless
nights not only in those years the parties were together but also after and throughout their separation.

Plaintiff-appellant assails the trial court’s decision on the ground that unlike those arising from a breach in ordinary contracts,
damages arising as a consequence of marriage may not be awarded. While it is correct that there is, as yet, no decided case by the
Supreme Court where damages by reason of the performance or non-performance of marital obligations were awarded, it does not
follow that no such award for damages may be made.

Defendant-appellee, in her amended answer, specifically prayed for moral and exemplary damages in the total amount of 7 million
pesos. The lower court, in the exercise of its discretion, found full justification of awarding at least half of what was originally
prayed for. We find no reason to disturb the ruling of the trial court.16

The award by the trial court of moral damages is based on Articles 2217 and 21 of the Civil Code, which read as follows:

ART. 2217. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be
recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant’s wrongful act or omission.

ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

The trial court referred to Article 21 because Article 221917 of the Civil Code enumerates the cases in which moral damages may
be recovered and it mentions Article 21 as one of the instances. It must be noted that Article 21 states that the individual must
willfully cause loss or injury to another. There is a need that the act is willful and hence done in complete freedom. In granting
moral damages, therefore, the trial court and the Court of Appeals could not but have assumed that the acts on which the moral
damages were based were done willfully and freely, otherwise the grant of moral damages would have no leg to stand on.

On the other hand, the trial court declared the marriage of the parties null and void based on Article 36 of the Family Code, due to
psychological incapacity of the petitioner, Noel Buenaventura. Article 36 of the Family Code states:

A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.

Psychological incapacity has been defined, thus:

. . . no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the
Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There
is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. . . .18
The Court of Appeals and the trial court considered the acts of the petitioner after the marriage as proof of his psychological
incapacity, and therefore a product of his incapacity or inability to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. Nevertheless,
said courts considered these acts as willful and hence as grounds for granting moral damages. It is contradictory to characterize
acts as a product of psychological incapacity, and hence beyond the control of the party because of an innate inability, while at the
same time considering the same set of acts as willful. By declaring the petitioner as psychologically incapacitated, the possibility
of awarding moral damages on the same set of facts was negated. The award of moral damages should be predicated, not on the
mere act of entering into the marriage, but on specific evidence that it was done deliberately and with malice by a party who had
knowledge of his or her disability and yet willfully concealed the same. No such evidence appears to have been adduced in this
case.

For the same reason, since psychological incapacity means that one is truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that one must
assume and discharge as a consequence of marriage, it removes the basis for the contention that the petitioner purposely deceived
the private respondent. If the private respondent was deceived, it was not due to a willful act on the part of the petitioner. Therefore,
the award of moral damages was without basis in law and in fact.

Since the grant of moral damages was not proper, it follows that the grant of exemplary damages cannot stand since the Civil Code
provides that exemplary damages are imposed in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.19

With respect to the grant of attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation the trial court explained, thus:

Regarding Attorney’s fees, Art. 2208 of the Civil Code authorizes an award of attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation, other than
judicial costs, when as in this case the plaintiff’s act or omission has compelled the defendant to litigate and to incur expenses of
litigation to protect her interest (par. 2), and where the Court deems it just and equitable that attorney’s fees and expenses of
litigation should be recovered. (par. 11)20

The Court of Appeals reasoned as follows:

On Assignment of Error D, as the award of moral and exemplary damages is fully justified, the award of attorney’s fees and costs
of litigation by the trial court is likewise fully justified.21

The acts or omissions of petitioner which led the lower court to deduce his psychological incapacity, and his act in filing the
complaint for the annulment of his marriage cannot be considered as unduly compelling the private respondent to litigate, since
both are grounded on petitioner’s psychological incapacity, which as explained above is a mental incapacity causing an utter
inability to comply with the obligations of marriage. Hence, neither can be a ground for attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.
Furthermore, since the award of moral and exemplary damages is no longer justified, the award of attorney’s fees and expenses of
litigation is left without basis.

Anent the retirement benefits received from the Far East Bank and Trust Co. and the shares of stock in the Manila Memorial Park
and the Provident Group of Companies, the trial court said:

The third issue that must be resolved by the Court is what to do with the assets of the conjugal partnership in the event of declaration
of annulment of the marriage. The Honorable Supreme Court has held that the declaration of nullity of marriage carries ipso facto a
judgment for the liquidation of property (Domingo v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 104818, Sept. 17, 1993, 226 SCRA, pp.
572 – 573, 586). Thus, speaking through Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero, it was ruled in this case:

When a marriage is declared void ab initio, the law states that the final judgment therein shall provide for the liquidation, partition
and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common children and the delivery of their
presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in the previous proceedings.

The parties here were legally married on July 4, 1979, and therefore, all property acquired during the marriage, whether the
acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal
unless the contrary is proved (Art. 116, New Family Code; Art. 160, Civil Code). Art. 117 of the Family Code enumerates what
are conjugal partnership properties. Among others they are the following:
1) Those acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition be for the
partnership, or for only one of the spouses;

2) Those obtained from the labor, industry, work or profession of either or both of the spouses;

3) The fruits, natural, industrial, or civil, due or received during the marriage from the common property, as well as the net fruits
from the exclusive property of each spouse. . . .

Applying the foregoing legal provisions, and without prejudice to requiring an inventory of what are the parties’ conjugal properties
and what are the exclusive properties of each spouse, it was disclosed during the proceedings in this case that the plaintiff who
worked first as Branch Manager and later as Vice-President of Far East Bank & Trust Co. received separation/retirement package
from the said bank in the amount of P3,701,500.00 which after certain deductions amounting to P26,164.21 gave him a net amount
of P3,675,335.79 and actually paid to him on January 9, 1995 (Exhs. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11). Not having shown debts or obligations
other than those deducted from the said retirement/separation pay, under Art. 129 of the Family Code "The net remainder of the
conjugal partnership properties shall constitute the profits, which shall be divided equally between husband and wife, unless a
different proportion or division was agreed upon in the marriage settlement or unless there has been a voluntary waiver or forfeiture
of such share as provided in this Code." In this particular case, however, there had been no marriage settlement between the parties,
nor had there been any voluntary waiver or valid forfeiture of the defendant wife’s share in the conjugal partnership properties. The
previous cession and transfer by the plaintiff of his one-half (1/2) share in their residential house and lot covered by T.C.T. No. S-
35680 of the Registry of Deeds of Parañaque, Metro Manila, in favor of the defendant as stipulated in their Compromise Agreement
dated July 12, 1993, and approved by the Court in its Partial Decision dated August 6, 1993, was actually intended to be in full
settlement of any and all demands for past support. In reality, the defendant wife had allowed some concession in favor of the
plaintiff husband, for were the law strictly to be followed, in the process of liquidation of the conjugal assets, the conjugal dwelling
and the lot on which it is situated shall, unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, be adjudicated to the spouse with whom their
only child has chosen to remain (Art. 129, par. 9). Here, what was done was one-half (1/2) portion of the house was ceded to
defendant so that she will not claim anymore for past unpaid support, while the other half was transferred to their only child as his
presumptive legitime.

Consequently, nothing yet has been given to the defendant wife by way of her share in the conjugal properties, and it is but just,
lawful and fair, that she be given one-half (1/2) share of the separation/retirement benefits received by the plaintiff the same being
part of their conjugal partnership properties having been obtained or derived from the labor, industry, work or profession of said
defendant husband in accordance with Art. 117, par. 2 of the Family Code. For the same reason, she is entitled to one-half (1/2) of
the outstanding shares of stock of the plaintiff husband with the Manila Memorial Park and the Provident Group of Companies.22

The Court of Appeals articulated on this matter as follows:

On Assignment of Error E, plaintiff-appellant assails the order of the trial court for him to give one-half of his separation/retirement
benefits from Far East Bank & Trust Company and half of his outstanding shares in Manila Memorial Park and Provident Group
of Companies to the defendant-appellee as the latter’s share in the conjugal partnership.

On August 6, 1993, the trial court rendered a Partial Decision approving the Compromise Agreement entered into by the parties.
In the same Compromise Agreement, the parties had agreed that henceforth, their conjugal partnership is dissolved. Thereafter, no
steps were taken for the liquidation of the conjugal partnership.

Finding that defendant-appellee is entitled to at least half of the separation/retirement benefits which plaintiff-appellant received
from Far East Bank & Trust Company upon his retirement as Vice-President of said company for the reason that the benefits
accrued from plaintiff–appellant’s service for the bank for a number of years, most of which while he was married to defendant-
appellee, the trial court adjudicated the same. The same is true with the outstanding shares of plaintiff-appellant in Manila Memorial
Park and Provident Group of Companies. As these were acquired by the plaintiff-appellant at the time he was married to defendant-
appellee, the latter is entitled to one-half thereof as her share in the conjugal partnership. We find no reason to disturb the ruling of
the trial court.23

Since the present case does not involve the annulment of a bigamous marriage, the provisions of Article 50 in relation to Articles
41, 42 and 43 of the Family Code, providing for the dissolution of the absolute community or conjugal partnership of gains, as the
case may be, do not apply. Rather, the general rule applies, which is that in case a marriage is declared void ab initio, the property
regime applicable and to be liquidated, partitioned and distributed is that of equal co-ownership.
In Valdes v. Regional Trial Court, Branch 102, Quezon City,24 this Court expounded on the consequences of a void marriage on
the property relations of the spouses and specified the applicable provisions of law:

The trial court correctly applied the law. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties
during the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may be, of the Family
Code. Article 147 is a remake of Article 144 of the Civil Code as interpreted and so applied in previous cases; it provides:

ART. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and
wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and
the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by
their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not
participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof
if the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.

Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned
in common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation.

When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be
forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants,
each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to
the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation.

This peculiar kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering no legal impediment to marry each other, so
exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void marriage or without the benefit of marriage. The term "capacitated" in
the provision (in the first paragraph of the law) refers to the legal capacity of a party to contract marriage, i.e., any "male or female
of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38" of the Code.

Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall be governed by the rules on
equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint
efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall still be considered as having contributed thereto
jointly if said party's "efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family household." Unlike the conjugal partnership of
gains, the fruits of the couple's separate property are not included in the co-ownership.

Article 147 of the Family Code, in substance and to the above extent, has clarified Article 144 of the Civil Code; in addition, the
law now expressly provides that —

(a) Neither party can dispose or encumber by act[s] inter vivos [of] his or her share in co-ownership property, without the consent
of the other, during the period of cohabitation; and

(b) In the case of a void marriage, any party in bad faith shall forfeit his or her share in the co-ownership in favor of their common
children; in default thereof or waiver by any or all of the common children, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving
descendants, or still in default thereof, to the innocent party. The forfeiture shall take place upon the termination of the cohabitation
or declaration of nullity of the marriage.

In deciding to take further cognizance of the issue on the settlement of the parties' common property, the trial court acted neither
imprudently nor precipitately; a court which had jurisdiction to declare the marriage a nullity must be deemed likewise clothed
with authority to resolve incidental and consequential matters. Nor did it commit a reversible error in ruling that petitioner and
private respondent own the "family home" and all their common property in equal shares, as well as in concluding that, in the
liquidation and partition of the property owned in common by them, the provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code, not
Articles 50, 51 and 52, in relation to Articles 102 and 129, of the Family Code, should aptly prevail. The rules set up to govern the
liquidation of either the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of gains, the property regimes recognized for valid and
voidable marriages (in the latter case until the contract is annulled), are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that exists
between common-law spouses. The first paragraph of Article 50 of the Family Code, applying paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of
Article 43, relates only, by its explicit terms, to voidable marriages and, exceptionally, to void marriages under Article 40 of the
Code, i.e., the declaration of nullity of a subsequent marriage contracted by a spouse of a prior void marriage before the latter is
judicially declared void. The latter is a special rule that somehow recognizes the philosophy and an old doctrine that void marriages
are inexistent from the very beginning and no judicial decree is necessary to establish their nullity. In now requiring for purposes
of remarriage, the declaration of nullity by final judgment of the previously contracted void marriage, the present law aims to do
away with any continuing uncertainty on the status of the second marriage. It is not then illogical for the provisions of Article 43,
in relation to Articles 41 and 42, of the Family Code, on the effects of the termination of a subsequent marriage contracted during
the subsistence of a previous marriage to be made applicable pro hac vice. In all other cases, it is not to be assumed that the law
has also meant to have coincident property relations, on the one hand, between spouses in valid and voidable marriages (before
annulment) and, on the other, between common-law spouses or spouses of void marriages, leaving to ordain, in the latter case, the
ordinary rules on co-ownership subject to the provision of Article 147 and Article 148 of the Family Code. It must be stressed,
nevertheless, even as it may merely state the obvious, that the provisions of the Family Code on the "family home," i.e., the
provisions found in Title V, Chapter 2, of the Family Code, remain in force and effect regardless of the property regime of the
spouses.25

Since the properties ordered to be distributed by the court a quo were found, both by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, to
have been acquired during the union of the parties, the same would be covered by the co-ownership. No fruits of a separate property
of one of the parties appear to have been included or involved in said distribution. The liquidation, partition and distribution of the
properties owned in common by the parties herein as ordered by the court a quo should, therefore, be sustained, but on the basis of
co-ownership and not of the regime of conjugal partnership of gains.

As to the issue on custody of the parties over their only child, Javy Singh Buenaventura, it is now moot since he is about to turn
twenty-five years of age on May 27, 200526 and has, therefore, attained the age of majority.

With regard to the issues on support raised in the Petition for Certiorari, these would also now be moot, owing to the fact that the
son, Javy Singh Buenaventura, as previously stated, has attained the age of majority.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 8, 1996 and its Resolution dated December 10, 1996 which
are contested in the Petition for Review (G.R. No. 127449), are hereby MODIFIED, in that the award of moral and exemplary
damages, attorney’s fees, expenses of litigation and costs are deleted. The order giving respondent one-half of the retirement
benefits of petitioner from Far East Bank and Trust Co. and one-half of petitioner’s shares of stock in Manila Memorial Park and
in the Provident Group of Companies is sustained but on the basis of the liquidation, partition and distribution of the co-
ownership and not of the regime of conjugal partnership of gains. The rest of said Decision and Resolution are AFFIRMED.

The Petition for Review on Certiorari (G.R. No. 127358) contesting the Court of Appeals’ Resolutions of September 2, 1996 and
November 13, 1996 which increased the support pendente lite in favor of the parties’ son, Javy Singh Buenaventura, is now MOOT
and ACADEMIC and is, accordingly, DISMISSED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
JAIME F. VILLALON, G.R. NO. 167206

Petitioner,

V.

MA. CORAZON N. VILLALON,

Respondent. Promulgated:

November 18, 2005

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J .:

On July 12, 1996, petitioner Jaime F. Villalon filed a petition [1] for the annulment of his marriage to respondent Ma. Corazon
N. Villalon before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City where it was docketed as JDRC No. 3917 and raffled to Branch 69. As
ground therefor, petitioner cited his psychological incapacity which he claimed existed even prior to his marriage.

According to petitioner, the manifestations of his psychological incapacity were: (a) his chronic refusal to maintain harmonious
family relations and his lack of interest in having a normal married life; (b) his immaturity and irresponsibility in refusing to accept
the essential obligations of marriage as husband to his wife; (c) his desire for other women and a life unchained from any spousal
obligation; and (d) his false assumption of the fundamental obligations of companionship and consortium towards respondent.
Petitioner thus prayed that his marriage to respondent be declared null and void ab initio.

On September 25, 1996, respondent filed an answer [2] denying petitioner's allegations. She asserted that her 18-year marriage to
petitioner has been 'fruitful and characterized by joy, contentment and hopes for more growth in their relationship and that their
marital squabbles were normal based on community standards. Petitioner's success in his professional life aided him in performing
his role as husband, father, and provider. Respondent claimed that petitioner's commitment to his paternal and marital
responsibilities was beyond reproach.

On October 7, 1996, the trial court directed the prosecutor to conduct an investigation on whether there was collusion between the
parties. [3] The report submitted to the trial court stated that there was no such collusion. [4]

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) subsequently entered its appearance in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines [5] and
submitted an opposition [6] to the petition on September 23, 1997. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

Petitioner testified that he met respondent sometime in the early seventies when he applied for a job at Metrobank, where
respondent was employed as a foreign exchange trader. They began dating in 1975 and had a romantic relationship soon thereafter.
[7] After going steady for about two years, petitioner and respondent were married at the San Pancracio Chapel in Paco, Manila
on April 22, 1978. Petitioner claimed that he married respondent because he believed that it was the right time to raise a family and
that she would be a good mother to his children. [8]

In the middle of 1993, petitioner decided to separate from respondent. According to him, their marriage reached a point where
there was no longer any communication between them and their relationship became devoid of love, affection, support and respect
due to his constant urge to see other women. [9] Moreover, their relationship tended to be 'one-sided since respondent was
unresponsive and hardly ever showed her love, needs, wants and emotions. [10]

Petitioner admitted that on certain occasions before his marriage, he had two girlfriends at the same time. He also saw other women
even when he became engaged to and, later on, married respondent. [11] Respondent learned of his affairs but reacted in a subdued
manner. [12] Petitioner surmised that it was respondent's nature to be silent and withdrawn. [13]
In January 1994, petitioner left the conjugal abode and moved into an apartment located five to ten minutes away. Before he left,he
and his wife spoke to their three children who, at that time, were 14, 8, and 6 years old, respectively. [14] Petitioner consulted a
child psychologist before talking to his children. [15] He considered himself as a good and loving father and described his
relationship with the children as 'great. [16]

Despite the separation, petitioner would regularly visit his children who stayed with him on alternate weekends. He voluntarily
gave monthly support to the children and paid for their tuition fees. He also shouldered the children's medical expenses as well as
the maintenance and miscellaneous fees for the conjugal abode. [17]

Petitioner presented Dr. Natividad Dayan, a clinical psychologist, to testify on his alleged psychological disorder of 'Narcissistic
Histrionic Personality Disorder with 'Casanova Complex. Dr. Dayan described the said disorder as 'a pervasive maladaptation in
terms of interpersonal and occupational functioning with main symptoms of grand ideation about oneself, self-centeredness,
thinking he is unique and wanting to always be the one followed, the I personality. A person afflicted with this disorder believes
that he is entitled to gratify his emotional and sexual feelings and thus engages in serial infidelities. Likewise, a person with
'Casanova Complex exhibits habitual adulterous behavior and goes from one relationship to another. [18]

Dr. Dayan submitted a psychological report on both petitioner and respondent based on clinical interviews and psychological tests.
[19]

Respondent testified that she first learned of her husband's infidelity in 1980. She discovered that he was having an affair with one
of her friends who worked as a trader in her husband's company. The affair was cut short when the woman left for the United States
to work. Eventually, she and petitioner were able to rebuild their relationship and overcome the crisis. [20]

When asked about the womanizing ways of her husband, respondent averred that she did not know whether her husband's acts
could be deemed 'womanizing since there were only two instances of infidelity which occurred 13 years apart. [21] She also
theorized that petitioner wanted to have their marriage annulled so he could marry her old friend. [22] She stated that she has not
closed her doors to petitioner but the latter would have to give up his extra-marital relationship. [23]

To controvert the findings of petitioner's expert witness, respondent presented a psychiatrist, Dr. Cecilia Villegas, who testified
that Dr. Dayan's findings were incomplete because a team approach was necessary in evaluating an individual's personality. An
evaluation of one's psychological capacity requires the expertise of a psychiatrist and social worker. [24]

Upon order of the trial court, the parties submitted their respective memoranda. [25] The OSG likewise filed a certification
[26] pursuant to Rep. of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals. [27] In due course, the trial court rendered judgment as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent Ma.
Corazon N. Villalon celebrated on April 22, 1978, as null and void ab initio on the ground of psychological
incapacity on the part of the petitioner pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.

Accordingly, the conjugal assets and liabilities are hereby ordered to be liquidated and the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership of gains be effected in accordance with Article 129 of the Family Code.

As petitioner manifested that he wishes to maintain the custody arrangement now existing, the custody of the
three (3) children ' Miguel Alberto, Fernando Alfonso, and Ma. Joanna Victoria ' shall remain with the
respondent subject to visitation rights of petitioner as may be mutually agreed upon by the parties.

In order to cancel the registration of the Marriage Contract between herein parties appearing in the Book of
Marriage of the city of Manila, let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Local Civil Registrar of Manila
as well as the National Census and Statistics Office (NCSO), CRD Legal Department, EDSA, Quezon City.

SO ORDERED. [28]
Respondent and the OSG seasonably filed an appeal from the decision of the trial court, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 74354. On
March 23, 2004, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision, the dispositive part of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the assailed decision dated November 12, 2001 is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE, and a new judgment entered DISMISSING the petitioner's petition for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED. [29]
Contrary to the trial court's findings, the appellate court held that petitioner failed to prove the juridical antecedence,
gravity and incurability of his alleged psychological incapacity. Although Dr. Dayan testified that petitioner's
psychological incapacity preceded the marriage, she failed to give sufficient basis for such a finding. Dr. Dayan also
stated that parental marital instability was the root cause of petitioner's psychological incapacity but failed to elaborate
thereon or link the two variables. Moreover, petitioner's sexual infidelity was made to appear as symptomatic of a grave
psychological disorder when, in reality, the same merely resulted from a general dissatisfaction with the marriage.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the appellate court's decision which was denied in an order dated October 28, 2004.
[30] Thus, petitioner took this recourse under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, asserting that the Court of Appeals erred in finding
that he failed to prove his psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.

The petition has no merit.

The totality of the evidence in this case does not support a finding that petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his
marital obligations. On the contrary, what is evident is the fact that petitioner was a good husband to respondent for a substantial
period of time prior to their separation, a loving father to their children and a good provider of the family. Although he engaged in
marital infidelity in at least two occasions, the same does not appear to be symptomatic of a grave psychological disorder which
rendered him incapable of performing his spousal obligations. The same appears as the result of a general dissatisfaction with his
marriage rather than a psychological disorder rooted in petitioner's personal history.

In Santos v. Court of Appeals, [31] the court held that psychological incapacity, as a ground for the declaration of nullity of a
marriage, must be characterized by juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability. [32] It should '

. [R]efer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants
that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the
Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There
is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.... [33]

In the case at bar, although Dr. Dayan testified that petitioner suffered from Narcissistic Histrionic Personality Disorder with
Casanova Complex even before the marriage and thus had the tendency to cheat on his wife, such conclusion was not sufficiently
backed by concrete evidence showing that petitioner indeed had several affairs and finds it difficult to be faithful. Except for
petitioner's general claim that on certain occasions he had two girlfriends at the same time, no details or explanations were given
of such circumstances that would demonstrate petitioner's inability to be faithful to respondent either before or at the time of the
celebration of their marriage.

Similarly, we agree with the Court of Appeals that petitioner failed to establish the incurability and gravity of his alleged
psychological disorder. While Dr. Dayan described the symptoms of one afflicted with Narcissistic Histrionic Personality Disorder
as 'self-centered', 'characterized by grandiose ideation and 'lack of empathy in relating to others' , and one with Casanova Complex
as a 'serial adulterer', the evidence on record betrays the presence of any of these symptoms.

Moreover, we are not convinced that petitioner is a 'serial or habitual adulterer', as he wants the court to believe. As stated by
respondent herself, it cannot be said that two instances of infidelity which occurred 13 years apart could be deemed 'womanizing',
especially considering that these instances involved the same woman. In fact, at the time of respondent's testimony, petitioner's
illicit relationship has been going on for six years. This is not consistent with the symptoms of a person suffering from 'Casanova
Complex who, according to Dr. Dayan, is one who jumps from one relationship to another.

Sexual infidelity, by itself, is not sufficient proof that petitioner is suffering from psychological incapacity. It must be shown that
the acts of unfaithfulness are manifestations of a disordered personality which make petitioner completely unable to discharge the
essential obligations of marriage. [34] The evidence on record fails to convince us that petitioner's marital indiscretions are
symptomatic of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. On the contrary, the evidence reveals that petitioner
was a good husband most of the time when he was living with respondent, a loving father to his children as well as a good provider.

In Rep. of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals, [35] we held that the cause of the alleged psychological incapacity must be identified as
a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Further '

The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words,
there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage. [36]

In the instant case, it appears that petitioner has simply lost his love for respondent and has consequently refused to stay married to
her. As revealed by his own testimony, petitioner felt that he was no longer part of respondent's life and that the latter did not need
or want him. [37] Respondent's uncommunicative and withdrawn nature apparently led to petitioner's discontentment with the
marital relationship.

However, as held in Rep. of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals, [38] refusal to comply with the essential obligations of marriage is not
psychological incapacity within the meaning of the law. The policy of the State is to protect and strengthen the family as the basic
social institution and marriage is the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of validity of the
marriage. [39]

WHEREFORE , the petition is DENIED. The March 23, 2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 74354 and
its October 28, 2004 Resolution, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 162368 July 17, 2006

MA. ARMIDA PEREZ-FERRARIS, petitioner,

vs.
BRIX FERRARIS, respondent.

RESOLUTION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This resolves the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Ma. Armida Perez-Ferraris of the Resolution dated June 9, 2004
denying the petition for review on certiorari of the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated April 30, 2003 and
February 24, 2004, respectively, for failure of the petitioner to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals committed any reversible
error.

On February 20, 2001, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 151 rendered a Decision 1 denying the petition for declaration
of nullity of petitioner's marriage with Brix Ferraris. The trial court noted that suffering from epilepsy does not amount to
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Civil Code and the evidence on record were insufficient to prove infidelity.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in an Order2 dated April 20, 2001 where the trial court reiterated that there was
no evidence that respondent is mentally or physically ill to such an extent that he could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof.

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed3 in toto the judgment of the trial court. It held that the evidence on
record did not convincingly establish that respondent was suffering from psychological incapacity or that his "defects" were
incurable and already present at the inception of the marriage.4 The Court of Appeals also found that Dr. Dayan's testimony failed
to establish the substance of respondent's psychological incapacity; that she failed to explain how she arrived at the conclusion that
the respondent has a mixed personality disorder; that she failed to clearly demonstrate that there was a natal or supervening disabling
factor or an adverse integral element in respondent's character that effectively incapacitated him from accepting and complying
with the essential marital obligations.5

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied6 for lack of merit; thus, she filed a petition for review on certiorari with this
Court. As already stated, the petition for review was denied for failure of petitioner to show that the appellate tribunal committed
any reversible error.

Petitioner filed the instant motion for reconsideration.7 The Court required respondent Brix Ferraris to file comment8 but failed to
comply; thus, he is deemed to have waived the opportunity to file comment. Further, the Court directed the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) to comment on petitioner's motion for reconsideration which it complied on March 2, 2006.

After considering the arguments of both the petitioner and the OSG, the Court resolves to deny petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.

The issue of whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of marriage depends crucially,
more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case.9 Such factual issue, however, is beyond the province of this Court to
review. It is not the function of the Court to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence or premises supportive of such factual
determination.10 It is a well-established principle that factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are
binding on this Court,11 save for the most compelling and cogent reasons, like when the findings of the appellate court go beyond
the issues of the case, run contrary to the admissions of the parties to the case, or fail to notice certain relevant facts which, if
properly considered, will justify a different conclusion; or when there is a misappreciation of facts,12 which are unavailing in the
instant case.

The term "psychological incapacity" to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, refers to a
serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent
as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.13 As all people
may have certain quirks and idiosyncrasies, or isolated characteristics associated with certain personality disorders, there is hardly
any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases
of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage.14 It is for this reason that the Court relies heavily on psychological experts for its understanding of the human personality.
However, the root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature must be fully explained, 15 which
petitioner failed to convincingly demonstrate.

As aptly held by the Court of Appeals:

Simply put, the chief and basic consideration in the resolution of marital annulment cases is the presence of evidence that can
adequately establish respondent's psychological condition. Here, appellant contends that there is such evidence. We do not agree.
Indeed, the evidence on record did not convincingly establish that respondent was suffering from psychological incapacity. There
is absolutely no showing that his "defects" were already present at the inception of the marriage, or that those are incurable.

Quite apart from being plainly self-serving, petitioner's evidence showed that respondent's alleged failure to perform his so-called
marital obligations was not at all a manifestation of some deep-seated, grave, permanent and incurable psychological malady. To
be sure, the couple's relationship before the marriage and even during their brief union (for well about a year or so) was not all bad.
During that relatively short period of time, petitioner was happy and contented with her life in the company of respondent. In fact,
by petitioner's own reckoning, respondent was a responsible and loving husband. x x x. Their problems began when petitioner
started doubting respondent's fidelity. It was only when they started fighting about the calls from women that respondent began to
withdraw into his shell and corner, and failed to perform his so-called marital obligations. Respondent could not understand
petitioner's lack of trust in him and her constant naggings. He thought her suspicions irrational. Respondent could not relate to her
anger, temper and jealousy. x x x.

At any rate, Dr. Dayan did not explain how she arrived at her diagnosis that respondent has a mixed personality disorder called
"schizoid," and why he is the "dependent and avoidant type." In fact, Dr. Dayan's statement that one suffering from such mixed
personality disorder is dependent on others for decision x x x lacks specificity; it seems to belong to the realm of theoretical
speculation. Also, Dr. Dayan's information that respondent had extramarital affairs was supplied by the petitioner herself. Notably,
when asked as to the root cause of respondent's alleged psychological incapacity, Dr. Dayan's answer was vague, evasive and
inconclusive. She replied that such disorder "can be part of his family upbringing" x x x. She stated that there was a history of
respondent's parents having difficulties in their relationship. But this input on the supposed problematic history of respondent's
parents also came from petitioner. Nor did Dr. Dayan clearly demonstrate that there was really "a natal or supervening disabling
factor" on the part of respondent, or an "adverse integral element" in respondent's character that effectively incapacitated him from
accepting, and, thereby complying with, the essential marital obligations. Of course, petitioner likewise failed to prove that
respondent's supposed psychological or mental malady existed even before the marriage. All these omissions must be held up
against petitioner, for the reason that upon her devolved the onus of establishing nullity of the marriage. Indeed, any doubt should
be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage and the indissolubility of the marital vinculum. 16

We find respondent's alleged mixed personality disorder, the "leaving-the-house" attitude whenever they quarreled, the violent
tendencies during epileptic attacks, the sexual infidelity, the abandonment and lack of support, and his preference to spend more
time with his band mates than his family, are not rooted on some debilitating psychological condition but a mere refusal or
unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage.

In Republic v. Court of Appeals,17 where therein respondent preferred to spend more time with his friends than his family on whom
he squandered his money, depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was dishonest to his wife regarding his finances, the
Court held that the psychological defects spoken of were more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the
performance of some marital obligations and that a mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities in no
wise constitute psychological incapacity; it is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as
married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological, not physical, illness.

Also, we held in Hernandez v. Court of Appeals18 that habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment do
not by themselves constitute grounds for declaring a marriage void based on psychological incapacity.

While petitioner's marriage with the respondent failed and appears to be without hope of reconciliation, the remedy however is not
always to have it declared void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity. An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a
null and void marriage.19 No less than the Constitution recognizes the sanctity of marriage and the unity of the family; it decrees
marriage as legally "inviolable" and protects it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be
"protected" by the state.20
Thus, in determining the import of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36, it must be read in conjunction with, although to be
taken as distinct from Articles 35,21 37,22 38,23 and 4124 that would likewise, but for different reasons, render the marriage void ab
initio, or Article 4525 that would make the marriage merely voidable, or Article 55 that could justify a petition for legal separation.
Care must be observed so that these various circumstances are not applied so indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent on the
matter.26 Article 36 should not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest
themselves.27 Neither it is to be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity
but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity,
abandonment and the like.28

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the motion for reconsideration of the Resolution dated June 9, 2004 denying the petition
for review on certiorari for failure of the petitioner to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals committed any reversible error,
is DENIED WITH FINALITY.

SO ORDERED.
[G.R. NO. 155800 : March 10, 2006]

LEONILO ANTONIO Petitioner, v. MARIE IVONNE F. REYES, Respondent.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

Statistics never lie, but lovers often do, quipped a sage. This sad truth has unsettled many a love transformed into matrimony. Any
sort of deception between spouses, no matter the gravity, is always disquieting. Deceit to the depth and breadth unveiled in the
following pages, dark and irrational as in the modern noir tale, dims any trace of certitude on the guilty spouse's capability to fulfill
the marital obligations even more.

The Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals dated 29 November 2001 and
24 October 2002. The Court of Appeals had reversed the judgment 3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati declaring the
marriage of Leonilo N. Antonio (petitioner) and Marie Ivonne F. Reyes (respondent), null and void. After careful consideration,
we reverse and affirm instead the trial court.

Antecedent Facts

Petitioner and respondent met in August 1989 when petitioner was 26 years old and respondent was 36 years of age. Barely a year
after their first meeting, they got married before a minister of the Gospel4 at the Manila City Hall, and through a subsequent church
wedding5 at the Sta. Rosa de Lima Parish, Bagong Ilog, Pasig, Metro Manila on 6 December 1990.6 Out of their union, a child was
born on 19 April 1991, who sadly died five (5) months later.

On 8 March 1993,7 petitioner filed a petition to have his marriage to respondent declared null and void. He anchored his petition
for nullity on Article 36 of the Family Code alleging that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage. He asserted that respondent's incapacity existed at the time their marriage was celebrated and still subsists
up to the present.8

As manifestations of respondent's alleged psychological incapacity, petitioner claimed that respondent persistently lied about
herself, the people around her, her occupation, income, educational attainment and other events or things, 9 to wit:

(1) She concealed the fact that she previously gave birth to an illegitimate son,10 and instead introduced the boy to petitioner as the
adopted child of her family. She only confessed the truth about the boy's parentage when petitioner learned about it from other
sources after their marriage.11

(2) She fabricated a story that her brother-in-law, Edwin David, attempted to rape and kill her when in fact, no such incident
occurred.12

(3) She misrepresented herself as a psychiatrist to her obstetrician, Dr. Consuelo Gardiner, and told some of her friends that she
graduated with a degree in psychology, when she was neither. 13

(4) She claimed to be a singer or a free-lance voice talent affiliated with Blackgold Recording Company (Blackgold); yet, not a
single member of her family ever witnessed her alleged singing activities with the group. In the same vein, she postulated that a
luncheon show was held at the Philippine Village Hotel in her honor and even presented an invitation to that effect 14 but petitioner
discovered per certification by the Director of Sales of said hotel that no such occasion had taken place. 15

(5) She invented friends named Babes Santos and Via Marquez, and under those names, sent lengthy letters to petitioner claiming
to be from Blackgold and touting her as the "number one moneymaker" in the commercial industry worth P2 million.16 Petitioner
later found out that respondent herself was the one who wrote and sent the letters to him when she admitted the truth in one of their
quarrels.17 He likewise realized that Babes Santos and Via Marquez were only figments of her imagination when he discovered
they were not known in or connected with Blackgold.18
(6) She represented herself as a person of greater means, thus, she altered her payslip to make it appear that she earned a higher
income. She bought a sala set from a public market but told petitioner that she acquired it from a famous furniture dealer. 19 She
spent lavishly on unnecessary items and ended up borrowing money from other people on false pretexts.20

(7) She exhibited insecurities and jealousies over him to the extent of calling up his officemates to monitor his whereabouts. When
he could no longer take her unusual behavior, he separated from her in August 1991. He tried to attempt a reconciliation but since
her behavior did not change, he finally left her for good in November 1991. 21

In support of his petition, petitioner presented Dr. Dante Herrera Abcede (Dr. Abcede), a psychiatrist, and Dr. Arnulfo V.

Lopez (Dr. Lopez), a clinical psychologist, who stated, based on the tests they conducted, that petitioner was essentially a normal,
introspective, shy and conservative type of person. On the other hand, they observed that respondent's persistent and constant lying

to petitioner was abnormal or pathological. It undermined the basic relationship that should be based on love, trust and
respect.22 They further asserted that respondent's extreme jealousy was also pathological. It reached the point of paranoia since
there was no actual basis for her to suspect that petitioner was having an affair with another woman. They concluded based on the
foregoing that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations. 23

In opposing the petition, respondent claimed that she performed her marital obligations by attending to all the needs of her husband.
She asserted that there was no truth to the allegation that she fabricated stories, told lies and invented personalities.24 She presented
her version, thus:

(1) She concealed her child by another man from petitioner because she was afraid of losing her husband.25

(2) She told petitioner about David's attempt to rape and kill her because she surmised such intent from David's act of touching her
back and ogling her from head to foot.26

(3) She was actually a BS Banking and Finance graduate and had been teaching psychology at the Pasig Catholic School for two
(2) years.27

(4) She was a free-lance voice talent of Aris de las Alas, an executive producer of Channel 9 and she had done three (3) commercials
with McCann Erickson for the advertisement of Coca-cola, Johnson & Johnson, and Traders Royal Bank. She told petitioner she
was a Blackgold recording artist although she was not under contract with the company, yet she reported to the Blackgold office
after office hours. She claimed that a luncheon show was indeed held in her honor at the Philippine Village Hotel on 8 December
1979.28

(5) She vowed that the letters sent to petitioner were not written by her and the writers thereof were not fictitious. Bea Marquez
Recto of the Recto political clan was a resident of the United States while Babes Santos was employed with Saniwares. 29

(6) She admitted that she called up an officemate of her husband but averred that she merely asked the latter in a diplomatic matter
if she was the one asking for chocolates from petitioner, and not to monitor her husband's whereabouts.30

(7) She belied the allegation that she spent lavishly as she supported almost ten people from her monthly budget of P7,000.00.31

In fine, respondent argued that apart from her non-disclosure of a child prior to their marriage, the other lies attributed to her by
petitioner were mostly hearsay and unconvincing. Her stance was that the totality of the evidence presented is not sufficient for a
finding of psychological incapacity on her part.32

In addition, respondent presented Dr. Antonio Efren Reyes (Dr. Reyes), a psychiatrist, to refute the allegations anent her
psychological condition. Dr. Reyes testified that the series of tests conducted by his assistant, 33 together with the screening
procedures and the Comprehensive Psycho-Pathological Rating Scale (CPRS) he himself conducted, led him to conclude that
respondent was not psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations. He postulated that regressive
behavior, gross neuroticism, psychotic tendencies, and poor control of impulses, which are signs that might point to the presence
of disabling trends, were not elicited from respondent.34
In rebuttal, Dr. Lopez asseverated that there were flaws in the evaluation conducted by Dr. Reyes as (i) he was not the one who
administered and interpreted respondent's psychological evaluation, and (ii) he made use of only one instrument called CPRS which
was not reliable because a good liar can fake the results of such test. 35

After trial, the lower court gave credence to petitioner's evidence and held that respondent's propensity to lying about almost
anything−her occupation, state of health, singing abilities and her income, among others−had been duly established. According
to the trial court, respondent's fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and personalities enabled her to live in a world of
make-believe. This made her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving meaning and significance to her
marriage.36 The trial court thus declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void.

Shortly before the trial court rendered its decision, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila annulled the Catholic
marriage of the parties, on the ground of lack of due discretion on the part of the parties. 37 During the pendency of the appeal before
the Court of Appeals, the Metropolitan Tribunal's ruling was affirmed with modification by both the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal, which held instead that only respondent was impaired by a lack of due discretion.38 Subsequently, the
decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal was upheld by the Roman Rota of the Vatican. 39

Petitioner duly alerted the Court of Appeals of these rulings by the Catholic tribunals. Still, the appellate court reversed the RTC's
judgment. While conceding that respondent may not have been completely honest with petitioner, the Court of Appeals nevertheless
held that the totality of the evidence presented was insufficient to establish respondent's psychological incapacity. It declared that
the requirements in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals40 governing the application and interpretation of psychological
incapacity had not been satisfied.

Taking exception to the appellate court's pronouncement, petitioner elevated the case to this Court. He contends herein that the
evidence conclusively establish respondent's psychological incapacity.

In considering the merit of this petition, the Court is heavily influenced by the credence accorded by the RTC to the factual
allegations of petitioner.41 It is a settled principle of civil procedure that the conclusions of the trial court regarding the credibility
of witnesses are entitled to great respect from the appellate courts because the trial court had an opportunity to observe the demeanor
of witnesses while giving testimony which may indicate their candor or lack thereof.42 The Court is likewise guided by the fact that
the Court of Appeals did not dispute the veracity of the evidence presented by petitioner. Instead, the appellate court concluded
that such evidence was not sufficient to establish the psychological incapacity of respondent. 43

Thus, the Court is impelled to accept the factual version of petitioner as the operative facts. Still, the crucial question remains as to
whether the state of facts as presented by petitioner sufficiently meets the standards set for the declaration of nullity of a marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code. These standards were definitively laid down in the Court's 1997 ruling in Republic v. Court
of Appeals44 (also known as the Molina case45 ), and indeed the Court of Appeals cited the Molina guidelines in reversing the RTC
in the case at bar.46 Since Molina was decided in 1997, the Supreme Court has yet to squarely affirm the declaration of nullity of
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.47 In fact, even before Molina was handed down, there was only one case, Chi Ming
Tsoi v. Court of Appeals,48 wherein the Court definitively concluded that a spouse was psychologically incapacitated under Article
36.

This state of jurisprudential affairs may have led to the misperception that the remedy afforded by Article 36 of the Family Code
is hollow, insofar as the Supreme Court is concerned.49 Yet what Molina and the succeeding cases did ordain was a set of guidelines
which, while undoubtedly onerous on the petitioner seeking the declaration of nullity, still leave room for a decree of nullity under
the proper circumstances. Molina did not foreclose the grant of a decree of nullity under Article 36, even as it raised the bar for its
allowance.

Legal Guides to Understanding Article 36

Article 36 of the Family Code states that "[a] marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization."50 The concept of psychological incapacity as a ground for nullity of
marriage is novel in our body of laws, although mental incapacity has long been recognized as a ground for the dissolution of a
marriage.
The Spanish Civil Code of 1889 prohibited from contracting marriage persons "who are not in the full enjoyment of their reason at
the time of contracting marriage."51 Marriages with such persons were ordained as void,52 in the same class as marriages with
underage parties and persons already married, among others. A party's mental capacity was not a ground for divorce under the
Divorce Law of 1917,53 but a marriage where "either party was of unsound mind" at the time of its celebration was cited as an
"annullable marriage" under the Marriage Law of 1929.54 Divorce on the ground of a spouse's incurable insanity was permitted
under the divorce law enacted during the Japanese occupation.55 Upon the enactment of the Civil Code in 1950, a marriage
contracted by a party of "unsound mind" was classified under Article 85 of the Civil Code as a voidable marriage. 56 The mental
capacity, or lack thereof, of the marrying spouse was not among the grounds for declaring a marriage void ab initio.57 Similarly,
among the marriages classified as voidable under Article 45 (2) of the Family Code is one contracted by a party of unsound mind.58

Such cause for the annulment of marriage is recognized as a vice of consent, just like insanity impinges on consent freely given
which is one of the essential requisites of a contract.59 The initial common consensus on psychological incapacity under Article 36
of the Family Code was that it did not constitute a specie of vice of consent. Justices Sempio-Diy and Caguioa, both members of
the Family Code revision committee that drafted the Code, have opined that psychological incapacity is not a vice of consent, and
conceded that the spouse may have given free and voluntary consent to a marriage but was nonetheless incapable of fulfilling such
rights and obligations.60 Dr. Tolentino likewise stated in the 1990 edition of his commentaries on the Family Code that this
"psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations does not affect the consent to the marriage." 61

There were initial criticisms of this original understanding of Article 36 as phrased by the Family Code committee. Tolentino
opined that "psychologically incapacity to comply would not be

juridically different from physical incapacity of consummating the marriage, which makes the marriage only voidable under Article
45 (5) of the Civil Code x x x [and thus] should have been a cause for annulment of the marriage only." 62 At the same time,
Tolentino noted "[it] would be different if it were psychological incapacity to understand the essential marital obligations, because
then this would amount to lack of consent to the marriage."63 These concerns though were answered, beginning with Santos v.
Court of Appeals,64 wherein the Court, through Justice Vitug, acknowledged that "psychological incapacity should refer to no less
than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly
must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage."65

The notion that psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the obligations of marriage, as opposed to a mere
inability to comply with them, was further affirmed in the Molina66 case. Therein, the Court, through then Justice (now Chief
Justice) Panganiban observed that "[t]he evidence [to establish psychological incapacity] must convince the court that the parties,
or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming,
or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereto."67 Jurisprudence since then has recognized that psychological
incapacity "is a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial
bond one is about to assume."68

It might seem that this present understanding of psychological incapacity deviates from the literal wording of Article 36, with its
central phase reading "psychologically incapacitated to comply

with the essential marital obligations of marriage."69 At the same time, it has been consistently recognized by this Court that the
intent of the Family Code committee was to design the law as to allow some resiliency in its application, by avoiding specific
examples that would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the preference of the
revision committee was for "the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, in the findings of
experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on

the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law."70

We likewise observed in Republic v. Dagdag:71

Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a marriage, depends crucially, more than
in any field of the law, on the facts of the case. Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations but according to its own facts. In regard to psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is
trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the
appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court. 72
The Court thus acknowledges that the definition of psychological incapacity, as intended by the revision committee, was not cast
in intractable specifics. Judicial understanding of psychological incapacity may be informed by evolving standards, taking into
account the particulars of each case, current trends in psychological and even canonical thought, and experience. It is under the
auspices of the deliberate ambiguity of the framers that the Court has developed the Molina rules, which have been consistently
applied since 1997. Molina has proven indubitably useful in providing a unitary framework that guides courts in adjudicating
petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the same time, the Molina guidelines are not set in stone, the clear legislative
intent mandating a case-to-case perception of each situation, and Molina itself arising from this evolutionary understanding of
Article 36. There is no cause to disavow Molina at present, and indeed the disposition of this case shall rely primarily on that
precedent. There is need though to emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of petitions for
declaration of nullity under Article 36.

Of particular notice has been the citation of the Court, first in Santos then in Molina, of the considered opinion of canon law experts
in the interpretation of psychological incapacity. This is but unavoidable, considering that the Family Code committee had bluntly
acknowledged that the concept of psychological incapacity was derived from canon law, 73 and as one member admitted, enacted
as a solution to the problem of marriages already annulled by the Catholic Church but still existent under civil law. 74 It would be
disingenuous to disregard the influence of Catholic Church doctrine in the formulation and subsequent understanding of Article
36, and the Court has expressly acknowledged that interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
local Church, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. 75 Still, it must be emphasized that the
Catholic Church is hardly the sole source of influence in the interpretation of Article 36. Even though the concept may have been
derived from canon law, its incorporation into the Family Code and subsequent judicial interpretation occurred in wholly secular
progression. Indeed, while Church thought on psychological incapacity is merely persuasive on the trial courts, judicial decisions
of this Court interpreting psychological incapacity are binding on lower courts. 76

Now is also opportune time to comment on another common legal guide utilized in the adjudication of petitions for declaration of
nullity under Article 36. All too frequently, this Court and lower courts, in denying petitions of the kind, have favorably cited
Sections 1 and 2, Article XV of the Constitution, which respectively state that "[t]he State recognizes the Filipino family as the
foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total developmen[t]," and that
"[m]arriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State." These provisions
highlight the importance of the family and the constitutional protection accorded to the institution of marriage.

But the Constitution itself does not establish the parameters of state protection to marriage as a social institution and the foundation
of the family. It remains the province of the legislature to define all legal aspects of marriage and prescribe the strategy and the
modalities to protect it, based on whatever socio-political influences it deems proper, and subject of course to the qualification that
such legislative enactment itself adheres to the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. This being the case, it also falls on the legislature
to put into operation the constitutional provisions that protect marriage and the family. This has been accomplished at present
through the enactment of the Family Code, which defines marriage and the family, spells out the corresponding legal effects,
imposes the limitations that affect married and family life, as well as prescribes the grounds for declaration of nullity and those for
legal separation. While it may appear that the judicial denial of a petition for declaration of nullity is reflective of the constitutional
mandate to protect marriage, such action in fact merely enforces a statutory definition of marriage, not a constitutionally ordained
decree of what marriage is. Indeed, if circumstances warrant, Sections 1 and 2 of Article XV need not be the only constitutional
considerations to be taken into account in resolving a petition for declaration of nullity.

Indeed, Article 36 of the Family Code, in classifying marriages contracted by a psychologically incapacitated person as a nullity,
should be deemed as an implement of this constitutional protection of marriage. Given the avowed State interest in promoting
marriage as the foundation of the family, which in turn serves as the foundation of the nation, there is a corresponding interest for
the State to defend against marriages ill-equipped to promote family life. Void ab initio marriages under Article 36 do not further
the initiatives of the State concerning marriage and family, as they promote wedlock among persons who, for reasons independent
of their will, are not capacitated to understand or comply with the essential obligations of marriage.

These are the legal premises that inform us as we decide the present petition.

Molina Guidelines As Applied in This Case

As stated earlier, Molina established the guidelines presently recognized in the judicial disposition of petitions for nullity under
Article 36. The Court has consistently applied Molina since its promulgation in 1997, and the guidelines therein operate as the
general rules. They warrant citation in full:
 1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved
in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted
in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family.
Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation."
It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties.
Both the family and marriage are to be "protected"' by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence,
inviolability and solidarity.
2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in
the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the
Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological not physical, although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally
or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or
knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need
be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis,
nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence
must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the
illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior
thereto.
4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability
may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone
of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not
necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a
pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but not
be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of
marriage.
5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations
of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts"
cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal,
neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the
person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from
really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and
their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence
and included in the text of the decision.
7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article
36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law,
which became effective in 1983 and which provides:

"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to
causes of psychological nature."

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our
people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate
tribunal. Ideally'subject to our law on evidence what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void. 77

Molina had provided for an additional requirement that the Solicitor General issue a certification stating his reasons for his
agreement or opposition to the petition.78 This requirement however was dispensed with following the implementation of A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC, or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages.79 Still,
Article 48 of the Family Code mandates that the appearance of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned be on behalf of the State
to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Obviously,
collusion is not an issue in this case, considering the consistent vigorous opposition of respondent to the petition for declaration of
nullity. In any event, the fiscal's participation in the hearings before the trial court is extant from the records of this case.
As earlier noted, the factual findings of the RTC are now deemed binding on this Court, owing to the great weight accorded to the
opinion of the primary trier of facts, and the refusal of the Court of Appeals to dispute the veracity of these facts. As such, it must
be considered that respondent had consistently lied about many material aspects as to her character and personality. The question
remains whether her pattern of fabrication sufficiently establishes her psychological incapacity, consistent with Article 36 and
generally, the Molina guidelines.

We find that the present case sufficiently satisfies the guidelines in Molina.

First. Petitioner had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving the psychological incapacity of his spouse. Apart from his own
testimony, he presented witnesses who corroborated his allegations on his wife's behavior, and certifications from Blackgold
Records and the Philippine Village Hotel Pavillon which disputed respondent's claims pertinent to her alleged singing career. He
also presented two (2) expert witnesses from the field of psychology who testified that the aberrant behavior of respondent was
tantamount to psychological incapacity. In any event, both courts below considered petitioner's evidence as credible enough. Even
the appellate court acknowledged that respondent was not totally honest with petitioner. 80

As in all civil matters, the petitioner in an action for declaration of nullity under Article 36 must be able to establish the cause of
action with a preponderance of evidence. However, since the action cannot be considered as a non-public matter between private
parties, but is impressed with State interest, the Family Code likewise requires the participation of the State, through the prosecuting
attorney, fiscal, or Solicitor General, to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not
fabricated or suppressed. Thus, even if the petitioner is able establish the psychological incapacity of respondent with preponderant
evidence, any finding of collusion among the parties would necessarily negate such proofs.

Second. The root cause of respondent's psychological incapacity has been medically or clinically identified, alleged in the
complaint, sufficiently proven by experts, and clearly explained in the trial court's decision. The initiatory complaint alleged that
respondent, from the start, had exhibited unusual and abnormal behavior "of peren[n]ially telling lies, fabricating ridiculous stories,
and inventing personalities and situations," of writing letters to petitioner using fictitious names, and of lying about her actual
occupation, income, educational attainment, and family background, among others. 81

These allegations, initially characterized in generalities, were further linked to medical or clinical causes by expert witnesses from
the field of psychology. Petitioner presented two (2) such witnesses in particular. Dr. Abcede, a psychiatrist who had headed the
department of psychiatry of at least two (2) major hospitals,82 testified as follows:

WITNESS:

Given that as a fact, which is only based on the affidavit provided to me, I can say that there are a couple of things that [are] terribly
wrong with the standards. There are a couple of things that seems (sic) to be repeated over and over again in the affidavit. One of
which is the persistent, constant and repeated lying of the "respondent"; which, I think, based on assessment of normal behavior of
an individual, is abnormal or pathological. x x x

ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)

Q - Would you say then, Mr. witness, that because of these actuations of the respondent she is then incapable of performing the
basic obligations of her marriage?cralawlibrary

A - Well, persistent lying violates the respect that one owes towards another. The lack of concern, the lack of love towards the
person, and it is also something that endangers human relationship. You see, relationship is based on communication between
individuals and what we generally communicate are our thoughts and feelings. But then when one talks and expresse[s] their
feelings, [you] are expected to tell the truth. And therefore, if you constantly lie, what do you think is going to happen as far as this
relationship is concerned. Therefore, it undermines that basic relationship that should be based on love, trust and respect.

