1. YES.

When the co-ownership is terminated by a partition and it

FLORENCIO IGNAO vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, appears that the house of an erstwhile co-owner has encroached
JUAN IGNAO, substituted by his Legal Heirs, and ISIDRO IGNAO upon a portion pertaining to another co-owner which was however
made in good faith, then the provisions of Article 448 should apply to
G.R. No. 72876 January 18, 1991 determine the respective rights of the parties.
2. NO. In Quemuel vs. Olaes, the Court categorically ruled that the right
FACTS: to appropriate the works or improvements or to oblige the builder to
pay the price of the land belongs to the landowner.
Petitioner Florencio Ignao and his uncles private respondents Juan Ignao
and Isidro Ignao were co-owners of a parcel of land with an area of 534
square meters situated in Barrio Tabon, Kawit, Cavite. Pursuant to an action
for partition, the then CFI of Cavite directed the partition of the aforesaid
land, alloting 133.5 square meters to private respondents Juan and Isidro,
and giving the remaining portion with a total area of 266.5 square meters to
petitioner Florencio. However, no actual partition was ever effected.

Petitioner instituted a complaint for recovery of possession of real property

against private respondents alleging that the area occupied by the two (2)
houses built by private respondents exceeded the 133.5 square meters
previously alloted to them. The lower court found that the houses of Juan and
Isidro actually encroached upon a portion of the land belonging to Florencio.

The CFI ruled that although private respondents occupied a portion of

Florencio’s property, they should be considered builders in good faith and
pursuant to Article 448 of the Civil Code, the owner of the land (Florencio)
should have the choice to either appropriate that part of the house standing
on his land after payment of indemnity or oblige the builders in good faith
(Juan and Isidro) to pay the price of the land.

However, the trial court observed that based on the facts of the case, it would
be useless and unsuitable for Florencio to exercise the first option since this
would render the entire houses of Juan and Isidro worthless. It ordered the
plaintiff Florencio Ignao to sell to the defendants Juan and Isidro Ignao that
portion of his property with an area of 101 square meters at P40.00 per
square meter, on which part the defendants had built their houses. On
appeal, the IAC affirmed the CFI’s decision.

ISSUES:

1. Should the provisions of Article 448 apply to a builder in good faith

on a property held in common?
2. May the court adopt a workable solution for the petitioner?

DOCTRINES:
Manotok Realty, Inc. vs Hon. Jose Tecson
Gr L-47475
August 19, 1988

Facts:

Manotok Realty, inc. filed a complaint against Nilo Madlangawa for the
recovery of possession of a parcel of land, but the trial court declared the
latter a building and possessor in good faith.
Petitioner then filed a case for the appropriation of the building as provided in
Article 448 and 546 of the Civil Code. It was argued that since the judgment
became final it is entitled to the execution of the judgment and delivery of
possession over the property. The CFI denied and held that circumstances
intervened, such as the construction of improvements, which would make the
action not legally proper. Appeal was then made to the Supreme Court. In
their comment, the respondent claim that the issue has already become moot
because fire has already gutted the buildings.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to the delivery of the possession of

the property in question.

Decision:

The court ruled in the affirmative. When the judgement became final, it
became incumbent upon the court to issue the necessary writ of execution.
The landowner cannot be denied of his right to appropriate the building
because it is an option given to him by law.
Furthermore, the buildings/improvements introduced father the filing
of the complaint cannot be held to be made in good faith. Since the
improvements thereon has been gutted by fire, the basis of the
respondent’s right to retain the premises has already been
extinguished. He therefore, has no other choice but to deliver the
property.
Vicente Sto. Domingo Bernardo vs Catalino Bataclan

Gr L-44606

November 28, 1938

Facts:

Bernardo learned when he entered into the premises of the property

purchased from Pastor Samonte that the latter authorised Catalino Bataclan
to make improvements thereon. In a civil case to secure possession, the
court ruled that Baraclan was a builder and possessor in good faith and was
entitled to reimbursement for the works and improvements,

The court gave the plaintiff 30 days within which to choose between the sale
of the land or to buy the works. Bernardo decided to sell the land to the
defendant but the latter informed the court that he is unable to pay the sum
required. The court then awarded the respondent 30 days to purchase the
land or else the property will be sold in a public auction.

In the auction sale, Toribio Teodoro was the highest bidder. The purchaser
sought judicial remedy for the possession of the property.

Issue:

Whether or not the defendant lost his right to retain the property pending
payment for indemnity.

Decision:

The court ruled that the right to retain the property has already been lost.
Due to the failure and inability of the defendant to pay the purchase price the
subject property was sold in a public auction which he himself asked for.
Furthermore, he already received his share of the purchase price. Therefore,
the court find no reason to keep the property in the possession of the
defendant.
Heirs of Roman Durano, Sr. vs Spouses Uy, et al. Issue:
Gr 136456
October 24, 2000 Whether or not the respondents are builders in good faith.

Facts: Decision:

Congressman Ramon Durano, Sr, and son Ramon Durano III and the latter’s The court ruled that the records indicated that the respondents’ possession
wife Elizabeth Hotchkiss Durano (herein petitioners) filed a case for damages has already ripened into ownership by acquisitive prescription. Acquisitive
against respondents for allegedly officiating a “hate campaign” against them prescription is acquired by possession in good faith with just tittle for a period
by lodging complaints for invasion of the respondents’ properties in of ten years. One is considered in good faith when he is not aware of any
Cahumayhumayan, Danao City. The complaints were filed with the Police flaw in his tittle or mode of acquisition of the property and there is just title
Department of Danao and the Office of the President. The said complaints when the adverse claimant came into possession of the property through
were investigated by the Department of Justice through the City Fiscal and one of the modes of acquiring ownership provided by law.
the Philippine Constabulary who later on dismissed the complaints for being
baseless. The petitioners added that the respondents spread false rumours In the case at bar, the respondents acquired the properties by purchase or
and tales which subjected them to public contempt and ridicule. inheritance and ever since were in actual, continuous, open, and adverse
possession. The records showed that they were unaware of any claims over
The respondents made a counterclaim demanding the return of their the properties until the notices given on August 1970.
properties claiming that in August 1970, they received mimeographed notices
signed by Durano Sr. informing them that the land they occupied is owned by The petitioners on the other hand cannot claim good faith. The validity of the
Cebu Portland Cement Company and was purchased by Durano & Co for certificates of title obtained by them were doubted by the courts as there was
immediate turn over. However, before many of them could even receive the a lack of registered title of Cepoc and the deed of sale between Cepoc and
notice, employees of Durano & Co. proceeded to bulldoze the land, Durano & Co. were not notarised and therefore unregisterable. Furthermore,
destroying plantings and improvements made therein. On September 15, a buyer could not have been ignorant that the property they bought were
1970, Durano & Co. sold the subject land to Durano III. Claiming that during adversely possessed by the respondents nor did they investigate the
that time, they were not able to find local relief as Durano Sr.’s wife was the property – the petitioners cannot be held to be buyers in good faith, nor
Mayor at that time causing them to send a letter to then President Marcos. builders in good faith.
On April 22, 1975, petitioners moved to dismiss their own complaint –
granted by the RTC without prejudice to the counterclaim of the respondents. Under the Article 449 of the New Civil Code, he who builds etc. in bad faith
According to the petitioners, the property originally belonged to Cepoc and on the land of another, loses what is built etc. without right of indemnity.
was sold to Durano & Co., and later on to Durano III. But Durano III claimed Furthermore, Article 450 gives the landowner over which something was built
that he only learned of the bulldozing when complaints were already filed by in bad faith the power to demolish the works to replace the property in their
the respondents. He further claimed that they dismissed the complaints former condition at the expense of the builder. And Article 451 gives him the
against the respondents as a form of reconciliation with them but the latter right to damages.
still pursued their counterclaim. According to him, the properties of the ***non property issue: piercing the veil of corporate fiction
claimants, except for Sepulveda Uy, daughter of former Mayor of Danao,
were occupants of the said property and Durano & Co. purchased the Test in determining the applicability of the doctrine of piercing the veil of
adjacent property for mining coal. corporate fiction:

