MANABAN v.

CA
G.R. No. 150723 July 11, 2006
Carpio, J.:

FACTS:
At around 1:00 am on Oct. 11, 996, Joselito Bautista’s daughter was rushed to UP Health Center. Needing money, Bautista
(member of UP Police force) went to withdraw money from the ATM at BPI Kalayaan Branch where accused Ramonito
Manaban was on duty. It was alleged that had taken alcoholic drinks before that. Bautista failed to withdraw and that his card
was captured because he had entered a wrong pin. He then started kicking and pounding the machine. Manaban asked him
the problem and suggested that Bautista return the next morning. This angered Bautista all the more and resumed pounding
the machine. Manaban urged him to calm down but continued raging and striking the machine. When Manaban could no
longer pacify him, he fired a warning shot. That diverted the attention of Bautista. Instead of venting his ire against the
machine, he confronted Manaban. After some exchange of words, a shot rang out fatally hitting Bautista. Several police
officers arrived at the crime scene where they saw Bautista lying on the ground, still breathing. They noticed that a .38 caliber
pistol was tucked in Bautista’s waist. Bautista was shot at the back. Manaban allegedly admitted the shooting. They brought
Bautista to East Avenue Medical Center where he died.

The NBI medico-legal officer testified that Bautista was shot at the back, the muzzle of the gun at about more than 24 inches
away from the entry point, and that the wound incurred by him was fatal as the bullet hit the right lung and lacerated parts of
the liver, stomach and the pancreas. He deduced that assailant must have been behind the victim.
Manaban testified that after he fired the warning shot, Bautista allegedly raised his shirt and showed his gun which was
tucked in his waist. Manaban stepped back and told Bautista not to draw his gun, otherwise he would shoot. However,
Bautista allegedly kept on moving toward Manaban, who again warned Bautista not to come near him or he would be forced
to shoot him. Bautista suddenly turned his back and was allegedly about to draw his gun. Fearing that he would be shot first,
Manaban pulled the trigger and shot Bautista. Manaban declared that it did not occur to him to simply disable the victim for
fear that Bautista would shoot him first.

ISSUE:
Whether there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, Bautista.

HELD:
NO. Unlawful aggression is an actual physical assault or at least a threat to attack or inflict physical injury upon a person. A
mere threatening or intimidating attitude is not considered unlawful aggression, unless the threat is offensive and menacing,
manifestly showing the wrongful intent to cause injury. There must be an actual, sudden, unexpected attack or imminent
danger thereof, which puts the defendant’s life in real peril.

In this case, there was no unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. First, Bautista was shot at the back as evidenced by
the point of entry of the bullet. Second, when Bautista was shot, his gun was still inside a locked holster and tucked in his
right waist. Third, when Bautista turned his back at Manaban, Manaban was already pointing his service firearm at Bautista.
These circumstances clearly belie Manaban’s claim of unlawful aggression on Bautista's part.

The allegation of Manaban that Bautista was about to draw his gun when he turned his back at Manaban is mere
speculation. Besides, Manaban was already aiming his loaded firearm at Bautista when the latter turned his back. In that
situation, it was Bautista whose life was in danger considering that Manaban, who had already fired a warning shot, was
pointing his firearm at Bautista. Bautista, who was a policeman, would have realized this danger to his life and would not
have attempted to draw his gun which was still inside a locked holster tucked in his waist. Furthermore, if Manaban really
feared that Bautista was about to draw his gun to shoot him, Manaban could have easily disabled Bautista by shooting his
arm or leg considering that Manaban’s firearm was already aimed at Bautista.

Aggression presupposes that the person attacked must face a real threat to his life and the peril sought to be avoided is
imminent and actual, not imaginary. Absent such actual or imminent peril to one’s life or limb, there is nothing to repel and
there is no justification for taking the life or inflicting injuries on another.
Case Title Senoja v People
G.R. no. GR 160341
Main Topic Justifying Circumstances; Defense of Self, Relatives,
and Strangers

Other Related Topic

Date: October 19, 2004

DOCTRINES
ART. 11. Justifying circumstances. — The following do not incur any criminal
liability:
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following
circumstances concur;
First. Unlawful aggression;
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or
repel it;
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself.
Unlawful aggression - presupposes an actual, sudden, unexpected attack or imminent
danger thereof, not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude. Hence, when an
unlawful aggression ceases to exist, the one making a defense has no right to kill or
injure the former aggressor. After the danger has passed, one is not justified in following
up his adversary to take his life.