Q - Would you say then, Mr. witness, that due to the behavior of the respondent in constantly lying and fabricating stories, she is
then incapable of performing the basic obligations of the marriage?

ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)

Q - Mr. witness, based on the testimony of Mr. Levy Mendoza, who is the third witness for the petitioner, testified that the
respondent has been calling up the petitioner's officemates and ask him (sic) on the activities of the petitioner and ask him on the
behavior of the petitioner. And this is specifically stated on page six (6) of the transcript of stenographic notes, what can you say
about this, Mr. witness?cralawlibrary

A - If an individual is jealous enough to the point that he is paranoid, which means that there is no actual basis on her suspect (sic)
that her husband is having an affair with a woman, if carried on to the extreme, then that is pathological. That is not abnormal. We
all feel jealous, in the same way as we also lie every now and then; but everything that is carried out in extreme is abnormal or
pathological. If there is no basis in reality to the fact that the husband is having an affair with another woman and if she persistently
believes that the husband is having an affair with different women, then that is pathological and we call that paranoid jealousy.

Q - Now, if a person is in paranoid jealousy, would she be considered psychologically incapacitated to perform the basic obligations
of the marriage?cralawlibrary

A - Yes, Ma'am.83

The other witness, Dr. Lopez, was presented to establish not only the psychological incapacity of respondent, but also the
psychological capacity of petitioner. He concluded that respondent "is [a] pathological liar, that [she continues] to lie [and] she
loves to fabricate about herself."84

These two witnesses based their conclusions of psychological incapacity on the case record, particularly the trial transcripts of
respondent's testimony, as well as the supporting affidavits of petitioner. While these witnesses did not personally examine
respondent, the Court had already held in Marcos v. Marcos85 that personal examination of the subject by the physician is not
required for the spouse to be declared psychologically incapacitated.86 We deem the methodology utilized by petitioner's witnesses
as sufficient basis for their medical conclusions. Admittedly, Drs. Abcede and Lopez's common conclusion of respondent's
psychological incapacity hinged heavily on their own acceptance of petitioner's version as the true set of facts. However, since the
trial court itself accepted the veracity of petitioner's factual premises, there is no cause to dispute the conclusion of psychological
incapacity drawn therefrom by petitioner's expert witnesses.

Also, with the totality of the evidence presented as basis, the trial court explicated its finding of psychological incapacity in its
decision in this wise:

To the mind of the Court, all of the above are indications that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential
obligations of marriage. It has been shown clearly from her actuations that respondent has that propensity for telling lies about
almost anything, be it her occupation, her state of health, her singing abilities, her income, etc. She has this fantastic ability to
invent and fabricate stories and personalities. She practically lived in a world of make believe making her therefore not in a position
to give meaning and significance to her marriage to petitioner. In persistently and constantly lying to petitioner, respondent
undermined the basic tenets of relationship between spouses that is based on love, trust and respect. As concluded by the psychiatrist
presented by petitioner, such repeated lying is abnormal and pathological and amounts to psychological incapacity.87

Third. Respondent's psychological incapacity was established to have clearly existed at the time of and even before the celebration
of marriage. She fabricated friends and made up letters from fictitious characters well before she married petitioner. Likewise, she
kept petitioner in the dark about her natural child's real parentage as she only confessed when the latter had found out the truth after
their marriage.

Fourth. The gravity of respondent's psychological incapacity is sufficient to prove her disability to assume the essential obligations
of marriage. It is immediately discernible that the parties had shared only a little over a year of cohabitation before the exasperated
petitioner left his wife. Whatever such circumstance speaks of the degree of tolerance of petitioner, it likewise supports the belief
that respondent's psychological incapacity, as borne by the record, was so grave in extent that any prolonged marital life was
dubitable.

It should be noted that the lies attributed to respondent were not adopted as false pretenses in order to induce petitioner into
marriage. More disturbingly, they indicate a failure on the part of respondent to distinguish truth from fiction, or at least abide by
the truth. Petitioner's witnesses and the trial court were emphatic on respondent's inveterate proclivity to telling lies and the
pathologic nature of her mistruths, which according to them, were revelatory of respondent's inability to understand and perform
the essential obligations of marriage. Indeed, a person unable to distinguish between fantasy and reality would similarly be unable
to comprehend the legal nature of the marital bond, much less its psychic meaning, and the corresponding obligations attached to
marriage, including parenting. One unable to adhere to reality cannot be expected to adhere as well to any legal or emotional
commitments.

The Court of Appeals somehow concluded that since respondent allegedly tried her best to effect a reconciliation, she had amply
exhibited her ability to perform her marital obligations. We are not convinced. Given the nature of her psychological condition, her
willingness to remain in the marriage hardly banishes nay extenuates her lack of capacity to fulfill the essential marital obligations.
Respondent's ability to even comprehend what the essential marital obligations are is impaired at best. Considering that the evidence
convincingly disputes respondent's ability to adhere to the truth, her avowals as to her commitment to the marriage cannot be
accorded much credence.

At this point, it is worth considering Article 45(3) of the Family Code which states that a marriage may be annulled if the consent
of either party was obtained by fraud, and Article 46 which enumerates the circumstances constituting fraud under the previous
article, clarifies that "no other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud
as will give grounds for action for the annulment of marriage." It would be improper to draw linkages between misrepresentations
made by respondent and the misrepresentations under Articles 45 (3) and 46. The fraud under Article 45(3) vitiates the consent of
the spouse who is lied to, and does not allude to vitiated consent of the lying spouse. In this case, the misrepresentations of
respondent point to her own inadequacy to cope with her marital obligations, kindred to psychological incapacity under Article 36.

Fifth. Respondent is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital obligations as embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the
Family Code. Article 68, in particular, enjoins the spouses to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render
mutual help and support. As noted by the trial court, it is difficult to see how an inveterate pathological liar would be able to commit
to the basic tenets of relationship between spouses based on love, trust and respect.

Sixth. The Court of Appeals clearly erred when it failed to take into consideration the fact that the marriage of the parties was
annulled by the Catholic Church. The appellate court apparently deemed this detail totally inconsequential as no reference was
made to it anywhere in the assailed decision despite petitioner's efforts to bring the matter to its attention. 88 Such deliberate
ignorance is in contravention of Molina, which held that interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of
the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.

As noted earlier, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila decreed the invalidity of the marriage in question in
a Conclusion89 dated 30 March 1995, citing the "lack of due discretion" on the part of respondent.90 Such decree of nullity was
affirmed by both the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal,91 and the Roman Rota of the Vatican.92 In fact, respondent's
psychological incapacity was considered so grave that a restrictive clause93 was appended to the sentence of nullity prohibiting
respondent from contracting another marriage without the Tribunal's consent.

In its Decision dated 4 June 1995, the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal pronounced:

The JURISRPRUDENCE in the Case maintains that matrimonial consent is considered ontologically defective and wherefore
judicially ineffective when elicited by a Part Contractant in possession and employ of a discretionary judgment faculty with a
perceptive vigor markedly inadequate for the practical understanding of the conjugal Covenant or serious impaired from the correct
appreciation of the integral significance and implications of the marriage vows.

The FACTS in the Case sufficiently prove with the certitude required by law that based on the depositions of the Partes in Causa
and premised on the testimonies of the Common and Expert Witnesse[s], the Respondent made the marriage option in tenure of
adverse personality constracts that were markedly antithetical to the substantive content and implications of the Marriage
Covenant, and that seriously undermined the integrality of her matrimonial consent in terms of its deliberative component. In
other words, afflicted with a discretionary faculty impaired in its practico-concrete judgment formation on account of an adverse
action and reaction pattern, the Respondent was impaired from eliciting a judicially binding matrimonial consent. There is no
sufficient evidence in the Case however to prove as well the fact of grave lack of due discretion on the part of the Petitioner. 94

Evidently, the conclusion of psychological incapacity was arrived at not only by the trial court, but also by canonical bodies. Yet,
we must clarify the proper import of the Church rulings annulling the marriage in this case. They hold sway since they are drawn
from a similar recognition, as the trial court, of the veracity of petitioner's allegations. Had the trial court instead appreciated
respondent's version as correct, and the appellate court affirmed such conclusion, the rulings of the Catholic Church on this matter
would have diminished persuasive value. After all, it is the factual findings of the judicial trier of facts, and not that of the canonical
courts, that are accorded significant recognition by this Court.

Seventh. The final point of contention is the requirement in Molina that such psychological incapacity be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. It was on this score that the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court, the appellate
court noting that it did not appear certain that respondent's condition was incurable and that Dr. Abcede did not testify to such
effect.95

Petitioner points out that one month after he and his wife initially separated, he returned to her, desiring to make their marriage
work. However, respondent's aberrant behavior remained unchanged, as she continued to lie, fabricate stories, and maintained her
excessive jealousy. From this fact, he draws the conclusion that respondent's condition is incurable.

From the totality of the evidence, can it be definitively concluded that respondent's condition is incurable? It would seem, at least,
that respondent's psychosis is quite grave, and a cure thereof a remarkable feat. Certainly, it would have been easier had petitioner's
expert witnesses characterized respondent's condition as incurable. Instead, they remained silent on whether the psychological
incapacity was curable or incurable.

But on careful examination, there was good reason for the experts' taciturnity on this point.

The petitioner's expert witnesses testified in 1994 and 1995, and the trial court rendered its decision on 10 August 1995. These
events transpired well before Molina was promulgated in 1997 and made explicit the requirement that the psychological incapacity
must be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such requirement was not expressly stated in Article 36 or
any other provision of the Family Code.

On the other hand, the Court in Santos, which was decided in January 1995, began its discussion by first citing the deliberations of
the Family Code committee,96 then the opinion of canonical scholars,97 before arriving at its formulation of the doctrinal definition
of psychological incapacity.98 Santos did refer to Justice Caguioa's opinion expressed during the deliberations that "psychological
incapacity is incurable,"99 and the view of a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Archdiocese of
Manila that psychological incapacity must be characterized "by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability."100 However, in formulating the doctrinal rule on psychological incapacity, the Court in Santos omitted any reference
to incurability as a characteristic of psychological incapacity.101

This disquisition is material as Santos was decided months before the trial court came out with its own ruling that remained silent
on whether respondent's psychological incapacity was incurable. Certainly, Santos did not clearly mandate that the incurability of
the psychological incapacity be established in an action for declaration of nullity. At least, there was no jurisprudential clarity at
the time of the trial of this case and the subsequent promulgation of the trial court's decision that required a medical finding of
incurability. Such requisite arose only with Molina in 1997, at a time when this case was on appellate review, or after the reception
of evidence.

We are aware that in Pesca v. Pesca,102 the Court countered an argument that Molina and Santos should not apply retroactively

with the observation that the interpretation or construction placed by the courts of a law constitutes a part of that law as of the date
the statute in enacted.103 Yet we approach this present case from utterly practical considerations. The requirement that psychological
incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable is one that necessarily cannot be divined without
expert opinion. Clearly in this case, there was no categorical averment from the expert witnesses that respondent's psychological
incapacity was curable or incurable simply because there was no legal necessity yet to elicit such a declaration and the appropriate
question was not accordingly propounded to him. If we apply Pesca without deep reflection, there would be undue prejudice to
those cases tried before Molina or Santos, especially those presently on appellate review, where presumably the respective
petitioners and their expert witnesses would not have seen the need to adduce a diagnosis of incurability. It may hold in those cases,
as in this case, that the psychological incapacity of a spouse is actually incurable, even if not pronounced as such at the trial court
level.

We stated earlier that Molina is not set in stone, and that the interpretation of Article 36 relies heavily on a case-to-case perception.
It would be insensate to reason to mandate in this case an expert medical or clinical diagnosis of incurability, since the parties
would have had no impelling cause to present evidence to that effect at the time this case was tried by the RTC more than ten (10)
years ago. From the totality of the evidence, we are sufficiently convinced that the incurability of respondent's psychological
incapacity has been established by the petitioner. Any lingering doubts are further dispelled by the fact that the Catholic Church
tribunals, which indubitably consider incurability as an integral requisite of psychological incapacity, were sufficiently convinced
that respondent was so incapacitated to contract marriage to the degree that annulment was warranted.

All told, we conclude that petitioner has established his cause of action for declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the Family
Code. The RTC correctly ruled, and the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court.

There is little relish in deciding this present petition, pronouncing as it does the marital bond as having been inexistent in the first
place. It is possible that respondent, despite her psychological state, remains in love with petitioner, as exhibited by her persistent
challenge to the petition for nullity. In fact, the appellate court placed undue emphasis on respondent's avowed commitment to
remain in the marriage. Yet the Court decides these cases on legal reasons and not vapid sentimentality. Marriage, in legal
contemplation, is more than the legitimatization of a desire of people in love to live together.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the RTC dated 10 August 1995, declaring the marriage between
petitioner and respondent NULL and VOID under Article 36 of the Family Code, is REINSTATED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
[G.R. NO. 173614 : September 28, 2007]

LOLITA D. ENRICO, Petitioner, v. HEIRS OF SPS. EULOGIO B. MEDINACELI AND TRINIDAD CATLI-MEDINACELI,
REPRESENTED BY VILMA M. ARTICULO, Respondents.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

The instant Petition for Certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure assails the Order, 1 dated 3 May 2006
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Aparri, Cagayan, Branch 6, in Civil Case No. II-4057, granting reconsideration of its
Order,2 dated 11 October 2005, and reinstating respondents' Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage.

On 17 March 2005, respondents, heirs of Spouses Eulogio B. Medinaceli (Eulogio) and Trinidad Catli-Medinaceli (Trinidad) filed
with the RTC, an action for declaration of nullity of marriage of Eulogio and petitioner Lolita D. Enrico. Substantially, the
complaint alleged, inter alia, that Eulogio and Trinidad were married on 14 June 1962, in Lal-lo, Cagayan.3 They begot seven
children, herein respondents, namely: Eduardo, Evelyn, Vilma, Mary Jane, Haizel, Michelle and Joseph Lloyd.4 On 1 May 2004,
Trinidad died.5 On 26 August 2004, Eulogio married petitioner before the Municipal Mayor of Lal-lo, Cagayan.6 Six months later,
or on 10 February 2005, Eulogio passed away.7

In impugning petitioner's marriage to Eulogio, respondents averred that the same was entered into without the requisite marriage
license. They argued that Article 348 of the Family Code, which exempts a man and a woman who have been living together for at
least five years without any legal impediment from securing a marriage license, was not applicable to petitioner and Eulogio because
they could not have lived together under the circumstances required by said provision. Respondents posited that the marriage of
Eulogio to Trinidad was dissolved only upon the latter's death, or on 1 May 2004, which was barely three months from the date of
marriage of Eulogio to petitioner. Therefore, petitioner and Eulogio could not have lived together as husband and wife for at least
five years. To further their cause, respondents raised the additional ground of lack of marriage ceremony due to Eulogio's serious
illness which made its performance impossible.

In her Answer, petitioner maintained that she and Eulogio lived together as husband and wife under one roof for 21 years openly
and publicly; hence, they were exempted from the requirement of a marriage license. From their union were born Elvin Enrico and
Marco Enrico, all surnamed Medinaceli, on 28 October 1988 and 30 October 1991, respectively. She further contended that the
marriage ceremony was performed in the Municipal Hall of Lal-lo, Cagayan, and solemnized by the Municipal Mayor. As an
affirmative defense, she sought the dismissal of the action on the ground that it is only the contracting parties while living who can
file an action for declaration of nullity of marriage.

On 11 October 2005, the RTC issued an Order,9 granting the dismissal of the Complaint for lack of cause of action. It cited A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC,10 dated 7 March 2003, promulgated by the Supreme Court En Banc as basis. The RTC elucidated on its position
in the following manner:

The Complaint should be dismissed.

1) Administrative Matter No. 02-11-10-SC promulgated by the Supreme Court which took effect on March 15, 2003 provides in
Section 2, par. (a)11 that a petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of a Void Marriage may be filed solely by the husband or
the wife. The language of this rule is plain and simple which states that such a petition may be filed solely by the husband or the
wife. The rule is clear and unequivocal that only the husband or the wife may file the petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity
of a Void Marriage. The reading of this Court is that the right to bring such petition is exclusive and this right solely belongs to
them. Consequently, the heirs of the deceased spouse cannot substitute their late father in bringing the action to declare the marriage
null and void.12 (Emphasis supplied.)

The dispositive portion of the Order, thus, reads:

WHEREFORE, [the] Motion to Dismiss raised as an affirmative defense in the answer is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the
Complaint filed by the [respondents] is hereby DISMISSED with costs de officio. 13
Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereof. Following the filing by petitioner of her Comment to the said motion, the
RTC rendered an Order14 dated 3 May 2006, reversing its Order of 11 October 2005. Hence, the RTC reinstated the complaint on
the ratiocination that the assailed Order ignored the ruling in Niñal v. Bayadog, 15 which was on the authority for holding that the
heirs of a deceased spouse have the standing to assail a void marriage even after the death of the latter. It held that Section 2(a) of
A.M. No. 02-11-20-SC, which provides that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by
the husband or the wife, applies only where both parties to a void marriage are still living. 16 Where one or both parties are deceased,
the RTC held that the heirs may file a petition to declare the marriage void. The RTC expounded on its stance, thus:

The questioned Order disregarded the case of Niñal v. Bayadog, 328 SCRA 122 (March 14, 2000) in which the Supreme Court,
First Division, held that the heirs of a deceased person may file a petition for the declaration of his marriage after his death. The
Order subject of this motion for reconsideration held that the case of Niñal v. Bayadog is now superseded by the new Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriages (hereinafter referred to as the Rule) because the Supreme Court has rejected the case
of Niñal v. Bayadog by approving the Rule on Nullity of Void Marriages. The Order further held that it is only the husband or the
wife who is (sic) the only parties allowed to file an action for declaration of nullity of their marriage and such right is purely
personal and is not transmissible upon the death of the parties.

It is admitted that there seems to be a conflict between the case of Niñal v. Bayadog and Section 2(a) of the Rule. In view of this,
the Court shall try to reconcile the case of Niñal v. Bayadog and the Rule. To reconcile, the Court will have to determine [the] basic
rights of the parties. The rights of the legitimate heirs of a person who entered into a void marriage will be prejudiced particularly
with respect to their successional rights. During the lifetime of the parent[,] the heirs have only an inchoate right over the property
of the said parents. Hence, during the lifetime of the parent, it would be proper that it should solely be the parent who should be
allowed to file a petition to declare his marriage void. However, upon the death of the parent his heirs have already a vested right
over whatever property left by the parent. Such vested right should not be frustrated by any rules of procedure such as the Rule.
Rules of Procedure cannot repeal rights granted by substantive law. The heirs, then, have a legal standing in Court.

If the heirs are prohibited from questioning the void marriage entered by their parent, especially when the marriage is illegal and
feloniously entered into, it will give premium to such union because the guilty parties will seldom, if ever at all, ask for the
annulment of the marriage. Such void marriage will be given a semblance of validity if the heirs will not be allowed to file the
petition after the death of the parent.

For these reasons, this Court believes that Sec. 2(a) of the Rules on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriage is applicable only
when both parties to a (sic) void marriage are still living. Upon the death of anyone of the guilty party to the void marriage, his
heirs may file a petition to declare the the (sic) marriage void, but the Rule is not applicable as it was not filed b the husband or the
wife. It shall be the ordinary rule of civil procedure which shall be applicable. 17

Perforce, the decretal portion of the RTC Order of 3 May 2006 states:

In view of the foregoing, the Court grants the motion for reconsideration dated October 31, 2005 and reinstate this case.18

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing Order; however, on 1 June 2006, the RTC denied the
said motion on the ground that no new matter was raised therein.19

Hence, the instant Petition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on the sole question of whether the case law as
embodied in Niñal, or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, as
specified in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC of the Supreme Court applies to the case at bar.

At the outset, we note that petitioner took an abbreviated route to this Court, countenancing the hierarchy of courts.

We have earlier emphasized that while the Supreme Court has the concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the RTCs
(for writs enforceable within their respective regions), to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition or certiorari, the litigants are well
advised against taking a direct recourse to this Court.20 Instead, they should initially seek the proper relief from the lower courts.
As a court of last resort, this Court should not be burdened with the task of dealing with causes in the first instance. Where the
issuance of an extraordinary writ is concurrently within the competence of the Court of Appeals or the RTC, litigants must observe
the principle of hierarchy of courts.21 However, it cannot be gainsaid that this Court has the discretionary power to brush aside
procedural lapses if compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues raised, warrant the immediate exercise of its
jurisdiction.22 Moreover, notwithstanding the dismissibility of the instant Petition for its failure to observe the doctrine on the
hierarchy of courts, this Court will proceed to entertain the case grounded as it is on a pure question of law.

Petitioner maintains that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC governs the instant case. A contrario, respondents posit that it is Niñal which is
applicable, whereby the heirs of the deceased person were granted the right to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage after his death.

We grant the Petition.

In reinstating respondents' Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion.

While it is true that Niñal in no uncertain terms allowed therein petitioners to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of their
father's marriage to therein respondent after the death of their father, we cannot, however, apply its ruling for the reason that the
impugned marriage therein was solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. The Court in Niñal recognized that the
applicable law to determine the validity of the two marriages involved therein is the Civil Code, which was the law in effect at the
time of their celebration.23 What we have before us belongs to a different milieu, i.e., the marriage sought to be declared void was
entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code. As can be gleaned from the facts, petitioner's marriage to Eulogio was
celebrated in 2004.ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC is explicit in its scope, to wit:

Section 1. Scope. - This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages and annulment of voidable
marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines.

The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily. (Emphasis supplied.)

The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for doubt. The coverage extends only to those marriages entered
into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on 3 August 1988. 24

Moreover, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC took effect on 15 March 2003, following its publication in a newspaper of general circulation.
Thus, contrary to the opinion of the RTC, there is no need to reconcile the provisions of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC with the ruling in
Niñal, because they vary in scope and application. As has been emphasized, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC covers marriages under the
Family Code of the Philippines, and is prospective in its application. The marriage of petitioner to Eulogio was celebrated on 26
August 2004, and it squarely falls within the ambit of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.

Hence, in resolving the issue before us, we resort to Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which provides:

Section 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.'

(a) Who may file. - A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. (n)
(Emphasis supplied.)

There is no ambiguity in the Rule. Absolute sententil expositore non indiget. When the language of the law is clear, no explanation
of it is required. Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, makes it the sole right of the husband or the wife to file a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage.

The Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal
Separation and Provisional Orders explicates on Section 2(a) in the following manner, viz:

1. Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file petitions for annulment of voidable marriages and declaration of absolute nullity
of void marriages. Such petitions cannot be filed by the compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. [Section 2;
Section 3, paragraph a]
Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidable marriages or declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The Committee is of
the belief that they do not have a legal right to file the petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the
death of their predecessor, and hence can only question the validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the death of a spouse in a
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of the
State is to preserve marriage and not to seek its dissolution.25 (Emphasis supplied.)

Respondents clearly have no cause of action before the court a quo. Nonetheless, all is not lost for respondents. While A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the
wife, it does not mean that the compulsory or intestate heirs are already without any recourse under the law. They can still protect
their successional right, for, as stated in the Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal Separation and Provisional Orders, compulsory or intestate heirs can still question the
validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity, but upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding
for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. Civil Case No. II-4057 filed before the Regional Trial Court of Aparri, Cagayan, Branch
6, is ORDERED DISMISSED without prejudice to challenging the validity of the marriage of Lolita D. Enrico to Eulogio B.
Medinaceli in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the latter. No costs.

SO ORDERE
G.R. No. 179922 December 16, 2008

JUAN DE DIOS CARLOS, petitioner,

vs.
FELICIDAD SANDOVAL, also known as FELICIDAD S. VDA. DE CARLOS or FELICIDAD SANDOVAL CARLOS or
FELICIDAD SANDOVAL VDA. DE CARLOS, and TEOFILO CARLOS II, respondents.

DECISION

REYES, R.T., J.:

ONLY a spouse can initiate an action to sever the marital bond for marriages solemnized during the effectivity of the Family Code,
except cases commenced prior to March 15, 2003. The nullity and annulment of a marriage cannot be declared in a judgment on
the pleadings, summary judgment, or confession of judgment.

We pronounce these principles as We review on certiorari the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) which reversed and set aside
the summary judgment2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in an action for declaration of nullity of marriage, status of a child,
recovery of property, reconveyance, sum of money, and damages.

The Facts

The events that led to the institution of the instant suitare unveiled as follows:

Spouses Felix B. Carlos and Felipa Elemia died intestate. They left six parcels of land to their compulsory heirs, Teofilo Carlos
and petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos. The lots are particularly described as follows:

Parcel No. 1

Lot No. 162 of the MUNTINLUPA ESTATE SUBDIVISION, Case No. 6137 of the Court of Land Registration.

Exemption from the provisions of Article 567 of the Civil Code is specifically reserved.

Area: 1 hectare, 06 ares, 07 centares.

Parcel No. 2

A parcel of land (Lot No. 159-B), being a portion of Lot 159, situated in the Bo. of Alabang, Municipality of Muntinlupa, Province
of Rizal, x x x containing an area of Thirteen Thousand Four Hundred Forty One (13,441) square meters.

Parcel No. 3

A parcel of land (Lot 159-B-2 of the subd. plan [LRC] Psd-325903, approved as a non-subd. project), being a portion of Lot 159-
B [LRC] Psd- Alabang, Mun. of Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, Island of Luzon. Bounded on the NE, points 2 to 4 by Lot 155,
Muntinlupa Estate; on the SE, point 4 to 5 by Lot 159-B-5; on the S, points 5 to 1 by Lot 159-B-3; on the W, points 1 to 2 by Lot
159-B-1 (Road widening) all of the subd. plan, containing an area of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY (130) SQ. METERS, more or
less.

PARCEL No. 4

A parcel of land (Lot 28-C of the subd. plan Psd-13-007090, being a portion of Lot 28, Muntinlupa Estate, L.R.C. Rec. No. 6137),
situated in the Bo. of Alabang, Mun. of Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. Bounded on the NE, along lines 1-2 by Lot 27, Muntinlupa
Estate; on the East & SE, along lines 2 to 6 by Mangangata River; and on the West., along line 6-1, by Lot 28-B of the subd. plan
x x x containing an area of ONE THUSAND AND SEVENTY-SIX (1,076) SQUARE METERS.
PARCEL No. 5

PARCELA DE TERRENO No. 50, Manzana No. 18, de la subd. de Solocan. Linda por el NW, con la parcela 49; por el NE, con
la parcela 36; por el SE, con la parcela 51; y por el SW, con la calle Dos Castillas. Partiendo de un punto marcado 1 en el plano, el
cual se halla a S. gds. 01'W, 72.50 mts. Desde el punto 1 de esta manzana, que es un mojon de concreto de la Ciudad de Manila,
situado on el esquina E. que forman las Calles Laong Laan y Dos. Castillas, continiendo un extension superficial de CIENTO
CINCUENTA (150) METROS CUADRADOS.

PARCEL No. 6

PARCELA DE TERRENO No. 51, Manzana No. 18, de la subd. De Solocon. Linda por el NW, con la parcela 50; por el NE, con
la parcela 37; por el SE, con la parcela 52; por el SW, con la Calle Dos Castillas. Partiendo de un punto Marcado 1 en el plano, el
cual se halla at S. 43 gds. 01'E, 82.50 mts. Desde el punto 1 de esta manzana, que es un mojon de concreto de la Ciudad de Manila,
situado on el esquina E. que forman las Calles Laong Laan y Dos. Castillas, continiendo una extension superficial de CIENTO
CINCUENTA (150) METROS CUADRADOS.3

During the lifetime of Felix Carlos, he agreed to transfer his estate to Teofilo. The agreement was made in order to avoid the
payment of inheritance taxes. Teofilo, in turn, undertook to deliver and turn over the share of the other legal heir, petitioner Juan
De Dios Carlos.

Eventually, the first three (3) parcels of land were transferred and registered in the name of Teofilo. These three (3) lots are now
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 234824 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City; TCT No. 139061 issued
by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City; and TCT No. 139058 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City.

Parcel No. 4 was registered in the name of petitioner. The lot is now covered by TCT No. 160401 issued by the Registry of Deeds
of Makati City.

On May 13, 1992, Teofilo died intestate. He was survived by respondents Felicidad and their son, Teofilo Carlos II (Teofilo II).
Upon Teofilo's death, Parcel Nos. 5 & 6 were registered in the name of respondent Felicidad and co-respondent, Teofilo II. The
said two (2) parcels of land are covered by TCT Nos. 219877 and 210878, respectively, issued by the Registry of Deeds of Manila.

In 1994, petitioner instituted a suit against respondents before the RTC in Muntinlupa City, docketed as Civil Case No. 94-1964.
In the said case, the parties submitted and caused the approval of a partial compromise agreement. Under the compromise, the
parties acknowledged their respective shares in the proceeds from the sale of a portion of the first parcel of land. This includes the
remaining 6,691-square-meter portion of said land.

On September 17, 1994, the parties executed a deed of extrajudicial partition, dividing the remaining land of the first parcel between
them.

Meanwhile, in a separate case entitled Rillo v. Carlos,4 2,331 square meters of the second parcel of land were adjudicated in favor
of plaintiffs Rillo. The remaining 10,000-square meter portion was later divided between petitioner and respondents.

The division was incorporated in a supplemental compromise agreement executed on August 17, 1994, with respect to Civil Case
No. 94-1964. The parties submitted the supplemental compromise agreement, which was approved accordingly.

Petitioner and respondents entered into two more contracts in August 1994. Under the contracts, the parties equally divided between
them the third and fourth parcels of land.

In August 1995, petitioner commenced an action, docketed as Civil Case No. 95-135, against respondents before the court a
quo with the following causes of action: (a) declaration of nullity of marriage; (b) status of a child; (c) recovery of property; (d)
reconveyance; and (e) sum of money and damages. The complaint was raffled to Branch 256 of the RTC in Muntinlupa.

In his complaint, petitioner asserted that the marriage between his late brother Teofilo and respondent Felicidad was a nullity in
view of the absence of the required marriage license. He likewise maintained that his deceased brother was neither the natural nor
the adoptive father of respondent Teofilo Carlos II.
Petitioner likewise sought the avoidance of the contracts he entered into with respondent Felicidad with respect to the subject real
properties. He also prayed for the cancellation of the certificates of title issued in the name of respondents. He argued that the
properties covered by such certificates of title, including the sums received by respondents as proceeds, should be reconveyed to
him.

Finally, petitioner claimed indemnification as and by way of moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees, litigation expenses,
and costs of suit.

On October 16, 1995, respondents submitted their answer. They denied the material averments of petitioner's complaint.
Respondents contended that the dearth of details regarding the requisite marriage license did not invalidate Felicidad's marriage to
Teofilo. Respondents declared that Teofilo II was the illegitimate child of the deceased Teofilo Carlos with another woman.

On the grounds of lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, respondents prayed for the dismissal of
the case before the trial court. They also asked that their counterclaims for moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's
fees, be granted.

But before the parties could even proceed to pre-trial, respondents moved for summary judgment. Attached to the motion was the
affidavit of the justice of the peace who solemnized the marriage. Respondents also submitted the Certificate of Live Birth of
respondent Teofilo II. In the certificate, the late Teofilo Carlos and respondent Felicidad were designated as parents.

On January 5, 1996, petitioner opposed the motion for summary judgment on the ground of irregularity of the contract evidencing
the marriage. In the same breath, petitioner lodged his own motion for summary judgment. Petitioner presented a certification from
the Local Civil Registrar of Calumpit, Bulacan, certifying that there is no record of birth of respondent Teofilo II.

Petitioner also incorporated in the counter-motion for summary judgment the testimony of respondent Felicidad in another case.
Said testimony was made in Civil Case No. 89-2384, entitled Carlos v. Gorospe, before the RTC Branch 255, Las Piñas. In her
testimony, respondent Felicidad narrated that co-respondent Teofilo II is her child with Teofilo.5

Subsequently, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa submitted to the trial court its report and manifestation, discounting
the possibility of collusion between the parties.

RTC and CA Dispositions

On April 8, 1996, the RTC rendered judgment, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, defendant's (respondent's) Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby denied. Plaintiff's
(petitioner's) Counter-Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby granted and summary judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
plaintiff as follows:

1. Declaring the marriage between defendant Felicidad Sandoval and Teofilo Carlos solemnized at Silang, Cavite on May 14, 1962,
evidenced by the Marriage Certificate submitted in this case, null and void ab initio for lack of the requisite marriage license;

2. Declaring that the defendant minor, Teofilo S. Carlos II, is not the natural, illegitimate, or legally adopted child of the late Teofilo
E. Carlos;

3. Ordering defendant Sandoval to pay and restitute to plaintiff the sum of P18,924,800.00 together with the interest thereon at the
legal rate from date of filing of the instant complaint until fully paid;

4. Declaring plaintiff as the sole and exclusive owner of the parcel of land, less the portion adjudicated to plaintiffs in Civil Case
No. 11975, covered by TCT No. 139061 of the Register of Deeds of Makati City, and ordering said Register of Deeds to cancel
said title and to issue another title in the sole name of plaintiff herein;
5. Declaring the Contract, Annex "K" of complaint, between plaintiff and defendant Sandoval null and void, and ordering the
Register of Deeds of Makati City to cancel TCT No. 139058 in the name of Teofilo Carlos, and to issue another title in the sole
name of plaintiff herein;

6. Declaring the Contract, Annex M of the complaint, between plaintiff and defendant Sandoval null and void;

7. Ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 210877 in the names of defendant Sandoval and defendant minor Teofilo S. Carlos II and
ordering the Register of Deeds of Manila to issue another title in the exclusive name of plaintiff herein;

8. Ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 210878 in the name of defendant Sandoval and defendant Minor Teofilo S. Carlos II and
ordering the Register of Deeds of Manila to issue another title in the sole name of plaintiff herein.

Let this case be set for hearing for the reception of plaintiff's evidence on his claim for moral damages, exemplary damages,
attorney's fees, appearance fees, and litigation expenses on June 7, 1996 at 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon.

SO ORDERED.6

Dissatisfied, respondents appealed to the CA. In the appeal, respondents argued, inter alia, that the trial court acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction in rendering summary judgment annulling the marriage of Teofilo, Sr. and Felicidad and in declaring Teofilo
II as not an illegitimate child of Teofilo, Sr.

On October 15, 2002, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC ruling, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, the summary judgment appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and in lieu thereof, a new one is entered
REMANDING the case to the court of origin for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.7

The CA opined:

We find the rendition of the herein appealed summary judgment by the court a quo contrary to law and public policy as ensconced
in the aforesaid safeguards. The fact that it was appellants who first sought summary judgment from the trial court, did not justify
the grant thereof in favor of appellee. Not being an action "to recover upon a claim" or "to obtain a declaratory relief," the rule on
summary judgment apply (sic) to an action to annul a marriage. The mere fact that no genuine issue was presented and the desire
to expedite the disposition of the case cannot justify a misinterpretation of the rule. The first paragraph of Article 88 and 101 of the
Civil Code expressly prohibit the rendition of decree of annulment of a marriage upon a stipulation of facts or a confession of
judgment. Yet, the affidavits annexed to the petition for summary judgment practically amount to these methods explicitly
proscribed by the law.

We are not unmindful of appellee's argument that the foregoing safeguards have traditionally been applied to prevent collusion of
spouses in the matter of dissolution of marriages and that the death of Teofilo Carlos on May 13, 1992 had effectively dissolved
the marriage herein impugned. The fact, however, that appellee's own brother and appellant Felicidad Sandoval lived together as
husband and wife for thirty years and that the annulment of their marriage is the very means by which the latter is sought to be
deprived of her participation in the estate left by the former call for a closer and more thorough inquiry into the circumstances
surrounding the case. Rather that the summary nature by which the court a quo resolved the issues in the case, the rule is to the
effect that the material facts alleged in the complaint for annulment of marriage should always be proved. Section 1, Rule 19 of the
Revised Rules of Court provides:

"Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. - Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of
the adverse party's pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. But in actions for annulment
of marriage or for legal separation, the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved." (Underscoring supplied)

Moreover, even if We were to sustain the applicability of the rules on summary judgment to the case at bench, Our perusal of the
record shows that the finding of the court a quo for appellee would still not be warranted. While it may be readily conceded that a
valid marriage license is among the formal requisites of marriage, the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant
to Article 80(3) in relation to Article 58 of the Civil Code the failure to reflect the serial number of the marriage license on the
marriage contract evidencing the marriage between Teofilo Carlos and appellant Felicidad Sandoval, although irregular, is not as
fatal as appellee represents it to be. Aside from the dearth of evidence to the contrary, appellant Felicidad Sandoval's affirmation
of the existence of said marriage license is corroborated by the following statement in the affidavit executed by Godofredo Fojas,
then Justice of the Peace who officiated the impugned marriage, to wit:

"That as far as I could remember, there was a marriage license issued at Silang, Cavite on May 14, 1962 as basis of the said marriage
contract executed by Teofilo Carlos and Felicidad Sandoval, but the number of said marriage license was inadvertently not placed
in the marriage contract for the reason that it was the Office Clerk who filled up the blanks in the Marriage Contract who in turn,
may have overlooked the same."

Rather than the inferences merely drawn by the trial court, We are of the considered view that the veracity and credibility of the
foregoing statement as well as the motivations underlying the same should be properly threshed out in a trial of the case on the
merits.

If the non-presentation of the marriage contract - the primary evidence of marriage - is not proof that a marriage did not take place,
neither should appellants' non-presentation of the subject marriage license be taken as proof that the same was not procured. The
burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage, it must be emphasized, rests upon the plaintiff and any doubt should be resolved
in favor of the validity of the marriage.

Considering that the burden of proof also rests on the party who disputes the legitimacy of a particular party, the same may be said
of the trial court's rejection of the relationship between appellant Teofilo Carlos II and his putative father on the basis of the
inconsistencies in appellant Felicidad Sandoval's statements. Although it had effectively disavowed appellant's prior claims
regarding the legitimacy of appellant Teofilo Carlos II, the averment in the answer that he is the illegitimate son of appellee's
brother, to Our mind, did not altogether foreclose the possibility of the said appellant's illegitimate filiation, his right to prove the
same or, for that matter, his entitlement to inheritance rights as such.

Without trial on the merits having been conducted in the case, We find appellee's bare allegation that appellant Teofilo Carlos II
was merely purchased from an indigent couple by appellant Felicidad Sandoval, on the whole, insufficient to support what could
well be a minor's total forfeiture of the rights arising from his putative filiation. Inconsistent though it may be to her previous
statements, appellant Felicidad Sandoval's declaration regarding the illegitimate filiation of Teofilo Carlos II is more credible when
considered in the light of the fact that, during the last eight years of his life, Teofilo Carlos allowed said appellant the use of his
name and the shelter of his household. The least that the trial court could have done in the premises was to conduct a trial on the
merits in order to be able to thoroughly resolve the issues pertaining to the filiation of appellant Teofilo Carlos II.8

On November 22, 2006, petitioner moved for reconsideration and for the inhibition of the ponente, Justice Rebecca De Guia-
Salvador. The CA denied the twin motions.

Issues

In this petition under Rule 45, petitioner hoists the following issues:

1. That, in reversing and setting aside the Summary Judgment under the Decision, Annex A hereof, and in denying petitioner's
Motion for reconsideration under the Resolution, Annex F hereof, with respect to the nullity of the impugned marriage, petitioner
respectfully submits that the Court of Appeals committed a grave reversible error in applying Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code,
despite the fact that the circumstances of this case are different from that contemplated and intended by law, or has otherwise
decided a question of substance not theretofore decided by the Supreme Court, or has decided it in a manner probably not in accord
with law or with the applicable decisions of this Honorable Court;

2. That in setting aside and reversing the Summary Judgment and, in lieu thereof, entering another remanding the case to the court
of origin for further proceedings, petitioner most respectfully submits that the Court of Appeals committed a serious reversible error
in applying Section 1, Rule 19 (now Section 1, Rule 34) of the Rules of Court providing for judgment on the pleadings, instead of
Rule 35 governing Summary Judgments;
3. That in reversing and setting aside the Summary Judgment and, in lieu thereof, entering another remanding the case to the court
of origin for further proceedings, petitioner most respectfully submits that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of
discretion, disregarded judicial admissions, made findings on ground of speculations, surmises, and conjectures, or otherwise
committed misapplications of the laws and misapprehension of the facts.9 (Underscoring supplied)

Essentially, the Court is tasked to resolve whether a marriage may be declared void ab initio through a judgment on the pleadings
or a summary judgment and without the benefit of a trial. But there are other procedural issues, including the capacity of one who
is not a spouse in bringing the action for nullity of marriage.

Our Ruling

I. The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage must be proved. Neither judgment on the pleadings nor
summary judgment is allowed. So is confession of judgment disallowed.

Petitioner faults the CA in applying Section 1, Rule 19 10 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides:

SECTION 1. Judgment on the pleadings. - Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations
of the adverse party's pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. But in actions for
annulment of marriage or for legal separation, the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved.

He argues that the CA should have applied Rule 35 of the Rules of Court governing summary judgment, instead of the rule on
judgment on the pleadings.

Petitioner is misguided. The CA did not limit its finding solely within the provisions of the Rule on judgment on the pleadings. In
disagreeing with the trial court, the CA likewise considered the provisions on summary judgments, to wit:

Moreover, even if We are to sustain the applicability of the rules on summary judgment to the case at bench, Our perusal of the
record shows that the finding of the court a quo for appellee would still not be warranted. x x x11

But whether it is based on judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment, the CA was correct in reversing the summary judgment
rendered by the trial court. Both the rules on judgment on the pleadings and summary judgments have no place in cases of
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage and even in annulment of marriage.

With the advent of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, known as "Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment
of Voidable Marriages," the question on the application of summary judgments or even judgment on the pleadings in cases of
nullity or annulment of marriage has been stamped with clarity. The significant principle laid down by the said Rule, which took
effect on March 15, 200312 is found in Section 17, viz.:

SEC. 17. Trial. - (1) The presiding judge shall personally conduct the trial of the case. No delegation of evidence to a commissioner
shall be allowed except as to matters involving property relations of the spouses.

(2) The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of marriage must be proved. No judgment on the pleadings,
summary judgment, or confession of judgment shall be allowed. (Underscoring supplied)

Likewise instructive is the Court's pronouncement in Republic v. Sandiganbayan.13 In that case, We excluded actions for nullity or
annulment of marriage from the application of summary judgments.

Prescinding from the foregoing discussion, save for annulment of marriage or declaration of its nullity or for legal separation,
summary judgment is applicable to all kinds of actions.14 (Underscoring supplied)

By issuing said summary judgment, the trial court has divested the State of its lawful right and duty to intervene in the case. The
participation of the State is not terminated by the declaration of the public prosecutor that no collusion exists between the parties.
The State should have been given the opportunity to present controverting evidence before the judgment was rendered.15
Both the Civil Code and the Family Code ordain that the court should order the prosecuting attorney to appear and intervene for
the State. It is at this stage when the public prosecutor sees to it that there is no suppression of evidence. Concomitantly, even if
there is no suppression of evidence, the public prosecutor has to make sure that the evidence to be presented or laid down before
the court is not fabricated.

To further bolster its role towards the preservation of marriage, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
reiterates the duty of the public prosecutor, viz.:

SEC. 13. Effect of failure to appear at the pre-trial. - (a) x x x

(b) x x x If there is no collusion, the court shall require the public prosecutor to intervene for the State during the trial on the merits
to prevent suppression or fabrication of evidence. (Underscoring supplied)

Truly, only the active participation of the public prosecutor or the Solicitor General will ensure that the interest of the State is
represented and protected in proceedings for declaration of nullity of marriages by preventing the fabrication or suppression of
evidence.16

II. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or wife. Exceptions: (1)
Nullity of marriage cases commenced before the effectivity of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and (2) Marriages celebrated during
the effectivity of the Civil Code.

Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, the petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may not be filed by any party outside of the marriage. The Rule made it exclusively a
right of the spouses by stating:

SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. -

(a) Who may file. - A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife.
(Underscoring supplied)

Section 2(a) of the Rule makes it the sole right of the husband or the wife to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriage. The rationale of the Rule is enlightening, viz.:

Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidable marriages or declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The Committee is of
the belief that they do not have a legal right to file the petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the
death of their predecessor, and, hence, can only question the validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the death of a spouse in
a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of
the State is to preserve marriage and not to seek its dissolution.17 (Underscoring supplied)

The new Rule recognizes that the husband and the wife are the sole architects of a healthy, loving, peaceful marriage. They are the
only ones who can decide when and how to build the foundations of marriage. The spouses alone are the engineers of their marital
life. They are simultaneously the directors and actors of their matrimonial true-to-life play. Hence, they alone can and should decide
when to take a cut, but only in accordance with the grounds allowed by law.

The innovation incorporated in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC sets forth a demarcation line between marriages covered by the Family
Code and those solemnized under the Civil Code. The Rule extends only to marriages entered into during the effectivity of the
Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988.18

The advent of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages marks the beginning of the end of the right of the
heirs of the deceased spouse to bring a nullity of marriage case against the surviving spouse. But the Rule never intended to deprive
the compulsory or intestate heirs of their successional rights.

While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may be filed solely by the
husband or the wife, it does not mean that the compulsory or intestate heirs are without any recourse under the law. They can still
protect their successional right, for, as stated in the Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration
of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, compulsory or intestate heirs can still question the validity of the marriage of the spouses,
not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity but upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased spouse filed in the regular courts.19

It is emphasized, however, that the Rule does not apply to cases already commenced before March 15, 2003 although the marriage
involved is within the coverage of the Family Code. This is so, as the new Rule which became effective on March 15, 2003 20 is
prospective in its application. Thus, the Court held in Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli,21 viz.:

As has been emphasized, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC covers marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines, and is prospective in
its application.22 (Underscoring supplied)

Petitioner commenced the nullity of marriage case against respondent Felicidad in 1995. The marriage in controversy was
celebrated on May 14, 1962. Which law would govern depends upon when the marriage took place. 23

The marriage having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law is the Civil Code which was
the law in effect at the time of its celebration.24 But the Civil Code is silent as to who may bring an action to declare the marriage
void. Does this mean that any person can bring an action for the declaration of nullity of marriage?

We respond in the negative. The absence of a provision in the Civil Code cannot be construed as a license for any person to institute
a nullity of marriage case. Such person must appear to be the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the
suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. 25 Elsewise stated, plaintiff must be the real party-in-interest. For it is basic in
procedural law that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party-in-interest.26

Interest within the meaning of the rule means material interest or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of
the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about the question involved or a mere incidental interest. One having no material
interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as plaintiff in an action. When plaintiff is not the real party-in-interest,
the case is dismissible on the ground of lack of cause of action. 27

Illuminating on this point is Amor-Catalan v. Court of Appeals,28 where the Court held:

True, under the New Civil Code which is the law in force at the time the respondents were married, or even in the Family Code, there
is no specific provision as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of marriage; however, only a party who can
demonstrate "proper interest" can file the same. A petition to declare the nullity of marriage, like any other actions, must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest and must be based on a cause of action. Thus, in Niñal v.
Badayog, the Court held that the children have the personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage of their deceased
father to their stepmother as it affects their successional rights.

In fine, petitioner's personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage cannot be ascertained because of the absence of
the divorce decree and the foreign law allowing it. Hence, a remand of the case to the trial court for reception of additional evidence
is necessary to determine whether respondent Orlando was granted a divorce decree and whether the foreign law which granted the
same allows or restricts remarriage. If it is proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained and the same did not allow respondent
Orlando's remarriage, then the trial court should declare respondent's marriage as bigamous and void ab initio but reduced the
amount of moral damages from P300,000.00 to P50,000.00 and exemplary damages from P200,000.00 to P25,000.00. On the
contrary, if it is proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained which allowed Orlando to remarry, then the trial court must dismiss
the instant petition to declare nullity of marriage on the ground that petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan lacks legal personality to file
the same.29 (Underscoring supplied)

III. The case must be remanded to determine whether or not petitioner is a real-party-in-interest to seek the declaration of
nullity of the marriage in controversy.

In the case at bench, the records reveal that when Teofilo died intestate in 1992, his only surviving compulsory heirs are respondent
Felicidad and their son, Teofilo II. Under the law on succession, successional rights are transmitted from the moment of death of
the decedent and the compulsory heirs are called to succeed by operation of law. 30
Upon Teofilo's death in 1992, all his property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance are transmitted to
his compulsory heirs. These heirs were respondents Felicidad and Teofilo II, as the surviving spouse and child, respectively.

Article 887 of the Civil Code outlined who are compulsory heirs, to wit:

(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and ascendants;

(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their legitimate children and descendants;

(3) The widow or widower;

(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;

(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287 of the Civil Code. 31

Clearly, a brother is not among those considered as compulsory heirs. But although a collateral relative, such as a brother, does not
fall within the ambit of a compulsory heir, he still has a right to succeed to the estate. Articles 1001 and 1003 of the New Civil
Code provide:

ART. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half
of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half.

ART. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed
to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following articles. (Underscoring supplied)

Indeed, only the presence of descendants, ascendants or illegitimate children excludes collateral relatives from succeeding to the
estate of the decedent. The presence of legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted child or children of the deceased precludes succession
by collateral relatives.32 Conversely, if there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the
collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the decedent.33

If respondent Teofilo II is declared and finally proven not to be the legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted son of Teofilo, petitioner
would then have a personality to seek the nullity of marriage of his deceased brother with respondent Felicidad. This is so,
considering that collateral relatives, like a brother and sister, acquire successional right over the estate if the decedent dies without
issue and without ascendants in the direct line.

The records reveal that Teofilo was predeceased by his parents. He had no other siblings but petitioner. Thus, if Teofilo II is finally
found and proven to be not a legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted son of Teofilo, petitioner succeeds to the other half of the estate
of his brother, the first half being allotted to the widow pursuant to Article 1001 of the New Civil Code. This makes petitioner a
real-party-interest to seek the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage of his deceased brother with respondent Felicidad. If the
subject marriage is found to be void ab initio, petitioner succeeds to the entire estate.

It bears stressing, however, that the legal personality of petitioner to bring the nullity of marriage case is contingent upon the final
declaration that Teofilo II is not a legitimate, adopted, or illegitimate son of Teofilo.

If Teofilo II is proven to be a legitimate, illegitimate, or legally adopted son of Teofilo, then petitioner has no legal personality to
ask for the nullity of marriage of his deceased brother and respondent Felicidad. This is based on the ground that he has no
successional right to be protected, hence, does not have proper interest. For although the marriage in controversy may be found to
be void from the beginning, still, petitioner would not inherit. This is because the presence of descendant, illegitimate, 34 or even an
adopted child35 excludes the collateral relatives from inheriting from the decedent.

Thus, the Court finds that a remand of the case for trial on the merits to determine the validity or nullity of the subject marriage is
called for. But the RTC is strictly instructed to dismiss the nullity of marriage case for lack of cause of action if it is proven
by evidence that Teofilo II is a legitimate, illegitimate, or legally adopted son of Teofilo Carlos, the deceased brother of
petitioner.
IV. Remand of the case regarding the question of filiation of respondent Teofilo II is proper and in order. There is a need
to vacate the disposition of the trial court as to the other causes of action before it.

Petitioner did not assign as error or interpose as issue the ruling of the CA on the remand of the case concerning the filiation of
respondent Teofilo II. This notwithstanding, We should not leave the matter hanging in limbo.

This Court has the authority to review matters not specifically raised or assigned as error by the parties, if their consideration is
necessary in arriving at a just resolution of the case.36

We agree with the CA that without trial on the merits having been conducted in the case, petitioner's bare allegation that respondent
Teofilo II was adopted from an indigent couple is insufficient to support a total forfeiture of rights arising from his putative filiation.
However, We are not inclined to support its pronouncement that the declaration of respondent Felicidad as to the illegitimate
filiation of respondent Teofilo II is more credible. For the guidance of the appellate court, such declaration of respondent Felicidad
should not be afforded credence. We remind the CA of the guaranty provided by Article 167 of the Family Code to protect the
status of legitimacy of a child, to wit:

ARTICLE 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have
been sentenced as an adulteress. (Underscoring supplied)

It is stressed that Felicidad's declaration against the legitimate status of Teofilo II is the very act that is proscribed by Article 167
of the Family Code. The language of the law is unmistakable. An assertion by the mother against the legitimacy of her child cannot
affect the legitimacy of a child born or conceived within a valid marriage. 37

Finally, the disposition of the trial court in favor of petitioner for causes of action concerning reconveyance, recovery of property,
and sum of money must be vacated. This has to be so, as said disposition was made on the basis of its finding that the marriage in
controversy was null and void ab initio.