The RTC ordered in their ruling that the petitioners are to pay damages to the 1. Control
respondent and the return of the properties of Venancia Repaso, 2. Control myst have been used to commit fraud or a wrong
Hermogenes Tito, and Marcelino Gonzales as well as the property of 3. Control and breach of duty must proximately cause the injury or unjust loss
Angeles Sepulveda Uy with respect to the are found outside of the Cepoc complained off.
property. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision but modified the
judgement ordering the return of all properties to the respondents.
COMMUNITIES CAGAYAN, INC., In view of the special circumstances obtaining in this case, we are
vs. constrained to rely on the presumption of good faith on the part of the
SPOUSES ARSENIO (Deceased) and ANGELES NANOL AND ANYBODY respondent-spouses which the petitioner failed to rebut. Thus, respondent-
CLAIMING RIGHTS UNDER THEM spouses being presumed builders in good faith, we now rule on the
applicability of Article 448 of the Civil Code. Article 448 on builders in good
Facts: faith does not apply where there is a contractual relation between the
Sometime in 1994, respondent-spouses Arsenio and Angeles Nanol parties, such as in the instant case. We went over the records of this case
entered into a Contract to Sell with petitioner Communities Cagayan, Inc., and we note that the parties failed to attach a copy of the Contract to Sell. As
(CCI) whereby the latter agreed to sell to respondent-spouses a house and such, we are constrained to apply Article 448 of the Civil Code, which
Lots 17 and 19 located at Block 16, Camella Homes Subdivision, Cagayan provides viz:
de Oro City, for the price of P368,000.00 (P368T). They obtained a loan from ART. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built,
Capitol Development Bank (CDB), using the property as collateral. To sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his
facilitate the loan, a simulated sale over the property was executed by own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity
petitioner in favor of respondent-spouses. Accordingly, titles (TCT Nos. provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or
105202 and 105203) were transferred in the names of respondent-spouses planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper
and submitted to CDB for loan processing. The bank collapsed and closed rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land
before it could release the loan. if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In
On November 30, 1997, respondent-spouses entered into another such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does
Contract to Sell with petitioner over the same property for the same not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity.
price. This time, they availed of petitioner’s in-house financing thus, The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of
undertaking to pay the loan over four years, from 1997 to 2001. disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof.
Respondent Arsenio demolished the original house and constructed a
The rule that the choice under Article 448 of the Civil Code belongs to
three-story house allegedly valued at P3.5 million, more or less. (Respondent
the owner of the land is in accord with the principle of accession, i.e., that the
Arsenio died, leaving his wife, herein respondent Angeles, to pay for the
accessory follows the principal and not the other way around. Even as the
monthly amortizations.) option lies with the landowner, the grant to him, nevertheless, is preclusive.
On September 10, 2003, petitioner sent respondent-spouses a The landowner cannot refuse to exercise either option and compel instead
notarized Notice of Delinquency and Cancellation of Contract to Sell due to
the owner of the building to remove it from the land. The raison d’etre for this
the latter’s failure to pay the monthly amortizations. Petitioner filed before the
provision has been enunciated thus: Where the builder, planter or sower has
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, an action for unlawful detainer against
acted in good faith, a conflict of rights arises between the owners, and it
respondent-spouses.
becomes necessary to protect the owner of the improvements without
In her Answer, respondent Angeles averred that the Deed of Absolute causing injustice to the owner of the land. In view of the impracticability of
Sale is valid. creating a state of forced co-ownership, the law has provided a just solution
Issues
by giving the owner of the land the option to acquire the improvements after
1) Whether petitioner is obliged to refund to respondent-spouses all
payment of the proper indemnity, or to oblige the builder or planter to pay for
the monthly installments paid; and
the land and the sower the proper rent. He cannot refuse to exercise either
2) Whether petitioner is obliged to reimburse respondent-spouses
option. It is the owner of the land who is authorized to exercise the option,
the value of the new house minus the cost of the original house. because his right is older, and because, by the principle of accession, he is
Ruling
entitled to the ownership of the accessory thing.
The petition is partly meritorious.
In conformity with the foregoing pronouncement, we hold that
Respondent-spouses are entitled to the cash surrender value of the
petitioner, as landowner, has two options. It may appropriate the new house
payments
by reimbursing respondent Angeles the current market value thereof minus
on the property equivalent to 50% of the total payments made under the the cost of the old house. Under this option, respondent Angeles would have
Maceda Law. "a right of retention which negates the obligation to pay rent." In the
Respondent-spouses are entitled to reimbursement of the
alternative, petitioner may sell the lots to respondent Angeles at a price
improvements
equivalent to the current fair value thereof. However, if the value of the lots is
made on the property.
considerably more than the value of the improvement, respondent Angeles
cannot be compelled to purchase the lots. She can only be obliged to pay
petitioner reasonable rent.
G.R. No. 170923 January 20, 2009 RULING:
SULO SA NAYON, INC. and/or PHILIPPINE VILLAGE HOTEL, INC.
and JOSE MARCEL E. PANLILIO,Petitioners, vs. NAYONG PILIPINO Article 448 is manifestly intended to apply only to a case where
FOUNDATION, Respondent. one builds, plants, or sows on land in which he believes himself to
have a claim of title and not to lands where the only interest of the
FACTS: builder, planter or sower is that of a holder, such as a tenant. In the
case at bar, petitioners have no adverse claim or title to the land. In
In 1975, respondent leased a portion of the Nayong Pilipino fact, as lessees, they recognize that the respondent is the owner of the
Complex, to petitioner Sulo sa Nayon, Inc. for the construction and land. What petitioners insist is that because of the improvements,
operation of a hotel building, to be known as the Philippine Village which are of substantial value that they have introduced on the leased
Hotel. The lease was for an initial period of 21 years, or until May premises with the permission of respondent they should be considered
1996. It is renewable for a period of 25 years under the same terms builders in good faith who have the right to retain possession of the
and conditions upon due notice in writing to respondent of the property until reimbursement by respondent.
intention to renew.
SC affirms the ruling of the CA that introduction of valuable
In 1995, petitioners sent respondent a letter notifying the latter improvements on the leased premises does not give the petitioners the
of their intention to renew the contract. July of the same year, parties right of retention and reimbursement which rightfully belongs to a
agreed to the renewal of the contract for another 25 years, or until builder in good faith. Otherwise, such a situation would allow the
2021. Under the new agreement, petitioner PVHI was bound to pay lessee to easily "improve" the lessor out of its property. We reiterate
the monthly rentals. the doctrine that a lessee is neither a builder in good faith nor in bad
faith that would call for the application of Articles 448and 546 of the
Beginning January 2001, petitioners defaulted in the payment of Civil Code. His rights are governed by Article 1678 of the Civil Code.
their monthly rental. Respondent repeatedly demanded petitioners to
pay the arrears and vacate the premises. MeTC rendered its decision
in favor of respondent. RTC modified the ruling of the MeTC. RTC
ordered Nayong Pilipino to submit a written manifestation of the
option or choice it selected, i.e., to appropriate the improvements
upon payment of proper indemnity or compulsory sale of the land
whereon the hotel building of PVHI and related improvements or
facilities were erected.

CA held that the RTC erroneously applied the rules on

accession, as found in Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code. CA held
that, “By and large, respondents are admittedly mere lessees of the
subject premises and as such, cannot validly claim that they are
builders in good faith in order to solicit the application of Articles 448
and 546 of the Civil Code in their favor.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Sulo sa Nayon as builders have acted in good

faith in order for Art. 448 in relation to Art.546 of the Civil Code may
apply with respect to their rights over improvements.
G.R. No. 205664 June 9, 2014 At any rate, the MTC was fair when it stated that that DepEd could not order
the immediate removal of the structures and directed Tuliao to exercise his
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, represented by its REGIONAL option under Art 448
DIRECTOR TERESITA DOMALANTA,Petitioner,
vs.
MARIANO TULIAO, Respondent.

Facts:

 Mariano Tuliao filed an action for recovery of possession and

removal of structure with damages against DepEd with the Mtc in
Tuguegarao.
 He alleged that he was a registered owner of the subject of parcel of
land and that a portion of said property was allowed by his
predecessor-in-interest to be used by the Atulayan Elementary
School as an access road for the schoolchildren in going to and from
the school.
 In March 200, upon discovering that a structure was being
constructed on the land, he demanded that DepEd cease and desist
and vacate the property. DepEd refused.
 Tuliao likewise demanded payment for reasonable rent but was also
ignored.
 Tuliao presented a certificate of title as well as tax declarations and
real property tax receipts for the years 2003-2005.
o Hence, the CA ruled that Tuliao has a better right of
possession

ISSUE:

W/N DepEd has the right to construct on the question land

HELD:

No, the registered owner of the land is Tuliao. It must be noted that DepEd’s
contention that its possession of the land was open, continuous, exclusive,
adverse, notorious and in the concept of an owner for 32 years is untenable.
DepEds possession of a portion of the Tuliao’s land to be used as a
passageway for the students was merely tolerance on the part of Tuliao.

o Mere material possession of the land ws not adverse as

against the owner and is insufficient to vest tile unless such
possession was accompanied by the intent to possess as an
owner.
LUCIANO BRIONES and NELLY BRIONES, Petitioners, vs. JOSE City; that by way of a verbal lease agreement, Ismael and Teresita occupied
MACABAGDAL, FE D. MACABAGDAL and VERGON REALTY these lots in Mar. 1992 and used them as their residence and the situs of
INVESTMENTS CORPORATION, Respondents. (G.R. No. 150666, their construction business; and that despite repeated demands, petitioners
August 3, 2010). failed to pay the agreed rental of P500. Ismael and Teresita denied the
existence of any verbal lease agreement. They claimed that respondents had
invited them to construct their residence and business on the subject lots in
order that they could all live near one another, employ marivic, the sister of
FACTS: Ismael, and help in resolving the problems of the family. They added that it
was the policy of respondents to allot the land they owned as an advance
Spouses Macabagdal purchased from Vergon a lot located in Vergonville grant of inheritance in favor of their children. The MTCC ruled in favor of
Subdivision. Sometime in 1984, spouses Briones, after obtaining the respondents and ordered petitioners to vacate the premises. It opined that
necessary building permit from Vergon, started constructing on the same Ismael and Teresita had occupied the lots, not by virtue of a verbal lease
parcel of land. After learning of such, spouses Macabagdal demanded agreement, but by tolerance of Vicente and Rosario. As their stay was
sposes Briones to demolish the house and vacate the property. Spouses merely tolerance, petitioners were necessarily bound by an implied promise
Briones refused. to vacate the lots upon demand. On appeal, the regional trial court updheld
the findings fo the MTCC. However, the RTC allowed the respondents to
Spouses Macabagdal thus filed a case for recovery of ownership and
appropriate the building and other improvements introduced by petitioners,
possession of said parcel of land. The RTC and CA ruled in favor of spouses
after payment of the indemnity provided for by Art. 448 in relation to Art. 546
Macabagdal, and ordered spouses Briones to either vacate the property or to
and 548 of the NCC. The CA sustained the finding of the two lower courts
pay spouses Macabagdal the prevailing price of the land.
that Ismael and Teresita had been occupying the subject lots only by the
ISSUE: tolerance of Vicente and Rosario. Citing Calubayan v. pascual, the CA
further ruled that petitioners status was analogous to that of a lessee or a
Are spouses Briones builders in good faith, thus, must not bear the damage tenant whose term of lease had expired, but whose occupancy continued by
alone? tolerance of the owner. Consequently , in ascertaining the right of the
petitioners to be reimbursed for the improvements they had introduced on
HELD: respondents properties, the appellate court applied the Civil Codes
provisions on lease.
Yes. Since there was no evidence to show that spouses Briones were
builders in bad faith, they must be considered builders in good faith. Thus, Issue:
the landowner is given the option to appropriate the building by paying
compensation or to oblige the builder to pay the price of the land. Moreover, W.O.N. the courts should fix the duration of possession.
the builder in good faith is entitled to be reimbursed the necessary and useful
expenses they made of the subject land. Held:

Thus, spouses Macabagdal cannot demand the removal of the building That Ismael and Teresita had a right to occupy the lots is therefore clear, the
unless he first exercises the option of appropriating such after payment to issue is the duration of possession. In the absence of a stipulation on this
spouses Briones of the proper compensation. point, Art. 1197 of the civil Code allows the courts to fix the duration or the
period. Article 1197. If the obligation does not fix a period, but from its
SPS. MACASAET vs SPS. MACASAET G.R. 154391-92 Sept. 30, 2004 nature and the circumstances it can be inferred that a period was intended,
the courts may fix the duration thereof. The courts shall also fix the duration
Facts: of the period when it depends upon the will of the debtor. Article 1197,
however, applies to a situation in which the parties intended a period. Such
Petitioners Ismael and Teresita Macasaet and Respondents Vicente and qualification cannot be inferred from the facts of the present case. The
Rosario Macasaet are first-degree relatives. Ismael is the son of respondents mere failure to fix the duration of their agreement does not necessarily justify
and Teresita is his wife. On December 10, 1997, the parents filed with the or authorize the courts to do so It can be safely concluded that the
MTC of Lipa an ejectment suit against the children. Respondents alleged that agreement subsisted as long as the parents and the children mutually
they were the owners of 2 parcels of land, situated at Banay-banay, Lipa
benefited from the arrangement. Effectively, there is a resolutory condition
in such an agreement

 Their possession which was originally lawful became unlawful when the
reason therefore – love and solidarity – ceased to
exist between them
heir possession which was originally lawful became unlawful when the
reason therefore – love and solidarity – ceased to
exist between them.
Their possession which was originally lawful became unlawful when the
reason therefore – love and solidarity – ceased to exist between them.
AQUINO VS AGUILAR

Facts:

Sps Aquino are owners of the house and lot. They were residing in
the US. Sps. Aguilar was given consent and approval by the Sps Aquino to
stay on the property. On said property, a three-story building was built on the
lot. Sps Aguilar stayed in the property for 20 years without rental. In 2003,
Aquino demanded from the Aguilar to vacate the propery to be used by an
immediate family member. Sps Aguilar alleged that they had made
contributions in the construction of the building.

Issue:

WON Article 448 shall apply. NO.

Ruling:

No. Aguilar is not a builder in good faith on account of their

admission that the subject lot belonged to the Sps Aquino when they
constructed the building. They were aware of the flaw on their title.

Moreover, the SC ruled that although there are some instances that
the SC applied Art. 448 to a builder who has constructed on the land of
another with the consent of the owner, 448 here still does not apply.

In those cases, the SC found out that the owners knew and
approved of the construction of improvements on the property. Hence, they
were held in good faith.

However, although the factual circumstances are somewhat similar,

there is one crucial factor here. There was evidence that Aquino prohibited
Aguilar from building their own structure on the property. There was this letter
warning in 1983 prohibiting them from building. They were forewarned that
the property is slated to be sold as it was only bought for investment
purposes.

Therefore, the Sps Aguilar were not in good faith. Article 448 does
not apply.

The Sps Aguilar also have no right to refund of any improvement

built therein pursuant to Article 449 and 450 of the Civil Code.

However, they may recover the necessary expenses incurred for the
preservation of the property pursuant to Article 452.
G.R. No. 152423 : December 15, 2010 unproven claim that she acquired a portion of the property from the
petitioners by virtue of an oral sale, the Torrens title of petitioners must
SPOUSES MARCOS R. ESMAQUEL and VICTORIA SORDEVILLA, prevail. Petitioners' title over the subject property is evidence of their
Petitioners, v. MARIA COPRADA, Respondent. ownership thereof. It is a fundamental principle in land registration that the
certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible
PERALTA, J.: title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein.
Moreover, the age-old rule is that the person who has a Torrens title over a
FACTS: land is entitled to possession thereof.

On February 24, 1997, spouses Esmaquel filed an ejectment case against Further, Coprada's argument that petitioners are no longer the owners of a
Coprada before the 2nd MCTC Laguna. Petitioners claimed that they are the portion of the subject land because of the sale in her favor is a collateral
registered owners of a parcel of land situated in San Miguel, Majayja. In attack on the title of the petitioners, which is not allowed. The validity of
1945, Coprada was able to persuade the petitioners to allow her and her petitioners' certificate of title cannot be attacked by respondent in this case
family to use and occupy the land for their residence, under the condition that for ejectment. Under Section 48 of PD No. 1529, a certificate of title shall not
they will vacate the premises should petitioners need to use the same. be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified or canceled,
Coprada and her family were allowed to construct their residential house. except in a direct proceeding for that purpose in accordance with law. The
Since then, the petitioners never made an attempt to drive them away out of issue of the validity of the title of the petitioners can only be assailed in an
pity, knowing that respondent and her eight children have no other place to action expressly instituted for that purpose. Whether or not the respondent
live in. the a few years later the financial condition of Copradas family, having has the right to claim ownership over the property is beyond the power of the
acquired her own residential house. This prompted petitioners to institute an trial court to determine in an action for unlawful detainer.
ejectment case against Coprada. Respondent avers that she had already
acquired ownership over the contested lot when she orally purchased it. And
further avers that the claim has already prescribed and thus barred by
laches.

MCTC ruled in favor of Coprada, thus the case was dismissed. On appeal to
the RTC, the ruling of the MCTC was reversed. The CA reversed the RTCs
decision and reinstated the MCTCs ruling.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners have a valid ground to evict respondent

from the subject property.

HELD:

LANDTITLES

As a registered owner, petitioner has a right to eject any person illegally

occupying his property. This right is imprescriptible and can never be barred
by laches.

In the present case, Coprada failed to present evidence to substantiate her

allegation that a portion of the land was sold to her in 1962. Coprada's
submission that there was an oral sale is a mere afterthought.

On the other hand, it is undisputed that the subject property is covered by a

title, registered in the name of the petitioners. As against the respondent's
DEL CAMPO V. ABESIA ISSUE:

When land is co-owned by two parties, but the co-ownership is terminated, w/n the rules of accession applies (and not coownership) on property that
Article 448 governs in case real property (like a house) encroaches the land used to be co-owned, but was subdivided.
of another. This is provided that good faith exists.

HELD:
FACTS:
The rule of accession applies because co-ownership was terminated upon
The case involves two friendly parties who are co-owners of a corner lot at the partitioning of the lot. Art 448 therefore governs. The house of Defendant
Flores and Cavan Streets in Cebu City. Plaintiff owns 2/3 of the lot and overlapped that of Plaintiff, but this was built on good faith. Hence, the
Defendant owns 1/3 of the same. The total size of the lot is 45 square meters plaintiffs have the right to choose one of two options
(which is about the size of a typical Starbux café)
> Appropriate the 5sqm portion of the house of Defendants after
Later on, the two parties decided to divide the co-owned property into two indemnifying the Defendants; or
lots. 30 square meters went to the plaintiffs and 15 square meters went to the > Obliging the Defendants to pay a portion of the land on which their home
defendants. From the sketch plan, both parties discovered that the house of rested. ( or they can rent it)
the defendants occupied a portion of the plaintiff’s adjacent lot, eating 5 sqm
of it. The parties then requested the trial court to adjudicate who should take
possession of the encroached 5 sqm.

The trial court ruled that Art 448 does not apply. The owner of the land on
which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have the
right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment
of the indemnity provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one
who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the
proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land
if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such
case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose
to appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall
agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court
shall fix the terms thereof. Since art 448 does not apply, the Plaintiff cannot
be obliged to pay for the portion of defendant’s house that entered into the 30
sqm lot, AND Defendant cannot be obliged to pay for the price of the 5 sqm
their house occupied. Why? The RTC believed the rules of co-ownership
should govern, and not that of accession.

RTC then assigned the full 30sqm to Plaintiff and ordered Defendants to
demolish the 5sqm part of their house encroaching the 30sqm lot of the
Plaintiffs. Defendants where aghast at having to axe the family home, hence
they appealed.

CA affirmed the decision. So we have the SC coming to the rescue.

ART. 447 Antonio Araneta was, therefore, not only the president of the Insular
GRN L-21783 NOVEMBER 29, 1969 Farms, Inc. but also a director and counsel of Pacific Farms.
PACIFIC FARMS, INC. VS. SIMPLICIO G. ESGUERRA, CARRIED During the trial of civil case the Insular Farms, Inc. was represented
LUMBER COMPANY by Attorney Amado Santiago, Jr. of the law firm of J. Antonio Araneta. The
latter was one of the counsels of the Pacific Farms, Inc. They cannot claim
FACTS: ignorance of the pendency of civil case because the Insular Farms, Inc.
On several occasions, the Company sold and delivered lumber and was defended by the same lawyer from the same law firm that
construction materials to the Insular Farms, Inc. which the latter used in the commenced the present action.
construction of the aforementioned six buildings at its compound in Bolinao, Pacific Farms merely folded its arms in disinterest and waited, so to
Pangasian. Of the total procurement price of P15,000, the sum of P4,710.18 speak. Not until a decision was rendered therein in favor of the Company, a
has not been paid by the Insular Farms, Inc. The Company instituted a civil writ of execution issued, and the six buildings levied upon by the sheriff, did it
case with the CIR of Pangasinan to recover the said unpaid balance from the file a third-party claim over the levied buildings.
Insular Farms, Inc. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the
Company's claim. The corresponding writ of execution was issued because
there was no appeal instituted by Insular, Inc.
The Pacific Farms, Inc. filed a third-party claim asserting ownership
over the levied buildings which it had acquired from the Insular Farms, Inc.
by virtue of a deed of absolute sale executed about seven months before the
Company filed the civil action. Shielded by an indemnity bond put up by the
Company and the Cosmopolitan Insurance Company, Inc., the sheriff
proceeded with the announced public auction and sold the levied buildings to
the Company.