FACTS:
- On April 16, 1997, petitioner Exequiel Senoja, Fidel Senoja, Jose Calica, and Miguel
Lumasac were drinking gin in the hut of Crisanto Reguyal in Barangay Zarah, San Luis,
Aurora. An angry Leon Lumasac suddenly arrived at the said place, holding a bolo in
his right hand and looking for his brother Miguel. Petitioner and Jose tried to pacify
Leon. But when petitioner approached Leon, the latter tried to hack him so he embraced
Leon and Jose took Leon's bolo. Then, Leon and petitioner talked things out and later
reconciled.
- Subsequently, Leon walked out of Crisanto's hut followed by petitioner. Suddenly, about
ten meters from the hut, petitioner stabbed Leon at the back. When Leon turned around,
petitioner continued stabbing him until he fell to the ground. Then, petitioner ran towards
the barangay road and threw away the "kolonial" knife he used in stabbing Leon. The
latter died on the spot.
- The petitioner admitted killing the victim but invoked the affirmative defense of self-
defense.
- On June 7, 2002, the trial court rendered judgment against the petitioner, finding him
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.
 - In due course, the petitioner appealed the decision to the CA which rendered judgment
affirming, with modification, the decision of the RTC. The petitioner now seeks relief
from this Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Senoja was justified in killing Leon Lumasac in self-defense.

HELD:
No. Unlawful aggression presupposes an actual, sudden, unexpected attack or imminent danger
thereof, not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude. Hence, when an unlawful aggression
ceases to exist, the one making a defense has no right to kill or injure the former aggressor.

The Court ruled that Senoja was the unlawful aggressor in the last confrontation and not Leon
Lumasac. The victim had already left the hut and was ten (10) meters away from it. There is no
showing that the victim, who was drunk, was aware that Senoja was following him, or that the
Senoja called out to him so that he (the victim) had to turn around and notice him. It is clear that
at that point in time, the victim was simply walking toward his home. He had stopped being an
aggressor. It was Senoja who wanted a confrontation. Senoja stabbed or poked the victim in the
left buttock resulting in the non-fatal wound, and when the latter turned around, successively
stabbed and hacked the victim in the armpit and chest until he fell. In all, the victim suffered
nine (9) wounds.

While Leon Lumasac had ceased being the aggressor after he left the hut to go home, accused
Exequiel Senoja was now the unlawful aggressor in this second phase of their confrontation.
Being now the unlawful aggressor, Senoja cannot validly claim that he acted in self-defense as
Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code requires that there must be an unlawful aggression on the
person killed.

PEOPLE v. DECENA
BY MAROON 5 PARTNERS AND ASSOCIATES JUNE 1, 2012 ART. 11 RPC SELF-DEFENSE
Facts:

On Christmas day, around 4pm, Luzviminda (14 y.o., daughter of the Jaime Ballesteros, victim),
saw Decena rushing towards her father with a long bladed weapon prompting her to warn her
father.
Decena, however, stabbed him on the right chest causing his death.
Narration of the defense:
At about 4pm, the victim was drunk and for no apparent reason, he held the appellant by the
neck and poked a fork against it. A barangay tanod intervened and advised the appellant to go
home. Appellant left but was later followed by Jaime (victim).
Biala, uncle of the appellant, testified that he saw Jaime attacking the appellant with a balisong.
Appellant was able to parry the blow, and overpowering Jaime, thruste the knife into his body.
Issue: W/N the appellant acted in complete self-defense that in killing Jaime Ballesteros absolving
him from criminal liability.

Held: No.

Ratio:

In criminal cases, the burden of proof is on the prosecution which may rely on the strength of its
evidence and not on the weakness of the defense. However, upon invoking self-defense, the
accused admits that he killed the victim and the burden of proof is upon him in proving that he
really acted in self-defense.
Basic requirement for self-defense as a justifying circumstance is unlawful aggression against the
person defending himself.
It must be shown that there was a previous unlawful and unprovoked attack that placed the life
of the accused in danger forcing him to inflict wounds upon his assailant
According to the defense, the unlawful aggression started when the victim started poking the
appellant with a fork
Elementary rule: when the aggressor leaves, the aggression ceases. It follows that when appellant
and Jaime heeded the advice of the barangay tanod, the unlawful aggression had ended. Since
the aggression no longer existed, appellant had no right to kill or even wound the former
aggressor.
The defense failed to establish that the victim persisted in his design to attack the appellant
Defense: continuing aggression
Whenever the victim was drunk, he would look for trouble (refuted by the testimony of the wife)
Witnesses: Jaime was staggering or wobbling as he walked – the victim could not have persisted
in attacking the appellant with his current state.
Testimony of the uncle: imaginative or coached witness

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROBERTO E. DELA CRUZ, accused-

appellant.
G.R. No. 128359, 6 December 2000

Facts:
 dela Cruz and San Antonio were currently living together when Macapagal (victim, San
Antonio’s ex-live-in partner) went to their apartment, holding a gun (9mm caliber pistol) and
banged the door of the bedroom ahere dela Cruz was demanding him to go out
 Dela Cruz opened the door, and upon seeing that Macapagal was pointing the gun at him,
he immediately went back to the room and closed the door.
 The next time he went out, he, too, was already holding a gun (.35 caliber revolver).
 The two immediately grappled each other and not long after, shots were heard and
Macapagal fell dead on the floor.
 Appellant told San Antonio to call the police and when they arrive, he surrendered the gun
he used and told the police that he shot Macapagal in self defense.
  According to the autopsy, Macapagal sustained 4 wounds. 3 of which were non-
penetrating (upper jaw, below the left shoulder, right side of the waist). The shot that took
his life was on the left side of the chest penetrating the heart.
 Dela Cruz had no license to carry the firearm.

