U.S.

Department
Of Transportation

Federal Aviation
Administration

7210.56C
Air Traffic Quality
Assurance

Distribution: ZAT-721 August 15, 2002 Prepared by the Air Traffic

Evaluations and Investigations Staff,
AAT-20
 RECORD OF CHANGES DIRECTIVE NO. 7210.56C

CHANGE SUPPLEMENTS OPTIONAL CHANGE SUPPLEMENTS OPTIONAL

TO TO
BASIC BASIC

FAA Form 1320-5 (6-80) Use Previous Edition

8/15/02 7210.56C

FOREWORD

This order is derived from a mutual goal of addressing quality efforts at the national, regional, facility and individual level.
It provides specific guidance on investigation, reporting and recording types of incidents that impact the quality of air
traffic services. This order represents several new ways of addressing quality assurance in a manner designed to improve
the system. All concerned personnel shall familiarize themselves with the provisions pertaining to their responsibilities.

Linda M. Schuessler
Manager, Air Traffic Evaluations and Investigations Staff, AAT-20

i (and ii)
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8/15/02 7210.56C
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER 1. GENERAL
Paragraph Page
1-1-1. PURPOSE ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 1-1
1-1-2. DISTRIBUTION ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1-1
1-1-3. CANCELLATION --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1-1
1-1-4. EXPLANATION OF CHANGES ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 1-1
1-1-5. EFFECTIVE DATE ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1-4
1-1-6. RELATED PUBLICATIONS -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1-4
1-1-7. USE OF TERMS ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1-5
1-1-8. SCOPE ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1-5

CHAPTER 2. QUALITY ASSURANCE (QA) PROGRAMS

2-1-1. OVERVIEW ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2-1
2-1-2. RESPONSIBILITIES ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2-1
2-1-3. PROGRAM CONTENT -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2-2

CHAPTER 3. TECHNICAL TRAINING DISCUSSIONS

3-1-1. OVERVIEW ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 3-1
3-1-2. DEFINITIONS ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 3-1
3-1-3. RESPONSIBILITIES ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 3-1
3-1-4. DOCUMENTATION ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 3-2

CHAPTER 4. AIR TRAFFIC INCIDENTS

4-1-1. DEFINITIONS ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 4-1
4-1-2. GENERAL HANDLING PROCEDURES ----------------------------------------------------------- 4-2
4-1-3. QUALITY ASSURANCE REVIEW (QAR)--------------------------------------------------------- 4-3
4-1-4. EMERGENCIES ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 4-4
4-1-5. FLIGHT ASSISTS --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 4-4
4-1-6. MILITARY FACILITY DEVIATIONS -------------------------------------------------------------- 4-5
4-1-7. SPILL OUTS ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 4-5
4-1-8. AIRSPACE INTRUSIONS ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 4-6
4-1-9. INVALID MODE C REPORTING -------------------------------------------------------------------- 4-6
4-1-10. SURFACE INCIDENTS AND RUNWAY INCURSIONS ---------------------------------------- 4-6

CHAPTER 5. AIR TRAFFIC OPERATIONAL ERRORS AND DEVIATIONS,

INVESTIGATION AND REPORTING
5-1-1. DEFINITIONS -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 5-1
5-1-2. SUSPECTED EVENT ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 5-2
5-1-3. INITIAL INVESTIGATIONS -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 5-2
5-1-4. MULTIPLE LOSSES OF SEPARATION DURING A SINGLE EVENT ---------------------- 5-4
5-1-5. INVESTIGATIVE PROCESS -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 5-4
5-1-6. ATM RESPONSIBILITIES ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 5-5
5-1-7. RECLASSIFICATION ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 5-6
5-1-8. PERFORMANCE BASED ACTIONS ----------------------------------------------------------------- 5-6
5-1-9. RETURN TO OPERATIONAL DUTY ---------------------------------------------------------------- 5-7
5-1-10. WHEN THE AIR TRAFFIC MANAGER IS INVOLVED ----------------------------------------- 5-8
5-1-11. FOLLOW-UP PERFORMANCE SKILL CHECK--------------------------------------------------- 5-8
5-1-12. SKILL ENHANCMENT TRAINING ------------------------------------------------------------------ 5-8
5-1-13. FINAL REPORTS ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 5-8
5-1-14. ENTRIES IN TRAINING AND PROFICIENCY RECORD
(FAA FORM 3120-1) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 5-9
5-1-15. DOCUMENTATION RETENTION -------------------------------------------------------------------- 5-9
5-1-16. HEADQUARTERS AND AIR TRAFFIC DIVISION ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES -- 5-10

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7210.56C 8/15/02

CHAPTER 6. SEVERITY INDEX

6-1-1. DEFINITIONS ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 6-1

6-1-2. SEVERITY CLASSIFICATIONS ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 6-1
6-1-3. FINAL SEVERITY CLASSIFICATIONS -------------------------------------------------------------- 6-1
6-1-4. RADAR OE SEVERITY INDEX EN-ROUTE CHART ---------------------------------------------- 6-2
6-1-5. RADAR OE SEVERITY INDEX TERMINAL AND EN-ROUTE SINGLE SITE CHART --- 6-3

CHAPTER 7. OPERATIONAL ERROR DETECTION PROGRAM (OEDP)

7-1-1. EN-ROUTE OPERATIONAL ERROR DETECTION PROGRAM (OEDP) -------------------- 7-1

7-1-2. OEDP AUDIT ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 7-1

APPENDIX 1. RADAR DATA PROCESSING

APPENDIX 2. INSTRUCTIONS FOR FAA FORM 7210-2,

PRELIMINARY OPERATIONAL ERROR/DEVIATION INVESTIGATION REPORT

APPENDIX 3. EXAMPLE OF FAA FORM 7210-2,

PRELIMINARY OPERATIONAL ERROR/DEVIATION INVESTIGATION REPORT

APPENDIX 4. INSTRUCTIONS FOR FAA FORM 7210-3,

FINAL OPERATIONAL ERROR/DEVIATION REPORT

APPENDIX 5. EXAMPLE OF FAA FORM 7210-3,

FINAL OPERATIONAL ERROR/DEVIATION REPORT

APPENDIX 6. INSTRUCTIONS AND EXAMPLE FOR FAA FORM 7210-5,

OPERATIONAL ERROR/DEVIATION RECLASSIFICATION REPORT

APPENDIX 7. INSTRUCTIONS FOR FAA FORM 7230-6, FLIGHT ASSIST REPORT

APPENDIX 8. EXAMPLE OF FAA FORM 7230-6, FLIGHT ASSIST REPORT

APPENDIX 9. INTERVIEW STATEMENT AND PARTICIPATING IN POST INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS

APPENDIX 10. GENERAL REPORTING PROCEDURES

APPENDIX 11. AIR TRAFFIC INCIDENT HANDLING PROCEDURES

APPENDIX 12. DATA RETENTION

APPENDIX 13. OPERATIONAL ERROR/DEVIATION HANDLING PROCEDURES AND RETURN TO

OPERATIONAL DUTY

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8/15/02 7210.56C
CHAPTER 1. GENERAL
(1) Provide a copy of all Regional and Facility
1-1-1. PURPOSE Quality Assurance (QA) Orders and Operational
Error/Deviation (OE/OD) prevention plans to AAT-20.
This order provides specific direction for the reporting,
investigation, and recording of air traffic incidents.
(2) Annually review all QA and OE/OD
Additional guidance is provided for the identification and
prevention plans.
correction of performance deficiencies through
establishing a quality assurance program at the facility
(3) Ensure a “Back to Basics” approach is
and regional level. This order is designed to work in
included in each OE/OD prevention plan.
concert with current Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) Orders concerning facility evaluations, air traffic
(4) Ensure each facility’s OE/OD prevention plan
technical training, performance management systems,
is facility specific.
and bargaining unit contractual agreements.
(5) Ensure regional/facility OE/OD prevention
plans provide the means to identify and correct non-
compliance or eliminate future non-compliance.
1-1-2. DISTRIBUTIONS
This Order is distributed to selected offices in (6) Provide trend analysis, statistical data and
Washington Headquarters, Regional Offices, the William recommendations to assist facilities with their prevention
J. Hughes Technical Center, the David J. Hurley Air efforts.
Traffic Control System Command Center, and the Mike
Monroney Aeronautical Center. Also, copies are sent to (7) Establish methods for early identification of
all air traffic control facilities, all international aviation facility trends in order to raise awareness. OE/OD rates
field offices, and the interested aviation public. per 100,000 operations will be tracked and distributed to
heighten awareness.

(8) Ensure towers include a comprehensive plan

1-1-3. CANCELLATION to prevent surface incidents in their facility runway
This revision cancels FAA Order 7210.56B, Air Traffic incursion prevention plan.
Quality Assurance, dated June 15, 2001.
d. 3-1-2. Technical Training Discussions
Definitions, adds the definitions of controller proficiency
and performance.
1-1-4. EXPLANATION OF CHANGES
Numerous editorial and formatting changes were made e. 3-1-3. a. (1) Technical Training Discussions
where necessary. The significant changes encompass Responsibilities, redefines the use of certified radar
several Memorandums of Understanding (MOU) with playback tools as a performance management tool.
the National Air Traffic Controllers Association
(NATCA) and policy memorandums from the Director f. 3-1-3. a. (3) Technical Training Discussions
of Air Traffic, AAT-1. Brief explanations of these Responsibilities Note, explains the intent of Technical
changes are listed below. If further information is Training Discussions (TTD) is to provide first level
desired, direct questions through the appropriate supervisors a formal venue to address and/or re-address
facility/regional staff to AAT-20. identified proficiency/performance issues.

a. 2-1-2 a. (4) Quality Assurance Programs g. 3-1-3. c. (1) Technical Training Discussions
Responsibilities, establishes the requirement for AAT-20 Responsibilities, establishes the requirement for the
to conduct formal investigations for facilities with high facility staff to complete a report to the ATM, describing
or increasing numbers of operational errors or incidents. all technical training that was assigned and completed
through the TTD process.
b. 2-1-2 a. (5) Quality Assurance Programs
Responsibilities, establishes recognition for facilities that h. 3-1-3. e. Technical Training Discussions
achieve a million error free operations. Responsibilities, establishes a Controller self-critique
and its inclusion into their Technical Training Discussion
c. 2-1-2 b. Quality Assurance Programs (TTD). To facilitate and assist employee self-
Responsibilities, adds several more requirements and/or development activities, an employee may request and
responsibilities for each Regional Air Traffic Division receive a tape of his/her own session. A self–critique, if
(ATD) Manager. These new requirements have been discussed with the employee’s supervisor, may be
adopted from policy memorandums distributed by the included in the employee’s technical training discussion.
Director of Air Traffic, AAT-1 and include:

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7210.56C 8/15/02

i. 3-1-4. b. Technical Training Discussions t. 4-1-8. a. (3) Airspace Intrusions, adds the
Responsibilities, adds the requirement for the employee requirement of tracking and identifying aircraft that enter
to sign for receipt of the discussion. It should be noted Special Use Airspace (SUA).
that the employee’s signature does not constitute
agreement with the contents of the discussion, only that u. 4-1-9. Invalid Mode C Reporting, allows for the
they have received a copy and a verbal briefing on its electronic distribution of invalid Mode C reporting.
contents. Additionally, it adds the requirement to include
previous Operational Errors (OE), Operational v. 5-1-1. Air Traffic Operational Error and
Deviations (OD), Quality Assurance Reviews (QAR), Deviations Investigations and Reporting, definitions are
regional/national OE/OD trends, and facility evaluations. added to include technical violations, the Operational
Error/Operational Deviation Steering Committee,
j. 4-1-1. Air Traffic Incidents Definitions, adds controlled event, uncontrolled event, severity index, and
specific definitions of air traffic incidents that were operational error casual factors.
incorporated from FAA Order 8020.11.
w. 5-1-2. Air Traffic Operational Errors and
k. 4-1-2. General Handling Procedures, adds the Deviations Investigations and Reporting, Suspected
requirement to log all air traffic incidents as a QAR on Event, redefines Air Traffic Policy that any employee
FAA Form 7230-4, Daily Record of Facility Operation. who is aware of any occurrence that may be an
operational error, operational deviation, or air traffic
l. 4-1-2. b. (5) (b) Air Traffic Incidents General incident (as defined in paragraph 4-1-1, Definitions)
Handling Procedures, redefines the employee interview immediately notify the appropriate management official.
(formerly consult) and documentation of the interview.
x. 5-1-3. Initial Investigations, outlines the intent
m. 4-1-3. Quality Assurance Review outlines the and process the Investigator-in-Charge should follow
QAR process as a means for facilities to identify and with a preliminary investigation. Additionally, it
correct system deficiencies (not just employee stipulates the need for a timely interview and a written
deficiencies) in a timely manner. statement from all involved employees and the initial
return to duty process under the severity index
n. 4-1-3. a. (4) Quality Assurance Review, adds classification process (See Chapter 6, Severity Index).
Operational Error Detection Program (OEDP) alert to the Keep in mind; if during the preliminary investigation a
QAR process. Existing standalone OEDP logs may be loss of separation can be attributed to ATC, then a
utilized in lieu of entries into the facility operational log preliminary report should be completed. If both ATC and
(FAA Form 7230-4). This addition simply formalizes the the Flight Crew of an aircraft are contributory, then both
current OEDP process on a national level. As with any reports should be completed.
investigation, the Air Traffic Manager shall ensure the
investigation is conducted in sufficient depth to assess y. 5-1-4. Multiple Losses of Separation During a
the system performance with reasonable accuracy. Single Event, the return to duty process will be based on
the higher severity event when multiple errors occur and
o. 4-1-3. d. Quality Assurance Review, re- the return to duty plans will be combined.
emphasizes the need to conduct an investigation in
sufficient detail as to accurately portray the incident and z. 5-1-5. Investigative Process, redefines the
take appropriate corrective action. guidelines to help assure a comprehensive and accurate
investigation is completed.
p. 4-1-3. k. Quality Assurance Review, adds the
requirement for a 45 day retention of all supporting aa. 5-1-7. Reclassification, reinforces the ATD
documentation on all suspected losses of separation. responsibility to validate each reclassification request
individually and, if warranted, coordinate a
q. 4-1-4. c. and d. Emergencies, redefines the reclassification with AAT-200.
requirement to immediately notify AAT-200 on all
significant emergencies and provide a preliminary report bb. 5-1-8. Performance Based Actions, performance
within 3 hours. management is a daily task. It is incumbent upon every
one to identify and address their individual proficiency.
r. 4-1-5. Flight Assists, redefines the procedures for Additionally:
the handling of FAA Form 7230-6, Flight Assist Report
and outlines the Regional and National Outstanding (1) Decertification shall not be based solely on
Flight Assist Award. the number of or involvement in an OE, but rather on the
employees’ overall performance history.
s. 4-1-7. Spill Outs, redefines the information
needed on all spill outs.

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8/15/02 7210.56C

(2) The revocation or suspension of control tower hh. 5-1-16. b. (6) Headquarters and Air Traffic
operator certificate and facility ratings shall not be used Division Roles and Responsibility, changes the
for addressing performance deficiencies. requirement to; All ATDs shall establish a follow-up
mechanism to determine if corrective actions contained
(3) No employee will be decertified or required in FAA Forms 7210-3 are effective and are
to complete remedial training for any operational error(s) accomplished in a timely manner. All corrective actions
classified as low severity or any operational deviation. shall specify a completion deadline.

cc. 5-1-9. Return to Operational Duty, ii. 6-1-1. Severity Index, as recommended by the
U.S. Department of Transportation, Office of Inspector
(1) All employees found to be General, we have developed a method to determine
primary/contributory to a low severity error shall be severity, or collision hazard, for operational errors that
returned to operational duty as soon as the preliminary occur in-flight. In addition, the Memorandum of
investigation is completed. No skill check or follow-up Understanding (MOU) between the National Air Traffic
skill check shall be completed. Skill Enhancement Controllers Association (NATCA) and the Federal
training may only be assigned if the event was classified Aviation Administration (FAA), dated January 17, 2001,
as uncontrolled. stipulated that an operational error classification system
be developed and implemented no later than April 30,
(2) All employees found to be 2001. A classification model was developed as a result
primary/contributory to a moderate or high severity, as of studying numerous operational errors throughout the
well as all surface, MVA/obstruction, oceanic/non-radar nation. The model selected is based upon a total of 100
errors or at a facility where radar data is not available points made up of several factors including vertical and
and where less than 80% of the separation standard was horizontal separation distances, flight paths and
maintained, shall not be returned to operational duty until cumulative closure rates, as well as the level of air traffic
the provisions of paragraph 5-1-9, Return to Operational control involvement. A validation and testing period was
Duty are completed. Skill enhancement training or completed to ensure that the model accurately captured
decertification and remedial training may be each airborne event. This classification system was put
administered if the employees’ documented performance into full implementation on April 1, 2001.
history warrants such action.
(1) The model for classification of each airborne
dd. 5-1-12. Skill Enhancement Training, is designed OE that occurs in domestic airspace includes components
to increase the proficiency of a specialist in a skill or task that are allotted point values corresponding with their
on a position on which the specialist is certified. Based relative significance during the event. To achieve an
on the circumstances unique to a specific error, skill accurate determination, a radar playback, with voice, of
enhancement training need not always be accomplished each airborne OE should be prepared so each event can
prior to an employee continuing operational duties. Skill be viewed repeatedly, if necessary. It is important that
enhancement training shall be based upon the factors OE’s be assessed in a timely manner so field managers
identified during the investigation. are able to make informed operational and personnel
decisions. For these reasons, compliance with the
ee. 5-1-15. a. (3) Documentation Retention, all following procedures is required. If any problems arise
supporting documentation, including the original NTAP which make compliance with these procedures unlikely,
or CDR plot shall be retained in approved electronic coordination with AAT-200 is required.
media, as well as all documentation, i.e. the supervisor’s
return to duty plan, performance skill checks and severity (2) Each applicable OE shall be analyzed and
index chart. assessed by AAT-200 personnel and a determination
made as to the severity of the event. Each OE that
ff. 5-1-15. b. Documentation Retention, preliminary occurs in domestic airspace, under radar control, will be
and final OE reports that are classified as low severity rated and categorized into one of three levels of severity.
and/or OD reports, while retained for 2 1/2 years, shall Most final determinations will be completed within 10
be sanitized after 12 months so that any information, business days of the initial OE call-in to AAT-200.
which could lead to the identification of an employee,
either primary or contributory to the OE/OD, has been (3) After carefully analyzing each event, point
removed. values will be assessed for several operational factors
and once totaled this cumulative number will fall into a
gg. 5-1-15. c. Documentation Retention, all range that defines each category.
references to a specific OE/OD shall be removed from
the employees’ FAA Form 3120-4 and returned to the
employee 2 1/2 years after the incident. All references to
a specific OE classified as a low severity and/or OD shall
be removed from the employees’ FAA Form 3120-4 and
returned to the employee 12 months after the incident.

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7210.56C 8/15/02

jj. 7-1-1. En-route Operational Error Detection addition of the severity index. Elimination of the
Program (OEDP), outlines the en-route procedures to be employees name and addition of employees last six
followed when a facility receives an OEDP alert. digits of their social security number for identification
purposes.
kk. 7-1-2. OEDP Audit, outlines the requirement for
en-route facilities to develop a process to audit their rr. Appendix 9, FAPM 2635 was recently replaced
internal OEDP alert validation process. with the FAA Human Resource Policy Manual. The
interview statement has changed and stipulates that it is
ll. Appendix 1, Radar Data Processing; NTAP, the duty of every employee to give to any supervisor or
SATORI, CDR plots, Radar Audio Playback Terminal official conducting an official investigation or inquiry,
Operations Recording (RAPTOR), Radar View Point, all information and testimony about all matters inquired
MSDT, ATC Plot and other reduction or playback tools of, arising under the law, rules, and regulations
are available to assist in investigations. As technological administered by the FAA. Additionally, it is the
advances are made, the ATC system must adjust to these responsibility of every employee to make themselves
changes and ensure that radar reduction tools are used available as directed so that such an interview may be
correctly and consistently throughout the system in order accomplished (as outlined in FAA Human Resource
to provide the most accurate recreation possible. Policy Manual, ER 4.1 Standards of Conduct). As
appropriate the interview statement shall be read or given
(1) NTAP, SATORI, CDR data, and other to an employee before conducting an interview.
reduction or playback tools shall not be arbitrarily used
as the primary initiating source (triggering event) for ss. Appendix 10, General Reporting Procedures, adds
reporting an OE/OD or commencing an investigation. a quick reference chart for the reporting of all air traffic
However, these reduction/playback tools may be used in incidents.
the investigation of suspected incidents to determine the
amount of separation that existed or the position of tt. Appendix 11, Air Traffic Incident Handling
aircraft. Additionally, these tools may be used for Procedures, adds a generalized quick reference page for
individual employee performance review/improvement specific air traffic incidents and their notification
and/or system/facility evaluation. When this is requirements.
accomplished and a loss of separation is discovered, that
error shall be reported, but attributed to the facility as a uu. Appendix 12, Data Retention adds a quick
facility error. Skill enhancement training may be reference chart for document retention requirements.
assigned to those employees’ determined to be
contributory to these events. However, decertification vv. Appendix 13, adds a quick reference page for the
shall not be imposed. handling of operational errors/deviations and the return
to duty process.
(2) SATORI, RAPTOR or other playback tool
may be used in the investigation of a QAR, suspected
OE/OD, pilot deviation, NMAC, TCAS event,
miscellaneous incident, or accident; to determine the 1-1-5. EFFECTIVE DATE
relative flight tracks, speeds, headings, location and This Order is effective August 15, 2002.
separation of the involved aircraft. These tools may be
used to determine controller and/or pilot performance
and/or involvement in the incident, as well the aircrafts
closest proximity. 1-1-6. RELATED PUBLICATIONS
The following publications are the primary references to
mm. Appendix 1-2, en-route LST 5 measurements be used in coordination with provisions of this order:
data are more precise than NTAP measurements.
Whenever possible a LST 5 shall be used to determine a. FAA Order 3120.4, Air Traffic Technical
closest proximity. Training.
nn. Appendix 1-3, Continuous Data Recording b. FAA Order 7010.1, Air Traffic Evaluations.
(CDR), defines terminal radar data classes.
c. FAA Order 7110.10, Flight Services.
oo. Appendix 1-4, defines CDR extraction and voice
recording procedures. d. FAA Order 7110.65, Air Traffic Control.
pp. Appendix 2 and 3, adds the new preliminary e. FAA Order 7210.3, Facility Operation and
operational error/deviation instructions and report. Administration.
qq. Appendix 3 and 4, FAA Form 7210-3, Final
Operational Error/Deviation Report, changes include,

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8/15/02 7210.56C

f. FAA Order 8020.11, Aircraft Accident and

Incident Notification, Investigation, and Reporting.

1-1-7. USE OF TERMS

First-Level Supervisor shall include the Air Traffic
Manager (ATM) wherever the ATM also performs such
duties.

First-Level Supervisor, ATM, etc., shall include their

official designees, except where specifically noted, for
the purpose of accomplishing roles and responsibilities.

Establish, Designate, Identify, Develop, Waive,

Authorize etc., shall be understood to require such
actions to be specific and in writing.

1-1-8. SCOPE
Quality assurance is a dynamic process used to
continually improve the air traffic system. Although we
will continue to measure the quality of our service by
some historical methods, such as the number of
operational errors, delays, employee and customer
feedback, we must also recognize factors that cannot as
readily be measured. Our willingness to function as a
team, our training, and the actions taken to support the
goal of zero operational errors all factor into quality
assurance. The success of our quality assurance efforts
is dependent on the recognition by the entire air traffic
workforce that all of us, independently and collectively,
must strive to provide the best service possible. We are
all accountable for the quality of that service.