ISSUE:
WON the Company is entitled to a materialman’s lien to be paid by Pacific
Farms, Inc?

HELD: YES.
Therefore, applying article 447 by analogy, we perforce consider the
buildings as the principal and the lumber and construction materials that went
into their construction as the accessory. Thus Pacific Farms, if it does own
the six buildings, must bear the obligation to pay for the value of the said
materials; the Company- which apparently has no desire to remove the
materials, and, even if it were minded to do so, cannot remove them without
necessarily damaging the buildings has the corresponding right to recover
the value of the unpaid lumber and construction materials.
Of course, the character of a buyer in good faith and for value, if
really possessed by the Pacific Farms, could possibly exonerate it from
making compensation. But the Pacific Farm's stance that it is an innocent
purchaser for value and in good faith is open to grave doubt because of
certain facts of substantial import (evident from the records) that
cannot escape notice.
In the deed of absolute sale, exhibit 1, the Insular Farms, Inc.
(vendor) was represented in the contract by its president, J. Antonio Araneta.
The latter was a director of the appellee (Pacific Farms, Inc.) and was the
counsel who signed the complaint filed by the appellee in the court below. J.
 apply when the owner of the land is also the builder of the works on his own
land who later on loses ownership by sale or donation.
PEDRO P. PECSON v. COURT OF APPEALS, SPS. NUGUID

> Art. 546 refers to the necessary and useful expenses which shall be
refunded to the possessor in good faith with right of retention. However, it
FACTS: does not state how to determine the value of the useful improvement. The
respondents [court and private respondents alike] espouses as sufficient
Pedro Pecson was the owner of a commercial lot on which he built a 4-door- reimbursement the cost of construction in 1965, however, this is contrary to
2-storey apartment building. He failed to pay realty taxes amounting to P12k previous rulings which declares that the value to the reimbursed should be
so the lot was sold at public auction to Mamerto Nepomuceno who later on the present market value of said improvements so as not to unjustly enrich
sold it to the Sps. Nuguid. either of the parties. [the trial court erred in ordering Pecson to pay rent since
the Sps. Nuguid has yet to pay the indemnity therefore Pecson has the right
Pecson challenged the validity of the auction before the RTC but was to retain the improvements and the income thereof. The case was remanded
dismissed but the RTC held that the apartment bldg was not subject of the to the trial court for determination of the current market value of the
litigation. On appeal, the CA appealed in toto the decision of the RTC that the apartment bldg and ordered the Sps to pay Pecson otherwise it shall be
apartment bldg was not included in the auction sale. restored to Pecson until payment of indemnity.]

After an entry of judgment was made, the Sps. Nuguid filed a motion with the TECHNOGAS PHIL. v. CA
RTC for a motion for delivery of possession of the lot and the apartment bldg
citing Art. 546 of the CC. The RTC issued an order declaring that the owner
of the lot and apartment bldg were the Sps. Nuguid and to pay the
construction cost of the apartment before a writ of possession would be FACTS
issued and to pay rent to the spouses. Pecson moved for reconsideration but
the Trial court did not act on it, instead it issued a writ of possession. The CA Petitioner bought a lot together with the building and improvements including
affirmed in part the decision declaring the cost of construction can be offset the wall which encroached that of the defendant. Upon learning of such
from the amount of rents to be collected and that since Sps. Nuguid opted to encroachment, petitioner offered to buy the land but defendant refused.
appropriate the improvement, Pecson is entitled to be reimbursed the cost of After 2 years, through an agreement, petitioner agreed to demolish the wall
construction at the time it was built in 1965 which is at P53k and the right the (but the case did not state what happened to this agreement, my assumption
retain the improvement until full indemnity is paid. is that it did not happen due to conflicts that arose after)

Thus the case at bar. Defendant dug a canal along the wall which caused a portion of it to collapse.
Petitioner filed a supplemental complaint re the action and a separate
criminal action of malicious mischief (which the wife was convicted of)
ISSUE:

Whether or not Art. 448 and 546 applies in the case at bar RTC decided for the petitioners and the CA reversed. Note that respondent
wants to have the wall demolished.

ISSUES:
HELD: YES
A. Whether or not petitioner is a builder in bad faith because it is 'presumed
> With regard to Art. 448, the provision on indemnity may be applied in to know the metes and bounds of his property.'
analogy. Whoever is the owner of the land may appropriate whatever has B. Whether or not amicable settlement was a proper remedy
been built, planted or sown after paying indemnity. However, it does not C. Whether or not respondent can opt to demolish the structure without
exercising the option to sell the land to the petitioner and the latter cannot do
buy the same

RULING: Petition was granted.

Good faith or Bad Faith – No such doctrinal statement that supports that the
knowledge of metes and bounds of a land due to the Torrens system would
amount to bad faith if there was encroachment on the land of another.

A. When the petitioner purchased the lot, the wall was already built. Even the
respondent did not knew about the encroachment until he has hired a
surveyor.

B. Where one derives title to the property from another, the act, declaration,
or omission of the latter, while holding the title, in relation to the property, is
evidence against the former. And possession in good faith does not lose this
character except when the possessor is aware of this impropriety.

C. The encroachment was very narrow which can be considered as a mere

error. Remedy – the petitioner, despite being a purchaser of the original
builder, can compel the landowner to either buy the property or sell the piece
of land because:

1. He was really unaware of the encroachment basing on the fact

presented by both sides.
2. When the petitioner bought the land, he has stepped into the rights of the
original owner (hence, the right to compel the LO to buy or sell is also
transferred)

Estoppel – Petitioner is not considered in estoppel only because it has

previously agreed to demolish a part of the wall. Rather, it was to be
negotiated by the parties concern. In the meantime, petitioner has to pay the
rent for the property occupied by its building only up to the date when
respondent serves notice of their option. Case remanded back to the trial
court for determination of the value of the land and the number of days to
allot for the respondent to choose an option.
PLEASANTVILLE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION VS. COURT OF said deed a provision stating that regardless of the outcome of the decision,
APPEALS such shall not be pursued by the parties and shall be considered dismissed
G.R. NO. 79688 253 SCRA 10 FEBRUARY 1, 1996 and without effect. The appellate court was not informed of this deal.
PONENTE: PANGANIBAN, J.
Issue: Whether or not a lot buyer who constructs improvements on the
Doctrine: Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that he land he is wrong property erroneously delivered by the owner’s agent, a builder in good
building on is his and his ignorance of any defect or flaw in his title. The faith?
burden of proving bad faith belongs to the one asserting it.
Held: Yes. Article 527 of the Civil Code provides the presumption that
Facts: Edith Robillo purchased from Pleasantville Development Corporation, petitioner has the burden of proving that Kee was a builder in bad faith. Kee
herein petitioner a parcel of land at Pleasantville Subdivision, Bacolod City. may be made liable for the violation of the contract with CTTEI but this may
The property was designated as Lot 9, Phase II. In 1975, herein respondent not be used as a basis of bad faith and as a sufficient ground to negate the
Eldred Jardinico bought the said subject lot from the former purchaser. presumption of good faith. Jardinico is presently only allowed to file a
Eldred later discovered that the property he purchased had improvements complaint for unlawful detainer. Good faith is based on the belief of the
introduced therein by respondent Wilson Kee. builder that the land he is building on is his and his ignorance of any flaw or
Kee on the other hand bought on installments Lot 8 of the same defect in is title. Since at the time when Kee constructed his improvements
subdivision from C.T. Torres Enterprises, Inc. (CTTEI) which is the exclusive on Lot 8, he was not aware that it was actually Lot 9 that was delivered to
real estate agent of the petitioner. Under the contract Kee was allowed to him. Petitioner further contends that Kee was negligent as a provision in the
take possession of the property even before full payment of the price. CTTEI Contract of Sale on Installment stated that the vendee must have personally
through an employee, Zenaida Octaviano accompanied Kee’s wife Donabelle examined the property and shall bear on his own the consequential
to inspect Lot No. 8. Octaviano however mistakenly pointed towards Lot 9. expenses in the changes that may happen thereon. The court held that such
Hence spouses Kee had their residence, an auto repair shop, a store and provision cannot be interpreted as a waiver of the vendee’s right to recover
other improvements constructed on the wrong lot. damages resulting from petitioner’s negligence. Such interpretation of the
waiver is contrary to law and public policy and cannot be allowed. Petitioner
Upon discovery of the blunder both Kee and Jardinico tried to reach cannot claim and excuse itself from liability by claiming that it was not directly
an amicable settlement but they failed. Jardinico demanded that the involved in the delivery of the property. The principal must be responsible for
improvements be removed but as Kee refused, Jardinico filed a complaint for the acts of the agent done within the scope of his authority. CTTEI was the
ejectment with damages against Kee at the Municipal Trial Court in Cities sole real estate representative of the petitioner when the delivery was made.
(MTCC) of Bacolod City. Kee filed a third-party complaint against herein Wilson Kee is therefore declared a builder in good faith. Petitioner and
petitioner and CTTEI. respondent CTTEI are declared solidarily liable for damages due to
negligence. The award of rentals to Jardinico is dispensed with.
The MTCC found that the error was attributable to CTTEI also since
at present the contract with Kee has rescinded for Kee’s failure to pay
installments. Kee no longer had any right over the subject property and must
pay rentals for its use. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City ruled
that petitioner and CTTEI were not at fault or were not negligent. It argued
that Kee was a builder in bad faith. Even if assuming that he was in good
faith, he was no longer so and must pay rentals from the time that he was
given notice to vacate the lot. The Court of Appeals ruled that Kee was a
builder in good faith as he was unaware of the mix-up when he constructed
the improvements. It was in fact due to the negligence and wrongful delivery
of CTTEI which included its principal the herein petitioner. It further ruled that
the award of rental was without basis.