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is MODIFIED as follows:

1. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court in regard to the action on the status and filiation of respondent Teofilo
Carlos II and the validity or nullity of marriage between respondent Felicidad Sandoval and the late Teofilo Carlos;

2. If Teofilo Carlos II is proven to be the legitimate, or illegitimate, or legally adopted son of the late Teofilo Carlos, the RTC is
strictly INSTRUCTED to DISMISS the action for nullity of marriage for lack of cause of action;

3. The disposition of the RTC in Nos. 1 to 8 of the fallo of its decision is VACATED AND SET ASIDE.

The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to conduct trial on the merits with dispatch and to give this case priority in its calendar.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 104818 September 17, 1993

ROBERTO DOMINGO, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and DELIA SOLEDAD AVERA represented by her Attorney-in-Fact MOISES R.
AVERA, respondents.

Jose P.O. Aliling IV for petitioner.

De Guzman, Meneses & Associates for private respondent.

ROMERO, J.:

The instant petition seeks the reversal of respondent court's ruling finding no grave abuse of discretion in the lower court's order
denying petitioner's motion to dismiss the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage and separation of property.

On May 29, 1991, private respondent Delia Soledad A. Domingo filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig entitled
"Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property" against petitioner Roberto Domingo. The petition which was
docketed as Special Proceedings No. 1989-J alleged among others that: they were married on November 29, 1976 at the YMCA
Youth Center Bldg., as evidenced by a Marriage Contract Registry No. 1277K-76 with Marriage License No. 4999036 issued at
Carmona, Cavite; unknown to her, he had a previous marriage with one Emerlina dela Paz on April 25, 1969 which marriage is
valid and still existing; she came to know of the prior marriage only sometime in 1983 when Emerlina dela Paz sued them for
bigamy; from January 23 1979 up to the present, she has been working in Saudi Arabia and she used to come to the Philippines
only when she would avail of the one-month annual vacation leave granted by her foreign employer since 1983 up to the present,
he has been unemployed and completely dependent upon her for support and subsistence; out of her personal earnings, she
purchased real and personal properties with a total amount of approximately P350,000.00, which are under the possession and
administration of Roberto; sometime in June 1989, while on her one-month vacation, she discovered that he was cohabiting with
another woman; she further discovered that he had been disposing of some of her properties without her knowledge or consent; she
confronted him about this and thereafter appointed her brother Moises R. Avera as her attorney-in-fact to take care of her properties;
he failed and refused to turn over the possession and administration of said properties to her brother/attorney-in-fact; and he is not
authorized to administer and possess the same on account of the nullity of their marriage. The petition prayed that a temporary
restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction be issued enjoining Roberto from exercising any act of administration and
ownership over said properties; their marriage be declared null and void and of no force and effect; and Delia Soledad be declared
the sole and exclusive owner of all properties acquired at the time of their void marriage and such properties be placed under the
proper management and administration of the attorney-in-fact.

Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the petition stated no cause of action. The marriage being void ab initio, the
petition for the declaration of its nullity is, therefore, superfluous and unnecessary. It added that private respondent has no property
which is in his possession.

On August 20, 1991, Judge Maria Alicia M. Austria issued an Order denying the motion to dismiss for lack of merit. She explained:

Movant argues that a second marriage contracted after a first marriage by a man with another woman is illegal and void (citing the
case of Yap v. Court of Appeals, 145 SCRA 229) and no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void marriage
(citing the cases of People v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033; People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845). Indeed, under the Yap case there is no
dispute that the second marriage contracted by respondent with herein petitioner after a first marriage with another woman is illegal
and void. However, as to whether or not the second marriage should first be judicially declared a nullity is not an issue in said case.
In the case of Vda. de Consuegra v. GSIS, the Supreme Court ruled in explicit terms, thus:

And with respect to the right of the second wife, this Court observed that although the second marriage can be presumed to be
void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of its nullity.
(37 SCRA 316, 326)
The above ruling which is of later vintage deviated from the previous rulings of the Supreme Court in the aforecited cases of Aragon
and Mendoza.

Finally, the contention of respondent movant that petitioner has no property in his possession is an issue that may be determined
only after trial on the merits.1

A motion for reconsideration was filed stressing the erroneous application of Vda. de Consuegra v. GSIS2 and the absence of
justiciable controversy as to the nullity of the marriage. On September 11, 1991, Judge Austria denied the motion for
reconsideration and gave petitioner fifteen (15) days from receipt within which to file his answer.

Instead of filing the required answer, petitioner filed a special civil action of certiorari and mandamus on the ground that the lower
court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying the motion to dismiss.

On February 7, 1992, the Court of Appeals3 dismissed the petition. It explained that the case of Yap v. CA4 cited by petitioner and
that of Consuegra v. GSIS relied upon by the lower court do not have relevance in the case at bar, there being no identity of facts
because these cases dealt with the successional rights of the second wife while the instant case prays for separation of property
corollary with the declaration of nullity of marriage. It observed that the separation and subsequent distribution of the properties
acquired during the union can be had only upon proper determination of the status of the marital relationship between said parties,
whether or not the validity of the first marriage is denied by petitioner. Furthermore, in order to avoid duplication and multiplicity
of suits, the declaration of nullity of marriage may be invoked in this proceeding together with the partition and distribution of the
properties involved. Citing Articles 48, 50 and 52 of the Family Code, it held that private respondent's prayer for declaration of
absolute nullity of their marriage may be raised together with other incidents of their marriage such as the separation of their
properties. Lastly, it noted that since the Court has jurisdiction, the alleged error in refusing to grant the motion to dismiss is merely
one of law for which the remedy ordinarily would have been to file an answer, proceed with the trial and in case of an adverse
decision, reiterate the issue on appeal. The motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied for lack of merit. 5

Hence, this petition.

The two basic issues confronting the Court in the instant case are the following.

First, whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is necessary. If in the affirmative, whether the same should
be filed only for purposes of remarriage.

Second, whether or not SP No. 1989-J is the proper remedy of private respondent to recover certain real and personal properties
allegedly belonging to her exclusively.

Petitioner, invoking the ruling in People v. Aragon6 and People v. Mendoza,7 contends that SP. No. 1989-J for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property filed by private respondent must be dismissed for being unnecessary and
superfluous. Furthermore, under his own interpretation of Article 40 of the Family Code, he submits that a petition for declaration
of absolute nullity of marriage is required only for purposes of remarriage. Since the petition in SP No. 1989-J contains no allegation
of private respondent's intention to remarry, said petition should therefore, be dismissed.

On the other hand, private respondent insists on the necessity of a judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage, not for
purposes of remarriage, but in order to provide a basis for the separation and distribution of the properties acquired during coverture.

There is no question that the marriage of petitioner and private respondent celebrated while the former's previous marriage with
one Emerlina de la Paz was still subsisting, is bigamous. As such, it is from the beginning. 8 Petitioner himself does not dispute the
absolute nullity of their marriage. 9

The cases of People v. Aragon and People v. Mendoza relied upon by petitioner are cases where the Court had earlier ruled that no
judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void, bigamous marriage. It is noteworthy to observe that Justice Alex
Reyes, however, dissented on these occasions stating that:

Though the logician may say that where the former marriage was void there would be nothing to dissolve, still it is not for the
spouses to judge whether that marriage was void or not. That judgment is reserved to the courts. . . . 10
This dissenting opinion was adopted as the majority position in subsequent cases involving the same issue. Thus, in Gomez
v. Lipana, 11 the Court abandoned its earlier ruling in the Aragon and Mendoza cases. In reversing the lower court's order forfeiting
the husband's share of the disputed property acquired during the second marriage, the Court stated that "if the nullity, or annulment
of the marriage is the basis for the application of Article 1417, there is need for a judicial declaration thereof, which of course
contemplates an action for that purpose."

Citing Gomez v. Lipana, the Court subsequently held in Vda. de Consuegra v. Government Service Insurance System, that
"although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting,
still there is need for judicial declaration of such nullity."

In Tolentino v. Paras,12 however, the Court turned around and applied the Aragon and Mendoza ruling once again. In granting the
prayer of the first wife asking for a declaration as the lawful surviving spouse and the correction of the death certificate of her
deceased husband, it explained that "(t)he second marriage that he contracted with private respondent during the lifetime of his first
spouse is null and void from the beginning and of no force and effect. No judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of
a void marriage."

However, in the more recent case of Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy 13 the Court reverted to the Consuegra case and held that there was "no
need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first husband at the time they married each other, for then
such a marriage though void still needs according to this Court a judicial declaration of such fact and for all legal intents and
purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz
Wiegel."

Came the Family Code which settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of the absolute
nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense. 14 Where the absolute nullity of
a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said
projected marriage be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. 15

The Family Law Revision Committee and the Civil Code Revision Committee 16 which drafted what is now the Family Code of
the Philippines took the position that parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void even if such
be the fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed to marry again.
This is borne out by the following minutes of the 152nd Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees where the
present Article 40, then Art. 39, was discussed.

B. Article 39. —

The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of a final judgment declaring the marriage void, except as
provided in Article 41.

Justice Caguioa remarked that the above provision should include not only void but also voidable marriages. He then suggested
that the above provision be modified as follows:

The validity of a marriage may be invoked only . . .

Justice Reyes (J.B.L. Reyes), however, proposed that they say:

The validity or invalidity of a marriage may be invoked

only . . .

On the other hand, Justice Puno suggested that they say:

The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only . . .

Justice Caguioa explained that his idea is that one cannot determine for himself whether or not his marriage is valid and that a
court action is needed. Justice Puno accordingly proposed that the provision be modified to read:
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of a final judgment annulling the marriage or declaring the marriage
void, except as provided in Article 41.

Justice Caguioa remarked that in annulment, there is no question. Justice Puno, however, pointed out that, even if it is a judgment
of annulment, they still have to produce the judgment.

Justice Caguioa suggested that they say:

The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of a final judgment declaring the marriage invalid, except as provided
in Article 41.

Justice Puno raised the question: When a marriage is declared invalid, does it include the annulment of a marriage and the
declaration that the marriage is void? Justice Caguioa replied in the affirmative. Dean Gupit added that in some judgments, even if
the marriage is annulled, it is declared void. Justice Puno suggested that this matter be made clear in the provision.

Prof. Baviera remarked that the original idea in the provision is to require first a judicial declaration of a void marriage and not
annullable marriages, with which the other members concurred. Judge Diy added that annullable marriages are presumed valid
until a direct action is filed to annul it, which the other members affirmed. Justice Puno remarked that if this is so, then the phrase
"absolute nullity" can stand since it might result in confusion if they change the phrase to "invalidity" if what they are referring to
in the provision is the declaration that the marriage is void.

Prof. Bautista commented that they will be doing away with collateral defense as well as collateral attack. Justice Caguioa explained
that the idea in the provision is that there should be a final judgment declaring the marriage void and a party should not declare for
himself whether or not the marriage is void, while the other members affirmed. Justice Caguioa added that they are, therefore,
trying to avoid a collateral attack on that point. Prof. Bautista stated that there are actions which are brought on the assumption that
the marriage is valid. He then asked: Are they depriving one of the right to raise the defense that he has no liability because the
basis of the liability is void? Prof. Bautista added that they cannot say that there will be no judgment on the validity or invalidity
of the marriage because it will be taken up in the same proceeding. It will not be a unilateral declaration that, it is a void
marriage. Justice Caguioa saw the point of Prof. Bautista and suggested that they limit the provision to remarriage. He then
proposed that Article 39 be reworded as follows:

The absolute nullity of a marriage for purposes of remarriage may be invoked only on the basis of final judgment . . .

Justice Puno suggested that the above be modified as follows:

The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of establishing the validity of a subsequent marriage only
on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void, except as provided in Article 41.

Justice Puno later modified the above as follows:

For the purpose of establishing the validity of a subsequent marriage, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may only be
invoked on the basis of a final judgment declaring such nullity, except as provided in Article 41.

Justice Caguioa commented that the above provision is too broad and will not solve the objection of Prof. Bautista. He proposed
that they say:

For the purpose of entering into a subsequent marriage, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may only be invoked on the
basis of a final judgment declaring such nullity, except as provided in Article 41.

Justice Caguioa explained that the idea in the above provision is that if one enters into a subsequent marriage without obtaining a
final judgment declaring the nullity of a previous marriage, said subsequent marriage is void ab initio.

After further deliberation, Justice Puno suggested that they go back to the original wording of the provision as follows:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage only on the basis of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void, except as provided in Article 41. 17

In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the protection of the spouse who, believing
that his or her marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her first marriage, the
person who marries again cannot be charged with bigamy. 18

Just over a year ago, the Court made the pronouncement that there is a necessity for a declaration of absolute nullity of a prior
subsisting marriage before contracting another in the recent case of Terre v. Terre. 19 The Court, in turning down the defense of
respondent Terre who was charged with grossly immoral conduct consisting of contracting a second marriage and living with
another woman other than complainant while his prior marriage with the latter remained subsisting, said that "for purposes of
determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null
and void ab initio is essential."

As regards the necessity for a judicial declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, petitioner submits that the same can be maintained
only if it is for the purpose of remarriage. Failure to allege this purpose, according to petitioner's theory, will warrant dismissal of
the same.

Article 40 of the Family Code provides:

Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void. (n)

Crucial to the proper interpretation of Article 40 is the position in the provision of the word "solely." As it is placed, the same
shows that it is meant to qualify "final judgment declaring such previous marriage void." Realizing the need for careful
craftsmanship in conveying the precise intent of the Committee members, the provision in question, as it finally emerged, did not
state "The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked solely for purposes of remarriage . . .," in which case "solely"
would clearly qualify the phrase "for purposes of remarriage." Had the phraseology been such, the interpretation of petitioner would
have been correct and, that is, that the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked solely for purposes of remarriage,
thus rendering irrelevant the clause "on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void."

That Article 40 as finally formulated included the significant clause denotes that such final judgment declaring the previous
marriage void need not be obtained only for purposes of remarriage. Undoubtedly, one can conceive of other instances where a
party might well invoke the absolute nullity of a previous marriage for purposes other than remarriage, such as in case of an action
for liquidation, partition, distribution and separation of property between the erstwhile spouses, as well as an action for the custody
and support of their common children and the delivery of the latters' presumptive legitimes. In such cases, evidence needs must be
adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity.
These need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void. Hence, in the instance
where a party who has previously contracted a marriage which remains subsisting desires to enter into another marriage which is
legally unassailable, he is required by law to prove that the previous one was an absolute nullity. But this he may do on the
basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.

This leads us to the question: Why the distinction? In other words, for purposes of remarriage, why should the only legally
acceptable basis for declaring a previous marriage an absolute nullity be a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void?
Whereas, for purposes other than remarriage, other evidence is acceptable?

Marriage, a sacrosanct institution, declared by the Constitution as an "inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family;"
as such, it "shall be protected by the State."20 In more explicit terms, the Family Code characterizes it as "a special contract of
permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal, and family
life." 21 So crucial are marriage and the family to the stability and peace of the nation that their "nature, consequences, and incidents
are governed by law and not subject to stipulation . . ." 22 As a matter of policy, therefore, the nullification of a marriage for the
purpose of contracting another cannot be accomplished merely on the basis of the perception of both parties or of one that their
union is so defective with respect to the essential requisites of a contract of marriage as to render it void ipso jure and with no legal
effect — and nothing more. Were this so, this inviolable social institution would be reduced to a mockery and would rest on very
shaky foundations indeed. And the grounds for nullifying marriage would be as diverse and far-ranging as human ingenuity and
fancy could conceive. For such a social significant institution, an official state pronouncement through the courts, and nothing less,
will satisfy the exacting norms of society. Not only would such an open and public declaration by the courts definitively confirm
the nullity of the contract of marriage, but the same would be easily verifiable through records accessible to everyone.

That the law seeks to ensure that a prior marriage is no impediment to a second sought to be contracted by one of the parties may
be gleaned from new information required in the Family Code to be included in the application for a marriage license, viz, "If
previously married, how, when and where the previous marriage was dissolved and annulled." 23

Reverting to the case before us, petitioner's interpretation of Art. 40 of the Family Code is, undoubtedly, quite restrictive. Thus, his
position that private respondent's failure to state in the petition that the same is filed to enable her to remarry will result in the
dismissal of SP No. 1989-J is untenable. His misconstruction of Art. 40 resulting from the misplaced emphasis on the term "solely"
was in fact anticipated by the members of the Committee.

Dean Gupit commented the word "only" may be misconstrued to refer to "for purposes of remarriage." Judge Diy stated that "only"
refers to "final judgment." Justice Puno suggested that they say "on the basis only of a final judgment." Prof. Baviera suggested
that they use the legal term "solely" instead of "only," which the Committee approved. 24 (Emphasis supplied)

Pursuing his previous argument that the declaration for absolute nullity of marriage is unnecessary, petitioner suggests that private
respondent should have filed an ordinary civil action for the recovery of the properties alleged to have been acquired during their
union. In such an eventuality, the lower court would not be acting as a mere special court but would be clothed with jurisdiction to
rule on the issues of possession and ownership. In addition, he pointed out that there is actually nothing to separate or partition as
the petition admits that all the properties were acquired with private respondent's money.

The Court of Appeals disregarded this argument and concluded that "the prayer for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may
be raised together with the other incident of their marriage such as the separation of their properties."

When a marriage is declared void ab initio, the law states that the final judgment therein shall provide for "the liquidation, partition
and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common children, and the delivery of their
presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings." 25 Other specific effects flowing
therefrom, in proper cases, are the following:

Art. 43. (2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the case may be, shall be dissolved and liquidated,
but if either spouse contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her share of the net profits of the community property or conjugal
partnership property shall be forfeited in favor of the common children or, if there are none, the children of the guilty spouse by a
previous marriage or, in default of children, the innocent spouse;

(3) Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid, except that if the donee contracted the marriage in bad faith, such
donations made to said donee are revoked by operation of law;
(4) The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of the other spouse who acted in bad faith as a beneficiary in any insurance
policy, even if such designation be stipulated as irrevocable; and
(5) The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith shall be disqualified to inherit from the innocent spouse by
testate and intestate succession. (n)
Art. 44. If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith, said marriage shall be void ab initio and all donations by
reason of marriage and testamentary disposition made by one in favor of the other are revoked by operation of law. (n) 26

Based on the foregoing provisions, private respondent's ultimate prayer for separation of property will simply be one of the
necessary consequences of the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage. Thus, petitioner's suggestion that in order
for their properties to be separated, an ordinary civil action has to be instituted for that purpose is baseless. The Family Code has
clearly provided the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage, one of which is the separation of property according to the
regime of property relations governing them. It stands to reason that the lower court before whom the issue of nullity of a first
marriage is brought is likewise clothed with jurisdiction to decide the incidental questions regarding the couple's properties.
Accordingly, the respondent court committed no reversible error in finding that the lower court committed no grave abuse of
discretion in denying petitioner's motion to dismiss SP No. 1989-J.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of respondent Court dated February 7, 1992 and the Resolution
dated March 20, 1992 are AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. L-69550 November 24, 1988

MARIA LUISA O. COJUANGCO, and LEO J. PALMA, petitioners,

vs.
HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., PRESIDING JUDGE OF RTC BRANCH XXVII, PASAY CITY AND SPOUSES
EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR., AND SOLEDAD O. COJUANGCO, respondents.

Rayala, Estrada & Associates Law Offices for petitioners.

Angara, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz Law Offices for private respondents.

PARAS, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction seeking: (1) to annul and set aside: (a) the Order dated
August 17, 1984 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, now Regional Trial Court, Branch XXVII, Pasay City, which reconsidered
and set aside its Order of July 19, 1984 dismissing Civil Case No.
Pq-0401-P, an action for declaration of nullity of marriage, entitled "Maria Luisa O. Cojuangco et al. v. Leo J. Palma" and
reinstating the same and (b) the Order dated December 10, 1984 denying the Joint Motion for Reconsideration of aforesaid
resolution; and (2) to prohibit respondent Judge from proceeding with Case No. Pq-041-P.

The decretal portion of the aforementioned order of August 17, 1984, reads:

The Order of July 19, 1984, is hereby reconsidered and set aside and the instant case reinstated.

By reason of and pursuant to the order of the Honorable Court dated December 21, 1983, defendant is hereby granted a period of
fifteen (15) days from notice hereof within which to file his answer to the complaint.

IT IS SO ORDERED. (Annex 1, p. 42, Rollo)

while the dispositive portion of the subsequent order dated December 10, 1984, reads:

Acting on the joint motion for reconsideration dated September, 4, 1984, which seeks to set aside the Order of this Court dated
August 17, 1984 reinstating the instant case, and considering the arguments raised therein as well as the opposition filed thereto,
the court resolves to deny the aforesaid 'joint Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit.

IT IS SO ORDERED. (Annex N, p. 72, Rollo)

This case is related to and is an incident of G.R. No. 64538 entitled "Leo Palma v. Hon. Manuel V. Romillo, Jr. et al." which was
resolved by the First Division of this Court per resolution dated December 21, 1983, the pertinent portion of which reads:

Upon consideration of the averments and arguments adduced in the petition, respondent's comment, petitioners' reply and
respondent's rejoinder and the documents annexed thereto, the Court Resolved to GRANT the petition and as prayed for, to ORDER
respondent judge to conduct a new trial in the case below and to allow petitioner to file his answer, which answer should be filed
within ten (10) days from finality of this Resolution. The records show that respondent Judge acted with undue haste in declaring
petitioner in default on the complaint filed on August 24, 1982 and in rendering his ex parte decision of November 2, 1982, as well
as in refusing to give due course to the timely appeal filed by petitioner and instead ordering the execution of the judgment.

On the disallowance of the appeal, respondent judge relied on the inapplicable case of Strachan & Macmurray, Ltd. vs. Court of
Appeals (62 SCRA 109) (re default in municipal courts under Rule 5, section 13), when under Rule 41, section 2, which is the rule
applicable to default cases in courts of first instance (now regional trial courts), "(A)party who has been declared in default may
likewise appeal from the judgment rendered against him as contrary to the evidence or to the law, even if no petition for relief to
set aside the order of default has been presented by him in accordance with Rule 38." But more decisively, and even though not
raised in the petition but taken cognizance of by the Court since it involves a matter of jurisdiction and authority Rule 18, Section
6 expressly mandates that there can be no defaults in actions for annulments of marriage and provides that "(I)f the defendant in an
action for annulment of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecution, attorney to investigate,
and if there is no collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence is not fabricated."

Considering further that in petitioner's reply, he states that in a letter of the principal plaintiff, Maria Luisa O. Cojuangco, dated
September, 1982 addressed to respondent's counsel (Annex T, petition), she expressed her desire not to take part in the case, the
ends of justice will be subserved by setting aside the judgment of November 2, 1982 and the subsequent implementing orders of
January 17, 1983 and June 6, 1983 and remanding the case to respondent judge's court for proper proceeding and determination.
(Rollo, G.R. No. 64538, pp. 163-164)

and the resolution of May 28, 1984 denying the motion for reconsideration of aforesaid resolution.

The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:

On August 24, 1982, an action for declaration of nullity of marriage between Leo J. Palma and Maria Luisa O. Cojuangco
(hereinafter referred to as petitioners) was filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, now Regional Trial Court Branch XXVII,
Pasay City, docketed as Civil Case No. Pq-0401-P by Maria Luisa O. Cojuangco and Spouses Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. and
Soledad O. Cojuangco (spouses Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. and Soledad O. Cojuangco). The complaint alleged that Maria Luisa
O. Cojuangco is 22 years of age, single and daughter of private respondents, Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. and Soledad O. Cojuangco,
while defendant Leo J. Palma, is a lawyer, 35 years of age and married to Elizabeth H. Palma with whom he contracted marriage
on December 19, 1971 at Cebu City and with whom he has been continuously cohabiting, thereby begetting three (3) children by
her, namely: Eugene Philip, born on March 23, 1973, Elias Anton, born on February 16, 1975 and Eduardo Lorenzo, born on
September 18, 1976. The complaint further alleged that Palma, who was for sometime a member of the law firm of Angara,
Concepcion, Regala, and Cruz Law Offices ("ACCRA") was offered by private respondent Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. to be his
own personal and confidential counsel and that of his family and companies wholly owned by him, which was promptly accepted
by the petitioner Palma; that he became so close with the family of the private respondents and was requested to tutor petitioner
Maria Luisa O. Cojuangco, who was then a student at the Assumption College; that with grave abuse and betrayal of trust and
confidence reposed in him and with his moral and intellectual ascendancy over Maria Luisa O. Cojuangco, he succeeded in courting
and contracting a second marriage with her on June 22, 1982 by falsely representing to the Hongkong authorities that he is a
"bachelor". Consequently, the marriage between Leo Palma and Maria Luisa O. Cojuangco, is null and void for being bigamous
and/or contrary to law, morals, good customs and public policy. Complainants (herein private respondents) prayed that judgment
be rendered declaring the marriage null and void ab initio and ordering petitioner Palma to pay private respondents reasonable
amounts as moral, nominal and exemplary damages, reasonable attorney's fees and expenses of litigation as may be proved in the
course of the trial.

On September 27, 1982, apparently because she wanted to continue her marital union, Maria Luisa O. Cojuangco sought the
immediate dismissal of the aforecited case and wrote petitioner's counsel, seeking the dismissal of the said case. On the same date,
respondent Judge issued an order granting Leo J. Palma three (3) days ending on September 30, 1982 within which to file his
answer to the complaint itself (Rollo, G.R. No. 64538, p.3).

On October 5, 1982, Palma was declared in default (Ibid).

On October 13, 1982, Palma prayed for reconsideration of the order declaring him in default, and a last extension of fifteen (15)
days from October 10, 1982 within which to file a responsive pleading to the complaint (Ibid., p. 3).

On October 25, 1982, Maria Luisa filed a Motion to Dismiss which apparently was not acted upon by respondent Judge. Instead,
an Order was issued on the same date denying Palma's motion for reconsideration (Ibid).

On November 2, 1982, the lower court issued a decision declaring the marriage of herein petitioner on June 22, 1982 as null and
void ab initio, while on February 18, 1983, Palma's motion for reconsideration (of aforesaid decision) with motion to lift order of
default was denied.

Hence, the petition for Certiorari, mandamus With Preliminary Injunction, filed in G.R. No. 64538.
On December 21, 1983, the First Division of this Court issued the aforequoted resolution setting aside the judgment of November
2, 1982 of the lower court.

In the lower court, a notice of dismissal dated July 13, 1984 was filed by petitioner Maria Luisa O. Cojuangco affirming her avowal
of not being a part of the case and of her desire for its dismissal with prejudice. Meanwhile, Palma filed a Motion and Rejoinder to
Notice of Dismissal with Reservation to File Responsive Pleading after receipt of resolution dated July 18, 1984. Accordingly, on
July 19, 1984, an order was issued by the lower court dismissing Civil Case No. Pq-0401-P with prejudice.

Thereafter, on August 14, 1984, the parents of Maria Luisa filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal dated July
19, 1984 alleging among others, that the notice of dismissal of July 13, 1984 is of doubtful authenticity and/or source and that said
parents had not been given a day in court; that the aforementioned order runs counter to the resolution of the court directing that a
new trial be conducted.

On August 17, 1984, Palma filed an opposition to the motion for reconsideration. On the same day, August 17, 1984, an order was
issued granting the motion for reconsideration, setting aside the order of July 19, 1984.

On September 5, 1984, petitioners Maria O. Cojuangco and Leo Palma, filed a Joint Motion for Reconsideration of the order of
August 17, 1984 which was denied for lack of merit in the order of December 10, 1984.

Hence, this petition.

In the resolution of January 21, 1985, this Court required respondents to file their answer to the petition (Rollo, p. 33), which
answer was filed on March 1, 1985 (Rollo, p. 83).

In the resolution of March 18, 1985, this Court required petitioners to file their reply (Rollo, p. 107), which was filed on May 13,
1985. In compliance with the resolution of July 10, 1985 (Rollo, p. 133), petitioners filed their memorandum on September 5, 1985
(Rollo, p. 134), while private respondents filed their memorandum on October 18, 1985 (Rollo, p. 148).<äre||anº•1àw>

In their petition, petitioners raised the following grounds to support the petition:

THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE CASE AND THE ORDER SETTING ASIDE THE
ORDER OF DISMISSAL IS CONTRARY TO LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE.

II

THE HONORABLE COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO WANT OF

JURISDICTION. (p. 7, Rollo).

The main issue in this case is whether or not respondent Judge committed a grave abuse of discretion, amounting to want of
jurisdiction, in refusing to dismiss the case in the lower court.

A careful perusal of the records shows that such refusal by respondent Judge was in obedience to the resolution of the First Division
of this Court of December 21, 1983 in G.R. No. 64538 entitled "Leo Palma v. Hon. Manuel V. Romillo, Jr., et al." specifically
ordering respondent Judge to conduct a new trial in the case below and to allow petitioner to file his answer.

On the other hand, Palma not only failed to file an answer within ten (10) days as required in aforesaid resolution, but insisted
instead on the dismissal of subject case, on grounds already considered by this Court before the issuance of said resolution. Such
action of the petitioner is obviously a disobedience to, if not a blatant defiance of this Court's Order, or at the very least, it is a bid
to delay the disposition of this case on the merits. Failing to achieve his objective in the lower court, Palma now elevated the matter
to the Supreme Court on certiorari and Prohibition without first complying with the requirements of aforesaid resolution of
December 21, 1983.
Moreover, the Court, in general does not entertain a petition for certiorari questioning the propriety of an interlocutory order (De
Midgely v. Fernando, 64 SCRA 23 [1975]; Malit v. People, 114 SCRA 349 [1982]) unless grave abuse of discretion was patently
committed by the trial court (Bernabe v. J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc., 78 SCRA 341 [1977]; Villalon v. Intermediate Appellate Court,
144 SCRA 443 [1986]) or where broader interests of justice require exception. An order denying a motion to dismiss is
interlocutory, and cannot be the subject of a petition for certiorari (Occena v. Jabson, 73 SCRA 637 [1976]; Gamboa v. Victoriano,
90 SCRA 40 [1979]; Bautista v. Sarmiento, 138 SCRA 587 [1985]; Cruz v. People, 144 SCRA 677 [1986]) unless in denying the
motion to dismiss or motion to quash, the court acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, in which
case certiorari or prohibition lies (Newsweek, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 142 SCRA 17 [1986]).

Unquestionably, respondent Judge cannot be faulted for following the resolution of this Court. In the exercise of his jurisdiction,
errors allegedly committed by respondent Judge may be corrected by a timely appeal and not by a special civil action of certiorari
(Santos v. C.A., 152 SCRA 378 [1987]).

PREMISES CONSIDERED, this petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The case is thus hereby REMANDED to the respondent
trial court for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.
[G.R. NO. 159220, September 22, 2008]

MA. DARLENE DIMAYUGA-LAURENA, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS AND JESSE LAURO

LAURENA, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 6 June 2003 Decision2 and 1 August 2003 Resolution3 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 58458. The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the 25 March 1997 Decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 140 (trial court) in Civil Case No. 93-3754.

The Antecedent Facts

Ma. Darlene Dimayuga-Laurena (petitioner) and Jesse Lauro Laurena (respondent) met in January 1983. 4 They were married on
19 December 1983 at the Church of Saint Augustine in Intramuros, Manila. They have two children, Mark Jordan who was born
on 2 July 1985 and Michael Joseph who was born on 11 November 1987.

On 19 October 1993, petitioner filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage against respondent. Petitioner alleged that
respondent was psychologically incapable of assuming the essential obligations of marriage, and the incapacity existed at the time
of the celebration of the marriage although she discovered it only after the marriage.

Petitioner alleged that after their wedding, she and respondent went to Baguio City for their honeymoon. They were accompanied
by a 15-year old boy, the son of one of respondent's house helpers, who respondent invited to sleep in their hotel suite. After their
honeymoon, they settled in respondent's house in Better Living Subdivision, Parañaque City. Petitioner became pregnant in March
1984 but suffered a miscarriage. According to petitioner, she almost bled to death while respondent continued watching a television
show at the foot of their matrimonial bed.

Petitioner alleged that respondent gave priority to the needs of his parents; would come home past midnight; and even tried to
convert her to his religion. In addition, respondent was a womanizer. Petitioner lived in Batangas for three years while she tended
to their gasoline station while respondent remained in Parañaque City. She discovered that respondent had been living a bachelor's
life while she was away. Petitioner also noticed that respondent had feminine tendencies. They would frequently quarrel and one
time, respondent hit her face. Petitioner alleged that in September 1990, respondent abandoned their conjugal home and stopped
supporting their children. Petitioner alleged that respondent's psychological incapacity was manifested by his infidelity, utter
neglect of his family's needs, irresponsibility, insensitivity, and tendency to lead a bachelor's life.

Petitioner further alleged that during their marriage, she and respondent acquired the following properties which were all part of
their conjugal partnership of gains:

1. duplex house and lot located at 4402 Dayap Street, Palanan, Makati City;
2. house and lot on Palaspas Street, Tanauan, Batangas;
3. dealership of Jeddah Caltex Service Station in Pres. Laurel Highway, Tanauan, Batangas (Jeddah Caltex Station);
4. Personal vehicles consisting of a Mitsubishi Lancer, Safari pick-up, L-300 van and L-200 pick-up; and
5. Jeddah Trucking.

Petitioner prayed for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains, for custody of their children, and for monthly support of
P25,000.

Respondent denied petitioner's allegations. He asserted that petitioner was emotionally immature, stubborn, unstable, unreasonable,
and extremely jealous. Respondent alleged that some of the properties claimed by petitioner were not part of their conjugal
partnership of gains. Respondent prayed for the dismissal of the petition.
The Ruling of the Trial Court

In its Decision5 dated 25 March 1997, the trial court denied the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. The trial court found
that the manifestations of respondent's psychological incapacity alleged by petitioner were not so serious as to consider respondent
psychologically incapacitated. The trial court ruled that petitioner's evidence only showed that she could not get along with
respondent.

The dispositive portion of the trial court's Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

a) DENYING the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by Ma. Darlene Dimayuga-Laurena on
the ground of psychological incapacity;

b) DECLARING the conjugal partnership of gains between petitioner and respondent Dissolved with all the
effects provided by law; and further AFFIRMING the petitioner's claim that all the properties acquired during
the marriage are conjugal properties;

c) AWARDING the custody of the children to the parent chosen by the said minors considering that they are
over seven (7) years of age;

Support of said minors shall be borne by the parents in proportion to their respective incomes.

After this decision becomes final, let copies thereof be furnished the Register of Deeds of Tanauan, Batangas
and Makati City for their information.

SO ORDERED.6

Petitioner appealed from the trial court's Decision insofar as the trial court denied her petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.
Respondent appealed from the trial court's Decision insofar as the trial court declared some of his parents' properties as part of the
conjugal partnership of gains.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In its 6 June 2003 Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the trial court's Decision.

The Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner failed to prove that the root cause of respondent's psychological incapacity was
medically or clinically identified and sufficiently proven by experts. The Court of Appeals noted that Dr. Lourdes Lapuz (Dr.
Lapuz), the psychiatrist presented by petitioner, was not able to talk to respondent and simply based her conclusions and
impressions of respondent from her two-hour session with petitioner. The Court of Appeals ruled that Dr. Lapuz's testimony was
vague and ambiguous on the matter of respondent's personality disorder which would render him psychologically incapacitated.
The Court of Appeals further ruled that petitioner was not able to prove that respondent's alleged psychological incapacity was
existing at the time of the celebration of their marriage. The Court of Appeals further ruled that in her complaint, petitioner's
bases were respondent's irresponsibility, insensitivity, and infidelity. During the trial, she claimed that the root of her husband's
incapacity was his homosexuality. The Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner's allegations in her complaint and during the trial
lacked factual and evidentiary bases. The Court of Appeals ruled that the totality of respondent's acts could not lead to the
conclusion that he was psychologically incapacitated; that his incapacity was existing at the time of the celebration of the
marriage; and that it was incurable.

The Court of Appeals also sustained the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains between petitioner and respondent. The
Court of Appeals rejected respondent's argument that the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains should also be denied
because of the denial of the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. The Court of Appeals ruled that respondent's
abandonment of his family and the fact that petitioner and respondent had been separated for more than a year prior to the filing
of the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage were sufficient grounds for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of
gains.

However, the Court of Appeals found that the trial court included as part of the conjugal partnership of gains properties and
businesses, particularly the ancestral house and lot in Tanauan, Batangas; the duplex house and lot on Dayap Street, Makati City;
the Jeddah Caltex Station; and Jeddah Trucking, which all belonged to respondent's parents. The Court of Appeals found that the
rentals derived from the properties and the income from the businesses were deposited in the account of respondent's parents. The
Court of Appeals excluded the properties and businesses derived from the operations of the Jeddah Caltex Station and Jeddah
Trucking from the conjugal partnership of gains.

The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals' Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the assailed decision is AFFIRMED with regard to the denial of
the petition for annulment of marriage and the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains. The
adjudication respecting the properties which comprise the conjugal partnership is MODIFIED to exclude the
properties belonging to the parents of respondent, i.e., the ancestral house and lot in Tanauan, Batangas, the
duplex house and lot at Dayap Street, Makati, as well as the properties acquired through the operation of the
Caltex station and Jeddah Trucking. No costs.

SO ORDERED.7

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration.

In its 1 August 2003 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied the motion.

Hence, the petition before this Court.

The Issues

The issues in this case are the following:

1. Whether respondent is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations; and

2. Whether the properties excluded by the Court of Appeals form part of the conjugal partnership of gains between
petitioner and respondent.

The Ruling of this Court

The petition has no merit.

Petitioner Failed to Prove Respondent's

Psychological Incapacity

The petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is anchored on Article 36 of the Family Code which provides that "[a] marriage
contracted by any party who, at the time of celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization." In Santos
v. Court of Appeals,8 the Court first declared that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b) judicial
antecedence; and (c) incurability.9 It should refer to "no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage" 10 It
must be confined to "the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage"11 Finally, the "psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is
celebrated"12 The Court explained:

(a) Gravity - It must be grave and serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary
duties required in a marriage;

(b) Judicial Antecedence - It must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the
overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and
 (c) Incurability - It must be incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the
party involved.13

In Republic v. Court of Appeals14 (Molina case), the Court laid down the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article
36 of the Family Code as follows:

1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and
our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution
devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation. It
decrees marriage as legally inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim
of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and
emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.

2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must
be psychological not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be
physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root
cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.

3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged
their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the
illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.

Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must
be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related
to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician
may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them
but not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as
an essential obligation of marriage.

5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume
the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness
must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty,
much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the
person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations
essential to marriage.

6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the

Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s)
must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.
 7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect
by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee
from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and
which provides:

"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature."

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the
religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight
should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally - subject to our law on evidence - what is decreed
as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void. 15

Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that petitioner failed to satisfy the guidelines in the Molina case.

As found by the Court of Appeals, petitioner anchored her petition on respondent's irresponsibility, infidelity, and homosexual
tendencies. Petitioner likewise alleged that respondent tried to compel her to change her religious belief, and in one of their
arguments, respondent also hit her. However, sexual infidelity, repeated physical violence, homosexuality, physical violence or
moral pressure to compel petitioner to change religious affiliation, and abandonment are grounds for legal separation 16 but not for
declaring a marriage void.

In Marcos v. Marcos,17 the Court ruled that if the totalities of the evidence presented are enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, there is no need to resort to the actual medical examination of the person concerned. However, while an
actual medical, psychiatric, or psychological examination is not a condition sine qua non to a finding of psychological incapacity,
an expert witness would have strengthened petitioner's claim of respondent's psychological incapacity. 18 While the examination by
a physician of a person to declare him or her psychologically incapacitated is not required, the root cause of psychological incapacity
must be medically or clinically identified.19 In this case, the testimony of Dr. Lapuz on respondent's psychological incapacity was
based only on her two-hour session with petitioner. Her testimony was characterized by the Court of Appeals as vague and
ambiguous. She failed to prove psychological incapacity or identify its root cause. She failed to establish that respondent's
psychological incapacity is incurable. Dr. Lapuz testified:

Q- What, in your opinion are the causes of this incapacity?

I feel, your Honor, that there is some personality agenda

on his part that I do not know because he has not come to
A-
see me but there are such men who can be very ardent
lovers but suddenly will completely turn over...

Q- Is this a sort of personality disorder?

A- Yes, your Honor.

Is that inherited or could have been acquired even before

Q-
marriage?

It was there on the time of the inception of his personality,

it was there. And my feeling is that these things do not
A- happen overnight, one does not change spot overnight but
that thing, like marriage, can completely turn-table his
behavior.

Doctora, do you think this kind of incapacity, this

Q-
personality disorder, is there any possibility of curing it?
 Very little at this time and sometimes, when they become
older, like when they reach the age of 50's or 60's, they
A-
may settle down and finally give out and reveal interest
in their families.

In short, there is possibility that this incapacity of the

Q-
respondent could be cured?

Only respondent's physical decline of sexual urge, if the

A- sexual urge would not decline, the incapacity will
continue.

Is there no medicine or is there any kind of medicine that

Q-
can cure this kind of disorder?

None to my knowledge, your Honor. There is no magic

feather in the psychiatric treatment. Perhaps, if the person
A-
would be willing and open enough and interested
enough...20

Even the recommendation in the Social Case Study Report submitted by Social Welfare Officer Marissa P. Obrero-Ballon, who
was assigned by the trial court to conduct a social case study on the parties, failed to show the existence of respondent's
psychological incapacity. The Social Welfare Officer instead found that petitioner was immature while respondent was
responsible.21 She also found that the couple separated because of respondent's infidelity. 22

Petitioner also failed to prove that respondent's psychological incapacity was existing at the time of the celebration of their
marriage. Petitioner only cited that during their honeymoon, she found it strange that respondent allowed their 15-year old
companion, the son of one of respondent's house helpers, to sleep in their room. However, respondent explained that he and
petitioner already stayed in a hotel for one night before they went to Baguio City and that they had sexual relations even before
their marriage. Respondent explained that the boy was with them to take pictures and videos of their stay in Baguio City and had
to stay with them in the room due to monetary constraints.

In sum, the totality of the evidence presented by petitioner failed to show that respondent was psychologically incapacitated and
that such incapacity was grave, incurable, and existing at the time of the solemnization of their marriage.

Properties of Respondent's Parents

Do Not Form Part of Conjugal Partnership of Gains

Petitioner assails the Court of Appeals' exclusion of the properties of respondent's parents from their conjugal partnership of
gains. In particular, the Court of Appeals excluded the ancestral house and lot in Tanauan, Batangas; the duplex house and lot on
Dayap Street, Makati City; and the properties acquired through the operations of the Jeddah Caltex Station and Jeddah Trucking.

We sustain in part the Court of Appeals' Decision.

As early as 15 July 1978, respondent's parents already executed a General Power of Attorney23 in favor of respondent covering
all their properties and businesses. Several Special Powers of Attorney were also executed by respondent's parents in favor of
respondent. On 14 April 1987, respondent's parents executed a Deed of Absolute Sale24 covering two parcels of land located in
Tanauan, Batangas, with a total area of 966 square meters, for P40,000. We agree with the Court of Appeals that the transfer was
merely an accommodation so that petitioner, who was then working at the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP), could acquire a
loan from BSP at a lower rate25 using the properties as collateral. The loan proceeds were used as additional capital for the
Jeddah Caltex Station. As found by the Court of Appeals, the loan was still being paid from the income from the Jeddah Caltex
Station. The Lease Contract26 on the Jeddah Caltex Station was signed by respondent as attorney-in-fact of his mother Juanita
Laurena, leaving no doubt that it was the business of respondent's parents. Jeddah Trucking was established from the proceeds
and income of the Jeddah Caltex Station.
As regards the duplex house and lot in Makati City, the Deed of Absolute Sale 27 was executed by Manuela C. Felix in favor of
respondent. Respondent claimed that the duplex house was purchased from the income of the Jeddah Caltex Station. However,
we find no sufficient proof to sustain this allegation. In fact, respondent testified that he received a series of promotions during
their marriage "until we can afford to buy that duplex [on] Dayap"28 Hence, the duplex house on Dayap Street, Makati City
should be included in the conjugal partnership of gains.

WHEREFORE, we PARTLY GRANT the petition. We AFFIRM the 6 June 2003 Decision and 1 August 2003 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 58458 with MODIFICATION by including the duplex house and lot on Dayap Street,
Makati City in the conjugal partnership of gains. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 170729 December 8, 2010

ENRIQUE AGRAVIADOR y ALUNAN, Petitioner,

vs.
ERLINDA AMPARO-AGRAVIADOR and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Enrique Agraviador y Alunan (petitioner) challenges through his petition for review on certiorari 1 the decision dated May 31,
20052 and the resolution dated December 6, 20053 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 75207.The challenged decision
reversed the resolution4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 276, Muntinlupa City, declaring the marriage of the petitioner
and Erlinda Amparo-Agraviador (respondent) null and void on the ground of the latter’s psychological incapacity. The assailed
resolution, on the other hand, denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

Antecedent Facts

The petitioner first met the respondent in 1971 at a beerhouse where the latter worked. The petitioner, at that time, was a 24-year
old security guard of the Bureau of Customs, while the respondent was a 17-year old waitress. Their meeting led to a courtship,
and they eventually became sweethearts. They often spent nights together at the respondent’s rented room, and soon entered into a
common-law relationship.

On May 23, 1973, the petitioner and the respondent contracted marriage in a ceremony officiated by Reverend Juanito Reyes at a
church in Tondo, Manila. The petitioner’s family was apprehensive about this marriage because of the nature of the respondent’s
work and because she came from a broken family. Out of their union, the petitioner and the respondent begot four (4) children,
namely: Erisque, Emmanuel, Evelyn, and Eymarey.

On March 1, 2001, the petitioner filed with the RTC a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with the respondent,
under Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended.5 The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 01-081. He alleged that the respondent
was psychologically incapacitated to exercise the essential obligations of marriage as she was carefree and irresponsible, and
refused to do household chores like cleaning and cooking; stayed away from their house for long periods of time; had an affair with
a lesbian; did not take care of their sick child; consulted a witch doctor in order to bring him bad fate; and refused to use the family
name Agraviador in her activities.

The petitioner likewise claimed that the respondent refused to have sex with him since 1993 because she became "very close" to a
male tenant in their house. In fact, he discovered their love notes to each other, and caught them inside his room several times.

The respondent moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that the root cause of her psychological incapacity was not medically
identified and alleged in the petition.6 The RTC denied this motion in its order dated July 2, 2001.7

In her answer,8 the respondent denied that she engaged in extramarital affairs and maintained that it was the petitioner who refused
to have sex with her. She claimed that the petitioner wanted to have their marriage annulled because he wanted to marry their
former household helper, Gilda Camarin. She added that she was the one who took care of their son at the hospital before he died.

The RTC ordered the city prosecutor and/or the Solicitor General to investigate if collusion existed between the parties. 9 The RTC,
in its Order of November 20, 2001, allowed the petitioner to present his evidence ex parte. 10 The petitioner, thus, presented
testimonial and documentary evidence to substantiate his claims.

In his testimony, the petitioner confirmed what he stated in his petition, i.e., that the respondent was carefree, irresponsible,
immature, and whimsical; stubbornly did what she wanted; did not stay long in the conjugal dwelling; refused to do household
chores; refused to take care of him and their children; and consulted a witch doctor in order to bring bad luck upon him.
The petitioner further confirmed that the respondent abandoned their sick child, which led to the latter’s death. The petitioner
further stated that the respondent became very close to a male border of their house; he discovered their love notes to each other,
and caught them inside his room several times.

The petitioner declared that he filed the petition for nullity because the respondent refused to change; he loves his children and
does not want their children to be affected by their mother’s conduct. He intimated that he might remarry if it would benefit their
children.

Aside from his testimony, the petitioner also presented a certified true copy of their marriage contract (Exh. "B") 11 and the
psychiatric evaluation report (Exh. "A")12 of Dr. Juan Cirilo L. Patac.

In his Psychiatric Evaluation Report, Dr. Patac made the following findings:

REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the information gathered from Enrique, his son and their helper, the psychological report and the mental status
examination, Enrique is found to be psychologically capable to fulfill the essential obligations of marriage. He coped with Erlinda’s
selfish and irresponsible behavior as he dutifully performed what she failed to do for the family. He patiently tried to understand
her and exerted every effort to make her realize the harm caused by her neglect to the family. Throughout their marriage, he
provided emotional and material support for the family. He engaged in other business endeavors aside from his employment as he
maintained to be financially productive.

The same data revealed that Erlinda failed to fulfill the essential obligations of marriage. She manifested inflexible maladaptive
behavior even at the time before their marriage. She is known to be stubborn and uncaring who did things her way without regard
to the feelings of others. She is an irresponsible individual who selfishly ignored and neglected her role as daughter to her parents
as wife to Enrique and mother to their children. Before the marriage at a young age of 17, Erlinda defied her parents as she lived
alone, rented a room for herself and allowed Enrique to sleep with her. She did not care about the needs of Enrique before and after
marriage and she maintained to be so with her children. She abandoned and relegated her duty to her family to their helper. She
never stayed long in their house despite pleadings from her children and Enrique. Her irresponsible, uncaring behavior even led to
the death of one of their children. Likewise, she does not show concern and ignores a daughter who is presently manifesting
behavioral problem. She kept secrets as she never allowed her husband and children know where she stays when she’s not at work.
She falsified documents as she hid her marital status when she used her maiden surname in her present employment. She is having
illicit affairs and is reported to be presently having an affair with a lesbian. Her desire to bring bad fate and death to Enrique through
her consultation with a "mangkukulam" point out her lack of care, love, and respect to Enrique.

Erlinda’s lack of motivation and insight greatly affected her capacity to render love, respect and support to her family.

The above data shows that Erlinda is suffering from a Personality Disorder (Mixed Personality Disorder). She has been having this
disorder since her adolescence. There is no definite treatment for this disorder. She is deemed psychologically incapacitated to
perform the obligations of marriage.

In fairness to Erlinda, she is recommended to undergo the same examination as Enrique underwent. 13

The RTC Ruling

The RTC nullified the marriage of the petitioner and the respondent in its decision of April 26, 2002. It saw merit in the petitioner’s
testimony and Dr. Patac’s psychiatric evaluation report, and concluded that:

Without contradiction the recitation by Petitioner and the findings of the doctor show that Respondent is indeed suffering from
"Mixed Personality Disorder" that render her incapable of complying with her marital obligations. Respondent’s refusal to commit
herself to the marriage, her tendencies to avoid a close relationship with Petitioner, preferring to be with her lover and finally
abandoning their home for a lesbian, a disregard of social norm, show that she was never prepared for marital commitment in the
first place. This incapacity is deeply rooted from her family upbringing with no hope for a cure. Therefore, for the good of society
and of the parties themselves, it is best that this marriage between ENRIQUE AGRAVIADOR Y ALUNAN and ERLINDA
AMPARO AGRAVIADOR be annulled as if it never took place at all. The Civil Registrar of the City of Manila and the General
Civil Registrar, National Census and Statistics Office, East Avenue, Quezon City, are hereby requested to make the necessary
correction of the civil record of the marriage between the parties and on their respective civil status.

The children ERISQUE AGRAVIADOR, EMMANUEL AGRAVIADOR, EVELYN AGRAVIADOR and EYMAREY
AGRAVIADOR will however remain as their legitimate children.

It is SO ORDERED.14

The CA Decision

The Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed the RTC decision to the CA. The CA, in its
decision15 dated May 31, 2005, reversed and set aside the RTC resolution, and dismissed the petition.

The CA held that Dr. Patac’s psychiatric evaluation report failed to establish that the respondent’s personality disorder was serious,
grave and permanent; it likewise did not mention the root cause of her incapacity. The CA further ruled that Dr. Patac had no basis
in concluding that the respondent’s disorder had no definite treatment because he did not subject her to a mental assessment.

The CA added that the "psychiatric remarks" in the Report were nothing but a showcase of respondent’s character flaws and
liabilities. There was no proof of a natal or supervening factor that effectively incapacitated the respondent from accepting and
complying with the essential obligations of marriage. If at all, these character flaws may only give rise to a legal separation suit.

The petitioner moved to reconsider this decision, but the CA denied his motion in its resolution of December 6, 2005. 16

The Petition and Issues

The petitioner now comes to us via the present petition to challenge and seek the reversal of the CA ruling, based on the following
arguments:

I. THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY [HIM] WAS MORE THAN SUBSTANTIAL TO ESTABLISH THE
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF THE RESPONDENT[;]
II. THE GUIDELINES SET FORTH IN REPUBLIC V. MOLINA [HAD BEEN] SATISIFIED[;]
III. THE ADMISSIBILITY XXX OF THE PSYCHIATRIC EVALUATION REPORT XXX STILL STANDS
FOR NOT HAVING BEEN CONTESTED XXX BY THE STATE AND/THE RESPONDENT[; and]
IV. THE DEGREE OF PROOF REQUIRED IN CIVIL CASES HAD BEEN SATISIFIED[.]

The issue in this case essentially boils down to whether there is basis to nullify the petitioner’s marriage to the respondent on the
ground of psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations.

The Court’s Ruling

We resolve to deny the petition for lack of merit, and hold that no sufficient basis exists to annul the marriage, pursuant to Article
36 of the Family Code and its related jurisprudence.

