ARISTOTLE

 384 BC - Born in aristocratic family in Stageira in

 366 BC - went to Athens to study in Plato’s Academy
o Where his vocation in philosophy was nurtured
o Stayed here for 20 years
o Left after Plato’s death in 347 BC
o His departure was due to his aversion to the academic style of
Plato’s successor, Speusippus
 Athens → Assos in Asia Minor (established a philosophical school) →
Mitylene
 343 BC - invited by Philip the Macedon to tutor his son, Alexander the
Great
 335 BC - returned to Athens and founded his own philosophical
school, Lyceum
o Built near Apollo’s temple called Lyceus
o School was known as “Peripatos” - Greek; “to walk around”
o Students were called “Peripatetics” - stroll around while
discussing
 322 BC - Aristotle died in exile
 De Anima (On the Soul) - one his important works

Reading 1.2 (De Anima, Book II)

 Soul - the animating principle that enables living beings to move on

their own and perform activities such as nutrition, growth, and
reproduction
o Principle of life
o Distinguishes a living being from a non-living being
o Explains the self-movement, self-dynamism and vitality of
living beings
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 Plants - vegetative soul
o Activities: growth, nutrition and reproduction
 Animals - sentient soul
o Activities: basic activities and sense of perception
 Human beings - rational soul
 Soul is inseparable from the body
o Theory of hylemorphism - the being of every material
substance is a composite of two coexistent principles: matter
and form
 Matter - principle of indetermination and imperfection
o Principle of potency which makes it capable of receiving a new
form every time it undergoes substantial change
 Substantial change - change in the identity or essence of
a thing; table burns and turns into ashes
o The underlying substrate which persists before and after
substantial change
 Form - principle of determination and perfection
o Actualizes the potency of matter
o There is neither total annihilation of the previous substance
(table) nor creation of new substance (ashes)
 Can be related to conservation of energy
 Something is only transformed to something else
 Soul is a form of a natural body which has life
 The soul and body coexist and work together
o A living thing does not only act with his soul but also with his
body

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 Thinking or intellection - highest function of man’s rational soul
o Two parts:
 Active or agent intellect - separate the intelligible from
the sensible
 Passive or possible intellect - receives and assimilates
the intelligible
 Man is a microcosm
o A small universe because he contains within himself the basic
characteristics of all the things in the universe, including the
body which is proper of a mineral or a material thing which has
no life or soul
 Reason - what is unique to man
o Two functions:
 Know or understand - both theoretical and practical
 Theoretical (speculative) reason - intellect
 For knowledge
 Its object is truth
 Practical reason - will; for the purpose of life
 For the purpose of life
 Its object is the good
 With knowledge, decide what to do in life

Reading 1.3 (Nichomachean Ethics)

 Man will become fully human only if he exercises and realizes his
intellectual powers.
 Man’s soul is not only his reason
o Other faculties include: feelings, desires, needs, drives and
instincts

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 o It is reason’s task to regulate the abovementioned functions to
fulfil the basic requirements of his biological existen
o Next, man attains temperance or self-moderation
o Then, he can pursue his loftiest goal which is to live a life full
of thought, a life dedicated to pursuit wisdom
 Contemplation - how man can be happy
 Happiness can also be found in cultivating real friendships in the
society
 Man can only pursue the good life in cooperation with his fellow men
 It is only in collectively promoting the good life of the community that
the members can secure their individual happiness
 Promoting the well-being of the community > promoting the well-
being of an individual
 Real friendship is established when one promotes the welfare of
others more than his own
 Friendship of utility - established in work and is needed in order to
accomplish the end for which the work is done
 Friendship of pleasure - comes along adolescents and is sought
because the company of a person gives pleasure to another
 Only real friendship thrives and lasts in life

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 ARISTOTLE ON THE SOUL

Matter and Form

1. Aristotle uses his familiar matter/form distinction to answer the

question “What is soul?” At the beginning of De Anima II.1, he
says that there are three sorts of substance:
a. Matter (potentiality) - material components
b. Form (actuality) - example: chairness, tableness
c. The compound of matter and form
2. Aristotle is interested in compounds that are alive. These— plants
and animals—are the things that have souls. Their souls are
what make them living things.
3. Since form is what makes matter a “this,” the soul is the form of
a living thing. (Not its shape, but its actuality, that in virtue of
which it is the kind of living thing that it is.)