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8/15/02 7210.56C
CHAPTER 2. QUALITY ASSURANCE (QA) PROGRAMS
orders that address OE/OD prevention. In doing so, each
2-1-1. OVERVIEW ATD shall take into account past deficiencies identified
A critical component of any effective quality assurance by AAT-20. In addition, each ATD shall ensure that all
program is problem prevention. This chapter provides a facilities have an OE/OD prevention plan written,
list of proactive quality assurance strategies. While it is approved, and in effect. Each ATD shall also ensure that
by no means all-inclusive, it does provide some ideas existing or revised QA orders are in compliance with this
that may be developed in individual quality assurance order.
programs.
Note:
Individual facility OE/OD prevention plans may be
combined into a single HUB document.
2-1-2. RESPONSIBILITIES
a. Manager, Air Traffic Evaluations and (5) Ensure a "Back to Basics" approach is
Investigations Staff, AAT-20, shall: included in each OE/OD prevention plan. The objective
of a back to basics approach is to reduce and prevent
(1) Provide guidance and assistance to OE/ODs by emphasizing proper use of the basics of air
Regional Air Traffic Divisions to develop their QA traffic control. As a minimum, all facilities shall
Programs. continually emphasize the use of standard phraseology,
the need to ensure pilot read-backs are complete and
(2) Ensure all Air Traffic QA Programs are correct, and the use of position relief checklists during
evaluated through the national evaluation process. position relief briefings. This back to basics approach
can be implemented using a variety of methods such as
(3) Maintain, on file, each regional QA weekly team briefings, staff meetings, increased dialog
program, and provide an annual assessment of those with the workforce during performance related
programs to the Director of Air Traffic, AAT-1. discussions and by posting examples monthly on facility
or QA bulletin boards.
(4) Conduct Investigative Reviews of Air
Traffic Services (IRATS) for facilities with high or (6) Ensure that facility OE/OD prevention
increasing numbers of operational errors or incidents. plans include items pertinent to a particular facility. In
developing OE/OD prevention plans, Air Traffic
(5) With assistance from Regional Quality Managers (ATM) shall consider past deficiencies
Assurance Staffs, identify and recognize air traffic identified by AAT-20.
facilities that:
(7) Ensure that regional/facility OE/OD
(a) Have achieved 1,000,000 error free prevention plans provide the means for identification of
operations. Facilities achieving the significant milestone non-compliance with national, regional, and local facility
of 1,000,000 error free operations shall be presented with directives or standards; identify the cause(s) of the non-
a Certificate from the Director of Air Traffic signifying compliance; immediately rectify occurrences of non-
their inclusion in the "None in a Million" Club. compliance; and eliminate future non-compliance.

(b) Have achieved significant reductions in (8) Provide trend analysis, statistical data,
OE/OD rates. recommendations and other pertinent information to
assist field facilities with their prevention efforts.
b. Regional Air Traffic Division (ATD) Managers Regional Quality Assurance Staffs shall also provide
shall: assistance and support to all terminal facilities to ensure
that all national surface error prevention strategies have
(1) Develop a Regional QA Program. been implemented as required.

(2) Identify which facilities within the region (9) Establish methods for early identification of
shall be required to develop a Facility QA Program. facility operational trends in order to raise facility
operational awareness. OE/OD rates per 100,000
(3) Provide a copy of all Regional and Facility operations will be tracked and distributed to heighten
Quality Assurance Orders and Operational awareness of each facility’s OE/OD trends.
Error/Operational Deviation (OE/OD) prevention plans
to AAT-20. (10) Ensure that towers include a
comprehensive plan to prevent surface incidents, if one is
(4) Annually review existing regional quality not already contained in a separate facility Runway
assurance orders and programs and, as necessary, Incursion Prevention Plan.
develop new quality assurance orders or revise existing

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7210.56C 8/15/02

c. Hub Managers/ATM's shall: OE/OD trends. These procedures shall provide for
appropriate investigation and reporting of observed
(1) Maintain a level of awareness and trends.
involvement in their facility's operations/programs so as
to ensure their maximum quality and efficiency. b. Teamwork. From the following list, include as
a minimum, two items that will instill teamwork within
(2) Develop a Facility QA Program as directed the air traffic control specialist (ATCS) workforce,
by the ATD or Hub manager. administrative workforce, and between facilities, outside
entities, etc.:
(3) Identify which facilities within their Hub
shall be required to develop a Facility QA Program. (1) Air Traffic Teamwork Enhancement
(ATTE) training, internal and external teams.

(2) Teamwork incentive/recognition programs.

2-1-3. PROGRAM CONTENT
QA programs shall establish methods to identify and (3) Roles of different positions/jobs (facility-
correct deficiencies and recognize successes in, as a wide cross training).
minimum, the following four areas:
(4) Supervisor/CIC skills course.
a. Operational Error and Operational Deviation
(OE/OD) Prevention: (5) Team meetings.

(1) From the following list, include, as a (6) Clearly communicated expectations.
minimum, three actions to preclude OE/OD's from
occurring: c. Communications. From the following list,
include as a minimum, four items to improve
(a) Hearback/Readback programs. communications among all employees and create an
atmosphere conducive to the sharing of information:
(b) Surface error prevention programs.
(1) Electronic Bulletin Board System or
(c) Incentive/recognition programs. Internet/Intranet access to data.

(d) Employee of the Month/Quarter (2) National Database - containing facility,

programs. regional and national QA data.

(e) List of good operating practices. (a) http://aat20.faa.gov/

(f) Tape talks/Phraseology Improvement (3) Newsletter(s) - electronic editions where

Programs. possible.

(g) Supplemental, refresher or skill (4) QA seminars and conferences.

enhancement training and/or simulation training.
(5) System wide QA TELCONs.
(h) Personal accounts of lessons learned.
(6) Team briefings on trends and issues.
(i) Periodic QA briefings in the facility
covering trends, customer input, evaluations, etc. (7) All hands meetings.

(j) Aggressive resolution of problems (8) SUPCOM

identified by the Unsatisfactory Condition Report (UCR)
program. (9) Industry reports (e.g. National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) reports, Aviation
(k) Review of Monitor Alert Parameters Safety Reporting System (ASRS), Air Line Pilots
(MAP). Association (ALPA), and Aircraft Owners and Pilots
Association (AOPA) newsletters).
(l) Incorporate previous OE scenarios into
the training program.

(2) Regional QA Programs shall include

procedures for the regular, periodic review of facilities'

2-2 Par 2-1-2

8/15/02 7210.56C

(4) Employee evaluation of shift performance.

d. Customer Service/Feedback. From the
following list, include as a minimum, four items to solicit (5) All hands meetings.
employee and customer feedback (internal/external
customers) regarding the quality of service provided by (6) SUPCOM.
the facility and the organization's impact on other
organizations, users, and individuals: (7) Familiarization flights.

(1) Operation Raincheck/Operation Takeoff. (8) Bargaining unit representatives.

(2) Surveys of internal and external customers. (9) Contacts with user organizations (e.g. Fixed
Base Operators, Flight Schools).
(3) Interaction with other organizations -
NTSB, Flight Standards District Office (FSDO), (10) Pilot safety seminars and airport
Department of Defense (DOD). management workgroups.

Par 2-1-3 2-3 (and 2-4)

INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
8/15/02 7210.56C
CHAPTER 3. TECHNICAL TRAINING DISCUSSIONS

Continuous Data Recording (CDR) playback, Radar

3-1-1. OVERVIEW Audio Playback Terminal Operations Recording
To provide for the continuous enhancement of technical (RAPTOR), the Systematic Air Traffic Operational
proficiency and correction of any performance Research Initiative (SATORI), and any other playback
deficiencies in the air traffic workforce, individualized tool that may be available.
training requirements for technical performance must be
identified and accomplished. FAA Order 3120.4 NOTE:
provides direction on technical proficiency training that SATORI/RAPTOR combines radar data recorded in the
shall be followed in accomplishing the procedures HOST/ARTS/STARS/EARTS computer system and digital
contained in this chapter. voice recordings for a visual and audio display of
information. This allows review of aircraft and air traffic
Technical Training Discussions (TTD's) are intended to situations within requested time and airspace
provide formal feedback from first-level supervisors parameters. SATORI/RAPTOR may be used as a "lessons
regarding an employee’s proficiency and to develop learned" performance management tool to recreate the
plans to enhance their development as appropriate. events that contributed to an OE/OD, incident, accident,
TTD's are not intended to be viewed as "pass/fail", or other operational scenarios.
"satisfactory/unsatisfactory”, to discuss issues of
conduct, nor employee performance in areas outside of (2) Using the appropriate job functions and
air traffic control. TTD's are not intended to be based indicators described in FAA Order 3120.4 as a guide,
upon a single, "snapshot" observation, but rather a develop and direct individualized proficiency training as
summary of observations by the employee’s first-level appropriate.
supervisor, the employee, or other supervisors/staff
specialists within the work unit, since the previous TTD. NOTE:
In preparation, supervisors should document in their Technical performance issues consist of areas of
supervisory notes their own observations, along with knowledge and application that might benefit from
those forwarded by others, as well as formal training. These issues are not necessarily areas of
documentation such as QAR’s, or operational errors. deficiency. An employee may demonstrate overall
acceptable technical proficiency, but might benefit from
EXAMPLE- technical training in the application of a particular skill
Some technical areas that may be addressed: or task.
Phraseology, Interphone Usage, Emergency Handling,
and Impact of Actions, Coordination, Sequencing, Speed (3) At least once every six months, conduct
Control (ground speed vs. indicated airspeed), technical training discussions about the employees’
Application of Visual Separation, Application of Visual individualized proficiency and any assigned training that
approaches, etc. has been accomplished, since the last TTD, and/or will
be conducted to address technical proficiency issues in
the near future. If no new technical proficiency issues
have been identified, a documented discussion shall still
3-1-2. DEFINITIONS take place to advise the employee of this and of regional,
a. Proficiency: Knowing, understanding, and national and/or facility trends. Additionally, these
applying air traffic procedures in a safe and efficient discussions shall be conducted:
manner.
(a) Whenever the first-level
b. Performance: The act of operating in a proficient supervisor identifies an area in an employees’ technical
manner. proficiency that might benefit from individualized
technical training.

(b) No later than 6 months from the

3-1-3. RESPONSIBILITIES employees’ previously documented technical training
a. The first-level supervisor shall accomplish the discussion.
following for each of their employees who are certified
on at least one operational position: (c) No later than 60 days after the
first-level supervisor assumes supervisory responsibility
(1) Continuously assess the employees’ for an employee who has not had a technical training
technical proficiency through both direct and indirect discussion documented during the previous 6 months.
methods. Think of the TTD as a means of addressing not
only performance deficiencies, but a means of addressing
performance improvement as well. Indirect methods
may include remote monitoring, tape reviews,

Par 3-1-1 3-1

7210.56C 8/15/02

NOTE: e. The Employee may:

TTD’s are intended to provide first-level supervisors a
formal process to address or re-address identified (1) Request and receive a tape of his/her own
proficiency issues and maintain a history of proficiency session to facilitate and assist self-development
discussions. activities. The self-critique, if discussed with the
employee’s supervisor, may be included in the
(4) Ensure all technical training identified is employee’s technical training discussion.
completed in a timely manner.

(5) Ensure all discussions conducted under this

chapter are documented as described in paragraph 3-1-4, 3-1-4. DOCUMENTATION
Documentation. a. Each technical training discussion shall be
documented in the employees’ FAA Form 3120-4,
b. Certain first-level supervisors may be unable to Training and Proficiency Record, in accordance with
observe their employees’ technical proficiency on a FAA Order 3120.4.
regular, on-going basis. An example of such a situation
might be supervisors who are not permanently assigned b. A record of discussion documenting the content of
to the same facility as their employees’, or supervisors each TTD shall be retained in the facility's records for 1
whose span of supervision is so broad as to prohibit year from the date of the discussion. FAA Forms 3120-
routine, meaningful observations of all their employees’. 25, -26, or -32 may be used as a guide and/or record of
The ATD Manager may waive the TTD requirements for the discussion. The record of discussion shall contain
employees’ in such cases, provided that alternative the following:
procedures are first established that ensure each
employee receives regular, meaningful observation and (1) Name and signature of the employee and the
feedback on their technical performance, and appropriate first-level supervisor conducting the discussion.
proficiency training. An example of such a program
might be a process for peer review between en-route (2) A review of any operational error and/or
operations supervisors, with specific expectations for operational deviation the employee may have been
direct observations, feedback on areas for improved involved in since the last TTD.
proficiency, and coordination of results with their
immediate supervisors. (3) Any QAR(s) the employee may have been
involved in since the last TTD.
c. Facility staff assigned quality assurance
responsibilities shall: (4) Discussion of trends such as OE/OD, facility
evaluations, etc.
(1) At least once every 12 months complete a
report, describing all technical training that was assigned (5) If no new technical proficiency issues have been
and completed through the TTD process. This report identified, a documented discussion shall still take place.
shall be designed to allow the ATM to identify recurring
and significant proficiency training needs in order to (6) Date discussion was completed.
develop effective future facility training plans.

(2) Notify the employees’ first-level

supervisor, in a timely manner, of any employees’
technical proficiency issues, which they identify through
routine QA initiatives.

d. The ATM shall:

(1) Identify, in writing, facility proficiency

training objectives and ensure those objectives are met.

(2) Identify, in writing, facility technical

performance trends and ensure appropriate follow-up
action is completed.

(3) Ensure that first-level supervisors have

access to employees’ training records, in the course of
their official duties.

3-2 Par 3-1-3

8/15/02 7210.56C
CHAPTER 4. AIR TRAFFIC INCIDENTS

traffic control (includes surface incidents involving

4-1-1. DEFINITIONS aircraft operated by non-pilots, such as mechanics).
There are several types of incidents that adversely affect
the capabilities of air traffic control (ATC) facilities to b. The following definitions are for incidents whose
provide safe, orderly, and expeditious movement of air reporting procedures are provided for by this chapter:
traffic:
(1) Emergency – a distress or urgent situation that
a. The following incidents are defined and FAA requires special handling of an aircraft by air traffic
Order 8020.11 provides for their reporting procedures: (AT); includes giving priority that may result in delays to
other aircraft.
(1) Aircraft Accident – an occurrence associated
with the operation of an aircraft which takes place (2) Flight Assist - when in-flight assistance is
between the time any person boards the aircraft with the provided to an aircraft in a potentially dangerous
intention of flight and until such time as all such persons situation.
have disembarked, and in which any person suffers death
or serious injury, or in which the aircraft receives (3) Military Facility Deviation - an operational
substantial damage. error or operational deviation that involves delegated AT
responsibilities performed by a military facility,
(2) Near Midair Collision (NMAC) – an incident including all Authorization for Interceptor Operations
associated with the operation of an aircraft in which the (AFIO) deviations.
possibility of collision occurs as a result of proximity of
less than 500 feet to another aircraft, or a report is NOTE:
received from a pilot or flight crewmember stating that a This classification does not include instances when
collision hazard existed between two or more aircraft. approved separation minima are used between military
aircraft that are less than those used by the FAA.
(a) Workload permitting, notify any
member of a flight-crew receiving air traffic control (4) Spill Out - an excursion of an IFR or VFR
services who expresses concern about the proximity of military aircraft, or a civil aircraft contracted to the
another aircraft to contact facility representatives. Use military, including remotely operated aircraft, from the
the following phraseology, “(aircraft identification) exterior boundary of Special Use Airspace (SUA)
advise you contact (facility) at (telephone number)”. allocated to military using agencies into other controlled
airspace without coordination or prior approval. SUA
(b) Upon receiving any telephone call includes Altitude Reservations (ALTRV); ATC Assigned
from a flight crewmember that expresses concern about Airspace (ATCAA); Military Operations Areas (MOA);
the proximity of another aircraft, the Military Training Routes (MTR); Prohibited, Restricted,
supervisor/controller-in-charge shall ask the caller if and Warning Areas.
he/she desires to file a formal near midair collision
report. All such calls shall be taken on a recorded line, if (5) Surface Incident (SI) - any event where
available. unauthorized or unapproved movement occurs within the
movement area associated with the operation of an
(3) Pilot Deviation – the actions of a pilot that aircraft that affects or could affect the safety of flight.
result in the violation of a Federal Aviation Regulation or
a North American Aerospace Defense (Command Air NOTE:
Defense Identification Zone) tolerance. Surface incidents result from Pilot Deviations,
Operational Errors, Vehicle or Pedestrian Deviations, or
(a) When it appears that the actions of a Operational Deviations.
pilot constitute a possible pilot deviation, notify the pilot,
workload permitting, using the following phraseology (6) Runway Incursion - any occurrence at an
“(aircraft identification) possible pilot deviation, advise airport involving an aircraft, vehicle, person, or object on
you contact (facility) at (telephone number)”. the ground that creates a collision hazard or results in a
loss of separation with an aircraft. The occurrence may
NOTE: involve a pilot taking off, intending to take off, landing,
These classifications include TCAS RA, spill outs and or intending to land.
controlled airspace intrusions that result in a loss of
separation. NOTE:
Runway incursions result from one of three types of
(4) Vehicle and Pedestrian Deviation – any entry airport surface incidents: pilot deviations, operational
or movement on the airport movement area by a vehicle errors, and vehicle or pedestrian deviations.
operator or pedestrian that has not been authorized by air

Par 4-1-1 4-1

7210.56C 8/15/02

c. Operational Errors and Operational Deviations the interview and attach facsimile copies of the pertinent
(OE/OD) are defined and their reporting procedures records.
provided for in Chapter 5.
NOTE:
FSS's are responsible for the immediate delivery of the
request message (either by telephone or hand delivery)
4-1-2. GENERAL HANDLING to addressees in their flight planning area.
PROCEDURES
In addition to any procedures provided for by other FAA c. Telegraphic Notification. Any incident that
orders and other sections of this document, the following warrants telegraphic notification will require adherence
procedures shall be applied to all air traffic incidents to the following procedures:
addressed in paragraph 4-1-1, Definitions:
(1) The message shall be a numbered operational
a. Compiling Information. The facility first learning priority message.
of or primarily involved in an incident shall obtain and
complete a summary of the pertinent data immediately (2) No part of the message shall exceed twenty
upon learning of the incident, or as soon thereafter as lines, as that will cause an incomplete message to be
duties permit, to meet the reporting time requirements for relayed.
the particular incident. A reference to this incident shall
be logged on FAA Form 7230-4, Daily Record of (3) The originating facility shall obtain and
Facility Operation as a Quality Assurance Review record an acknowledgment from each addressee.
(QAR), as outlined in paragraph 4-1-3, Quality
Assurance Review. d. Post-Incident Coordination. As part of the initial
process for handling accidents or serious incidents, it is
b. Incidents Involving More Than One Facility. imperative that facilities remain aware of the potential
personal impact to involved individuals and to any
(1) The ATM's of the involved facilities shall special needs or requests that may develop as a result.
cooperate in the investigation and the preparation of the To that end, the ATD must ensure that appropriate
final report. regional counterparts are kept abreast of developing
information so that they may participate in subsequent
(2) If circumstances prevent collaboration, the decisions affecting facility personnel.
facility most involved shall prepare the final report and
provide a copy to the other. (1) ATM's shall, following a major aircraft
accident or serious incident; contact the regional ATD
(3) Do not submit individual reports on the same and provide an assessment of the personal affect on
incident. facility personnel. Additionally, any proposed personnel
action that results from the incident shall be coordinated
(4) When facility or regional boundaries overlap, with the appropriate regional offices.
send a copy of the final report to each ATD involved.
(2) ATD Managers shall ensure that subsequent
(5) When an incident occurs and it is suspected coordination is accomplished as necessary with the
that other facilities may have provided services (flight Aviation Medical Division, Human Resource
plan, pilot briefing, radio contact, etc.), transmit a Management Division, as well as the Assistant Chief
priority FF message on Service B to all facilities as Counsel. Employee Assistance Program Coordinators or
follows (text only): "Advise whether any services Contractors should also be alerted to the potential need
provided (aircraft identification) today (or specify date). of their services. Additionally, any proposed personnel
Negative replies requested." action that results from the incident shall be coordinated
with AAT-20 before initiation.
(a) Limit the reply to the message reference,
the aircraft identification, the services provided, and the e. Coordination with Regional Counsel. Incidents
time and the date the records will be forwarded. resulting in personal injury or property damage may
result in a lawsuit. In such event, the files and records
EXAMPLE- relating to the investigation and any actions taken may be
(text only): Reference message from your office subject to disclosure to the attorneys for the litigants and
(RUMES) (date-time) N1235M. Pilot briefed 1410, VFR produced in court. Therefore, coordinate follow-up
flight plan filed. Records will be mailed (date). actions with the Regional Counsel. The purpose of this
action is not to minimize or restrict actions but to provide
assurance that the findings upon which the action is
(b) After interviewing the employee taken contain no misleading language resulting in
involved, if necessary, prepare a narrative summary of possible liability to the agency or the individual.

4-2 Par 4-1-1

8/15/02 7210.56C

pilot was adequate.

4-1-3. QUALITY ASSURANCE REVIEW
(QAR) [3] Determine whether a controller's radar vectors
For the ATC system to be effective, it is essential that all resulted in an instrument approach intercept inside the
system deficiencies be identified and corrected. Serious final approach fix.
system deficiencies may be involved in air traffic
incidents that fall outside of the definitions and c. The ATM shall designate the personnel
corrective procedures for OE/OD's. QAR's provide an responsible for the conduct of QAR's. This designation
opportunity for the identification, investigation, and may be made on a permanent, or ad hoc basis.
resolution through corrective training of these identified
deficiencies. d. Conduct the QAR in sufficient detail so as to
assess the system performance with reasonable accuracy.
a. Conduct a QAR for all of the following when air The detail of a QAR may range from simply discussing
traffic control services are involved: the situation with the involved employees, to a full
investigation that may include reviewing recorded radar
(1) Aircraft accidents. data and voice communications from the incident (see
paragraph 5-1-5a, Investigative Process, Fact Finding,
(2) Air traffic incidents other than OE/OD's. for investigative sources to consider).

NOTE: e. The result of a QAR that involves an employee

QAR's are not required for incidents preliminarily shall be communicated to the affected employee as soon
identified as OE/OD's. As such reviews would be as practical, normally the employees’ next assigned shift
redundant to OE/OD investigative/corrective procedures and forwarded to the employees’ first-level supervisor
(see Chapter 5 AT OE/OD Investigation and Reporting). for review.

(3) Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System f. Accomplish appropriate corrective training for all
(TCAS) Resolution Advisory (RA) Reports. identified employee technical proficiency deficiencies.
Training shall be administered in accordance with FAA
(4) Operational Error Detection Program (OEDP) Order 3120.4.
alert.
NOTE:
(5) Other miscellaneous incidents or reports that In cases of serious technical performance deficiencies,
involve a loss of separation. appropriate training may include decertification and
remedial training if documented performance history
(6) Public inquiries regarding air traffic control warrants.
services provided during a specific operation; e.g. flight
crewmember, passenger, or media inquiries. g. Communicate the conclusions of the QAR,
including those finding no employee performance
(7) Interfacility traffic management initiatives that deficiency, to the ATM.
cause “NO NOTICE GROUND STOPS” or “NO
NOTICE AIRBORNE HOLDING”. h. Record notification of the QAR initiating incident
and conclusion of its review on FAA Form 7230-4, Daily
NOTE: Record of Facility Operation, in accordance with FAA
Both the initiating and receiving facilities shall conduct Order 7210.3.
a review of these interfacility initiatives. The review
shall include the causes and the effects of these i. Notify AAT-200 through the Regional Operations
initiatives. Center (ROC), along with the ATD and the Washington
Operations Center (WOC) within 3 hours of any
b. Determine in a QAR whether employee occurrence that results in less than standard separation.
performance, procedures, and/or equipment may have
contributed to, increased the severity of, or unreasonably NOTE:
failed to mitigate the initiating incident. When reporting operational errors/deviations, follow the
reporting procedures in paragraph 5-1-3, Initial
EXAMPLE- Investigations.
[1] In review of a pilot deviation resulting in a runway
incursion, determine whether a local controller's
scanning of movement areas was adequate.

[2] In review of an aircraft accident, determine whether

an in-flight specialist's weather briefing to the involved

Par 4-1-3 4-3

7210.56C 8/15/02

j. Notify the ATD through the ROC within 3 hours Flight Assist Report, and include the pilot's name and
of the occurrence of all surface pilot deviations, vehicle address if obtainable. Instructions for completing FAA
runway deviations, “NO NOTICE GROUND STOPS”, Form 7230-6, Flight Assist Report are contained in
“NO NOTICE AIRBORNE HOLDING”, and any other Appendix 7 Instructions for FAA Form 7230-6, Flight
safety related incidents, regardless of whether standard Assist Report.
separation was lost. This requirement is supplemental to
the requirements contained in FAA Order 8020.11. b. When another pilot helps in providing flight
assistance, obtain the assisting pilot's name and address,
k. Retain all suspected air traffic incidents (listed via telephone, and include in Item 16 of FAA Form
above) and supporting data that are investigated and 7230-6, Flight Assist Report.
determined to be a non-occurrence for 45 days.
c. Prepare FAA Form 7230-6, Flight Assist Report
NOTE: within 10 administrative days of the occurrence and
Retain all supporting documentation including; certified include the following:
re-recordings of the pertinent voice tapes, employee
statements, and NTAP/CDR data in electronic format (1) The pilot's name and address, if obtainable,
used to determine the event was a non-occurrence. in Item 16.
Facilities that determine the event was a non-occurrence
based on a printed NTAP or CDR Plot (i.e. significant (2) If the assistance was of an outstanding
target jump) shall retain both the original paper printout nature, enter the word "Outstanding" at the top center of
and an electronic copy. the form.