The totality of evidence presented

failed to establish the respondent’s

psychological incapacity

The petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is anchored on Article 36 of the Family Code which provides that "[a] marriage
contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization." It introduced
the concept of psychological incapacity as a ground for nullity of marriage, although this concept eludes exact definition.
The initial common consensus on psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code was that it did not involve a species
of vice of consent. Justices Sempio-Diy and Caguioa, both members of the Family Code revision committee that drafted the Code,
conceded that the spouse may have given free and voluntary consent to a marriage but was, nonetheless, incapable of fulfilling
such rights and obligations. Dr. Arturo Tolentino likewise stated in the 1990 edition of his commentaries on the Family Code that
this "psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations does not affect the consent to the marriage." 17

In Santos v. Court of Appeals,18 the Court first declared that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b)
juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability. It should refer to "no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to
be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage."19 It must be confined to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.

We laid down more definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code in Republic v. Court
of Appeals20 (the Molina case) where we said:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution
and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family,
recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution
at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and
solidarity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity
must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince
the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known
the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such
incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless
such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be
given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the
illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time,
but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or
even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such
incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the
exercise of a profession or employment in a job. x x x

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The
illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words,
there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband
and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. x x x
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No
decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly
stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with
the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed
submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor
vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.

These guidelines incorporate the basic requirements we established in Santos. A later case, Marcos v. Marcos, 21 further clarified
that there is no requirement that the defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as
a condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity. Accordingly, it is no longer
necessary to introduce expert opinion in a petition under Article 36 of the Family Code if the totality of evidence shows that
psychological incapacity exists and its gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability can be duly established.

A later case, Ngo Te v. Yu-Te,22 declared that it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as the
one in Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological incapacity. We stated that instead of serving as a
guideline, Molina unintentionally became a straightjacket, forcing all cases involving psychological incapacity to fit into and be
bound by it, which is not only contrary to the intention of the law but unrealistic as well because, with respect to psychological
incapacity, no case can be considered as on "all fours" with another. Ngo Te, therefore, put into question the applicability of time-
tested guidelines set forth in Molina.

Ting v. Velez-Ting23 and the fairly recent case of Suazo v. Suazo24 squarely met the issue and laid to rest any question regarding
the applicability of Molina. In these cases, we clarified that Ngo Te did not abandon Molina; far from abandoning Molina, it simply
suggested the relaxation of its stringent requirements. We also explained in Suazo that Ngo Te merely stands for a more flexible
approach in considering petitions for declaration of nullity of marriages based on psychological incapacity.

Under these established guidelines, we find the totality of the petitioner’s evidence insufficient to prove the respondent’s
psychological incapacity.

a. Petitioner’s court testimony

For clarity, we reproduce the pertinent portions of the petitioner’s testimony that essentially confirmed what the petition alleged:

Q: Out of your marriage with the said respondent, were you blessed with children, and how many?

A: Yes, sir, we were blessed with four (4), two (2) boys and two (2) girls.

Q: Where are they now?

A: All grown up with the exception of one who died of pneumonia due to the neglect and fault of my said wife who abandone[d]
him at the time of his illness.

Q: Is that the reason why you file[d] the instant petition, Mr. Witness?

A: It is only one of the several reasons, Sir.

Q: Can you cite these reasons, you mentioned?

A: She appears to be carefree, irresponsible, immature, whimsical and used to impose what she wanted to get, she refused to do
household chores, like cooking, caring for the husband and children, used to stay from the conjugal dwelling, initially for weeks,
then for months and lately fully abandoned the family house and stay with a lesbian. [sic]

At first, I discovered a love note while being so secretive and used to be very close to a male renter in the ground floor of their
house and caught them several times alone in his room, thus explaining the reason why she refused to have sex since 1993, up to
and until the present time.
Lately, we discovered that she used to consult a cult "mangkukulam" to bring bad fate against the family and death for me.

Q: By the way did you give her the chance to change? Q: Can you not give a last chance for you to save your
marriage?
A: I gave her but she refused to reform.
A: I think I cannot since she does not accept her fault and she
does not want to change for the sake of our family.25

These exchanges during trial significantly constituted the totality of the petitioner’s testimony on the respondent’s supposed
psychological or mental malady. We glean from these exchanges the petitioner’s theory that the respondent’s psychological
incapacity is premised on her refusal or unwillingness to perform certain marital obligations, and a number of unpleasant personality
traits such as immaturity, irresponsibility, and unfaithfulness.

These acts, in our view, do not rise to the level of psychological incapacity that the law requires, and should be distinguished from
the "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect," in the performance of some marital obligations that characterize some
marriages.26 The intent of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of
personality disorders – existing at the time of the marriage – clearly demonstrating an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage.27 The psychological illness that must have afflicted a party at the inception of the marriage should
be a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he
or she is about to assume.28

In the present case, the petitioner’s testimony failed to establish that the respondent’s condition is a manifestation of a disordered
personality rooted on some incapacitating or debilitating psychological condition that makes her completely unable to discharge
the essential marital obligations. If at all, the petitioner merely showed that the respondent had some personality defects that showed
their manifestation during the marriage; his testimony sorely lacked details necessary to establish that the respondent’s defects
existed at the inception of the marriage. In addition, the petitioner failed to discuss the gravity of the respondent’s condition; neither
did he mention that the respondent’s malady was incurable, or if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the respondent’s
means to undertake. The petitioner’s declarations that the respondent "does not accept her fault," "does not want to change," and
"refused to reform" are insufficient to establish a psychological or mental defect that is serious, grave, or incurable as contemplated
by Article 36 of the Family Code.

In a similar case, Bier v. Bier,29 we ruled that it was not enough that the respondent, alleged to be psychologically incapacitated,
had difficulty in complying with his marital obligations, or was unwilling to perform these obligations. Proof of a natal or
supervening disabling factor – an adverse integral element in the respondent's personality structure that effectively incapacitated
him from complying with his essential marital obligations – had to be shown.

b. Dr. Patac’s Psychiatric Evaluation Report

The Court finds that Dr. Patac’s Psychiatric Evaluation Report fell short in proving that the respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to perform the essential marital duties. We emphasize that Dr. Patac did not personally evaluate and examine the
respondent; he, in fact, recommended at the end of his Report for the respondent to "undergo the same examination [that the
petitioner] underwent."30 Dr. Patac relied only on the information fed by the petitioner, the parties’ second child, Emmanuel, and
household helper. Sarah. Largely, the doctor relied on the information provided by the petitioner. Thus, while his Report can be
used as a fair gauge to assess the petitioner’s own psychological condition (as he was, in fact, declared by Dr. Patac to be
psychologically capable to fulfill the essential obligations of marriage), the same statement cannot be made with respect to the
respondent’s condition. The methodology employed simply cannot satisfy the required depth and comprehensiveness of the
examination required to evaluate a party alleged to be suffering from a psychological disorder. 31

We do not suggest that a personal examination of the party alleged to be psychologically incapacitated is mandatory. We have
confirmed in Marcos v. Marcos that the person sought to be declared psychologically incapacitated must be personally examined
by a psychologist as a condition sine qua non to arrive at such declaration. 32 If a psychological disorder can be proven by
independent means, no reason exists why such independent proof cannot be admitted and given credit. 33 No such independent
evidence appears on record, however, to have been gathered in this case.

In his Report, Dr. Patac attempted to establish the juridical antecedence of the respondent’s condition by stating that the respondent
manifested "inflexible maladaptive behavior" before marriage, pointing out how the respondent behaved before the marriage – the
respondent defied her parents and lived alone; rented a room for herself; and allowed the petitioner to sleep with her. These
perceived behavioral flaws, to our mind, are insufficient to establish that the incapacity was rooted in the history of the respondent
antedating the marriage. Dr. Patac failed to elucidate on the circumstances that led the respondent to act the way she did, for
example, why she "defied her parents" and decided to live alone; why she "neglected her obligations as a daughter;" and why she
often slept with the petitioner. This is an area where independent evidence, such as information from a person intimately related to
the respondent, could prove useful. As earlier stated, no such independent evidence was gathered in this case. In the absence of
such evidence, it is not surprising why the Psychiatric Report Evaluation failed to explain how and why the respondent’s so-called
inflexible maladaptive behavior was already present at the time of the marriage.

Dr. Patac’s Psychiatric Evaluation Report likewise failed to prove the gravity or seriousness of the respondent’s condition. He
simply made an enumeration of the respondent’s purported behavioral defects (as related to him by third persons), and on this basis
characterized the respondent to be suffering from mixed personality disorder. In the "Background History" portion of his Psychiatric
Evaluation Report, Dr. Patac mentioned that the respondent employed one of her siblings to do the household chores; did not help
in augmenting the family’s earnings; belittled the petitioner’s income; continued her studies despite the petitioner’s disapproval;
seldom stayed at home; became "close" to a male border; had an affair with a lesbian; did not disclose the actual date of her
departure to Taiwan; threatened to poison the petitioner and their children; neglected and ignored their children; used her maiden
name at work; and consulted a witch doctor to bring bad fate to the petitioner. Except for the isolated and unfounded statement that
"Erlinda’s lack of motivation and insight greatly affected her capacity to render love, respect and support to the family,"34 there
was no other statement regarding the degree of severity of the respondent’s condition, why and to what extent the disorder is grave,
and how it incapacitated her to comply with the duties required in marriage. There was likewise no showing of a supervening
disabling factor or debilitating psychological condition that effectively incapacitated the respondent from complying with the
essential marital obligations. At any rate, the personality flaws mentioned above, even if true, could only amount to insensitivity,
sexual infidelity, emotional immaturity, and irresponsibility, which do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Interestingly, Dr. Patac’s Psychiatric Evaluation Report highlighted only the respondent’s negative behavioral traits without
balancing them with her other qualities. The allegations of infidelity and insinuations of promiscuity, as well as the claim that the
respondent refused to engage in sexual intercourse since 1993, of course, came from the petitioner, but these claims were not
proven. Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that these accusations were true, the Psychiatric Evaluation Report did not indicate that
unfaithfulness or promiscuousness were traits that antedated or existed at the time of marriage. Likewise, the accusation that the
respondent abandoned her sick child which eventually led to the latter’s death appears to be an exaggerated claim in the absence
of any specifics and corroboration. On the other hand, the petitioner’s own questionable traits – his flirtatious nature before marriage
and his admission that he inflicted physical harm on the respondent every time he got jealous – were not pursued. From this
perspective, the Psychiatric Evaluation Report appears to be no more than a one-sided diagnosis against the respondent that we
cannot consider a reliable basis to conclusively establish the root cause and the degree of seriousness of her condition.1avvphi1

The Psychiatric Evaluation Report likewise failed to adequately explain how Dr. Patac came to the conclusion that the respondent’s
personality disorder had "no definite treatment." It did not discuss the concept of mixed personality disorder, i.e., its classification,
cause, symptoms, and cure, and failed to show how and to what extent the respondent exhibited this disorder in order to create a
necessary inference that the respondent’s condition had no definite treatment or is incurable. A glaring deficiency, to our mind, is
the Psychiatric Evaluation Report’s failure to support its findings and conclusions with any factual basis. It simply enumerated the
respondent’s perceived behavioral defects, and then associated these traits with mixed personality disorder. We find it unfortunate
that Dr. Patac himself was not called on the witness stand to expound on the findings and conclusions he made in his Psychiatric
Evaluation Report. It would have aided petitioner’s cause had he called Dr. Patac to testify.

Admittedly, the standards used by the Court in assessing the sufficiency of psychological evaluation reports may be deemed very
strict, but these are proper, in view of the principle that any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage and
the indissolubility of the marital vinculum.35 Marriage, an inviolable institution protected by the State, cannot be dissolved at the
whim of the parties, especially where the prices of evidence presented are grossly deficient to show the juridical antecedence,
gravity and incurability of the condition of the party alleged to be psychologically incapacitated to assume and perform the essential
marital duties.

The petitioner’s marriage to the respondent may have failed and appears to be without hope of reconciliation The remedy, however,
is not always to have it declared void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity. We stress that Article 36 of the Family
Code contemplates downright incapacity or inability to assume and fulfill the basic marital obligations, not a mere refusal, neglect
or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the errant spouse. It is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital
bond at the time the grounds for divorce manifest themselves. The State, fortunately or unfortunately, has not seen it fit to decree
that divorce should be available in this country. Neither should an Article 36 declaration of nullity be equated with legal separation,
in which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption,
civil interdiction, drug addiction, sexual infidelity, abandonment, and the like.36 Unless the evidence presented clearly reveals a
situation where the parties or one of them, by reason of a grave and incurable psychological illness existing at the time the marriage
was celebrated, was incapacitated to fulfill the obligations of marital life (and thus could not then have validly entered into a
marriage), then we are compelled to uphold the indissolubility of the marital tie.

WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the Decision and the Resolution of the Court of
Appeals dated May 31, 2005 and December 6, 2005, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 75207. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 168796 : April 15, 2010]

SILVINO A. LIGERALDE, PETITIONER, VS. MAY ASCENSION A. PATALINGHUG AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This petition seeks to set aside the November 30, 2004 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) which reversed the Decision[2] of
the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City (RTC) declaring the marriage between petitioner Silvino A. Ligeralde (Silvino) and
private respondent May Ascension A. Patalinghug (May) null and void.

Silvino and May got married on October 3, 1984. They were blessed with four children. Silvino claimed that, during their
marriage, he observed that May had several manifestations of a negative marital behavior. He described her as immature,
irresponsible and carefree. Her infidelity, negligence and nocturnal activities, he claimed, characterized their marital relations.

Sometime in September 1995, May arrived home at 4:00 o'clock in the morning. Her excuse was that she had watched a video
program in a neighboring town, but admitted later to have slept with her Palestinian boyfriend in a hotel. Silvino tried to persuade
her to be conscientious of her duties as wife and mother. His pleas were ignored. His persuasions would often lead to altercations
or physical violence.

In the midst of these, Silvino's deep love for her, the thought of saving their marriage for the sake of their children, and the
commitment of May to reform dissuaded him from separating from her. He still wanted to reconcile with her.

The couple started a new life. A few months after, however, he realized that their marriage was hopeless. May was back again to
her old ways. This was demonstrated when Silvino arrived home one day and learned that she was nowhere to be found. He
searched for her and found her in a nearby apartment drinking beer with a male lover.

Later, May confessed that she had no more love for him. They then lived separately.

With May's irresponsible, immature and immoral behavior, Silvino came to believe that she is psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential obligations of marriage.

Prior to the filing of the complaint, Silvino referred the matter to Dr. Tina Nicdao-Basilio for psychological evaluation. The
psychologist certified that May was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations; that the incapacity
started when she was still young and became manifest after marriage; and that the same was serious and incurable.[3]

On October 22, 1999, the RTC declared the marriage of Silvino and May null and void. Its findings were based on the
Psychological Evaluation Report of Dr. Tina Nicdao-Basilio.

The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC decision. It ruled that private respondent's alleged sexual infidelity, emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility do not constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code and that
the psychologist failed to identify and prove the root cause thereof or that the incapacity was medically or clinically permanent or
incurable.

Hence, this petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

The core issue raised by petitioner Silvino Ligeralde is that "the assailed order of the CA is based on conjecture and, therefore,
issued without jurisdiction, in excess of jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction."[4]

The Court required the private respondent to comment but she failed to do so. Efforts were exerted to locate her but to no avail.

Nevertheless, the petition is technically and substantially flawed. On procedural grounds, the Court agrees with the public
respondent that the petitioner should have filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 instead of this petition for
certiorari under Rule 65. For having availed of the wrong remedy, this petition deserves outright dismissal.

Substantially, the petition has no merit. In order to avail of the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised
Rules of Court,[5] the petitioner must clearly show that the public respondent acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess in jurisdiction. By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious or whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where
the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. In sum, for the extraordinary writ
of certiorari to lie, there must be capricious, arbitrary or whimsical exercise of power. [6]

In this case at bench, the Court finds no commission of a grave abuse of discretion in the rendition of the assailed CA decision
dismissing petitioner's complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. Upon close scrutiny
of the records, we find nothing whimsical, arbitrary or capricious in its findings.

A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is anchored on Article 36 of the Family Code which provides:

ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

Psychological incapacity required by Art. 36 must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence and (c) incurability.
The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in
marriage. It must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only
after the marriage. It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party
involved.[7] The Court likewise laid down the guidelines in resolving petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage, based on
Article 36 of the Family Code, in Republic v. Court of Appeals.[8] Relevant to this petition are the following:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff; (2) the root cause of the psychological
incapacity must be medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts and clearly
explained in the decision; (3) the incapacity must be proven to be existing at the "time of the celebration" of the marriage; (4)
such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable; and (5) such illness must be grave
enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage.

Guided by these pronouncements, it is the Court's considered view that petitioner's evidence failed to establish respondent May's
psychological incapacity.

Petitioner's testimony did not prove the root cause, gravity and incurability of private respondent's condition. Even Dr. Nicdao-
Basilio failed to show the root cause of her psychological incapacity. The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be
identified as a psychological illness, its incapacitating nature fully explained and established by the totality of the evidence
presented during trial.[9]

More importantly, the acts of private respondent do not even rise to the level of the "psychological incapacity" that the law
requires. Private respondent's act of living an adulterous life cannot automatically be equated with a psychological disorder,
especially when no specific evidence was shown that promiscuity was a trait already existing at the inception of marriage.
Petitioner must be able to establish that respondent's unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a disordered personality, which makes
her completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state. [10]

Doubtless, the private respondent was far from being a perfect wife and a good mother. She certainly had some character flaws.
But these imperfections do not warrant a conclusion that she had a psychological malady at the time of the marriage that rendered
her incapable of fulfilling her marital and family duties and obligations. [11]

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 173138 December 1, 2010

NOEL B. BACCAY, Petitioner,

vs.
MARIBEL C. BACCAY and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, assails the Decision1 dated
August 26, 2005 and Resolution2 dated June 13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 74581. The CA reversed
the February 5, 2002 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 38, which declared the marriage of petitioner
Noel B. Baccay (Noel) and Maribel Calderon-Baccay (Maribel) void on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 364 of
the Family Code of the Philippines.

The undisputed factual antecedents of the case are as follows:

Noel and Maribel were schoolmates at the Mapua Institute of Technology where both took up Electronics and Communications
Engineering. Sometime in 1990, they were introduced by a mutual friend and became close to one another. Noel courted Maribel,
but it was only after years of continuous pursuit that Maribel accepted Noel’s proposal and the two became sweethearts. Noel
considered Maribel as the snobbish and hard-to-get type, which traits he found attractive.5

Noel’s family was aware of their relationship for he used to bring Maribel to their house. Noel observed that Maribel was
inordinately shy when around his family so to bring her closer to them, he always invited Maribel to attend family gatherings and
other festive occasions like birthdays, Christmas, and fiesta celebrations. Maribel, however, would try to avoid Noel’s invitations
and whenever she attended those occasions with Noel’s family, he observed that Maribel was invariably aloof or snobbish. Not
once did she try to get close to any of his family members. Noel would talk to Maribel about her attitude towards his family and
she would promise to change, but she never did.

Around 1997, Noel decided to break up with Maribel because he was already involved with another woman. He tried to break up
with Maribel, but Maribel refused and offered to accept Noel’s relationship with the other woman so long as they would not sever
their ties. To give Maribel some time to get over their relationship, they still continued to see each other albeit on a friendly basis.

Despite their efforts to keep their meetings strictly friendly, however, Noel and Maribel had several romantic moments together.
Noel took these episodes of sexual contact casually since Maribel never demanded anything from him except his company. Then,
sometime in November 1998, Maribel informed Noel that she was pregnant with his child. Upon advice of his mother, Noel
grudgingly agreed to marry Maribel. Noel and Maribel were immediately wed on November 23, 1998 before Judge Gregorio
Dayrit, the Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City.

After the marriage ceremony, Noel and Maribel agreed to live with Noel’s family in their house at Rosal, Pag-asa, Quezon City.
During all the time she lived with Noel’s family, Maribel remained aloof and did not go out of her way to endear herself to them.
She would just come and go from the house as she pleased. Maribel never contributed to the family’s coffer leaving Noel to shoulder
all expenses for their support. Also, she refused to have any sexual contact with Noel.

Surprisingly, despite Maribel’s claim of being pregnant, Noel never observed any symptoms of pregnancy in her. He asked
Maribel’s office mates whether she manifested any signs of pregnancy and they confirmed that she showed no such signs. Then,
sometime in January 1999, Maribel did not go home for a day, and when she came home she announced to Noel and his family
that she had a miscarriage and was confined at the Chinese General Hospital where her sister worked as a nurse.

Noel confronted her about her alleged miscarriage sometime in February 1999. The discussion escalated into an intense quarrel
which woke up the whole household. Noel’s mother tried to intervene but Maribel shouted "Putang ina nyo, wag kayo makialam"
at her. Because of this, Noel’s mother asked them to leave her house. Around 2:30 a.m., Maribel called her parents and asked them
to pick her up. Maribel left Noel’s house and did not come back anymore. Noel tried to communicate with Maribel but when he
went to see her at her house nobody wanted to talk to him and she rejected his phone calls. 6
On September 11, 2000 or after less than two years of marriage, Noel filed a petition 7 for declaration of nullity of marriage with
the RTC of Manila. Despite summons, Maribel did not participate in the proceedings. The trial proceeded after the public prosecutor
manifested that no collusion existed between the parties. Despite a directive from the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) also did not submit a certification manifesting its agreement or opposition to the case.8

On February 5, 2002, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of Noel. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage of the parties hereto celebrated on November 23, 1998 at the
sala of Judge Gregorio Dayrit of the Metropolitan Trial Court in Quezon City as NULL and VOID.

The Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and the Chief of the National Statistics Office are hereby directed to record and enter
this decree into the marriage records of the parties in their respective marriage registers.

The absolute community property of the parties is hereby dissolved and, henceforth, they shall be governed by the property regime
of complete separation of property.

With costs against respondent.

SO ORDERED.9

The RTC found that Maribel failed to perform the essential marital obligations of marriage, and such failure was due to a personality
disorder called Narcissistic Personality Disorder characterized by juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability as determined by
a clinical psychologist. The RTC cited the findings of Nedy L. Tayag, a clinical psychologist presented as witness by Noel, that
Maribel was a very insecure person. She entered into the marriage not because of emotional desire for marriage but to prove
something, and her attitude was exploitative particularly in terms of financial rewards. She was emotionally immature, and viewed
marriage as a piece of paper and that she can easily get rid of her husband without any provocation. 10

On appeal by the OSG, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC, thus:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila Branch 38 declaring as null and void
the marriage between petitioner-appellee and respondent is hereby REVERSED. Accordingly, the instant Petition for Declaration
of Nullity of Marriage is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.11

The appellate court held that Noel failed to establish that Maribel’s supposed Narcissistic Personality Disorder was the
psychological incapacity contemplated by law and that it was permanent and incurable. Maribel’s attitudes were merely mild
peculiarities in character or signs of ill-will and refusal or neglect to perform marital obligations which did not amount to
psychological incapacity, said the appellate court. The CA noted that Maribel may have failed or refused to perform her marital
obligations but such did not indicate incapacity. The CA stressed that the law requires nothing short of mental illness sufficient to
render a person incapable of knowing the essential marital obligations. 12

The CA further held that Maribel’s refusal to have sexual intercourse with Noel did not constitute a ground to find her
psychologically incapacitated under Article 36 of the Family Code. As Noel admitted, he had numerous sexual relations with
Maribel before their marriage. Maribel therefore cannot be said to be incapacitated to perform this particular obligation and that
such incapacity existed at the time of marriage.13

Incidentally, the CA held that the OSG erred in saying that what Noel should have filed was an action to annul the marriage under
Article 45 (3)14 of the Family Code. According to the CA, Article 45 (3) involving consent to marriage vitiated by fraud is limited
to the instances enumerated under Article 4615 of the Family Code. Maribel’s misrepresentation that she was pregnant to induce
Noel to marry her was not the fraud contemplated under Article 45 (3) as it was not among the instances enumerated under Article
46.16

On June 13, 2006, the CA denied Noel’s motion for reconsideration. It held that Maribel’s personality disorder is not the
psychological incapacity contemplated by law. Her refusal to perform the essential marital obligations may be attributed merely to
her stubborn refusal to do so. Also, the manifestations of the Narcissistic Personality Disorder had no connection with Maribel’s
failure to perform her marital obligations. Noel having failed to prove Maribel’s alleged psychological incapacity, any doubts
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.17

Hence, the present petition raising the following assignment of errors:

I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT THE
CASE OF CHI MING TSOI vs. COURT OF APPEALS DOES NOT FIND APPLICATION IN THE INSTANT CASE.

II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT THE
RESPONDENT IS NOT SUFFERING FROM NARCISSISTIC PERSONALITY DISORDER; AND THAT HER FAILURE TO
PERFORM HER ESSENTIAL MARITAL OBLIGATIONS DOES NOT CONSTITUTE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY. 18

The issue to be resolved is whether the marriage between the parties is null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Petitioner Noel contends that the CA failed to consider Maribel’s refusal to procreate as psychological incapacity. Insofar as he
was concerned, the last time he had sexual intercourse with Maribel was before the marriage when she was drunk. They never had
any sexual intimacy during their marriage. Noel claims that if a spouse senselessly and constantly refuses to perform his or her
marital obligations, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity rather than to stubborn refusal. He
insists that the CA should not have considered the pre-marital sexual encounters between him and Maribel in finding that the latter
was not psychologically incapacitated to procreate through marital sexual cooperation. He argues that making love for procreation
and consummation of the marriage for the start of family life is different from "plain, simple and casual sex." He further stresses
that Maribel railroaded him into marrying her by seducing him and later claiming that she was pregnant with his child. But after
their marriage, Maribel refused to consummate their marriage as she would not be sexually intimate with him. 19

Noel further claims that there were other indicia of Maribel’s psychological incapacity and that she consistently exhibited several
traits typical of a person suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder before and during their marriage. He points out that
Maribel would only mingle with a few individuals and never with Noel’s family even if they lived under one (1) roof. Maribel was
also arrogant and haughty. She was rude and disrespectful to his mother and was also "interpersonally exploitative" as shown by
her misrepresentation of pregnancy to force Noel to marry her. After marriage, Maribel never showed respect and love to Noel and
his family. She displayed indifference to his emotional and sexual needs, but before the marriage she would display unfounded
jealousy when Noel was visited by his friends. This same jealousy motivated her to deceive him into marrying her.

Lastly, he points out that Maribel’s psychological incapacity was proven to be permanent and incurable with the root cause existing
before the marriage. The psychologist testified that persons suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder were unmotivated to
participate in therapy session and would reject any form of psychological help rendering their condition long lasting if not incurable.
Such persons would not admit that their behavioral manifestations connote pathology or abnormality. The psychologist added that
Maribel’s psychological incapacity was deeply rooted within her adaptive system since early childhood and manifested during
adult life. Maribel was closely attached to her parents and mingled with only a few close individuals. Her close attachment to her
parents and their over-protection of her turned her into a self-centered, self-absorbed individual who was insensitive to the needs
of others. She developed the tendency not to accept rejection or failure. 20

On the other hand, the OSG maintains that Maribel’s refusal to have sexual intercourse with Noel did not constitute psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code as her traits were merely mild peculiarities in her character or signs of ill-will and
refusal or neglect to perform her marital obligations. The psychologist even admitted that Maribel was capable of entering into
marriage except that it would be difficult for her to sustain one. Also, it was established that Noel and Maribel had sexual relations
prior to their marriage. The OSG further pointed out that the psychologist was vague as to how Maribel’s refusal to have sexual
intercourse with Noel constituted Narcissistic Personality Disorder.

The petition lacks merit.

Article 36 of the Family Code provides:

ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.

The Court held in Santos v. Court of Appeals21 that the phrase "psychological incapacity" is not meant to comprehend all possible
cases of psychoses. It refers to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly noncognitive of the
basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as expressed by
Article 6822 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help
and support. The intendment of the law has been to confine it to the most serious of cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.

In Republic of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals,23 the Court laid down the guidelines in resolving petitions for declaration of nullity
of marriage, based on Article 36 of the Family Code, to wit:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution
and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family,
recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution
at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes
their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity
must be psychological – not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince
the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known
the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such
incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless
such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be
given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the
illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do’s." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time,
but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.1avvphi1 Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to
marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses
of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her
own children as an essential obligation of marriage.1avvphi1

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The
illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words,
there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband
and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. x x x.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No
decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly
stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with
the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed
submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor
vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095. (Emphasis ours.)

In this case, the totality of evidence presented by Noel was not sufficient to sustain a finding that Maribel was psychologically
incapacitated. Noel’s evidence merely established that Maribel refused to have sexual intercourse with him after their marriage,
and that she left him after their quarrel when he confronted her about her alleged miscarriage. He failed to prove the root cause of
the alleged psychological incapacity and establish the requirements of gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. As correctly
observed by the CA, the report of the psychologist, who concluded that Maribel was suffering from Narcissistic Personality
Disorder traceable to her experiences during childhood, did not establish how the personality disorder incapacitated Maribel from
validly assuming the essential obligations of the marriage. Indeed, the same psychologist even testified that Maribel was capable
of entering into a marriage except that it would be difficult for her to sustain one. 24 Mere difficulty, it must be stressed, is not the
incapacity contemplated by law.

The Court emphasizes that the burden falls upon petitioner, not just to prove that private respondent suffers from a psychological
disorder, but also that such psychological disorder renders her "truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly
must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage."25 Psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty,"
a "refusal," or a "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. An unsatisfactory marriage is not a null and void
marriage. As we stated in Marcos v. Marcos:26

Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes
therefor manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the
marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume. x x x.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 74581 is AFFIRMED and
UPHELD.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 185286 August 18, 2010

MA. SOCORRO CAMACHO-REYES, Petitioner,

vs.
RAMON REYES, Respondent.

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

This case is, again, an instance of the all-too-familiar tale of a marriage in disarray.

In this regard, we air the caveat that courts should be extra careful before making a finding of psychological incapacity or
vicariously diagnosing personality disorders in spouses where there are none. On the other hand, blind adherence by the courts to
the exhortation in the Constitution1 and in our statutes that marriage is an inviolable social

institution, and validating a marriage that is null and void despite convincing proof of psychological incapacity, trenches on the
very reason why a marriage that is doomed from its inception should not be forcibly inflicted upon its hapless partners for life.

At bar is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA -G.R. CV No. 897612 which
reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 89, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-01-44854.3

First, we unfurl the facts.

Petitioner Maria Socorro Camacho-Reyes met respondent Ramon Reyes at the University of the Philippines (UP), Diliman, in 1972
when they were both nineteen (19) years old. They were simply classmates then in one university subject when respondent cross-
enrolled from the UP Los Baños campus. The casual acquaintanceship quickly developed into a boyfriend-girlfriend relationship.
Petitioner was initially attracted to respondent who she thought was free spirited and bright, although he did not follow conventions
and traditions.4 Since both resided in Mandaluyong City, they saw each other every day and drove home together from the
university.

Easily impressed, petitioner enjoyed respondent’s style of courtship which included dining out, unlike other couples their age who
were restricted by a university student’s budget. At that time, respondent held a job in the family business, the Aristocrat Restaurant.
Petitioner’s good impression of the respondent was not diminished by the latter’s habit of cutting classes, not even by her discovery
that respondent was taking marijuana.

Not surprisingly, only petitioner finished university studies, obtaining a degree in AB Sociology from the UP. By 1974, respondent
had dropped out of school on his third year, and just continued to work for the Aristocrat Restaurant.

On December 5, 1976, the year following petitioner’s graduation and her father’s death, petitioner and respondent got married. At
that time, petitioner was already five (5) months pregnant and employed at the Population Center Foundation.

Thereafter, the newlyweds lived with the respondent’s family in Mandaluyong City. All living expenses were shouldered by
respondent’s parents, and the couple’s respective salaries were spent solely for their personal needs. Initially, respondent gave
petitioner a monthly allowance of ₱1,500.00 from his salary.

When their first child was born on March 22, 1977, financial difficulties started. Rearing a child entailed expenses. A year into
their marriage, the monthly allowance of ₱1,500.00 from respondent stopped. Further, respondent no longer handed his salary to
petitioner. When petitioner mustered enough courage to ask the respondent about this, the latter told her that he had resigned due
to slow advancement within the family business. Respondent’s game plan was to venture into trading seafood in the province,
supplying hotels and restaurants, including the Aristocrat Restaurant. However, this new business took respondent away from his
young family for days on end without any communication. Petitioner simply endured the set up, hoping that the situation will
change.
To prod respondent into assuming more responsibility, petitioner suggested that they live separately from her in-laws. However,
the new living arrangement engendered further financial difficulty. While petitioner struggled to make ends meet as the single-
income earner of the household, respondent’s business floundered. Thereafter, another attempt at business, a fishpond in Mindoro,
was similarly unsuccessful. Respondent gave money to petitioner sporadically. Compounding the family’s financial woes and
further straining the parties’ relationship was the indifferent attitude of respondent towards his family. That his business took him
away from his family did not seem to bother respondent; he did not exert any effort to remain in touch with them while he was
away in Mindoro.

After two (2) years of struggling, the spouses transferred residence and, this time, moved in with petitioner’s mother. But the new
set up did not end their marital difficulties. In fact, the parties became more estranged. Petitioner continued to carry the burden of
supporting a family not just financially, but in most aspects as well.

In 1985, petitioner, who had previously suffered a miscarriage, gave birth to their third son. At that time, respondent was in Mindoro
and he did not even inquire on the health of either the petitioner or the newborn. A week later, respondent arrived in Manila, acting
nonchalantly while playing with the baby, with nary an attempt to find out how the hospital bills were settled.

In 1989, due to financial reverses, respondent’s fishpond business stopped operations. Although without any means to support his
family, respondent refused to go back to work for the family business. Respondent came up with another business venture, engaging
in scrap paper and carton trading. As with all of respondent’s business ventures, this did not succeed and added to the trail of debt
which now hounded not only respondent, but petitioner as well. Not surprisingly, the relationship of the parties deteriorated.

Sometime in 1996, petitioner confirmed that respondent was having an extra-marital affair. She overheard respondent talking to
his girlfriend, a former secretary, over the phone inquiring if the latter liked respondent’s gift to her. Petitioner soon realized that
respondent was not only unable to provide financially for their family, but he was, more importantly, remiss in his obligation to
remain faithful to her and their family.

One of the last episodes that sealed the fate of the parties’ marriage was a surgical operation on petitioner for the removal of a cyst.
Although his wife was about to be operated on, respondent remained unconcerned and unattentive; and simply read the newspaper,
and played dumb when petitioner requested that he accompany her as she was wheeled into the operating room. After the operation,
petitioner felt that she had had enough of respondent’s lack of concern, and asked her mother to order respondent to leave the
recovery room.

Still, petitioner made a string of "final" attempts to salvage what was left of their marriage. Petitioner approached respondent’s
siblings and asked them to intervene, confessing that she was near the end of her rope. Yet, even respondent’s siblings waved the
white flag on respondent.

Adolfo Reyes, respondent’s elder brother, and his spouse, Peregrina, members of a marriage encounter group, invited and sponsored
the parties to join the group. The elder couple scheduled counseling sessions with petitioner and respondent, but these did not
improve the parties’ relationship as respondent remained uncooperative.

In 1997, Adolfo brought respondent to Dr. Natividad A. Dayan for a psychological assessment to "determine benchmarks of current
psychological functioning." As with all other attempts to help him, respondent resisted and did not continue with the clinical
psychologist’s recommendation to undergo psychotherapy.

At about this time, petitioner, with the knowledge of respondent’s siblings, told respondent to move out of their house. Respondent
acquiesced to give space to petitioner.

With the de facto separation, the relationship still did not improve. Neither did respondent’s relationship with his children.

Finally, in 2001,5 petitioner filed (before the RTC) a petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage with the respondent,
alleging the latter’s psychological incapacity to fulfill the essential marital obligations under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Traversing the petition, respondent denied petitioner’s allegations that he was psychologically incapacitated. Respondent
maintained that he was not remiss in performing his obligations to his family—both as a spouse to petitioner and father to their
children.
After trial (where the testimonies of two clinical psychologists, Dr. Dayan and Dr. Estrella Magno, and a psychiatrist, Dr. Cecilia
Villegas, were presented in evidence), the RTC granted the petition and declared the marriage between the parties null and void on
the ground of their psychological incapacity. The trial court ruled, thus:

Wherefore, on the ground of psychological incapacity of both parties, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the marriage
between petitioner MA. SOCORRO PERPETUA CAMACHO and respondent RAMON REYES contracted on December 4, 1976
at the Archbishop’s Chapel Villa San Miguel Mandaluyong, Rizal, is declared null and void under Art. 36 of the Family Code, as
amended. Henceforth, their property relation is dissolved.

Parties are restored to their single or unmarried status.

Their children JESUS TEODORO CAMACHO REYES and JOSEPH MICHAEL CAMACHO REYES, who are already of age
and have the full civil capacity and legal rights to decide for themselves having finished their studies, are free to decide for
themselves.

The Decision becomes final upon the expiration of fifteen (15) days from notice to the parties. Entry of Judgment shall be made if
no Motion for Reconsideration or New Trial or Appeal is filed by any of the parties, the Public Prosecutor or the Solicitor General.

Upon finality of this Decision, the Court shall forthwith issue the corresponding Decree if the parties have no properties[.]
[O]therwise, the Court shall observe the procedure prescribed in Section 21 of AM 02-11-10 SC.

The Decree of Nullity quoting the dispositive portion of the Decision (Sec. 22 AM 02-11-10 SC) shall be issued by the Court only
after compliance with Articles 50 & 51 of the Family Code as implemented under the Rules on Liquidation, Partition and
Distribution of Property (Sections 19 & 21, AM 02-11-10 SC) in a situation where the parties have properties.

The Entry of Judgment of this Decision shall be registered in the Local Civil Registry of Mandaluyong and Quezon City.

Let [a] copy of this Decision be furnished the parties, their counsel, the Office of the Solicitor General, the Public Prosecutor, the
Office of the Local Civil Registrar, Mandaluyong City, the Office of the Local Civil Registrar, Quezon City and the Civil Registrar
General at their respective office addresses.

SO ORDERED.6

Finding no cogent reason to reverse its prior ruling, the trial court, on motion for reconsideration of the respondent, affirmed the
declaration of nullity of the parties’ marriage.

Taking exception to the trial court’s rulings, respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals, adamant on the validity of his marriage
to petitioner. The appellate court, agreeing with the respondent, reversed the RTC and declared the parties’ marriage as valid and
subsisting. Significantly, a special division of five (two members dissenting from the majority decision and voting to affirm the
decision of the RTC) ruled, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 23, 2007 and Order dated July 13, 2007
of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 89 in Civil Case No. Q-01-44854 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Amended Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage is hereby DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs. 7

Undaunted by the setback, petitioner now appeals to this Court positing the following issues:

I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT RESPONDENT IS PSYCHOLOGICALLY
INCAPACITATED TO COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL OBLIGATIONS OF MARRIAGE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT PETITIONER IS LIKEWISE
PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL OBLIGATIONS OF
MARRIAGE.
III
 THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT DISREGARDED THE TESTIMONIES OF THE EXPERT
WITNESSES PRESENTED BY PETITIONER.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT
ARE BINDING ON IT.
V
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE TOTALITY OF THE EVIDENCE
PRESENTED DULY ESTABLISHED THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITIES OF THE PARTIES TO
COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL OBLIGATIONS OF MARRIAGE.
VI
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITIES
OF THE PARTIES TO COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL OBLIGATIONS OF MARRIAGE WERE
ESTABLISHED, NOT MERELY BY A TOTALITY, BUT BY A PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE.
VII
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE PARTIES’ MARRIAGE, WHICH IS
UNDOUBTEDLY VOID AB INITIO UNDER ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE, DOES NOT
FURTHER THE INITIATIVES OF THE STATE CONCERNING MARRIAGE AND FAMILY AND
THEREFORE, NOT COVERED BY THE MANTLE OF THE CONSTITUTION ON THE PROTECTION
OF MARRIAGE.
VIII
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE AMENDED PETITION WAS
VALIDLY AMENDED TO CONFORM TO EVIDENCE.8

Essentially, petitioner raises the singular issue of whether the marriage between the parties is void ab initio on the ground of both
parties’ psychological incapacity, as provided in Article 36 of the Family Code.

In declaring the marriage null and void, the RTC relied heavily on the oral and documentary evidence obtained from the three (3)
experts i.e., Doctors Magno, Dayan and Villegas. The RTC ratiocinated, thus:

After a careful evaluation of the entire evidence presented, the Court finds merit in the petition.

Article 36 of the Family Code reads:

"A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after solemnization."

and Art. 68 of the same Code provides:

"The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support."

Similarly, Articles 69-71 further define the mutual obligations of a marital partner towards each other and Articles 220, 225 and
271 of the Family Code express the duties of parents toward their children.

Article 36 does not define what psychological incapacity means. It left the determination of the same solely to the Court on a case
to case basis.

xxxx

Taking into consideration the explicit guidelines in the determination of psychological incapacity in conjunction to the totality of
the evidence presented, with emphasis on the pervasive pattern of behaviors of the respondent and outcome of the
assessment/diagnos[is] of expert witnesses, Dra. Dayan, Dra. Mango and Dra. Villegas on the psychological condition of the
respondent, the Court finds that the marriage between the parties from its inception has a congenital infirmity termed "psychological
incapacity" which pertains to the inability of the parties to effectively function emotionally, intellectually and socially towards each
other in relation to their essential duties to mutually observe love, fidelity and respect as well as to mutually render help and support,
(Art. 68 Family Code). In short, there was already a fixed niche in the psychological constellation of respondent which created the
death of his marriage. There is no reason to entertain any slightest doubt on the truthfulness of the personality disorder of the
respondent.

The three expert witnesses have spoken. They were unanimous in their findings that respondent is suffering from personality
disorder which psychologically incapacitated him to fulfill his basic duties to the marriage. Being professionals and hav[ing] solemn
duties to their profession, the Court considered their assessment/diagnos[is] as credible or a product of an honest evaluation on the
psychological status of the respondent. This psychological incapacity of the respondent, in the uniform words of said three (3)
expert witnesses, is serious, incurable and exists before his marriage and renders him a helpless victim of his structural constellation.
It is beyond the respondent’s impulse control. In short, he is weaponless or powerless to restrain himself from his consistent
behaviors simply because he did not consider the same as wrongful. This is clearly manifested from his assertion that nothing was
wrong in his marriage with the petitioner and considered their relationship as a normal one. In fact, with this belief, he lent deaf
ears to counseling and efforts extended to them by his original family members to save his marriage. In short, he was blind and too
insensitive to the reality of his marital atmosphere. He totally disregarded the feelings of petitioner who appeared to have been
saturated already that she finally revealed her misfortunes to her sister-in-law and willingly submitted to counseling to save their
marriage. However, the hard position of the respondent finally constrained her to ask respondent to leave the conjugal dwelling.
Even the siblings of the respondent were unanimous that separation is the remedy to the seriously ailing marriage of the parties.
Respondent confirmed this stand of his siblings.

The process of an ideal atmosphere demands a give and take relationship and not a one sided one. It also requires surrender to the
fulfillment of the essential duties to the marriage which must naturally be observed by the parties as a consequence of their marriage.
Unfortunately, the more than 21 years of marriage between the parties did not create a monument of marital integrity, simply
because the personality disorder of the respondent which renders him psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his basic duties to his
marriage, is deeply entombed in his structural system and cure is not possible due to his belief that there is nothing wrong with
them.

The checkered life of the parties is not solely attributable to the respondent. Petitioner, too, is to be blamed. Dra. Villegas was firm
that she, too, is afflicted with psychological incapacity as her personality cannot be harmonized with the personality of the
respondent. They are poles apart. Petitioner is a well-organized person or a perfectionist while respondent is a free spirited or
carefree person. Thus, the weakness of the respondent cannot be catered by the petitioner and vice-versa.

Resultantly, the psychological incapacities of both parties constitute the thunder bolt or principal culprit on their inability to nurture
and reward their marital life with meaning and significance. So much so that it is a pity that though their marriage is intact for 21
years, still it is an empty kingdom due to their psychological incapacity which is grave, incurable and has origin from unhealthy
event in their growing years.

Both parties to the marriage are protected by the law. As human beings, they are entitled to live in a peaceful and orderly
environment conducive to a healthy life. In fact, Article 72 of the Family Code provides remedy to any party aggrieved by their
marital reality. The case of the parties is already a settled matter due to their psychological incapacity. In the words of Dra. Magno,
their marriage, at the very inception, was already at the funeral parlor. Stated differently, there was no life at all in their marriage
for it never existed at all. The Court finds that with this reality, both parties suffer in agony by continuously sustaining a marriage
that exists in paper only. Hence, it could no longer chain or jail the parties whose marriage remains in its crib with its boots and
diaper due to factors beyond the physical, emotional, intellectual and social ability of the parties to sustain. 9

In a complete turnaround, albeit disposing of the case through a divided decision, the appellate court diverged from the findings of
the RTC in this wise:

On the basis of the guidelines [in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina] vis-à-vis the totality of evidence presented by herein
[petitioner], we find that the latter failed to sufficiently establish the alleged psychological incapacity of her husband, as well as of
herself. There is thus no basis for declaring the nullity of their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.

[Petitioner] presented several expert witnesses to show that [respondent] is psychologically incapacitated. Clinical psychologist
Dayan diagnosed [respondent] as purportedly suffering from Mixed Personality Disorder (Schizoid Narcissistic and Anti-Social
Personality Disorder). Further, clinical psychologist Magno found [respondent] to be suffering from an Antisocial Personality
Disorder with narcissistic and dependent features, while Dr. Villegas diagnosed [respondent] to be suffering from Personality
Disorder of the anti-social type, associated with strong sense of Inadequacy especially along masculine strivings and narcissistic
features.
Generally, expert opinions are regarded, not as conclusive, but as purely advisory in character. A court may place whatever weight
it chooses upon such testimonies. It may even reject them, if it finds that they are inconsistent with the facts of the case or are
otherwise unreasonable. In the instant case, neither clinical psychologist Magno nor psychiatrist Dr. Villegas conducted a
psychological examination on the [respondent].

Undoubtedly, the assessment and conclusion made by Magno and Dr. Villegas are hearsay. They are "unscientific and unreliable"
as they have no personal knowledge of the psychological condition of the [respondent] as they never personally examined the
[respondent] himself.

[I]t can be gleaned from the recommendation of Dayan that the purported psychological incapacity of [respondent] is not incurable
as the [petitioner] would like this Court to think. It bears stressing that [respondent] was referred to Dayan for "psychological
evaluation to determine benchmarks of current psychological functioning." The undeniable fact is that based on Dayan’s personal
examination of the [respondent], the assessment procedures used, behavioral observations made, background information gathered
and interpretation of psychological data, the conclusion arrived at is that there is a way to help the [respondent] through individual
therapy and counseling sessions.

Even granting arguendo that the charges cast by the [petitioner] on [respondent], such as his failure to give regular support,
substance abuse, infidelity and "come and go" attitude are true, the totality of the evidence presented still falls short of establishing
that [respondent] is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations within the contemplation of
Article 36 of the Family Code.

In the case at bar, we hold that the court a quo’s findings regarding the [respondent’s] alleged mixed personality disorder, his "come
and go" attitude, failed business ventures, inadequate/delayed financial support to his family, sexual infidelity, insensitivity to
[petitioner’s] feelings, irresponsibility, failure to consult [petitioner] on his business pursuits, unfulfilled promises, failure to pay
debts in connection with his failed business activities, taking of drugs, etc. are not rooted on some debilitating psychological
condition but on serious marital difficulties/differences and mere refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. [Respondent’s] "defects" were not present at the inception of marriage. They were even able to live in harmony in the
first few years of their marriage, which bore them two children xxx. In fact, [petitioner] admitted in her Amended Petition that
initially they lived comfortably and [respondent] would give his salary in keeping with the tradition in most Filipino households,
but the situation changed when [respondent] resigned from the family-owned Aristocrat Restaurant and thereafter, [respondent]
failed in his business ventures. It appears, however, that [respondent] has been gainfully employed with Marigold Corporation, Inc.
since 1998, which fact was stipulated upon by the [petitioner].

As regards the purported psychological incapacity of [petitioner], Dr. Villegas’ Psychiatric Report states that [petitioner]
"manifested inadequacies along her affective sphere, that made her less responsive to the emotional needs of her husband, who
needed a great amount of it, rendering her relatively psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities of
marriage.

However, a perusal of the Amended Petition shows that it failed to specifically allege the complete facts showing that petitioner
was psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage at the time of celebration
[thereof] even if such incapacity became manifest only after its celebration xxx. In fact, what was merely prayed for in the said
Amended Petition is that judgment be rendered "declaring the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent solemnized on
04 December 1976 to be void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of the respondent at the time of the
celebration of marriage

What is evident is that [petitioner] really encountered a lot of difficulties in their marriage. However, it is jurisprudentially settled
that psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," a "refusal" or a "neglect" in the performance of some marital
obligations, it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological illness existing at the
time of the celebration of the marriage.

While [petitioner’s] marriage with [respondent] failed and appears to be without hope of reconciliation, the remedy, however, is
not always to have it declared void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity. An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is
not a null and void marriage. No less than the Constitution recognizes the sanctity of marriage and the unity of the family; it decrees
marriage as legally "inviolable" and protects it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be
"protected" by the State.
Thus, in determining the import of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36, it must be read in conjunction with, although to be
taken as distinct from Articles 35, 37, 38 and 41 that would likewise, but for different reasons, render the marriage void ab initio,
or Article 45 that would make the marriage merely voidable, or Article 55 that could justify a petition for legal separation. Care
must be observed so that these various circumstances are not applied so indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent on the matter.
Article 36 should not be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves.

It remains settled that the State has a high stake in the preservation of marriage rooted in its recognition of the sanctity of married
life and its mission to protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. Hence, any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. 10

After a thorough review of the records of the case, we cannot subscribe to the appellate court’s ruling that the psychological
incapacity of respondent was not sufficiently established. We disagree with its decision declaring the marriage between the parties
as valid and subsisting. Accordingly, we grant the petition.