Issue: W/N the accused is able to prove to the court the elements of self-defense in order to
extenuate him from the crime.

Held: No.

Ratio:
 Three conditions must concur to extenuate him:
1. Unlawful aggression by the person injured or killed
 presuppose an actual, sudden, and unexpected attack or imminent danger on the life and
limb of a person – not a mere threatening or intimidating attitude – but most importantly at
the time the defensive action was taken against the aggressor.
 In this case, the victim banged at the bedroom door with his gun but the appellant, upon
seeing the victim pointing a gun at him was able to prevent at this stage harm to himself by
promptly closing the door. He could have stopped there. Instead, he confronted the victim.
1. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel that unlawful aggression
 The number of wounds sustained by the victim would negate this component of self
defense. The four gunshot wounds indicate a determined effort to kill.
1. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself
 When the appellant confronted the victim, instead of taking precautionary measures,
appellant could no longer argue that there was no provocation on his part
 Claim of self defense rejected

People v. Jaurigue et al, C.A. No. 384 (1946)

Topic. Commission of crime in a place of worship

Case. Petition to review lower court decision finding Avelina guilty of homicide with ACs

Facts. Victim Amado was courting Avelina. In one occasion, while Avelina’s cousing washed the
latter’s hankerchief, Amado stole it. Amado proposed her love to Avelina. Avelina refused.
Amado grabbed her, kissed her, and touched her chest. To this, Avelina slapped him, threw fist
blows, and kicked him. Avelina told her mother the next day. Her mother gave her a fan knife for
protection.

Not long after, Amado intruded in Avelina’s house while she was asleep. He kissed her hand which
woke her up. She screamed for help, he hid under the bed. Her parents arrive in the room. He
apologized.

Days after, Avelina and her family attended services in the Seventh Day Adventists chapel.
Avelina’s father got there first, Avelina followed and sat on one of the benches. Amado saw
Avelina, sat beside her and put his hand in her right thigh. Avelina tried to get her knife with right
hand. Amado held her right hand to stop her. Avelina quickly grabbed the knife with her left hand
and stabbed Amado in the neck.

Amado staggered. Avelina’s father saw Amado bleeding. Her father asked why she did it, she said
she could not endure it anymore. CFI found Avelina guilty of homicide wit the aggravating
circumstance of having committed the act in a place of worship, inter alia. Avelina appealed.

Issue. Is the AC of offending a place of worship applicable? -No

Ratio. While it is true that the crime occurred in a chapel, this does not necessarily denote the
attachment of said AC. As per law, for a proper appreciation of AC of having committed the crime
in a place of worship, there should be premeditation that the offender intended to do it in the
place of worship. As the facts show, Avelina did not plan to kill Amado nor to kill him in a chapel.
Avelina had in her case the fan knife just for protection whenever and wherever she might need
it. It just so happened that Amado provoked her in the chapel and that was where Avelina could
not bear it anymore. With this in mind, the present court ruled that the lower court erred in
assigning the AC in its judgment against Avelina.

People vs. Narvaez, 121 SCRA 389 (1983)

FACTS:
Mamerto Narvaez has been convicted of murder (qualified by treachery) of David
Fleischer and Flaviano Rubia. On August 22, 1968, Narvaez shot Fleischer and Rubia
during the time the two were constructing a fence that would prevent Narvaez from getting
into his house and rice mill. The defendant was taking a nap when he heard sounds of
construction and found fence being made. He addressed the group and asked them to
stop destroying his house and asking if they could talk things over. Fleischer responded
with "No, gadamit, proceed, go ahead." Defendant lost his "equilibrium," and shot Fleisher
with his shotgun. He also shot Rubia who was running towards the jeep where the
deceased's gun was placed. Prior to the shooting, Fleischer and Co. (the company of
Fleischer's family) was involved in a legal battle with the defendant and other land settlers
of Cotabato over certain pieces of property. At the time of the shooting, the civil case was
still pending for annulment (settlers wanted granting of property to Fleisher and Co. to be
annulled). At time of the shooting, defendant had leased his property from Fleisher
(though case pending and ownership uncertain) to avoid trouble. On June 25, defendant
received letter terminating contract because he allegedly didn't pay rent. He was given 6
months to remove his house from the land. Shooting was barely 2 months after letter.
Defendant claims he killed in defense of his person and property. CFI ruled that Narvaez
was guilty. Aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation offset by the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender. For both murders, CFI sentenced him to reclusion
perpetua, to indemnify the heirs, and to pay for moral damages.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not CFI erred in convicting defendant-appellant despite the fact that he
acted in defense of his person.
No. The courts concurred that the fencing and chiselling of the walls of the house of the
defendant was indeed a form of aggression on the part of the victim. However, this
aggression was not done on the person of the victim but rather on his rights to property.
On the first issue, the courts did not err. However, in consideration of the violation of
property rights, the courts referred to Art. 30 of the civil code recognizing the right of
owners to close and fence their land.
Although is not in dispute, the victim was not in the position to subscribe to the article
because his ownership of the land being awarded by the government was still pending,
therefore putting ownership into question. It is accepted that the victim was the original
aggressor.