(3) If a pilot helps in providing assistance,

include their name in Item 16.
4-1-4. EMERGENCIES
a. When appropriate, make emergency notification (4) Indicate in Item 16 when an FAA Form
using FAA Form 8020-3, Facility Accident/Incident 8020-17, Preliminary Pilot Deviation Report, is filed as a
Notification Record. result of a flight assist.

b. Compile the information and document on FAA (5) For outstanding flight assists, indicate in
Form 7230-4, Daily Record of Facility Operation, the item 17 the name of the employee primarily responsible
events, the notifications, and the termination of the for the assist. All other names in item 17 will be
emergency. considered as having provided additional assistance.

c. Notify AAT-200, the ATD, and the appropriate d. Pilot Recognition:

FSDO through the ROC/WOC whenever:
(1) The ATM shall review the circumstances
(1) The aircraft involved is an air carrier, a when a pilot aids in providing flight assistance. If
commuter, or an air taxi; or appropriate, write a letter of recognition. Attach a copy
to FAA Form 7230-6, Flight Assist Report.
(2) The aircraft is carrying members of
Congress or prominent persons; or (2) When pilot assistance is of an outstanding
nature, the ATD shall review the circumstances, and if
(3) The emergency is or may become appropriate, prepare a regional level letter of recognition.
newsworthy by coming to the attention of the public or
the news media. e. Distribute FAA Form 7230-6, Flight Assist
Report as follows, and indicate on the original to whom
d. Prepare FAA Form 8020-11, Incident Report in the copies are routed:
accordance with FAA Order 8020.11. For significant
emergencies (e.g., involving air carriers, air taxis, or (1) The original to the facility's files.
prominent persons), immediately notify AAT-200, ATD
ROC/WOC by telephone, and forward a preliminary (2) The ATD.
report within 3 hours.
(3) ATX-400.

(4) The FSDO.

4-1-5. FLIGHT ASSISTS
a. Report instances where a pilot is provided in- (5) Others as determined by the ATD.
flight assistance to the appropriate FSDO through the
ROC within 3 hours of the occurrence. Obtain the f. Process Annual National and regional
information required to complete FAA Form 7230-6, Outstanding Flight Assist Award as follows:

4-4 Par 4-1-3

8/15/02 7210.56C

1. Annual National and Regional Outstanding b. Distribute the report as follows:

Flight Assist Awards recognize employees whose actions
contribute significantly to the safety of aviation. The (1) Original to the ATD.
selection of an outstanding flight assist will be judged on
the basis of operational efficiency. Factors to be (2) Facility's files.
considered are the method used, expediency of the assist,
circumstances surrounding the flight assist, analytical (3) AAT-20.
decision exhibited, timely action, the all-out effort
demonstrated, and any other special factors that are (4) Military Distribution:
appropriate.
(a) Designated Regional Office Military
2. Each region may submit three nominations representative.
(one per option: en-route, terminal and flight service).
(b) Send one copy to the facility’s major
3. Each nomination is expected to include a command (MAJCOM/MACOM). Obtain
narrative statement describing the details of the flight MAJCOM/MACOM information from the facility or the
assist, a copy of FAA Form 7230-6, Flight Assist Report, appropriate regional military representative.
a certified voice recording of the flight assist, and any
other documentation relative to the occurrence. 1. Air Force
HQ AFFSA/XAES
4. Nominations for the preceding year must be 1535 Command Drive
received by the Program Director of Air Traffic Suite D-309
Resource Management, ATX-1, by February 15. Andrews AFB, MD 20762 –7002

NOTE: 2. Army
An employee is limited to one monetary award for a US Army Aeronautical Services
single contribution. Therefore, it is recommended that Agency
regional or facility awards are not made until it is ATTN: Chief, Airspace Support
determined that the occurrence does not warrant a Division
national award. 9325 Gunston Road
Bldg 1466, Suite N-319
Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-5582
4-1-6. MILITARY FACILITY 3. Navy/Marine
DEVIATIONS Chief, Air Traffic Branch
a. The AT facility or representative (ATREP, CNO N885F
RADLO, etc.) noting or receiving information about a Navy Department
military facility deviation shall report the occurrence Washington, DC 20350-2000
immediately to the respective ATD.

(1) The report number shall be composed of 4-1-7. SPILL OUTS

the letter "M", followed by the last digit of the calendar
year, a slant line, and the sequential number of military Spill out reporting is a non-punitive program to identify
facility deviations forwarded by the reporting FAA design and/or procedural problems with special use
office. Use a new sequence of numbers beginning airspace. Facilities shall report all spill outs and forward
January 1 of each year. the following information to AAT-20 through the ATD,
ROC, and the WOC with an information copy to
(2) Report the deviation in narrative form by Manager, Special Operations Division, ATP-200, via
memorandum within 10 administrative days of the data communications Service B message, within 3 hours
occurrence. Prepare the report as follows: of the incident.

(a) Include a chronological summary of a. If the spill out resulted in a loss of separation or
the incident. Details shall be as complete as security report of a NMAC with another aircraft outside the SUA,
considerations and data availability will permit. report the incident as a pilot deviation and forward the
following information to AAT-20 via the Washington
(b) Include a brief statement of the Operations Center (WOC) within 3 hours of the incident:
probable cause or causes if the available data is sufficient
to make these conclusions. (1) Reporting facility.

(c) Include recommendations, as (2) Date and time (UTC) of the incident.
appropriate, to preclude a recurrence of the event. .

Par 4-1-5 4-5

7210.56C 8/15/02

(3) Aircraft identification. reporting controller of the outcome of the enforcement

action.
(4) Type, number, and equipment suffix of
aircraft. 4-1-9. INVALID MODE C REPORTING
(5) Location (VOR with DME Fix). a. In order to track and report aircraft with
transponders equipped with invalid Mode C readouts
(6) Altitude of incident. whose pilots have been advised to stop the altitude
squawk, facility managers shall provide guidance in a
(7) Type of flight plan, i.e. IFR or VFR. facility directive(s) to ensure that a designated facility
officer compiles a weekly list of invalid Mode C reports
(8) Branch of Military service of aircraft. and forwards this report to the Regional Flight Standards
Division. This report may be forwarded electronically
(9) Special Use Airspace Name. with the concurrence of the Regional Flight Standards
Division and shall include:
(10) Special Use Airspace Type.
(1) Aircraft registration number/call sign.
(11) Using Agency Name.
(2) UTC date and UTC time of the incident.
(12) Type of control of using agency (ATC or
MRU). (3) Assigned altitude and Mode C reported altitude.

(13) Controlling facility. (4) Facility 3-character identifier and facility type.

(14) Was there a loss of separation? NOTE: A negative report is not required.

(a) Call sign/Tail number.

4-1-10. SURFACE INCIDENTS AND
(b) Type aircraft.
RUNWAY INCURSIONS
(c) Closest proximity.
a. For significant surface incidents and runway
(15) Summary of events. incursions (e.g., involving air carriers, air taxis, or
prominent persons), in addition to routine reporting
procedures, notify the ATD, regional airports division,
AAT-20, and the WOC through the ROC by telephone.
4-1-8. AIRSPACE INTRUSIONS
Intrusions are reported as pilot deviations in accordance b. Notify airport management of all surface
with FAA Order 8020.11. incidents, regardless of type, by the close of business the
next administrative day. If previously reported incidents
a. ATM's (excluding AFSS and FSS managers) shall are determined to be runway incursions, inform the
provide guidance in facility directives for the tracking airport operator of the status change.
and identification of aircraft that enter:

(1) Class A or B airspace without authorization.

(2) Class C or D airspace without establishing

communications with air traffic control (ATC).

(3) Special Use Airspace, e.g. Temporary Flight

Restriction (TFR), prohibited areas, and other restricted
airspace without authorization.

NOTE:
The Chief Counsel's office has instructed the Regional
Counsel offices to include the ATD on their distribution
lists for notification following final enforcement action
on controlled area intrusions.

b. When enforcement action is taken as a result of a

controlled area intrusion, the ATD shall be responsible
for ensuring notification through the facility ATM to the

4-6 Par 4-1-7

8/15/02 7210.56C
CHAPTER 5. AIR TRAFFIC OPERATIONAL ERRORS AND DEVIATIONS,
INVESTIGATION AND REPORTING
or a playback tool will be initially classified as a low
5-1-1. DEFINITIONS severity, if all indications are that at least 80% separation
a. Operational Error: An occurrence attributable to minima was maintained. See Chapter 6, Severity Index.
an element of the air traffic system in which:
d. Operational Duties: Duties that require an
(1) Less than the applicable separation minima employee to issue or relay an ATC clearance or
results between two or more aircraft, or between an instruction; make a control decision that will affect
aircraft and terrain or obstacles (e.g., operations below coordination; perform a strip marking function or update
minimum vectoring altitude (MVA); equipment / computer generated information that may be used by an
personnel on runways), as required by FAA Order AT controller to make a control decision; or supervise
7110.65 or other national directive; or these duties.

(2) An aircraft lands or departs on a runway e. Operational Error/Operational Deviation Steering

closed to aircraft operations after receiving air traffic Committee: As established by Memorandum of
authorization. Understanding (MOU) to address national quality
assurance issues contained within this order and other
(3) An aircraft lands or departs on a runway matters including, but not limited to, trend analysis,
closed to aircraft operations, at an uncontrolled airport program effectiveness, compliance, and ongoing positive
and it was determined that a NOTAM regarding the efforts. The committee meets as necessary to review and
runway closure was not issued to the pilot as required. address quality assurance matters. The steering
committee is comprised of two representatives from
b. Operational Deviation: An occurrence attributable NATCA and two representatives from AAT-20.
to an element of the air traffic system in which
applicable separation minima as referenced in paragraph f. Controlled Event: An operational error where the
5-1-1a, Operational Error was maintained, but: AT employee was aware of the impending conflict and
takes corrective action to increase the separation.
(1) Less than the applicable separation minima
existed between an aircraft and adjacent airspace without g. Uncontrolled Event: An operational error where
prior approval; or the AT employee was unaware of the conflict, takes no
corrective action and/or became aware of the conflict but
(2) An aircraft penetrated airspace that was did not have enough time to effectively mitigate the loss
delegated to another position of operation or another of separation.
facility without prior coordination and approval; or
h. Severity Index: A method to determine the
(3) An aircraft penetrated airspace that was gravity, or degree that the separation standard was
delegated to another position of operation or another violated, for operational errors that occur in-flight.
facility at an altitude or route contrary to the altitude or
route requested and approved in direct coordination or as i. OE Causal Factors: The Air Traffic Evaluations
specified in a letter of agreement (LOA), pre- and Investigations Staff, AAT-20, in coordination with
coordination, or internal procedure; or the Office of Aerospace Medicine’s Human Resources
Research Division, AAM-500, analyzes, FAA Form
(4) An aircraft is either positioned and/or routed 7210-3, Final Operational Error/Deviation Reports to
contrary to that which was coordinated individually or; compile statistics and determine trends regarding the
as specified in a LOA/directive between positions of causal factors for OE/D’s.
operation in either the same or a different facility; or
Based on that analytical information and as a quality
NOTE: assurance initiative to further reduce the potential for
This does not apply to inter/intra-facility traffic OE/D’s system-wide, AAT-20 has identified certain
management initiatives. checklist items that, when rated as problematic during
evaluations, indicate that the facility’s potential for
(5) An aircraft, vehicle, equipment, or personnel experiencing an OE/D is increased.
encroached upon a landing area that was delegated to
another position of operation without prior coordination
and approval.

c. Technical Violation: Operational errors that are

classified as low severity and all operational deviations.
Operational errors that cannot be reviewed by radar data

Par 5-1-1 5-1

7210.56C 8/15/02

promptly as operational and staffing conditions permit.

5-1-2. SUSPECTED EVENT This action is intended to allow employees’ an
a. In order to maintain an effective Air Traffic opportunity to review the voice recordings and prepare
System, it is imperative that we identify all deficiencies draft statements while the circumstances are fresh in
within our system and take appropriate corrective actions their minds. The relief of an employee from operational
necessary to fix any associated problems. Operational duty also provides the employee the opportunity to
errors and deviations are reported for just that reason, so participate in the preliminary investigation. Initial
those problems (either systemic or individual) can be written statements should be completed prior to initial
corrected to enhance system integrity. The identification AAT-200 notification.
of operational errors and deviations without fear of
reprisal is an absolute requirement and is the NOTE:
responsibility of all of us who work within our system. It may be necessary for involved employees’
participating in suspected OE/OD investigations to
b. Accordingly, it remains Air Traffic Policy that any remain in the facility beyond their scheduled shift in
employee who is aware of any occurrence that may be an order to complete their statement, be interviewed, and
operational error, deviation, or air traffic incident (as participate in the initial investigation.
defined in paragraph 4-1-1, Definitions), immediately
report the occurrence to any available supervisor, c. Gather flight progress strips, weather data, and
controller-in-charge (CIC) or management official. other pertinent information. If another facility is
involved, that facility shall provide the reporting
c. Employees’ shall verbally provide the preliminary facility's supervisor with all the pertinent data necessary
information, of which they have knowledge, when for the timely completion of the preliminary report.
requested by the supervisor, controller-in-charge (CIC)
or management official to make an initial determination d. Review voice recordings; denote the difference in
as to whether an investigation is warranted. This phase the system times and, as soon as feasible; prepare a
is meant only to determine the need of an investigation cassette re-recording from the original to be used as a
and is not investigatory. Therefore, Union representation working tape.
is not required at this time.
e. Review available radar data; denote the difference
in the system times, e.g., National Track Analysis
Program (NTAP), or Continuous Data Recording (CDR)
5-1-3. INITIAL INVESTIGATIONS data, etc. See Appendix 1, Radar Data Processing.
The initial investigation is intended to be fact finding in
nature. It has been designed to determine what occurred f. Review appropriate computer data and denote the
in the system, to ensure corrective action is initiated to difference in the system times;
maintain system integrity, and to report significant
events to higher levels of management. (1) Data Analysis Reduction Tool (DART).

NOTE: (2) Airport Movement Area Safety System

There are occasions when it is appropriate for higher (AMASS).
levels of management to require further review of a
suspected incident, and this further review may result in (3) Tower Data Link Services (TDLS).
the discovery of an incident not previously identified.
(4) Pre-departure Clearance (PDC).
The operations supervisor or the controller-in-charge
when a supervisor is not available, with ATM (5) User Request Evaluation Tool (URET).
concurrence, shall determine the validity of suspected
OE/OD's and, if valid, shall ensure the following is (6) Core Capability Limited Deployment
accomplished: (CCLD).

NOTE: (7) Controller Pilot Data Link Communications

Other facility personnel shall assist the operations (CPDLC) messages.
supervisor and/or controller-in-charge in gathering data
to conduct the initial investigation, whenever feasible. (8) Operational and Supportability Improvement
System (OASIS) or Model 1.
a. When information indicates that an OE/OD may
have occurred in another facility, promptly advise that
facility's operational supervisor-in-charge.

b. Provide relief to any employee who appears to be

involved in the incident from all operational duties as

5-2 Par 5-1-2

8/15/02 7210.56C

EXAMPLE – NOTE:
DART printouts will indicate a chronological sequence Once AAT-200 receives this official report of the OE, the
of textual CPDLC transactions. Individual CPDLC AAT-200 specialist will issue a preliminary severity
messages are stored in the Data Link Applications classification in accordance with Chapter 6, Severity
Processor (DLAP) temporary file as a binary encoded Index for return to duty purposes.
message and can be printed out in a text format for
review. k. If an employee is believed to be primary or
contributory:
NOTE:
Most of these new systems retain data on their individual (1) For an operational error/deviation initially
hard drives, which are automatically deleted after 15 classified as low severity by AAT-200, the employee
days. It is the ATM’s responsibility to advise Airways shall be returned to operational duty in accordance with
Facilities, in a timely manner, so they may extract this paragraph 5-1-9b, Return to Operational Duty.
data onto a storable/retainable electronic media. The
pertinent data shall then be retained with the required (a) In cases where AAT-200 cannot
incident file. complete a preliminary severity classification within one
hour of official notification to AAT-200, and initial
g. Conduct preliminary interviews with involved indications are that at least 80% of the separation minima
employees’. Efforts should be made to complete these was maintained, the employee shall be returned to
interview(s) prior to the initial AAT-200 notification. operational duty as stated above,

h. Notify the ATM of the OE/OD. (b) In the event the classification later
indicates a moderate or high severity, a controller may be
i. Ensure that FAA Form 7210-2, Preliminary required to complete skill enhancement training, if such
Operational Error/Deviation Investigation, is completed. training is appropriate.

NOTE: (2) For operational errors classified as moderate

When writing the summary, be as clear and concise as or high severity and if the employees’ overall
possible using who, what, when, where, and how, to documented performance history warrants, he/she shall
describe the entire events. Instructions for completing not be assigned to operational duties until the provisions
FAA Form 7210-2 are contained in Appendix 2 and shall of paragraph 5-1-9, Return to Operational Duty, are met.
include pertinent actions of the pilot(s) and air traffic
control leading up to the event and any subsequent l. If the preliminary investigation reveals that certain
action. employees’ first believed to be primary/contributory
were not, they may be returned to duty without further
j. Notify AAT-200 and the ATD through action. If these employees’ have knowledge of the
ROC/WOC by telephone within 3 hours from the time events, obtain their views and recommendations.
the occurrence is first reported or suspected with the
following information/data: m. If an operational supervisor, by virtue of
performing supervisory duties, or a controller while
NOTE: performing CIC duties, is believed to be
The intent of the time limit is not to preclude a primary/contributory to a suspected OE/OD, that
continuation of the preliminary investigation. However, employee shall not be assigned supervisory/CIC duties
it is intended to ensure that AAT-200 is aware of until the provisions of paragraph 5-1-9, Return to
reported or suspected events within 3 hours of Operational Duty, are met.
occurrence. If you are unable to meet the 3-hour
requirement an extension shall be requested from n. When the initial investigation results in a
AAT-200. determination of a non-occurrence, retain for 45 days, all
data used in the investigation process. For example,
(1) A completed FAA Form 7210-2. pilot/controller statements, record of conversations,
original NTAP and CDR plot(s) in an approved
(2) En-route; a reduced copy of the NTAP with electronic format, used in a determination of a non-
LST 5 text data shall be faxed to AAT-200. occurrence, as well as any other pertinent data not
otherwise required to be retained. Facilities that
(3) Terminal; a copy of the CDR plot with the determine the event was a non-occurrence based on a
associated separation data shall be faxed to AAT-200. printed NTAP or CDR Plot (i.e. significant target jump)
shall retain both the original paper printout and an
electronic copy.

Par 5-1-3 5-3

7210.56C 8/15/02

(12) Weather.
5-1-4. MULTIPLE LOSSES OF
SEPARATION DURING A SINGLE (13) Position configuration.
EVENT
(14) Coordination procedures.
a. During a single event where multiple losses of
standard separation are reported/discovered, and are
(15) Airport environment:
determined to be the result of employee actions or
inaction, each instance of a loss of separation shall be
(a) Runway markings.
reported individually by completing a separate FAA
Form 7210-2 and FAA Form 7210-3. Each form should
(b) Ramp use.
describe the individual loss of separation, including a
reference, if necessary for clarity, to the other related
(c) Areas of poor visibility (blind spots, fog).
incidents.
(d) Runway configuration.
b. When a singular failure of a employee to ensure
separation between two aircraft (or an aircraft and
(e) Airport Congestion.
terrain) that subsequently creates a chain reaction of
additional losses of separation between other pairs of
(f) Surface Conditions (rain, ice, snow)
aircraft or terrain, the multiple losses of separation shall
be considered as a single event only for return to
(16) Human factors.
operational duty purposes, performance skill checks, and
training actions/plans. If combined, these actions and/or
(17) Compare the system time of any pertinent
documentation shall be based on the higher of severity
equipment.
classification assigned.
(18) Staffing levels and/or position assignments
c. The individual separation losses may be combined
based on proficiency vs. complexity/volume.
as one event for the purposes of entries onto FAA Form
3120-1, Section VI.
(19) Radar Data (see Appendix 1, Radar Data
Processing).

5-1-5. INVESTIGATIVE PROCESS b. Interviews. Certain information, which is

necessary to complete FAA Forms 7210-2 and 7210-3,
a. Fact Finding. The investigation of an OE/OD must
must be obtained from the employees’ involved. Since
entail an in-depth inquiry into all causal factors. The
many employees’ in the facility, e.g., controllers, air
following should be considered for a comprehensive
traffic assistants, and supervisors may be knowledgeable
investigation:
of, or a party to the incident, interviews with all possibly
involved personnel shall be held. It is imperative that
(1) Facility procedures.
these interviews be conducted in an atmosphere of
shared concern as to the events leading to and
(2) Facility training.
surrounding the incident. When an interview is
conducted, the following shall apply:
(3) Facility supervision.
(1) As appropriate the Interview Statement shall
(4) Equipment.
be read or given to an employee before conducting an
interview (see Appendix 9, Interview Statement).
(5) Control environment.
(2) An employee who is a member of a
(6) External factors.
bargaining unit may elect to have a union representative
present during the interview, in accordance with the
(7) Controller action vs. inaction.
applicable negotiated agreement.
(8) Airspace configuration.

(9) Traffic flow/volume/initiatives.

(10) Pilot actions, including the consequence of

any Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System
(TCAS) event.

(11) Route of flight or taxi route, as appropriate.

5-4 Par 5-1-4

8/15/02 7210.56C

(3) An employee who is interviewed shall be

afforded the opportunity to submit written comments and (3) Designate the Investigator-In-Charge (IIC). The
recommendations to the ATM within 5-calendar days of IIC may be designated on a rotational or permanent
the interview. The comments shall include the basis. Supervisory personnel or facility staff shall
employees’ name, position function, and location of perform the IIC function. If the only facility officer is
employment. The employees’ signature shall be affixed the ATM, and there are no assigned supervisors, the
to the end of the statement and dated. Recommendations ATM performs the IIC functions.
should concern corrective actions that can be undertaken
to preclude a similar occurrence. (4) Designate a team to assist the IIC in the
investigation of each OE/OD. The ATM shall determine
(4) Interviews shall be conducted by supervisory the size and composition of the team, but shall as a
personnel, designated IIC's or the ATM. Investigative minimum afford:
team members, other than the involved employees’, may
participate in the interviews. (a) A Union designated representative
reasonable opportunity to participate as a member of the
(5) Every effort shall be made to conduct investigative team.
interviews during the employees’ regularly assigned shift
and within the employees’ assigned facility. (b) Employees’ believed to be
primary/contributory to the event reasonable opportunity
c. Voice Recordings. to participate in the investigative process, except during
the interview of other employees’.
(1) Two certified cassette re-recordings, one
marked "Original" and the other marked "Copy", shall be (5) Ensure FAA Form 7210-3 is completed.
made from the original voice recording that shall include Instructions for completing FAA Form 7210-3 are
the time track, when available both tapes shall be contained in Appendix 4.
retained in the OE/OD file. Certification and labeling of
these cassettes shall be in accordance with FAA Order b. The ATM of any other involved facility shall be
8020.11. Include all communications for a period of 5 responsible for providing the reporting facility with
minutes before initial contact to 5 minutes after the last information and assistance as required. This may require
contact with each position involved in the OE/OD. When an investigation on the same scale as the reporting
re-recordings are made from digital voice recording facility, in which case the ATM shall have the same
system (DVRS) equipment, this period will be from the responsibilities as defined under paragraph 5-1-3, Initial
call file immediately proceeding and immediately after Investigations. The ATM of any other involved facility
the 5 minute before and after requirement. shall also be responsible for retaining all pertinent
original data until notified of release by AAT-20.
(2) If the above period exceeds 30 minutes, the
ATD manager may approve, for the specific OE/OD, c. The IIC is responsible for conducting a complete
limiting the recording to that period pertinent to the investigation and shall be the final authority for the
incident. findings and recommendations to be submitted to the
ATM. In addition the IIC shall:

(1) Ensure that all pertinent data has been collected

5-1-6. ATM RESPONSIBILITIES and documented in Part I of FAA Form 7210-3 and
a. The ATM of the facility whose personnel were distributed to the ATM.
responsible for the separation of the aircraft involved,
regardless of where the OE/OD occurred, shall: (2) When other facilities are involved, ascertain the
scope of their investigation and coordinate the exchange
(1) Ensure that OE/OD investigations are of data and assistance as required.
conducted in accordance with any negotiated agreements
between the FAA and pertinent labor organizations. (3) Assign duties to team members.