Santos v. Court of Appeals11 solidified the jurisprudential foundation of the principle that the factors characterizing psychological
incapacity to perform the essential marital obligations are: (1) gravity, (2) juridical antecedence, and (3) incurability. We explained:

The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in
marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only
after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.12

As previously adverted to, the three experts were one in diagnosing respondent with a personality disorder, to wit:

1. Dra. Cecilia C. Villegas

PSYCHODYNAMICS OF THE CASE

[Petitioner] is the second among 6 siblings of educated parents. Belonging to an average social status,
intellectual achievement is quite important to the family values (sic). All children were equipped with high
intellectual potentials (sic) which made their parents proud of them. Father was disabled, but despite his
handicap, he was able to assume his financial and emotional responsibilities to his family and to a limited
extent, his social functions (sic). Despite this, he has been described as the unseen strength in the family.
Mother [of petitioner] was [actively involved] in activities outside the home. Doing volunteer and community
services, she was not the demonstrative, affectionate and the emotional mother (sic). Her love and concern
came in the form of positive attitudes, advices (sic) and encouragements (sic), but not the caressing, sensitive
and soothing touches of an emotional reaction (sic). Psychological home environment did not permit one to
nurture a hurt feeling or depression, but one has to stand up and to help himself (sic). This trained her to
subjugate (sic) emotions to reasons.
Because of her high intellectual endowment, she has easy facilities for any undertakings (sic). She is organized,
planned (sic), reliable, dependable, systematic, prudent, loyal, competent and has a strong sense of duty (sic).
But emotionally, she is not as sensitive. Her analytical resources and strong sense of objectivity predisposed
her to a superficial adjustments (sic). She acts on the dictates of her mind and reason, and less of how she feels
(sic). The above qualities are perfect for a leader, but less effective in a heterosexual relationship, especially to
her husband, who has deep seated sense of inadequacy, insecurity, low self esteem and self-worth despite his
intellectual assets (sic). Despite this, [petitioner] remained in her marriage for more than 20 years, trying to
reach out and lending a hand for better understanding and relationship (sic). She was hoping for the time when
others, like her husband would make decision for her (sic), instead of being depended upon. But the more
[petitioner] tried to compensate for [respondent’s] shortcomings, the bigger was the discrepancy in their coping
mechanisms (sic). At the end, [petitioner] felt unloved, unappreciated, uncared for and she characterized their
marriage as very much lacking in relationship (sic).
On the other hand, [respondent] is the 9th of 11 siblings and belonged to the second set of brood (sic), where
there were less bounds (sic) and limitations during his growing up stage. Additionally, he was acknowledged
as the favorite of his mother, and was described to have a close relationship with her. At an early age, he
manifested clinical behavior of conduct disorder and was on marijuana regularly. Despite his apparent high
intellectual potentials (sic), he felt that he needed a "push" to keep him going. His being a "free spirit", attracted
[petitioner], who adored him for being able to do what he wanted, without being bothered by untraditional,
unacceptable norms and differing ideas from other people. He presented no guilt feelings, no remorse, no
 anxiety for whatever wrongdoings he has committed. His studies proved too much of a pressure for him, and
quit at the middle of his course, despite his apparent high intellectual resources (sic).
His marriage to [petitioner] became a bigger pressure. Trying to prove his worth, he quit work from his family
employment and ventured on his own. With no much planning and project study, his businesses failed. This
became the sources (sic) of their marital conflicts, the lack of relationships (sic) and consultations (sic) with
each other, his negativistic attitudes (sic) and sarcasm, stubbornness and insults, his spitting at her face which
impliedly meant "you are nothing as compared to me" were in reality, his defenses for a strong sense of
inadequacy (sic).
As described by [petitioner], he is intelligent and has bright ides. However, this seemed not coupled with
emotional attributes such as perseverance, patience, maturity, direction, focus, adequacy, stability and
confidence to make it work. He complained that he did not feel the support of his wife regarding his decision
to go into his own business. But when he failed, the more he became negativistic and closed to suggestions
especially from [petitioner]. He was too careful not to let go or make known his strong sense of inadequacy,
ambivalence, doubts, lack of drive and motivation or even feelings of inferiority, for fear of rejection or loss of
pride. When things did not work out according to his plans, he suppressed his hostilities in negative ways, such
as stubbornness, sarcasm or drug intake.
His decision making is characterized by poor impulse control, lack of insight and primitive drives. He seemed
to feel more comfortable in being untraditional and different from others. Preoccupation is centered on himself,
(sic) an unconscious wish for the continuance of the gratification of his dependency needs, (sic) in his mother-
son relationship. From this stems his difficulties in heterosexual relationship with his wife, as pressures,
stresses, (sic) demands and expectations filled up in (sic) up in their marital relationship. Strong masculine
strivings is projected.
For an intelligent person like [respondent], he may sincerely want to be able to assume his duties and
responsibilities as a husband and father, but because of a severe psychological deficit, he was unable to do so.
Based on the clinical data presented, it is the opinion of the examiner, that [petitioner] manifested inadequacies
along her affective sphere, that made her less responsive to the emotional needs of her husband, who needed a
great amount of it, rendering her relatively psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties and
responsibilities of marriage. [Respondent], on the other hand, has manifested strong clinical evidences (sic),
that he is suffering from a Personality Disorder, of the antisocial type, associated with strong sense of
Inadequacy along masculine strivings and narcissistic features that renders him psychologically incapacitated
to perform the duties and responsibilities of marriage. This is characterized by his inability to conform to the
social norms that ordinarily govern many aspects of adolescent and adult behavior. His being a "free spirit"
associated with no remorse, no guilt feelings and no anxiety, is distinctive of this clinical condition. His
prolonged drug intake [marijuana] and maybe stronger drugs lately, are external factors to boost his ego.
The root cause of the above clinical conditions is due to his underlying defense mechanisms, or the unconscious
mental processes, that the ego uses to resolve conflicts. His prolonged and closed attachments to his mother
encouraged cross identification and developed a severe sense of inadequacy specifically along masculine
strivings. He therefore has to camouflage his weakness, in terms of authority, assertiveness, unilateral and
forceful decision making, aloofness and indifference, even if it resulted to antisocial acts. His narcissistic
supplies rendered by his mother was not resolved (sic).
It existed before marriage, but became manifest only after the celebration, due to marital demands and stresses.
It is considered as permanent in nature because it started early in his psychological development, and therefore
became so engrained into his personality structures (sic). It is considered as severe in degree, because it
hampered, interrupted and interfered with his normal functioning related to heterosexual adjustments.
(emphasis supplied)13

2. Dr. Natividad A. Dayan

Adolfo and Mandy[, respondent]’s brothers, referred [respondent] to the clinic. According to them, respondent
has not really taken care of his wife and children. He does not seem to have any direction in life. He seems to
be full of bright ideas and good at starting things but he never gets to accomplish anything. His brothers are
suspecting (sic) that until now [respondent] is still taking drugs. There are times when they see that [respondent]
is not himself. He likes to bum around and just spends the day at home doing nothing. They wish that he’d be
more responsible and try to give priority to his family. [Petitioner,] his wife[,] is the breadwinner of the family
because she has a stable job. [Respondent]’s brothers learned from friends that [petitioner] is really
disappointed with him. She has discussed things with him but he always refused to listen. She does not know
what to do with him anymore. She has grown tired of him.
 When [respondent] was asked about his drug problem, he mentioned that he stopped taking it in 1993. His
brothers think that he is not telling the truth. It is so hard for [respondent] to stop taking drugs when he had
been hooked to it for the past 22 years. When [respondent] was also asked what his problems are at the moment,
he mentioned that he feels lonely and distressed. He does not have anyone to talk to. He feels that he and his
wife [have] drifted apart. He wants to be close to somebody and discuss things with this person but he is not
given the chance. He also mentioned that one of his weak points is that he is very tolerant of people[,] that is
why he is taken advantage of most of the time. He wants to avoid conflict so he’d rather be submissive and
compliant. He does not want to hurt anyone [or] to cause anymore pain. He wants to make other people happy.
Interpretation of Psychological Data
A. Intellectual / Cognitive Functioning
B. Vocational Preference
C. Socio Emotional Functioning
In his relationships with people, [respondent] is apt to project a reserved, aloof and detached attitude.
[Respondent] exhibits withdrawal patterns. He has deep feelings of inadequacy. Due to a low self-esteem, he
tends to feel inferior and to exclude himself from association with others. He feels that he is "different" and as
a result is prone to anticipate rejections. Because of the discomfort produced by these feelings, he is apt to
avoid personal and social involvement, which increases his preoccupation with himself and accentuates his
tendency to withdraw from interpersonal contact. [Respondent] is also apt to be the less dominant partner. He
feels better when he has to follow than when he has to take the lead. A self-contained person[,] he does not
really need to interact with others in order to enjoy life and to be able to move on. He has a small need of
companionship and is most comfortable alone. He, too[,] feels uncomfortable in expressing his more tender
feelings for fear of being hurt. Likewise, he maybe very angry within but he may choose to repress this feeling.
[Respondent’s] strong need for social approval, which could have stemmed from some deep seated insecurities
makes him submissive and over [compliant]. He tends to make extra effort to please people. Although at times[,
he] already feels victimized and taken advantage of, he still tolerates abusive behavior for fear of interpersonal
conflicts. Despite
his [dis]illusion with people, he seeks to minimize dangers of indifference and disapproval [of] others.
Resentments are suppressed. This is likely to result in anger and frustrations which is likewise apt to be
repressed.
There are indications that [respondent] is[,] at the moment[,] experiencing considerable tension and anxiety.
He is prone to fits of apprehension and nervousness. Likewise, he is also entertaining feelings of hopelessness
and is preoccupied with negative thought. He feels that he is up in the air but with no sound foundation. He is
striving [for] goals which he knows he will never be able to attain. Feeling discouraged and distressed, he has
difficulty concentrating and focusing on things which he needs to prioritize. He has many plans but he can’t
accomplish anything because he is unable to see which path to take. This feeling of hopelessness is further
aggravated by the lack of support from significant others.
Diagnostic Impression
Axis I : Drug Dependence
Axis II : Mixed Personality Disorder
[Schizoid, Narcissistic and Antisocial Personality Disorder]
Axis III : None
Axis IV : Psychosocial and Environmental Problems:
Severe
He seems to be very good at planning and starting things but is unable to accomplish anything; unable to give
priority to the needs of his family; in social relationships.
Axis V : Global Assessment of Functioning – Fair (Emphasis supplied)14

3. Dr. Estrella T. Tiongson-Magno

Summary and Conclusion

From the evidence available from [petitioner’s] case history and from her psychological assessment, and
despite the non-cooperation of the respondent, it is possible to infer with certainty the nullity of this marriage.
Based on the information available about the respondent, he suffers from [an] antisocial personality disorder
with narcissistic and dependent features that renders him too immature and irresponsible to assume the normal
obligations of a marriage. As for the petitioner, she is a good, sincere, and conscientious person and she has
tried her best to provide for the needs of her children. Her achievements in
this regard are praiseworthy. But she is emotionally immature and her comprehension of human situations is
very shallow for a woman of her academic and professional competence. And this explains why she married
 RRR even when she knew he was a pothead, then despite the abuse, took so long to do something about her
situation.
Diagnosis for [petitioner]:
Axis I Partner Relational Problem
Axis II Obsessive Compulsive Personality Style with Self-Defeating features
Axis III No diagnosis
Axis IV Psychosocial Stressors-Pervasive Family Discord (spouse’s immaturity, drug abuse, and infidelity)
Severity: 4-severe
Diagnosis for [respondent]
Axis I Partner Relational Problem
Axis II Antisocial Personality Disorder with marked narcissistic, aggressive sadistic and dependent features
Axis III No diagnosis
Axis IV Psychosocial Stressors-Pervasive Family Discord (successful wife)
Severity: 4 (severe)
xxxx

One has to go back to [respondent’s] early childhood in order to understand the root cause of his antisocial personality disorder.
[Respondent] grew up the ninth child in a brood of 11. His elder siblings were taken cared of by his grandmother. [Respondent’s]
father was kind, quiet and blind and [respondent] was [reared] by his mother. Unfortunately, [respondent’s] mother grew up
believing that she was not her mother’s favorite child, so she felt "api, treated like poor relations." [Respondent’s] mother’s reaction
to her perceived rejection was to act out—with poor impulse control and poor mood regulation (spent money like water, had terrible
temper tantrums, etc.). Unwittingly, his mother became [respondent’s] role model.

However, because [respondent] had to get on with the business of living, he learned to use his good looks and his charms, and
learned to size up the weaknesses of others, to lie convincingly and to say what people wanted to hear (esp. his deprived mother
who liked admiration and attention, his siblings from whom he borrowed money, etc.). In the process, his ability to love and to
empathize with others was impaired so that he cannot sustain a relationship with one person for a long time, which is devastating
in a marriage.

[Respondent’s] narcissistic personality features were manifested by his self-centeredness (e.g. moved to Mindoro and lived there
for 10 years, leaving his family in Manila); his grandiose sense of self-importance (e.g. he would just "come and go," without
telling his wife his whereabouts, etc.); his sense of entitlement (e.g. felt entitled to a mistress because [petitioner] deprived him of
his marital rights, etc.); interpersonally exploitative (e.g. let his wife spend for all the maintenance needs of the family, etc.); and
lack of empathy (e.g. when asked to choose between his mistress and his wife, he said he would think about it, etc.) The aggressive
sadistic personality features were manifested whom he has physically, emotionally and verbally abusive [of] his wife when high
on drugs; and his dependent personality features were manifested by his need for others to assume responsibility for most major
areas of his life, and in his difficulty in doing things on his own.

[Respondent], diagnosed with an antisocial personality disorder with marked narcissistic features and aggressive sadistic and
dependent features, is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill the essential obligations of marriage: to love, respect and render
support for his spouse and children. A personality disorder is not curable as it is permanent and stable over time.

From a psychological viewpoint, therefore, there is evidence that the marriage of [petitioner] and [respondent is] null and void from
the very beginning. (emphasis supplied)15

Notwithstanding these telling assessments, the CA rejected, wholesale, the testimonies of Doctors Magno and Villegas for being
hearsay since they never personally examined and interviewed the respondent.

We do not agree with the CA.

The lack of personal examination and interview of the respondent, or any other person diagnosed with personality disorder, does
not per se invalidate the testimonies of the doctors. Neither do their findings automatically constitute hearsay that would result in
their exclusion as evidence.

For one, marriage, by its very definition,16 necessarily involves only two persons. The totality of the behavior of one spouse during
the cohabitation and marriage is generally and genuinely witnessed mainly by the other. In this case, the experts testified on their
individual assessment of the present state of the parties’ marriage from the perception of one of the parties, herein petitioner.
Certainly, petitioner, during their marriage, had occasion to interact with, and experience, respondent’s pattern of behavior which
she could then validly relay to the clinical psychologists and the psychiatrist.

For another, the clinical psychologists’ and psychiatrist’s assessment were not based solely on the narration or personal interview
of the petitioner. Other informants such as respondent’s own son, siblings and in-laws, and sister-in-law (sister of petitioner),
testified on their own observations of respondent’s behavior and interactions with them, spanning the period of time they knew
him.17 These were also used as the basis of the doctors’ assessments.

The recent case of Lim v. Sta. Cruz-Lim,18 citing The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition (DSM
IV),19 instructs us on the general diagnostic criteria for personality disorders:

A. An enduring pattern of inner experience and behavior that deviates markedly from the expectations of the individual's culture.
This pattern is manifested in two (2) or more of the following areas:

(1) cognition (i.e., ways of perceiving and interpreting self, other people, and events)

(2) affectivity (i.e., the range, intensity, liability, and appropriateness of emotional response)

(3) interpersonal functioning

(4) impulse control

B. The enduring pattern is inflexible and pervasive across a broad range of personal and social situations.

C. The enduring pattern leads to clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational or other important areas of
functioning.

D. The pattern is stable and of long duration, and its onset can be traced back at least to adolescence or early adulthood.

E. The enduring pattern is not better accounted for as a manifestation or a consequence of another mental disorder.

F. The enduring pattern is not due to the direct physiological effects of a substance (i.e., a drug of abuse, a medication) or a general
medical condition (e.g., head trauma).

Specifically, the DSM IV outlines the diagnostic criteria for Antisocial Personality Disorder:

A. There is a pervasive pattern of disregard for and violation of the rights of others occurring since age 15 years, as indicated by
three (or more) of the following:

(1) failure to conform to social norms with respect to lawful behaviors as indicated by repeatedly performing acts that are grounds
for arrest

(2) deceitfulness, as indicated by repeated lying, use of aliases, or conning others for personal profit or pleasure

(3) impulsivity or failure to plan ahead

(4) irritability and aggressiveness, as indicated by repeated physical fights or assaults

(5) reckless disregard for safety of self or others

(6) consistent irresponsibility, as indicated by repeated failure to sustain consistent work behavior or honor financial obligations
(7) lack of remorse as indicated by being indifferent to or rationalizing having hurt, mistreated, or stolen from another

B. The individual is at least 18 years.

C. There is evidence of conduct disorder with onset before age 15 years.

D. The occurrence of antisocial behavior is not exclusively during the course of schizophrenia or a manic episode. 20

Within their acknowledged field of expertise, doctors can diagnose the psychological make up of a person based on a number of
factors culled from various sources. A person afflicted with a personality disorder will not necessarily have personal knowledge
thereof. In this case, considering that a personality disorder is manifested in a pattern of behavior, self-diagnosis by the respondent
consisting only in his bare denial of the doctors’ separate diagnoses, does not necessarily evoke credence and cannot trump the
clinical findings of experts.

The CA declared that, based on Dr. Dayan’s findings and recommendation, the psychological incapacity of respondent is not
incurable.

The appellate court is mistaken.

A recommendation for therapy does not automatically imply curability. In general, recommendations for therapy are given by
clinical psychologists, or even psychiatrists, to manage behavior. In Kaplan and Saddock’s textbook entitled Synopsis of
Psychiatry,21 treatment, ranging from psychotherapy to pharmacotherapy, for all the listed kinds of personality disorders are
recommended. In short, Dr. Dayan’s recommendation that respondent should undergo therapy does not necessarily negate the
finding that respondent’s psychological incapacity is incurable.

Moreover, Dr. Dayan, during her testimony, categorically declared that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform the
essential marital obligations.22 As aptly stated by Justice Romero in her separate opinion in the ubiquitously cited case of Republic
v. Court of Appeals & Molina:23

[T]he professional opinion of a psychological expert became increasingly important in such cases. Data about the person’s entire
life, both before and after the ceremony, were presented to these experts and they were asked to give professional opinions about a
party’s mental capacity at the time of the wedding. These opinions were rarely challenged and tended to be accepted as decisive
evidence of lack of valid consent.

… [Because] of advances made in psychology during the past decades. There was now the expertise to provide the all-important
connecting link between a marriage breakdown and premarital causes.

In sum, we find points of convergence & consistency in all three reports and the respective testimonies of Doctors Magno, Dayan
and Villegas, i.e.: (1) respondent does have problems; and (2) these problems include chronic irresponsibility; inability to recognize
and work towards providing the needs of his family; several failed business attempts; substance abuse; and a trail of unpaid money
obligations.

It is true that a clinical psychologist’s or psychiatrist’s diagnoses that a person has personality disorder is not automatically believed
by the courts in cases of declaration of nullity of marriages. Indeed, a clinical psychologist’s or psychiatrist’s finding of a personality
disorder does not exclude a finding that a marriage is valid and subsisting, and not beset by one of the parties’ or both parties’
psychological incapacity.

On more than one occasion, we have rejected an expert’s opinion concerning the supposed psychological incapacity of a party. 24 In
Lim v. Sta. Cruz-Lim,25 we ruled that, even without delving into the non-exclusive list found in Republic v. Court of Appeals &
Molina,26 the stringent requisites provided in Santos v. Court of Appeals27 must be independently met by the party alleging the
nullity of the marriage grounded on Article 36 of the Family Code. We declared, thus:

It was folly for the trial court to accept the findings and conclusions of Dr. Villegas with nary a link drawn between the
"psychodynamics of the case" and the factors characterizing the psychological incapacity. Dr. Villegas' sparse testimony does not
lead to the inevitable conclusion that the parties were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations.
Even on questioning from the trial court, Dr. Villegas' testimony did not illuminate on the parties' alleged personality disorders and
their incapacitating effect on their marriage x x x.

Curiously, Dr. Villegas' global conclusion of both parties' personality disorders was not supported by psychological tests properly
administered by clinical psychologists specifically trained in the tests' use and interpretation. The supposed personality disorders
of the parties, considering that such diagnoses were made, could have been fully established by psychometric and neurological
tests which are designed to measure specific aspects of people's intelligence, thinking, or personality.

The expert opinion of a psychiatrist arrived at after a maximum of seven (7) hours of interview, and unsupported by separate
psychological tests, cannot tie the hands of the trial court and prevent it from making its own factual finding on what happened in
this case. The probative force of the testimony of an expert does not lie in a mere statement of his theory or opinion, but rather in
the assistance that he can render to the courts in showing the facts that serve as a basis for his criterion and the reasons upon which
the logic of his conclusion is founded.

In the case at bar, however, even without the experts’ conclusions, the factual antecedents (narrative of events) alleged in the
petition and established during trial, all point to the inevitable conclusion that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to
perform the essential marital obligations.

Article 68 of the Family Code provides:

Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and
support.

In this connection, it is well to note that persons with antisocial personality disorder exhibit the following clinical features:

Patients with antisocial personality disorder can often seem to be normal and even charming and ingratiating. Their histories,
however, reveal many areas of disordered life functioning. Lying, truancy, running away from home, thefts, fights, substance abuse,
and illegal activities are typical experiences that patients report as beginning in childhood. x x x Their own explanations of their
antisocial behavior make it seem mindless, but their mental content reveals the complete absence of delusions and other signs of
irrational thinking. In fact, they frequently have a heightened sense of reality testing and often impress observers as having good
verbal intelligence.

Those with this disorder do not tell the truth and cannot be trusted to carry out any task or adhere to any conventional standard of
morality. x x x A notable finding is a lack of remorse for these actions; that is, they appear to lack a conscience. 28

In the instant case, respondent’s pattern of behavior manifests an inability, nay, a psychological incapacity to perform the essential
marital obligations as shown by his: (1) sporadic financial support; (2) extra-marital affairs; (3) substance abuse; (4) failed business
attempts; (5) unpaid money obligations; (6) inability to keep a job that is not connected with the family businesses; and (7) criminal
charges of estafa.

On the issue of the petitioner’s purported psychological incapacity, we agree with the CA’s ruling thereon:

A perusal of the Amended Petition shows that it failed to specifically allege the complete facts showing that petitioner was
psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage at the time of the celebration of
marriage even if such incapacity became manifest only after its celebration x x x. In fact, what was merely prayed for in the said
Amended Petition is that judgment be rendered "declaring the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent solemnized on
04 December 1976 to be void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of the respondent at the time of the
celebration of the marriage x x x

At any rate, even assuming arguendo that [petitioner’s] Amended Petition was indeed amended to conform to the evidence, as
provided under Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court, Dr. Villegas’ finding that [petitioner] is supposedly suffering from an
Inadequate Personality [Disorder] along the affectional area does not amount to psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the
Family Code. Such alleged condition of [petitioner] is not a debilitating psychological condition that incapacitates her from
complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage.1avvphi1 In fact, in the Psychological Evaluation Report of clinical
psychologist Magno, [petitioner] was given a glowing evaluation as she was found to be a "good, sincere, and conscientious person
and she has tried her best to provide for the needs of her children. Her achievements in this regard are praiseworthy." Even in Dr.
Villegas’ psychiatric report, it was stated that [petitioner] was able to remain in their marriage for more than 20 years "trying to
reach out and lending a hand for better understanding and relationship." With the foregoing evaluation made by no less than
[petitioner’s] own expert witnesses, we find it hard to believe that she is psychologically incapacitated within the contemplation of
Article 36 of the Family Code.29

All told, it is wise to be reminded of the caveat articulated by Justice Teodoro R. Padilla in his separate statement in Republic v.
Court of Appeals and Molina:30

x x x Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own
facts. In the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours"
with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible,
avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court."

In fine, given the factual milieu of the present case and in light of the foregoing disquisition, we find ample basis to conclude that
respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations at the time of his marriage to the
petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA -G.R. CV No. 89761 is REVERSED. The
decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 89, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-01-44854 declaring the marriage between
petitioner and respondent NULL and VOID under Article 36 of the Family Code is REINSTATED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 165321 : August 03, 2010]

RICARDO P. TORING, PETITIONER, VS. TERESITA M. TORING AND REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We resolve the appeal filed by petitioner Ricardo P. Toring from the May 31, 2004 decision [1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CV No. 71882. The CA reversed the August 10, 2001 judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 106 of
Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-99-36662,[2] nullifying Ricardo's marriage with respondent Teresita M. Toring on the ground of
psychological incapacity.

THE FACTS

Ricardo was introduced to Teresita in 1978 at his aunt's house in Cebu. Teresita was then his cousin's teacher in Hawaiian dance
and was conducting lessons at his aunt's house. Despite their slight difference in age (of five years), the younger Ricardo found
the dance teacher attractive and fell in love with her. He pursued Teresita and they became sweethearts after three months of
courtship. They eloped soon after, hastened by the bid of another girlfriend, already pregnant, to get Ricardo to marry her.

Ricardo and Teresita were married on September 4, 1978 before Hon. Remigio Zari of the City Court of Quezon City. They
begot three children: Richardson, Rachel Anne, and Ric Jayson.

On February 1, 1999, more than twenty years after their wedding, Ricardo filed a petition for annulment before the RTC. He
claimed that Teresita was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage prior to, at the time
of, and subsequent to the celebration of their marriage. He asked the court to declare his marriage to Teresita null and void.

At the trial, Ricardo offered in evidence their marriage contract; the psychological evaluation and signature of his expert witness,
psychiatrist Dr. Cecilia R. Albaran, and his and Dr. Albaran's respective testimonies. Teresita did not file any answer or
opposition to the petition, nor did she testify to refute the allegations against her.[3]

Ricardo alleged in his petition and in his testimony at the trial that Teresita was an adulteress and a squanderer. He was an
overseas seaman, and he regularly sent money to his wife to cover the family's living expenses and their children's tuition.
Teresita, however, was not adept in managing the funds he sent and their finances. Many times, Ricardo would come home and
be welcomed by debts incurred by his wife; he had to settle these to avoid embarrassment.

Aside from neglect in paying debts she incurred from other people, Teresita likewise failed to remit amounts she collected as
sales agent of a plasticware and cosmetics company. She left the family's utility bills and their children's tuition fees unpaid. She
also missed paying the rent and the amortization for the house that Ricardo acquired for the family, so their children had to live in
a small rented room and eventually had to be taken in by Ricardo's parents. When confronted by Ricardo, Teresita would simply
offer the excuse that she spent the funds Ricardo sent to buy things for the house and for their children.

Ricardo likewise accused Teresita of infidelity and suspected that she was pregnant with another man's child. During one of his
visits to the country, he noticed that Teresita's stomach was slightly bigger. He tried to convince her to have a medical
examination but she refused. Her miscarriage five months into her pregnancy confirmed his worst suspicions. Ricardo alleged
that the child could not have been his, as his three instances of sexual contact with Teresita were characterized by "withdrawals";
other than these, no other sexual contacts with his wife transpired, as he transferred and lived with his relatives after a month of
living with Teresita in Cebu. Ricardo reported, too, of rumors that his wife represented herself to others as single, and went out
on dates with other men when he was not around.

Ricardo opined that his wife was a very extravagant, materialistic, controlling and demanding person, who mostly had her way in
everything; had a taste for the nightlife and was very averse to the duties of a housewife; was stubborn and independent, also
most unsupportive, critical and uncooperative; was unresponsive to his hard work and sacrifices for their family; and was most
painfully unmindful of him.[4] He believed that their marriage had broken down beyond repair and that they both have lost their
mutual trust and love for one another.[5]

Dr. Cecilia R. Albaran testified that a major factor that contributed to the demise of the marriage was Teresita's Narcissistic
Personality Disorder that rendered her psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her essential marital obligations. To quote Dr.
Albaran:

Teresita, the respondent[,] has [sic] shown to manifest the following pervasive pattern of behaviors: a sense
of entitlement as she expected favorable treatment and automatic compliance to her wishes, being
interpersonally exploitative as on several occasions she took advantage of him to achieve her own ends, lack
of empathy as she was unwilling to recognize her partners [sic] feelings and needs[,] taking into
consideration her own feelings and needs only, her haughty and arrogant behavior and attitude and her
proneness to blame others for her failures and shortcomings. These patterns of behavior speaks [sic] of a
Narcissistic Personality Disorder, which started to manifest in early adulthood. The disorder is considered to
be grave and incurable based on the fact that individuals do not recognize the symptoms as it is ego syntonic
and they feel there is nothing wrong in them. Because of that[,] they remain unmotivated for treatment and
impervious to recovery.[6]

She based her diagnosis on the information she gathered from her psychological evaluation on Ricardo and Richardson (Ricardo
and Teresita's eldest son). She admitted, though, that she did not personally observe and examine Teresita; she sent Teresita a
personally-delivered notice for the conduct of a psychiatric evaluation, but the notice remained unanswered.

In opposing the petition for annulment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contended that there was no basis to declare
Teresita psychologically incapacitated. It asserted that the psychological evaluation conducted on Ricardo (and his son
Richardson) only revealed a vague and general conclusion on these parties' personality traits but not on Teresita's psychological
makeup. The OSG also argued that the evidence adduced did not clinically identify and sufficiently prove the medical cause of
the alleged psychological incapacity. Neither did the evidence indicate that the alleged psychological incapacity existed prior to
or at the time of marriage, nor that the incapacity was grave and incurable.

The RTC agreed with Ricardo, and annulled his marriage to Teresita. In short, the RTC believed Dr. Albaran's psychological
evaluation and testimony and, on the totality of Ricardo's evidence, found Teresita to be psychologically incapacitated to assume
the essential obligations of marriage. The OSG appealed the decision to the CA.

The CA reversed the RTC decision and held that the trial court's findings did not satisfy the rules and guidelines set by this Court
in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina.[7] The RTC failed to specifically point out the root illness or defect that caused
Teresita's psychological incapacity, and likewise failed to show that the incapacity already existed at the time of celebration of
marriage.

The CA found that the conclusions from Dr. Albaran's psychological evaluation do not appear to have been drawn from well-
rounded and fair sources, and dwelt mostly on hearsay statements and rumors. Likewise, the CA found that Ricardo's allegations
on Teresita's overspending and infidelity do not constitute adequate grounds for declaring the marriage null and void under
Article 36 of the Family Code. These allegations, even if true, could only effectively serve as grounds for legal separation or a
criminal charge for adultery.

THE PETITION AND THE PARTIES' ARGUMENTS

Ricardo faults the CA for disregarding the factual findings of the trial court, particularly the expert testimony of Dr. Albaran, and
submits that the trial court - in declaring the nullity of the marriage - fully complied with Molina.

In its Comment,[8] the OSG argued that the CA correctly reversed the RTC's decision, particularly in its conclusion that Ricardo
failed to comply with this Court's guidelines for the proper interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code.
Reiterating its earlier arguments below, the OSG asserts that the evidence adduced before the trial court failed to show the
gravity, juridical antecedence, or incurability of the psychological incapacity of Teresita, and failed as well to identify and
discuss its root cause. The psychiatrist, likewise, failed to show that Teresita was completely unable to discharge her marital
obligations due to her alleged Narcissistic Personality Disorder.

Ricardo's Reply[9] reiterated that the RTC decision thoroughly discussed the root cause of Teresita's psychological incapacity and
identified it as Narcissistic Personality Disorder. He claimed that sufficient proof had been adduced by the psychiatrist whose
expertise on the subject cannot be doubted. Interestingly, Ricardo further argued that alleging the root cause in a petition for
annulment under Article 36 of the Family Code is no longer necessary, citing Barcelona v. Court of Appeals.[10]

These positions were collated and reiterated in the memoranda the parties filed.

THE COURT'S RULING

We find the petition unmeritorious, as the CA committed no reversible error when it set aside the RTC's decision for lack of
legal and factual basis.

In the leading case of Santos v. Court of Appeals, et al.,[11] we held that psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family
Code must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability, to be sufficient basis to annul a
marriage. The psychological incapacity should refer to "no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be
truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage."[12]

We further expounded on Article 36 of the Family Code in Molina and laid down definitive guidelines in the interpretation and
application of this article. These guidelines incorporate the basic requirements of gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability
established in the Santos case, as follows:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of
the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation
of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim
of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their
permanence, inviolability and solidarity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in
the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the
Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations
and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such
incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis (Salita v. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, 108), nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

(3)The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence
must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the
illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior
thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely
against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of
marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and
prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise
his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
 obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability,
not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling
factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the
person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

(6)The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and
their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. [13]

Subsequent jurisprudence on psychological incapacity applied these basic guidelines to varying factual situations, thus
confirming the continuing doctrinal validity of Santos. In so far as the present factual situation is concerned, what should not be
lost in reading and applying our established rulings is the intent of the law to confine the application of Article 36 of the Family
Code to the most serious cases of personality disorders; these are the disorders that result in the utter insensitivity or inability of
the afflicted party to give meaning and significance to the marriage he or she contracted. Furthermore, the psychological illness
and its root cause must have been there from the inception of the marriage. From these requirements arise the concept that
Article 36 of the Family Code does not really dissolve a marriage; it simply recognizes that there never was any marriage in the
first place because the affliction - already then existing - was so grave and permanent as to deprive the afflicted party of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she was to assume or had assumed.[14]

In the present case and guided by these standards, we find the totality of the petitioner's evidence to be insufficient to prove that
Teresita was psychologically incapacitated to perform her duties as a wife. As already mentioned, the evidence presented
consisted of the testimonies of Ricardo and Dr. Albaran, and the latter's psychological evaluation of Ricardo and Richardson from
where she derived a psychological evaluation of Teresita.

a. Dr. Albaran's psychological evaluation and testimony

Dr. Albaran concluded in her psychological evaluation that Teresita suffers from Narcissistic Personality Disorder that rendered
her psychologically incapacitated to assume essential marital obligations. To support her findings and conclusion, she banked on
the statements told to her by Ricardo and Richardson, which she narrated in her evaluation. Apparently relying on the same
basis, Dr. Albaran added that Teresita's disorder manifested during her early adulthood and is grave and incurable.

To say the least, we are greatly disturbed by the kind of testimony and evaluation that, in this case, became the basis for the
conclusion that no marriage really took place because of the psychological incapacity of one of the parties at the time of
marriage.

We are in no way convinced that a mere narration of the statements of Ricardo and Richardson, coupled with the results of the
psychological tests administered only on Ricardo, without more, already constitutes sufficient basis for the conclusion that
Teresita suffered from Narcissistic Personality Disorder. This Court has long been negatively critical in considering
psychological evaluations, presented in evidence, derived solely from one-sided sources, particularly from the spouse seeking the
nullity of the marriage.

In So v. Valera,[15] the Court considered the psychologist's testimony and conclusions to be insufficiently in-depth and
comprehensive to warrant the finding of respondent's psychological incapacity because the facts, on which the conclusions were
based, were all derived from the petitioner's statements whose bias in favor of his cause cannot be discounted. In another
case, Padilla-Rumbaua v. Rumbaua,[16] the Court declared that while the various tests administered on the petitioner-wife could
have been used as a fair gauge to assess her own psychological condition, this same statement could not be made with respect to
the respondent-husband's psychological condition. To our mind, conclusions and generalizations about Teresita's psychological
condition, based solely on information fed by Ricardo, are not any different in kind from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of
the truthfulness of the content of such evidence.[17]

To be sure, we have recognized that the law does not require that the allegedly incapacitated spouse be personally examined by a
physician or by a psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code.[18] This recognition, however, does not signify that the evidence, we shall favorably appreciate, should be any less
than the evidence that an Article 36 case, by its nature, requires.

Our recognition simply means that the requirements for nullity outlined in Santos and Molina need not necessarily come from the
allegedly incapacitated spouse. In other words, it is still essential - although from sources other than the respondent spouse - to
show his or her personality profile, or its approximation, at the time of marriage; the root cause of the inability to appreciate the
essential obligations of marriage; and the gravity, permanence and incurability of the condition.

Other than from the spouses, such evidence can come from persons intimately related to them, such as relatives, close friends or
even family doctors or lawyers who could testify on the allegedly incapacitated spouse's condition at or about the time of
marriage, or to subsequent occurring events that trace their roots to the incapacity already present at the time of marriage.

In the present case, the only other party outside of the spouses who was ever asked to give statements for purposes of Teresita's
psychological evaluation was Richardson, the spouses' eldest son who would not have been very reliable as a witness in an
Article 36 case because he could not have been there when the spouses were married and could not have been expected to know
what was happening between his parents until long after his birth.

We confirm the validity of this observation from a reading of the summary of Richardson's interview with the pyschologist:
Richardson's statement occupied a mere one paragraph (comprising eleven sentences) in the psychological evaluation and merely
recited isolated instances of his parents fighting over the foreclosure of their house, his father's alleged womanizing, and their
differences in religion (Ricardo is a Catholic, while Teresita is a Mormon). [19]

We find nothing unusual in these recited marital incidents to indicate that Teresita suffered from some psychological disorder as
far back as the time of her marriage to Ricardo, nor do we find these fights to be indicative of problems traceable to any basic
psychological disorder existing at the time of marriage. For one, these points of dispute are not uncommon in a marriage and
relate essentially to the usual roots of marital problems - finances, fidelity and religion. The psychologist, too, never delved into
the relationship between mother and son except to observe their estranged relationship due to a previous argument - a money
problem involving Ricardo's financial remittances to the family. To state the obvious, the psychologist's evaluation never
explained how the recited incidents, made by one who was not even born at the time of the spouses' marriage, showed a
debilitating psychological incapacity already existing at that time.

Of more serious consequence, fatal to Ricardo's cause, is the failure of Dr. Albaran's psychological evaluation to fully explain the
details - i.e., the what, how, when, where and since when - of Teresita's alleged Narcissistic Personality Disorder. It seems to us
that, with hardly any supporting evidence to fall back on, Dr. Albaran simply stated out of the blue that Teresita's personality
disorder manifested itself in early adulthood, presuming thereby that the incapacity should have been there when the marriage
was celebrated. Dr. Albaran never explained, too, the incapacitating nature of Teresita's alleged personality disorder, and how it
related to the essential marital obligations that she failed to assume. Neither did the good doctor adequately explain in her
psychological evaluation how grave and incurable was Teresita's psychological disorder.

Dr. Albaran's testimony at the trial did not improve the evidentiary situation for Ricardo, as it still failed to provide the required
insights that would have remedied the evidentiary gaps in her written psychological evaluation. In fact, Dr. Albaran's cross-
examination only made the evidentiary situation worse when she admitted that she had difficulty pinpointing the root cause of
Teresita's personality disorder, due to the limited information she gathered from Ricardo and Richardson regarding Teresita's
personal and family history. To directly quote from the records, Dr. Albaran confessed this limitation when she said that "[t]he
only data that I have is that, the respondent seem [sic] to have grown from a tumultuous family and this could be perhaps the
[sic] contributory to the development of the personality disorder."[20] Dr. Albaran's obvious uncertainty in her assessment only
proves our point that a complete personality profile of the spouse, alleged to be psychologically incapacitated, could not be
determined from meager information coming only from a biased source.

b. Ricardo's testimony

Ricardo testified in court that Teresita was a squanderer and an adulteress. We do not, however, find Ricardo's characterizations
of his wife sufficient to constitute psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Article 36 contemplates
downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations. Mere "difficulty," "refusal, or
"neglect" in the performance of marital obligations or "ill will" on the part of the spouse is different from "incapacity" rooted on
some debilitating psychological condition or illness.[21]

Ricardo's testimony merely established that Teresita was irresponsible in managing the family's finances by not paying their rent,
utility bills and other financial obligations. Teresita's spendthrift attitude, according to Ricardo, even resulted in the loss of the
house and lot intended to be their family residence. This kind of irresponsibility, however, does not rise to the level of a
psychological incapacity required under Article 36 of the Family Code. At most, Teresita's mismanagement of the family's
finances merely constituted difficulty, refusal or neglect, during the marriage, in the handling of funds intended for the family's
financial support.

Teresita's alleged infidelity, even if true, likewise does not constitute psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family
Code. In order for sexual infidelity to constitute as psychological incapacity, the respondent's unfaithfulness must be established
as a manifestation of a disordered personality, completely preventing the respondent from discharging the essential obligations of
the marital state;[22] there must be proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor that effectively incapacitated her from
complying with the obligation to be faithful to her spouse.[23]

In our view, Ricardo utterly failed in his testimony to prove that Teresita suffered from a disordered personality of this
kind. Even Ricardo's added testimony, relating to rumors of Teresita's dates with other men and her pregnancy by another man,
would not fill in the deficiencies we have observed, given the absence of an adverse integral element and link to Teresita's
allegedly disordered personality.

Moreover, Ricardo failed to prove that Teresita's alleged character traits already existed at the inception of their marriage. Article
36 of the Family Code requires that the psychological incapacity must exist at the time of the celebration of the marriage, even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.[24] In the absence of this element, a marriage cannot be annulled
under Article 36.

Root cause of the psychological incapacity needs to be

alleged in a petition for annulment under Article 36 of
the Family Code

Citing Barcelona,[25] Ricardo defended the RTC decision, alleging that the root cause in a petition for annulment under Article 36
of the Family Code is no longer necessary. We find this argument completely at variance with Ricardo's main argument against
the assailed CA decision - i.e., that the RTC, in its decision, discussed thoroughly the root cause of Teresita's psychological
incapacity as Narcissistic Personality Disorder. These conflicting positions, notwithstanding, we see the need to address this
issue to further clarify our statement in Barcelona, which Ricardo misquoted and misinterpreted to support his present petition
that "since the new Rules do not require the petition to allege expert opinion on the psychological incapacity, it follows that there
is also no need to allege in the petition the root cause of the psychological incapacity."[26]

In Barcelona, the petitioner assailed the bid for annulment for its failure to state the "root cause" of the respondent's alleged
psychological incapacity. The Court resolved this issue, ruling that the petition sufficiently stated a cause of action because the
petitioner - instead of stating a specific root cause - clearly described the physical manifestations indicative of the
psychological incapacity. This, the Court found to be sufficiently compliant with the first requirement in the Molina case - that
the "root cause" of the psychological incapacity be alleged in an Article 36 petition.

Thus, contrary to Ricardo's position, Barcelona does not do away with the "root cause" requirement. The ruling simply means
that the statement of the root cause does not need to be in medical terms or be technical in nature, as the root causes of many
psychological disorders are still unknown to science. It is enough to merely allege the physical manifestations constituting the
root cause of the psychological incapacity. Section 2, paragraph (d) of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (Rules)[27] in fact provides:

SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.

x x x x

(d) What to allege. - A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specially allege the
complete facts showing that either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated from complying
with the essential marital obligations of marriages at the time of the celebration of marriage even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its celebration.

The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological
incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need not be alleged.
As we explained in Barcelona, the requirement alleging the root cause in a petition for annulment under Article 36 of the Family
Code was not dispensed with by the adoption of the Rules. What the Rules really eliminated was the need for an expert
opinion to prove the root cause of the psychological incapacity. The Court further held that the Rules, being procedural in nature,
apply only to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their adoption.

To sum up, Ricardo failed to discharge the burden of proof to show that Teresita suffered from psychological incapacity; thus, his
petition for annulment of marriage must fail. Ricardo merely established that Teresita had been remiss in her duties as a wife for
being irresponsible in taking care of their family's finances - a fault or deficiency that does not amount to the psychological
incapacity that Article 36 of the Family Code requires. We reiterate that irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or
perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological
incapacity, as the same may only be due to a person's difficulty, refusal or neglect to undertake the obligations of marriage that is
not rooted in some psychological illness that Article 36 of the Family Code addresses. [28]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 71882. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 176464 February 4, 2010

EDWARD N. LIM, Petitioner,

vs.
MA. CHERYL STA. CRUZ-LIM, Respondent.

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

This petition raises a far-from-novel issue, i.e., the invalidity of a marriage on the ground of either or both of the parties’
psychological incapacity. However, similar petitions continue to hound the lower courts, even with the stringent requirements for
the grant of declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, given the facility with which married
persons are diagnosed with personality disorders.

The instant petition for review on certiorari assails the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 74822, which
reversed the decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 140, Makati City, in Civil Case No. 99-1852.

First, the all too familiar antecedents of man-meets-woman; they get married after a whirlwind relationship; and, not surprisingly,
the marriage goes awry.

Petitioner Edward N. Lim and respondent Maria Cheryl Sta. Cruz-Lim met in 1978 in Cebu, where petitioner, who resides in
Makati City, spent a semestral break from college; and respondent, who resides in Gingoog City, Cagayan de Oro, was a boarder
in petitioner’s uncle’s house. At that time, petitioner was twenty-six (26) years old, a college student, and working in the family
business, while respondent was a secretarial student.

After less than a year of courtship via long distance phone calls, petitioner and respondent became sweethearts in early 1979. Within
that year, or on December 8, 1979, the two were wed at the Don Bosco Church in Makati City, with a reception at Midtown Ramada
Hotel.

As is customary among those of Chinese descent, petitioner and respondent took up residence with the former’s grandparents and
parents in Forbes Park, Makati City. The couple was blessed with three (3) children: Lester Edward,3 Candice Grace,4 and Mariano
III.5

During their stay in Forbes Park, all living, household and medical expenses were paid and provided by petitioner’s grandparents.
Petitioner’s salary of ₱6,000.00 for working in the family distillery went straight to respondent. Despite all these amenities, the
setup and living arrangement rankled respondent, who continued to insist that they live separately and independently from
petitioner’s family.

October 14, 1990 proved to be a black-letter day for the union of petitioner and respondent. That morning, respondent registered a
complaint, which was recorded in the police blotter of the Makati City police, about a prior incident where she caught petitioner in
their house in a compromising situation with the stay-in caregiver of petitioner’s grandmother. This incident landed on the pages
of a tabloid newspaper, Abante, where petitioner, his grandparents’ house and the family business were all named and identified.
Naturally, this caused embarrassment and humiliation to petitioner and to the rest of his family and relatives.

Also, on that same day, respondent finally left petitioner and brought with her their three (3) children. Respondent forcibly opened
their cabinet and cleaned out the contents thereof, which included petitioner’s passport, jewelry, and a land title in petitioner’s
name.

Respondent likewise filed a criminal complaint for Concubinage and Physical Injuries against petitioner which was eventually
dismissed by the investigating prosecutor for lack of merit.

Subsequently, respondent filed with the RTC of Makati City an action for support against petitioner and petitioner’s parents.
Thereafter, the trial court directed petitioner to give a monthly support of ₱6,000.00 and, in case of his inability to do so, petitioner’s
parents were also decreed to give a monthly support for the three minor children in the amount of ₱34,000.00.6
On October 29, 1999, petitioner filed a petition and sought the declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent on the ground
of the latter’s psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Three years thereafter, on July 22, 2002, petitioner
filed an amended petition including an allegation of his own psychological incapacity, as both he and respondent were diagnosed
with personality disorders—dependent personality disorder and histrionic personality disorder, respectively.

Following the exchange of pleadings between the parties, petitioner presented evidence, which consisted of the testimonies of Dr.
Cecilia C. Villegas, a psychiatrist; and Maxima Adato, petitioner’s co-employee in the distillery. In addition, petitioner offered in
evidence Dr. Villegas’ Psychiatric Report, which concluded that the parties were suffering from personality disorders. Respondent,
despite filing an Answer to the petition denying the allegations therein, waived her right to present evidence.

Based on the foregoing, primarily on the Psychiatric Report, the RTC declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent null
and void as the two were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The RTC disposed of the
case, to wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby DECLARES the marriage of EDWARD N. LIM and MA. CHERYL STA.
CRUZ on December 8, 1979 in Makati City VOID AB INITIO on ground of psychological incapacity of both parties pursuant to
Article 36 of the Family Code with all the effects and consequences of all the existing provisions of law.

As regards the custody of the children, considering that all of them are over seven (7) years of age, the Court shall take into account
the choice of each of the child, unless the Court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.

Let copies thereof be sent to the Office of Local Civil Registrar of Makati City and the National Statistics Office, Quezon City who
are directed to CANCEL from their respective Civil Registries the marriage of EDWARD N. LIM and CHERYL STA. CRUZ on
December 8, 1979 in Makati City.

The Conjugal Partnership of the Spouses shall be liquidated, partitioned, and distributed in accordance with the provisions of
Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code.7

Disagreeing completely with the RTC’s disposition, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appealed to the CA, questioning the
RTC’s finding that the parties were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The appellate
court granted the OSG’s appeal and reversed the trial court. It ruled thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is GRANTED. Accordingly, the assailed Decision dated March 25, 2002
is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage between herein parties is hereby declared subsisting and valid.8

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari positing the singular issue of whether the marriage between petitioner and respondent
is null and void on the ground of the parties’ psychological incapacity.

We deny the petition.

The seminal ruling in Santos v. Court of Appeals9 cites three (3) factors characterizing psychological incapacity to perform the
essential marital obligations: (1) gravity, (2) juridical antecedence, (3) incurability. We expounded on the foregoing, to wit:

The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in
marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only
after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.

Given the foregoing stringent requisites and without going into the non-exclusive list found in Republic v. Court of
Appeals,10 petitioner, as the party alleging his own psychological incapacity and that of his spouse, had the special albatross to
prove that he and his wife were suffering from "the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage."11

Instead, petitioner presented the Psychiatric Report of Dr. Villegas, the conclusions drawn are reprinted in full:
PSYCHODYNAMICS OF THE CASE:

Edward is of Chinese descent, born and grew up in a Philippine environment. He was raised and educated in Philippine school.
However, despite his prominent Filipino exposure, his immediate family still practice a strong cultural Chinese tradition within his
home. Very clannish, all family members has to stay in one roof, in a communal style of living, with the elders in this case, the
grandparents are recognized as the authority. Most of the family members tend to rebel, but at the end, tendency to be submissive
and passive were developed. But despite physical closeness, Edward did not build close attachments to his parents. The father was
exceptionally temperamental and moody, while the mother was extremely asocial, isolated, withdrawn and seclusive, that repelled
him from both of them.

Surrogate parenting from his grandparents satisfied his dependency needs. He developed into a kind, obedient, submissive and
passive adult, which became the center of jealousy and rivalry among the siblings. Under stressful situation, he became depressed
and had suicidal intentions. He felt so secure with his grandparents, that he subordinated his needs to them. He allowed them to
assume responsibilities for major areas of his life, as in his family decision and independence. He has difficulty expressing
disagreements with others, especially with his wife, because of fear of loss of support or approval. So that even an abusive spouse
may be tolerated for long periods, in order not to disturb the sense of attachments. A persevering worker, he had difficulties
initiating change due to lack of self-confidence in judgment or abilities, rather than lack of motivation or energy. Within 10 years
in marriage, he tried hard to grant his wife’s wishes, but to no avail. His wife left him in October, 1990 together with their three
children, whom he missed very much. The death of his grandfather in 1994 was a big blow to him, but he finds solace and security
in visiting his grave every Sunday since then.

On the other hand, Cheryl was initially congenial, which lasted only for a short period of time. Later, her immaturity interfered
with her behavioral pattern and adjustment. Apparently, she could not recognize realities in their family set-up and will insist on
her fantasized wishes. When not granted, she’ll go into tantrums, moodiness, anger, hostilities, exhibitions and dramatizations, just
to get attention and to emphasize her wants. Her attention-getting devices will be endless and her suggestibility to the influence of
others is very fertile.

Based on the family background, pattern of behavior, and outcome of their marriage, clinical evidence showed that Mr. Edward
Lim is suffering from a Dependent Personality Disorder, while Cheryl is suffering from Histrionic Personality Disorder associated
with immaturity, that render both of them psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities of
marriage.1avvphi1

The root cause of the above clinical condition on the part of Edward was due to overindulgence and overprotection of his surrogate
parents, that left no room for him to develop his own abilities, encouraging too much dependence, lack of self-confidence, self-
doubt, passivity, pessimism, and depression. How much of the Dependent Disorder was due to developmental defect and how much
was due to strong Chinese culture and traditions, will be difficult to assess.

On the part of Cheryl, the root cause was due to unsatisfied dependency needs that finds gratification in adult stage, in the form of
attention-seeking devices, manifested in her clinical symptoms. Both existed prior to marriage, but became obviously manifested
only after the celebration, due to marital stresses and demands. Both disorders are considered permanent and incurable, because
they started early in their developmental stage and therefore became so engrained in their personality structure. Both are severe
and grave in degree, because they hampered their normal functioning, specifically related to a difficult heterosexual adjustment.12

In addition, Dr. Villegas testified in the lower court as to the findings contained in the Psychiatric Report. Thus, on direct
examination, Dr. Villegas’ testimony consisted of the following:

Q- Can you tell the Court how you happened to know the petitioner?

A- He was referred to me by his counsel for psychological and psychiatric evaluation related to his application for nullity of
marriage in this Honorable Court, ma’am.

Q- And were you able to actually conduct an examination for the purposes that you have stated?

A- Yes, ma’am.
Q- How many times were you able to examine or meet the petitioner?

A- I met him three (3x) times, ma’am. That was on January 10, January 14 and January 17, year 2000.

Q- And is there any other witness or person that you have met for the purpose of evaluating the behavior and personality of
petitioner?

A- Yes, ma’am. I was able to interview a long time employee that they have in their company in the person of Mrs. Emmy Adato
who herself know the petitioner since he was eight (8) years old, ma’am.

Q- Do you affirm before this Honorable Court the conclusions that you have arrived at to be correct?

A- Yes, ma’am.

Q- And what was the conclusion after you conducted the evaluation of the character of petitioner, as well as that of the respondent?

A- After my intensive interview about the circumstances of their marriage, family background of the petitioner and also the family
background of the respondent, it is the opinion of the examiner that the petitioner Mr. Edward Lim is suffering from DEPENDENT
PERSONALITY DISORDER that renders him psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities of marriage,
ma’am. On the other hand, based on the informations and clinical data gathered from the petitioner and my other informant, Ms.
Emmy Adato, it is the opinion of the examiner that the respondent is suffering from HISTRIONIC PERSONALITY DISORDER
associated with an immaturity that renders her psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities of marriage.

Q- In your capacity as expert, a psychiatrist of forty (40) years, can you conclude that this deficiencies or defects that you found
are sufficient ground to nullify the marriage under Article 36?

A- Yes, ma’am.

Q- Do you conclude also these deficiencies are continuous and permanent?

A- Yes, ma’am.

Q- Would you conclude therefore – would you consider it as valid ground for the annulment of the marriage?

A- Yes, ma’am.13

On cross examination by the prosecutor, Dr. Villegas testified as follows:

Q- Doctor, you have testified that it was only the petitioner whom you have examined and evaluated with (sic)?

A- Yes, ma’am.

Q- And the other person whom you have interviewed was the employee of the petitioner?

A- Yes, ma’am.

Q- No other person whom you have interviewed?

A- None, ma’am.

Q- You did not interview the surrogate parents of petitioner?

A- No, ma’am.

Q- Did you attempt to communicate with the respondent of this case for the purpose of interviewing her?

A- Yes, ma’am. [A]nd I have made this through the petitioner who has contacted his children in Cagayan De Oro, ma’am.

Q- So you are telling us, Doctor, that the respondent is in Cagayan De Oro?

A- Yes, ma’am.

Q- And despite your invitation, she did not appear to you?

A- Yes, ma’am.

Q- So based from your Report on the circumstances of marriage, the information regarding the marriage of parties in this case came
from the petitioner?

A- Yes, sir.

Q- And the family background you have made on Cheryl, the respondent also came from the petitioner?

A- Yes, ma’am.

Q- And the interview you have made on Adato, the employee of petitioner, she gave you some background of the respondent here?

A- Yes, ma’am.

Q- But most of the informations you have gathered from her were pertaining to the petitioner?

A- Yes, ma’am.

Q- So practically, the evaluation you have made were based on the interview only on both the employee and the petitioner himself?

A- Yes, ma’am.

Q- You did not conduct a series of tests to determine or evaluate further?