2. WON the court erred in convicting defendant-appellant although he acted in defence

of his rights.

Yes. However, the argument of the justifying circumstance of self-defense is applicable

only if the 3 requirements are fulfilled. Art. 11(1) RPC enumerates these requisites:
Unlawful aggression. In the case at bar, there was unlawful aggression towards
appellant's property rights. Fleisher had given Narvaez 6 months and he should have left
him in peace before time was up, instead of chiseling Narvaez's house and putting up
fence. Art. 536 of the Civil Code also provides that possession may not be acquired
through force or intimidation; while Art. 539 provides that every possessor has the right
to be respected in his possession
Reasonable necessity of means employed to prevent or repel attack. In the case, killing
was disproportionate to the attack.
Lack of sufficient provocation on part of person defending himself. Here, there was no
provocation at all since he was asleep
Since not all requisites present, defendant is credited with the special mitigating
circumstance of incomplete defense, pursuant to Art. 13(6) RPC. These mitigating
circumstances are: voluntary surrender and passion and obfuscation (read p. 405
explanation) Crime is homicide (2 counts) not murder because treachery is not applicable
on account of provocation by the deceased. Also, assault was not deliberately chosen
with view to kill since slayer acted instantaneously. There was also no direct evidence of
planning or preparation to kill. Art. 249 RPC: Penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal.
However, due to mitigating circumstances and incomplete defense, it can be lowered
three degrees (Art. 64) to arrestomayor.

3. WON he should be liable for subsidiary imprisonment since he is unable to pay the civil
indemnity due to the offended party.

No. He is not liable to be subsidiarily imprisoned for nonpayment of civil indemnity. RA

5465 made the provisions of Art. 39 applicable to fines only and not to reparation of
damage caused, indemnification of consequential damages and costs of proceedings.
Although it was enacted only after its conviction, considering that RA 5465 is favorable to
the accused who is not a habitual delinquent, it may be given retroactive effect pursuant
to Art. 22 of the RPC.
Judgment: Defendant guilty of homicide but w/ mitigating circumstances and extenuating
circumstance of incomplete self defense. Penalty is 4 months arresto mayor and to
indemnify each group of heirs 4,000 w/o subsidiary imprisonment and w/o award for moral
damages. Appellant has already been detained 14 years so his immediate release is
ordered.

Gutierrez, dissenting. Defense of property can only be invoked when coupled with form
of attack on person defending property. In the case at bar, this was not so. Appellant
should then be sentenced to prision mayor. However, since he has served more than
that, he should be released.
G.R. NO. 168818 : March 9, 2007
Nilo Sabang v People

- Nilo Sabang and Butad were having drinks together with spouses Cruz and Andresa
Villamor Butad, a civilian agent with the Philippine National Police, was armed with a
.38-caliber revolver. In the midst of the drinking spree, Randy Sabang suddenly and
unexpectedly appeared before the group. His appearance triggered a negative reaction from
Butad, who then uttered the words "I will shoot you" to Randy Sabang. Within moments,
Butad himself lay dead from four gunshot wounds on his body Nilo Sabang, admits to the
killing of Butad, but claims that the shooting was accidental and done as a as a means of
defending his son.
-
- Nilo Sabang claimed that by the time Butad had joined the drinking spree, he was already
in a belligerent mood and was looking for Ramil Perez. That earlier that afternoon, Ramil
was demanding payment for a bet that Butad had lost over a cockfight.
-
- Sombilon, a witness, testified that when Butad told Randy Sabang, "I will shoot you," the
deceased already had his revolver aimed at Randy.Nilo
-
- Nilo Sabang claimed that he then grabbed the arm of Butad, attempting to twist it toward
his body and away from his son. As they were grappling and the revolver was pointed
towards the body of Butad, petitioner claimed he heard gunshots, and only after the shots
were fired was he able to "take the gun" from Butad..
-
- In a Judgment of the trial court convicted Nilo Butang of the crime of Homicide. The court
relays on the strength of the testimony of Dr. Edilberto P. Calipayan, the physician who
conducted the post mortem examination of Butad’s body, to the effect that the absence of
powder burns indicates that the gunshots were fired at a distance of more than 10 inches
from the victim’s body and not close range as claimed by Nilo Sabang.
-
- Petitioner theorizes that the fact that Butad was then fully clothed could have accounted
for the absence of powder burns on Butad’s body

The Court of Appeals affirmed petitioner’s conviction in a Decision

Issue: Did Nilo Sabang act in defense of his son, a justifying circumstance?

Held : No. The act of Nilo Sabang is not justified.