Grades of Actuality and Potentiality

1. Aristotle distinguishes between two levels of actuality

(entelecheia). At 412a11 he gives knowing and attending as
examples of these two kinds of actuality. (It has become traditional
to call these first and second actuality, respectively.) At 412a22-
26 he elaborates this example and adds this one: being
asleep vs. being awake. But he does not fully clarify this important
distinction until II.5 (417a22-30), to which we now turn.
2. At 417a20, Aristotle says that there are different types of both
potentiality and actuality. His example concerns different ways in
which someone might be described as a knower. One might be
called a knower in the sense that he or she:
a. is a human being.
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 b. has grammatical knowledge.
c. is attending to something.

A knower in sense (a) is someone with a mere potential to know

something, but no actual knowledge. (Not everything has this
potential, of course. E.g., a rock or an earthworm has no such
potential.) A knower in sense (b) has some actual knowledge (for
example, she may know that it is ungrammatical to say “with John
and I”), even though she is not actually thinking about it right now.
A knower in sense (c) is actually exercising her knowledge (for
example, she thinks “that’s ungrammatical” when she hears
someone say “with John and I”).

God is not a knower since He already knows everything. He is

knowledge Himself.

3. Note that (b) involves both actuality and potentiality. The knower
in sense (b) actually knows something, but that actual knowledge
is itself just a potentiality to think certain thoughts or perform
certain actions. So we can describe our three knowers this way:
a. First potentiality - property of an object (rational, sentient,
living, corporeal substance)
b. Second potentiality = first actuality
c. Second actuality
4. Here is another example (not Aristotle’s) that might help clarify
the distinction.
a. First potentiality: a child who does not speak French.
b. Second potentiality (first actuality): a (silent) adult who
speaks French.

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 c. Second actuality: an adult speaking (or actively
understanding) French.

A child (unlike a rock or an earthworm) can (learn to) speak

French. A Frenchman (unlike a French infant, and unlike most
Americans) can actually speak French, even though he is silent at
the moment. Someone who is actually speaking French is, of
course, the paradigm case of a French speaker.

5. Aristotle uses the notion of first actuality in his definition of the

soul (412a27):

The soul is the first actuality of a natural body that has life
potentially.

6. Remember that first actuality is a kind of potentiality—

a capacity to engage in the activity which is the
corresponding second actuality. So soul is a capacity—but a
capacity to do what?
7. A living thing’s soul is its capacity to engage in the activities that
are characteristic of living things of its natural kind. What are those
activities? Some are listed in DA II.1; others in DA II.2:
o Self-nourishment
o Growth
o Decay
o Movement and rest (in respect of place)
o Perception
o Intellect
8. So anything that nourishes itself, that grows, decays, moves about
(on its own, not just when moved by something else), perceives,
or thinks is alive. And the capacities of a thing in virtue of which
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 it does these things constitute its soul. The soul is what is causally
responsible for the animate behavior (the life activities) of a
living thing.

Degrees of Soul

1. There is a nested hierarchy of soul functions or activities

(413a23).
a. Growth, nutrition, (reproduction)
b. Locomotion, perception
c. Intellect (= thought)
2. This gives us three corresponding degrees of soul:
a. Nutritive soul (plants)
b. Sensitive soul (all animals)
c. Rational soul (human beings)
3. These are nested in the sense that anything that has a higher
degree of soul also has all of the lower degrees. All living things
grow, nourish themselves, and reproduce. Animals not only do
that, but move and perceive. Humans do all of the above and
reason, as well. (There are further subdivisions within the various
levels, which we will ignore.)