A- No, ma’am.

Q- You have not collaborated with any psychologists so as to get some psychological evaluation on petitioner?

A- No, ma’am. But the clearer picture of the case presented to me is a very clear picture already of the psychiatric disorder which
did not necessitated (sic) the assistance of a psychologist because it is obvious, the signs and symptoms are obviously manifested
by the parties.

Q- How many times did you meet the petitioner?

A- Three (3) times ma’am.

Q- And the duration of interview or examination on petitioner is how long?

A- It lasted for about one and a half hours to two and a half hours.
Q- For each session?

A- For each session.

Q- So you were able to examine him for a duration of six (6) hours, more or less. In the six (6) or seven (7) hours, you were able
to make the conclusions which you have made in your report?

A- Yes, ma’am. A psychiatric interview is a very structured interview…

Q- When did you find out that you don’t have to resort to psychological evaluation?

A- Even on my interview, I already kn[e]w that I will not be referring this case to a psychological evaluation because the signs and
symptoms are already very clear.

Q- What are these signs and symptoms?

A- The family background, for example, which gave the rootcause, of this case are very, very typical ground that can bring about…

Q- Did you not have any suspicion that the petitioner might be giving you some informations which would given (sic) some
presumption to nullifying his marriage?

A- I have no basis to doubt that kind of information that he might be lying. During the one and a half to two hours of interview
based on his reactions, the way he answers me, the way he grimaces and also, his statements that he has been giving me are very
sincere on his part, that he even, despite the fact that that happened already about eleven years ago, I could still appreciate how
much he feels, so devastated, so frustrated and disappointed about family life.

Q- You made a conclusion about the personality of both the petitioner and the respondent. Would you say that even if petitioner
would marry again, the same manifestations would exist in the second marriage?

A- It would depend again on the personality profile of the would be partner that he will be having. So it is not really absolute in his
case, in a personality profile, but it would again depend on the personality profile of the would-be partner that he will be having,
ma’am.14

It was folly for the trial court to accept the findings and conclusions of Dr. Villegas with nary a link drawn between the
"psychodynamics of the case" and the factors characterizing the psychological incapacity. Dr. Villegas’ sparse testimony does not
lead to the inevitable conclusion that the parties were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations.
Even on questioning from the trial court, Dr. Villegas’ testimony did not illuminate on the parties’ alleged personality disorders
and their incapacitating effect on their marriage:

Q- Doctora, you gave a conclusion that the respondent is suffering from Histrionic Personality Disorder associated with immaturity.
Did you discover the antecedents of this disorder?

A- Yes, your honor.

Q- What did you find out?

A- I found out from her family background that the parents were separated. She lived with a stepfather and therefore their family
relationship were only preoccupied by earning a living and no attention were given to the children. When the children were growing
up, specifically Cheryl – (interrupted).

Q- By the way, who supplied you this information?

A- The petitioner.
Q- You never discussed the matter with the respondent or any of her relatives, except the husband?

A- None, ma’am.

Q- Now, you have interviewed Mr. Lim three (3) times. What tests did you give to him aside from the interview?

A- I did not give him any test because a psychological examination is given by a psychologist who acts as a laboratory aide to a
psychiatrist and therefore, if there are some doubts in our clinical interviews, that is the time we refer the case to a psychologist for
a sort of clarification in our clinical interviews.

Q- As far as the gravity of the disorder of petitioner is concerned do you have any suggestions as to the cure of the same?

A- Because the psychological/psychiatric incapacity has been formed or developed during his early years of development, I would
say that it is ingrained in his personality and therefore, no amount of psychiatric assistance or medicines can help him improve his
personality, your honor.15

The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition (DSM IV),16 provides general diagnostic criteria for
personality disorders:

A. An enduring pattern of inner experience and behavior that deviates markedly from the expectations of the individual’s culture.
This pattern is manifested in two (2) or more of the following areas:

(1) cognition (i.e., ways of perceiving and interpreting self, other people, and events)

(2) affectivity (i.e., the range, intensity, lability, and appropriateness of emotional response)

(3) interpersonal functioning

(4) impulse control

B. The enduring pattern is inflexible and pervasive across a broad range of personal and social situations.

C. The enduring pattern leads to clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational or other important areas of
functioning.

D. The pattern is stable and of long duration, and its onset can be traced back at least to adolescence or early adulthood.

E. The enduring pattern is not better accounted for as a manifestation or a consequence of another mental disorder.

F. The enduring pattern is not due to the direct physiological effects of a substance (i.e., a drug of abuse, a medication) or a general
medical condition (e.g., head trauma).

The alleged personality disorders of the parties have the following specified diagnostic criteria:

301.6 DEPENDENT PERSONALITY DISORDER

A pervasive and excessive need to be taken care of that leads to submissive and clinging behavior and fears of separation, beginning
by early adulthood and present in a variety of contexts, as indicated by five (or more) of the following:

(1) has difficulty making everyday decisions without an excessive amount of advice and reassurance from others;

(2) needs others to assume responsibility for most major areas of his or her life;
(3) has difficulty expressing disagreement with others because of fear of loss of support or approval. Note: do not include realistic
fears of retribution;

(4) has difficulty intiating projects or doing things on his or her own (because of a lack of self-confidence in judgment or abilities
rather than a lack of motivation or energy);

(5) goes to excessive lengths to obtain nurturance and support from others, to the point of volunteering to do things that are
unpleasant;

(6) feels uncomfortable or helpless when alone because of exaggerated fears of being unable to care for himself or herself;

(7) urgently seeks another relationship as a source of care and support when a close relationship ends;

(8) is unrealistically preoccupied with fears of being left to take care of himself or herself.

301.5 HISTRIONIC PERSONALITY DISORDER

A pervasive pattern of excessive emotionality and attention seeking, beginning by early adulthood and present in a variety of
contexts, as indicated by five (or more) of the following:

(1) is uncomfortable in situations in which he or she is not the center of attention;

(2) interaction with others is often characterized by inappropriate sexually seductive or provocative behavior;
(3) displays rapidly shifting and shallow expressing of emotions;
(4) consistently uses physical appearance to draw attention to self;
(5) has a style of speech that is excessively impressionistic and lacking in detail;
(6) shows self-dramatization, theatricality, and exaggerated expression of emotion;
(7) is suggestible, i.e., easily influenced by others or circumstances; and
(8) considers relationships to be more intimate than they actually are.

Significantly, nowhere in Dr. Villegas’ Psychiatric Report and in her testimony does she link particular acts of the parties to the
DSM IV’s list of criteria for the specific personality disorders.

Curiously, Dr. Villegas’ global conclusion of both parties’ personality disorders was not supported by psychological tests properly
administered by clinical psychologists specifically trained in the tests’ use and interpretation. The supposed personality disorders
of the parties, considering that such diagnoses were made, could have been fully established by psychometric and neurological
tests which are designed to measure specific aspects of people’s intelligence, thinking, or personality. 17

Concededly, a copy of DSM IV, or any of the psychology textbooks, does not transform a lawyer or a judge into a professional
psychologist. A judge should not substitute his own psychological assessment of the parties for that of the psychologist or the
psychiatrist. However, a judge has the bounden duty to rule on what the law is, as applied to a certain set of facts. Certainly, as in
all other litigations involving technical or special knowledge, a judge must first and foremost resolve the legal question based on
law and jurisprudence.

The expert opinion of a psychiatrist arrived at after a maximum of seven (7) hours of interview, and unsupported by separate
psychological tests, cannot tie the hands of the trial court and prevent it from making its own factual finding on what happened in
this case. The probative force of the testimony of an expert does not lie in a mere statement of his theory or opinion, but rather in
the assistance that he can render to the courts in showing the facts that serve as a basis for his criterion and the reasons upon which
the logic of his conclusion is founded.18

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 74822 is hereby
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 203993, April 20, 2015

PRISCILO B. PAZ,*Petitioner, v. NEW INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL UNIVERSALITY, INC., Respondent.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated January 31, 2012 and the Resolution 3 dated October 2,
2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 00903-MIN, which affirmed the Decision4 dated May 19, 2006 of the
Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 33 (RTC) in Civil Case No. 29,292-2002, declaring petitioner Captain Priscilo B.
Paz (petitioner) liable for breach of contract.

The Facts

On March 1, 2000, petitioner, as the officer-in-charge of the Aircraft Hangar at the Davao International Airport, Davao City,
entered into a Memorandum of Agreement5 (MOA) with Captain Allan J. Clarke (Capt. Clarke), President of International
Environmental University, whereby for a period of four (4) years, unless pre-terminated by both parties with six (6) months
advance notice, the former shall allow the latter to use the aircraft hangar space at the said Airport "exclusively for company
aircraft/helicopter."6 Said hangar space was previously leased to Liberty Aviation Corporation, which assigned the same to
petitioner.7

On August 19, 2000, petitioner complained in a letter8 addressed to "MR. ALLAN J. CLARKE, International
Environmental Universality, Inc. x x x" that the hangar space was being used "for trucks and equipment, vehicles maintenance
and fabrication," instead of for "company helicopter/aircraft" only, and thereby threatened to cancel the MOA if the "welding,
grinding, and fabrication jobs" were not stopped immediately. 9

On January 16, 2001, petitioner sent another letter10 to "MR. ALLAN J. CLARKE, International Environmental Universality,
Inc. x x x," reiterating that the hangar space "must be for aircraft use only," and that he will terminate the MOA due to the safety
of the aircrafts parked nearby. He further offered a vacant space along the airport road that was available and suitable for Capt.
Clarke's operations.11

On July 19, 2002, petitioner sent a third letter,12 this time, addressed to "MR. ALLAN JOSEPH CLARKE, CEO, New
International Environmental University, Inc. x x x," demanding that the latter vacate the premises due to the damage caused by an
Isuzu van driven by its employee to the left wing of an aircraft parked inside the hangar space, which Capt. Clarke had
supposedly promised to buy, but did not.13

On July 23, 2002, petitioner sent a final letter14 addressed to "MR. ALLAN J. CLARKE, Chairman, CEO, New International
Environmental University, Inc. x x x," strongly demanding the latter to immediately vacate the hangar space. He further informed
Capt. Clarke that the company will "apply for immediate electrical disconnection with the Davao Light and Power Company
(DLPC)[,] so as to compel [the latter] to desist from continuing with [the] works" thereon. 15

On September 4, 2002, respondent New International Environmental Universality, Inc. 16 (respondent) filed a complaint17 against
petitioner for breach of contract before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 29, 292-2002,18 claiming that: (a) petitioner had
disconnected its electric and telephone lines; (b) upon petitioner's instruction, security guards prevented its employees from
entering the leased premises by blocking the hangar space with barbed wire; and (c) petitioner violated the terms of the MOA
when he took over the hangar space without giving respondent the requisite six (6)-month advance notice of termination.19

In his defense, petitioner alleged, among others, that: (a) respondent had no cause of action against him as the MOA was
executed between him and Capt. Clarke in the latter's personal capacity; (b) there was no need to wait for the expiration of the
MOA because Capt. Clarke performed highly risky works in the leased premises that endangered other aircrafts within the
vicinity; and (c) the six (6)-month advance notice of termination was already given in the letters he sent to Capt. Clarke.20

On March 25, 2003, the RTC issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction 21 ordering petitioner to: (a) immediately remove all his
aircrafts parked within the leased premises; (b) allow entry of respondent by removing the steel gate installed thereat; and (c)
desist and refrain from committing further acts of dispossession and/or interference in respondent's occupation of the hangar
space.
For failure of petitioner to comply with the foregoing writ, respondent filed on October 24, 2003 a petition for indirect
contempt22 before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 30,030-2003, which was tried jointly with Civil Case No. 29, 292-2002.23

The RTC Ruling

After due trial, the RTC rendered a Decision24 dated May 19, 2006 finding petioner: (a) guilty of indirect contempt for
contumaciously disregarding its Order25 dated March 6, 2003, by not allowing respondent to possess occupy the leased premises
pending final decision in the main case; and (b) liable for breach of contract for illegally terminating the MOA even before the
expiration of the term thereof.26 He was, thus, ordered to pay a fine of P5,000.00, and to pay respondent nominal damages of
P100,000.00 and attorney's fees of P50,000.00 with legal interest, and costs of suit. 27

On the challenge to respondent's juridical personality, the RTC quoted the Order28 dated April 11, 2005 of the SEC explaining
that respondent was issued a Certificate of Incorporation on September 3, 2001 as New International Environmental Universality,
Inc. but that, subsequently, when it amended its Articles of Incorporation on November 14, 2001 and July 11, 2002, the SEC
Extension Office in Davao City erroneously used the name New International Environmental University, Inc.29 The latter name
was used by respondent when it filed its amended complaint on September 11, 2002 and the petition for indirect contempt against
petitioner on October 24, 2003 believing that it was allowed to do so, as it was only on April 11, 2005 when the SEC directed it
to revert to its correct name.30

The RTC further declared that the MOA, which was "made and executed by and between CAPT. [PRISCILO] B. PAZ, Officer-
In-Charge of Aircraft Hangar at Davao International Airport, Davao City, Philippines, hereinafter called as FIRST PARTY [a]nd
CAPT. ALLAN J. CLARKE[,] President of INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL UNIVERSITY with office address at
LIBERTY AVIATION HANGAR, Davao International Airport, Davao City, Philippines, hereinafter called as SECOND
PARTY,"31 was executed by the parties not only in their personal capacities but also in representation of their respective
corporations or entities.32

On the issue of the violation of the terms of the MOA, the RTC found respondent to have been effectively evicted from the leased
premises between July and August of 2002, or long before the expiration of the term thereof in 2004, when petitioner: (a) placed
a gate/fence that prevented ingress to and egress from the leased premises; (b) parked a plane inside and outside the leased
premises; (c) disconnected the electrical and telephone connections of respondent; and (d) locked respondent's employees
out.33 Despite the service of the injunctive writ upon petitioner, respondent was not allowed to possess and occupy the leased
premises, as in fact, the trial court even had to order on March 8, 2004 the inventory of the items locked inside the bodega of said
premises that was kept off-limits to respondent. Hence, petitioner was declared guilty of indirect contempt. 34

Aggrieved, petitioner elevated his case on appeal before the CA, arguing that the trial court should have dismissed outright the
cases against him for failure of respondent to satisfy the essential requisites of being a party to an action, i.e., legal personality,
legal capacity to sue or be sued, and real interest in the subject matter of the action.35

The CA Ruling

Finding that the errors ascribed by petitioner to the trial court only touched the civil action for breach of contract, the appellate
court resolved the appeal against him in a Decision36 dated January 31, 2012, and affirmed the RTC's finding of petitioner's
liability for breach of contract.37

The CA ruled that, while there was no corporate entity at the time of the execution of the MOA on March 1, 2000 when Capt.
Clarke signed as "President of International Environmental University," petitioner is nonetheless estopped from denying that he
had contracted with respondent as a corporation, having recognized the latter as the "Second Party" in the MOA that "will use the
hangar space exclusively for company aircraft/helicopter."38 Petitioner was likewise found to have issued checks to respondent
from May 3, 2000 to October 13, 2000, which belied his claim of contracting with Capt. Clarke in the latter's personal capacity.39

Petitioner moved for the reconsideration40 of the foregoing Decision, raising as an additional issue the death 41 of Capt. Clarke
which allegedly warranted the dismissal of the case.42 However, the motion was denied in a Resolution43 dated October 2, 2012
where the CA held that Capt. Clarke was merely an agent of respondent, who is the real party in the case. Thus, Capt. Clarke's
death extinguished only the agency between him and respondent, not the appeal against petitioner. 44

Undaunted, petitioner is now before the Court via the instant petition,45 claiming that: (a) the CA erred in not settling his appeal
for both the breach of contract and indirect contempt cases in a single proceeding and, consequently, the review of said cases
before the Court should be consolidated,46 and (b) the CA should have dismissed the cases against him for (1) lack of jurisdiction
of the trial court in view of the failure to implead Capt. Clarke as an indispensable party; 47 (2) lack of legal capacity and
personality on the part of respondent;48 and (3) lack of factual and legal bases for the assailed RTC Decision.49

The Court's Ruling

The petition lacks merit.

First, on the matter of the consolidation50 of the instant case with G.R. No. 202826 entitled "Priscilo B. Paz v. New International
Environmental University,'' the petition for review of the portion of the RTC Decision finding petitioner guilty of indirect
contempt,51 the Court had earlier denied said motion in a Resolution52 dated July 24, 2013 on the ground that G.R. No. 202826
had already been denied53 with finality.54 Thus, any further elucidation on the issue would be a mere superfluity.

Second, whether or not Capt. Clarke should have been impleaded as an indispensable party was correctly resolved by the CA
which held that the former was merely an agent of respondent.55 While Capt. Clarke's name and signature appeared on the MOA,
his participation was, nonetheless, limited to being a representative of respondent. As a mere representative, Capt. Clarke
acquired no rights whatsoever, nor did he incur any liabilities, arising from the contract between petitioner and respondent.
Therefore, he was not an indispensable party to the case at bar. 56

It should be emphasized, as it has been time and again, that this Court is not a trier of facts, and is thus not duty-bound to analyze
again and weigh the evidence introduced in and considered by the tribunals. 57 When supported by substantial evidence, the
findings of fact by the CA are conclusive and binding on the parties and are not reviewable by this Court, unless the case falls
under any of the exceptions,58 none of which was established herein.

The CA had correctly pointed out that, from the very language itself of the MOA entered into by petitioner whereby he obligated
himself to allow the use of the hangar space "for company aircraft/helicopter," petitioner cannot deny that he contracted with
respondent.59 Petitioner further acknowledged this fact in his final letter dated July 23, 2002, where he reiterated and strongly
demanded the former to immediately vacate the hangar space his "company is occupying/utilizing."60

Section 2161 of the Corporation Code62 explicitly provides that one who assumes an obligation to an ostensible corporation, as
such, cannot resist performance thereof on the ground that there was in fact no corporation. Clearly, petitioner is bound by his
obligation under the MOA not only on estoppel but by express provision of law. As aptly raised by respondent in its
Comment63 to the instant petition, it is futile to insist that petitioner issued the receipts for rental payments in respondent's name
and not with Capt. Clarke's, whom petitioner allegedly contracted in the latter's personal capacity, only because it was upon the
instruction of an employee.64 Indeed, it is disputably presumed that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns,65 and that all
private transactions have been fair and regular.66 Hence, it is assumed that petitioner, who is a pilot, knew what he was doing
with respect to his business with respondent.

Petitioner's pleadings, however, abound with clear indications of a business relationship gone sour. In his third letter dated July
19, 2002, petitioner lamented the fact that Capt. Clarke's alleged promise to buy an aircraft had not materialized. 67 He likewise
insinuated that Capt. Clarke's real motive in staying in the leased premises was the acquisition of petitioner's right to possess and
use the hangar space.68 Be that as it may, it is settled that courts have no power to relieve parties from obligations they voluntarily
assumed, simply because their contracts turn out to be disastrous deals or unwise investments. 69

The lower courts, therefore, did not err in finding petitioner liable for breach of contract for effectively evicting respondent from
the leased premises even before the expiration of the term of the lease. The Court reiterates with approval the ratiocination of the
RTC that, if it were true that respondent was violating the terms and conditions of the lease, "[petitioner] should have gone to
court to make the [former] refrain from its 'illegal' activities or seek rescission of the [MOA], rather than taking the law into his
own hands."70

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 31, 2012 and the Resolution dated October 2, 2012 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 00903-MIN are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 186400 October 20, 2010

CYNTHIA S. BOLOS, Petitioner,

vs.
DANILO T. BOLOS, Respondent.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking a review of the December 10, 2008
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in an original action for certiorari under Rule 65 entitled "Danilo T. Bolos v. Hon. Lorifel
Lacap Pahimna and Cynthia S. Bolos," docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 97872, reversing the January 16, 2007 Order of the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 69 (RTC), declaring its decision pronouncing the nullity of marriage between petitioner and
respondent final and executory.

On July 10, 2003, petitioner Cynthia Bolos (Cynthia) filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage to respondent
Danilo Bolos (Danilo) under Article 36 of the Family Code, docketed as JDRC No. 6211.

After trial on the merits, the RTC granted the petition for annulment in a Decision, dated August 2, 2006, with the following
disposition:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage between petitioner CYNTHIA S. BOLOS and respondent
DANILO T. BOLOS celebrated on February 14, 1980 as null and void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity on the
part of both petitioner and respondent under Article 36 of the Family Code with all the legal consequences provided by law.

Furnish the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan as well as the National Statistics Office (NSO) copy of this decision.

SO ORDERED.2

A copy of said decision was received by Danilo on August 25, 2006. He timely filed the Notice of Appeal on September 11, 2006.

In an order dated September 19, 2006, the RTC denied due course to the appeal for Danilo’s failure to file the required motion for
reconsideration or new trial, in violation of Section 20 of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages.

On November 23, 2006, a motion to reconsider the denial of Danilo’s appeal was likewise denied.

On January 16, 2007, the RTC issued the order declaring its August 2, 2006 decision final and executory and granting the Motion
for Entry of Judgment filed by Cynthia.

Not in conformity, Danilo filed with the CA a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 seeking to annul the orders of the RTC as they
were rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction, to wit: 1) the September 19, 2006 Order
which denied due course to Danilo’s appeal; 2) the November 23, 2006 Order which denied the motion to reconsider the September
19, 2006 Order; and 3) the January 16, 2007 Order which declared the August 2, 2006 decision as final and executory. Danilo also
prayed that he be declared psychologically capacitated to render the essential marital obligations to Cynthia, who should be declared
guilty of abandoning him, the family home and their children.

As earlier stated, the CA granted the petition and reversed and set aside the assailed orders of the RTC. The appellate court stated
that the requirement of a motion for reconsideration as a prerequisite to appeal under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC did not apply in this
case as the marriage between Cynthia and Danilo was solemnized on February 14, 1980 before the Family Code took effect. It
relied on the ruling of this Court in Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli3 to the effect that the "coverage [of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC]
extends only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988."
Cynthia sought reconsideration of the ruling by filing her Manifestation with Motion for Extension of Time to File Motion for
Reconsideration and Motion for Partial Reconsideration [of the Honorable Court’s Decision dated December 10, 2008]. The CA,
however, in its February 11, 2009 Resolution,4 denied the motion for extension of time considering that the 15-day reglementary
period to file a motion for reconsideration is non-extendible, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 40, 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure
citing Habaluyas v. Japson, 142 SCRA 208. The motion for partial reconsideration was likewise denied.

Hence, Cynthia interposes the present petition via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising the following

ISSUES
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN ISSUING THE QUESTIONED DECISION
DATED DECEMBER 10, 2008 CONSIDERING THAT:
A. THE PRONOUNCEMENT OF THE HONORABLE COURT IN ENRICO V. SPS. MEDINACELI
IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT CASE CONSIDERING THAT THE FACTS AND THE
ISSUE THEREIN ARE NOT SIMILAR TO THE INSTANT CASE.
B. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE PRONOUNCEMENT OF THE HONORABLE COURT IS
APLLICABLE TO THE INSTANT CASE, ITS RULING IN ENRICO V. SPS. MEDINACELI IS
PATENTLY ERRONEOUS BECAUSE THE PHRASE "UNDER THE FAMILY CODE" IN A.M. NO.
02-11-10-SC PERTAINS TO THE WORD "PETITIONS" RATHER THAN TO THE WORD
"MARRIAGES."
C. FROM THE FOREGOING, A.M. NO. 02-11-10-SC ENTITLED "RULE ON DECLARATION OF
ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF VOID MARRIAGES AND ANNULMENT OF VOIDABLE
MARRIAGES" IS APPLICABLE TO MARRIAGES SOLEMNIZED BEFORE THE EFFECTIVITY
OF THE FAMILY CODE. HENCE, A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS A PRECONDITION
FOR AN APPEAL BY HEREIN RESPONDENT.
D. CONSIDERING THAT HEREIN RESPONDENT REFUSED TO COMPLY WITH A
PRECONDITION FOR APPEAL, A RELAXATION OF THE RULES ON APPEAL IS NOT PROPER
IN HIS CASE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN ISSUING THE QUESTIONED RESOLUTION
DATED FEBRUARY 11, 2009 CONSIDERING THE FOREGOING AND THE FACTUAL
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE.
III
THE TENETS OF JUSTICE AND FAIR PLAY, THE NOVELTY AND IMPORTANCE OF THE
ISSUE AND THE SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES IN THIS CASE JUSTIFY AND WARRANT A
LIBERAL VIEW OF THE RULES IN FAVOR OF THE PETITIONER. MOREOVER, THE INSTANT
PETITION IS MERITORIOUS AND NOT INTENDED FOR DELAY.5

From the arguments advanced by Cynthia, the principal question to be resolved is whether or not A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC entitled
"Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages," is applicable to the case at
bench.

Petitioner argues that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is also applicable to marriages solemnized before the effectivity of the Family Code.
According to Cynthia, the CA erroneously anchored its decision to an obiter dictum in the aforecited Enrico case, which did not
even involve a marriage solemnized before the effectivity of the Family Code.

She added that, even assuming arguendo that the pronouncement in the said case constituted a decision on its merits, still the same
cannot be applied because of the substantial disparity in the factual milieu of the Enrico case from this case. In the said case, both
the marriages sought to be declared null were solemnized, and the action for declaration of nullity was filed, after the effectivity of
both the Family Code in 1988 and of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC in 2003. In this case, the marriage was solemnized before the effectivity
of the Family Code and A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC while the action was filed and decided after the effectivity of both.

Danilo, in his Comment,6 counters that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is not applicable because his marriage with Cynthia was solemnized
on February 14, 1980, years before its effectivity. He further stresses the meritorious nature of his appeal from the decision of the
RTC declaring their marriage as null and void due to his purported psychological incapacity and citing the mere "failure" of the
parties who were supposedly "remiss," but not "incapacitated," to render marital obligations as required under Article 36 of the
Family Code.
The Court finds the petition devoid of merit.

Petitioner insists that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC governs this case. Her stance is unavailing. The Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which the Court
promulgated on March 15, 2003, is explicit in its scope. Section 1 of the Rule, in fact, reads:

Section 1. Scope – This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages and annulment of voidable
marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines.

The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily.

The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for doubt. The coverage extends only to those marriages entered
into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988. 7 The rule sets a demarcation line between
marriages covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the Civil Code. 8

The Court finds Itself unable to subscribe to petitioner’s interpretation that the phrase "under the Family Code" in A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC refers to the word "petitions" rather than to the word "marriages."

A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for
construction or interpretation. There is only room for application.9 As the statute is clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must
be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This is what is known as the plain-meaning rule or verba
legis. It is expressed in the maxim, index animi sermo, or "speech is the index of intention." Furthermore, there is the maxim verba
legis non est recedendum, or "from the words of a statute there should be no departure."10

There is no basis for petitioner’s assertion either that the tenets of substantial justice, the novelty and importance of the issue and
the meritorious nature of this case warrant a relaxation of the Rules in her favor. Time and again the Court has stressed that the
rules of procedure must be faithfully complied with and should not be discarded with the mere expediency of claiming substantial
merit.11 As a corollary, rules prescribing the time for doing specific acts or for taking certain proceedings are considered absolutely
indispensable to prevent needless delays and to orderly and promptly discharge judicial business. By their very nature, these rules
are regarded as mandatory.12

The appellate court was correct in denying petitioner’s motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration considering
that the reglementary period for filing the said motion for reconsideration is non-extendible. As pronounced in Apex Mining Co.,
Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 13

The rule is and has been that the period for filing a motion for reconsideration is non-extendible. The Court has made this clear as
early as 1986 in Habaluyas Enterprises vs. Japzon. Since then, the Court has consistently and strictly adhered thereto.1avvphil

Given the above, we rule without hesitation that the appellate court’s denial of petitioner’s motion for reconsideration is justified,
precisely because petitioner’s earlier motion for extension of time did not suspend/toll the running of the 15-day reglementary
period for filing a motion for reconsideration. Under the circumstances, the CA decision has already attained finality when
petitioner filed its motion for reconsideration. It follows that the same decision was already beyond the review jurisdiction of this
Court.

In fine, the CA committed no reversible error in setting aside the RTC decision which denied due course to respondent’s appeal
and denying petitioner’s motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration.

Appeal is an essential part of our judicial system. Its purpose is to bring up for review a final judgment of the lower court. The
courts should, thus, proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of his right to appeal. 14 In the recent case of Almelor v. RTC
of Las Pinas City, Br. 254,15 the Court reiterated: While the right to appeal is a statutory, not a natural right, nonetheless it is an
essential part of our judicial system and courts should proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of the right to appeal, but
rather, ensure that every party-litigant has the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause, free from the
constraints of technicalities.
In the case at bench, the respondent should be given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his appeal considering that
what is at stake is the sacrosanct institution of marriage.

No less than the 1987 Constitution recognizes marriage as an inviolable social institution. This constitutional policy is echoed in
our Family Code. Article 1 thereof emphasizes its permanence and inviolability, thus:

Article 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for
the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the
property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code.

This Court is not unmindful of the constitutional policy to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social
institution and marriage as the foundation of the family.16

Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution in which the State is vitally
interested. The State finds no stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy families. The break up of families weakens our social
and moral fabric and, hence, their preservation is not the concern alone of the family members.17

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

G.R. No. 166357 September 19, 2011

VALERIO E. KALAW, Petitioner,

vs.
MA. ELENA FERNANDEZ, Respondent.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

A finding of psychological incapacity must be supported by well-established facts. It is the plaintiff’s burden to convince the court
of the existence of these facts.

Before the Court is a Petition for Review1 of the Court of Appeals’ (CA) May 27, 2004 Decision 2 and December 15, 2004
Resolution3 in CA-G.R. CV No. 64240, which reversed the trial court’s declaration of nullity of the herein parties’ marriage. The
fallo of the assailed Decision reads:

WHEREFORE¸the appeal is GRANTED, and the assailed Decision is SET ASIDE and VACATED while the petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.4

Factual Antecedents

Petitioner Valerio E. Kalaw (Tyrone) and respondent Ma. Elena Fernandez (Malyn) met in 1973. They maintained a relationship
and eventually married in Hong Kong on November 4, 1976. They had four children, Valerio (Rio), Maria Eva (Ria), Ramon
Miguel (Miggy or Mickey), and Jaime Teodoro (Jay).

Shortly after the birth of their youngest son, Tyrone had an extramarital affair with Jocelyn Quejano (Jocelyn), who gave birth to a
son in March 1983.5

In May 1985, Malyn left the conjugal home (the house of her Kalaw in-laws) and her four children with Tyrone.6 Meanwhile,
Tyrone started living with Jocelyn, who bore him three more children. 7

In 1990, Tyrone went to the United States (US) with Jocelyn and their children. He left his four children from his marriage with
Malyn in a rented house in Valle Verde with only a househelp and a driver. 8 The househelp would just call Malyn to take care of
the children whenever any of them got sick. Also, in accordance with their custody agreement, the children stayed with Malyn on
weekends.9

In 1994, the two elder children, Rio and Ria, asked for Malyn’s permission to go to Japan for a one-week vacation. Malyn acceded
only to learn later that Tyrone brought the children to the US.10 After just one year, Ria returned to the Philippines and chose to
live with Malyn.

Meanwhile, Tyrone and Jocelyn’s family returned to the Philippines and resumed physical custody of the two younger children,
Miggy and Jay. According to Malyn, from that time on, the children refused to go to her house on weekends because of alleged
weekend plans with their father.11

Complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage

On July 6, 1994, nine years since the de facto separation from his wife, Tyrone filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
based on Article 36 of the Family Code.12 He alleged that Malyn was psychologically incapacitated to perform and comply with
the essential marital obligations at the time of the celebration of their marriage. He further claimed that her psychological incapacity
was manifested by her immaturity and irresponsibility towards Tyrone and their children during their co-habitation, as shown by
Malyn’s following acts:
1. she left the children without proper care and attention as she played mahjong all day and all night;

2. she left the house to party with male friends and returned in the early hours of the following day; and

3. she committed adultery on June 9, 1985, which act Tyrone discovered in flagrante delicto.13

During trial,14 Tyrone narrated the circumstances of Malyn’s alleged infidelity. According to him, on June 9, 1985, he and his
brother-in-law, Ronald Fernandez (Malyn’s brother), proceeded to Hyatt Hotel and learned that Malyn was occupying a room with
a certain Benjie Guevarra (Benjie). When he proceeded to the said room, he saw Benjie and Malyn inside. 15 At rebuttal, Tyrone
elaborated that Benjie was wearing only a towel around his waist, while Malyn was lying in bed in her underwear. After an exchange
of words, he agreed not to charge Malyn with adultery when the latter agreed to relinquish all her marital and parental rights.16 They
put their agreement in writing before Atty. Jose Palarca.

Tyrone presented a psychologist, Dr. Cristina Gates (Dr. Gates), and a Catholic canon law expert, Fr. Gerard Healy, S.J. (Fr. Healy),
to testify on Malyn’s psychological incapacity.

Dr. Gates explained on the stand that the factual allegations regarding Malyn’s behavior – her sexual infidelity, habitual mahjong
playing, and her frequent nights-out with friends – may reflect a narcissistic personality disorder (NPD).17 NPD is present when a
person is obsessed to meet her wants and needs in utter disregard of her significant others. 18 Malyn’s NPD is manifest in
her utter neglect of her duties as a mother.19

Dr. Gates reported that Malyn’s personality disorder "may have been evident even prior to her marriage" because it is rooted in her
family background and upbringing, which the psychologist gathered to be materially deprived and without a proper maternal role
model.20

Dr. Gates based her diagnosis on the facts revealed by her interviews with Tyrone, Trinidad Kalaw (Tyrone’s sister-in-law), and
the son Miggy. She also read the transcript of Tyrone’s court testimony.21

Fr. Healy corroborated Dr. Gates’ assessment. He concluded that Malyn was psychologically incapacitated to perform her marital
duties.22 He explained that her psychological incapacity is rooted in her role as the breadwinner of her family. This role allegedly
inflated Malyn’s ego to the point that her needs became priority, while her kids’ and husband’s needs became secondary. Malyn is
so self-absorbed that she is incapable of prioritizing her family’s needs.

Fr. Healy clarified that playing mahjong and spending time with friends are not disorders by themselves. They only constitute
psychological incapacity whenever inordinate amounts of time are spent on these activities to the detriment of one’s familial
duties.23 Fr. Healy characterized Malyn’s psychological incapacity as grave and incurable. 24

He based his opinion on his interview with Tyrone, the trial transcripts, as well as the report of Dr. Natividad Dayan (Dr. Dayan),
Malyn’s expert witness.25 He clarified that he did not verify the truthfulness of the factual allegations regarding Malyn’s "habits"
because he believed it is the court’s duty to do so.26 Instead, he formed his opinion on the assumption that the factual allegations
are indeed true.

Malyn’s version

Malyn denied being psychologically incapacitated.27 While she admitted playing mahjong, she denied playing as frequently as
Tyrone alleged. She maintained that she did so only two to three times a week and always between 1 p.m. to 6 p.m. only. 28 And in
those instances, she always had Tyrone’s permission and would often bring the children and their respective yayas with her. 29 She
maintained that she did not neglect her duties as mother and wife.

Malyn admitted leaving the conjugal home in May 1985. She, however, explained that she did so only to escape her physically
abusive husband.30 On the day she left, Tyrone, who preferred to keep Malyn a housewife, was upset that Malyn was preparing to
go to work. He called up the security guards and instructed them not to let Malyn out of the house. Tyrone then placed cigarette
ashes on Malyn’s head and proceeded to lock the bedroom doors. Fearing another beating, Malyn rushed out of their bedroom and
into her mother-in-law’s room. She blurted that Tyrone would beat her up again so her mother-in-law gave her ₱300 to leave the
house.31 She never returned to their conjugal home.
Malyn explained that she applied for work, against Tyrone’s wishes, because she wanted to be self-sufficient. Her resolve came
from her discovery that Tyrone had a son by Jocelyn and had secretly gone to the US with Jocelyn. 32

Malyn denied the allegation of adultery. She maintained that Benjie only booked a room at the Hyatt Hotel for her because she was
so drunk after partying with friends. She admitted finding her brother Ronald and Tyrone at the door of the Hyatt Hotel room, but
maintained being fully clothed at that time.33 Malyn insisted that she wrote the letter relinquishing all her spousal and parental
rights under duress.34

After the Hyatt Hotel incident, Malyn only saw her children by surreptitiously visiting them in school. She later obtained partial
custody of the children as an incident to the legal separation action filed by Tyrone against her (which action was subsequently
dismissed for lack of interest).

As an affirmative defense, Malyn maintained that it was Tyrone who was suffering from psychological incapacity, as manifested
by his drug dependence, habitual drinking, womanizing, and physical violence.35 Malyn presented Dr. Dayan a clinical
psychologist, as her expert witness.

Dr. Dayan interviewed Tyrone, Malyn, Miggy/Mickey, Jay, and Ria for her psychological evaluation of the spouses. The factual
narrations culled from these interviews reveal that Tyrone found Malyn a "lousy" mother because of her mahjong habit, 36 while
Malyn was fed up with Tyrone’s sexual infidelity, drug habit, and physical abuse. 37 Dr. Dayan determined that both Tyrone and
Malyn were behaviorally immature. They encountered problems because of their personality differences, which ultimately led to
the demise of their marriage. Her diagnostic impressions are summarized below:

The marriage of Tyrone and Malyn was a mistake from the very beginning. Both of them were not truly ready for marriage even
after two years of living together and having a child. When Malyn first met Tyrone who showered her with gifts, flowers, and
affection she resisted his overtures. She made it clear that she could ‘take him or leave him.’ But the minute she started to care, she
became a different person – clingy and immature, doubting his love, constantly demanding reassurance that she was the most
important person in his life. She became relationship-dependent. It appears that her style then was when she begins to care for a
man, she puts all her energy into him and loses focus on herself. This imbalance between thinking and feeling was overwhelming
to Tyrone who admitted that the thought of commitment scared him. Tyrone admitted that when he was in his younger years, he
was often out seeking other women. His interest in them was not necessarily for sex, just for fun – dancing, drinking, or simply
flirting.

Both of them seem behaviorally immature. For some time, Malyn adapted to her husband who was a moody man with short temper
and unresolved issues with parents and siblings. He was a distancer, concerned more about his work and friends tha[n] he was
about spending time with his family. Because of Malyn’s and Tyrone’s backgrounds (both came from families with high conflicts)
they experienced turmoil and chaos in their marriage. The conflicts they had struggled to avoid suddenly galloped out of control
Their individual personalities broke through, precipitating the demise of their marriage.38

Dr. Dayan likewise wrote in her psychological evaluation report that Malyn exhibited significant, but not severe, dependency,
narcissism, and compulsiveness.39

On the stand, the psychologist elaborated that while Malyn had relationship problems with Tyrone, she appeared to have a good
relationship with her kids.40 As for Tyrone, he has commitment issues which prevent him from committing himself to his duties as
a husband. He is unable to remain faithful to Malyn and is psychologically incapacitated to perform this duty. 41

Children’s version

The children all stated that both their parents took care of them, provided for their needs, and loved them. Rio testified that they
would accompany their mother to White Plains on days that she played mahjong with her friends. None of them reported being
neglected or feeling abandoned.

The two elder kids remembered the fights between their parents but it was only Ria who admitted actually witnessing physical
abuse inflicted on her mother.42 The two elder kids also recalled that, after the separation, their mother would visit them only in
school.43
The children recalled living in Valle Verde with only the househelp and driver during the time that their dad was abroad.44 While
they did not live with their mother while they were housed in Valle Verde, the kids were in agreement that their mother took care
of them on weekends and would see to their needs. They had a common recollection that the househelp would call their mother to
come and take care of them in Valle Verde whenever any of them was sick. 45

Other witnesses

Dr. Cornelio Banaag, Tyrone’s attending psychiatrist at the Manila Sanitarium, testified that, for the duration of Tyrone’s
confinement, the couple appeared happy and the wife was commendable for the support she gave to her spouse. 46 He likewise
testified that Tyrone tested negative for drugs and was not a drug dependent.47
Malyn’s brother, Ronald Fernandez, confirmed Tyrone’s allegation that they found Malyn with Benjie in the Hyatt hotel room.
Contrary to Tyrone’s version, he testified that neither he nor Tyrone entered the room, but stayed in the hallway. He likewise did
not recall seeing Benjie or Malyn half-naked.48
Tyrone then presented Mario Calma (Mario), who was allegedly part of Malyn’s group of friends. He stated on the stand that
they would go on nights-out as a group and Malyn would meet with a male musician-friend afterwards.49

Social worker

The trial court ordered the court social worker, Jocelyn V. Arre (Arre), to conduct a social case study on the parties as well as the
minor children. Arre interviewed the parties Tyrone and Malyn; the minor children Miggy/Mickey and Jay; Tyrone’s live-in
partner, Jocelyn;50 and Tyrone and Malyn’s only daughter, Ria. While both parents are financially stable and have positive
relationships with their children, she recommended that the custody of the minor children be awarded to Malyn. Based on the
interviews of family members themselves, Malyn was shown to be more available to the children and to exercise better supervision
and care. The social worker commended the fact that even after Malyn left the conjugal home in 1985, she made efforts to visit her
children clandestinely in their respective schools. And while she was only granted weekend custody of the children, it appeared
that she made efforts to personally attend to their needs and to devote time with them. 51

On the contrary, Tyrone, who had custody of the children since the couple’s de facto separation, simply left the children for several
years with only a maid and a driver to care for them while he lived with his second family abroad.52 The social worker found that
Tyrone tended to prioritize his second family to the detriment of his children with Malyn. Given this history during the formative
years of the children, the social worker did not find Tyrone a reliable parent to whom custody of adolescents may be awarded.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court53

After summarizing the evidence presented by both parties, the trial court concluded that both parties are psychologically
incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations under the Family Code. The court’s Decision is encapsulated in this
paragraph:

From the evidence, it appears that parties are both suffering from psychological incapacity to perform their essential marital
obligations under Article 36 of the Family Code. The parties entered into a marriage without as much as understanding what it
entails. They failed to commit themselves to its essential obligations: the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering
of mutual help, the procreation and education of their children to become responsible individuals. Parties’ psychological incapacity
is grave, and serious such that both are incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage. The incapacity has been
clinically established and was found to be pervasive, grave and incurable. 54

The trial court then declared the parties’ marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code. 55

Ruling of the Court of Appeals56

Malyn appealed the trial court’s Decision to the CA.1âwphi1 The CA reversed the trial court’s ruling because it is not supported
by the facts on record. Both parties’ allegations and incriminations against each other do not support a finding of psychological
incapacity. The parties’ faults tend only to picture their immaturity and irresponsibility in performing their marital and familial
obligations. At most, there may be sufficient grounds for a legal separation. 57 Moreover, the psychological report submitted by
petitioner’s expert witness, Dr. Gates, does not explain how the diagnosis of NPD came to be drawn from the sources. It failed to
satisfy the legal and jurisprudential requirements for the declaration of nullity of marriage. 58
Tyrone filed a motion for reconsideration59 but the same was denied on December 15, 2004.60

Petitioner’s arguments

Petitioner Tyrone argues that the CA erred in disregarding the factual findings of the trial court, which is the court that is in the
best position to appreciate the evidence. He opines that he has presented preponderant evidence to prove that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations, to wit:

a) the expert witnesses, Dr. Gates and Fr. Healy, proved on the stand that respondent’s egocentric attitude, immaturity, self-
obsession and self-centeredness were manifestations of respondent’s NPD;61

b) these expert witnesses proved that respondent’s NPD is grave and incurable and prevents her from performing her essential
martial obligations;62 and

c) that respondent’s NPD existed at the time of the celebration of the marriage because it is rooted in her upbringing, family
background, and socialite lifestyle prior to her marriage.63

Petitioner stresses that even respondent insisted that their marriage is void because of psychological incapacity, albeit on petitioner’s
part.64

Respondent’s arguments

Respondent maintains that Tyrone failed to discharge his burden of proving her alleged psychological incapacity. 65 She argues that
the testimonies of her children and the findings of the court social worker to the effect that she was a good, loving, and attentive
mother are sufficient to rebut Tyrone’s allegation that she was negligent and irresponsible. 66

She assails Dr. Gates’s report as one-sided and lacking in depth. Dr. Gates did not interview her, their common children, or even
Jocelyn. Moreover, her report failed to state that Malyn’s alleged psychological incapacity was grave and incurable.67 Fr. Healy’s
testimony, on the other hand, was based only on Tyrone’s version of the facts.68

Malyn reiterates the appellate court’s ruling that the trial court Decision is intrinsically defective for failing to support its conclusion
of psychological incapacity with factual findings.

Almost four years after filing her memorandum, respondent apparently had a change of heart and filed a Manifestation with Motion
for Leave to Withdraw Comment and Memorandum.69 She manifested that she was no longer disputing the possibility that their
marriage may really be void on the basis of Tyrone’s psychological incapacity. She then asked the Court to dispose of the case with
justice.70 Her manifestation and motion were noted by the Court in its January 20, 2010 Resolution. 71

Issue

Whether petitioner has sufficiently proved that respondent suffers from psychological incapacity
Our Ruling
The petition has no merit. The CA committed no reversible error in setting aside the trial court’s Decision for lack of legal and
factual basis.
A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is governed by Article 36 of the Family Code which provides:
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.

Psychological incapacity is the downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital
obligations.72 The burden of proving psychological incapacity is on the plaintiff. 73 The plaintiff must prove that the incapacitated
party, based on his or her actions or behavior, suffers a serious psychological disorder that completely disables him or her from
understanding and discharging the essential obligations of the marital state. The psychological problem must be grave, must have
existed at the time of marriage, and must be incurable.74
In the case at bar, petitioner failed to prove that his wife (respondent) suffers from psychological incapacity. He presented the
testimonies of two supposed expert witnesses who concluded that respondent is psychologically incapacitated, but the conclusions
of these witnesses were premised on the alleged acts or behavior of respondent which had not been sufficiently proven. Petitioner’s
experts heavily relied on petitioner’s allegations of respondent’s constant mahjong sessions, visits to the beauty parlor, going out
with friends, adultery, and neglect of their children. Petitioner’s experts opined that respondent’s alleged habits, when performed
constantly to the detriment of quality and quantity of time devoted to her duties as mother and wife, constitute a psychological
incapacity in the form of NPD.

But petitioner’s allegations, which served as the bases or underlying premises of the conclusions of his experts, were not actually
proven. In fact, respondent presented contrary evidence refuting these allegations of the petitioner.

For instance, petitioner alleged that respondent constantly played mahjong and neglected their children as a result. Respondent
admittedly played mahjong, but it was not proven that she engaged in mahjong so frequently that she neglected her duties as a
mother and a wife. Respondent refuted petitioner’s allegations that she played four to five times a week. She maintained it was
only two to three times a week and always with the permission of her husband and without abandoning her children at home. The
children corroborated this, saying that they were with their mother when she played mahjong in their relative’s home. Petitioner
did not present any proof, other than his own testimony, that the mahjong sessions were so frequent that respondent neglected her
family. While he intimated that two of his sons repeated the second grade, he was not able to link this episode to respondent’s
mahjong-playing. The least that could have been done was to prove the frequency of respondent’s mahjong-playing during the
years when these two children were in second grade. This was not done. Thus, while there is no dispute that respondent played
mahjong, its alleged debilitating frequency and adverse effect on the children were not proven.

Also unproven was petitioner’s claim about respondent’s alleged constant visits to the beauty parlor, going out with friends, and
obsessive need for attention from other men. No proof whatsoever was presented to prove her visits to beauty salons or her frequent
partying with friends. Petitioner presented Mario (an alleged companion of respondent during these nights-out) in order to prove
that respondent had affairs with other men, but Mario only testified that respondent appeared to be dating other men. Even assuming
arguendo that petitioner was able to prove that respondent had an extramarital affair with another man, that one instance of sexual
infidelity cannot, by itself, be equated with obsessive need for attention from other men. Sexual infidelity per se is a ground for
legal separation, but it does not necessarily constitute psychological incapacity.

Given the insufficiency of evidence that respondent actually engaged in the behaviors described as constitutive of NPD, there is no
basis for concluding that she was indeed psychologically incapacitated. Indeed, the totality of the evidence points to the opposite
conclusion. A fair assessment of the facts would show that respondent was not totally remiss and incapable of appreciating and
performing her marital and parental duties. Not once did the children state that they were neglected by their mother. On the contrary,
they narrated that she took care of them, was around when they were sick, and cooked the food they like. It appears that respondent
made real efforts to see and take care of her children despite her estrangement from their father. There was no testimony whatsoever
that shows abandonment and neglect of familial duties. While petitioner cites the fact that his two sons, Rio and Miggy, both failed
the second elementary level despite having tutors, there is nothing to link their academic shortcomings to Malyn’s actions.

After poring over the records of the case, the Court finds no factual basis for the conclusion of psychological incapacity. There is
no error in the CA’s reversal of the trial court’s ruling that there was psychological incapacity. The trial court’s Decision merely
summarized the allegations, testimonies, and evidence of the respective parties, but it did not actually assess the veracity of these
allegations, the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight of the evidence. The trial court did not make factual findings which can
serve as bases for its legal conclusion of psychological incapacity.

What transpired between the parties is acrimony and, perhaps, infidelity, which may have constrained them from dedicating the
best of themselves to each other and to their children. There may be grounds for legal separation, but certainly not psychological
incapacity that voids a marriage.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals’ May 27, 2004 Decision and its December
15, 2004 Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 64240 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 170022 January 9, 2013

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
CESAR ENCELAN, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We resolve the petition for review on certiorari1 filed by petitioner Republic of the Philippines challenging the October 7, 2005
amended decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) that reconsidered its March 22, 2004 decision3 (original decision) in CA-G.R. CV
No. 75583. In its original decision, the CA set aside the June 5, 2002 decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch
47, in Civil Case No. 95-74257, which The Factual Antecedents

On August 25, 1979, Cesar married Lolita5 and the union bore two children, Maricar and Manny.6 To support his family, Cesar
went to work in Saudi Arabia on May 15, 1984. On June 12, 1986, Cesar, while still in Saudi Arabia, learned that Lolita had been
having an illicit affair with Alvin Perez. Sometime in 1991,7 Lolita allegedly left the conjugal home with her children and lived
with Alvin. Since then, Cesar and Lolita had been separated. On June 16, 1995, Cesar filed with the RTC a petition against Lolita
for the declaration of the nullity of his marriage based on Lolita’s psychological incapacity. 8

Lolita denied that she had an affair with Alvin; she contended that Alvin used to be an associate in her promotions business. She
insisted that she is not psychologically incapacitated and that she left their home because of irreconcilable differences with her
mother-in-law.9

At the trial, Cesar affirmed his allegations of Lolita’s infidelity and subsequent abandonment of the family home. 10 He testified
that he continued to provide financial support for Lolita and their children even after he learned of her illicit affair with Alvin.11

Cesar presented the psychological evaluation report12 on Lolita prepared by Dr. Fareda Fatima Flores of the National Center for
Mental Health. Dr. Flores found that Lolita was "not suffering from any form of major psychiatric illness," 13 but had been "unable
to provide the expectations expected of her for a good and lasting marital relationship";14 her "transferring from one job to the other
depicts some interpersonal problems with co-workers as well as her impatience in attaining her ambitions";15 and "her refusal to
go with her husband abroad signifies her reluctance to work out a good marital and family relationship." 16

The RTC Ruling

In its June 5, 2002 decision,17 the RTC declared Cesar’s marriage to Lolita void, finding sufficient basis to declare Lolita
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations.

The petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appealed to the CA.

The CA Ruling

The CA originally18 set aside the RTC’s verdict, finding that Lolita’s abandonment of the conjugal dwelling and infidelity were
not serious cases of personality disorder/psychological illness. Lolita merely refused to comply with her marital obligations which
she was capable of doing. The CA significantly observed that infidelity is only a ground for legal separation, not for the declaration
of the nullity of a marriage.

Cesar sought reconsideration19 of the CA’s decision and, in due course, attained his objective. The CA set aside its original decision
and entered another, which affirmed the RTC’s decision. In its amended decision, 20 the CA found two circumstances indicative of
Lolita’s serious psychological incapacity that resulted in her gross infidelity: (1) Lolita’s unwarranted refusal to perform her marital
obligations to Cesar; and (2) Lolita’s willful and deliberate act of abandoning the conjugal dwelling.

The OSG then filed the present petition.

The Petition

The OSG argues that Dr. Flores’ psychological evaluation report did not disclose that Lolita had been suffering from a
psychological illness nor did it establish its juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability; infidelity and abandonment do not
constitute psychological incapacity, but are merely grounds for legal separation.

The Case for the Respondent

Cesar submits that Lolita’s infidelity and refusal to perform her marital obligations established her grave and incurable
psychological incapacity.

The Issue

The case presents to us the legal issue of whether there exists sufficient basis to nullify Cesar’s marriage to Lolita on the ground
of psychological incapacity.

The Court’s Ruling

We grant the petition. No sufficient basis exists to annul Cesar’s marriage to Lolita on the ground of psychological incapacity.

Applicable Law and Jurisprudence

on Psychological Incapacity

Article 36 of the Family Code governs psychological incapacity as a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage. It provides that
"a marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization."