(2) When the Preliminary OE/OD Investigation (4) Ensure that interviews conducted are done in
Report indicates that another facility(s) is involved in the accordance with paragraph 5-1-5b, Interviews.
occurrence, as soon as feasible confer with other ATM(s)
to determine the scope of the other facility's investigative d. The IIC Investigative Team shall:
effort and how long it will take. This includes gathering
data and completing Parts I and II of FAA Form 7210-3, (1) Assist the IIC by performing and completing all
Final Operational Error/Deviation Report. If the assigned tasks.
reporting ATM and the other ATM cannot concur in any
phase of their respective investigations, their differences (2) Remain under the supervision and jurisdiction
shall be reported to the ATD for a resolution. of the IIC until relieved by the IIC or ATM.

Par 5-1-5 5-5

7210.56C 8/15/02

b. When radar data does not exist and all indications

5-1-7. RECLASSIFICATION are that less than 80% of the separation minima was
a. After preliminary notification procedures are maintained, performance based action shall be handled in
completed, a review of the data may indicate a accordance with paragraph 5-1-9c, Return to Operational
reclassification of the incident to one of the following: Duty.

(1) Pilot deviation. c. When radar data does not exist and all indications
are that at least 80% of the separation minima was
(2) Military facility deviation. maintained, performance based action shall be handled in
accordance with paragraph 5-1-9b, Return to Operational
(3) From an operational deviation to an Duty.
operational error.
d. No controller will be decertified or required to
(4) From an operational error to an operational complete remedial training for any operational error(s)
deviation. classified as a low severity and/or any operational
deviation(s). However, skill enhancement training may
(5) No occurrence. be administered in accordance with paragraph 5-1-12,
Skill Enhancement Training, for errors classified as low
b. If a reclassification is determined to be severity and are uncontrolled.
appropriate, the ATM shall:
e. The number and types of error(s) shall not be the
sole determining factor for performance-based actions.
(1) Complete FAA Form 7210-5, Operational Performance based actions shall be based on overall
Error/Deviation Reclassification Report. documented performance history.

NOTE: f. The revocation or suspension of control tower

If a reclassification is from an operational deviation to operator certificate and facility ratings shall not be used
an operational error or from an operational error to an for addressing performance deficiencies.
operational deviation, then reclassify the original
incident to a "No Occurrence" and indicate in the g. Decertification shall not be based solely on
supporting documentation the new OE/OD report involvement in the OE but rather the employee's overall
number. performance history. Operational position decertification
and remedial training shall only be used in cases where
(2) Forward FAA Form 7210-5, Operational an employees’ documented performance history warrants
Error/Deviation Reclassification Report along with the such action. The employees’ supervisor, with ATM
rationale and all necessary supporting documentation, concurrence, determines whether to decertify.
including voice tapes and radar data, to the ATD for Decertification may be on one, multiple, or all positions
review. as appropriate for the documented performance
deficiencies.
c. The ATD shall conduct an initial review of all
requests for reclassification. Those they believe have EXAMPLE –
merit shall be reviewed jointly between the ATD and The employee has been determined to be primary in two
AAT-200. Should the ATD and AAT-200 not agree operational errors within the last 2 1/2 years. The
with the resolution of any request, AAT-20 is the employees’ first-line supervisor has had three
authority to make a final determination. Once AAT-200 documented performance discussions (including a TTD)
verbal approval is obtained, the ATD shall submit FAA within the past year outlining needed performance
Form 7210-5, Operational Error/Deviation improvement with a training plan.
Reclassification Report, for all reclassification requests
to AAT-20. (1) Determine the appropriate actions and training
necessary to return the employee fully to duty in
d. Facilities shall retain all original forms and consideration of performance deficiencies identified in
supporting investigative data for a period of 2 1/2 years. the above review.

(2) If the decision is not to decertify then skill

enhancement training may be administered in accordance
5-1-8. PERFORMANCE BASED ACTIONS with paragraph 5-1-12, Skill Enhancement Training.
a. Performance based action of surface errors,
MVA/Obstruction errors, and oceanic/non-radar errors (3) If the decision is made to decertify the
shall be handled in accordance with paragraph 5-1-9c, employee the following actions and training, as a
Return to Operational Duty. minimum, shall be taken:

5-6 Par 5-1-7

8/15/02 7210.56C

(a) A corrective action/recertification plan (a) Conduct an in-depth review with the
shall be developed in accordance with FAA Order employee of the their role. This review shall include as a
3120.4. minimum:
(b) This plan shall include, as a minimum,
remedial training, which addresses all identified 1. The events leading up to and
performance issues. surrounding the incident.

(c) Prior to communicating the above 2. The procedure or the separation

determinations and plans to the employee, the supervisor standard involved.
shall brief the ATM on the issues associated with the OE
and obtain the ATM's concurrence for the action plans 3. Available computer, radar data and
developed. voice recording of the incident via SATORI/RAPTOR
playback.
(d) Accomplish recertification in accordance
with FAA Order 3120.4 for the position(s) that the 4. The training record, including all
employee has been decertified. applicable technical training discussions (TTD’s).

(e) Upon satisfactory completion of the c. For all operational errors initially classified as
performance skill check, the employee shall be returned moderate, or high severity, as well as all surface,
to duty; or MVA/Obstruction, oceanic/non-radar errors or at those
facilities where radar data is not available and less than
(f) If the employee fails to successfully 80% of the separation minima was maintained:
complete the performance skill check, then the employee
shall remain decertified and the provisions of FAA Order (1) Employee(s) determined to be
3120.4 applied. primary/contributory to an operational error and if the
employees’ performance warrants, shall not be assigned
h. When either an operations supervisor (OS) or a to operational duties until the employees’ supervisor or
controller while performing supervisory/CIC duties, is designee shall take the following action:
identified as primary/contributory to an OE/OD,
operations CIC duties shall be suspended. Approval (a) Conduct an in-depth review of the
from the ATD shall be required before an OS/CIC is employees’ role in the OE. This review shall include as a
authorized to resume supervisory/CIC duties. minimum:

1. The events leading up to and

surrounding the incident.
5-1-9. RETURN TO OPERATIONAL
DUTY 2. The employees’ statement.
a. The ATM shall remain involved in the post error
process, in consultation with the ATD, including a 3. The procedure or the separation
review of the supervisors' determinations made under standard involved.
this paragraph to ensure complete and consistent
handling of all incidents. 4. Available computer, radar data and
voice recording of the incident via SATORI/RAPTOR
b. For all operational errors initially classified as a playback.
low severity and/or all operational deviations:
5. The training record, including all
(1) The employee(s) determined to be applicable technical training discussions (TTD's).
primary/contributory to the error/deviation shall be
returned to operational duties as soon as the preliminary 6. Verification of currency on the
investigation activities are completed. position of operation.

(2) No post OE/OD performance skill check will 7. Employee involvement in previous
be completed on any operational position associated with OE/ODs during the past 2 1/2 years.
this return to duty, nor will a 30-day follow-up
performance skill check be conducted relating to this (b) Conduct performance based action in
error/deviation. accordance with paragraph 5-1-8g, Performance Based
Action.
(3) The employees’ supervisor or designee shall
complete the following as soon as feasible after the
employee has returned to operational duty:

Par 5-1-8 5-7

7210.56C 8/15/02

(c) Conduct performance skill check(s) for a result of the OE and shall be documented in accordance
those positions on which the employee(s) will be allowed paragraph 3-1-4, Documentation.
to return to operational duty while training is being
provided. This skill check may be accomplished on NOTE:
individual or multiple positions at the discretion of the There is no performance skill check or 30-day follow-up
ATM. If the employee fails to successfully complete the performance skill check required with any operational
performance skill check, then the employee shall be
error classified as a low severity or operational
decertified and the provisions of FAA Order 3120.4 deviation.
applied.

EXAMPLE-
If an employee was removed from operational duties on
5-1-12. SKILL ENHANCEMENT
the radar departure position, but is to be returned to duty
in the tower cab while completing some skill TRAINING
enhancement training for the departure position, a a. Skill enhancement training is designed to increase
performance skill check(s) would be required in the the proficiency of a specialist in a skill on a position on
tower cab function, so as not to unduly delay the return which the specialist is certified. Based on the
to duty. circumstances unique to a specific error, skill
enhancement training need not always be accomplished
(d) As soon as possible after the employee has prior to an employee continuing operational duties. Skill
returned to operational duty, the employees’ supervisor enhancement training shall be based upon the factors
or designee shall conduct a performance discussion to identified during the investigation of the operational
include: error.

1. The results and recommendations from b. For employees’ identified as either primary or
the IIC/investigative team and/or the facility OE review contributory to an operational error classified as low
board. severity, skill enhancement training may be appropriate
only if the operational error has been classified as
2. Any deficiencies in the employees’ uncontrolled.
performance identified during the investigation of the
OE. c. Based on the employee(s) performance skill
enhancement training may be required for employees’
identified as either primary or contributory to an
operational error classified as moderate or high severity.
5-1-10. WHEN THE AIR TRAFFIC
MANAGER IS INVOLVED
If the employee involved in the OE/OD is the ATM, the
5-1-13. FINAL REPORTS
ATD manager may waive the requirements in paragraph
5-1-9, Return to Operational Duty, temporarily. This The ATM shall:
waiver shall not exceed 2 weeks, pending the arrival of
an ATD designee. Upon arrival, the ATD designee shall a. Analyze the data submitted by the IIC in Part I of
serve as the employees’ certifying official for the the FAA Form 7210-3 to determine:
purpose of complying with paragraph 5-1-9, Return to
Operational Duty, and 5-1-11, Follow-up Performance (1) The classification of the occurrence; i.e.,
Skill Check. operational error, operational deviation, pilot deviation,
or no occurrence. If it is determined that an OE/OD can
be reclassified, the ATM shall request that the incident
be reclassified in accordance with paragraph 5-1-7,
5-1-11. FOLLOW-UP PERFORMANCE Reclassification.
SKILL CHECK
The employees’ first line supervisor or designee of an (2) The categorization of the OE/OD; i.e., ATCS,
employee found to be primary/contributory to an OE of manager/supervisor/other personnel, procedural, equipment,
moderate or high severity, as well as all surface errors, or any combination thereof.
MVA/Obstruction errors, and oceanic/non-radar errors
shall conduct, as a minimum, a follow-up performance (3) The causal factors of the OE/OD.
skill check of the employee, within 30 days from the date
of return to operational duty. The skill check shall be (4) The recommendations and corrective actions to
conducted on a position in the control function involved be taken to prevent a recurrence of the OE/OD.
in the OE. The subsequent technical training discussion
(TTD) shall review all training that was administered as

5-8 Par 5-1-9

8/15/02 7210.56C

c. Any associated position performance skill checks,

b. Provide copies of Part I and Part II to each including all follow-up performance skill checks (e.g.,
employee involved and the Principal Union 30-day) shall be logged in accordance with FAA Order
Representative, before completing Part II, Item 69, 3120.4, without reference to the OE.
Facility Manager's Recommendations and Corrective
Actions. Employees’ may submit comments or d. Any associated recertification shall be logged, in
recommendations in writing to the ATM within 5- accordance with FAA Order 3120.4, without reference to
calendar days of receipt. The comments shall include the the OE.
employees’ name, position function, and location of
employment, signature and date. Recommendations
should concern corrective actions that can be undertaken
to preclude a similar occurrence. The ATM shall 5-1-15. DOCUMENTATION RETENTION
consider these comments in his/her deliberations before a. The OE/OD investigation file shall:
completing Facility Manager's Recommendations and
Corrective Actions and shall append the employees’ (1) Be retained by the reporting facility for 2 1/2
comments to Part II. years from the date of the occurrence.

c. Complete Part II of the FAA Form 7210-3 and (2) Be identified by a label (maximum size 3"x5")
submit two copies of Parts I and II and all attachments clearly marked "OPERATIONAL ERROR" or
(including employee and union statements) to the ATD, "OPERATIONAL DEVIATION," the report number, the
and one copy each to other ATMs and ATDs as required, incident local date and time, and the local date to be
within 30 administrative workdays of the date the destroyed.
occurrence was reported.
(3) Contain, as a minimum, the original FAA
d. When an employee(s) of another facility is Forms 7210-2 and 7210-3, signed employee personnel
involved in an OE/OD, ensure that the employees’ statements and/or any similar supporting documents, the
supervisor, through that facility ATM, is provided two certified re-recordings marked "Original," and
sufficient documentation to determine the appropriate "Copy” in accordance with paragraph 5-1-5c, all
corrective action. supporting documentation such as the original NTAP or
CDR plot in both printed format and an approved
e. Provide involved employee(s) with a copy of the electronic media, as well as all documentation from the
complete report after receipt of Part III from the ATD. supervisor's training plan, performance skill checks, and
the severity index chart from AAT-20.
f. Retain the original report in the facility files.
NOTE:
g. Establish a method of follow-up to evaluate the A facility may elect to store the supporting data, i.e.. two
effectiveness of the local recommendations/actions that certified voice re-recordings, and NTAP on a floppy disk
result from the investigation. in a separate secured place in lieu of the OE/OD
investigation file.

b. Preliminary and final OE reports that are

5-1-14. ENTRIES IN TRAINING AND classified as low severity and/or OD reports, while
PROFICIENCY RECORD (FAA FORM retained for 2 1/2 years, shall be sanitized after 12
3120-1) months so that any information, which could lead to the
When an employees’ performance has been determined identification of an employee, either primary or
to contribute to an OE/OD, the following shall be entered contributory to the OE/OD, has been removed.
into the employees’ FAA Form 3120-1:
c. All references to a specific OE/OD shall be
a. The causal factors as determined by the ATM removed from the employees’ FAA Form 3120-1 and
shall be fully transcribed and endorsed by the returned to the employee 2 1/2 years after the incident.
employees’ first-line supervisor on a separate page in All references to a specific OE classified as a low
Section VI. This page shall be used for any further severity and/or OD shall be removed from the
reference to the OE/OD and shall indicate the facility's employees’ FAA Form 3120-1 and returned to the
name, the OE/OD report number, and the removal date employee 12 months after the incident.
for the page.

b. Any associated training, remedial and/or skill

enhancement shall be logged, in accordance with FAA
Order 3120.4, without reference to the OE/OD.

Par 5-1-13 5-9

7210.56C 8/15/02

accordance with paragraph 5-1-7, Reclassification, to

5-1-16. HEADQUARTERS AND AIR AAT-20.
TRAFFIC DIVISION ROLES AND
RESPONSIBILITIES (6) Establish a follow-up mechanism to
determine if corrective actions contained in FAA Forms
a. AAT-1 shall be responsible for establishing and
7210-3 are effective and are accomplished in a timely
maintaining an analytical and investigative element
manner. All corrective actions shall specify a completion
within the headquarters office of Air Traffic Evaluations
deadline.
and Investigations Staff, AAT-20, which shall:
(7) Provide regional assistance to facilities as
(1) Maintain a central source of OE/OD data.
required.
(2) Review all FAA Forms 7210-3, Final
(8) Work closely with other ATDs when an
Operational Error/Deviation Report, for the purpose of
OE/OD may involve facilities in different regions and
identifying system wide deficiencies (e.g., human,
the respective ATMs cannot concur in any phase of their
equipment, and procedural) and based upon these
investigations. If 30 administrative workdays have
reviews, initiate recommendations for corrective actions
passed since the incident and a decision cannot be
to reduce the occurrence of OE/ODs.
reached with the other ATDs, forward all investigative
data to AAT-20 for resolution. Until a decision is
(3) Distribute, on a semi-annual basis, an
reached, ensure that all recordings, data and
OE/OD Analysis Report. This report shall, as a
documentation pertaining to the incident are retained.
minimum, identify trends concerning deficiencies
specified in paragraph 5-1-14a and be sent to all regions
and AT facilities.

(4) Conduct periodic program evaluations to

determine the effectiveness and efficiency of this
program.

(5) Maintain liaison with the regions, facilities,

and other headquarters AT offices and services to
provide continuity and follow-up on corrective action
recommendations.

(6) Provide policy interpretations concerning

the administration of this order.

b. The ATD shall be responsible for establishing an

analysis element within the ATD, which shall within 10
administrative workdays after receipt of Parts I and II of
FAA Form 7210-3:

(1) Review Parts I and II and complete Part III.

Completion of Part III ends the investigation process.

(2) Send copies of the completed FAA Form

7210-3, Parts I, II, and III and all attachments, including
employee and union statements, to AAT-20 and the
Planning, Information and Analysis Division, ATX-400.

(3) Send a copy of Part III to the appropriate

ATM's and other ATD's, when required, and retain the
original in either paper or automated form in the regional
files.

(4) If the above cannot be completed within the

10-day time period, notify AAT-20 via telephone.

(5) Review all requests to reclassify OE/OD's

for completeness of data and to ensure their validity
before coordination with AAT-20. Send the approvals in

5-10 Par 5-1-16

8/15/02 7210.56C
CHAPTER 6. SEVERITY INDEX

Program (OEDP) alerts in Air Route Traffic Control

6-1-1. DEFINITIONS Centers (ARTCC) and conflict alert printouts in terminal
a. Severity Index: a method to determine the gravity, radar approach controls (TRACON) may not necessarily
or degree that the separation standard was violated, for be the same as those values derived from analysis of
operational errors that occur in-flight. radar plots or any playback tool. Consequently, radar
extractions through National Track Analysis Program
b. Operational Error/Operational Deviation Steering (NTAP) and Continuous Data Recording (CDR) are
Committee: as established by Memorandum of required to accurately determine those distances. With
Understanding (MOU) to address national quality this in mind, facility personnel are required to supply
assurance issues contained within this order and other radar and voice data to AAT-200 as soon as possible.
matters including, but not limited to, trend analysis, Several methods of transferring extracted radar and voice
program effectiveness, compliance, and ongoing positive data are available. An AAT-200 file transfer protocol
efforts. The committee meets as necessary to review and (FTP://172.22.8.31) secured intranet site has been
address quality assurance matters. The steering established so any facility can post digital data for
committee is comprised of two representatives from efficient transfer of requested information. Also, an
NATCA and two representatives from AAT-20. AAT-200 dedicated post office box (address 7-AWA-
AAT-210) has been established to receive digital data.
c. Controlled Event: an operational error where the Additionally, overnight parcel express is also available
employee was aware of the impending conflict and takes and occasionally printed data may be faxed to AAT-200
corrective action to increase the separation. (202-267-7389 or 9356) that will enable investigators to
assess each event. This data needs to be prepared in one
d. Uncontrolled Event: an operational error where of several different forms as listed below. Any question
the employee was unaware of the conflict takes no regarding what data and what is the best transfer method
corrective action and/or became aware of the conflict but should be directed to AAT-200 at 202-267-7010 or 9569.
did not have enough time to effectively mitigate the loss
of separation. b. For all En-Route Facilities (ARTCC), prepare a
SATORI, with voice, on each OE within 72 business
e. Technical Violation: Operational errors that are hours of the event and place the SATORI on the AAT-
classified as low severity and all operational deviations 200 SATORI network server, SATORI directory. Name
or operational errors that cannot be reviewed by radar each file using the facility identification, error number,
data or a playback tool will be initially classified as a low sector number and video map name/number, e.g.,
severity if all indications are that 80% minima was ZXX_00_002_r35_35. Each ATD shall ensure facility
maintained. personnel are proficient at placing SATORI files on the
AAT-200 server. If unable to prepare a SATORI in this
time frame, forward a chronology, and an NTAP to
6-1-2. SEVERITY CLASSIFICATIONS AAT-200 as soon as possible via the agreed upon
method. The NTAP shall comply with FAA Order
7210.56 requirements and shall contain LST 5 data for
a. Airborne operational errors that can be reviewed
target coordinates. Target coordinates are necessary for
by a playback tool will be classified by AAT-20 as high,
distance calculations when the SATORI playback is not
moderate, or low severity.
available.
b. Any dispute regarding the value of any component
c. For TRACON’s, on each OE within 72 business
specific to an event shall be elevated to the OE/OD
hours of the event, perform a CDR extraction via the PC-
Steering Committee. The committee will attempt to
Editor using only the time and sensor filters. ARTSIIIA
resolve all disputes within 10 days of elevation. Should
systems use data classes TD and TG; and ARTSIIE and
the parties not agree, the parties are free to pursue
IIIE systems CR, TA, TU, and TG data classes. Save the
whatever course of action is available to them under the
extraction as a single text file. This data shall be posted
collective bargaining agreement and the Federal Service
on the AAT-200 file transfer protocol
Labor-Management Relations Statute.
(FTP://172.22.8.31) secured intranet site within 72
business hours. Voice segments should be prepared in
digital form as a WAV file and sent electronically as a
6-1-3. FINAL SEVERITY voice re-recording with time channel, sent overnight to
CLASSIFICATIONS AAT-200, or recorded over the telephone as requested by
AAT-200.
a. Facility managers shall ensure that radar OE’s in
domestic airspace are investigated in enough depth to
accurately report closest proximity distances. The
distances recorded with Operational Error Detection

Par 6-1-1 6-1

7210.56C 8/15/02

6-1-4. RADAR OE SEVERITY INDEX EN-ROUTE CHART

VERTICAL SEPARATION POINTS HORIZONTAL SEPARATION* POINTS
1,000 feet required 5-mile separation requirement
Less than 500 feet 25 Less than ½ mile 25
500 feet to 599 feet 20 ½ mile to 0.999 mile 25
600 feet to 699 feet 16 1 mile to 1.499 miles 24
700 feet to 799 feet 12 1.5 miles to 2 miles 24
800 feet to 899 feet 6 2 miles to 2.499 miles 23
900 feet to 999 feet 2 2.5 miles to 2.999 miles 22
VERTICAL SEPARATION POINTS 3 miles to 3.499 miles 20
2,000 feet required
Less than 500 feet 25 3.5 miles to 3.999 miles 16
500 feet to 599 feet 25 4 miles to 4.499 miles 10
600 feet to 699 feet 24 4.5 miles to 4.999 miles 5
700 feet to 799 feet 24 CLOSURE RATE POINTS
800 feet to 899 feet 23 700 knots and greater 10
900 feet to 999 feet 22 300 knots to 699 knots 8
1,000 feet to 1,099 feet 20 100 knots to 299 knots 6
1,100 feet to 1,199 feet 18 Less than 100 knots 4
1,200 feet to 1,299 feet 16 FLIGHT PATHS POINTS
1,300 feet to 1,399 feet 14 Converging - Opposite Courses 20
1,400 feet to 1,499 feet 12 Converging – Crossing Course 18
1,500 feet to 1,599 feet 10 Same Course 10
1,600 feet to 1,699 feet 8 Diverging/Non-Intersecting 0
1,700 feet to 1,799 feet 6 ATC CONTROL FACTOR POINTS
1,800 feet to 1,899 feet 4 Uncontrolled 20
1,900 feet to 1,999 feet 2 Controlled with TCAS RA 15
Controlled with no TCAS RA 4

6-2 Par 6-1-4

8/15/02 7210.56C

6-1-5. RADAR OE SEVERITY INDEX TERMINAL AND EN-ROUTE SINGLE SITE CHART
VERTICAL SEPARATION POINTS HORIZONTAL SEPARATION* POINTS
3-mile separation requirement
Less than 500 feet 25 Less than ½ mile 25
500 feet to 599 feet 20 ½ mile to 0.999 mile 18
600 feet to 699 feet 16 1 mile to 1.499 miles 14
700 feet to 799 feet 12 1.5 miles to 2 miles 10
800 feet to 899 feet 6 2 miles to 2.499 miles 6
900 feet to 999 feet 2 2.5 miles to 2.999 miles 2
CLOSURE RATE POINTS HORIZONTAL SEPARATION POINTS
2.5-mile requirement
700 knots and greater 10 Less than ½ mile 25
300 knots to 699 knots 8 ½ mile to 0.999 mile 20
100 knots to 299 knots 6 1 mile to 1.499 miles 16
Less than 100 knots 4 1.5 miles to 1.999 miles 10
FLIGHT PATHS POINTS 2 miles to 2.499 miles 4
Converging - Opposite Courses 20 ATC CONTROL FACTOR POINTS
Converging – Crossing Course 18 Uncontrolled 20
Same Course 10 Controlled with TCAS RA 15
Diverging/Non-Intersecting 0 Controlled with no TCAS RA 4

* When wake turbulence separation standards are governing, DO NOT include any vertical point value. Instead use
the appropriate in trail separation index below, as well as other applicable factors.