In order to successfully claim that he acted in defense of a relative, the accused must prove
the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the
person killed or injured; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel
the unlawful aggression; and (3) the person defending the relative had no part in provoking
the assailant, should any provocation been given by the relative attacked. Unlawful
aggression is a primary and indispensable requisite without which defense of relative,
 whether complete or otherwise, cannot be validly invoked. It is well-settled in this
jurisdiction that once an accused has admitted that he inflicted the fatal injuries on the
deceased, it is incumbent upon him in order to avoid criminal liability, to prove the
justifying circumstance claimed by him with clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence.
He cannot rely on the weakness of the prosecution but on the strength of his own evidence,
"for even if the evidence of the prosecution were weak it could not be disbelieved after the
accused himself had admitted the killing." Thus, petitioner must establish with clear and
convincing evidence that the killing was justified, and that he incurred no criminal liability
therefor.

Unlawful aggression must be clearly established by the evidence. In this case, there is a
divergence in the testimonies of the prosecution and defense witnesses as to whether Butad
aimed a gun at petitioner’s son as he uttered the words "I will shoot you." With this conflict
emerges the question of whether petitioner sensed an imminent threat to his son’s life.
Payud unequivocally testified that petitioner even dismissed Butad’s utterance saying,
"Just try to shoot my child because I’ll never fight for him because he is a spoiled brat."

This indicates to us that petitioner did not consider Butad’s words a threat at all.

These circumstances led the trial court to conclude that there was no unlawful aggression
on the part of Butad which could have precipitated petitioner’s actions. This finding,
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, is conclusive on the Court barring any showing of any
arbitrariness or oversight of material facts that could change the result.29

Furthermore, the presence of four (4) gunshot wounds on Butad’s body negates the claim
that the killing was justified but instead indicates a determined effort to kill him. Even
assuming that it was Butad who initiated the attack, the fact that petitioner was able to
wrest the gun from him signifies that the aggression which Butad had started already
ceased. Petitioner became the unlawful aggressor when he continued to shoot Butad even
as he already lay defenseless on the ground.30

On this point, the defense’s own witness, Caparoso, said in his Counter Affidavit 31 and during
direct examination that after the first shot was fired, he saw petitioner take possession of the
gun as Butad released his hold of it. It was after petitioner already had the gun that Caparoso
heard more gunshots.32 Even petitioner admitted that he had an easy time twisting the hand with
which Butad was supposedly holding his revolver because the latter was already very drunk
having started drinking before noon that day.

People vs Dagani
Facts:
- Crime of murder was reduced to homicide by the Supreme Court absence proof of treachery
and it also dissolved ruling of RTC and affirmation of CA that there was conspiracy between 2
accused.
- Accused are Dagani and Santiano
- At about 4:45 in the afternoon a group of men were drinking in
the canteen located inside the compound of PNR.
- All of a sudden, appellants, who were security officers of the
PNR entered the canteen and approached the group.
- Appellant Dagani Javier while Santiano shot Javier twice at his
left side, killing the latter.
- Appellants said that they were ordered by their desk officer to
investigate a commotion at the canteen .
- That Dagani approached Javier who had been striking a bottle of
beer on the table. Javier then pulled out a .22 caliber revolver
and attempted to fire at Dagani , but the gun failed to go off.
- Then suddenly, while outside the canteen, Santiano heard gunfire
and, from his vantage point, he saw Jav ier and Dagani grappling
for a .22 caliber gun which belonged to Javier.
- During the course of the struggle, the gun went off, forcing
Santiano to fire a warning shot
- He heard Javier’s gun fire again, so he decided to rush into the
canteen. Santiano then shot Javier from a distance of less than
four meters.

- Appellants invoked the justifying circumstances of self -defense

and lawful performance of official duty as PNR security officers.

- They arguedthat the prosecution failed to establish treachery and

conspiracy.

- RTC nonetheless find them guilt y beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Murder with the presence of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender and granting them the benefit of [the] Indeterminate Sentence
Law

They were asked to pay P50,000.00 as death indemnit y, P31,845.00 as

funeral and burial expenses , P30,000.00 as and for [sic] attorney’s
fees, P1,000.00 per appearance of counsel .

- RTC is convinced about the judgment because:

 - appellants failed to prove that Javier attempted to squeeze the
trigger of the .22 caliber gun when he pointed it at Dagani
- that during the course of the struggle for the possession of the
.22 caliber gun, the danger to the life of the accused ceased to be
imminent
- in grappling for the weapon, Dagani “controlled” the hands of
Javier and pushed them away from his body;
- appellants failed to produce the two empty shells as physical
evidence of the gunfire allegedly caused by Javier ;
- no points of entry or bullet markings on the walls of the canteen
were shown
- no unlawful aggression was present on the part of the victim
- appellants failed to prove that they were on official duty at the
time of the incidence
- since it was not established that Javier actually fired his gun, the
injury inflicted upon him cannot be regarded as a necessary
consequence of the due performance of an official duty ;
- appellants were acting in conspiracy;
- on the issue of treachery, it is clear that Javier had been shot
while his hands were being held by Dagani and his body was out
of balance and about to fall; and that the mitigating circumstance
- RTC considered mitigating circumstance due to voluntary
surrender and penalty was reduced to reclusion
- CA affirmed decision of RTC with slight modification.
Appellants were sentenced to reclusion perpetua
- Hence, necessary review of Supreme Court
- Appellants say that RTC and CA erred in not APPRECIATING
SELF DEFENSE , LAWFUL PERFORMANCE OF AN OFFICIAL DUTY ,
unable to CONSPIRACY, thus fail to establish Guilt BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT

SC Ruling:
- Murder was reduced to homicide absence proof of treachery. Conspiracy between accused was
dissolved absence proof. Self-defense and performance of official duty cannot be invoked as
justifying circumstance
Ratio:
On self defense: The defense was unable to prove that there was
unlawful aggression on the part of Javier. They were unable to
present evidence that the victim actually fired his gun. No spent
shells from the .22 caliber pistol were found and no bullets were
recovered from the scene of the incid ent. Javier also tested negative
for gunpowder residue. Moreover, the trial court found appellant
Dagani’s account of the incident to be incredible and self -serving. In
sum, the defense presented a bare claim of self -defense without any
proof of the existence of its requisites. [ 1 5 ]

- danger to their lives had already ceased the moment Dagani held
down the victim and grappled for the gun with the latter. After
the victim had been thrown off-balance, there was no longer
any unlawful aggression
- Santiano went beyond the call of self -preservation when he
proceeded to inflict the excessive and fatal injuries on Javier,
- Means that are reasonable and necessary were not satisfied to
invoke self defense.
Considering the circumstances in its entirety. It does not justify appellant
Santiano’s act of fatally shooting the victim twice. [ 2 6 ]
- Regarding exercise of lawful duty as justifying, Two requisites must concur
before this defense can prosper: 1) the accused must have ac ted
in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right
or office; and 2) the injury caused or the offense committed
should have been the necessary consequence of such lawful
exercise. [ 3 1 ]
These criteria was not satisfied. Accused were not in duty when incident happened. Assuming
arguendo that they are, what they did will still not fall within the boundaries of fulfilling their
lawful duty.
- The law does not clothe police officers with authority to arbitrarily judge the
necessity to kill
- it must be stressed that the judgment and discretion of police officers in the
performance of their duties must be exercised neither capriciously nor
oppressively, but within reasonable limits.
- Regarding conspiracy, although the victim had been shot by one of the accused while
being held by a co-accused, there is no other evidence that the appellants were
 animated by the same purpose or were moved by a previous common accord.
conspiracy must be established by clear and convincing evidence. 39
- The prosecution did not establish that the act of Dagani in trying to wrestle the
gun from Javier and in the process, held the latter’s hands, was for the purpose
of enabling Santiano to shoot at Javier
- Dagani "seem[ed] to be shocked, he was standing and looking at the victim" as
Javier gradually fell to the ground
- It must be resolved in favor of the accused.

Title: Palaganas v. People, G.R. No. 157057

Subject Matter: Aggravating circumstance, Art. 14 of the Revised Penal Code

Facts:
Brothers Servillano, Melton and Michael Ferrer were having their drinking spree at their house
but later decided to proceed to Tidbits Videoke Bar to continue their drinking spree and to sing.
Thereafter, Jaime Palaganas arrived together with Ferdinand Palaganas and Virgilio Bautista.
When Jaime Palaganas was singing, Melton Ferrer sang with him. Jaime got irritated and insulted.
He felt that he was being mocked by Melton that caused him to go to the latter’s table and
uttered statements which began the fight. Ferdinand sought help from Rujjeric Palaganas. They
went to the bar and upon seeing the Ferrers instructed Rujjeric to shoot them. Rujjeric Palaganas
shot Servillano, Melton and Michael with the use of unlicensed firearm. As a result, Melton was
killed, Servillano was fatally wounded and Michael was shot in his right shoulder.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not Rujjeric Palaganas was guilty of the crime of homicide and 2 counts of
frustrated murder.

(2) Whether or not the use of the unlicensed firearm is a special aggravating circumstance which
should be appreciated by the court at the case at bar.

Held:
In the first issue, Rujjeric Palaganas is guilty of homicide for the death of Melton Ferrer, frustrated
homicide for fatally wounding Servillano Ferrer and attempted homicide for shooting Michael at
his right shoulder.

On the second issue, yes, the unlicensed firearm is a special aggravating circumstance. An
aggravating circumstance was provided for under Presidential Decree No. 1866 as amended by
Republic Act 8294 which is a special law that was passed stating that: if homicide or murder is
committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be
considered as an aggravating circumstance cannot be offset by an ordinary mitigating
circumstance. Voluntary surrender of the petitioner in this case is merely an ordinary mitigating
circumstance.

PEOPLE V RICOHERMOSO
11
FEB
L – 30527 – 28 | March 29, 1974 | J. Aquino

Avoidance of Greater Evil or Injury

Facts:

Geminiano de Leon, together with his common-law wife, son Marianito de Leon and one Rizal
Rosales, chanced upon Pio Ricohermoso. Owning a parcel of land, which Ricohermoso cultivated
as kaingin, Geminiano asked about his share of palay harvest and added that she should be
allowed to taste the palay harvested from his land. Ricohermoso said Geminiano could collect
the palay anytime.