Pending the resolution of the case at the Court of Appeals Jardinico

and Kee entered into a deed of sale, wherein Lot 9 was sold to Kee. In the
 And even if the petitioners indeed promised to sell, it would not make
the private respondents possessors or builders in good faith so as to be
G.R. NO. 120303. JULY 24, 1996 covered by the provisions of Article 448 of the Civil Code. The latter cannot
GEMINIANO, ET. AL. VS. COURT OF APPEALS raise the mere expectancy of ownership of the aforementioned lot because
the alleged promise to sell was not fulfilled nor its existence even proven.
FACTS:
It appears that subject lot was originally owned by the petitioners'
mother, Paulina Amado vda. de Geminiano. On a 12-square-meter portion
of that lot stood the petitioners' unfinished bungalow, which the petitioners
sold to the private respondents, with an alleged promise to sell to the latter
that portion of the lot occupied by the house. Subsequently, the
petitioners' mother executed a contract of lease over a 126 square-meter
portion of the lot, including that portion on which the house stood, in favor of
the private respondents for P40.00 per month for a period of 7 years.
The private respondents then introduced additional improvements
and registered the house in their names. After the expiration of the lease
contract, however, the petitioners' mother refused to accept the monthly
rentals.
It turned out that the lot in question was the subject of a suit, which
resulted in its acquisition by one Maria Lee in 1972. Lee sold the lot to Lily
Salcedo, who in turn sold it to the spouses Dionisio. Spouses Dionisio
executed a Deed of Quitclaim over the said property in favor of the
petitioners.
The petitioners sent a letter addressed to private respondent Mary
Nicolas demanding that she vacate the premises and pay the rentals in
arrears within twenty days from notice.
Upon failure of the private respondents to heed the demand, the
petitioners filed a complaint for unlawful detainer and damages.

ISSUE: WON Art. 448 is applicable to this case.

HELD: NO.
The private respondents claim they are builders in good faith, hence,
Article 448 of the Civil Code should apply. They rely on the lack of title of the
petitioners' mother at the time of the execution of the contract of lease, as
well as the alleged assurance made by the petitioners that the lot on which
the house stood would be sold to them.
But being mere lessees, the private respondents knew that their occupation
of the premises would continue only for the life of the lease. Plainly, they
cannot be considered as possessors nor builders in good faith.
Article 448 of the Civil Code, in relation to Article 546 of the same
Code, which allows full reimbursement of useful improvements and retention
of the premises until reimbursement is made, applies only to a possessor in
good faith, i.e., one who builds on land with the belief that he is the owner
thereof. It does not apply where one's only interest is that of a lessee under
a rental contract; otherwise, it would always be in the power of the tenant to
"improve" his landlord out of his property.
 did not comply, petitioners, as heirs of Jose and Erlinda, filed a Complaint for
unlawful detainer against the City.
Heirs of Mariano vs Naga City
The MTC dismissed the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. It
Facts: reasoned that the City's defense, which involved a claim of ownership,
The officers of City Heights Subdivision wrote to the mayor of the City of removed the issue from the case of unlawful detainer. The RTC reversed the
Naga (City), offering to construct the Naga City Hall within the premises of dismissal and ruled in favor of petitioners by ordering the City of Naga and
the Subdivision. Their letter indicated that the City Hall would be built on an the other government agencies occupying the subject property to vacate
area of not less than two hectares within the Subdivision, which would be therefrom and pay back rentals to petitioners.
designated as the open space reserved for a public purpose. Upon the City's
request, the Subdivision amended its offer and agreed to donate five On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA), in an amended decision, overturned
hectares to the City. The area is a portion of the land registered in the names the RTC and upheld the dismissal of the MTC. The CA thus concluded that
of Macario Mariano and Jose Gimenez under TCT No. 671 measuring a total the existence and due execution of the Deed of Donation had been duly
of established, warranting the dismissal of the ejectment case. The CA also
22.9301 hectares. found that petitioners' claim was barred by laches, noting that the City had
The amended offer was signed by Mariano and Gimenez to indicate their been in open, public and adverse possession of the subject property for 49
"conforme," together their respective spouses. Thereafter, the Municipal years at the time the ejectment case was filed.
Board adopted Resolution No. 89 accepting the Subdivision's offer of
donation and its proposed contract. Issue : Whether or not the Petitioners, as heirs of a registered owner of
the subject property, have the preferred or better right of possession
According to the City, the Mayor Imperial and the registered landowners,
Mariano and Gimenez, executed a Deed of Donation on August 16, 1954, Held:
whereby the latter donated five hectares of land (subject property), two Yes. The Court has consistently upheld the registered owners' superior right
hectares of which to be used as the City Hall site, another two hectares for to possess the property in unlawful detainer cases. A fundamental principle
the public plaza, and the remaining hectare for the public market. By virtue in land registration is that the certificate of title serves as evidence of an
thereof, the City entered the property and began construction of the indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the. person
government center. It also declared the five-hectare property in whose name appears therein. It is conclusive evidence as regards ownership
its name for tax purposes. Subsequently, other government agencies and of the land therein described, and the titleholder is entitled to all the attributes
instrumentalities entered the same property and built their offices thereon. of ownership of the property, including possession Thus, the Court has time
and again reiterated the age-old rule that the person who has a Torrens title
However, the heirs of Mariano (petitioners) aver that the plan to donate five over a parcel of land is entitled to possession thereof.
hectares to the City did not materialize as the contract to build the City Hall
was not awarded to the Subdivision but to a another contractor (Francisco The title to the subject property remains registered in the names of Macario
Sabaria). This caused Mariano and officers of the Subdivision to meet with and Gimenez. The alleged Deed of Donation does not appear to have been
Mayor Imperial to demand the return of the five-hectare lot as the condition registered and TCT No. 671 does not bear any inscription of said Deed.
for the donation was not complied with. Mayor Imperial purportedly assured
them that the City would buy the property from them. On May 14, 1968, It has likewise been constantly emphasized that when the property is
Mariano instructed the Subdivision's President to make a follow-up on the registered under the Torrens system, the registered owner's title to the
City's payment for the subject lot. The purchase, however, did not property is presumed legal and cannot be collaterally attacked, especially in
materialize. In 1971, Mariano died without receiving payment from the City. a mere action for unlawful detainer. It has even been held that it does not
even matter if the party's title to the property is questionable.
In 1976, a certain Tirso Mariano filed an action for partition of Mariano's
estate. The action was opposed by his widow, Irene, and their adopted It has been held that a certificate of title has a superior probative value as
children, Jose and Erlinda. Irene died in 1988. Jose's heirs and against that of an unregistered deed of conveyance in ejectment cases. As
Erlinda were declared as Irene's heirs. In 2003, Danilo Mariano, as against the City's unregistered claim, the Torrens title in the name of Mariano
administrator of Irene's estate, demanded upon then City Mayor of Naga, and Gimenez must prevail, conferring upon the registered owners the better
Jesse M. Robredo, to vacate and return the subject property. When the City
right of possession. This superior or preferred right of possession applies to
petitioners as Mariano's hereditary successors who have stepped into said
decedent's shoes by operation of law.
 4. Respondent sought to demolish Concession 4 at the
expense of Petitioner. Respondent argued that Petitioner should
LEVISTE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM AUTHOR: Reyes, Brixton first get the consent of the registered owners of the condominium
v. LEGASPI TOWERS 200 INC., et. project before amendment of the Master Deed under Sec. 4 of
al. the Condominium Act. Petitioner argued that there must be a
G.R. No. 199353 April 4, 2018 determination of the required values under Depra before
TOPIC: Builder in Good Faith Respondent can take action.
PONENTE: J. Leonardo-De Castro
5. RTC: Affirmed Respondent.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
 Art. 448 and 546 of the Civil Code on builders in good faith are 6. CA: Affirmed RTC Decision.
inapplicable in cases covered by the Condominium Act.

 The land belongs to a condominium corporation wherein the builder,

as a unit owner, is considered a stockholder or member under Sec. ISSUE(S): Whether Respondent can build Concession 4 on top of
10 of the Condominium Act. The builder is already in co-ownership Petitioner’s condominium building.
with other unit owners as members or stockholders of the
condominium corporation. The purchaser of a condominium unit HELD: No. Petitioner contravened the Master Deed by adding a 3rd level
binds himself to a contract with other unit owners. above the roof deck and by violating the Condominium Act and Respondent’s
by-laws.
 A builder must gain the consent of other registered owners and RATIO:
follow the by-rules of the condominium before amending the Master  Instead of procuring the required consent of the registered owners
Deed. under Sec. 4 of the Condominium Act or having Concession 4
FACTS: approved by the members in a regular or special meeting called for
1. Legaspi Towers is a 7-floor condominium building the purpose under Respondent’s by-laws, Petitioner merely had an
with a deck roof and 2 levels above the deck roof, as stated in internal agreement with the former president of Respondent. This
the Master Deed, at Paseo De Roxas, Makati City with a unit on cannot bind corporations since they can act only through their Board
the roof deck and 2 levels above said unit called Concession 2 of Directors.
and Concession 3. Concession 3 was bought by Leviste
Management System (Petitioner).  Art. 448 of the Civil Code on builders in good faith does not apply
where there is contractual relation between the parties. The RTC
2. Petitioner sought to build another unit called erred in considering Art. 448 and Art. 546 of the Civil Code in this
Concession 4 on top of Concession 3 and was able to secure a case.
buiding permit for its construction. However, Legaspi Towers 200
Inc. (Respondent) sent a notice to Petitioner that its construction Article 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built,
was illegal but the latter did not heed such. Petitioner filed a writ sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as
of mandatory injunction against Respondent. his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the
. indemnity provided for in articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the
3. The RTC affirmed Respondent wherein it found one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one
application of Art. 448 of the Civil Code and Depra v. Dumlao1. who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot
The “air space” above the unit actually belongs to Respondent. be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that
of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if
the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or
trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms
of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms
 thereof. (361a)

Article 546. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every

possessor; but only the possessor in good faith may retain the thing
until he has been reimbursed therefor.

Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the possessor in good

faith with the same right of retention, the person who has defeated
him in the possession having the option of refunding the amount of
the expenses or of paying the increase in value which the thing may
have acquired by reason thereof. (453a)

The land belongs to a condominium corporation wherein the builder,

as a unit owner, is considered a stockholder or member under Sec.
10 of the Condominium Act. The builder is already in co-ownership
with other unit owners as members or stockholders of the
condominium corporation. Thus, the purchaser of a condominium
unit binds himself to a contract with other unit owners.

 Art. 448 and 546 of the Civil Code on builders in good faith are
inapplicable in cases covered by the Condominium Act where the
owner of the land and the builder are already bound by specific
legislation on the subject property and by contract (the Master Deed
and the By-Laws of the condominium corporation).

136 SCRA 475

In Depra, the court should determine:

1. The present fair price of the encroached area of the land;
2. The amount of expenses spent in building;
3. The increase in value the area may have acquired by reason of
the building;
4. Whether the value of the build land is considerably more than
that of the land build thereon.

After determination of the above, the court shall grant the owner a period of
15 days to exercise his option whether:
a. To appropriate the land by paying the amount of expenses spent
for building the same or the increase of such area’s value by
reason of the building or;
b. To oblige the builder in good faith to pay the price of the said
area.
AGUSTIN V. IAC bank a known portion of land and transfers it to another estate, the owner of
segregated portion retains ownership provided he removes the same w/in 2
years. And Art. 463 states that whenever the current of a river divides itself
into branches, leaving a piece of land or part thereof isolated, the owner of
FACTS: the land retains ownership. He also retains it if a portion of land is separated
Private respondents, Maria Melad and Pablo Binuyag are among those who from the estate by the current.
are occupying the western bank of the Cagayan River while on the eastern
bank is owned by petitioner Eulogio Agustin. From 1919 to 1968, the
Cagayan river has eroded the lands on the eastern bank including Agustin’s
Lot depositing alluvium on the land possessed by Pablo Binuyag. In 1968, Leonida Cureg, Romeo Carniyan, et al. v. IAC, Domingo Apostol, et al.
after a typhoon which caused a big flood, the Cagayan River changed its GR No. 73465 | September 7, 1989 | Medialdea, J. (Gel)
course and returned it to its 1919 bed and it cut through the lands of
respondents whose lands were transferred on the eastern side. To cultivate Facts: In 1982 Apostol, et al filed a complaint for quieting of title and
the lands they had to cross the river. When they were cultivating said lands, damages with preliminary injunction against the Carniyans with the RTC of
(they were planting corn) Agustin accompanied by the mayor and some Isabela. Apostol, et al. alleged that they are the legal heirs of Domingo
policemen claimed the land and drove them away. So Melad and Binuyag Geraro who has been in OCEN possession of a parcel of land referred to as
filed separate complaints for recovery of their lots and its accretions. The "motherland" since time immemorial or before July 26, 1894. During the
Trial Court held ordered Agustin et. al to vacate the lands and return them to execution of the Extra-Judicial Partition with Voluntary Reconveyance, the
respondents. On appeal, the IAC affirmed in toto the judgment thus the case motherland already showed/manifested signs of accretion of about 3 has on
at bar. the north caused by the northward movement of the Cagayan River. Apostol
declared the motherland and its accretion for tax purposes under a tax
ISSUE: declaration. Apostol, et al. were about to cultivate their “motherland” together
Whether or not private respondents own the accretion and such ownership is with its accretion, they were prevented and threatened by the Carniyans from
not affected by the sudden and abrupt change in the course of the Cagayan continuing to do so.
River when it reverted to its old bed
Carniyans’ answer: the “motherland” is nonexistent; that Antonio Carniyan,
petitioners’ predecessorininterest, was the owner of a piece of land bounded
on the north by Cagayan River and not by the land of Gerardo as claimed by
HELD: YES private respondents; that the “subject land” is an accretion to their registered
land and that petitioners have been in possession and cultivation of the
Art. 457 states that the owner of the lands adjoining river banks own the
“accretion” for many years now.
accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the currents of the
waters. Accretion benefits a riparian owner provided that these elements are
RTC: Apostol is the absolute owner
present: 1) deposit be gradual and imperceptible 2) it resulted from the IAC: affirmed RTC.
effects of the current of the water and 3) the land is adjacent to the river
bank. When the River moved from 1919 to 1968, there was alluvium Issue: WoN can be considered riparian owners who are entitled to the
deposited and it was gradual and imperceptible. “subject land” which is an accretion

Accretion benefits the riparian owner because these lands are exposed to Held: Yes. OCT is better than tax declarations!
floods and other damage due to the destructive force of the waters, and if by
virtue of law they are subject to encumbrances and various kinds of Apostol's claim of ownership is anchored on 4 tax declarations, while
easements, it is only just that such risks or dangers should in some way be Carniyans relied on the indefeasibility and incontrovertibility of their OCT No.
compensated by the right of accretion. Also, respondent’s ownership over P19093, dated November 25, 1968.The declaration of ownership for
said lots was not removed when due to the sudden and abrupt change in the purposes of assessment on the payment of the tax is not sufficient evidence
course of the river; their accretions were transferred to the other side. Art. to prove ownership. As against tax declarations and/or tax receipts which are
459 states when the current of a river x x x segregates from an estate on its not conclusive evidence of ownership nor proof of the area covered therein,
an OCT indicates true and legal ownership by the registered owners over the
disputed premises.

Since OCT clearly stated that subject land is bounded on the north by the
Cagayan River, Apostol's claim over their “motherland,” allegedly existing
between petitioners’ land and the Cagayan River, is deemed barred and
nullified with the issuance of the OCT.

Thus the alleged “motherland” claimed by private respondents is nonexistent.

The “subject land” is an alluvial deposit left by the northward movement of
the Cagayan River and pursuant to NCC 457:

“To the owners of land adjoining the banks of river belong the
accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current
of the waters.”

However, it should be noted that the area covered by OCT No. P19093 is
only 4,584 m2. The accretion attached to said land is approximately 5.5
hectares. The increase in the area of petitioners’ land, being an accretion left
by the change of course or the northward movement of the Cagayan River
does not automatically become registered land just because the lot which
receives such accretion is covered by a Torrens title. (Grande v. CA, 1962).
As such, it must also be placed under the operation of the Torrens System

Petition granted. IAC reversed.

 protect the riparian owner against the dimunition of the area of his registered
land through gradual changes in the course of an adjoining stream or river.
VIAJAR v. CA Accretions which the banks of the river may gradually receive from the effect
of the current become the property of the owners of the banks.
It is a well settled rule that registration under the Torrens System does not
protect the riparian owner against the diminution of the area of his registered
land through gradual changes in the course of an adjoining stream or river.

FACTS:

Private respondents Spouses Ladrido are owners of Lot 7511 of the

Cadastral Survey of Pototan Iloilo. Petitioners are owners of the Lot 7340,
which they bought from the Te. Viajar had lot 7340 relocated and found out
that the property was in the possession of Ladrido. She demanded the return
but the latter refused. She instituted a civil action for recovery of possession
and damages. She also impleaded Te as defedant for the reason that if
Ladrido is going to be favored then the sale was to be annulled and plaintiff
must be reimbursed. During the trial it was proven that during the cadastral
survey in 1926, the two lots were separated by the Suague River and that a
part of the land of Lot 7340 and the old river bed were in the possession of
the defendants and that the plaintiffs have never been in actual physical
possession.

CFI ruled in favor of the defendants which the CA confirmed. There was a
mention in the case that the issue from which the decision of the CFI was not
the issue appealed in the CA so the affirmation made by the CA should be
void.

ISSUES:

1) Whether or not the change in the course of the Suague River was gradual
or sudden
2) Whether or not the plaintiffs are protected by the Torrens System (in
relation to the dimunition of the area of their land because the plaintiffs are
contending that Art 457 must be interpreted as applicable only to
unregistered lands)

RULING:

It was established in the trial that for a period of 40 years the Suague river
overflowed its banks yearly and the property of the defendant gradually
received deposits of soil from the effects of the current of the river.

It is a well settled rule that registration under the Torrens System does not
 domain). The Apellate court denied all motions of the Director and the
Government.
HEIRS OF NAVARRO V. IAC

The matter went to the SC.

Accretion along an area adjacent to the sea is public domain, even if the
accretion results from rivers emptying into the sea. It cannot be registered.
ISSUE:

FACTS: Whether or not the accretion taking place on property adjacent to the sea can
be registered under the Torrens system.
Sinforoso Pascual sits in the midst of a land registration case. The story
begins on 1946 upon his desire to register land on the northern section of his
existing property. His current registered property is bounded on the east by HELD:
Talisay River, on the West by Bulacan River and on the North by the Manila
bay. Both rivers flow towards the Manila Bay. Because of constantly flowing It cannot be registered. This is land of Public domain. Pascual claimed
water, extra land of about 17hectares (that’s about the size of Disney Park!) ownership under Article 457 of the Civil Code saying that the disputed 14-
formed in the northern most section of the property. It is this property he hectare land is an accretion caused by the joint action of the Talisay and
sought to register. Bulacan Rivers Art 457: Accretion as a mode of acquiring property and
requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) that the accumulation
of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of
The RTC denied the registration claiming this to be foreshore land and part the action of the waters of the river; and (3) that the land where the accretion
of public domain (remember, accretion formedby the sea is public dominion). takes place is adjacent to the bank of the river.
His Motion for Reconsideration likewise burned. In 1960, he attempted
registry again, claiming that the Talisay and Bulacan rivers deposited more
Unfortunately, Pasucal and Heirs claim of ownership based on Art 457 is
silt resulting on accretion. He claimed this land as riprarian owner. The
misplaced. If there’s any land to be claimed, it should be land ADJACENT to
Director of Lands, Director of Forestry and the Fiscal opposed.
the rivers Talisay and Bulacan. The law is clear on this. Accretion of land
along the river bank may be registered. This is not the case of accretion of
land on the property adjacent to Manila Bay.
Then a new party surfaced. Mr Emiliano Navarro jumped into the fray
opposing the same application, stating the he leased part of the property
sought to be registered. He sought to protect his fishpond that rested on the Furthermore, Manila Bay is a sea. Accretion on a sea bank is foreshore land
same property. Sinforoso was not amused and filed ejectment against Mr. and the applicable law is not Art 457 but Art 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters
Navarro, claiming that Navarro used stealth force and strategy to occupy a of 1866. This law, while old, holds that accretion along sea shore cannot be
portion of his land. Pascual lost the case against Navarro so he appealed. registered as it remains public domain unless abandoned by government for
During the appeal, his original land registration case was consolidated and public use and declared as private property capable of alienation.
tried jointly. (alas Pascual died) The heirs of Pascual took over the case.
On 1975, the court decided that the property was foreshore land and Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of August 3, 1866 provides as follows:
therefore part of public domain. The RTC dismissed the complaint of Pascual
for ejectment against Navarro and also denied his land registration request.
Lands added to the shores by accretions and alluvial deposits caused by the
Pascual’s heirs appealed and the RTC was reversed by the IAC. The
action of the sea, form part of the public domain. When they are no longer
Apellate court granted petition for registration! The reason? The accretion
washed by the waters of the sea and are not necessary for purposes of
was caused by the two rivers, not manila bay. Hence it wasn’t foreshore land.
public utility, or for the establishment of special industries, or for the coast-
(BUT the confusion lies in the fact that the accretion formed adjacent to
guard service, the Government shall declare them to be the property of the
Manila Bay… which is sea!) Aggrieved, the Director of Forestry moved for
owners of the estates adjacent thereto and as increment thereof.
reconsideration (Government insists it is foreshore and hence, public
The IAC decision granting registration was reversed and set aside.
Registration cannot be allowed.
 The CA upheld the RTC’s pronouncement, and stated that it could not be
Republic vs. Arcadio Santos III denied that "to the owners of the lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong
the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of
Facts: the waters" (Article 457 New Civil Code) as in this case, Arcadio Ivan Santos
Alleging continuous and adverse possession of more than ten years, III and Arcadio Santos, Jr., are the owners of the land which was previously
respondent Arcadio Ivan A. Santos III (ArcadioIvan) applied on March 7, part of the Parañaque River which became an orchard after it dried up and
1997 for the registration of Lot 4998-B (the property) in the Regional Trial considering that Lot 4 which adjoins the same property is owned by the
Court (RTC) in Parafiaque City. The property, which had an area of 1,045 applicant which was obtained by the latter from his mother
square meters, more or less, was located in Barangay San Dionisio,
Parañaque City, and was bounded in the Northeast by Lot 4079 belonging to The Republic submits, however, that the application by both lower courts
respondent Arcadio C.Santos, Jr. (Arcadio, Jr.), in the Southeast by the of Article 457 of the Civil Code was erroneous in the face of the fact that
Parañaque River, in the Southwest by an abandoned road, and in the respondents’ evidence did not establish accretion, but instead the drying up
Northwest by Lot 4998-A also owned by Arcadio Ivan. of the Parañaque River.

On May 21, 1998, Arcadio Ivan amended his application for land registration Issue:Whether or not respondents could claim the property by virtue of
to include Arcadio, Jr. as his co-applicant because of the latter’s co- acquisitive prescription (section 14(1) of PD 1529)
ownership of the property. He alleged that the property had been formed
through accretion and had been in their joint open, notorious, public, Ruling:
continuous and adverse possession for morethan 30 years. 1. The land was not an accretion. The process of drying up of a river to form
dry land involved the recession of the water level from the river banks. And
The City of Parañaque (the City) opposed the application for land the dried-up land did not equate to accretion, which was the gradual and
registration, stating that it needed the property for its flood control program; imperceptible deposition of soil on the river banks through the effects of the
that the property was within the legal easement of 20 meters from the river current. In accretion, the water level did not recede and was more or less
bank; and that assuming that the property was not covered by the legal maintained. Hence, respondents as the riparian owners had no legal right to
easement, title to the property could not be registered in favor of the claim ownership of lot 4998-B.
applicants for the reason that the property was an orchard that had dried up
and had not resulted from accretion . Also, it seems highly improbable that the large volume of soil that ultimately
comprised the dry land with an area of 1,045 square meters had been
On May 10, 2000 the RTC granted the application for land registration. deposited in a gradual and imperceptible manner by the current of the river in
the span of about 20-30 years.
With this, the Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
appealed. The CA grossly erred in applying Article 457 of the Civil Code 2. RTC apparently reckoned respondents’ period of supposed possession to
to respondents’ benefit. be “more than thirty years” from the fact that “their predecessors in interest
are the adjoining owners of the subject parcel of land.” Yet, its decision
Article 457 of the Civil Code provides that "(t)o the owners of lands adjoining nowhere indicated what acts respondents had performed showing their
the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from possession of the property “continuously, openly, publicly and adversely” in
the effects of the currents of the waters. that length of time. The decision mentioned only that they had paid realty
taxes and had caused the survey of the property to be made. That was not
"In ruling for respondents, the RTC pronounced that on the basis of the enough to justify the foregoing findings, because, firstly, the payment of
evidence presented by the applicants, the Court finds that Arcadio Ivan A. realty taxes did not conclusively prove the payor’s ownership of the land the
Santos III and Arcadio C. Santos, Jr., are the owners of the land subject of taxes were paid for, the tax declarations and payments being mere indicia of
this application which was previously a part of the Parañaque River which a claim of ownership; and secondly, the causing of surveys of the property
became an orchard after it dried up and further considering that Lot 4 which involved was not itself an act of continuous, open, public and adverse
adjoins the same property is owned by applicant, Arcadio C. Santos, Jr., after possession.
itwas obtained by him through inheritance from his mother, Concepcion Cruz,
now deceased.
The principle that the riparian owner whose land receives the gradual
deposits of soil does not need to make an express act of possession, and
that no acts of possession are necessary in that instance because it is the
law itself that pronounces the alluvium to belong to the riparian owner from
the time that the deposit created by the current of the water becomes
manifest has no applicability herein because lot 4998-B was not formed
through accretion. Hence, the ownership of the land adjacent to the river
bank by respondents’ predecessor in interest did not translate to possession
of lot 4998-B that would ripen to acquisitive prescription in relation to lot
4998-B.

Even conceding, for the sake of argument, that respondents possessed lot
4998-B for more than 30 years in the character that they claimed, they did
not thereby acquire the land by prescription or by other means without any
competent proof that the land was already declared as alienable and
disposable by the Government. Absent that declaration, the land still
belonged to the State as part of its public dominion.

3. Subject to the exceptions defined in Article 461 of the Civil Code which
states:

Art. 461. River beds which are abandoned through the natural change in
the course of the waters ipso facto belong to the owners whose lands are
occupied by the new course in proportion to the area lost. However, the
owners of the lands adjoining the old bed shall have the right to
acquire the same by paying the value thereof, which value shall not exceed
the value of the area occupied by the new bed. (370a)

All river beds remain property of public dominion and cannot be acquired by
acquisitive prescription unless previously declared by the Government to be
alienable and disposable. Considering that Lot 4998-B was not shown to be
already declared to be alienable and disposable, respondents could not be
deemed to have acquired the property through prescription.

In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative

action, report, statute or certification was presented to the Court. The
petitioners only cite a surveyor-geodetic engineer’s notation indicating that
the survey was inside alienable and disposable land. Such notation does not
constitute a positive act validly changing the classification of the land in
question.

Wherefore, petition was Granted.

 Who has a better right of possession over the property, Baytion or Daclison?

REX DACLISON v. EDUARDO BAYTION HELD:

G.R. No. 219811, April 6, 2016
Mendoza, J. Baytion does not have a better right over the contested portion. Baytion’s
contention that he owns that portion by reason of accretion is misplaced. In
FACTS: the case at bench, this contested portion cannot be considered an accretion
under Article 457 on the New Civil Code. To begin with, the land came about
Respondent Eduardo Baytion (Baytion) filed a Complaint for Forcible Entry not by reason of a gradual and imperceptible deposit. The deposits were
and Damages with Prayer for Issuance of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction artificial and man-made and not the exclusive result of the current from the
with the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 43, Quezon City (MeTC) against creek adjacent to his property. Baytion failed to prove the attendance of the
petitioner Rex Daclison (Daclison). indispensable requirement that the deposit was due to the effect of the
current of the river or creek. Alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature
In the complaint, Baytion alleged that he was a co-owner of a parcel of land. and not a result of human intervention.
As the administrator, he leased portions of the property to third persons.
Erected on the said property was a one-story building which was divided into Furthermore, the disputed property cannot also be considered an
seven units or stalls. One of the stalls was leased to a certain Leonida Dela improvement or accession under Article 445 of the New Civil Code. It must
Cruz (Leonida) who used it for her business of selling rocks, pebbles and be noted that Article 445 uses the adverb “thereon” which is simply defined
similar construction materials. When the lease of Nida expired, Daclison and as “on the thing that has been mentioned.” In other words, the supposed
other persons acting under her took possession of the portion leased and improvement must be made, constructed or introduced within or on the
occupied by Leonida without the prior knowledge and consent of Baytion. property and not outside so as to qualify as an improvement contemplated
Since then, Daclison had been occupying the contested portion and using it ‘by law. Otherwise, it would just be very convenient for landowners to expand
for his business of selling marble and other finishing materials without paying or widen their properties in the guise of improvements.
anything to Baytion.

Upon learning of Daclison’s unauthorized entry into the subject portion of the
property. Baytion demanded that he vacate it. Despite oral and written
demands to vacate, Daclison refused to do so. This prompted Baytion to file
the complaint for forcible entry and damages.

The MeTC dismissed the case on the ground that Baytion failed to include
his siblings or his co-owners, as plaintiffs in the case. The dismissal,
however, was without prejudice. Baytion appealed the case to the RTC,
which ruled that the MeTC lacked jurisdiction to decide the case because the
allegations in the complaint failed to constitute a case of forcible entry. The
CA concluded that Baytion, as co-owner of the subject property, had a better
right to possess.