Soul and Body

1. A key question for the ancient Greeks (as it still is for many people
today) is whether the soul can exist independently of the body.
(Anyone who believes in personal immortality is committed to the
independent existence of the soul.) Plato (as we know from
the Phaedo) certainly thought that the soul could exist separately.
Here is what Aristotle has to say on this topic:

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 … the soul neither exists without a body nor is a body of some
sort. For it is not a body, but it belongs to a body, and for
this reason is present in a body, and in a body of such-and-
such a sort (414a20ff).

So on Aristotle’s account, although the soul is not a material

object, it is not separable from the body. (When it comes to the
intellect, however, Aristotle waffles. See DA III.4)

2. Aristotle’s picture is not Cartesian:

a. There is no inner/outer contrast. The soul is not an inner
spectator, in direct contact only with its own perceptions and
other psychic states, having to infer the existence of a body
and an “external” world.

There is thus no notion of the privacy of experience, the

incorrigibility of the mental, etc., in Aristotle’s picture.

b. The soul is not an independently existing substance. It is

linked to the body more directly: it is the form of the body,
not a separate substance inside another substance (a body)
of a different kind. It is a capacity, not the thing that has
the capacity.

It is thus not a separable soul. (It is, at most, pure thought,

devoid of personality, that is separable from the body on
Aristotle’s account.)

c. Soul has little to do with personal identity and individuality.

There is no reason to think that one (human) soul is in any
important respect different from any other (human) soul. The

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 form of one human being is the same as the form of any
other.

There is, in this sense, only soul, and not souls. You and I
have different souls because we are different people. But we
are different human beings because we are different
compounds of form and matter. That is, different bodies both
animated by the same set of capacities, by the same (kind
of) soul.

Two Types of Knowledge

 Theoretical knowledge
o Knowledge of the natural world (everything we see) is
knowledge of its universal and unchanging aspects
o Essences of natural things and their laws of development are
known because these patterns never change
o Perception is the basis of knowledge. It is what makes us see
and judge.
o There is nothing in the mind without passing through the
senses
o Things may vary within the limits but the universal and
unchanging character of the species persist.
o World of metaphysics - realm of theoretical knowledge
 Practical knowledge
o Choice, character and action
o Aims at wisdom about what to do and how to live.
o It is done as some particular situation or other, so ethics must
pay attention to particulars as well as universals.
o Realm of human world/ ethics

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Important points:

 There is nothing in the mind without passing through the senses.

 Ideas or things may vary within limits but the universal and
unchanging character of the species persist.

Aristotle's Influence on Christian Thought

 God is the Final Cause (the uncaused cause)
 God is the Unmoved Mover
 God is a perfect idea
 God is eternal, beyond space and time, immutable
 The universe has a purpose

How to arrive at the essences of natural things

Essence
Abstraction
(universal and is
Object (mind denudes
predicable to
the nonessential
specific things
characteristics)
only)

5 External
Senses Phantasm Idea
(passive intellect (sense image) (term or name)
receives data)

Scattered Internal Senses

Ideas (active intellect)

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External Senses

 Sense of sight - color

 Sense of hearing - sound
 Sense of smell - odor
 Sense of taste - flavor
 Sense of touch - texture

Internal Senses

 The Common Sense (Central Sense)

o Nature of the common sense

By means of the central sense, a knowing subject

perceives the actual sensations of the external senses,
distinguishes between them, and combines them.

The proper sense judges of the proper sensible by

discerning it from other things which come under the same
sense: for instance, by discerning white from black or green.
But neither sight nor taste can discern white from sweet:
because what discerns between two things must know both.