IN TRAIL SEPARATION POINTS IN TRAIL SEPARATION POINTS

4-mile separation requirement 5-mile separation requirement
3.499 miles and less 60 4.499 miles and less 60
3.5 miles to 3.999 miles 35 4.5 miles to 4.999 miles 35
IN TRAIL SEPARATION POINTS
6-mile separation requirement
5.499 miles and less 60
5.5 miles to 5.999 miles 35

SEVERITY CLASSIFICATION
90 points and above – HIGH
40-89 points – MODERATE
39 points and below – LOW

Par 6-1-5 6-3 (and 6-4)

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CHAPTER 7. OPERATIONAL ERROR DETECTION PROGRAM (OEDP)

7-1-1. EN-ROUTE OPERATIONAL 7-1-2. OEDP AUDIT
ERROR DETECTION PROGRAM (OEDP)
a. All en-route facilities shall establish a review
a. When the OEDP Alert activates or you are process to validate/audit OEDP alerts. Consider the
advised by another facility that they have received an following data when auditing OEDP alerts:
OEDP alert on one or more aircraft that are under your
facility’s jurisdictional control, take the following (1) Ensure that all numbers are sequential.
actions:
(2) Ensure that all OEDP alerts have a valid
(1) Record the alert on FAA Form 7230-4, Daily explanation.
Record of Facility Operation, or a locally developed
OEDP form. (3) Conduct weekly checks; e.g., eight visual
climbs (if available) and five non-visual/VFR events.
NOTE:
Facilities may establish a local form and procedures for (4) Any questionable alerts, shall be validated by
recording, disseminating and documenting the any one of the below methods:
resolution.
(a) Pilot reports will be verified by voice tape.
(2) Review the alert and determine the validity of
the alert. (b) Target swap - check flight plan readout to
determine if aircraft were in possible transition, validate
(3) If the alert is valid, proceed with the via NTAP/CDR.
investigation and reporting procedures that are listed in
paragraph 5-1-3, Initial Investigations. Ensure that the (c) FAA Order 7110.65 requirement, validate
OEDP form contains the following information: all with voice and/or NTAP/CDR.

(a) “OEDP Alert” with the four digit alert (d) Military Assumes Responsibility for
number. Separating Aircraft (MARSA), ensure military aircraft
where involved.
(b) Reason for the alert.
(e) Visuals/VFR climb, check altitudes.
(c) Operating initials. Check for B757 or heavy wake turbulence criteria.

(4) If the alert is invalidated, ensure that the (f) VFR separation, check flight plan readouts
OEDP form contains the following information: and altitudes.

(a) “OEDP Alert” with the four digit alert b. Prepare a quarterly report of the findings to the
number. ATM identifying the initiating incident and conclusion of
(b) Resolution of the alert. the review.

(c) Operating initials. c. Retain all OEDP forms for 6 months.

(5) For resolution of OEDP Alerts make the

following entry onto FAA Form 7230-4, Daily Record of
Facility Operation, or a locally developed OEDP form.

“Q” ENTRY
TIME OF NOTIFICATION
“OEDP Alert”
Facility reporting OEDP
Aircraft call signs
Resolution to alert
Operating initials

EXAMPLE:
“Q” 1700 OEDP Alert ZAU, AAL33, UAL44, Target
Swap, HH

Par 7-1-1 7-1 (and 7-2)

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8/15/02 7210.56C
Appendix 1

APPENDIX 1. RADAR DATA PROCESSING

Three of the major limitations in using NTAP plots to
1. GENERAL INFORMATION measure separation distances are the following:

a. Use of radar data in OE/OD investigation (1) High-speed printer limitations, due to design
processes remains one of the most accurate methods and physical characteristics of the high-speed printer
available to re-create events. Because of the importance preclude accurate plotting of NTAP aircraft position
placed on radar data in the determination of the facts symbols.
surrounding incidents, it is imperative that this data be
processed and analyzed using clearly defined procedures (2) Multiple radar data processing creates a
that eliminate localized interpretations of how best to compound environment of surveillance sites with
extract, present, and assess the information. unsynchronized radar scans, producing aircraft target
updates in non-uniform time frames.
b. NTAP, SATORI, CDR plots, Radar Audio
Playback Terminal Operations Recording (RAPTOR), (3) Manual measurements and smoothing of
Radar View Point, MSDT ATC Plot and other reduction flight tracks are subject to human error, creative
or playback tools are available to assist in investigations. interpretation, and optical parallax. In addition, target
As technological advances are made, the ATC system symbol positions being measured may not accurately
must adjust to these changes and ensure that radar represent relative aircraft positional information.
reduction tools are used correctly and consistently
throughout the system in order to provide the most b. Because of the above limitations, use of NTAP
accurate recreation possible. for measuring aircraft separation values, requires specific
guidelines to ensure system credibility. The following
c. NTAP, SATORI, CDR data, and other procedures shall be used when using NTAP for OE/OD
reduction or playback tools shall not be arbitrarily used determinations:
as the primary initiating source (triggering event) for
reporting an OE/OD or commencing an investigation. (1) NTAP may be used for OE/OD
However, these reduction/playback tools may be used in determinations at an en-route facility provided all the
the investigation of suspected incidents to determine the following conditions are met:
amount of separation that existed or the position of
aircraft. Additionally, these tools may be used for (a) A plot size of one-inch equals one-mile is
individual employee performance review/improvement used.
and/or system/facility evaluation. When this is
accomplished and a loss of separation is discovered, that (b) For aircraft speeds of less than 250 knots,
error shall be reported, but attributed to the facility as a input times shall be at least 2 minutes before and after
facility error. Skill enhancement training may be the time of the triggering OEDP alert. For speeds above
assigned to those employees’ determined to be 250 knots use at least 1 minute before and after the alert
contributory to these events. However, decertification time.
shall not be imposed.
(c) The following plot keywords are used:
d. SATORI, RAPTOR or other playback tool may
be used in the investigation of a QAR, suspected OE/OD, 1. PRI (primary targets); or
pilot deviation, NMAC, TCAS event, miscellaneous
incident, or accident; to determine the relative flight 2. BCN (beacon targets); or
tracks, speeds, headings, location and separation of the
involved aircraft. These tools may be used to 3. LDB (limited data blocks); or
determine employee and/or pilot performance and/or
involvement in the incident, as well the closest 4. SEL (select plots only BCN or LDB
proximity. associated with particular beacon codes input on the code
card); or

2. NATIONAL TRACK ANALYSIS NOTE:

SEL is a stand-alone option or can be used as a sub-
PROGRAM (NTAP) option of BCN to plot aircraft on particular beacon
codes.
a. NTAP was originally designed to assist in
Search and Rescue missions aimed at locating missing or 5. A combination of the above options.
suspected downed aircraft. This program has inherent
limitations when used to measure aircraft separation.

Page 1
7210.56C 8/15/02
Appendix 1
(a) TA – Tracking Associated Data – Data
6. LST A (list data), a special plot Block, flight plan information that has been linked
keyword is used to create separate data between a tracked target (transponder secondary code)
listings for each of the four list (LST) and the Flight Data System, NAS or HOST.
options.
(b) TU – Tracking Unassociated Data – all
(d) 1/5 mile is added to the distance between other tracked secondary and primary targets with limited
the printed symbol centers before making a data blocks that cannot be correlated with the Flight Data
determination. This accommodates the high-speed System, NAS or HOST.
printer limitations.
(c) RB- Radar Reinforced Beacon Target
(e) If target position jumps have occurred, a Reports – All primary and secondary radar data available
smoothed line shall be drawn indicating the most on any individual track.
probable flight path of the involved aircraft. That line
shall be used for measurement purposes. When (d) BT – Beacon Target Reports – All
determining the most probable flight path, ensure that a secondary radar data.
maximum number of printed target symbols are used in
the smoothing process. (e) RT – Radar Target Reports – All primary
radar targets.
(f) The NTAP plot is used to declare an
OE/OD only if the Air Route Traffic Control Center (f) CR - provide Aircraft Type, Scratch Pad,
(ARTCC) providing the computer data was responsible Special Designators - VFR, ENROUTE, TCAS,
for the separation of the aircraft involved. HEAVY, Radio Failure, Hi-Jack, Emergency,
Transponder Indent, Conflict Alert Indicator, MSAW
c. Computer operational error detection software Indicator, and Leader Direction for every time the track
(OEDP) measurements are more precise than NTAP is updated on the screen.
measurements. An error detection alert measurement
cannot be invalidated by an NTAP plot measurement by (2) ARTS IIIA:
the ARTCC receiving the alert unless at least one target
position, used by HOST in the generation of the alert (a) TD – Tracking Data – Tracking Associated
message, is clearly identified as a significant target jump. Data – Data Block, flight plan information that has been
All original NTAP plots used to invalidate OEDP alerts linked between a tracked target (transponder secondary
shall be forwarded to the facility’s QA office for review, code) and the Flight Data System, NAS or HOST and
and shall be retained for 45 days. Tracking Unassociated Data – all other tracked
secondary and primary targets with limited data blocks
d. LST 5 measurements data are more precise than that cannot be correlated with the Flight Data System,
NTAP measurements. When ever possible a LST 5 shall NAS or HOST.
be used to determine closest proximity.
(b) TG – Target Reports - Radar Reinforced
Beacon Target Reports – All primary and secondary
radar data available on any individual track. Beacon
3. CONTINUOUS DATA RECORDING Target Reports – All secondary radar data. Radar Target
(CDR) Reports – All primary radar targets.

a. When CDR data is used in an OE/OD

investigation(s) the Automated Radar Terminal Systems
(ARTS) clock shall be verified as accurate. In addition, 4. CDR EXTRACTION and/or VOICE
any plotted depiction of targets derived from CDR data RECORDING REQUEST for RAPTOR
shall be certified as accurate and valid. A statement of CDR Playback
such certification shall be added to the plot depiction.
a. When a CDR extraction and/or voice recording
b. For CDR reductions from ARTS systems that is requested, please use the following guidelines below.
calculate aircraft separation distances both from target It is imperative that extractions are made exactly as listed
“A” to “B” and from target “B” to “A”, use the larger of below. Please do not deviate from these specifications
the two aircraft separation calculations within the same unless instructed/requested to do so by AAT-200.
time stamp.
b. CDR EXTRACTIONS do not use any filters
c. DATA CLASSES except for time, Data Class and subsystem (radar
sensor) unless specifically requested.
(1) ARTS IIE & IIIE:

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 8/15/02 7210.56C
Appendix 1

(1) Extract the data, using “CDR-Editor” or

similar extraction tool as follows:

(2) Data classes for ARTS IIE and IIIE systems

- TA, TU, TG and CR

(3) Data classes for ARTS IIIA systems - TD

and TG.

(4) Save as a single file in ASCII format

ending in .TXT.

(5) For multiple sensor systems, identify the

sensor number in use or filter all but primary the sensor
in use.

(6) Please identify and/or provide an electronic

copy of the radar map most likely in use during the
event.

c. VOICE RECORDINGS

(1) If a time channel is not included or a digital

voice file is created without a time reference, include the
exact time (hh:mm:ss UTC) of the first radio transmission
that can be correlated with radar display information.

(2) When voice recordings are also requested,

please indicate the time difference, if any, between the
recorder clock and the ARTS clock and ensure you
provide the start times and ensure both the time channel
and voice is audible.

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Appendix 2

APPENDIX 2. INSTRUCTIONS FOR FAA FORM 7210-2,

PRELIMINARY OPERATIONAL ERROR/DEVIATION INVESTIGATION
REPORT

Notify AAT-200, WOC & ATD through the ROC appropriate altitude stratum. For surface events,
within 3 hours. use runway numbers, taxiway names, or other
locations found on airport diagrams. For
Instructions For FAA Form 7210-2, Oceanic events use Latitude & Longitude.
Preliminary Operational Error/Deviation Block 7 Closest Proximity: Do not leave
Investigation Report blank. Indicate Feet, Miles or Minutes. This IS
the closest proximity, not just the first hit under
REPORT NUMBER:
the required loss of separation or OEDP. If
FAC ID: Enter the facility three-character
estimated, indicate method in Summary, Block
identifier.
21. Where no other aircraft were involved, as in
TYPE: Enter the type of facility ("T" –
closed-runways or MVA incidents, indicate and
Terminal, "R" – TRACON, "C" – En-Route,
explain in Summary, Block 21.
and “F" - Flight Service)
Block 8 Alerts: Check "ACTIVATED" if an
NOTE - Use "R" for stand alone radar facilities
alert was generated during the incident.
assigned a separate facility three-character
Check "NOT ACTIVATED" if this feature is
identifier
installed and functioning, but did not generate
CY: Enter the last two digits of the calendar
an alert during the incident.
year in which the incident occurred.
Check "NOT AVAILABLE" if this feature is
E/D: Enter "E" for an error or "D" for a
installed, but was not available during the
deviation.
incident.
SEQ.#: Enter the sequential number of the
Check “SUPPRESSED” only if this feature
incident for the calendar year.
was suppressed.
NOTE - Each calendar year operational errors
Check "NOT INSTALLED" only if the facility
will start with 001 and operational deviations
does not have this feature.
will start with 001 (however, they are counted
Block 9 TMU: Complete each item that applies
separately). e.g., ZDC-C-01-E-005.
to your facility, otherwise leave blank.
Block 1 Date and Time of Occurrence: Date
Item a. Enter Monitor Alert Parameter (MAP)
is based on local time only, enter time in Local
or other automated alert function, for the
and time in UTC.
sector/position(s) involved. Item b. Check
Block 2 Date and Time Initial Investigation
“ACTIVATED” if an alert was generated
Started: Date is based on local time; enter time
during/or before the incident.
in Local and time in UTC.
Check “ NON-ACTIVATED” if this feature is
Block 3 Facility: Check “FACILITY” if your
installed and functioning but did not generate
facility personnel initially reported this incident
an alert.
or check “OTHER” if equipment (i.e. OEDP,
Check “NOT AVAILABLE” if this feature is
CA), another facility, pilot or organization
installed at the facility, but was not available
reported this incident.
during the incident.
Block 4 Involved Facilities: List all other
Item c. Were any initiatives in place in
facilities that may have contributed to this
response to sector/position volume or
incident.
complexity, check Yes or No and explain why
Block 5 Altitude: Enter "SFC" if this is a
if volume or complexity may have contributed
surface incident; otherwise enter altitude at
to this incident?
which loss of separation occurred.
Block 6 Location: Use a VOR
Fix/Radial/Distance that is compatible with the

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Appendix 2

Blocks 10: Enter ALL SECTORS/POSITIONS that were

Item a. Traffic Volume: Enter the number of combined to the position at the time of the
aircraft for which the controller had separation incident.
responsibility, including point outs. For Item e. Enter date of last certification, and
incidents involving tower cab local controllers, include Initial or Recertification, e.g., I 1+07
do not count aircraft waiting in line for (year+months)
departure unless the controller was, for some Item f. Enter all previous Errors and/or
reason, responsible for separation. Deviations within the last 2-½ years, including
Item b. Traffic Complexity: Circle traffic dates. Explain factors identified in previous
complexity with “Low” being number 1, errors in Summary, Block 21.
“Moderate” as number 3 and “High” as number Block 14 Hand Off Position: Item a. Was a
5. RA/D-side/Tracker/HO or Coordinator
Block 11 Type of Control: Check “RADAR” assigned to this radar position? If no and
if the incident occurred within a radar volume or complexity may have been a factor,
environment. explain in Summary, Block 21.
Check “NON-RADAR” if incident occurred Item b. Was a Local or Ground Associate
within a non-radar environment. assigned to the Tower position? If no and
Check “OCEANIC” if the incident occurred volume or complexity may have been a factor,
within an oceanic environment. explain in Summary, Block 21.
Check "TOWER" if incident occurred within a Block 15 Staffing: List Staffing levels at time
tower environment (also check "RADAR," if of incident. Note: this applies to staffing in the
the cab controller had radar available). specific function/area that this incident
Check “AFSS/FSS” if the incident occurred occurred in, e.g., combined TRACON/Towers,
within a flight service environment. incident occurred in TRACON, list only the
Block 12 Required Separation: Check "FAA staffing for employees assigned to the
DIRECTIVE" if the required separation was TRACON at the time of the incident. Only list
from an FAA directive such as FAA Order CIC’s if that individual has been assigned CIC
7110.65, or a facility directive. List specific duties for the shift.
paragraph that was violated/misapplied. Block 16 Position Profiles: List
Check "LETTER OF AGREEMENT" if the position/sector(s) available in the area, radar
required separation was from a letter of room, sector or tower cab, WHERE the
agreement with another facility or organization, incident occurred.
(e.g., An LOA requiring 8 miles separation Block 17 Operational Supervision: Item a.
between aircraft in specified areas). List Identify if an OS or a CIC was in charge, when
specific paragraph that was the incident occurred.
violated/misapplied. Item b. Describe the OSIC/CIC actual activity
Block 13 Controller Information: Item a. when the incident occurred. Be Specific, e.g.,
Enter last six digits of the employees Social on the phone, coordinating with TMU about the
Security Number (DO NOT ASK THE no notice hold into EWR.
EMPLOYEE), e.g., 55-1234 Block 18 Weather Sequence: Provide the
Item b. Enter Title/certification status, e.g., most applicable weather sequence (nearest in
"CPC/OS/CIC/OM/DEV/TMC/TMS/ATM/SS”. location and time to the OE/D), identifying the
Item c. Enter time on position, e.g., 75 (in source and time. List all PIREPS/SIGMETS
minutes). /AIRMETS valid for the area.
Item d. Enter Area and Sector or Position Block 19 Aircraft Information: Items a – c
Designation, e.g., "Area A-R71/D71" or "South Enter the involved Aircraft’s callsign, type
Satellite." aircraft, and equipment suffix. Check “NRP” if
the aircraft was on a filed National Route
Program flight plan (not just issued “direct”).

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Appendix 2

Check “TCAS RA” if the aircraft advised it had

received a Resolution Advisory. Check
“NMAC” if the pilot stated he encountered or
intended on filing a NMAC Report. Enter route
of flight, pertinent to this incident.
Block 20 Terminals Only: Runway Incursion
information; answer all questions if applicable.
Block 21 Possible Factors: This is a short list
of possible factors that may have been involved
in the incident. The person filling out this form
should use this block as a general checklist to
help develop the description of events in the
summary. Enter all additional factors
preliminarily determine to be contributory to
the incident e.g., controller judgment, visual
observation, distractions. Ensure that the
rationale for each possible factor identified is
clearly described in Summary, Block 21.
Block 22 Summary: The description of events
should be factual and concise, but must include
all pertinent information. Ensure that the
rationale for each possible factor identified in
Block 20 is clearly described. Use terms such
as "Aircraft #1" and "Controller A" rather than
actual call signs and position identifiers or
names. Additionally, explain employee’s
activities at the time of the event as outlined in
Block 13 and (if applicable) why no HO/D-
side/Tracker/Local/Ground associate was
assigned, as outlined in Block 14.
Block 23 Data Reviewed: Indicate if the voice
tape, computer data, employee statements or
radar playback were reviewed prior to filing
this report.
Block 24 Notification: Item a. This is the
person from the facility reporting the incident
to Regional and Headquarters personnel.
Item b. This is the individual from the
Regional Operations Center (ROC), Regional
Quality Assurance Specialist (AXX-505),
Washington Operations Center (WOC), and
Headquarters Safety Investigator (AAT-200)
receiving the report.

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Appendix 3
APPENDIX 3. EXAMPLE OF PRELIMINARY OPERATIONAL
ERROR/DEVIATION INVESTIGATION REPORT
Severity Classification (Preliminary & Final) Report Number

- - - -
(Notify AAT-200, WOC & ATD thru the ROC within 3 hours) FAC ID - TYPE - CY - E/D - SEQ #

1. DATE AND TIME OF OCCURRENCE: 2. DATE AND TIME INITIAL INVESTIGATION STARTED:
DATE (LOCAL) Time (local) Time (utc) DATE (LOCAL) Time (local) Time (utc)

3. INITIALLY REPORTED BY: 4. OTHER INVOLVED FACILITIES:

FACILITY OTHER (Explain here) FAC ID #1 FAC ID #2

5. Altitude: 6. Location of Occurrence: 7. CLOSEST PROXIMITY:

Pertinent fix (Fix/Radial/DME), airport surface

Indicate if on the Surface Vertical Lateral (ft/mi/min)
location or Lat/Long.

8. ALERTS: (If installed, explain checked boxes in Summary, Block 21)

CONFLICT ALERT: Activated Not activated Not available Suppressed Not installed

MSAW / EMSAW: Activated Not activated Not available Suppressed Not installed

9 TMU: a. M.A.P. b. Alerts: Activated Non-activated Not available

c. Were any initiatives in place, in response to sector/position volume: Yes No
d. If either yes or no, explain why here:

10 a. Traffic Volume: (# of ACFT) b. Traffic Complexity: Low 1 2 3 4 5 High

11. TYPE OF CONTROL: 12. REQUIRED SEPARATION:
RADAR FAA DIRECTIVE
NON-RADAR Required Separation Handbook and Paragraph

OCEANIC LETTER OF AGREEMENT, WITH:

TOWER
AFSS/FSS FAC. or ORG. Paragraph Required Separation

13. CONTROLLER INFORMATION (Explain activities of each individual in Summary, Block 21):
Primary Contributory Contributory Contributory
a. Last 6-digits of SSN:

b. Title (CPC/DEV/OS/CIC/OM//TMC/TMS/SS/ATM):

c. Time on position (in minutes):

d. Area/Sector/Position(s), List ALL positions combined:

e. Date of last certification (Initial or Recertification):

f. List previous Errors and/or Deviations:

FAA FORM 7210-2 (08/02) Supercedes Previous Editions

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REPORT NUMBER
- - - -

14 a. ARTCC/TRACON: Was a RA/D-side/Tracker/HO/Coordinator position staffed? Yes No N/A

(If no and volume or complexity was a factor explain in Summary, Block 21)

14 b. Tower: Was Local or Ground Associate positions staffed? Yes No N/A

(If no and volume or complexity was a factor explain in Summary, Block 21)

16. NUMBER OF POSITIONS IN

15. STAFFING On Duty On Position On Break Other
AREA/SECTOR:
a. OS/CIC a. Available
b. CPC b. Open
c. DEV

17 a. OPERATIONAL SUPERVISION: OSIC CIC

b. What was the OSIC/CIC doing when the incident occurred? (Explain and Be specific.)

18. WEATHER SEQUENCE:

VMC IMC DUSK DAWN

19. AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

TYPE/SUFFIX TCAS RA: What action was NMAC
a. Aircraft #1: NRP
taken?
Route of Flight/Taxi Route
TYPE/SUFFIX TCAS RA: What action was NMAC
b. Aircraft #2: NRP
taken?

Route of Flight/Taxi Route

TYPE/SUFFIX TCAS RA: What action was NMAC
c. Aircraft #3: NRP
taken?
Route of Flight/Taxi Route

20 Terminal only:
a. Was takeoff clearance issued YES NO?
b. If yes, did aircraft start takeoff roll YES NO?
c. Was takeoff clearance cancelled YES NO?
1. Was aircraft able to abort YES NO?
2. Did aircraft hold in position: YES NO?
3. Proximity when departing aircraft was at taxi speed?
4. How far did aircraft roll in feet?
d. Was any clearance issued or amended YES NO? Explain:
e. Was either aircraft issued a go around YES NO?
1. If yes, what was mileage on final when instructions where issued.
FAA FORM 7210-2 (08/02) Supercedes Previous Editions

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Appendix 3
Report Number
- - - -

21. POSSIBLE FACTORS: (Check or indicate as many possible factors as you can identify and explain each factor below in Summary, Block 21)

Procedures Equipment Communications (Hearback/Readback)

Traffic Management Other(s)

22. SUMMARY: Please describe the events surrounding the incident that occurred. Consider the list of factors above and
describe them as necessary to explain the incident. If you receive any Pilots’ Comments, please explain what they where
here, Be brief as possible, but still FULLY explain the incident:

23. DATA REVIEWED: VOICE TAPE COMPUTER DATA EMPLOYEE STATEMENTS EMPLOYEE INTERVIEWS
PLAYBACK (SATORI, RAPTOR, Other)

24 a. PERSON MAKING NOTIFICATION: (Facility) DATE & TIME (LOCAL):

24 b. PERSON RECEIVING NOTIFICATION: AXX-505: DATE & TIME (LOCAL):

ROC TIME (LOCAL): WOC TIME (LOCAL): (AAT-200) DATE & TIME (LOCAL):

FAA FORM 7210-2 (08/02) Supercedes Previous Editions

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APPENDIX 4. INSTRUCTIONS FOR FAA FORM 7210-3,
FINAL OPERATIONAL ERROR/DEVIATION REPORT
GENERAL INFORMATION Block 1 - DATE AND TIME OF INCIDENT

The Final Operational Error/Deviation Report (OE/OD), The time of an OE is the time that the loss of separation
FAA Form 7210-3, has been designed to facilitate the occurred. The time of an OD is the time that the airspace
gathering and documentation of factual information was violated.
concerning the events, which led to the occurrence of an
operational error or deviation. It also provides a means of DATE: Use the date based on the local date:
reporting the findings, recommendations, and conclusions
of the facility manager and the regional ATD manager. EXAMPLE: May 4, 1996 would be entered as
"05/04/1996."
Situations may arise which are not adequately accounted
for in Part I of this report. However, a careful analysis of TIME: Using the 24-hour clock, enter the local time of the
the facts should usually establish a relationship to the incident.
information required in this report. If there are exceptions,
when the information cannot be adequately expressed, or EXAMPLE- 3:38 p.m. (Time of incident) would be entered
there is insufficient room to answer a question, use Block as "1538."
64, Summary of Incident. Each comment should be
prefaced with the block number to which it pertains. Block 2 - RESPONSIBLE FACILITY AND
CLASSIFICATION LEVEL
An "*" indicates that an explanation is required or may be
required in Block 65, Summary of Incident. Responsible Facility: The three-letter identifier of the
facility completing the report will be automatically entered
REPORT NUMBER in this block after the report number has been entered.