In interpreting this provision, we have repeatedly stressed that psychological incapacity contemplates "downright incapacity or
inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations";21 not merely the refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less ill will, on the part of the errant spouse.22 The plaintiff bears the burden of proving the juridical antecedence (i.e., the
existence at the time of the celebration of marriage), gravity and incurability of the condition of the errant spouse.23

Cesar failed to prove Lolita’s

psychological incapacity

In this case, Cesar’s testimony failed to prove Lolita’s alleged psychological incapacity. Cesar testified on the dates when he
learned of Lolita’s alleged affair and her subsequent abandonment of their home, 24 as well as his continued financial support to
her and their children even after he learned of the affair,25 but he merely mentioned in passing Lolita’s alleged affair with Alvin
and her abandonment of the conjugal dwelling.

In any event, sexual infidelity and abandonment of the conjugal dwelling, even if true, do not necessarily constitute psychological
incapacity; these are simply grounds for legal separation.26 To constitute psychological incapacity, it must be shown that the
unfaithfulness and abandonment are manifestations of a disordered personality that completely prevented the erring spouse from
discharging the essential marital obligations.27 No evidence on record exists to support Cesar’s allegation that Lolita’s infidelity
and abandonment were manifestations of any psychological illness.

Cesar mistakenly relied on Dr. Flores’ psychological evaluation report on Lolita to prove her alleged psychological incapacity.
The psychological evaluation, in fact, established that Lolita did not suffer from any major psychiatric illness.28 Dr. Flores’
observation on Lolita’s interpersonal problems with co-workers,29 to our mind, does not suffice as a consideration for the
conclusion that she was – at the time of her marriage – psychologically incapacitated to enter into a marital union with Cesar.
Aside from the time element involved, a wife’s psychological fitness as a spouse cannot simply be equated with her
professional/work relationship; workplace obligations and responsibilities are poles apart from their marital counterparts. While
both spring from human relationship, their relatedness and relevance to one another should be fully established for them to be
compared or to serve as measures of comparison with one another. To be sure, the evaluation report Dr. Flores prepared and
submitted cannot serve this purpose. Dr. Flores’ further belief that Lolita’s refusal to go with Cesar abroad signified a reluctance
to work out a good marital relationship30 is a mere generalization unsupported by facts and is, in fact, a rash conclusion that this
Court cannot support.

In sum, we find that Cesar failed to prove the existence of Lolita’s psychological incapacity; thus, the CA committed a reversible
error when it reconsidered its original decision.1âwphi1

Once again, we stress that marriage is an inviolable social institution 31 protected by the State. Any doubt should be resolved in
favor of its existence its existence and continuation and against its dissolution and nullity. 32 It cannot be dissolved at the whim of
the parties nor by transgressions made by one party to the other during the marriage.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition and SET ASIDE the October 7, 2005 amended decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 75583. Accordingly, we DISMISS respondent Cesar Encelan's petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage to
Lolita Castillo-Encelan.

Costs against the respondent.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 166357, January 14, 2015

VALERIO E. KALAW, Petitioner, v. MA. ELENA FERNANDEZ, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

BERSAMIN, J.:

In our decision promulgated on September 19, 2011,1 the Court dismissed the complaint for declaration of nullity of the marriage
of the parties upon the following ratiocination, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The petition has no merit. The CA committed no reversible error in setting aside the trial court’s Decision for
lack of legal and factual basis.

xxxx

In the case at bar, petitioner failed to prove that his wife (respondent) suffers from psychological incapacity.
He presented the testimonies of two supposed expert witnesses who concluded that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated, but the conclusions of these witnesses were premised on the alleged acts or
behavior of respondent which had not been sufficiently proven. Petitioner’s experts heavily relied on
petitioner’s allegations of respondent’s constant mahjong sessions, visits to the beauty parlor, going out with
friends, adultery, and neglect of their children. Petitioner’s experts opined that respondent’s alleged habits,
when performed constantly to the detriment of quality and quantity of time devoted to her duties as mother
and wife, constitute a psychological incapacity in the form of NPD.

But petitioner’s allegations, which served as the bases or underlying premises of the conclusions of his
experts, were not actually proven. In fact, respondent presented contrary evidence refuting these allegations
of the petitioner.

For instance, petitioner alleged that respondent constantly played mahjong and neglected their children as a
result. Respondent admittedly played mahjong, but it was not proven that she engaged in mahjong so
frequently that she neglected her duties as a mother and a wife. Respondent refuted petitioner’s allegations
that she played four to five times a week. She maintained it was only two to three times a week and always
with the permission of her husband and without abandoning her children at home. The children corroborated
this, saying that they were with their mother when she played mahjong in their relative’s home. Petitioner did
not present any proof, other than his own testimony, that the mahjong sessions were so frequent that
respondent neglected her family. While he intimated that two of his sons repeated the second grade, he was
not able to link this episode to respondent’s mahjong-playing. The least that could have been done was to
prove the frequency of respondent’s mahjong-playing during the years when these two children were in
second grade. This was not done. Thus, while there is no dispute that respondent played mahjong, its alleged
debilitating frequency and adverse effect on the children were not proven.

Also unproven was petitioner’s claim about respondent’s alleged constant visits to the beauty parlor, going
out with friends, and obsessive need for attention from other men. No proof whatsoever was presented to
prove her visits to beauty salons or her frequent partying with friends. Petitioner presented Mario (an alleged
companion of respondent during these nights-out) in order to prove that respondent had affairs with other
men, but Mario only testified that respondent appeared to be dating other men. Even assuming arguendo that
petitioner was able to prove that respondent had an extramarital affair with another man, that one instance of
sexual infidelity cannot, by itself, be equated with obsessive need for attention from other men. Sexual
infidelity per se is a ground for legal separation, but it does not necessarily constitute psychological
incapacity.

Given the insufficiency of evidence that respondent actually engaged in the behaviors described as
constitutive of NPD, there is no basis for concluding that she was indeed psychologically incapacitated.
Indeed, the totality of the evidence points to the opposite conclusion. A fair assessment of the facts would
show that respondent was not totally remiss and incapable of appreciating and performing her marital and
parental duties. Not once did the children state that they were neglected by their mother. On the contrary,
they narrated that she took care of them, was around when they were sick, and cooked the food they like. It
 appears that respondent made real efforts to see and take care of her children despite her estrangement from
their father. There was no testimony whatsoever that shows abandonment and neglect of familial duties.
While petitioner cites the fact that his two sons, Rio and Miggy, both failed the second elementary level
despite having tutors, there is nothing to link their academic shortcomings to Malyn’s actions.

After poring over the records of the case, the Court finds no factual basis for the conclusion of psychological
incapacity. There is no error in the CA’s reversal of the trial court’s ruling that there was psychological
incapacity. The trial court’s Decision merely summarized the allegations, testimonies, and evidence of the
respective parties, but it did not actually assess the veracity of these allegations, the credibility of the
witnesses, and the weight of the evidence. The trial court did not make factual findings which can serve as
bases for its legal conclusion of psychological incapacity.

What transpired between the parties is acrimony and, perhaps, infidelity, which may have constrained them
from dedicating the best of themselves to each other and to their children. There may be grounds for legal
separation, but certainly not psychological incapacity that voids a marriage.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals’ May 27, 2004 Decision
and its December 15, 2004 Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 64240 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.2

In his Motion for Reconsideration,3 the petitioner implores the Court to take a thorough second look into what
constitutes psychological incapacity; to uphold the findings of the trial court as supported by the testimonies of three expert
witnesses; and consequently to find that the respondent, if not both parties, were psychologically incapacitated to perform their
respective essential marital obligation.

Upon an assiduous review of the records, we resolve to grant the petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.

Psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even prior to the celebration of the marriage that is permanent as to deprive the party of the
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she was about to assume. Although the Family Code
has not defined the term psychological incapacity, the Court has usually looked up its meaning by reviewing the deliberations of
the sessions of the Family Code Revision Committee that had drafted the Family Code in order to gain an insight on the
provision. It appeared that the members of the Family Code Revision Committee were not unanimous on the meaning, and in the
end they decided to adopt the provision “with less specificity than expected” in order to have the law “allow some resiliency in its
application.”4 Illustrative of the “less specificity than expected” has been the omission by the Family Code Revision Committee
to give any examples of psychological incapacity that would have limited the applicability of the provision conformably with the
principle of ejusdem generis, because the Committee desired that the courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis,
guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and the decisions of church tribunals
that had persuasive effect by virtue of the provision itself having been taken from the Canon Law.5chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On the other hand, as the Court has observed in Santos v. Court of Appeals,6 the deliberations of the Family Code Revision
Committee and the relevant materials on psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage have rendered it
obvious that the term psychological incapacity as used in Article 36 of the Family Code “has not been meant to comprehend all
such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence,
immaturity, and like circumstances,” and could not be taken and construed independently of “but must stand in conjunction with,
existing precepts in our law on marriage.” Thus correlated:-

x x x “psychological incapacity” should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a
party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include
their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There
is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of “psychological
incapacity” to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time
 the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the
spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family
Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be
“legitimate.”7

In time, in Republic v. Court of Appeals,8 the Court set some guidelines for the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the
Family Code, as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of
the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it “as the foundation
of the nation.” It decrees marriage as legally “inviolable,” thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim
of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be “protected” by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes
their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in
the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the
Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological — not physical, although its manifestations
and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such
incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating
nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the celebration” of the marriage. The
evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their “I do’s.” The manifestation
of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment,
or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely
against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of
marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and
prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise
his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, “mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts” cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability,
not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling
factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the
person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and
their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that
Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon
Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
 “The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume
the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature.”

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the
religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight
should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally — subject to our law on evidence — what is
decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.

This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision,
contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church —
while remaining independent, separate and apart from each other — shall walk together in synodal cadence
towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the
nation.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel
for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will
be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may
be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court.
The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under
Canon 1095.9

The foregoing guidelines have turned out to be rigid, such that their application to every instance practically condemned the
petitions for declaration of nullity to the fate of certain rejection. But Article 36 of the Family Code must not be so strictly and
too literally read and applied given the clear intendment of the drafters to adopt its enacted version of “less specificity” obviously
to enable “some resiliency in its application.” Instead, every court should approach the issue of nullity “not on the basis of
a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations, but according to its own facts” in recognition of the verity that no case
would be on “all fours” with the next one in the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage; hence,
every “trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid
substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.”10chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In the task of ascertaining the presence of psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage, the courts, which are
concededly not endowed with expertise in the field of psychology, must of necessity rely on the opinions of experts in order to
inform themselves on the matter, and thus enable themselves to arrive at an intelligent and judicious judgment. Indeed, the
conditions for the malady of being grave, antecedent and incurable demand the in-depth diagnosis by
experts.11chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

II

The findings of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) on the existence or non-existence of a party’s psychological incapacity should be
final and binding for as long as such findings and evaluation of the testimonies of witnesses and other evidence are not shown to
be clearly and manifestly erroneous.12 In every situation where the findings of the trial court are sufficiently supported by the
facts and evidence presented during trial, the appellate court should restrain itself from substituting its own judgment. 13 It is not
enough reason to ignore the findings and evaluation by the trial court and substitute our own as an appellate tribunal only because
the Constitution and the Family Code regard marriage as an inviolable social institution. We have to stress that the fulfilment of
the constitutional mandate for the State to protect marriage as an inviolable social institution14 only relates to a valid marriage.
No protection can be accorded to a marriage that is null and void ab initio, because such a marriage has no legal
existence.15chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In declaring a marriage null and void ab initio, therefore, the Courts really assiduously defend and promote the sanctity of
marriage as an inviolable social institution. The foundation of our society is thereby made all the more strong and solid.

Here, the findings and evaluation by the RTC as the trial court deserved credence because it was in the better position to view and
examine the demeanor of the witnesses while they were testifying.16 The position and role of the trial judge in the appreciation of
the evidence showing the psychological incapacity were not to be downplayed but should be accorded due importance and
respect.
Yet, in the September 19, 2011 decision, the Court brushed aside the opinions tendered by Dr. Cristina Gates, a psychologist, and
Fr. Gerard Healy on the ground that their conclusions were solely based on the petitioner’s version of the events.

After a long and hard second look, we consider it improper and unwarranted to give to such expert opinions a merely generalized
consideration and treatment, least of all to dismiss their value as inadequate basis for the declaration of the nullity of the
marriage. Instead, we hold that said experts sufficiently and competently described the psychological incapacity of the respondent
within the standards of Article 36 of the Family Code. We uphold the conclusions reached by the two expert witnesses because
they were largely drawn from the case records and affidavits, and should not anymore be disputed after the RTC itself had
accepted the veracity of the petitioner’s factual premises.17chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Admittedly, Dr. Gates based her findings on the transcript of the petitioner’s testimony, as well as on her interviews of the
petitioner, his sister Trinidad, and his son Miguel. Although her findings would seem to be unilateral under such circumstances, it
was not right to disregard the findings on that basis alone. After all, her expert opinion took into consideration other factors
extant in the records, including the own opinions of another expert who had analyzed the issue from the side of the respondent
herself. Moreover, it is already settled that the courts must accord weight to expert testimony on the psychological and mental
state of the parties in cases for the declaration of the nullity of marriages, for by the very nature of Article 36 of the Family Code
the courts, “despite having the primary task and burden of decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as
decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments of the
parties.”18chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The expert opinion of Dr. Gates was ultimately necessary herein to enable the trial court to properly determine the issue of
psychological incapacity of the respondent (if not also of the petitioner). Consequently, the lack of personal examination and
interview of the person diagnosed with personality disorder, like the respondent, did not per se invalidate the findings of the
experts. The Court has stressed in Marcos v. Marcos19 that there is no requirement for one to be declared psychologically
incapacitated to be personally examined by a physician, because what is important is the presence of evidence that adequately
establishes the party’s psychological incapacity. Hence, “if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted
to.”20chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Verily, the totality of the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity
and the psychological disorder itself. If other evidence showing that a certain condition could possibly result from an assumed
state of facts existed in the record, the expert opinion should be admissible and be weighed as an aid for the court in interpreting
such other evidence on the causation.21 Indeed, an expert opinion on psychological incapacity should be considered as conjectural
or speculative and without any probative value only in the absence of other evidence to establish causation. The expert’s findings
under such circumstances would not constitute hearsay that would justify their exclusion as evidence. 22 This is so, considering
that any ruling that brands the scientific and technical procedure adopted by Dr. Gates as weakened by bias should be eschewed if
it was clear that her psychiatric evaluation had been based on the parties’ upbringing and
psychodynamics.23chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In that context, Dr. Gates’ expert opinion should be considered not in isolation but along with the other evidence presented here.

Moreover, in its determination of the issue of psychological incapacity, the trial court was expected to compare the expert
findings and opinion of Dr. Natividad Dayan, the respondent’s own witness, and those of Dr. Gates.

In her Psychological Evaluation Report,24 Dr. Dayan impressed that the respondent had “compulsive and dependent tendencies”
to the extent of being “relationship dependent.” Based from the respondent’s psychological data, Dr. Dayan indicated
that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

In her relationship with people, Malyne is likely to be reserved and seemingly detached in her ways.
Although she likes to be around people, she may keep her emotional distance. She, too, values her
relationship but she may not be that demonstrative of her affections. Intimacy may be quite difficult for her
since she tries to maintain a certain distance to minimize opportunities for rejection. To others, Malyne may
appear, critical and demanding in her ways. She can be assertive when opinions contrary to those of her own
are expressed. And yet, she is apt to be a dependent person. At a less conscious level, Malyne fears that
others will abandon her. Malyne, who always felt a bit lonely, placed an enormous value on having
significant others would depend on most times.

xxxx
 But the minute she started to care, she became a different person—clingy and immature, doubting his love,
constantly demanding reassurance that she was the most important person in his life. She became
relationship-dependent.25

Dr. Dayan was able to clearly interpret the results of the Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory test 26 conducted on the respondent,
observing that the respondent obtained high scores on dependency, narcissism and compulsiveness, to
wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Atty. Bretania

Q: How about this Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory?

Sir, the cut of the score which is supposed to be normal

is 73 percental round and there are several scores
A: wherein Mrs. Kalaw obtained very high score and these
are on the score of dependency, narcissism and
compulsion.

Would you please tell us again, Madam Witness, what

Q:
is the acceptable score?

When your score is 73 and above, that means that it is

A: very significant. So, if 72 and below, it will be
considered as acceptable.

Q: In what area did Mrs. Kalaw obtain high score?

Under dependency, her score is 78; under narcissism, is

A:
79; under compulsiveness, it is 84.27

It is notable that Dr. Dayan’s findings did not contradict but corroborated the findings of Dr. Gates to the effect that the
respondent had been afflicted with Narcissistic Personality Disorder as well as with Anti-Social Disorder. Dr. Gates relevantly
testified:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

ATTY. GONONG

Could you please repeat for clarity. I myself is [sic] not

quite familiar with psychology terms. So, more or less,
Q: could you please tell me in more layman’s terms how
you arrived at your findings that the respondent is self-
centered or narcissistic?

I moved into this particular conclusion. Basically, if you

ask about her childhood background, her father died in
a vehicular accident when she was in her teens and
thereafter she was prompted to look for a job to partly
assume the breadwinner’s role in her family. I gathered
that paternal grandmother partly took care of her and
her siblings against the fact that her own mother was
A: unable to carry out her respective duties and
responsibilities towards Elena Fernandez and her
siblings considering that the husband died prematurely.
And there was an indication that Elena Fernandez on
several occasions ever told petitioner that he cannot
blame her for being negligent as a mother because she
herself never experienced the care and affection of her
own mother herself. So, there is a precedent in her
background, in her childhood, and indeed this seems to
 indicate a particular script, we call it in psychology a
script, the tendency to repeat some kind of experience
or the lack of care, let’s say some kind of deprivation,
there is a tendency to sustain it even on to your own life
when you have your own family. I did interview the son
because I was not satisfied with what I gathered from
both Trinidad and Valerio and even though as a young
son at the age of fourteen already expressed the he
could not see, according to the child, the sincerity of
maternal care on the part of Elena and that he preferred
to live with the father actually.

Taking these all out, you came to the conclusion that

Q:
respondent is self-centered and narcissistic?

Actually respondent has some needs which tempts [sic]

from a deprived childhood and she is still in search of
A: this. In her several boyfriends, it seems that she would
jump from one boyfriend to another. There is this need
for attention, this need for love on other people.

Q: And that led you to conclude?

And therefore I concluded that she is self-centered to the

A:
point of neglecting her duty as a wife and as a mother.28

The probative force of the testimony of an expert does not lie in a mere statement of her theory or opinion, but rather in the
assistance that she can render to the courts in showing the facts that serve as a basis for her criterion and the reasons upon which
the logic of her conclusion is founded.29 Hence, we should weigh and consider the probative value of the findings of the expert
witnesses vis-à-vis the other evidence available.

The other expert of the petitioner was Fr. Healy, a canon law expert, an advocate before the Manila Archdiocese and Matrimonial
Tribunal, and a consultant of the Family Code Revision Committee. Regarding Father Healy’s expert testimony, we have once
declared that judicial understanding of psychological incapacity could be informed by evolving standards, taking into account the
particulars of each case, by current trends in psychological and even by canonical thought, and by experience.30 It is prudent for us
to do so because the concept of psychological incapacity adopted under Article 36 of the Family Code was derived from Canon
Law.

Father Healy tendered his opinion on whether or not the respondent’s level of immaturity and irresponsibility with regard to her
own children and to her husband constituted psychological incapacity, testifying thusly:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

ATTY. MADRID I would say it is a clear case of psychological incapacity

A: because of her immaturity and traumatic irresponsibility
Now, respondent Ma. Elena Fernandez claims that she is with regards to her own children.
not psychologically incapacitated. On the facts as you
Q: read it based on the records of this case before this So what you are saying is that, the claim of respondent
Q:
Honorable Court, what can you say to that claim of that she is not psychologically incapacitated is not true?
respondent?
A: Yes. It should be rejected.

Q: Why do you say so?

Because of what she has manifested in her whole unusual position of prominence and then begun to inflate
lifestyle, inconsistent pattern has been manifested her own ego and she begun to concentrate her own
A: running through their life made a doubt that this is beauty and that became an obsession and that led to her
immaturity and irresponsibility because her family was few responsibility of subordinating to her children to this
dysfunctional and then her being a model in her early life lifestyle that she had embraced.
and being the breadwinner of the family put her in an
 You only mentioned her relationship with the children, And in medical or clinical parlance, what specifically do
Q:
Q: the impact. How about the impact on the relationship of you call this?
the respondent with her husband?
That is narcissism where the person falls in love with
A:
Also the same thing. It just did not fit in to her lifestyle himself is from a myt[h]ical case in Roman history.
to fulfill her obligation to her husband and to her
A: children. She had her own priorities, her beauty and her Q: Could you please define to us what narcissism is?
going out and her mahjong and associating with friends.
It’s a self-love, falling in love with oneself to make up
They were the priorities of her life.
for the loss of a dear friend as in the case of Narcissus,
And what you are saying is that, her family was merely the myth, and then that became known in clinical
Q: A:
secondary? terminology as narcissism. When a person is so
concern[ed] with her own beauty and prolonging and
A: Secondary. protecting it, then it becomes the top priority in her life.

Q: And how does that relate to psychological incapacity? xxxx

That she could not appreciate or absorb or fulfill the And you stated that circumstances that prove this
obligations of marriage which everybody takes for Q: narcissism. How do you consider this narcissism
granted. The concentration on the husband and the afflicting respondent, it is grave, slight or ….?
A: children before everything else would be subordinated to
the marriage with her. It’s the other way around. Her I would say it’s grave from the actual cases of neglect of
beauty, her going out, her beauty parlor and her mahjong, her family and that causes serious obligations which she
they were their priorities in her life. A: has ignored and not properly esteemed because she is so
concern[ed] with herself in her own lifestyle. Very
serious.

And do you have an opinion whether or not this That could have expanded because it became very
Q: narcissism afflicting respondent was already existing at A: obvious after the marriage because she was neglecting
the time or marriage or even thereafter? such fundamental obligations.

xxxx And how about the matter of curability, is this medically

Q:
or clinically curable, this narcissism that you mentioned?
When you get married you don’t develop narcissism or
psychological incapacity. You bring with you into the Let’s say, it was manifested for so many years in her life.
marriage and then it becomes manifested because in A: It was found in her family background situation. Say,
A:
marriage you accept these responsibilities. And now you almost for sure would be incurable now.
show that you don’t accept them and you are not capable
of fulfilling them and you don’t care about them. Q: What specific background are you referring to?

Is this narcissism, Fr. Healy, acquired by accident or Well, the fact when the father died and she was the
Q: breadwinner and her beauty was so important to give in
congenital or what?
her job and money and influence and so on. But this is a
No. The lifestyle generates it. Once you become a model very unusual situation for a young girl and her position
A:
and still the family was depended [sic] upon her and she in the family was exalted in a very very unusual manner
A: was a model at Hyatt and then Rustan’s, it began to and therefore she had that pressure on her and in her
inflate her ego so much that this became the top priority accepting the pressure, in going along with it and putting
in her life. It’s her lifestyle. it in top priority.31

What you are saying is that, the narcissism of respondent

Q:
even expanded after the marriage?

Given his credentials and conceded expertise in Canon Law, Father Healy’s opinions and findings commanded respect. The
contribution that his opinions and findings could add to the judicial determination of the parties’ psychological incapacity was
substantive and instructive. He could thereby inform the trial court on the degrees of the malady that would warrant the nullity of
marriage, and he could as well thereby provide to the trial court an analytical insight upon a subject as esoteric to the courts as
psychological incapacity has been. We could not justly disregard his opinions and findings. Appreciating them together with
those of Dr. Gates and Dr. Dayan would advance more the cause of justice. The Court observed in Ngo Te v. Yu-
Te:32chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
 By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and burden of decision-making, must
not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and
mental temperaments of the parties.

Justice Romero explained this in Molina, as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion of a psychological expert became
increasingly important in such cases. Data about the person's entire life, both before and after the ceremony,
were presented to these experts and they were asked to give professional opinions about a party's mental
capacity at the time of the wedding. These opinions were rarely challenged and tended to be accepted as
decisive evidence of lack of valid consent.

The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this area did not amount to the addition of new
grounds for annulment, but rather was an accommodation by the Church to the advances made in psychology
during the past decades. There was now the expertise to provide the all-important connecting link between a
marriage breakdown and premarital causes.

During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of marriage from that of a legal contract to that of a
covenant. The result of this was that it could no longer be assumed in annulment cases that a person who
could intellectually understand the concept of marriage could necessarily give valid consent to marry. The
ability to both grasp and assume the real obligations of a mature, lifelong commitment are now considered a
necessary prerequisite to valid matrimonial consent.

Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient psychological incapacity, "not only to sexual
anomalies but to all kinds of personality disorders that incapacitate a spouse or both spouses from assuming
or carrying out the essential obligations of marriage. For marriage . . . is not merely cohabitation or the right
of the spouses to each other's body for heterosexual acts, but is, in its totality the right to the community of the
whole of life; i.e., the right to a developing lifelong relationship. Rotal decisions since 1973 have refined the
meaning of psychological or psychic capacity for marriage as presupposing the development of an adult
personality; as meaning the capacity of the spouses to give themselves to each other and to accept the other
as a distinct person; that the spouses must be `other oriented' since the obligations of marriage are rooted in
a self-giving love; and that the spouses must have the capacity for interpersonal relationship because
marriage is more than just a physical reality but involves a true intertwining of personalities. The fulfillment
of the obligations of marriage depends, according to Church decisions, on the strength of this interpersonal
relationship. A serious incapacity for interpersonal sharing and support is held to impair the relationship and
consequently, the ability to fulfill the essential marital obligations. The marital capacity of one spouse is not
considered in isolation but in reference to the fundamental relationship to the other spouse.

Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements necessary to the mature marital
relationship:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

"The courts consider the following elements crucial to the marital commitment: (1) a permanent
and faithful commitment to the marriage partner; (2) openness to children and partner; (3) stability;
(4) emotional maturity; (5) financial responsibility; (6) an ability to cope with the ordinary stresses
and strains of marriage, etc."

Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological conditions that might lead to the failure of a
marriage:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

"At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding conjugal communion even with the best
intentions of the parties. Among the psychic factors possibly giving rise to his or her inability to
fulfill marital obligations are the following: (1) antisocial personality with its fundamental lack of
loyalty to persons or sense of moral values; (2) hyperesthesia, where the individual has no real
freedom of sexual choice; (3) the inadequate personality where personal responses consistently fall
short of reasonable expectations.

xxxx
The psychological grounds are the best approach for anyone who doubts whether he or she has a
case for an annulment on any other terms. A situation that does not fit into any of the more
traditional categories often fits very easily into the psychological category.

As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are already detecting a shift in their use. Whereas
originally the emphasis was on the parties' inability to exercise proper judgment at the time of the
marriage (lack of due discretion), recent cases seem to be concentrating on the parties' incapacity
to assume or carry out their responsibilities and obligations as promised (lack of due competence).
An advantage to using the ground of lack of due competence is that at the time the marriage was
entered into civil divorce and breakup of the family almost always is proof of someone's failure to
carry out marital responsibilities as promised at the time the marriage was entered into."

Hernandez v. Court of Appeals emphasizes the importance of presenting expert testimony to establish the
precise cause of a party's psychological incapacity, and to show that it existed at the inception of the
marriage. And as Marcos v. Marcos asserts, there is no requirement that the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by a physician, if the totality of evidence presented is
enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity. Verily, the evidence must show a link, medical or the
like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.

This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless for emphasis, that the presentation of expert proof
presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive
diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity. 33

Ngo Te also emphasized that in light of the unintended consequences of strictly applying the standards set in Molina,34 the courts
should consider the totality of evidence in adjudicating petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of
the Family Code, viz:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The resiliency with which the concept should be applied and the case-to-case basis by which the provision
should be interpreted, as so intended by its framers, had, somehow, been rendered ineffectual by the
imposition of a set of strict standards in Molina, thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

xxxx

Noteworthy is that in Molina, while the majority of the Court’s membership concurred in the ponencia of
then Associate Justice (later Chief Justice) Artemio V. Panganiban, three justices concurred “in the result”
and another three--including, as aforesaid, Justice Romero--took pains to compose their individual separate
opinions. Then Justice Teodoro R. Padilla even emphasized that “each case must be judged, not on the basis
of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations, but according to its own facts. In the field of
psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on ‘all fours’
with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court
must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.”

Predictably, however, in resolving subsequent cases, the Court has applied the aforesaid standards, without
too much regard for the law's clear intention that each case is to be treated differently, as “courts should
interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers
in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.”

In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as the one in Molina,
in resolving all cases of psychological incapacity. Understandably, the Court was then alarmed by the deluge
of petitions for the dissolution of marital bonds, and was sensitive to the OSG's exaggeration of Article 36 as
the "most liberal divorce procedure in the world." The unintended consequences of Molina, however, has
taken its toll on people who have to live with deviant behavior, moral insanity and sociopathic personality
anomaly, which, like termites, consume little by little the very foundation of their families, our basic social
institutions. Far from what was intended by the Court, Molina has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to
fit into and be bound by it. Wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently applying Molina, has allowed
diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to continuously debase and
pervert the sanctity of marriage. Ironically, the Roman Rota has annulled marriages on account of the
personality disorders of the said individuals.
 The Court need not worry about the possible abuse of the remedy provided by Article 36, for there are ample
safeguards against this contingency, among which is the intervention by the State, through the public
prosecutor, to guard against collusion between the parties and/or fabrication of evidence. The Court should
rather be alarmed by the rising number of cases involving marital abuse, child abuse, domestic violence and
incestuous rape.

In dissolving marital bonds on account of either party's psychological incapacity, the Court is not
demolishing the foundation of families, but it is actually protecting the sanctity of marriage, because it
refuses to allow a person afflicted with a psychological disorder, who cannot comply with or assume the
essential marital obligations, from remaining in that sacred bond. It may be stressed that the infliction of
physical violence, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and psychosexual
anomaly are manifestations of a sociopathic personality anomaly. Let it be noted that in Article 36, there is no
marriage to speak of in the first place, as the same is void from the very beginning. To indulge in imagery,
the declaration of nullity under Article 36 will simply provide a decent burial to a stillborn marriage.

xxxx

Lest it be misunderstood, we are not suggesting the abandonment of Molina in this case. We simply declare
that, as aptly stated by Justice Dante O. Tinga in Antonio v. Reyes, there is need to emphasize other
perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article
36. At the risk of being redundant, we reiterate once more the principle that each case must be judged, not on
the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. And, to
repeat for emphasis, courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the
findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.35

III

In the decision of September 19, 2011, the Court declared as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Respondent admittedly played mahjong, but it was not proven that she engaged in mahjong so frequently
that she neglected her duties as a mother and a wife. Respondent refuted petitioner’s allegations that she
played four to five times a week. She maintained it was only two to three times a week and always with the
permission of her husband and without abandoning her children at home. The children corroborated this,
saying that they were with their mother when she played mahjong in their relatives home. Petitioner did
not present any proof, other than his own testimony, that the mahjong sessions were so frequent that
respondent neglected her family. While he intimated that two of his sons repeated the second grade, he was
not able to link this episode to respondent’s mahjong-playing. The least that could have been done was to
prove the frequency of respondent’s mahjong-playing during the years when these two children were in
second grade. This was not done. Thus, while there is no dispute that respondent played mahjong, its alleged
debilitating frequency and adverse effect on the children were not proven. 36 (Emphasis supplied)

The frequency of the respondent’s mahjong playing should not have delimited our determination of the presence or absence of
psychological incapacity. Instead, the determinant should be her obvious failure to fully appreciate the duties and responsibilities
of parenthood at the time she made her marital vows. Had she fully appreciated such duties and responsibilities, she would have
known that bringing along her children of very tender ages to her mahjong sessions would expose them to a culture of gambling
and other vices that would erode their moral fiber.

Nonetheless, the long-term effects of the respondent’s obsessive mahjong playing surely impacted on her family life, particularly
on her very young children. We do find to be revealing the disclosures made by Valerio Teodoro Kalaw37 – the parties’ eldest son
– in his deposition, whereby the son confirmed the claim of his father that his mother had been hooked on playing
mahjong, viz:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
 From the time…before your parent’s separation, Really long cuz’ we would go to my aunt’s house
ATTY. do you remember any habit or activity or practice in White Plains and I think we would get there by
WITNESS :
PISON: which your mother engaged in, before the lunch then leave, we fall asleep. I think it was
separation? like one in the morning.

Yeah, habit? She was a heavy smoker and she ATTY.

You, you went there? She brought you?
WITNESS: likes to play mahjong a lot, and I can’t PISON:
remember.
Yeah, to play with my cousins, yeah and my
WITNESS :
xxxx brothers & sisters.

ATTY. You said that your mother played mahjong ATTY.

Were you brought all the time?
PISON: frequently. How frequent, do you remember? PISON:

Not really, but it was a lot. Not actually, I can’t, I Yeah, almost all the time but sometimes, I guess
WITNESS : WITNESS:
can’t… she’d go out by herself.38

ATTY. How long would she stay playing mahjong say

PISON: one session?

The fact that the respondent brought her children with her to her mahjong sessions did not only point to her neglect of parental
duties, but also manifested her tendency to expose them to a culture of gambling. Her willfully exposing her children to the
culture of gambling on every occasion of her mahjong sessions was a very grave and serious act of subordinating their needs for
parenting to the gratification of her own personal and escapist desires. This was the observation of Father Healy himself. In that
regard, Dr. Gates and Dr. Dayan both explained that the current psychological state of the respondent had been rooted on her own
childhood experience.

The respondent revealed her wanton disregard for her children’s moral and mental development. This disregard violated her duty
as a parent to safeguard and protect her children, as expressly defined under Article 209 and Article 220 of the Family Code, to
wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Article 209. Pursuant to the natural right and duty of parents over the person and property of their
unemancipated children, parental authority and responsibility shall include the caring for and rearing of
such children for civic consciousness and efficiency and the development of their moral, mental and
physical character and well-being.

Article 220. The parents and those exercising parental authority shall have with respect to their
unemancipated children or wards the following rights and duties:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

(1) To keep them in their company, to support, educate and instruct them by right precept and good
example, and to provide for their upbringing in keeping with their means;chanrobleslaw

(3) To provide them with moral and spiritual guidance, inculcate in them honesty, integrity, self-discipline,
self-reliance, industry and thrift, stimulate their interest in civic affairs, and inspire in them compliance with
the duties of citizenship;chanrobleslaw

(4) To enhance, protect, preserve and maintain their physical and mental health at all times;

(5) To furnish them with good and wholesome educational materials, supervise their activities, recreation and
association with others, protect them from bad company, and prevent them from acquiring habits
detrimental to their health, studies and morals;

The September 19, 2011 decision did not properly take into consideration the findings of the RTC to the
effect that bothpetitioner and the respondent had been psychologically incapacitated, and thus could not
assume the essential obligations of marriage. The RTC would not have found so without the allegation to that
effect by the respondent in her answer,39 whereby she averred that it was not she but the petitioner who had
 suffered from psychological incapacity.

The allegation of the petitioner’s psychological incapacity was substantiated by Dr. Dayan, as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

ATTY. BRETAÑA: I think he also mentioned that his concept of marriage

was not duly stable then. He was not really thinking of
You stated earlier that both parties were behaviorally A: marriage except that his wife got pregnant and so he
Q:
immature? thought that he had to marry her. And even that time he
was not also a monogamous person.
A: Yes, sir.
Are you saying, Madam Witness, that ultimately the
Q: And that the marriage was a mistake? Q:
decision to marry lied on the petitioner?
A: Yes, sir.
A: I think so, Sir.
What is your basis for your statement that respondent
Q: Now, in your report, Madam Witness, you mentioned
was behaviorally immature?
here that the petitioner admitted to you that in his
Sir, for the reason that even before the marriage Malyn younger years he was often out seeking other women.
had noticed already some of those short temper of the I’m referring specifically to page 18. He also admitted to
petitioner but she was very much in love and so she lived- you that the thought of commitment scared him, the
in with him and even the time that they were together, Q: petitioner. Now, given these admissions by petitioner to
A: that they were living in, she also had noticed some of his you, my questions is, is it possible for such a person to
psychological deficits if we may say so. But as I said, enter into marriage despite this fear of commitment and
because she is also dependent and she was one who given his admission that he was a womanizer? Is it
determined to make the relationship work, she was possible for this person to stop his womanizing ways
denying even those kinds of problems that she had seen. during the marriage?

To make it clear, Madam witness, I’m talking here of the A: Sir, it’s difficult.
Q: petitioner, Mr. Kalaw. What led you to conclude that Mr.
Kalaw was behaviorally immature?

Q: It would be difficult for that person? Sir, it would impair his ability to have sexual integrity
A: and also to be fully committed to the role of husband to
A: Yes, Sir. Malyn.
What is the probability of this person giving up his Madam Witness, you never directly answered my
Q:
womanizing after marriage? question on whether the petitioner was psychologically
incapacitated to perform his duty as a husband. You only
Sir, I would say the probability of his giving up is almost
A: Q: said that the petitioner was behaviorally immature and
only 20%.
that the marriage was a mistake. Now, may I asked [sic]
So, it is entirely possible that the respondent womanized you that question again and request you to answer that
Q: directly?
during his marriage with the respondent?

A: Yes, Sir. A: Sir, he is psychologically incapacitated.40

What is the bearing of this fear of commitment on the

Q: part of the petitioner insofar as his psychological
capacity to perform his duties as a husband is concerned?

Although the petitioner, as the plaintiff, carried the burden to prove the nullity of the marriage, the respondent, as the defendant
spouse, could establish the psychological incapacity of her husband because she raised the matter in her answer. The courts are
justified in declaring a marriage null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code regardless of whether it is the petitioner or the
respondent who imputes the psychological incapacity to the other as long as the imputation is fully substantiated with proof.
Indeed, psychological incapacity may exist in one party alone or in both of them, and if psychological incapacity of either or both
is established, the marriage has to be deemed null and void.

More than twenty (20) years had passed since the parties parted ways. By now, they must have already accepted and come to
terms with the awful truth that their marriage, assuming it existed in the eyes of the law, was already beyond repair. Both parties
had inflicted so much damage not only to themselves, but also to the lives and psyche of their own children. It would be a greater
injustice should we insist on still recognizing their void marriage, and then force them and their children to endure some more
damage. This was the very same injustice that Justice Romero decried in her erudite dissenting opinion in Santos v. Court of
Appeals:41chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

It would be great injustice, I believe, to petitioner for this Court to give a much too restrictive interpretation
of the law and compel the petitioner to continue to be married to a wife who for purposes of fulfilling her
marital duties has, for all practical purposes, ceased to exist.

Besides, there are public policy considerations involved in the ruling the Court makes today. It is not, in
effect, directly or indirectly, facilitating the transformation of petitioner into a “habitual tryster” or one forced
to maintain illicit relations with another woman or women with emerging problems of illegitimate children,
simply because he is denied by private respondent, his wife, the companionship and conjugal love which he
has sought from her and to which he is legally entitled?

I do not go as far as to suggest that Art. 36 of the Family Code is a sanction for absolute divorce but I submit
that we should not constrict it to non-recognition of its evident purpose and thus deny to one like petitioner,
an opportunity to turn a new leaf in his life by declaring his marriage a nullity by reason of his wife’s
psychological incapacity to perform an essential marital obligation.

In this case, the marriage never existed from the beginning because the respondent was afflicted with psychological incapacity at
and prior to the time of the marriage. Hence, the Court should not hesitate to declare the nullity of the marriage between the
parties.

To stress, our mandate to protect the inviolability of marriage as the basic foundation of our society does not preclude striking
down a marital union that is “ill-equipped to promote family life,” thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Now is also the opportune time to comment on another common legal guide utilized in the adjudication of
petitions for declaration of nullity in the adjudication of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36.
All too frequently, this Court and lower courts, in denying petitions of the kind, have favorably cited Sections
1 and 2, Article XV of the Constitution, which respectively state that “[t]he State recognizes the Filipino
family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its
total development[t],” and that [m]arriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family
and shall be protected by the State.” These provisions highlight the importance of the family and the
constitutional protection accorded to the institution of marriage.

But the Constitution itself does not establish the parameters of state protection to marriage as a social
institution and the foundation of the family. It remains the province of the legislature to define all legal
aspects of marriage and prescribe the strategy and the modalities to protect it, based on whatever socio-
political influences it deems proper, and subject of course to the qualification that such legislative enactment
itself adheres to the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. This being the case, it also falls on the legislature to
put into operation the constitutional provisions that protect marriage and the family. This has been
accomplished at present through the enactment of the Family Code, which defines marriage and the family,
spells out the corresponding legal effects, imposes the limitations that affect married and family life, as well
as prescribes the grounds for declaration of nullity and those for legal separation. While it may appear that
the judicial denial of a petition for declaration of nullity is reflective of the constitutional mandate to protect
marriage, such action in fact merely enforces a statutory definition of marriage, not a constitutionally
ordained decree of what marriage is. Indeed, if circumstances warrant, Sections 1 and 2 of Article XV need
not be the only constitutional considerations to be taken into account in resolving a petition for declaration of
nullity.

Indeed, Article 36 of the Family Code, in classifying marriages contracted by a psychologically incapacitated
person as a nullity, should be deemed as an implement of this constitutional protection of marriage. Given the
avowed State interest in promoting marriage as the foundation of the family, which in turn serves as the
foundation of the nation, there is a corresponding interest for the State to defend against marriages ill-
equipped to promote family life. Void ab initio marriages under Article 36 do not further the initiatives of
the State concerning marriage and family, as they promote wedlock among persons who, for reasons
 independent of their will, are not capacitated to understand or comply with the essential obligations of
marriage.42 (Emphasis supplied)

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Motion for Reconsideration; REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated
on September 19, 2011; and REINSTATES the decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court declaring the marriage between the
petitioner and the respondent on November 4, 1976 as NULL AND VOID AB INITIO due to the psychological incapacity of the
parties pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.

No pronouncement on costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 198780 October 16, 2013

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
LIBERTY D. ALBIOS, Respondent.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules t of Court assailing the September 29, 2011 Decision 1 of the
Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414, which affirmed the April 25, 2008Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Imus,
Cavite (RTC). declaring the marriage of Daniel Lee Fringer (Fringer) and respondent Liberty Albios (A/bios) as void from the
beginning.

The facts

On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were married before Judge Ofelia I. Calo of the Metropolitan Trial
Court, Branch59, Mandaluyong City (MeTC), as evidenced by a Certificate of Marriage with Register No. 2004-1588.3

On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity 4 of her marriage with Fringer. She alleged
that immediately after their marriage, they separated and never lived as husband and wife because they never really had any
intention of entering into a married state or complying with any of their essential marital obligations. She described their marriage
as one made in jest and, therefore, null and void ab initio .

Summons was served on Fringer but he did not file his answer. On September 13, 2007, Albios filed a motion to set case for pre-
trial and to admit her pre-trial brief. The RTC ordered the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to conduct an investigation and determine
the existence of a collusion. On October 2, 2007, the Assistant Prosecutor complied and reported that she could not make a
determination for failure of both parties to appear at the scheduled investigation.

At the pre-trial, only Albios, her counsel and the prosecutor appeared. Fringer did not attend the hearing despite being duly notified
of the schedule. After the pre-trial, hearing on the merits ensued.

Ruling of the RTC

In its April 25, 2008 Decision,5 the RTC declared the marriage void ab initio, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage of Liberty Albios and Daniel Lee Fringer
as void from the very beginning. As a necessary consequence of this pronouncement, petitioner shall cease using the surname of
respondent as she never acquired any right over it and so as to avoid a misimpression that she remains the wife of respondent.

SO ORDERED.6

The RTC was of the view that the parties married each other for convenience only. Giving credence to the testimony of Albios, it
stated that she contracted Fringer to enter into a marriage to enable her to acquire American citizenship; that in consideration
thereof, she agreed to pay him the sum of $2,000.00; that after the ceremony, the parties went their separate ways; that Fringer
returned to the United States and never again communicated with her; and that, in turn, she did not pay him the $2,000.00 because
he never processed her petition for citizenship. The RTC, thus, ruled that when marriage was entered into for a purpose other than
the establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce and should not be recognized from its inception.

Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a motion for reconsideration.
The RTC issued the Order, 7 dated February 5, 2009, denying the motion for want of merit. It explained that the marriage was
declared void because the parties failed to freely give their consent to the marriage as they had no intention to be legally bound by
it and used it only as a means to acquire American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00.

Not in conformity, the OSG filed an appeal before the CA.

Ruling of the CA

In its assailed decision, dated September 29, 2011, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling which found that the essential requisite of
consent was lacking. The CA stated that the parties clearly did not understand the nature and consequence of getting married and
that their case was similar to a marriage in jest. It further explained that the parties never intended to enter into the marriage contract
and never intended to live as husband and wife or build a family. It concluded that their purpose was primarily for personal gain,
that is, for Albios to obtain foreign citizenship, and for Fringer, the consideration of $2,000.00.

Hence, this petition.

Assignment of Error

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAWWHEN IT HELD THAT A MARRIAGE

CONTRACTED FOR THEPURPOSE OF OBTAINING FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP WAS DONEIN JEST,
HENCE, LACKING IN THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OFCONSENT.8

The OSG argues that albeit the intention was for Albios to acquire American citizenship and for Fringer to be paid $2,000.00, both
parties freely gave their consent to the marriage, as they knowingly and willingly entered into that marriage and knew the benefits
and consequences of being bound by it. According to the OSG, consent should be distinguished from motive, the latter being
inconsequential to the validity of marriage.

The OSG also argues that the present case does not fall within the concept of a marriage in jest. The parties here intentionally
consented to enter into a real and valid marriage, for if it were otherwise, the purpose of Albios to acquire American citizenship
would be rendered futile.

On October 29, 2012, Albios filed her Comment9 to the petition, reiterating her stand that her marriage was similar to a marriage
by way of jest and, therefore, void from the beginning.

On March 22, 2013, the OSG filed its Reply10 reiterating its arguments in its petition for review on certiorari.

Ruling of the Court

The resolution of this case hinges on this sole question of law: Is a marriage, contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring American
citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00, void ab initio on the ground of lack of consent?

The Court resolves in the negative.

Before the Court delves into its ruling, It shall first examine the phenomenon of marriage fraud for the purposes of immigration.

Marriage Fraud in Immigration

The institution of marriage carries with it concomitant benefits. This has led to the development of marriage fraud for the sole
purpose of availing of particular benefits. In the United States, marriages where a couple marries only to achieve a particular
purpose or acquire specific benefits, have been referred to as "limited purpose" marriages. 11 A common limited purpose marriage
is one entered into solely for the legitimization of a child.12 Another, which is the subject of the present case, is for immigration
purposes. Immigration law is usually concerned with the intention of the couple at the time of their marriage, 13 and it attempts to
filter out those who use marriage solely to achieve immigration status.14

In 1975, the seminal case of Bark v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 15 established the principal test for determining the
presence of marriage fraud in immigration cases. It ruled that a "marriage is a sham if the bride and groom did not intend to establish
a life together at the time they were married. "This standard was modified with the passage of the Immigration Marriage Fraud
Amendment of 1986 (IMFA), which now requires the couple to instead demonstrate that the marriage was not "entered into for the
purpose of evading the immigration laws of the United States." The focus, thus, shifted from determining the intention to establish
a life together, to determining the intention of evading immigration laws. 16 It must be noted, however, that this standard is used
purely for immigration purposes and, therefore, does not purport to rule on the legal validity or existence of a marriage.

The question that then arises is whether a marriage declared as a sham or fraudulent for the limited purpose of immigration is also
legally void and in existent. The early cases on limited purpose marriages in the United States made no definitive ruling. In 1946,
the notable case of

United States v. Rubenstein17 was promulgated, wherein in order to allow an alien to stay in the country, the parties had agreed to
marry but not to live together and to obtain a divorce within six months. The Court, through Judge Learned Hand, ruled that a
marriage to convert temporary into permanent permission to stay in the country was not a marriage, there being no consent, to wit:

x x x But, that aside, Spitz and Sandler were never married at all. Mutual consent is necessary to every contract; and no matter what
forms or ceremonies the parties may go through indicating the contrary, they do not contract if they do not in fact assent, which
may always be proved. x x x Marriage is no exception to this rule: a marriage in jest is not a marriage at all. x x x It is quite true
that a marriage without subsequent consummation will be valid; but if the spouses agree to a marriage only for the sake of
representing it as such to the outside world and with the understanding that they will put an end to it as soon as it has served its
purpose to deceive, they have never really agreed to be married at all. They must assent to enter into the relation as it is ordinarily
understood, and it is not ordinarily understood as merely a pretence, or cover, to deceive others.18

(Italics supplied)

On the other end of the spectrum is the 1969 case of Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines,19 which declared as valid a marriage entered into
solely for the husband to gain entry to the United States, stating that a valid marriage could not be avoided "merely because the
marriage was entered into for a limited purpose."20 The 1980 immigration case of Matter of McKee,21 further recognized that a
fraudulent or sham marriage was intrinsically different from a non subsisting one.

Nullifying these limited purpose marriages for lack of consent has, therefore, been recognized as problematic. The problem being
that in order to obtain an immigration benefit, a legal marriage is first necessary. 22 At present, United States courts have generally
denied annulments involving" limited purpose" marriages where a couple married only to achieve a particular purpose, and have
upheld such marriages as valid.23

The Court now turns to the case at hand.

Respondent’s marriage not void

In declaring the respondent’s marriage void, the RTC ruled that when a marriage was entered into for a purpose other than the
establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce and should not be recognized from its inception. In its resolution
denying the OSG’s motion for reconsideration, the RTC went on to explain that the marriage was declared void because the parties
failed to freely give their consent to the marriage as they had no intention to be legally bound by it and used it only as a means for
the respondent to acquire American citizenship. Agreeing with the RTC, the CA ruled that the essential requisite of consent was
lacking. It held that the parties clearly did not understand the nature and consequence of getting married. As in the Rubenstein case,
the CA found the marriage to be similar to a marriage in jest considering that the parties only entered into the marriage for the
acquisition of American citizenship in exchange of $2,000.00. They never intended to enter into a marriage contract and never
intended to live as husband and wife or build a family.

The CA’s assailed decision was, therefore, grounded on the parties’ supposed lack of consent. Under Article 2 of the Family Code,
consent is an essential requisite of marriage. Article 4 of the same Code provides that the absence of any essential requisite shall
render a marriage void ab initio.

Under said Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the presence of a solemnizing officer. A
"freely given" consent requires that the contracting parties willingly and deliberately enter into the marriage. Consent must be real
in the sense that it is not vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the vices of consent under Articles45 and 46 of the Family Code,
such as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue influence. 24 Consent must also be conscious or intelligent, in that the parties must be
capable of intelligently understanding the nature of, and both the beneficial or unfavorable consequences of their act. 25 Their
understanding should not be affected by insanity, intoxication, drugs, or hypnotism. 26

Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was real consent because it was not vitiated
nor rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their consent was also conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature and
the beneficial and inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so. That their consent was
freely given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring American citizenship through marriage. Such plainly
demonstrates that they willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage. There was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid
marriage so as to fully comply with the requirements of an application for citizenship. There was a full and complete understanding
of the legal tie that would be created between them, since it was that precise legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their goal.

In ruling that Albios’ marriage was void for lack of consent, the CA characterized such as akin to a marriage by way of jest. A
marriage in jest is a pretended marriage, legal in form but entered into as a joke, with no real intention of entering into the actual
marriage status, and with a clear understanding that the parties would not be bound. The ceremony is not followed by any conduct
indicating a purpose to enter into such a relation.27 It is a pretended marriage not intended to be real and with no intention to create
any legal ties whatsoever, hence, the absence of any genuine consent. Marriages in jest are void ab initio, not for vitiated, defective,
or unintelligent consent, but for a complete absence of consent. There is no genuine consent because the parties have absolutely no
intention of being bound in any way or for any purpose.

The respondent’s marriage is not at all analogous to a marriage in jest.1âwphi1 Albios and Fringer had an undeniable intention to
be bound in order to create the very bond necessary to allow the respondent to acquire American citizenship. Only a genuine
consent to be married would allow them to further their objective, considering that only a valid marriage can properly support an
application for citizenship. There was, thus, an apparent intention to enter into the actual marriage status and to create a legal tie,
albeit for a limited purpose. Genuine consent was, therefore, clearly present.

The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the Family Code is for the couple to establish a conjugal and family life. The
possibility that the parties in a marriage might have no real intention to establish a life together is, however, insufficient to nullify
a marriage freely entered into in accordance with law. The same Article 1 provides that the nature, consequences, and incidents of
marriage are governed by law and not subject to stipulation. A marriage may, thus, only be declared void or voidable under the
grounds provided by law. There is no law that declares a marriage void if it is entered into for purposes other than what the
Constitution or law declares, such as the acquisition of foreign citizenship. Therefore, so long as all the essential and formal
requisites prescribed by law are present, and it is not void or voidable under the grounds provided by law, it shall be declared
valid.28

Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and cannot dictate on the kind of life that a couple
chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle would go into the realm of their right to privacy and would raise serious
constitutional questions.29 The right to marital privacy allows married couples to structure their marriages in almost any way they
see fit, to live together or live apart, to have children or no children, to love one another or not, and so on.30 Thus, marriages entered
into for other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as convenience, companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they
comply with all the legal requisites,31 are equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration in a marriage contract, is not the only
valid cause for marriage. Other considerations, not precluded by law, may validly support a marriage.