Upon returning from his trip to Barrio Bagobasin, Geminiano dropped by Ricohermoso’s house
and asked him about the palay, to which the latter answered defiantly that he will not give him
the palay, whatever happens. Geminiano remonstrated and that point (as if by prearrangement),
Ricohermoso unsheathed his bolo, while his father-in-law Severo Padernal got an axe, and
attacked Geminiano. At the same time and place, Ricohermoso’s brother-in-law Juan Padernal
suddenly embraced Marianito. They grappled and rolled down the hill, at which point Marianito
passed out. When he regained consciousness, he discovered that the rifle he carried beforehand
was gone and that his father was mortally wounded.

The defendants shifted the responsibility of killing in their version of the case.

Issue:

W/N appellant Juan Padernal can invoke the justifying circumstance of avoidance of a greater
evil or injury

Held:

No. Juan Padernal’s reliance on the justifying circumstance is erroneous because his act in
preventing Marianito from shooting Ricohermoso and Severo Padernal, the aggressors in this
case, was designed to insure the killing of Geminiano de Leon without any risk to the assailants
and not an act to prevent infliction of greater evil or injury. His intention was to forestall any
interference in the assault.

Treachery was also appreciated in the case. The trial court convicted the appellants with lesiones
leves, from an attempted murder charge with respect to Marianito de Leon.

Judgment as to Juan Padernal affirmed.

(Note: Severo Padernal withdrew his appeal, thus, in effect, accepted the prosecution’s version
of the case and trial court’s finding of guilt.)

PEOPLE v. NORMA HERNANDEZ (1959)

BY MAROON 5 PARTNERS AND ASSOCIATES JUNE 1, 2012 SLANDER
Plaintiff-Appellee: People of the Philippines

Defendant-Appellants: Maria Norma Hernandez, Mariano Hernandez (father) & Ramona

Martinez (mother)

FACTS:

Vivencio Lascano, 19 y/o, started courting appellant, Maria Norma Hernandez and after months
of courtship, appellant finally accepted Vivencio. On the same date, she asked him to bring his
parents over her home so that they could talk about their marriage.
When Vivencio and his parents went to her house, they brought chickens and goats and they
agreed to buy a wedding dress, 2 vestidas, shoes, P20 for the sponsors and to repair the uncle’s
roof.
While the celebration was going on, appellant was nowhere to be found. Vivencio and his parents
waited but she never showed up thus causing them great shame and humiliation.
Norma Hernandez averred that Vivencio was really courting her but that she wasn’t really in love
with him. Her parents tried to persuade her to accept the proposal and that she only accepted
it out of obedience to her parents and the uncle’s insistence.
Before Vivencio’s parents came to their home, she already counselled them not to bring the
chickens and that they should not regret whatever may happen later.
Appellant said she felt torture because she wasn’t honestly in love with Vivencio and so she
decided to leave home as last recourse to prevent the marriage.
Appellant’s parents also corroborated her testimony.
RTC convicted her of serious slander by deed because she purposely and deliberately fled to
prevent celebration of marriage. Thus, she appealed.
HELD:

Court reversed the RTC judgment and acquitted the appellant.

RATIO:
Malice, one of the essential requisites of slander hasn’t been proven. There is no malice in the
act of the appellant changing her mind. She was merely exercising her right not to give her
consent the marriage after mature consideration.
Furthermore, there were no strained relations existing between the complainant & appellant
before the incident. There always existed good relations between them for they were neighbours
so it cannot be sustained that appellant was motivated by spite or ill-will in deliberately
frustrating the marriage.
Appellant has the privilege to reconsider her previous commitment to marry and it would be
utterly inconsistent to convict her for slander by deed simply because she desisted in continuing
with the marriage. If she would be liable then that would be tantamount to compelling her to go
into a marriage without her free consent.
Appellant had the right to avoid to herself the evil of going through a loveless marriage. (Art. 11
par.4, RPC)

People vs Delima Case Digest

Facts:

Lorenzo Napilon escaped from the jail. Some days afterwards, policeman Felipe Delima found him in
the house of Jorge Alegria, armed with a pointed piece of bamboo in the shape of a lance, and
demanded his surrender. Napilon answered with a stroke of his lance. Delima dodged, it, and
to impose his authority fired his revolver, but the bullet did not hit him. Napilon ran away, without
parting with his weapon. Delima went after him and fired again his revolver, this time hitting and
killing him. Delima was tried and convicted for homicide and sentenced to reclusion temporal and
the accessory penalties.