FAC ID - Enter the facility three-character identifier. Classification Level: Enter the classification at the time of
the incident of the facility completing the report. Valid
NOTE: entries are 1 through 5. This will be automatically printed
If the facility chargeable for the error/deviation is ARINC, for each incident after the initial facility information is
enter "XXX" as the facility three-character identifier. entered in the automated program.

TYPE - Enter the type of facility: Block 3 – SEVERITY INDEX

"T" - Tower Indicate whether this error was classified as: a Low,
"R" - TRACON Moderate, or High severity, Controlled with no TCAS,
Controlled with TCAS RA or Uncontrolled and
NOTE: Converging, Opposite Courses, Converging, Crossing
Use "R" for radar only facilities assigned a separate three- Courses, Same Course or Diverging/Non-intersecting
character identifier. Courses as determined by AAT-20.

"C"- En Route * Block 4 - WAS WEATHER A FACTOR IN THE

"F" - Flight Service INCIDENT?

NOTE: If weather or conditions caused by weather were pertinent

ZSU and ZHN should be entered as TRACON facilities and to the incident, select "Yes" and explain fully in Block 65,
ZUA should be entered as an en route facility. Summary of Incident.

CY - Enter the last two digits of the calendar year in For example, if thunderstorms caused an unexpected route
which the incident occurred. deviation or icing affected the climb, of an aircraft that was
involved in an OE/OD, at the time of the incident, select
E/D - Enter "E" for error or "D" for deviation. "Yes" and explain.

SEQ# - Enter the sequential number of the Block 5 - ALTITUDE/FLIGHT LEVEL OF

incident for the calendar year. Each calendar year INCIDENT
operational errors will start with 001 and operational IF INCIDENT ENTER
deviations will start with 001. For example, the facility's' HAPPENED
second operational error is 002 and the thirteenth would be
On the surface SFC
013. The facility's second operational deviation will be 002
and the thirteenth would be 013. In the air Enter an altitude above the
surface to the nearest
PART I - Investigative Data 100 feet omitting the last two digits.
Examples:
GENERAL INFORMATION 1 foot - 149 feet, enter "001"
750 feet, enter "008"
Part I provides for the documentation of the factual data 1150 feet, enter "012"
which is gathered by the Investigator-In-Charge (IIC) and, 29,700 feet, enter "297"
when appointed, an investigation team.
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Appendix 4

Block 6 - TYPE OF AIRSPACE Block 8 - CLOSEST PROXIMITY

Select the type of airspace where the incident occurred, Complete this block for incidents in the air and on the
"Other" will require additional information. surface.

Block 7 - LOCATION OF INCIDENT For aircraft in flight, the closest proximity is expressed in
lateral/longitudinal and vertical measurements. When
If the incident occurred in the air, complete FIX, separation is lost, determine the closest proximity as
DIRECTION, and DISTANCE unless the location is best follows: Enter the smallest lateral/longitudinal distance that
described by latitude and longitude. existed between the aircraft while separation was lost.
Then, enter the vertical distance that existed between the
If the incident occurred on the surface, complete aircraft at the time of that smallest lateral/longitudinal
INTERSECTION, RUNWAY and TAXIWAY. distance.

If the incident occurred in the air and is best described by EXAMPLE- At one point two aircraft came within 2.8
latitude and longitude or in oceanic airspace, complete miles and 400 feet of each other at the same time. The 400
LATITUDE and LONGITUDE. feet was the smallest vertical distance between the aircraft
during the incident. The same two aircraft continued their
FIX: The fix provides a reference as to where the incident flight and came within 2.34 miles and 800 feet of each
occurred. Enter a 3- or 5-letter location identifier whenever other at the same time; 2.34 miles being the smallest lateral
possible to clearly identify the fix. distance between the aircraft during the incident. The
proper entry would be "2.34" for lateral and "0800" for
EXAMPLE- Dryer VORTAC would be entered as "DJB." vertical.
NESTO intersection would be entered as "NESTO."
For situations where lateral/longitudinal distance was
DIRECTION: Use three digits to indicate the degrees of the constant, enter that constant lateral/longitudinal distance
radial or course from the NAVAID. If the fix used is an and the smallest vertical distance between the aircraft.
airport, intersection, or waypoint that does not have
prescribed radials or a compass rose, use the 16 points of EXAMPLE- Two aircraft were 2 miles apart on parallel
the compass to describe direction. routes, one at seven thousand feet and one at six thousand
feet. The aircraft at seven thousand feet was cleared to
EXAMPLE- The 10 degree radial would be entered as descend to five thousand feet. The vertical distance
"010." North-Northeast would be entered as "NNE." decreased until the aircraft were at the same altitude, then
increased until the descending aircraft leveled at five
DISTANCE- Specify the distance of the incident from the thousand feet. Enter "2.00," which was the constant (and
fix in nautical miles. smallest) lateral distance between the aircraft and "0"
which was the smallest vertical distance.
EXAMPLE- One nautical mile would be entered as "001."
Twenty nautical miles would be entered as "020." VERTICAL- Enter the vertical distance measured in feet.

INTERSECTION- Enter the airport intersection closest to EXAMPLE- One foot would be entered as "0001," 100 feet
the incident. would be entered as "0100," and 1,000 feet would be
entered as "1000."
RUNWAY- Enter the runway(s) closest to the incident.
Use a "/" to separate runways that are not left, right, or LATERAL- Select "feet," "miles," "minutes," or "N/A"
center. Do not exceed 6 digits. then enter the appropriate lateral distance.

EXAMPLE- Runway 9 would be entered as "000009." If EXAMPLE- Two thousand feet would be entered as
the incident occurred at or near the intersection of runway "2000," 2.34 miles would be entered as "2.34," and 4
3 and runway 12, it should be entered as "003/12." minutes would be entered as "4."
Runways 9L and 17R would be entered as "09L17R."
Block 9 - NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT FOR WHICH
TAXIWAY- If the taxiway is described using the phonetic THE CONTROLLER HAD CONTROL
alphabet; enter the letter not the word. RESPONSIBILITY AT THE TIME OF THE
INCIDENT
EXAMPLE- Echo would be "E" and HOTEL 1 would be
"H1." Enter the number of aircraft for which the controller had
separation responsibility, including point outs even though
LATITUDE: the aircraft may be on another frequency. For incidents
involving tower cab local controllers, do not count aircraft
EXAMPLE- For 48 degrees 35 minutes NORTH, enter "N waiting in line for departure unless the controller was
48 30 0." responsible for their separation.

LONGITUDE:

EXAMPLE- For 153 degrees WEST, enter "W 153 0 0."

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Appendix 4

Block 10 - WAS TRAINING IN PROGRESS? Select the position or the performance level of the
employee at the time of the incident. Select
Select "Yes" or "No" to indicate if, at the time of the "DEVELOPMENTAL," "CPC," "SUPERVISOR,"
incident, training was being conducted at the position "STAFF SPECIALIST," or "OTHER."
where the incident took place. Blocks 11 through 36 shall If "CPC" is selected, enter, as of the date of the incident,
be completed for each employee identified as primary how many years and months the employee has been a CPC
or contributory to the incident. in the facility where the incident occurred.

Block 11 - ENTER P FOR PRIMARY OR C FOR EXAMPLE- 5 years and 8 months would be entered as
CONTRIBUTORY "05-08."

Indicate whether the employee was the primary cause of Block 18 - LAST DATE OF CERTIFICATION OR
the incident or contributed to the incident by entering a "P" RECERTIFICATION ON POSITION
for primary or "C" for contributory. One employee should
be designated as the primary employee responsible for the DATE: Enter the most recent of either the date that the
incident. If a facility is unable to identify one employee as employee was initially certified or the last date that the
primary, mark all employees’ with a "C" and include employee was recertified on the position that he/she was
justification for the designation in Block 70, Facility staffing at the time of the incident.
Manager's Recommendations and Corrective Actions. Do
not include employees’ who were receiving OJT at the time EXAMPLE- A date of May 25, 1993 would be entered as
of the incident. "05/25/1993."

Block12 - NUMBER OF PERSONNEL INVOLVED CERTIFICATION: Indicate whether the date entered is the
This is the total number of personnel involved in the error initial certification date by selecting "I" or recertification be
or deviation at the facility that completes this report. This selecting "R."
number will be automatically inserted in this block
depending on the number of employees’ for whom data is Block 19 - HAS TRAINING BEEN RECEIVED
provided. WITHIN THE LAST 12 MONTHS THAT IS
RELEVANT TO THE INCIDENT?
Block 13 - EMPLOYEE IDENTIFIER/FACILITY
Select "Yes" or "No" to indicate whether the employee has
EMPLOYEE IDENTIFIER: This letter will be received training within the 12 months prior to the incident
automatically placed in the block for each employee for that is relevant to the incident. If "Yes" is selected, list the
whom data is provided. type and date of the training in the provided text box.

EMPLOYEE FACILITY IDENTIFICATION: Enter the * Block 20 - IS A MEDICAL CERTIFICATION ISSUE

three-letter identifier of the facility where the employee RELATED TO THE INCIDENT?
worked at the time of the incident.
Select "Yes" or "No" to indicate if a medical certification
EMPLOYEE FACILITY LEVEL: Select the classification issue was related to the incident.
level of the facility where the employee worked at the time
of the incident. Select from levels 1 through 5. If "Yes" is selected, provide a complete explanation of how
the medical certification issue related to the incident in
EMPLOYEE FACILITY TYPE: Select the type of facility Block 65, Summary of Incident.
where the employee worked at the time of the incident.
Select from, "CENTER," "FLIGHT SERVICE," Block 21 - IDENTIFY AND DESCRIBE THE TYPE
"TOWER," "TRACON," or "OTHER." OF WORK SCHEDULE BEING WORKED AT THE
TIME OF INCIDENT
Block 14 – EMPLOYEE IDENTIFIER
EXAMPLE- When the employee is on an alternate work
Enter the employees’ identifier. schedule always enter "AWS" before describing the shift.
For example, an AWS shift of eight 9-hour days and one 8-
Block 15 - DATE OF BIRTH hour day per pay period would be entered as "AWS 5-4/9."
An AWS shift working four 10-hour days per week would be
Enter the month, day, and year of the employees’ birth. entered as "AWS 4/10."

EXAMPLE- A birth date of September 30, 1949 would be When the employee works 8-hour shifts; 2 days, 2 swings,
entered as "09/30/1949." 1 mid per week, enter "2-2-1." Explain any other schedules
such as: "8 hour day shifts," "8 hour mid shifts," or "No
Block 16 - SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER standard operational work schedule, person on detail."

Enter the last SIX numbers of the employees’ social Supervisors, managers, or staff specialists who are
security number. maintaining currency but not working traffic full time
should be described as: "First-level supervisor/area
Block 17 - INDICATE THE PERFORMANCE LEVEL manager/air traffic manager/staff specialist maintaining
OF THE EMPLOYEE currency."

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Appendix 4

Block 22 - CURRENT AND PREVIOUS SHIFT Block 28 - POSITION FUNCTION

Enter local times using the 24-hour clock. Select the employees’ position function at the time of the
PREVIOUS SHIFT: Enter the sign-in and sign-out times of incident from the following choices. Area Supervisor,
the employee for the shift immediately prior to the shift on Radar, Handoff, Radar Associate, Local Control, Ground
which the incident occurred. Enter these times ONLY if Control, Clearance Delivery, Departure Position, Arrival
that shift ended less than 36 hours from the beginning of Position, Air Traffic Assistant, Traffic Management, Flight
the shift on which the incident occurred. If the previous Data, or Other.
shift ended more than 36 hours before the shift on which
the incident occurred, enter "N/A." If "Other" is selected, enter that function in the appropriate
space.
CURRENT SHIFT: Enter the sign-in and sign-out times for
the employee for the shift on which the incident occurred. EXAMPLE- If the employee involved is an Area
Supervisor but he/she was working a radar position at the
Block 23 - AREA OF SPECIALIZATION time of the incident, enter an "R." If the employee was a
staff specialist working the Controller-In-Charge position,
Enter the employees’ area of specialization. enter "CIC."

EXAMPLE- Area B, Tower, TRACON, South Area, * Block 29 - DID THE EMPLOYEE REQUEST
Tower/TRACON. ASSISTANCE PRIOR TO THE INCIDENT?

Block 24 - SECTOR OR POSITION Select "Yes" or "No" to indicate if the employee requested
assistance prior to the incident. If "Yes" is selected, provide
Enter the sector or position that the employee was staffing an explanation of the request, to whom it was directed, any
at the time of the incident. action or inaction that resulted based upon the request, etc.,
in the Block 65.
EXAMPLE- Sector 34, Blueridge Sector, BKW, Sector
OC9, South Arrival Radar, Arrival Radar 1, and Local * Block 30 - WAS THE EMPLOYEE AWARE THAT
Control One. AN OPERATIONAL ERROR/DEVIATION WAS
DEVELOPING?
Block 25 - TIME ON POSITION
Select "Yes" or "No" to indicate if the employee was aware
Enter the amount of time in minutes the employee had been that an OE/OD was developing. In either case, provide an
on the position at the time of the incident. explanation in Block 65. If "Yes" is selected, explain the
surrounding circumstances in relation to when the
Block 26 - WHAT SECTORS OR POSITIONS WERE employee was aware. If "No" is selected, explain why the
COMBINED AT THE POSITION BEING STAFFED employee was unaware.
BY THE CONTROLLER AT THE TIME OF THE
INCIDENT? * Block 31 - DID THE EMPLOYEE CONTEMPLATE
TAKING CORRECTIVE ACTION?
List any other sectors or positions that were combined at
the sector or position that the controller was staffing at the Select "Yes" or "No" to indicate if the employee
time of the incident. contemplated taking any corrective actions regarding the
incident. In either case, provide an explanation in 65.
EXAMPLE- If the hand-off position of Sector 34 was
combined at the radar position of Sector 34 that was being If "Yes" is selected, explain what the employee thought of
worked by the primary controller, enter "H34." If the North doing to correct the situation. If "No" is selected, explain
Feeder radar position was combined at the South Feeder why the employee did not think of taking corrective action.
radar position, enter "North Feeder Radar." A midnight
watch would probably have several sectors/positions * Block 32 - DID THE EMPLOYEE ATTEMPT TO
combined. TAKE CORRECTIVE ACTION?

Block 27 - WHICH ASSOCIATED POSITIONS WERE Enter "Yes" or "No" to indicate if the employee attempted
STAFFED AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT? to take corrective action regarding the incident. In either
case, provide an explanation in Block 65. If "Yes" is
List any associated positions that were staffed at the time of selected, explain what action was taken. If "No" is selected,
the incident. These are positions that directly work with or explain why no corrective action was attempted.
assist the position being worked by the primary controller.
Block 33 - EMPLOYEE WAS ALERTED TO THE
EXAMPLE- If D34 was staffed at the time of incident when INCIDENT BY
the primary controller was working R34, enter "D34." If
the handoff position for Arrival Radar 1 was staffed, enter Enter the first source that alerted the employee of the
"Handoff Arrival Radar 1." incident by selecting one of the following: Conflict Alert,
MSAW/EMSAW, Self-identified, Facility Personnel, Pilot,
Another Facility, or Other. If "Other" is selected, describe
the source in the appropriate space.

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Appendix 4

Block 34 - DATE AND TIME EMPLOYEE BECAME Block 41 - IF SECTORS WERE COMBINED, DID
AWARE OF THE INCIDENT THE OSIC/CIC APPROVE THE COMBINATION?
For those facilities that have sectors, select "NOT
Using the 24-hour clock, indicate the local date and time COMBINED," "NO," or "YES" as appropriate.
the employee became occurred even if it was not clear at For those facilities that do not have sectors, select "N/A."
the time that the incident was an error or deviation.
Block 42 - IF POSITIONS WERE COMBINED, DID
Block 35 - WAS THE DISTANCE REFERENCE (e.g., THE OSIC/CIC APPROVE THE COMBINATION?
THE J-RING) BEING USED?
Select "NOT COMBINED," "YES," or "NO," to describe
This block applies only to ARTCC's. Select "Yes" or "No" the combination of positions.
to indicate if, at the time of the incident, the "J-ring"
(HALO) was being used on at least one aircraft involved in Block 43 - IN WHAT ACTIVITY WAS THE
the incident. ASSIGNED OSIC/CIC ENGAGED AT THE TIME OF
THE INCIDENT?
* Block 36 - WERE THERE ANY DISTRACTIONS
OR ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS THAT MAY Select the activity that most describes what the OSIC/CIC
HAVE INFLUENCED THE INCIDENT? assigned to supervise the operation was doing at the time of
the incident. If "Other" is selected, describe the activity as
Select "Yes" or "No." If "Yes" is selected, explain in Block briefly as possible.
65. The explanation may include reference to conditions
such as construction, equipment installation, presence of "General Supervision" means the OSIC/CIC was not
visitors, loud or boisterous co-workers, equipment engaged in direct operational supervision at the time of the
malfunction, or extraneous conversation with co-workers or incident. However, he/she was in the area, perhaps dealing
Environmental: ambient air, work area layout, temperature, with paperwork, phone calls, weather displays, equipment
noise, or lighting. matters, etc.

Block 37 - NAME THE OSIC/CIC ASSIGNED AT "Direct operational supervision" means the OSIC/CIC was
THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT observing control positions and providing guidance and/or
direction to controllers.
Enter the last name, first name, middle initial and last six
numbers of social security number of the employee Block 44 - WAS THE OSIC CERTIFIED IN THE
assigned as the Operational Supervisor-in-Charge AREA OF SPECIALIZATION WHERE THE
(OSIC)/CIC of the operational area, at the time of the INCIDENT TOOK PLACE?
incident.
If an OSIC was assigned, at the time of the incident, to
* Block 38 - WAS THE ASSIGNED OSIC/CIC supervise the area of operation where the incident took
PRESENT IN THE OPERATIONAL AREA AT THE place, select either "Yes", "No." A selection of "Yes"
TIME OF THE INCIDENT? means that the OSIC was certified to work at least one
operational control position in the area of specialization, at
Select "Yes" or "No" to indicate if the OSIC/CIC was the time of the incident.
present in the operational area at the time of the incident.
If "No" is selected, provide an explanation in this block of
If "No" is selected, provide an explanation in Block 65. why the assigned OSIC was not certified to work at least
one operational control position in the area of
Block 39 - DID THE EMPLOYEE REQUIRE specialization, at the time of the incident.
OSIC/CIC ASSISTANCE PRIOR TO THE
INCIDENT? Select "N/A" if an OSIC was not assigned, at the time of
the incident, to supervise the area of operation where the
This block should be completed using input from the incident took place.
OSIC/CIC assigned to the operational area, at the time of
the incident. Block 45 - TRAFFIC COMPLEXITY

Select "Yes" or "No" to indicate if assistance that is Select 1 through 5 on the scale to indicate the level of
normally provided by the OSIC/CIC could have helped the traffic complexity at the time of the incident. One indicates
employee to prevent the incident. a low level of complexity, 3 indicate an average level of
complexity, and 5 indicate a high level of complexity.
* Block 40 - DID THE ASSIGNED OSIC/CIC
PROVIDE ASSISTANCE? When determining the traffic complexity, consider the
overall difficulty of the controller's task; e.g. weather,
Select "Yes" or "No" to indicate if the assigned OSIC/CIC variety of aircraft, traffic volume, coordination
provided assistance to the employee that was pertinent to requirements, runway configuration, emergency situations,
the incident. If "Yes" is selected, explain in Block 65 what arrival/departure flows, etc.
assistance was provided. If "No" is selected, explain in
Block 65 why assistance pertinent to the incident was not
provided by the OSIC/CIC.

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Appendix 4
Enter the aircraft prefix/type/suffix using combinations not
to exceed 9 alphanumeric.
* Block 46 - INDICATE WHICH FACTOR (S) WERE
ASSOCIATED WITH TRAFFIC COMPLEXITY EXAMPLE- A heavy Boeing 747 with TCAS, RNAV, and a
transponder with altitude encoding capability would be
Select the factor(s) that determined the level of traffic entered as "B/B747/R."
complexity at the time of the incident. If any of the factors
were pertinent to the incident, provide an explanation in Block 54 - FLIGHT PROFILE OR VEHICLE
Block 65. POSITION AT TIME OF INCIDENT

Block 47 - TYPE OF CONTROL PROVIDED Select the flight profile that best describes the aircraft
before the incident. This should be the profile that was in
Select the type of control that was being provided at the effect before any action was taken to resolve the potential
position at the time of the incident. Select "RADAR," incident.
"TOWER," "OCEANIC," or "NONRADAR."
For example, an aircraft was in level flight when the
Block 48 - REQUIRED SEPARATION WAS BY controller saw the potential conflict. The controller then
Select the appropriate document that specified the required climbed the aircraft to maintain separation, but that action
separation concerning the incident. Select either "FAA was not enough and separation was lost. Select "LEVEL
ORDER," or "FACILITY LETTER OF AGREEMENT OR FLIGHT" in this block for this scenario. The same would
DIRECTIVE." apply to vectors given to resolve the situation.

If "FAA ORDER" is selected, enter the order number and Select "OTHER" if the most appropriate profile is not listed
applicable paragraph number. and describe that profile in the text field. When more than
one of the profile choices applies, make one selection then
If "FACILITY LETTER OF AGREEMENT OR select "OTHER" and describe the other profile(s) in the text
DIRECTIVE" is selected, enter the facility with which the field.
LOA has been negotiated or the facility directive and
paragraph numbers. Block 55 - AIRCRAFT GROUND SPEED

Block 49 - WERE ANY DEFICIENT PROCEDURES Enter the aircraft ground speed, in knots, at the time of the
NOTED AS A RESULT OF THE INCIDENT? incident. Select "N/A" if the aircraft was on the ground at
the time of the incident.
Select "Yes" or "No" to indicate if any national, regional,
or local procedures were found to be deficient as a result of Block 56 - TCAS EQUIPPED
the incident. If "Yes" is selected, provide an explanation in
this block. Select "Yes", "No", or "Unknown" to indicate if the aircraft
was equipped with an operating TCAS at the time of the
Block 50 - WERE ANY SPECIAL PROCEDURES IN incident.
EFFECT AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT?
Block 57 - EVASIVE ACTION
Select "Yes" or "No" to indicate if any pertinent special
procedures were in effect at the time of the incident. If Select "Yes", "No", or "Unknown" to indicate if the aircraft
"Yes" is selected, provide an explanation in this block. took any evasive action with regard to the incident. Chose
"TCAS" if a pilot responded to a resolution advisory and
For example, if a special military operation was pertinent to climbed or descended.
the incident, identify the operation and explain how it was
pertinent. If unusual runway or airspace configurations EXAMPLE- An aircraft inadvertently vectored close to
were pertinent to the incident, describe those configurations another aircraft at the same altitude turns out of the path of
and explain their pertinent relationship to the incident. that aircraft.

Block 51 - NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT INVOLVED IN Block 58 - DID THE PILOT FILE A NEAR MIDAIR
THE INCIDENT COLLISION REPORT?

This number will automatically be entered as data for each Select "Yes", "No", or "Unknown" to indicate if the pilot
aircraft is entered. filed a near midair collision report.

Blocks 52 through 58 shall be completed for each Block 59 - AIRCRAFT AND

aircraft/vehicle identified as involved in the incident. OBSTRUCTION/OBSTACLES

Block 52 - IDENTIFICATION If the incident involved aircraft and an obstruction or

obstacle that contributed to the cause of the incident, select
Enter the aircraft identity using combinations not to exceed the appropriate item. If "Airport Movement Area" or
7 alphanumeric characters "Other" is selected, explain in the text field.