The proper object of the common sense is not the common

sensibles. For common sensibles can be known by the external
senses through their proper sensibles: e.g., shape can be seen
through color. The proper object of the common sense is the
sensations of the external senses.

o Functions of the common sense

1) To know all the sensations of the external senses which
are known separately by the external senses.
2) To compare and distinguish these qualities, e.g., color and
taste.
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 3) To be aware of the operations of the external senses.
4) To distinguish the real objects from the images of the
fantasy, e.g., to know whether we are dreaming, and to
realize that our dreams are not reality.
5) Create phantasm (sense image)
6) Put together data

 The Imagination Or Phantasy

o Nature of the imagination

The imagination is, as it were, a storehouse of forms

received through the senses. The existence of this power is
obvious through introspection. The imagination is really distinct
from the external senses, because an external sense cannot
retain the impression of the sense object when this object is no
longer acting upon the organ. And it is also distinct from the
common sense because the common sense operates only when
the external senses are sensing an object. The imagination, on
the other hand, produces images of objects even when these
objects are absent.

The imagination receives the impressed species from the

common sense. It retains these species when actuated by them.
The imagination produces as the term of its action an expressed
species, called a phantasm. When we use our imagination, we
always have an image of the object in which we know the real
object.

o Functions of the imagination

1) To preserve the impressed species that it receives from
the common sense--not only the impressed species

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 related to sight, but any impressed species (e.g., that of
a melody).
 Complement common sense
2) To combine images or phantasms to form unreal images
(artistic ability).
 Produce an image based on the description given
 The Estimative Sense
o Nature of the estimative sense

This power is called "instinct." By means of this power, the

animals are capable of perceiving the beneficial and harmful
character of concrete objects. The perception of such beneficial
or harmful character is followed by a movement of the sense
appetite to attain the beneficial object or to avoid the harmful
one.

The operation of the estimative power is similar to what

is called "knowledge through affinity," which inclines the
human being through immediate intuition to avoid what is
evil and to tend towards the good.

The estimative power in human beings is called the cogitative

power:

Animals perceive these intentions only by natural

instinct, while man perceives these by means of coalition of
ideas. Therefore, the power which in other animals is called
the natural estimative power, in man is called the cogitative
power.

o Functions of the cogitative power

1) To know the sensible per accidents in individuals
2) To consider individual things as sharing a common nature.
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 3) To prepare the phantasm for the intellect.
4) The cogitative power is thus a sort of bridge between the
intellect and the senses.
5) Create approximation

 The Memorative Sense (Sense Memory)

o Nature of the memorative sense

The memorative power retains the perception of the

estimative power, that is, it retains the perceptions that cannot
be retained by the imagination. Hence, the memorative power
is to the estimative sense as the imagination is to the external
senses and to the central sense.

o Functions of the memorative sense

1) To retain the perceptions of the estimative sense,
namely, to remember what is harmful and beneficial for
the animal.
2) Help the recollection of memories by way of a sort of
syllogism, or by way of a spontaneous recollection, like
association. This is called reminiscence in man.
3) Receptacle of ideas

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 WHAT IS HAPPINESS

 Happiness is the highest good and the end at which all our activities
ultimately aim.
 All our activities aim at some end, though most of these ends are
means toward other ends.
o For example, we go grocery shopping to buy food, but buying
food is itself a means toward the end of eating well and thriftily.
Eating well and thriftily is also not an end in itself but a means
to other ends.
 Only happiness is an end in itself, so it is the ultimate end at which
all our activities aim.
 Happiness must be something proper to the person and that cannot
be taken away.
 Happiness is the supreme good.
 Aristotle defines the supreme good as an activity of the rational soul
in accordance with virtue.
 Virtue for the Greeks is equivalent to excellence.
o A man has virtue as a flautist, for instance, if he plays the flute
well, since playing the flute is the distinctive activity of a
flautist. A virtuous person is someone who performs the
distinctive activity of being human well.
 Rationality is our distinctive activity, that is, the activity that
distinguishes us from plants and animals.
o All living things have a nutritive soul, which governs growth
and nutrition.
o Humans and animals are distinct from plants in having a
sensitive soul, which governs locomotion and instinct.
o Humans are distinct above all for having also a rational soul,
which governs thought.
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 o Since our rationality is our distinctive activity, its exercise is
the supreme good.
 Happiness is not possible without excellence or virtue.
 Happy life = good life = life of activity
o Not something that happens to you
o Not something that the world owes you
o Not passive
o It is active and we seize for it!
 A short time does not make a man blessed or happy. It takes time.