Daclison insists that what is really in dispute in the present controversy is the
filled-up portion between the riprap constructed by the government and the
property of Baytion and therefore, outside of the land co-owned by Baytion.
Accordingly, the RTC and the CA should have dismissed the case because
the leased property was already surrendered to its owner, thereby, mooting
the complaint.

ISSUE:
G.R. No. 182908 Accretion, had illegally registered the said accretions in their names,
August 6, 2014 notwithstanding the fact that they were not the riparian owners (as
HEIRS OF FRANCISCO I. NARVASA, SR., and HEIRS OF PETRA they did not own the Motherland to which the accretions merely
IMBORNAL and PEDRO FERRER, represented by their Attorneyin-Fact, formed adjacent to). In this relation, Francisco, et al. explained that
MRS. REMEDIOS B. NARVASA-REGACHO, Petitioners, they did not assert their inheritance claims over the Motherland and
vs. the two (2) accretions because they respected respondents’ rights,
EMILIANA, VICTORIANO, FELIPE, MA TEO, RAYMUNDO, MARIA, until they discovered in 1983 that respondents have repudiated their
and EDUARDO, all surnamed IMBORNAL,Respondents. (Francisco, et al.’s) shares thereon. 22 Thus, bewailing that respondents
have refused them their rights not only with respect to the Motherland,
but also to the subsequent accretions, Francisco, et al. prayed for the
Facts: reconveyance of said properties, or, in the alternative, the payment of
Basilia owned a parcel of land situated at Sabangan, Pangasinan which their value, as well as the award of moral damages in the amount
she conveyed to her three (3) daughters Balbina, Alejandra, and of P100,000.00, actual damages in the amount of P150,000.00,
Catalina (Imbornal sisters) sometime in 1920. including attorney’s fees and other costs.23
Meanwhile, Catalina’s husband, Ciriaco Abrio (Ciriaco), applied for and On August 20, 1996, the RTC rendered a Decision 26 in favor of
was granted a homestead patent over a 31,367-sq. m. riparian land Francisco, et al. and thereby directed respondents to: (a) reconvey to
(Motherland) adjacent to the Cayanga River in San Fabian, Francisco, et al. their respective portions in the Motherland and in the
Pangasinan.14 He was eventually awarded Homestead Patent No. accretions thereon, or their pecuniary equivalent; and (b) pay actual
2499115 therefor, and, on December 5, 1933, OCT No. 1462 was issued damages in the amount of P100,000.00, moral damages in the amount
in his name. Later, or on May 10, 1973, OCT No. 1462 was cancelled, ofP100,000.00, and attorney’s fees in the sum of P10,000.00, as well
and Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 101495 16 was issued in the as costs of suit.
name of Ciriaco’s heirs, namely: Margarita Mejia; Rodrigo Abrio, On November 28, 2006, the CA rendered a Decision 29 reversing and
marriedto Rosita Corpuz; Antonio Abrio, married to Crisenta Corpuz; setting aside the RTC Decision and entering a new one declaring: (a)
Remedios Abrio, married to Leopoldo Corpuz; Pepito Abrio; Dominador the descendants of Ciriaco as the exclusive owners of the Motherland;
Abrio; Francisca Abrio; Violeta Abrio; and Perla Abrio (Heirs of Ciriaco). (b) the descendants of respondent Victoriano asthe exclusive owners of
Ciriaco and his heirs had since occupied the northern portion of the the First Accretion; and (c) the descendants of Pablo (i.e., respondents
Motherland, while respondents occupied the southern portion.17 collectively) as the exclusive owners of the Second Accretion.
Sometime in 1949, the First Accretion, approximately 59,772 sq. m. in At odds with the CA’s disposition, Francisco et al. filed a motion for
area, adjoined the southern portion of the Motherland. On August 15, reconsideration which was, however denied by the CA in a
1952, OCT No. P-318 was issued in the name of respondent Victoriano, Resolution35 dated May 7, 2008, hence, this petition taken by the
married to Esperanza Narvarte, covering the First Accretion. 18 Decades latter’s heirs as their successors-in-interest.
later, or in 1971, the Second Accretion, which had an area of 32,307 Issues:
sq. m., more or less, abutted the First Accretion on its southern
(a) WON the descendants of Ciriaco are the exclusive owners of the
portion.19 On November 10, 1978, OCT No. 21481 was issued in the Motherland; (b) WON the descendants of respondent Victoriano are the
names of all the respondents covering the Second Accretion. exclusive owners of the First Accretion; and
Claiming rights over the entire Motherland, Francisco, et al., as the (c) WON the descendants of Pablo (respondents collectively) are the
children of Alejandra and Balbina, filed on February 27,1984 an exclusive owners of the Second Accretion on the basis of the following
Amended Complaint20 for reconveyance, partition, and/or damages grounds:
against respondents, docketed as Civil Case No. D-6978. They (1) prescription of the reconveyance action, which was duly raised as
anchored their claim on the allegation that Ciriaco, with the help of his an affirmative defense in the Amended Answer, and
wife Catalina, urged Balbina and Alejandra to sell the Sabangan (2) the existence of an implied trust between the Imbornal sisters and
property. Ciriaco.
Likewise, Francisco, et al. alleged that through deceit, fraud, falsehood, Ruling:
and misrepresentation, respondent Victoriano, with respect to the First The petition is bereft of merit.
Accretion, and the respondents collectively, with regard to the Second A. Procedural Matter: Issue of Prescription.
At the outset, the Court finds that the causes of action pertaining to improvement of the homestead. It must be presumed, therefore, that
the Motherland and the First Accretion are barred by prescription. Ciriaco underwent the rigid process and duly satisfied the strict
To recount, Francisco, et al. asserted co-ownership over the conditions necessary for the grant of his homestead patent application.
Motherland, alleging that Ciriaco agreed to hold the same in trust for As such, it is highly implausible that the Motherland had been acquired
their predecessors-in-interest Alejandra and Balbina upon issuance of and registered by mistake or through fraud as would create an implied
the title in his name. Likewise, they alleged that respondents acquired trust between the Imbornal sisters and Ciriaco.
the First and Second Accretions by means of fraud and deceit. Hence, when OCT No. 1462 covering the Motherland was issued in his
When property is registered in another’s name, an implied or name pursuant to Homestead Patent No. 24991 on December 15,
constructive trust is created by law in favor of the true owner. 1933, Ciriaco’s title to the Motherland had become indefeasible. It
An action for reconveyance based on an implied trust prescribes in 10 bears to stress that the proceedings for land registration that led to the
years. The reference point of the 10-yearprescriptive period is the date issuance of Homestead Patent No. 24991 and eventually, OCT No.
of registration of the deed or the issuance of the title. The prescriptive 1462 in Ciriaco’s name are presumptively regular and proper, 49 which
period applies only if there is an actual need to reconvey the property presumption has not been overcome by the evidence presented by
as when the plaintiff is not in possession of the property. However, if Francisco, et al.
the plaintiff, as the real owner of the property also remains in Consequently, as Francisco, et al. failed to prove their ownership rights
possession of the property, the prescriptive period to recover title and over the Motherland, their cause of action with respect to the First
possession of the property does not run against him. Accretion and, necessarily, the Second Accretion, must likewise fail. A
Based on the foregoing, Francisco, et al. had then a period of ten (10) further exposition is apropos.
years from the registration of the respective titles covering the As regards the third issue, being the owner of the land adjoining the
disputed properties within which to file their action for reconveyance, foreshore area, respondent is the riparian or littoral owner who has
taking into account the fact that they were never in possession of the preferential right to lease the foreshore area.
said properties. Hence, with respect tot he Motherland covered by OCT Accordingly, therefore, alluvial deposits along the banks of a creek or a
No. 1462 issued on December 5, 1933 in the name of Ciriaco, an action river do not form part of the public domain as the alluvial property
for reconveyance therefor should have been filed until December 5,
1943; with respect to the First Accretion covered by OCT No. P-318 automatically belongs to the owner of the estate to which it may have
issued on August 15, 1952 in the name of respondent Victoriano, an been added. The only restriction provided for by law is that the owner
action of the same nature should have been filed until August 15, of the adjoining property must register the same under the Torrens
1962; and, finally, with respect to the Second Accretion covered by system; otherwise, the alluvial property may be subject to acquisition
OCT No. 21481 issued on November 10, 1978in the name of the through prescription by third persons.53
In this case, Francisco, et al. and, now, their heirs, i.e., herein
respondents, a suit for reconveyance therefor should have been filed petitioners are not the riparian owners of the Motherland to which the
until November 10, 1988. First Accretion had attached, hence, they cannot assert ownership over
A judicious perusal of the records, however, will show that the the First Accretion. Consequently, as the Second Accretion had merely
Amended Complaint42 covering all three (3) disputed properties was attached to the First Accretion, they also have no right over the Second
filed only on February 27, 1984. As such, it was filed way beyond the Accretion. Neither were they able to show that they acquired these
10-year reglementary period within which to seek the reconveyance of properties through prescription as it was ·not established that they
two (2) of these properties, namely, the Motherland and the First were in possession of any of them. Therefore, whether through
Accretion, with only the reconveyance action with respect to the accretion or, independently, through prescription, the discernible
Second Accretion having been seasonably filed. conclusion is that Francisco et al. and/or petitioners' claim of title over
B. Substantive Matter: Existence of an Implied Trust. the First and Second Accretions had not been substantiated, and, as a
The main thrust of Francisco, et al.’s Amended Complaint is that an result, said properties cannot be reconveyed in their favor. This is
implied trust had arisen between the Imbornal sisters, on the one especially so since on the other end of the fray lie respondents armed
hand, and Ciriaco, on the other, with respect to the Motherland. with a certificate of title in their names covering the First and Second
a homestead patent award requires proof that the applicant meets the Accretions coupled with their possession thereof, both of which give
stringent conditions48 set forth under Commonwealth Act No. 141, as rise to the superior credibility of their own claim. Hence, petitioners'
amended, which includes actual possession, cultivation, and action for reconveyance with respect to both accretions must
altogether fail.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.