Block 53 - PREFIX/TYPE/SUFFIX

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Appendix 4

* Block 60 - WAS EQUIPMENT LAYOUT OR EXAMPLE-

DESIGN A FACTOR IN THE INCIDENT?
a. The controller may have been focusing on another
Select "Yes" or "No" to indicate if equipment layout or situation and when he/she noticed the potential incident it
design influenced the incident. If "Yes" is selected, provide was too late to maintain separation.
an explanation in Block 65.
b. The controller issued a clearance but by the time
* Block 61 - WAS ANY PERTINENT EQUIPMENT he/she noticed the aircraft was not complying fast enough it
OPERATED BY THE CONTROLLER (S) was too late to maintain separation.
REPORTED AS FUNCTIONING
UNSATISFACTORILY BEFORE THE INCIDENT? c. A readback/hearback error occurred and the controller
did not have enough time to issue the correct clearances to
maintain separation.
Select "Yes" or "No" to indicate if any problems with
pertinent equipment were reported by the controller prior to d. The controller thought the heading/climb/descent
the incident. These are problems with equipment that he/she gave an aircraft would maintain separation but by
existed before and during the incident. If "Yes" is selected, the time it was apparent that separation would be lost, it
provide an explanation in Block 65. was too late for more effective instructions to take effect.

Block 62 - SYSTEM(S) IN USE e. Equipment failure did not allow the controller to issue
the necessary timely instructions.
Select the system(s) in use at the position where the
incident occurred at the time of the incident. f. An authorized local/regional/national procedure was
followed correctly but an OE/OD still resulted.
Block 63 - WAS RADAR TRANSITION FROM ONE
SYSTEM TO ANOTHER IN PROGRESS? NOTE:
A phrase such as "The controller failed to establish vertical
Select "Yes" or "No" to indicate if a radar transition from separation before lateral separation was lost" is not
one system to another was in progress at the time of the appropriate. It is a factual statement but it does not
incident. If "Yes" is selected, explain the circumstances of describe the specific circumstances surrounding the
the transition in this block. incident or why the controller failed to maintain
separation.
Block 64 - WHAT WAS THE STATUS OF THE
CONFLICT ALERT AT THE TIME OF THE Block 65 - SUMMARY OF INCIDENT EXAMPLE
INCIDENT?
AAL1045, B757, was eastbound at FL290 from over LIN
Select the status that best describes the status of the conflict direct OAL en route to JFK and in communication with
alert feature at the position where the incident occurred at R25. UAL432, DC10, was westbound at FL350 from
the time of the incident. approximately over OAL direct MOD, en route to SFO,
and in communication with R12. The aircraft were on
Block 65 - SUMMARY OF INCIDENT approximately opposite direction courses.

Explain, in chronological order, each factor relevant to the At 0923:15, R12 accepted the hand-off on AAL1045 and
incident. requested D12 to coordinate with Sector 25 to assign
AAL1045 a heading of 120 degrees and to climb the
Tell a detailed story, describing the pertinent actions of all aircraft to FL370. D12 then contacted R25 with the
those involved (e.g. controllers by position, supervisors, requests and R25 issued AAL1045 the coordinated
aircraft, etc.). It should be apparent what actions (of lack clearances. The pilot acknowledged both the heading and
of) contributed to or caused the incident. Include any the altitude clearance.
explanations necessary from previous blocks.
At 0924:05 the R25 controller requested help at the sector
Refer to aircraft using their call signs and to individuals by due to traffic volume (15 aircraft and increasing) and flow
position or title, as appropriate. For example, use restrictions, due to weather, requiring a 20 mile-in-trail
"UAL1065" instead of "Aircraft #1." Use "R34" or "Local restriction for aircraft landing SFO. The OSIC had a
Control" instead of "Controller A." The summary should be controller working on the "D" position at Sector 25 within
complete so that the reader does not have to refer back to 3 minutes of the request.
other blocks for information on controller positions, aircraft
identifications, etc. At 0925:30, R25 accepted the hand-off on UAL432, which
was converging with AAL1045. The DART data showed
REFERENCE specific times only when it is necessary to that AAL1045's altitude was FL316. The aircraft were 72
better describe the order of events. Use local times so the miles apart.
reader can better understand the time of day the events
took place.

End the summary with a short (usually 4-5 lines) recap of

the specific reasons the incident occurred. Explain why the
controller did not maintain separation.
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7210.56C 8/15/02
Appendix 4

At 0927:50, the R25 controller generated a HALO around b. The category (ies) of the operational error/deviation
UAL432 radar target and, simultaneously, the Conflict and the reasons for category determination.
Alert activated. Three seconds later UAL432 made initial
contact with R25, at FL350. Lateral separation was then 39 c. Recommendations and actions to be taken to prevent a
miles with AAL1045 climbing through FL342. recurrence of the incident.
Immediately following UAL432's initial contact, the R25
controller issued UAL432 a 20-degree right turn. The pilot d. The causal factor(s) of the incident.
acknowledged.
Block 67 - SELECT THE CATEGORY OF THE
At 0928:05, the R25 controller issued AAL1045 a right OPERATIONAL ERROR/DEVIATION
turn to heading 140 degrees and asked the pilot to "give me
a good rate of climb". The pilot acknowledged. The R25 Select the category or categories that best describe(s) the
controller then returned to UAL432 and issued a right turn cause(s) of the incident.
to 310 degrees and the pilot acknowledged. The R25
controller thought that the vectors given were adequate to Select "ATCS" if one or more of the following is identified
maintain lateral separation so that AAL1045 could continue as either a causal or contributing factor:
to climb through the altitude of UAL432. Approximately
20 seconds passed and at 0928:45 the R25 controller asked a. An ATCS fails to adhere to procedures in or acts
UAL432 if he had started his turn. The pilot's response according to an individual misinterpretation of Orders
was, "We see the traffic out in front of us." The R25 7110.65, 7110.10, or supplemental instructions.
controller stated that he needed UAL432 to start the turn
"immediately." The pilot stated that he was turning and b. An ATCS demonstrates substandard performance not
passing through "three zero". Though not yet evident to the covered in a, above.
R25 controller, the turn had been started at or before
09:28:40, as indicated by NTAP data. Select "MANAGER/SUPERVISOR/OTHER
PERSONNEL" when an action or inaction of a manager(s),
At 0929:04 separation was lost. The NTAP indicated 3.9 supervisor(s), or other personnel is identified as a causal
miles lateral and 200 feet vertical separation as the closest factor or a contributing factor to the incident.
proximity.
NOTE:
Although the R25 controller accepted a handoff on This category should not be used for an OE/OD involving a
UAL432 knowing of the route convergence with manager, supervisor, or other personnel performing
AAL1045, he thought that AAL1045's initial vector and the regular ATCS duties, e.g., working an operational position
310 degrees heading he assigned to UAL432 would for shift coverage, or currency time. Such incidents should
maintain separation. He could have amended AAL1045's instead be categorized as "ATCS."
altitude to FL330 during the climb to maintain vertical
separation or could have given sharper turns to both aircraft Select "PROCEDURAL" if an established procedure was
to achieve lateral separation. By the time he recognized that the primary cause or contributed significantly to the
the vectors were not working, it was too late to maintain cause(s) of the incident. Do not complete blocks 14-18 for
separation. errors categorized as “PROCEDURAL”.

Block 66 - INVESTIGATORS Select "EQUIPMENT" if equipment failure was the

primary cause or contributed significantly to the cause(s) of
Enter the dates the investigators reviewed the report. incident. Do not complete blocks 14-18 for errors
Investigators shall sign in the appropriate places to indicate categorized as “EQUIPMENT”.
they have reviewed the completed report.
Entering a date in the appropriate space will cause a "/s/" to Block 68 - CAUSAL FACTORS
be automatically entered in the associated signature space
when printed. Under each column designated for a specific employee,
The page with the original signature(s) shall be retained at select any box so that an "X" appears, when the description
the facility with the rest of the report. Copies of this page identifies a causal factor of the incident.
may contain a copy of the signature(s) or an "/s/" in the
signature space(s). EXAMPLE- If overlapping data blocks were a causal
factor of the incident and it was employee "A" who was
PART II - Facility Manager Action associated with the overlapping data blocks, select the box
in column "A" under section B (1) entitled "Overlapping
GENERAL INFORMATION data blocks." If a causal factor of the incident was the
employees’ failure to coordinate correctly with a position
The facility manager's signature indicates that he/she has within the same sector, select the box on the line in sector E
reviewed and concurs with the data submitted by the IIC (1) entitled "Intra-position."
and the investigative team (if applicable), and is satisfied
that Part I of the final report is complete and sufficient to If "Other" is selected, in any section and more room is
determines the following: needed for the explanation, use Block 65, Incident of
Summary.
a. The determination that the incident is an operational
error or operational deviation.

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Appendix 4

SECTION A: DATA POSTING e. Acknowledgment

A data posting error is any error of calculation, omission, or The failure to obtain or give an acknowledgment for the receipt
incomplete data, erroneous entries, handling, or subsequent of information.
revisions to this data. This includes errors in posting and
recording data. It does not include errors involved in receiving,
transmitting, coordinating, or otherwise forwarding this f. Other
information. If one of the causal factors listed does not
adequately describe the factor involved, list the factor under If the causal factors listed above do not adequately describe the
"Other" and provide a brief explanation. factor involved, list the factor and provide a brief explanation.
SECTION B: RADAR DISPLAY
SECTION E: COORDINATION
a. Misidentification
Any factor associated with a failure to exchange requirement
Radar misidentification means a failure to properly identify the information. This includes coordination between individuals,
correct target and includes subsequent errors committed after positions of operation, and facilities for exchange of
the original identification was properly accomplished. Indicate information such as APREQ's, position reports, forwarding of
the listed item(s), which most closely describes the reason for flight data, etc. If one of the causal factors listed does not
misidentification. If one of the causal factors listed does not adequately describe the factor involved, list the factor under
adequately describe the factor involved, list the factor under "Other" and provide a brief explanation.
"Other" and provide a brief explanation.
SECTION F: POSITION RELIEF BRIEFING
b. Inappropriate Use of Displayed Data
Relief briefing errors are special errors of both communication
A data or display information error occurs due to a failure to and coordination, which occur as the result of position relief.
maintain constant surveillance of a flight data display or traffic They include such things as failure to give a relief briefing,
situation and to properly use the information presented by the failure to request a briefing, incomplete or erroneous briefing,
display or situation. If one of the causal factors listed does not etc. If one of the causal factors listed does not adequately
adequately describe the factor involved, list the factor under describe the factor involved, list the factor under "Other" and
"Other" and provide a brief explanation. provide a brief explanation.

SECTION C: AIRCRAFT OBSERVATION (Towers Only) Block 69 - FACILITY MANAGER'S

RECOMMENDATIONS AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
An aircraft observation error means a failure to maintain
constant surveillance of aircraft and the movement area, and to List recommendations and/or corrective actions that have been
properly react to, interpret, or otherwise utilize, in a timely taken or will be taken to prevent a recurrence of a similar OE or
manner, the information being viewed. If one of the causal OD.
factors listed does not adequately describe the factor involved,
list the factor under "Other" and provide a brief explanation. The facility manager should address any written comments
from the involved employees’ or the bargaining unit in this
SECTION D: COMMUNICATIONS ERROR block.

A communications error is a causal factor associated with the The facility manager may use this block to explain the rationale
exchange of information between two or more people (e.g., behind any decisions or to comment on any part(s) of the
pilots and specialists). It refers to the failure of human investigation.
communication not communications equipment.
Record the local date (month/day/year) in the appropriate space
a. Phraseology that the facility manager, or his/her authorized representative,
signed the report. Print or type the name of the facility manager
Use of incorrect or improper phraseology. in the appropriate space. The facility manager, or his/her
authorized representative, shall sign in the appropriate space.
b. Transposition
Entering a date in the appropriate space will cause a "/s/" to be
An error due to transposition of words, numbers, or symbols by automatically entered in the signature space when printed.
either oral or written means. This involves writing/saying one
thing while thinking/hearing something else. The page with the original signature shall be retained at the
facility with the rest of the report. Copies of this page may
c. Misunderstanding contain a copy of the signature or an "/s/" in the signature
space.
The failure to communicate clearly and concisely so that no
misunderstanding exists for any actions contemplated or agreed
upon.

d. Read back

The failure to identify improper or incorrect read back of

information.

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7210.56C 8/15/02
Appendix 4

PART III - Air Traffic Division Manager

Block 70 - DIVISION MANAGER'S CONCLUSIONS

AND RECOMMENDATIONS

If the ATD manager concurs with the recommendations and

corrective actions taken by the facility manager, select the box
at the top of the block so that an "X" appears in the box next to
the sentence "We concur with the recommendations and
corrective actions of the facility manager."

If the ATD manager does not concur with the recommendations

and corrective actions taken by the facility manager, describe
the differences of opinions.

Record the local date (month/day/year) in the appropriate space

that the division manager, or his/her authorized representative,
signed the report. Print or type the name of the division
manager in the appropriate space. The division manager, or
his/her authorized representative, shall sign in the appropriate
space.

Entering a date in the appropriate space will cause a "/s/" to be

automatically entered in the signature space when printed.
The page with the original signature shall be retained at the
division with the rest of the report. Copies of this page may
contain a copy of the signature or an "/s/" in the signature
space.

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8/15/02 APPENDIX 5. EXAMPLE OF FAA FORM 7210-3, 7210.56C
FINAL OPERATIONAL ERROR/DEVIATION REPORT Appendix 5
Final Operational Error/Deviation Report Report Number

1. Date and time of incident:

MM/DD/YYYY Time (Local)
PART I. INVESTIGATIVE DATA
2. Responsible facility: 3. Severity Index: points
Converging, Opposite Courses
Classification level: Low Controlled w/ no TCAS Converging, Crossing Courses
Moderate Controlled with TCAS RA Same Course
High Uncontrolled Diverging/Non-intersecting Courses

4. Was weather a factor in the incident? Yes No 5. Altitude/flight level of incident:

(If yes, explain in the incident summary.)

6. Type of airspace: 7. Location of incident:

Class A Class E Fix Intersection

Class B Class G Direction Runway

Class C Oceanic Distance Taxiway

Class D Airport surface Latitude

Other Longitude

8. Closest proximity: 9. Number of aircraft controller had control 10. Was training
responsibility for at the time of the incident: in progress?
Vertical feet Lateral Feet
Miles Yes
Minutes
N/A No

Complete blocks 11-36 for each employee

13. Employees’ facility:
11. Enter P for Primary or C for
12. Number of personnel involved:
contributory: 3-letter Level Type
Identification

14. Employee identifier: 15. Date of birth: 16: Social Security Number:

MM/DD/YYYY Last 6 digits only

17. Indicate the performance 18. Last date of certification or 19. Has training been received within the last 12 months
level of the employee: recertification on position: that is relevant to the incident?

Developmental Yes No

CPC If yes, list the type and the date of that training in this block:

Supervisor

Staff Specialist

Other
Initial Certification
If CPC, how long since CPC
in current facility? Recertification

YY-MM
FAA Form 7210-3 (08/02) Supersedes Previous Edition

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7210.56C 8/15/02
Appendix 5

Final Operational Error/Deviation Report Report Number

20. Is a medical certification issue related to the 21. Identify and describe the type of 22. Current and previous shift
incident? work schedule being worked at the time of the
Previous shift
Yes Sign in Sign out

No
Current shift
(If yes, explain in the incident summary.) Sign in Sign out

23. Area of specialization: 24. Sector or position: 25. Time on position: 26. What sectors or position were combined at the
position being staffed by the controller at the time
of the incident?

Number and Name Minutes

27. Which associated positions were staffed at the time of the incident?

28. Position function: Radar Radar Associate Hand Off Local Control Ground Control

Flight Data Clearance Delivery Departure Position Arrival Position Area Supervisor

Air Traffic Assistant Traffic Management Tracker Other:

29. Did the employee request assistance prior to the incident? 30. Was the employee aware that an
operational error/deviation was developing?
Yes No

Yes No
(If yes, provide explanation in the incident summary.)
(Provide explanation in the incident summary.)

31. Did the employee contemplate taking corrective action? 32. Did the employee attempt to take corrective action?

Yes No Yes No

(Provide explanation in the incident summary.) (Provide explanation in the incident summary.)

33. Employee was alerted to the incident by:

Equipment: Personnel: Non-facility personnel: Other:

Conflict alert Self-identified Pilot

MSAW/EMSAW Facility personnel Another facility

34. Date and time employee became aware of the incident: 35. Was the Distance Reference Indicator Yes
(i.e., J-Ring) being used?
No
MM/DD/YYYY Time (local)

36. Were there any distractions or environmental conditions that may have influenced the incident?

Yes No (If yes, provide explanation in the incident summary.)

(i.e., distractions: construction, equipment installation, presence of visitors, loud or boisterous coworkers, equipment malfunction, and extraneous
Conversation w/coworkers; environmental: ambient air, work area layout, temperature, noise, and lighting.)
FAA Form 7210-3 (08/02) Supersedes Previous Edition Page 2

Page 2
8/15/02 7210.56C
Appendix 5
Final Operational Error/Deviation Report Report Number
Employee: Continuation Page 2

11. Enter P for primary or C for 12. Number of personnel involved: 13. Employees’ facility:
Contributory: 3 letter Identification Level Type

14. Employee Identifier: 15. Date of birth: 16. Social Security Number:

MM/DD/YYYY Last 6 digits only

17. Indicate the performance 18. Last date of certification or 19. Has training been received
level of the employee: recertification on position: within the last 12 months that is
relevant to the incident?
Developmental
MM/DD/YYYY Yes
CPC
No
Supervisor
If yes, list the type and the date of
Staff Specialist Initial Certification That training in this block.

Other Recertification

If CPC, how long since CPC in

Current facility?

YY-MM

20. Is a medical certification issue related 21. Identify and describe the type of 22. Current and previous shift
to the incident? work schedule being worked at the time of the
incident. Previous shift
Yes Sign in Sign out

No
Current shift
(If yes, explain in the incident summary.) Sign in Sign out

23. Area of specialization: 24. Sector or position: 25. Time on position 26. What sectors or positions were combined at the
position being staffed by the primary controller at the
time of the incident?

Number and Name Minutes

27. Which other positions at the sector were staffed at the time of the incident?

28. Position function: Radar Radar Associate Hand Off Local Control Ground Control

Flight Data Clearance Delivery Departure Position Arrival Position Area Supervisor

Air Traffic Assistant Traffic Management Tracker Other:

FAA Form 7210-3 (08/02) Supersedes Previous Edition Page 2

Page 3
7210.56C 8/15/02
Appendix 5

Final Operational Error/Deviation Report Report Number

Employee: Continuation Page 2

29. Did the employee request assistance prior to the occurrence? 30. Was the employee aware that an operational
error/deviation was developing?
Yes No
Yes No
(If yes, provide explanation in the incident summary.)
(Provide explanation in the incident summary.)

31. Did the employee contemplate taking corrective action? 32. Did the employee attempt to take corrective action?

Yes No Yes No

(Provide explanation in the incident summary.) (Provide explanation in the incident summary.)

33. Employee was alerted to the incident by:

Equipment: Personnel: Non-facility personnel: Other:

Conflict alert Self-identified Pilot

MSAW/EMSAW Facility personnel Another facility

34. Date and time employee became aware of the incident: 35. Was the Distance Reference Indictor Yes
(i.e., J-Ring) being used?
No
MM/DD/YYYY Time (local)

36. Were there any distractions or environmental conditions that may have influenced the incident?

Yes No

(If yes, provide explanation in the incident summary.)

(i.e., distractions: construction, equipment installation, presence of visitors, loud or boisterous coworkers, equipment malfunction, and extraneous
Conversation w/coworkers; environmental: ambient air, work area layout, temperature, noise, and lighting.)

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Appendix 5

Final Operational Error/Deviation Report Report Number

37. Name the OSIC/CIC assigned at the time of the incident: 38. Was the assigned OSIC/CIC present in the
operational area at the time of the incident?
Enter A for OSIC
Enter C for CIC Yes No

Last name First name MI SSN (Last 6 digits)

39. Did the employee require OSIC/CIC assistance prior to the incident? 40. Did the assigned OSIC/CIC provide assistance?

Yes No Yes No
(Provide explanation in the incident summary.)

41. If sectors were combined, did the OSIC/CIC approve the combination? 42. If positions were combined, did the OSIC/CIC
approve the combination?
Yes No Not combined N/A
Yes No Not Combined

43. In what activity was the assigned OSIC/CIC engaged at the time of the 44. Was the OSIC/CIC certified in the area of
incident? specialization where the incident took place?

General Supervision Administering training Yes No N/A (If no, explain here)

Direct operational supervision Receiving training

Working a position of operation Other

45. Traffic complexity 46. Indicate which factor(s) were associated with traffic complexity.

1 2 3 4 5 Weather Runway configuration

Low Avg High
Terrain Runway condition

Airspace configuration Flow control

Number of aircraft Special event

Experience level Other

Emergency situation

47. Type of Control Provided 48. Required separation was by:

Radar FAA Order

Tower Facility Letter of Agreement (LOA) or Directive

Oceanic FAA Order Facility LOA/Directive

Nonradar Paragraph Paragraph

49. Were any deficient procedures noted as a 50. Were any special procedures in effect at the time of the incident?
result of the incident? (e.g. Traffic Management Program)
Yes No Yes No
(If yes, explain here) (If yes, explain here)

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Appendix 5

Final Operational Error/Deviation Report Report Number

(Complete additional sections if more than two aircraft are involved)

51. Number of aircraft involved in the incident:
Aircraft No. 1 Aircraft No. 2
52. Identification

53. Prefix/type/suffix

54. Flight profile or vehicle Descending Making approach Descending Making approach
position at time of
incident Touching down Radar vector Touching down Radar vector

Level flight Takeoff roll Level flight Takeoff roll

Taxiing-runway Landing roll Taxiing-runway Landing roll

Climbing Holding in position on runway Climbing Holding in position on runway

Other Other

55. Aircraft ground speed N/A knots N/A Knots

56. TCAS equipped Yes No Unknown Yes No Unknown

57. Evasive action Yes No TCAS Unknown Yes No TCAS Unknown

58. Did the pilot file a Near Yes No Unknown Yes No Unknown
Midair Collision Report

59. Aircraft and Obstruction/Obstacles

Terrain Vehicle(s) Personnel Obstruction Equipment Protected Airspace

Airport Movement Area (explain) Not applicable Other (explain)

60. Was equipment layout or design a factor in the incident? 61. Was any pertinent equipment operated by the controller(s)
reported as functioning unsatisfactorily before the incident?
Yes No (If yes, explain in the incident summary)
Yes No (If yes, explain in the incident summary)

62. System(s) in use:

Narrowband ASR-9 ASDE II STARS ARTS IIIA

Broadband ASR-11 ASDE III STARS on ARTS ARTS IIE

DARC URET AMASS ACDs on ARTS ARTS IIIE

CENRAP OASIS D-BRITE DSR EARTS

Mode S Model1 BRITE IV Other:

63. Was radar transition from one system to another in progress? 64. What was the status of the conflict alert at the time of
the incident?
Yes No (If yes, explain here)
Activated Not available Not activated

Not installed Suppressed

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Appendix 5

Final Operational Error/Deviation Report Report Number

Additional aircraft sections

51. Number of aircraft involved in the incident:
Aircraft No. 3 Aircraft No. 4
52. Identification

53. Prefix/type/suffix

54. Flight profile or vehicle Descending Making approach Descending Making approach
Position at time of
Incident Touching down Radar vector Touching down Radar vector

Level flight Takeoff roll Level flight Takeoff roll

Taxiing-runway Landing roll Taxiing-runway Landing roll

Climbing Holding in position on runway Climbing Holding in position on runway

Other Other

55. Aircraft ground speed N/A knots N/A Knots

56. TCAS equipped Yes No Unknown Yes No Unknown

57. Evasive action Yes No TCAS Unknown Yes No TCAS Unknown

58. Did the pilot file a Near Yes No Unknown Yes No Unknown
Midair Collision Report

(Complete additional sections if more than two aircraft are involved)

51. Number of aircraft involved in the incident:
Aircraft No. 5 Aircraft No. 6
52. Identification

53. Prefix/type/suffix

54. Flight profile or vehicle Descending Making approach Descending Making approach
Position at time of
Incident Touching down Radar vector Touching down Radar vector