WHAT IS NOT HAPPINESS

 Pleasure (sentient)
 Fame and control - you are not in control of these
o Whether they’re bestowed or withdrawn, these things depends
on others
o If you these as your end, you give your happiness as a hostage
into the hands of others

ROLE OF REASON

 Finding the mean in the situation

 The mean is discovered by right reason
 We must recognize and act upon the middle way between extremes
of action and character (in other words, the middle point between
vices). These “middle way” character traits are called “virtues.” For
example, the virtue that sits between foolhardiness and cowardice is
courage.
 Aristotle outlines many of these virtues that we must practice to
achieve happiness, including:
o Intelligence and scientific (or certain) knowledge.
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 o Practical wisdom: the ability to “deliberate well about what is
good and expedient for [oneself].”
o Temperance: restraint, usually with regard to pleasurable
activities.
o Generosity and friendship.
o Courage: The tendency to act in order to achieve some good
even when facing the risk of physical harm.
o Contemplation: reflection on eternal truths.

MORAL VIRTUE

 Aristotle defines moral virtue as a disposition to behave in the right

manner and as a mean between extremes of deficiency and excess,
which are vices.
 We learn moral virtue primarily through habit and practice rather
than through reasoning and instruction.
 Virtue is a matter of having the appropriate attitude toward pain and
pleasure.
o For example, a coward will suffer undue fear in the face of
danger, whereas a rash person will not suffer sufficient fear.
 To be virtuous (vir means man) means to be manly
o Persist in the midst of tribulations
o Not coward (MAN UP‼!)
 A virtuous or excellent person is the one who is good at rationally
discovering the mean relative to us with regard to our emotions, our
dispositions, habits and our actions.
 A virtue can’t be a simple emotion or feeling for two reasons:
o We are in general blamed not for being angry or such, but
for giving into our anger, for resisting our anger and for being
unreasonably angry
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 o We feel fear and anger without choosing to, but the virtues
are a sort of choice or at least not possible without choices
 Aristotle lists the principle virtues along with their corresponding
vices, as represented in the following table

SPHERE OF
MEAN DEFICIENCY
ACTION OR EXCESS (VICE)
(VIRTUE) (VICE)
FEELING
Fear and
Rashness Courage Cowardice
confidence
Pleasure & pain Licentiousness Temperance Insensibility
Getting & spending
Prodigality Liberality Illiberality
(minor)
Getting & spending
Vulgarity Magnificence Pettiness
(major)
Honor & dishonor
Vanity Magnanimity Pusillanimity
(major)
Honor & dishonor Proper
Ambition Unambitiousness
(minor) ambition
Anger Irascibility Patience Lack of spirit
Self-expression Boastfulness Truthfulness Understatement
Conversation Buffoonery Wittiness Boorishness
Obsequiousness
Social conduct Friendliness Cantankerousness
or flattery
Shame Shyness Modesty Shamelessness
Righteous Malicious
Indignation Envy
indignation enjoyment

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 We can only be held responsible for actions we perform voluntarily
and not for cases involving physical compulsion or unavoidable
ignorance.
 The best measure of moral judgment is choice, since choices are
always made voluntarily by means of rational deliberation.
o We always choose to aim at the good, but people are often
ignorant of what is good and so aim at some apparent good
instead, which is in fact a vice.