Although the Court views with disdain the respondent’s attempt to utilize marriage for dishonest purposes, It cannot declare the
marriage void. Hence, though the respondent’s marriage may be considered a sham or fraudulent for the purposes of immigration,
it is not void ab initio and continues to be valid and subsisting.

Neither can their marriage be considered voidable on the ground of fraud under Article 45 (3) of the Family Code. Only the
circumstances listed under Article 46 of the same Code may constitute fraud, namely, (1) non- disclosure of a previous conv1ctwn
involving moral turpitude; (2) concealment by the wife of a pregnancy by another man; (3) concealment of a sexually transmitted
disease; and (4) concealment of drug addiction, alcoholism, or homosexuality. No other misrepresentation or deceit shall constitute
fraud as a ground for an action to annul a marriage. Entering into a marriage for the sole purpose of evading immigration laws does
not qualify under any of the listed circumstances. Furthermore, under Article 47 (3), the ground of fraud may only be brought by
the injured or innocent party. In the present case, there is no injured party because Albios and Fringer both conspired to enter into
the sham marriage.

Albios has indeed made a mockery of the sacred institution of marriage. Allowing her marriage with Fringer to be declared void
would only further trivialize this inviolable institution. The Court cannot declare such a marriage void in the event the parties fail
to qualify for immigration benefits, after they have availed of its benefits, or simply have no further use for it. These unscrupulous
individuals cannot be allowed to use the courts as instruments in their fraudulent schemes. Albios already misused a judicial
institution to enter into a marriage of convenience; she should not be allowed to again abuse it to get herself out of an inconvenient
situation.

No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an in violable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the State.32 It must, therefore, be safeguarded from the whims and caprices of the contracting parties. This Court
cannot leave the impression that marriage may easily be entered into when it suits the needs of the parties, and just as easily nullified
when no longer needed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The September 29, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414
is ANNULLED, and Civil Case No. 1134-06 is DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-53703 August 19, 1986

LILIA OLIVA WIEGEL, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE ALICIA V. SEMPIO-DIY (as presiding judge of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of
Caloocan City) and KARL HEINZ WIEGEL, respondents.

Dapucanta, Dulay & Associates for petitioner.

Siguion Reyna, Montecillo and Ongsiako Law Office for private respondent.

PARAS, J.:

In an action (Family Case No. 483) filed before the erstwhile Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Caloocan City, herein
respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel (plaintiff therein) asked for the declaration of Nullity of his marriage (celebrated on July, 1978 at
the Holy Catholic Apostolic Christian Church Branch in Makati, Metro Manila) with herein petitioner Lilia Oliva Wiegel (Lilia,
for short, and defendant therein) on the ground of Lilia's previous existing marriage to one Eduardo A. Maxion, the ceremony
having been performed on June 25, 1972 at our Lady of Lourdes Church in Quezon City. Lilia, while admitting the existence of
said prior subsisting marriage claimed that said marriage was null and void, she and the first husband Eduardo A. Maxion having
been allegedly forced to enter said marital union. In the pre-trial that ensued, the issue agreed upon by both parties was the status
of the first marriage (assuming the presence of force exerted against both parties): was said prior marriage void or was it merely
voidable? Contesting the validity of the pre-trial order, Lilia asked the respondent court for an opportunity to present evidence-

(1) that the first marriage was vitiated by force exercised upon both her and the first husband; and

(2) that the first husband was at the time of the marriage in 1972 already married to someone else.

Respondent judge ruled against the presentation of evidence because the existence of force exerted on both parties of the first
marriage had already been agreed upon. Hence, the present petition for certiorari assailing the following Orders of therespondent
Judge-

(1) the Order dated March 17, 1980 in which the parties were compelled to submit the case for resolution based on "agreed facts;"
and

(2) the Order dated April 14, 1980, denying petitioner's motion to allow her to present evidence in her favor.

We find the petition devoid of merit.

There is no need for petitioner to prove that her first marriage was vitiated by force committed against both parties because assuming
this to be so, the marriage will not be void but merely viodable (Art. 85, Civil Code), and therefore valid until annulled. Since no
annulment has yet been made, it is clear that when she married respondent she was still validly married to her first husband,
consequently, her marriage to respondent is VOID (Art. 80, Civil Code).

There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first husband at the time they married
each other, for then such a marriage though void still needs according to this Court a judicial declaration 1 of such fact and for all
legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her marriage with respondent
Karl Heinz Wiegel); accordingly, the marriage of petitioner and respondent would be regarded VOID under the law.

WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby DISMISSED, for lack of merit, and the Orders complained of are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 104818 September 17, 1993

ROBERTO DOMINGO, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and DELIA SOLEDAD AVERA represented by her Attorney-in-Fact MOISES R.
AVERA, respondents.

Jose P.O. Aliling IV for petitioner.

De Guzman, Meneses & Associates for private respondent.

ROMERO, J.:

The instant petition seeks the reversal of respondent court's ruling finding no grave abuse of discretion in the lower court's order
denying petitioner's motion to dismiss the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage and separation of property.

On May 29, 1991, private respondent Delia Soledad A. Domingo filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig entitled
"Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property" against petitioner Roberto Domingo. The petition which was
docketed as Special Proceedings No. 1989-J alleged among others that: they were married on November 29, 1976 at the YMCA
Youth Center Bldg., as evidenced by a Marriage Contract Registry No. 1277K-76 with Marriage License No. 4999036 issued at
Carmona, Cavite; unknown to her, he had a previous marriage with one Emerlina dela Paz on April 25, 1969 which marriage is
valid and still existing; she came to know of the prior marriage only sometime in 1983 when Emerlina dela Paz sued them for
bigamy; from January 23 1979 up to the present, she has been working in Saudi Arabia and she used to come to the Philippines
only when she would avail of the one-month annual vacation leave granted by her foreign employer since 1983 up to the present,
he has been unemployed and completely dependent upon her for support and subsistence; out of her personal earnings, she
purchased real and personal properties with a total amount of approximately P350,000.00, which are under the possession and
administration of Roberto; sometime in June 1989, while on her one-month vacation, she discovered that he was cohabiting with
another woman; she further discovered that he had been disposing of some of her properties without her knowledge or consent; she
confronted him about this and thereafter appointed her brother Moises R. Avera as her attorney-in-fact to take care of her properties;
he failed and refused to turn over the possession and administration of said properties to her brother/attorney-in-fact; and he is not
authorized to administer and possess the same on account of the nullity of their marriage. The petition prayed that a temporary
restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction be issued enjoining Roberto from exercising any act of administration and
ownership over said properties; their marriage be declared null and void and of no force and effect; and Delia Soledad be declared
the sole and exclusive owner of all properties acquired at the time of their void marriage and such properties be placed under the
proper management and administration of the attorney-in-fact.

Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the petition stated no cause of action. The marriage being void ab initio, the
petition for the declaration of its nullity is, therefore, superfluous and unnecessary. It added that private respondent has no property
which is in his possession.

On August 20, 1991, Judge Maria Alicia M. Austria issued an Order denying the motion to dismiss for lack of merit. She explained:

Movant argues that a second marriage contracted after a first marriage by a man with another woman is illegal and void (citing the
case of Yap v. Court of Appeals, 145 SCRA 229) and no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void marriage
(citing the cases of People v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033; People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845). Indeed, under the Yap case there is no
dispute that the second marriage contracted by respondent with herein petitioner after a first marriage with another woman is illegal
and void. However, as to whether or not the second marriage should first be judicially declared a nullity is not an issue in said case.
In the case of Vda. de Consuegra v. GSIS, the Supreme Court ruled in explicit terms, thus:

And with respect to the right of the second wife, this Court observed that although the second marriage can be presumed to be
void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of its nullity.
(37 SCRA 316, 326)
The above ruling which is of later vintage deviated from the previous rulings of the Supreme Court in the aforecited cases of Aragon
and Mendoza.

Finally, the contention of respondent movant that petitioner has no property in his possession is an issue that may be determined
only after trial on the merits.1

A motion for reconsideration was filed stressing the erroneous application of Vda. de Consuegra v. GSIS2 and the absence of
justiciable controversy as to the nullity of the marriage. On September 11, 1991, Judge Austria denied the motion for
reconsideration and gave petitioner fifteen (15) days from receipt within which to file his answer.

Instead of filing the required answer, petitioner filed a special civil action of certiorari and mandamus on the ground that the lower
court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying the motion to dismiss.

On February 7, 1992, the Court of Appeals3 dismissed the petition. It explained that the case of Yap v. CA4 cited by petitioner and
that of Consuegra v. GSIS relied upon by the lower court do not have relevance in the case at bar, there being no identity of facts
because these cases dealt with the successional rights of the second wife while the instant case prays for separation of property
corollary with the declaration of nullity of marriage. It observed that the separation and subsequent distribution of the properties
acquired during the union can be had only upon proper determination of the status of the marital relationship between said parties,
whether or not the validity of the first marriage is denied by petitioner. Furthermore, in order to avoid duplication and multiplicity
of suits, the declaration of nullity of marriage may be invoked in this proceeding together with the partition and distribution of the
properties involved. Citing Articles 48, 50 and 52 of the Family Code, it held that private respondent's prayer for declaration of
absolute nullity of their marriage may be raised together with other incidents of their marriage such as the separation of their
properties. Lastly, it noted that since the Court has jurisdiction, the alleged error in refusing to grant the motion to dismiss is merely
one of law for which the remedy ordinarily would have been to file an answer, proceed with the trial and in case of an adverse
decision, reiterate the issue on appeal. The motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied for lack of merit. 5

Hence, this petition.

The two basic issues confronting the Court in the instant case are the following.

First, whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is necessary. If in the affirmative, whether the same should
be filed only for purposes of remarriage.

Second, whether or not SP No. 1989-J is the proper remedy of private respondent to recover certain real and personal properties
allegedly belonging to her exclusively.

Petitioner, invoking the ruling in People v. Aragon6 and People v. Mendoza,7 contends that SP. No. 1989-J for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property filed by private respondent must be dismissed for being unnecessary and
superfluous. Furthermore, under his own interpretation of Article 40 of the Family Code, he submits that a petition for declaration
of absolute nullity of marriage is required only for purposes of remarriage. Since the petition in SP No. 1989-J contains no allegation
of private respondent's intention to remarry, said petition should therefore, be dismissed.

On the other hand, private respondent insists on the necessity of a judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage, not for
purposes of remarriage, but in order to provide a basis for the separation and distribution of the properties acquired during coverture.

There is no question that the marriage of petitioner and private respondent celebrated while the former's previous marriage with
one Emerlina de la Paz was still subsisting, is bigamous. As such, it is from the beginning. 8 Petitioner himself does not dispute the
absolute nullity of their marriage. 9

The cases of People v. Aragon and People v. Mendoza relied upon by petitioner are cases where the Court had earlier ruled that no
judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void, bigamous marriage. It is noteworthy to observe that Justice Alex
Reyes, however, dissented on these occasions stating that:

Though the logician may say that where the former marriage was void there would be nothing to dissolve, still it is not for the
spouses to judge whether that marriage was void or not. That judgment is reserved to the courts. . . . 10
This dissenting opinion was adopted as the majority position in subsequent cases involving the same issue. Thus, in Gomez
v. Lipana, 11 the Court abandoned its earlier ruling in the Aragon and Mendoza cases. In reversing the lower court's order forfeiting
the husband's share of the disputed property acquired during the second marriage, the Court stated that "if the nullity, or annulment
of the marriage is the basis for the application of Article 1417, there is need for a judicial declaration thereof, which of course
contemplates an action for that purpose."

Citing Gomez v. Lipana, the Court subsequently held in Vda. de Consuegra v. Government Service Insurance System, that
"although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting,
still there is need for judicial declaration of such nullity."

In Tolentino v. Paras,12 however, the Court turned around and applied the Aragon and Mendoza ruling once again. In granting the
prayer of the first wife asking for a declaration as the lawful surviving spouse and the correction of the death certificate of her
deceased husband, it explained that "(t)he second marriage that he contracted with private respondent during the lifetime of his first
spouse is null and void from the beginning and of no force and effect. No judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of
a void marriage."

However, in the more recent case of Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy 13 the Court reverted to the Consuegra case and held that there was "no
need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first husband at the time they married each other, for then
such a marriage though void still needs according to this Court a judicial declaration of such fact and for all legal intents and
purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz
Wiegel."

Came the Family Code which settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of the absolute
nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense. 14 Where the absolute nullity of
a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said
projected marriage be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. 15

The Family Law Revision Committee and the Civil Code Revision Committee 16 which drafted what is now the Family Code of
the Philippines took the position that parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void even if such
be the fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed to marry again.
This is borne out by the following minutes of the 152nd Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees where the
present Article 40, then Art. 39, was discussed.

B. Article 39. —

The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of a final judgment declaring the marriage void, except as
provided in Article 41.

Justice Caguioa remarked that the above provision should include not only void but also voidable marriages. He then suggested
that the above provision be modified as follows:

The validity of a marriage may be invoked only . . .

Justice Reyes (J.B.L. Reyes), however, proposed that they say:

The validity or invalidity of a marriage may be invoked

only . . .

On the other hand, Justice Puno suggested that they say:

The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only . . .

Justice Caguioa explained that his idea is that one cannot determine for himself whether or not his marriage is valid and that a
court action is needed. Justice Puno accordingly proposed that the provision be modified to read:
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of a final judgment annulling the marriage or declaring the marriage
void, except as provided in Article 41.

Justice Caguioa remarked that in annulment, there is no question. Justice Puno, however, pointed out that, even if it is a judgment
of annulment, they still have to produce the judgment.

Justice Caguioa suggested that they say:

The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of a final judgment declaring the marriage invalid, except as provided
in Article 41.

Justice Puno raised the question: When a marriage is declared invalid, does it include the annulment of a marriage and the
declaration that the marriage is void? Justice Caguioa replied in the affirmative. Dean Gupit added that in some judgments, even if
the marriage is annulled, it is declared void. Justice Puno suggested that this matter be made clear in the provision.

Prof. Baviera remarked that the original idea in the provision is to require first a judicial declaration of a void marriage and not
annullable marriages, with which the other members concurred. Judge Diy added that annullable marriages are presumed valid
until a direct action is filed to annul it, which the other members affirmed. Justice Puno remarked that if this is so, then the phrase
"absolute nullity" can stand since it might result in confusion if they change the phrase to "invalidity" if what they are referring to
in the provision is the declaration that the marriage is void.

Prof. Bautista commented that they will be doing away with collateral defense as well as collateral attack. Justice Caguioa explained
that the idea in the provision is that there should be a final judgment declaring the marriage void and a party should not declare for
himself whether or not the marriage is void, while the other members affirmed. Justice Caguioa added that they are, therefore,
trying to avoid a collateral attack on that point. Prof. Bautista stated that there are actions which are brought on the assumption that
the marriage is valid. He then asked: Are they depriving one of the right to raise the defense that he has no liability because the
basis of the liability is void? Prof. Bautista added that they cannot say that there will be no judgment on the validity or invalidity
of the marriage because it will be taken up in the same proceeding. It will not be a unilateral declaration that, it is a void
marriage. Justice Caguioa saw the point of Prof. Bautista and suggested that they limit the provision to remarriage. He then
proposed that Article 39 be reworded as follows:

The absolute nullity of a marriage for purposes of remarriage may be invoked only on the basis of final judgment . . .

Justice Puno suggested that the above be modified as follows:

The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of establishing the validity of a subsequent marriage only
on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void, except as provided in Article 41.

Justice Puno later modified the above as follows:

For the purpose of establishing the validity of a subsequent marriage, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may only be
invoked on the basis of a final judgment declaring such nullity, except as provided in Article 41.

Justice Caguioa commented that the above provision is too broad and will not solve the objection of Prof. Bautista. He proposed
that they say:

For the purpose of entering into a subsequent marriage, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may only be invoked on the
basis of a final judgment declaring such nullity, except as provided in Article 41.

Justice Caguioa explained that the idea in the above provision is that if one enters into a subsequent marriage without obtaining a
final judgment declaring the nullity of a previous marriage, said subsequent marriage is void ab initio.

After further deliberation, Justice Puno suggested that they go back to the original wording of the provision as follows:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage only on the basis of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void, except as provided in Article 41. 17

In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the protection of the spouse who, believing
that his or her marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her first marriage, the
person who marries again cannot be charged with bigamy. 18

Just over a year ago, the Court made the pronouncement that there is a necessity for a declaration of absolute nullity of a prior
subsisting marriage before contracting another in the recent case of Terre v. Terre. 19 The Court, in turning down the defense of
respondent Terre who was charged with grossly immoral conduct consisting of contracting a second marriage and living with
another woman other than complainant while his prior marriage with the latter remained subsisting, said that "for purposes of
determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null
and void ab initio is essential."

As regards the necessity for a judicial declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, petitioner submits that the same can be maintained
only if it is for the purpose of remarriage. Failure to allege this purpose, according to petitioner's theory, will warrant dismissal of
the same.

Article 40 of the Family Code provides:

Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void. (n)

Crucial to the proper interpretation of Article 40 is the position in the provision of the word "solely." As it is placed, the same
shows that it is meant to qualify "final judgment declaring such previous marriage void." Realizing the need for careful
craftsmanship in conveying the precise intent of the Committee members, the provision in question, as it finally emerged, did not
state "The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked solely for purposes of remarriage . . .," in which case "solely"
would clearly qualify the phrase "for purposes of remarriage." Had the phraseology been such, the interpretation of petitioner would
have been correct and, that is, that the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked solely for purposes of remarriage,
thus rendering irrelevant the clause "on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void."

That Article 40 as finally formulated included the significant clause denotes that such final judgment declaring the previous
marriage void need not be obtained only for purposes of remarriage. Undoubtedly, one can conceive of other instances where a
party might well invoke the absolute nullity of a previous marriage for purposes other than remarriage, such as in case of an action
for liquidation, partition, distribution and separation of property between the erstwhile spouses, as well as an action for the custody
and support of their common children and the delivery of the latters' presumptive legitimes. In such cases, evidence needs must be
adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity.
These need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void. Hence, in the instance
where a party who has previously contracted a marriage which remains subsisting desires to enter into another marriage which is
legally unassailable, he is required by law to prove that the previous one was an absolute nullity. But this he may do on the
basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.

This leads us to the question: Why the distinction? In other words, for purposes of remarriage, why should the only legally
acceptable basis for declaring a previous marriage an absolute nullity be a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void?
Whereas, for purposes other than remarriage, other evidence is acceptable?

Marriage, a sacrosanct institution, declared by the Constitution as an "inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family;"
as such, it "shall be protected by the State."20 In more explicit terms, the Family Code characterizes it as "a special contract of
permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal, and family
life." 21 So crucial are marriage and the family to the stability and peace of the nation that their "nature, consequences, and incidents
are governed by law and not subject to stipulation . . ." 22 As a matter of policy, therefore, the nullification of a marriage for the
purpose of contracting another cannot be accomplished merely on the basis of the perception of both parties or of one that their
union is so defective with respect to the essential requisites of a contract of marriage as to render it void ipso jure and with no legal
effect — and nothing more. Were this so, this inviolable social institution would be reduced to a mockery and would rest on very
shaky foundations indeed. And the grounds for nullifying marriage would be as diverse and far-ranging as human ingenuity and
fancy could conceive. For such a social significant institution, an official state pronouncement through the courts, and nothing less,
will satisfy the exacting norms of society. Not only would such an open and public declaration by the courts definitively confirm
the nullity of the contract of marriage, but the same would be easily verifiable through records accessible to everyone.

That the law seeks to ensure that a prior marriage is no impediment to a second sought to be contracted by one of the parties may
be gleaned from new information required in the Family Code to be included in the application for a marriage license, viz, "If
previously married, how, when and where the previous marriage was dissolved and annulled." 23

Reverting to the case before us, petitioner's interpretation of Art. 40 of the Family Code is, undoubtedly, quite restrictive. Thus, his
position that private respondent's failure to state in the petition that the same is filed to enable her to remarry will result in the
dismissal of SP No. 1989-J is untenable. His misconstruction of Art. 40 resulting from the misplaced emphasis on the term "solely"
was in fact anticipated by the members of the Committee.

Dean Gupit commented the word "only" may be misconstrued to refer to "for purposes of remarriage." Judge Diy stated that "only"
refers to "final judgment." Justice Puno suggested that they say "on the basis only of a final judgment." Prof. Baviera suggested
that they use the legal term "solely" instead of "only," which the Committee approved. 24 (Emphasis supplied)

Pursuing his previous argument that the declaration for absolute nullity of marriage is unnecessary, petitioner suggests that private
respondent should have filed an ordinary civil action for the recovery of the properties alleged to have been acquired during their
union. In such an eventuality, the lower court would not be acting as a mere special court but would be clothed with jurisdiction to
rule on the issues of possession and ownership. In addition, he pointed out that there is actually nothing to separate or partition as
the petition admits that all the properties were acquired with private respondent's money.

The Court of Appeals disregarded this argument and concluded that "the prayer for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may
be raised together with the other incident of their marriage such as the separation of their properties."

When a marriage is declared void ab initio, the law states that the final judgment therein shall provide for "the liquidation, partition
and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common children, and the delivery of their
presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings." 25 Other specific effects flowing
therefrom, in proper cases, are the following:

Art. 43. xxx xxx xxx

(2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the case may be, shall be dissolved and liquidated, but if
either spouse contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her share of the net profits of the community property or conjugal
partnership property shall be forfeited in favor of the common children or, if there are none, the children of the guilty spouse by a
previous marriage or, in default of children, the innocent spouse;

(3) Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid, except that if the donee contracted the marriage in bad faith, such donations
made to said donee are revoked by operation of law;

(4) The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of the other spouse who acted in bad faith as a beneficiary in any insurance
policy, even if such designation be stipulated as irrevocable; and

(5) The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith shall be disqualified to inherit from the innocent spouse by
testate and intestate succession. (n)

Art. 44. If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith, said marriage shall be void ab initio and all donations by
reason of marriage and testamentary disposition made by one in favor of the other are revoked by operation of law. (n) 26

Based on the foregoing provisions, private respondent's ultimate prayer for separation of property will simply be one of the
necessary consequences of the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage. Thus, petitioner's suggestion that in order
for their properties to be separated, an ordinary civil action has to be instituted for that purpose is baseless. The Family Code has
clearly provided the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage, one of which is the separation of property according to the
regime of property relations governing them. It stands to reason that the lower court before whom the issue of nullity of a first
marriage is brought is likewise clothed with jurisdiction to decide the incidental questions regarding the couple's properties.
Accordingly, the respondent court committed no reversible error in finding that the lower court committed no grave abuse of
discretion in denying petitioner's motion to dismiss SP No. 1989-J.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of respondent Court dated February 7, 1992 and the Resolution
dated March 20, 1992 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Bidin and Melo, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions

VITUG, J., concurring:

I concur with the opinion so well expressed by Mme. Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero. I should like, however, to put in a modest
observation.

Void marriages are inexistent from the very beginning and, I believe, no judicial decree is required to establish their nullity, except
in the following instances:

(a) For purposes of remarriage pursuant to the provision of Article 40 of the Family Code; viz.:

The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void. (n)

(b) A marriage celebrated prior to the effectivity of the Family Code in case a party thereto was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage (Article 36, Family Code), where an action or defense for the declaration
of nullity prescribes ten (10) years after the Family Code took effect (Article 39, Family Code); otherwise, the marriage is deemed
unaffected by the Family Code.

A void marriage, even without its being judicially declared a nullity, albeit the preferability for, and justiciability (fully discussed
in the majority opinion) of, such a declaration, will not give it the status or the consequences of a valid marriage, saving only
specific instances where certain effects of a valid marriage can still flow from the void marriage. Examples of these cases are
children of void marriages under Article 36 (due to psychological incapacity) and Article 53, in relation to Article 52 (due to failure
of partition, delivery of presumptive legitimes of children and recording thereof following the annulment or declaration of nullity
a prior marriage), conceived or born before the judicial declaration of nullity of such void marriages, who the law deems as
legitimate (Article 54, Family Code).

In most, if not in all, other cases, a void marriage is to be considered extant per se. Neither the conjugal, partnership of gain under
the old regime nor the absolute community of property under the new Code (absent a marriage settlement), will apply; instead,
their property relations shall be governed by the co-ownership rules under either Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. I
must hasten to add as a personal view, however, that the exceptional effects on children of a void marriage because of the
psychological incapacity of a party thereto should have been extended to cover even the personal and property relations of the
spouses. Unlike the other cases of void marriages where the grounds therefor may be established by hard facts and with little
uncertainty, the term "psychological incapacity" is so relative and unsettling that until a judicial declaration of nullity is made its
interim effects can long and literally hang on the balance not only insofar as the spouses themselves are concerned but also as
regards third persons with whom the spouses deal.
# Separate Opinions

VITUG, J., concurring:

I concur with the opinion so well expressed by Mme. Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero. I should like, however, to put in a modest
observation.

Void marriages are inexistent from the very beginning and, I believe, no judicial decree is required to establish their nullity, except
in the following instances:

(a) For purposes of remarriage pursuant to the provision of Article 40 of the Family Code; viz.:

The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void. (n)

(b) A marriage celebrated prior to the effectivity of the Family Code in case a party thereto was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage (Article 36, Family Code), where an action or defense for the declaration
of nullity prescribes ten (10) years after the Family Code took effect (Article 39, Family Code); otherwise, the marriage is deemed
unaffected by the Family Code.

A void marriage, even without its being judicially declared a nullity, albeit the preferability for, and justiciability (fully discussed
in the majority opinion) of, such a declaration, will not give it the status or the consequences of a valid marriage, saving only
specific instances where certain effects of a valid marriage can still flow from the void marriage. Examples of these cases are
children of void marriages under Article 36 (due to psychological incapacity) and Article 53, in relation to Article 52 (due to failure
of partition, delivery of presumptive legitimes of children and recording thereof following the annulment or declaration of nullity
a prior marriage), conceived or born before the judicial declaration of nullity of such void marriages, who the law deems as
legitimate (Article 54, Family Code).

In most, if not in all, other cases, a void marriage is to be considered extant per se. Neither the conjugal, partnership of gain under
the old regime nor the absolute community of property under the new Code (absent a marriage settlement), will apply; instead,
their property relations shall be governed by the co-ownership rules under either Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. I
must hasten to add as a personal view, however, that the exceptional effects on children of a void marriage because of the
psychological incapacity of a party thereto should have been extended to cover even the personal and property relations of the
spouses. Unlike the other cases of void marriages where the grounds therefor may be established by hard facts and with little
uncertainty, the term "psychological incapacity" is so relative and unsettling that until a judicial declaration of nullity is made its
interim effects can long and literally hang on the balance not only insofar as the spouses themselves are concerned but also as
regards third persons with whom the spouses deal.
A.M. No. MTJ-92-706 March 29, 1995

LUPO ALMODIEL ATIENZA, complainant,

vs.
JUDGE FRANCISCO F. BRILLANTES, JR., Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 28, Manila, respondent.

QUIASON, J.:

This is a complaint by Lupo A. Atienza for Gross Immorality and Appearance of Impropriety against Judge Francisco Brillantes,
Jr., Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 20, Manila.

Complainant alleges that he has two children with Yolanda De Castro, who are living together at No. 34 Galaxy Street, Bel-Air
Subdivision, Makati, Metro Manila. He stays in said house, which he purchased in 1987, whenever he is in Manila.

In December 1991, upon opening the door to his bedroom, he saw respondent sleeping on his (complainant's) bed. Upon inquiry,
he was told by the houseboy that respondent had been cohabiting with De Castro. Complainant did not bother to wake up respondent
and instead left the house after giving instructions to his houseboy to take care of his children.

Thereafter, respondent prevented him from visiting his children and even alienated the affection of his children for him.

Complainant claims that respondent is married to one Zenaida Ongkiko with whom he has five children, as appearing in his 1986
and 1991 sworn statements of assets and liabilities. Furthermore, he alleges that respondent caused his arrest on January 13, 1992,
after he had a heated argument with De Castro inside the latter's office.

For his part, respondent alleges that complainant was not married to De Castro and that the filing of the administrative action was
related to complainant's claim on the Bel-Air residence, which was disputed by De Castro.

Respondent denies that he caused complainant's arrest and claims that he was even a witness to the withdrawal of the complaint
for Grave Slander filed by De Castro against complainant. According to him, it was the sister of De Castro who called the police
to arrest complainant.

Respondent also denies having been married to Ongkiko, although he admits having five children with her. He alleges that while
he and Ongkiko went through a marriage ceremony before a Nueva Ecija town mayor on April 25, 1965, the same was not a valid
marriage for lack of a marriage license. Upon the request of the parents of Ongkiko, respondent went through another marriage
ceremony with her in Manila on June 5, 1965. Again, neither party applied for a marriage license. Ongkiko abandoned respondent
17 years ago, leaving their children to his care and custody as a single parent.

Respondent claims that when he married De Castro in civil rites in Los Angeles, California on December 4, 1991, he believed, in
all good faith and for all legal intents and purposes, that he was single because his first marriage was solemnized without a license.

Under the Family Code, there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage before a party thereto can enter
into a second marriage. Article 40 of said Code provides:

The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for the purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void.

Respondent argues that the provision of Article 40 of the Family Code does not apply to him considering that his first marriage
took place in 1965 and was governed by the Civil Code of the Philippines; while the second marriage took place in 1991 and
governed by the Family Code.

Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 regardless of the date
of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the Family Code, said Article is given "retroactive effect insofar as it does not
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." This is particularly true with Article
40, which is a rule of procedure. Respondent has not shown any vested right that was impaired by the application of Article 40 to
his case.

The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights may not preclude their retroactive application to pending
actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely
affected (Gregorio v. Court of Appeals, 26 SCRA 229 [1968]). The reason is that as a general rule no vested right may attach to,
nor arise from, procedural laws (Billones v. Court of Industrial Relations, 14 SCRA 674 [1965]).

Respondent is the last person allowed to invoke good faith. He made a mockery of the institution of marriage and employed deceit
to be able to cohabit with a woman, who beget him five children.

Respondent passed the Bar examinations in 1962 and was admitted to the practice of law in 1963. At the time he went through the
two marriage ceremonies with Ongkiko, he was already a lawyer. Yet, he never secured any marriage license. Any law student
would know that a marriage license is necessary before one can get married. Respondent was given an opportunity to correct the
flaw in his first marriage when he and Ongkiko were married for the second time. His failure to secure a marriage license on these
two occasions betrays his sinister motives and bad faith.

It is evident that respondent failed to meet the standard of moral fitness for membership in the legal profession.

While the deceit employed by respondent existed prior to his appointment as a Metropolitan Trial Judge, his immoral and illegal
act of cohabiting with De Castro began and continued when he was already in the judiciary.

The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of impropriety, not only with respect to
his performance of his judicial duties but also as to his behavior as a private individual. There is no duality of morality. A public
figure is also judged by his private life. A judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times, in the performance of his judicial duties and in his everyday life. These are
judicial guideposts too self-evident to be overlooked. No position exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness and uprightness
of an individual than a seat in the judiciary (Imbing v. Tiongzon, 229 SCRA 690 [1994]).

WHEREFORE, respondent is DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all leave and retirement benefits and with prejudice
to reappointment in any branch, instrumentality, or agency of the government, including government-owned and controlled
corporations. This decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

[A.M. No. MTJ-95-1070. February 12, 1997]

MARIA APIAG, TERESITA CANTERO SECUROM and GLICERIO CANTERO, complainants, vs. JUDGE ESMERALDO
G. CANTERO, Respondent.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Judges ought to be more learned than witty, more reverend than plausible, and more advised than confident. Above all things,
integrity is their portion and proper virtue.1chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The eminent Francis Bacon wrote the foregoing exhortation some 400 years ago. Today, it is still relevant and quotable. By the
nature of their functions, judges are revered as models of integrity, wisdom, decorum, competence and propriety. Human as they
are, however, magistrates do have their own weaknesses, frailties, mistakes and even indiscretions. In the case before us, respondent
Judge Esmeraldo G. Cantero was charged administratively in the twilight of his government service, as a result of a failed love
affair that happened some 46 years ago. After an otherwise unblemished record, he would have reached the compulsory retirement
age of 70 years on August 8, 1997 had death not intervened a few months ago on September 26, 1996. Notwithstanding his death,
this Court still resolved to rule on this case, as it may affect his retirement benefits.
Antecedent Facts

In a letter-complaint2 dated November 10, 1993, Maria Apiag Cantero with her daughter Teresita A. Cantero Sacurom and son
Glicerio A. Cantero charged the respondent, Judge Esmeraldo G. Cantero of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Pinamungajan-
Aloquinsan, Cebu, with gross misconduct for allegedly having committed bigamy and falsification of public documents.

After receipt of the respondent's Comment, the Court on February 5, 1996, referred this case3 to Executive Judge Gualberto P.
Delgado of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Cebu for investigation, report and recommendation. The latter submitted his
Report and Recommendation4 dated July 26, 1996. Thereafter, the Court referred this case also to the Office of the Court
Administrator5 for evaluation, report and recommendation.

According to the complainants:

"Sometime in August 11, 1947, defendant (should be respondent) and plaintiff (should be complainant) Maria Apiag, joined
together in holy matrimony in marriage after having lived together as husband and wife wherein they begot a daughter who was
born on June 19, 1947, whom they named: Teresita A. Cantero; and then on October 29, 1953, Glicerio A. Cantero was born.
Thereafter, defendant left the conjugal home without any apparent cause, and leaving the plaintiff Maria Apiag to raise the two
children with her meager income as a public school teacher at Hinundayan, Southern Leyte. Plaintiffs suffered a lot after defendant
abandoned them for no reason whatsoever. For several years, defendant was never heard of and his whereabout unknown.

Few years ago, defendant surfaced at Hinundayan, Southern Leyte, whereupon, plaintiffs begged for support, however, they were
ignored by defendant. x x x"6chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On September 21, 1993, complainants, through Atty. Redentor G. Guyala, wrote a letter to respondent as follows:

"Judge Esmeraldo Cantero

Pinamungajan, Cebu

Dear Judge Cantero:

We are writing in behalf of your legal wife, Maria Apiag, and your two legitimate children by her, Teresita (Mrs. Sacurom) and
Glicerio.

It appears that sometime in the 1950's for reasons known only to you, you left your conjugal home at Hinundayan, Southern Leyte,
and abandoned without any means of support your said wife and children. Since then and up to now, they have not seen or heard
from you.

They would wish now that you do them right by living up to your duty as husband and father to them, particularly that expressly
provided under Art. 68 and Art. 195 of the Family Code (Art. 109 and 195 of the Civil Code) in relation to Art. 203 of the same
Code.

You will please consider this letter as a formal demand for maintenance and support for three of them, and a request that they be
properly instituted and named as your compulsory heirs and legal beneficiaries in all legal documents now on file and to be filed
with the Supreme Court and other agencies or offices as may be required under applicable laws, such as, the insurance (GSIS) and
retirement laws.

We hope this matter can be amicably settled among you, your wife and children, without having to resort to judicial recourse.

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) REDENTOR G. GUYALA"7chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The letter elicited no action or response from the respondent. Subsequently, complainants learned that respondent Judge had another
family. In their own words,

"x x x The plaintiffs later on learned that defendant has another wife by the name of Nieves C. Ygay, a Public School teacher from
Tagao, Pinamungajan, Cebu. According to some documents obtained by plaintiffs, the herein defendant and Nieves C. Ygay have
children of their own, named as follows with their date of births: Noralyn Y. Cantero -- May 19, 1968; Ellen Y. Cantero -- February
4, 1970; Erwin Y. Cantero -- April 29, 1979; Onofre Y. Cantero -- June 10, 1977; and Desirie Vic Y. Cantero -- December 2, 1981.

It was shocking to the senses that in all of the public documents required of defendant Judge Cantero to be filed with the Supreme
Court such as his sworn statement of assets and liabilities, his personal data sheet (SC Form P. 001), income tax returns and his
insurance policy with the Government Service Insurance System, defendant misrepresented himself as being married to Nieves C.
Ygay, with whom he contracted a second marriage. The truth of the matter is that defendant is married to plaintiff Maria Apiag
with whom they have two legitimate children, namely: Teresita A. Cantero and Glicerio A. Cantero."8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The respondent Judge, in his Comment, explained his side as follows:

"x x x I admit the existence and form of Annex 'A' of the said complaint, but vehemently deny the validity of its due execution, for
the truth of the matter is that such alleged marriage was only dramatized at the instance of our parents just to shot (sic) their wishes
and purposes on the matter, without my consent freely given. As a matter of fact, I was only called by my parents to go home to
our town at Hinundayan, Southern Leyte to attend party celebration of my sister's birthday from Iligan City, without patently
knowing I was made to appear (in) a certain drama marriage and we were forced to acknowledge our signatures appearing in the
duly prepared marriage contract(.) That was 46 years ago when I was yet 20 years of age, and at my second year high school
days."9chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Furthermore, Judge Cantero related that:

"x x x sometime in the year 1947, when both respondent and complainant, Maria Apiag were still in their early age and in their
second year high school days, they were engaged in a lovely affair which resulted to the pregnancy of the said complainant, and
then and there gave birth to a child, named Teresita Apiag, having (been) born out of wedlock on June 19, 1947, now Mrs. Teresita
Sacurom, one of the complainants. That in order to save name and shame, parents of both the respondent and the complainant came
to an agreement to allow the respondent, and the complainant (to) get married in the (sic) name, but not to live together as husband,
wife for being close relatives, thereby forcing the respondent to appear in a marriage affair where all the pertinent marriage papers
were all ready (sic) prepared (sic), and duly signed by somebody; that after the said affair both respondent and the complainant
immediately separated each other (sic) without living together as husband, and wife even for a day, nor having established a
conjugal home. From that time respondent and the complainant have never met each other nor having (sic) communicated (with)
each other for the last 40 years; that respondent continued his studies at Cebu City, and eventually became member of the Philippine
Bar, having passed the bar examination in the year 1960, that is 14 years after the affair of 1947; that in 1964, respondent was first
connected in the government service as Comelec Registrar of the Commission on Elections, assigned at Pinamungajan, Cebu(,)
that is 16 years after the affair of 1947; that in the year 1982, respondent was appointed as CLAO lawyer, now PAO, of the
Department of Justice, that is 35 years after the after the affair of 1947; and finally, on October 3, 1989, respondent was appointed
to the Judiciary as Municipal Circuit Trial Judge (MCTC) of the Municipalities of Pinamungajan and Aloguinsan, province of
Cebu, that is 42 years from August 11, 1947; that respondent is (sic) already 32 years in the government service up to the present
time with more than 6 years in the Judiciary; that respondent is already 69 years old, having been born on August 8, 1927, and
retirable by next year if God willing; that respondent has served in the government service for the last 32 years, faithfully, honestly
and judiciously without any complaint whatsoever, except this instant case; that respondent as member of the Judiciary, has live-
up (sic) to the standard required by the (sic) member (sic) of the bar and judiciary; that the charges against the respondent were all
based or rooted from the incedent (sic) that happened on August 11, 1947 and no other; that the complainants are morally dishonest
in filing the instant (case) just now, an elapsed (sic) of almost 42 years and knowing that respondent (is) retirable by next year,
1997; that this actuation is very suspicious, and intriguing;

xxx

That complainant Maria Apiag has been living together with another man during her public service as public school teacher and
have begotten a child, name (sic) Manuel Apiag and respondent promised (sic) the Honorable Court to furnish a complete paper
regarding this case in order to enlighten the Honorable (Court) that, he who seek (sic) justice must seek justice with cleab (sic)
hand;
That respondent did not file any annullment (sic) or judicial declaration (of nullity) of the alleged marriage because it is the
contention and honest belief, all the way, that the said marriage was void from the beginning, and as such nothing is to be voided
or nullified, and to do so will be inconsistent with the stand of the respondent; that this instant case (was) simply filed for money
consideration as reflected in their letter of demand; (t)hat as a matter of fact, respondent and the complainant have already signed
a compromised (sic) agreement, copy of which hereto (sic) attached as Annex '1', stating among other things that respondent will
give a monthly allowance to Terecita (sic) Sacurom in the (amount) of P4,000.00 and the complainant will withdraw their complaint
from the Supreme Court., and that respondent had already given the said allowance for three consecutive months plus the amount
of P25,000.00 for their Attorney to withdraw the case, and that respondent stop (sic) the monthly allowance until such time the
complainant will actually withdraw the instant case, and without knowledge of the respondent, complainant proceeded (sic) their
complaint after the elapsed (sic) of three (3) years."10chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Relevant portions of said compromise agreement which was executed sometime in March 1994 by Esmeraldo C. Cantero and
Teresita C. Sacurom and witnessed by Maria Apiag and Leovegardo Sacurom are reproduced thus:

"That this COMPROMISE AGREEMENT is executed and entered into by ESMERALDO C. CANTERO, of legal age, married,
Filipino, and with residence and postal address at Pinamungajan, Cebu, Philippines, otherwise called as the FIRST PARTY, and
TERESITA C. SACUROM, also of legal age, married, Filipino, representing her mother and her brother, and a residence (sic) of
133-A J. Ramos Street, Caloocan City, after having duly swirn (sic) to in accordance with law do hereby depose and say:

1. That the First Party is presently a Municipal Circuit Trial Judge of Pinamungajan-Aloguinsan, Cebu, is charged by Second Party
for Misconduct before the Office of the Court Administrator of the Supreme Court now pending action;

2. That the parties have came (sic) to agreement to have the said case settled amicably in the interest of family unity and
reconciliation, and arrived at compromise agreement based on law of equity, as follows:

(a) That both parties have agreed voluntarily, the Second Party will get ONE FOURTH (1/4) of the retirement
that the First will receive from the GSIS, and the rest of it will be for the First Party;

(b) That the Second Party and his brother will be included as one of the beneficiaries of the First Party, in case
of death;

(c) That the Second party and his only brother will inherit the properties of the First party inherited from his
parents;

(d) That the Second Party, representing her brother, is authorized to receive and collect P4,000.00, monthly out
of the second check salary of the First Party (The second half salary only);

3. That it was further voluntarily agreed that the Second Party will cause the withdrawal and the outright dismissal of the said
pending case filed by her and her mother;

4. That it was also agreed that the above agreement, shall never be effective and enforceable unless the said case will be withdrawn
and dismiss (sic) from the Supreme Court, and said dismissal be received by the First Party, otherwise the above-agreement is void
from the beginning; and the Second Party must desist from further claining (sic) and filing civil abd (sic) criminal liabilities.

5. That this agreement is executed voluntarily, in good faith, and in the interest of good will and reconciliation and both parties is
(sic) duty bound to follow faithfully and religiously."11chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In line with the foregoing, the respondent wrote a letter dated 14 March, 1994 addressed to the Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS) designating Teresita Cantero Sacurom and Glicerio Cantero as additional beneficiaries in his life insurance
policy.12chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The Issues

The respondent Judge formulated the following "issues":

"1. That the first marriage with the complainant, Maria Apiag on August 11, 1947 is void;

2. The absence of his first wife complainant Maria Apiag for more than seven (7) years raise the presumption that she is already
dead, that there was no need for any judicial declaration;

3. The charge of Grave Misconduct is not applicable to him because assuming that he committed the offense, he was not yet a
member of the judiciary;

4. The crime of Bigamy and Falsification had already prescribed;

5. The charges have no basis in fact and in law."13chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Report and Recommendation of Investigating Judge and Court Administrator

Investigating Judge Gualberto P. Delgado recommended in his report that:

"After a careful perusal of the evidence submitted by the parties, this Office finds respondent Guilty of the crime of Grave
Misconduct (Bigamy and Falsification of Public Documents) however, considering his length of service in the government, it is
recommended that he be suspended for one (1) year without pay."14chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The Office of the Court Administrator also submitted its report15 recommending respondent Judge's dismissal, as follows:

"After a careful review of all the documents on file in this case, we find no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the investigating
judge.

Extant from the records of the case and as admitted by respondent, he was married to complainant Maria Apiag on August 11, 1947
and have (sic) two (2) children with her. Respondent's contention that such marriage was in jest and assuming that it was valid, it
has lost its validity on the ground that they never met again nor have communicated with each other for the last 40 years cannot be
given a (sic) scant consideration. Respondent's argument that he was not yet a lawyer, much more, a member of the bench when
he contracted his first marriage with the complainant, is unavailing for having studied law and had become a member of the Bar in
1960, he knows that the marriage cannot be dissolved without a judicial declaration of death. Respondent's second marriage with
Nieves Ygay was therefore bigamous for it was contracted during the existence of a previous marriage.

We are likewise not persuaded by the assertion of the respondent that he cannot be held liable for misconduct on the ground that
he was not yet a lawyer nor a judge when the act(s) complained of were committed. The infraction he committed continued from
the time he became a lawyer in 1960 to the time he was appointed as a judge in October 23, 1989. This is a continuing offense (an
unlawful act performed continuously or over and over again, Law Dictionary, Robert E. Rothenberg). He can therefore be held
liable for his misdeeds.

On the charge of falsification, it was shown with clarity in his Personal Data Sheet for Judges, Sworn Statement of Assets, Liabilities
and Networth, Income Tax Return (pp. 99-102, rollo), that he had committed a misrepresentation by stating therein that his spouse
is Nieves Ygay and (had) eight (8) children (with her) which is far from (the) truth that his wife is Maria Apiag with whom he had
two (2) children.

Aside from the admission, the untenable line of defense by the respondent presupposes the imposition of an administrative sanction
for the charges filed against him. 'A judge's actuation of cohabiting with another when his marriage was still valid and subsisting -
his wife having been allegedly absent for four years only constitutes gross immoral conduct' (Abadilla vs. Tabiliran Jr., 249 SCRA
447). It is evident that respondent failed to meet the standard of moral fitness for membership in the legal profession. While deceit
employed by respondent, existed prior to his appointment as a x x x Judge, his immoral and illegal act of cohabiting with x x x
began and continued when he was already in the judiciary. A judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times, in the performance of his judicial duties and in his everyday
life. These are judicial guidepost to(sic) self-evident to be overlooked. No position exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness
and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the judiciary (Atienza vs. Brilliantes, Jr., 243 SCRA 32-33).
ACCORDINGLY, it is respectfully recommended that respondent judge be DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all
leave and retirement benefits and with prejudice to re-appointment in any branch, instrumentality or agency of the government,
including government-owned and controlled corporations."

As earlier indicated, respondent Judge died on September 27, 1996 while this case was still being deliberated upon by this Court.

The Court's Ruling

In spite of his death, this Court decided to resolve this case on the merits, in view of the foregoing recommendation of the OCA
which, if affirmed by this Court, would mean forfeiture of the death and retirement of the respondent.

Gross Misconduct Not Applicable

The misconduct imputed by the complainants against the judge comprises the following: abandonment of his first wife and children,
failing to give support, marrying for the second time without having first obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his first
marriage, and falsification of public documents. Misconduct, as a ground for administrative action, has a specific meaning in law.

"'Misconduct in office has definite and well understood legal meaning. By uniform legal definition, it is a misconduct such as
affects his performance of his duties as an officer and not such only as affects his character as a private individual. In such cases,
it has been said at all times, it is necessary to separate the character of man from the character of an officer. x x x It is settled that
misconduct, misfeasance, or malfeasance warranting removal from office of an officer, must have direct relation to and be
connected with the performance of official duties x x x.' More specifically, in Buenaventura vs. Benedicto, an administrative
proceeding against a judge of the court of first instance, the present Chief Justice defines misconduct as referring 'to a transgression
of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer.' That
is to abide by the authoritative doctrine as set forth in the leading case of In re Horilleno, a decision penned by Justice Malcolm,
which requires that in order for serious misconduct to be shown, there must be 'reliable evidence showing that the judicial acts
complained of were corrupt or inspired by an intention to violate the law or were in persistent disregard of well-known legal
rules.'"16

The acts imputed against respondent Judge Cantero clearly pertain to his personal life and have no direct relation to his judicial
function. Neither do these misdeeds directly relate to the discharge of his official responsibilities. Therefore, said acts cannot be
deemed misconduct much less gross misconduct in office. For any of the aforementioned acts of Judge Cantero" x x x (t)o warrant
disciplinary action, the act of the judge must have a direct relation to the performance of his official duties. It is necessary to
separate the character of the man from the character of the officer." 17chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Nullity of Prior Marriage

It is not disputed that respondent did not obtain a judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage to Maria Apiag prior to marrying
Nieves C. Ygay. He argued however that the first marriage was void and that there was no need to have the same judicially declared
void, pursuant to jurisprudence then prevailing. In the en banc case of Odayat vs. Amante, 18 complainant charged Amante, a clerk
of court, with oppression, immorality and falsification of public document. The complainant Odayat alleged among others " x x x
that respondent is cohabiting with one Beatriz Jornada, with whom he begot many children, even while his spouse Filomena Abella
is still alive x x x." In order to rebut the charge of immorality, Amante " x x x presented in evidence the certification (of the) x x x
Local Civil Registrar x x x attesting that x x x Filomena Abella was married to one Eliseo Portales on February 16, 1948.
Respondent's contention is that his marriage with Filomena Abella was void ab initio, because of her previous marriage with said
Eliseo Portales." This Court ruled that "Filomena Abella's marriage with the respondent was void ab initio under Article 80 [4] of
the New Civil Code, and no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of void marriages." 19

Now, per current jurisprudence, "a marriage though void still needs x x x a judicial declaration of such fact" 20 before any party
thereto "can marry again; otherwise, the second marriage will also be void."21 This was expressly provided under Article 4022 of
the Family Code. However, the marriage of Judge Cantero to Nieves Ygay took place and all their children were born before the
promulgation of Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy and before the effectivity of the Family Code. Hence, the doctrine in Odayat vs. Amante
applies in favor of respondent.
On the other hand, the charge of falsification will not prosper either because it is based on a finding of guilt in the bigamy charge.
Since, as shown in the preceding discussion, the bigamy charge cannot stand, so too must the accusation of falsification fail.
Furthermore, the respondent judge's belief in good faith that his first marriage was void shows his lack of malice in filling up these
public documents, a valid defense in a charge of falsification of public document, 23 which must be appreciated in his favor.

Personal Conduct of a Judge

However, the absence of a finding of criminal liability on his part does not preclude this Court from finding him administratively
liable for his indiscretion, which would have merited disciplinary action from this Court had death not intervened. In deciding this
case, the Court emphasizes that "(t)he personal behavior of a judge, not only upon the bench but also in his everyday life, should
be above reproach and free from the appearance of impropriety. He should maintain high ethical principles and sense of propriety
without which he cannot preserve the faith of the people in the judiciary, so indispensable in an orderly society. For the judicial
office circumscribes the personal conduct of a judge and imposes a number of restrictions thereon, which he has to observe faithfully
as the price he has to pay for accepting and occupying an exalted position in the administration of justice." 24 It is against this
standard that we must gauge the public and private life of Judge Cantero.

The conduct of the respondent judge in his personal life falls short of this standard because the record reveals he had two families.
The record also shows that he did not attend to the needs, support and education of his children of his first marriage. Such is conduct
unbecoming a trial magistrate. Thus, the late Judge Cantero "violated Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics which mandates
that '[a] judge's official conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only upon the
bench and in the performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life, should be beyond reproach,' and Canon 2 of the Code
of Judicial Conduct which provides that '[a] judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all
activities.'"25chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

A Penalty of Suspension is Warranted

Finally, the Court also scrutinized the whole of respondent's record. Other than this case, we found no trace of wrongdoing in the
discharge of his judicial functions from the time of his appointment up to the filing of this administrative case, and has to all
appearances lived up to the stringent standards embodied in the Code of Judicial Conduct. Considering his otherwise untarnished
32 years in government service,26 this Court is inclined to treat him with leniency.

Man is not perfect. At one time or another, he may commit a mistake. But we should not look only at his sin. We should also
consider the man's sincerity in his repentance, his genuine effort at restitution and his eventual triumph in the reformation of his
life.

This respondent should not be judged solely and finally by what took place some 46 years ago. He may have committed an
indiscretion in the past. But having repented for it, such youthful mistake should not forever haunt him and should not totally
destroy his career and render inutile his otherwise unblemished record. Indeed, it should not demolish completely what he built in
his public life since then. Much less should it absolutely deprive him and/or his heirs of the rewards and fruits of his long and
dedicated service in government. For these reasons, dismissal from service as recommended by the Office of the Court
Administrator would be too harsh.

However, we also cannot just gloss over the fact that he was remiss in attending to the needs of his children of his first marriage --
children whose filiation he did not deny. He neglected them and refused to support them until they came up with this administrative
charge. For such conduct, this Court would have imposed a penalty. But in view of his death prior to the promulgation of this
Decision, dismissal of the case is now in order.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this case is hereby DISMISSED.