Level flight Takeoff roll Level flight Takeoff roll

Taxiing-runway Landing roll Taxiing-runway Landing roll

Climbing Holding in position on runway Climbing Holding in position on runway

Other Other

55. Aircraft ground speed N/A knots N/A Knots

56. TCAS equipped Yes No Unknown Yes No Unknown

57. Evasive action Yes No TCAS Unknown Yes No TCAS Unknown

58. Did the pilot file a Near Yes No Unknown Yes No Unknown
Midair Collision Report

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Appendix 5

Final Operational Error/Deviation Report Report Number

65. SUMMARY OF INCIDENT

FAA Form 7210-3 (08/02) Supersedes Previous Edition Page 5

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Appendix 5

Final Operational Error/Deviation Report Report Number

65. SUMMARY OF INCIDENT (continued from page 5)

66. INVESTIGATORS
Date Typed/Printed Name Signature

MM/DD/YYYY First/Last Name Investigator-in-Charge

MM/DD/YYYY First/Last Name Team Member

MM/DD/YYYY First/Last Name Team Member

MM/DD/YYYY First/Last Name Team Member

MM/DD/YYYY First/Last Name Team Member

MM/DD/YYYY First/Last Name Team Member

MM/DD/YYYY First/Last Name Team Member

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Appendix 5

Final Operational Error/Deviation Report Report Number

65. SUMMARY OF INCIDENT (continued from page 6)

FAA Form 7210-3 (08/02) Supersedes Previous Edition Page 6a

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Appendix 5

Final Operational Error/Deviation Report Report Number

Part II. FACILITY MANAGER ACTION

67. Select the category of the operational error/deviation. (more than one category may be possible)

Procedural Equipment ATCS Manager/Supervisor/Other Personnel

68. Causal Factors No Yes (employee)

A B C D E

A. Data Posting
(1) Computer Entry
Incorrect input
Incorrect update
Premature termination of data
Input/Update not made
Other (explain)

(2) Flight Progress Strip

Not updated
Interpreted incorrectly
Posted incorrectly
Updated incorrectly
Premature removal
Other (explain)

B. Radar Display
(1) Misidentification
Failure to reidentify aircraft when the accepted target identity becomes questionable
Overlapping data blocks
Acceptance of incomplete or difficult to correlate position information
Other (explain)

(2) Inappropriate Use of Displayed Data

MODE C
BRITE
Conflict alert
Failure to detect displayed data
Failure to comprehend displayed data
Failure to project future status of displayed data
Other (explain)

C. Aircraft Observation (Towers Only)

(1) Actual Observation of Aircraft
(2) Improper Use of Visual Data
Landing
Taking Off
Ground Operation
Taxiing across runway
Holding in position for takeoff
Other (explain)

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Appendix 5

Final Operational Error/Deviation Report Report Number

No Yes (employee)
A B C D E

D. Communication Error
(1) Phraseology
(2) Transposition
(3) Misunderstanding
(4) Read back
Altitude
Clearance
Identification
Other (explain)
(5) Acknowledgement
(6) Other (explain)

E. Coordination
(1) Area of Incident
Intra-sector/position
Inter-sector/position
Inter-facility
Facility type: , level: , and facility ID:
(2) Failure to utilize/comply with precoordination information
(3) Improper use of information exchanged in coordination
Aircraft Identification
Altitude/Flight Level
Route of Flight
Speeds
APREQs
Special Instructions
Other (explain)
(4) Failure to coordinate between ground and local control
Crossing active runway
Vehicle, equipment, or personnel on active runway
Use of other than active runway for arrival and departures
Runway closure
Other (explain)

F. Position Relief Briefing

(1) Employee did not use position relief checklist
(2) Employee being relieved gave incomplete briefing
(3) Relieving employee did not make use of pertinent data exchanged at briefing
(4) Other (explain)

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Appendix 5

Final Operational Error/Deviation Report Report Number

69. FACILITY MANAGER’S RECOMMENDATIONS AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

Date Typed/Printed Name of Facility Manager Signature

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Appendix 5

Final Operational Error/Deviation Report Report Number

69. FACILITY MANAGER’S RECOMMENDATIONS AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (continued from page 9)

FAA Form 7210-3 (08/02) Supersedes Previous Edition Page 9a

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Appendix 5

Final Operational Error/Deviation Report Report Number

Part III. AIR TRAFFIC DIVISION

MANAGER
70. AIR TRAFFIC DIVISION MANGER’S CONCLUSIONS/RECOMMENDATIONS

We concur with the recommendations and corrective actions of the facility manager.

Date Typed/Printed Name of Division Manager Signature

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Appendix 5

Final Operational Error/Deviation Report Report Number

70. AIR TRAFFIC DIVISION MANGER’S CONCLUSIONS/RECOMMENDATIONS (continued from page 10)

FAA Form 7210-3 (08/02) Supersedes Previous Edition Page 10a

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Appendix 6
APPENDIX 6.
INSTRUCTIONS AND EXAMPLE OF FAA FORM 7210-5,
OPERATIONAL ERROR/DEVIATION RECLASSIFICATION REPORT

1. REPORT NUMBER: - - - -

2. OCCURRENCE RECLASSIFIED:
TO: MILITARY FACILITY DEVIATION

PILOT DEVIATION

NO OCCURRENCE

3. DATE OF OCCURRENCE:

4. TIME OF OCCURRENCE: (Z)

5. NAME/TITLE OF PERSON REPORTING RECLASSIFFICATION:

6. DATE OF RECLASSIFICATION:

7. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME OF AIR TRAFFIC DIVISION 8. SIGNATURE:

MANAGER:

FAA Form 7210-5 (08/02) Supersedes Previous Edition

General Information Instructional Guide

After an FAA Form 7210-2, Preliminary Operational 1. REPORT NUMBER. Enter the report number of the
Error Investigation, has been completed and telephone Preliminary Operational Error/Deviation Report.
notification to FAA Washington Headquarters has been
accomplished, a review of the data by a reporting facility 2. OCCURRENCE RECLASSIFIED Place an “X” in
the appropriate box that represents the new
official (e.g.. ATM) may result in a reclassification of an classification.
operational error or deviation to one of the following:
• Pilot Deviation 3. DATE OF OCCURRENCE. Enter the date (month-
• Military Facility Deviation day-year) of the error or deviation.
• No Occurrence
4. TIME OF OCCURRENCE (UTC) Self explanatory
The Operational Error/Deviation Reclassification Report,
5. NAME AND TITLE OF PERSON REPORTING
FAA Form 7210-5, provides a means of reporting such a THE RECLASSIFICATION Self explanatory
reclassification without requiring the IIC to complete the
Final Operational Error/Deviation Report, FAA Form 6. DATE OF RECLASSIFICATION Self explanatory
7210-3.
7. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME OF ATM Self
The Regional Air Traffic Division Manager, along with explanatory
AAT-20 must concur with the reclassification.
8. SIGNATURE Self explanatory

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Appendix 7

APPENDIX 7.
INSTRUCTIONS FOR FAA FORM 7230-6,
FLIGHT ASSIST REPORT
INSTRUCTIONS

This form will facilitate analysis and correlation of the significant factors that can individually or in combination, result in a
pilot requiring assistance from an FAA air traffic control or flight service facility. Complete this form for each incident in
which in-flight assistance is provided to the pilot of an aircraft in a potentially dangerous situation. To ensure uniformity of
information, follow the instructions below.

The word Outstanding should be entered at the top center of the form for all Outstanding Flight Assists.

REGION: Use three letter regional identifier (AAL, ACE, AEA, AGL, ANE, ANM, ASO, ASW, AWP).

FLIGHT ASSIST REPORT NO.: Assign number using three digits; start with 001 at beginning of each calendar year.

ITEM

1. Use FAA three-letter identifier

2. Use six digits to specify date of assist, such as 010101 for January 1, 2001.
3. Supply UTC at which initial contact was made with aircraft requiring flight assistance. Use four digits.
4. Use aircraft registration number or if applicable, FAA authorized call sign.
5. Self-explanatory.
6. Self-explanatory.
7. Self-explanatory.
8. Indicate type of facility making report.
9. Indicate whether flight assist occurred during daylight or darkness.
10. Indicate if an Incident Report, FAA Form 8020-11 was filed.
11. Place an “X” in the box that describes the aircraft involved in the flight assist. Use FAA designator for the type of
aircraft in the last box.
12. Self-explanatory.
13. Indicate actual flight conditions in the vicinity at the time the aircraft made it’s initial call.
14. Indicate primary cause that triggered the flight incident. If an “X” is placed in the equipment malfunction or other box,
explain as necessary in Item 16. Only mark “Other” when the primary cause for the flight assist is not indicated
elsewhere in Item 14.
15. Self-Explanatory.
16. Give a brief narrative summary of the incident. Include the results such as damage to the aircraft and whether other
aircraft were delayed; further explanation of Items 13 and 14 if appropriate; and any other significant factors,
comments or recommendations. The pilot’s name and address should be included, if known, or if obtainable from the
pilot. Use additional sheets if more space is required.
17. Indicate the employee(s) primarily responsible for the flight assist with and asterisk (*).

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Appendix 8
APPENDIX 8.
EXAMPLE OF FAA FORM 7230-6, FLIGHT ASSIST REPORT
REGION FLIGHT ASSIST REPORT
FLIGHT ASSIST REPORT
NO.
1. FACILITY 2. DATE 3. TIME 4. AIRCRAFT IDENTIFICATION 5. NO. PERSONS
(UTC) ON BOARD

6. POINT OF DEPARTURE 7. ORIGINAL DESTINATION For Items 8-15 place “X” in appropriate
box except where designated otherwise.
8. FSS TERMINAL CENTER 9 OCCURRED DAYLIGHT DARKNESS 10. INCIDENT YES NO
DURING
FACILITY REPORT FAA
HOURS OF
TYPE
FORM 8020-11, filed
11. AIRCRAFT DESIGNATION
AIRCRAFT CATEGORY TYPE NUMBER OF ENGINES
DESCRIPTION GEN. AVIA MILITARY AIR PISTON TURBINE ONE TWO THREE OR (Specify)
CARRIER MORE

12. FLIGHT VFR IFR NONE 13. VFR IFR VFR UNKNOWN
PLAN ACTUAL FLIGHT ON TOP
CONDITIONS

LOST LOW CAUGHT

14. FUEL ON TOP EQUIPMENT MALFUNCTION OTHER (Specify)
PRIMARY
CAUSE COMM. NAV. MECH.

15. PRIMARY RADAR DF VOR ADF OTHER GEOGRAPHICAL SPECIALIST DETECTED

AIRCRAFT FEATURES AND ADVISED PILOT
METHOD
OF ASSISTANCE

16. BRIEF SUMMARY OF INCIDENT

17. ATC SPECIALIST WHO PROVIDED FLIGHT ASSISTANCE SERVICE

NAME POSITION WORKED TITLE AND GRADE

SIGNATURE (Air Traffic Manager) COPY DISTRIBUTION

A -505, ATX-400, FSDO- , Facility Files
FAA Form 7230-6 (08-02) Supersedes Previous Edition

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Appendix 9
APPENDIX 9.
INTERVIEW STATEMENT AND PARTICIPATING IN POST INCIDENT
INVESTIGATIONS
Human Resource Policy Manual (HRPM)
Human Resource Management (AHR)

STANDARDS OF CONDUCT
ER-4.1

This version effective: August 11, 2000 unless otherwise specified for a collective bargaining unit

Background information: This chapter replaces chapters 1, 2, 3, and 5 of FAPM LETTER 2635.
However, FAPM 2635 will remain in effect for bargaining unit employees/positions where any
applicable collective bargaining agreement contains provisions that conflict with this chapter and/or
until all bargaining obligations with individual collective bargaining units have been satisfied.

9. GIVING STATEMENTS AND/OR TESTIMONY:

a. It is the duty and requirement of every employee to give, orally and/or in writing as directed, to
any supervisor or DOT official conducting an investigation, inquiry or hearing in the interest of the
agency, complete and truthful information and testimony pertaining to all matters in which queried.

b. When directed by the Administrator (or his/her authorized representative), an employee shall
take an oath or make an affirmation about his/her testimony or written statement before an agent
authorized by law to administer oaths, and the employee shall, if requested, sign his/her name to the
transcript of testimony, affidavit or written statement which the employee provided. No employee may
refuse to testify or provide information pertinent to matters under investigation or inquiry.

c. All employees must give complete and truthful information in response to requests received
from Congress, the General Accounting Office, the Office of the Inspector General, the Office of
Personnel Management or other duly authorized investigative bodies, regarding matters under their
jurisdiction. It is FAA policy to cooperate with such bodies in the public interest. Employees must
notify their supervisor, or their second-level supervisor if the inquiry concerns the first-line supervisor,
of any such request.

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Appendix 10
APPENDIX 10.
GENERAL REPORTING PROCEDURES

Event Time Frame 1 Reference Form

Operational Error or Significant 2: AAT-200 Immediately FAA Order FAA Form 7210-
Deviation Other: No later than 3 hours unless an 7210.56 2
extension is granted by AAT-200 Par 5-1-3i
Aircraft Accident Significant: AAT-200 Immediately FAA Order FAA Form 8020-
Other: As soon as possible but not 8020.11, 3 and 8020-9
later than 2 hours Par 64
Near Mid-Air Collision Significant: AAT-200 Immediately FAA Order FAA Form 8020-
Otherwise: 3 hours 8020.11 Par 81 21
Pilot Deviations or Significant: AAT-200 Immediately FAA Order FAA Form 8020-
Airspace Intrusions Loss of separation: 3 hours 8020.11, 17
Other: 3 hours Par 84
Vehicle and Pedestrian Significant: AAT-200 Immediately FAA Order FAA Form 8020-
Deviations Loss of separation: 3 hours 8020.11 24
Other: 3 hours Par 86
Emergency Significant: AAT-200 Immediately FAA Order FAA Form 8020-
Loss of separation: 3 hours 7210.56, 11
Other: 3 hours Par 4-1-4
Flight Assist Significant: ATD Immediately FAA Order FAA Form 8020-
Other: 3 hours 7210.56, 11 or 8020-17 as
Par 4-1-5 appropriate
Military Facility Significant: AAT-200 Immediately FAA Order FAA Form 8020-
Deviation Other: 3 hours 7210.56, 11
Par 4-1-6
Spill Outs Significant: AAT-200 Immediately FAA Order FAA Form 8020-
Loss of separation: 3 hours as a Pilot 7210.56, 11
Deviation. Par 4-1-7
Other: 3 hours

Significant Events: a loss of separation, runway incursion, incident, accident, emergency or other
event that includes an air carrier, commuter, air taxi, an aircraft carrying members of Congress, a
prominent person(s), or the incident may or has become newsworthy. Please keep in mind when in
doubt, contact the WOC, they will conference you with the AAT-200 duty specialist for guidance.

1
All Notifications to AAT-200 shall be made through the WOC via the ROC.
2
Significant: involvement of an Air Carrier, Air Taxi, prominent persons and/or may become newsworthy.

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Appendix 11
APPENDIX 11.
AIR TRAFFIC INCIDENT
HANDLING PROCEDURES
1. Operational deviations: for all operational deviations a completed FAA Form 7210-2 shall be
faxed and a conference call through the WOC with the AT facility(s), ATD and AAT-200 within 3
hours of the event, during normal business hours. During after hour’s only significant deviations (see
below for definition), deviations involving the NY or DC Metro facilities (because they are very news
worthy) or individuals with multiple errors or deviations within the past 2 1/2 years shall be
conferenced.

2. Operational errors: for all operational errors; a completed FAA Form 7210-2 shall be faxed
and a conference call shall be made through the WOC with the AT facility(s), ATD and AAT-200 on
all errors. Additionally, a reduced copy of the NTAP, copy of the LST 5 data for en-route errors or an
enlarged copy of the CDR plot with the associated text including A/B, B/A separation for terminal
errors, shall be attached to the OE/OD report and faxed to the WOC (please ensure that the data and
report is legible). AAT-200, the AT facility and ATD SHALL be conferenced within 3 hours of the
event unless AAT-200 approves an extension. All en-route facility’s shall prepare and post a SATORI
on AAT-200's system and all terminals shall prepare and post on AAT-200's web site
(ftp://172.22.8.31), a RAPTOR formatted CDR extraction (see Appendix 1, Radar Data Porcessing)
and a voice tape (if requested) shall be forwarded electronically, mailed or played over the phone, to
AAT-200 within 72 hours of an event. All files shall be named with the operational error number and
centers shall include sector and video map number, either with the file or in the OE report. All
employees with a prior error within 2 1/2 years shall also fax/e-mail a copy of the employees’ prior
TTD to AAT-200 by the next business day (202-267-7389/9356). Please ensure the OE number is on
the form.

3. Accidents: all IFR or VFR Fatalities where ATC was providing services or a significant
accident (see definition below) shall be conferenced through the WOC with the involved AT
Facility(s), ATD and AAT-200 as soon as possible, but no later than 2 hours from time of occurrence.
The ATD shall ensure and FAA Form 8020-9, Aircraft Accident/Incident Preliminary Notice and if
needed, a summary is faxed to the WOC within 2 hours of all accidents. Please include the weather,
and a complete synopsis on services rendered.

4. All NMACs, significant pilot deviations, significant vehicle/pedestrian deviations or other

significant events (see definition below). A faxed report (appropriate report) and a conference call
between the involved facilities, ATD and AAT-200 shall occur within 3 hours of the event.

5. Significant Events: a loss of separation, runway incursion, incident, accident, emergency or

other event that includes an air carrier, commuter, air taxi, an aircraft carrying members of Congress, a
prominent person(s), or the incident may or has become newsworthy. Please keep in mind when in
doubt notify the WOC, request to be conferenced with the AAT-200 duty specialist.

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Appendix 12
APPENDIX 12.
DATA RETENTION

INCIDENT TYPE REQUIRED DATA RETENTION REFERENCE

INVESTIGATION OF AN OE/OD resulting FAA Order 7210.56, par 5-1-3 FAA Order 7210.56,
45 days
in a determination of a non-occurrence par 5-1-3
OPERATIONAL ERROR (OE) FAA Order 7210.56, par 5-1- FAA Order 7210.56,
2.5 years
13 par 5-1-13
OE-TECHNICAL VIOLATION FAA Order 7210.56, par 5-1- 2.5 years/ NATCA/FAA MOU,
13 12 months January 17, 2001
OPERATIONAL DEVIATION (OD) FAA Order 7210.56, par 5-1- 2.5 years/ NATCA/FAA MOU,
13 12 months January 17, 2001
INVESTIGATION OF AN INCIDENT 3 FAA Order 8020.11 according FAA Order 8020.11
OTHER THAN OE/OD resulting in a determination of a to the type incident being 45 days
non-occurrence investigated 4
QAR INVESTIGATION Data used to investigate FAA Order 7210.56
45 days
incident
NEAR MID-AIR COLLISION FAA Order 8020.11, par 81 2.5 years FAA 8020.11, par 81 l.
HATR/OHR FAA Order 8020.11, par 82 FAA 8020.11, par
2.5 years
82c(4)
PILOT DEVIATION FAA Order 8020.11. Par 84 2.5 years FAA 8020.11, par 84r.
VEHICLE/PEDESTRIAN DEVIATIONS FAA Order 8020.11, par 86 2.5 years FAA 8020.11, par 86j.
OTHER AT INCIDENTS FAA Order 8020.11, par 85, FAA 8020.11, par 85j.
2.5 years
87, 88
INFORMAL ACCIDENT FAA Order 8020.11 2.5 years FAA 8020.11, par 79c.
FORMAL ACCIDENT-COPIES FAA Order 8020.11, par 74 2.5 years FAA 8020.11, par 79b.
FORMAL ACCIDENT-ORIGINAL PACKAGE FAA Order 8020.11, par 74 5 years 5 FAA 8020.11, par 79a.
3
In this context, “incident” refers to those events as defined in FAA Order 7210.56, paragraph 4-1-1, except Operational
Errors/Deviations.
4
The 45-day requirement has to do primarily with the preservation of voice recordings, radar data and supporting data beyond
the normal 15-day retention requirement.

5
Except when advised by AAT-200, that the accident is in litigation, then retain until advised by AAT-200.

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Appendix 13
APPENDIX 13.
OPERATIONAL ERROR/DEVIATION
HANDLING PROCEDURES AND RETURN TO OPERATIONAL DUTY
1. All Surface Errors, MVA/Obstruction, Oceanic errors, IFR vs. VFR and/or all Terminal
errors on final; where the separation requirement is 1.0nm, 1.5nm or 2.0nm; shall be handled in
accordance with FAA Order 7210.56 paragraph 5-1-9, Return to Operational Duty. The 80% rule does
not apply to these types of errors and as a minimum the following shall be accomplished:

a. Conduct an in-depth review with all involved employees.

b. Identify all deficiencies.

c. Document the discussion.

d. Assess performance; decertify and provide remedial training if performance history

warrants such action, or provide skill enhancement training as needed and document in the employees’
training record (do not reference the error in the training jacket).

e. When it is appropriate for the employee to return to duty, administer a skill check prior to
return to operational duties. Skill enhancement training may be provided before or after the involved
employee(s) have returned to duty. Conduct a 30-day follow-up performance skill check with all
involved employees’.

2. At all EARTS facility’s AND/OR any En-route or Terminal error that occurs and radar data
is not immediately available to review and all indications are that at least 80% separation
minima was maintained and/or AAT-200 is unable to provide a severity classification within 1-
hour of notification shall be handled as a Low Severity for initial return to duty. If radar data
later becomes available and the event is then classified as a moderate or high severity, then post event
skill enhancement or decertification/remedial training may be accomplished as outlined below.

3. All Operational Deviations shall be handled as a Low Severity, as outlined below.

4. Any Operational Error determined to be a Low Severity:

a. The employee shall be provided a reasonable opportunity to participate in the preliminary

investigation.

b. As soon as the preliminary investigation is complete, all employees’ found to be

contributory or primary to the Low Severity/Operational Deviation (controlled or uncontrolled) shall
be returned to duty WITHOUT a Return to Duty (RTD) skill check or the 30-day follow-up skill
check.
c. If the Low Severity/Operational Deviation was "uncontrolled" (per AAT-20) and
performance warrants, skill enhancement training may be provided after the employee(s) has been
returned to duty.

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Appendix 13

d. If the Low Severity or Operational Deviation was “controlled” (per AAT-20), skill
enhancement training shall not be accomplished.

e. The employees’ first-line supervisor shall conduct an in-depth review of the event with the
employee as soon as possible/practical, but after the employee has returned to operational duty.

f. The employees’ first line supervisor shall discuss any identified performance deficiencies.

g. The employees’ first line supervisor may document the discussion, but keep in mind this
document shall not be used for any future return to duty preparation.

h. In the event that the classification is later determined to be moderate or severe, skill
enhancement training may be assigned and the corresponding documentation will be retained per
normal retention requirements.

5. Any Operational Error that is determined to be Moderate:

a. The employee shall be provided a reasonable opportunity to participate in the preliminary

investigation.

b. The employees’ first-line supervisor shall conduct an in-depth review of the event with the
employee as soon as possible/practical.

c. The employees’ first-line supervisor shall discuss/address any identified performance

deficiencies.

d. The employees’ first-line supervisor shall document the discussion.

e. Skill enhancement training may be administered for any identified performance issues
and/or; decertification may only occur, if prior documented performance history warrants such action.

f. If decertification occurs, then remedial training shall be administered.

g. A skill check IS required prior to any return to operational duties and a 30-day follow-up
skill check shall occur.

6. Any Operational Error that is determined to be High:

a. The employee shall be provided a reasonable opportunity to participate in the preliminary

investigation.

b. The employees’ first-line supervisor shall conduct an in-depth review of the event with the
employee as soon as possible/practical.

c. The employees’ first-line supervisor shall discuss/address any identified performance

deficiencies.

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Appendix 13

d. The employees’ first-line supervisor shall document the discussion.

e. Skill enhancement training, shall be administered for any identified performance issues
and/or:

f. Decertification may occur if proper documented performance history warrants such action.

g. If decertification occurs then remedial training shall be administered.

h. A skill check IS required prior to return to operational duties and a 30-day follow-up skill
check shall occur.

7. Additionally, please keep these factors in mind:

The severity index was designed to assess the severity of the error and may not adequately
reflect actual employee performance. So, based upon the facility’s review of performance and/or if an
isolated event is so grievous that it leads you to question the employees’ overall ability to safely
perform their duties ("prevent the collision between aircraft" and "organize and expedite the flow of
traffic safely"), as a minimum skill enhancement training or decertification with remedial training may
be accomplished, based on the individuals documented performance history (except for controlled low
severity or operational deviations). If the employees’ known performance deficiencies were not
properly documented (TTD's, supervisory notes or other documents) you may not use this "snapshot"
or isolated incident, as the sole determining factor for decertification and administering remedial
training.

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