THE HIGHEST GOOD

 Activates whatever is best in us

 Incorporates levels of nutrition, reproduction, sensation and reason
 At the very peak, is nous (mind), non-passive, purely active source
of wisdom and knowledge
 The best activity is the activity of the nous
 Contemplation - activity of the nous
o Highest activity
o Highest good and greatest happiness
o Discovering and keeping in mind the first principles of
things
 Foundations of this claim:
o Most pleasant and self-sufficient life
o The life of contemplation is praised because it is a life
independent of fortune - to the extent that is possible for a
human being

Analysis

The Nicomachean Ethics advances an understanding of ethics known as virtue

ethics because of its heavy reliance on the concept of virtue. The word we
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translate as virtue is aretê, and it could equally be translated as “excellence.”
Something has aretê if it performs its function well. A good horseman, for
example, has the aretê of being good at handling horses, and a good knife
has the aretê of sharpness. For the Greeks, moral virtue is not essentially
different from these other kinds of excellence. The Greeks do not have a
distinctive concept of morality like we do, which carries associations of sanctity
or duty. Moral virtue is simply a matter of performing well in the function of
being human. For the Greeks, the motivation for being good is not based in a
divine legislator or a set of moral dos and don’ts but rather in the same kind
of striving after excellence that might make an athlete train hard. The Greek
word ethos, from which we derive the word ethics, literally means “character,”
and Aristotle’s goal is to describe what qualities constitute an excellent
character.

The important lesson to draw from Aristotle’s Doctrine of the Mean is that
virtue consists of finding an appropriate middle ground between two extremes.
As such, each virtue has not one opposite but two. The opposite of courage is
both cowardice and rashness, for example. This idea that there are two
opposites for every virtue goes against much of the received wisdom of
Aristotle’s time, including Plato’s writings on virtue. It also emphasizes the
importance of moderation: we achieve virtue by finding a middle ground, not
by aiming for an extreme. Where exactly this middle ground lies, however, is
less obvious. Aristotle repeats a number of times that his table presents only
a rough approximation and that virtues lie closer to one vice than another to
different extents for different people. The Table of Virtues just presented is
not intended as a set of exact rules. On the contrary, Aristotle argues that a
truly virtuous person will naturally be inclined to behave appropriately and will
have no need of rules.

Aristotle is clear that we arrive at moral virtue primarily through practice and
that the value of studying ethical texts such as the one he has written is
limited. This view makes sense when we consider that moral virtue is not

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essentially different from other forms of excellence as far as the Greeks are
concerned. If we want to achieve excellence in rock climbing, for instance, it
helps to study texts that show us how to improve our technique, but we can’t
make any significant improvements except by getting on a rock wall and
practicing. Analogously, it helps to read texts like the Nicomachean Ethics to
get a clearer understanding of moral virtue, but the only way to become more
virtuous is through practice. We can only become more courageous by making
a point of facing down our fears, and we can only become more patient by
making a habit of controlling our anger. Since practice, not study, is the key
to becoming virtuous, Aristotle takes a strong interest in the education of the
young. He perceives that there is only so much we can do to improve a nasty
adult, and we can more easily mold virtuous youths by instilling the proper
habits in them from a young age.

Aristotle calls happiness an “activity,” which distinguishes his conception of

happiness both from our modern conception of happiness and from virtue,
which Aristotle calls a “disposition.” We tend to think of happiness as an
emotional state and hence as something we are, rather than as something
we do. The Greek word generally translated as “happiness”
is eudaimonia, and it can equally be rendered as “success” or “flourishing.”
People who are eudaimonare not in a particular emotional state so much as
they are living successfully. While happiness is the activity of living well, virtue
represents the potential to live well. Excelling in all the moral virtues is fine
and good, but it doesn’t ensure our happiness unless we exercise those
virtues. Courageous people who never test their courage by facing down fear
have virtue, but they are not happy. Aristotle illustrates this distinction
between happiness and virtue by saying that the best athletes only win at the
Olympic Games if they compete. A virtuous person who does not exercise
virtue is like an athlete who sits on the sideline and watches. Aristotle has a
proactive conception of the good life: happiness waits only for those who go
out and seize it.

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