Held:

The killing was done in the performance of a duty. The deceased was under the obligation to
surrender, and had no right, after evading service of his sentence, to commit assault and
disobedience with a weapon in the hand, which compelled the policeman to resort to such an
extreme means, which, although it proved to be fatal, was justified by the circumstances. (People vs.
Delima, G.R. No. L-18660, December 22, 1922)

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
IGNACIO LAGATA, defendant-appellant.
G.R. Nos. L-1940-42 March 24, 1949
FACTS:
 The accused, Ignacio Lagata, a provincial guard of Catbalogan, Samar, was in
charge of 6 prisoners (Jesus, Tipace, Eusebio, Mariano, Labong & Abria)
assigned to work in the capitol plaza of Samar.
 Lagata ordered the prisoners to go to the nursery to pick up gabi. Not long
afterwards, they were called to assemble. Epifanio Labong was missing so
Lagata ordered the 5 remaining prisoners to go look for him.
 Eusebio Abria said that while they were gathering gabi, he heard 3 shots. He
was wounded by the 2nd one. They were already assembled by the 1st shot and
that he did not see Tipace being shot. He said he ran away because he was
afraid that he might be shot again and that his companions were also probably
scared and that is why they ran.
 Another prisoner, Mariano Ibañez stated that Epifanio Labong did not answer
their call so Ignacio Lagata ordered to go look for him in the mountain. He said
that Abria went to the camote plantation and found footprints and called on
Lagata to inform him about the footprints. When Abria told Lagata of the
flattened grass and that he was unable to look for Labong, Ignacio Lagata fired at
him and he was hit on his left arm. Abria told Lagata he was wounded and in
turn, Lagata told them to assemble. Once they were assembled, Lagata cocked
his gun and shot Ceferino Tipace. Mariano said that when he saw Tipace was
shot, he ran away because he also could have been shot.
 Eustaquio Galet, another detainee, received good treatment from Lagata though
his testimony corroborated those of the other prisoners.
 Pedro Mayuga, chief of Samar Provincial Hospital & Gilberto Rosales, Sanitary
Division president, verified the gunshot wound and that the death of Tipace
resulted therein.
 Ignacio Lagata, however, said that he fired his gun because the prisoners were
running far from him when he already ordered them to stop. He said that he
would be the one in jail if a prisoner escaped under his custody. Furthermore, he
would be discharged from duty like the others. He was hopeless
already. Moreover, the picking up of gabi was not part of the prisoner’s work.
HELD:
 Court ruled that Lagata should be sentenced for homicide and serious physical
injuries.
 Appellant was entitled to the benefit of mitigating circumstance of incomplete
justifying circumstance. (Art.11par.5, RPC)
RATIO:
 It was clear that Lagata had absolutely no reason to fire at Tipace. The record
does not show that Tipace was bent on committing any act of aggression or that
he attempted to escape.
 According to Lagata himself, Tipace was running towards and around him. How
could anyone intending to escape run towards and around the very guard one
was supposed to escape from?
  Even if Lagata sincerely believed that he acted in the performance of his duties,
the circumstances show that there was no necessity for him to fire directly
against the prisoners as to wound them seriously and even kill one of them.
 While custodians should take care for prisoners not to escape, only ABSOLUTE
NECESSITY would authorize them to fire against them.

MAMANGUN V PEOPLE
11
FEB
GR No. 149152 | February 2, 2007 | J. Garcia

Fulfillment of Duty/Lawful Exercise of Right

Facts:

Policeman (PO2) Rufino Mamangun was responding to a robbery-holdup call, with his fellow
police officers, at Brgy. Calvario, Meycauayan, Bulacan. A certain Liberty Contreras was heard
shouting, which prompted residents to respond and chase the suspect, who entered the yard
and proceeded to the rooftop of Antonio Abacan. Mamangun, with PO2 Diaz and Cruz, each
armed with a drawn handgun, searched the rooftop and saw a man who they thought was the
robbery suspect. Mamangun, who was ahead of the group, fired his gun once and hit the man,
who turned out to be Gener Contreras (not the suspect) – Contreras died of the gunshot wound.

According to the lone witness Crisanto Ayson, he accompanied the policemen to the lighted
rooftop. He was beside Mamangun when he (Ayson) recognized the deceased. According to
Ayson, Mamangun pointed his gun at the man, who instantly exclaimed “Hindi ako, hindi ako!”
to which Mamangun replied, “Anong hindi ako?” and shot him.

The defense rejects this testimony, alleging that they were the only ones at the dark rooftop
when Mamangun noticed a crouching man who suddenly continued to run. Mamangun shouted
“Pulis, tigil!” whereupon the person stopped and raised a steel pipe towards Mamangun’s head.
This prompted Mamangun to shoot the person. The three police claim that Contreras only said
“Hindi ako, hindi ako” only when they approached him. Mamangun then asked “Why did you go
to the rooftop? You know there are policemen here.” Mamangun reported the incident to the
desk officer who directed investigator Hernando Banez to investigate the incident. Banez later
on found a steel pipe on the roof.

Issue:
W/N the death of the victim was the necessary consequence of the petitioner’s fulfillment of his
duty

Held:

No. The Court denies the instant petition and affirms Sandiganbayan’s decision after finding the
petitioner’s testimony to be nothing but a concocted story designed to evade criminal liability.
Per Sandiganbayan’s observations, the defense was self-serving for the accused and biased with
respect to his co-policemen-witnesses because:

After supposed introductions and forewarnings uttered allegedly by Mamangun, it is contrary to

human experience for a man (who is not the suspect) to attack one of three policemen with
drawn guns
Mamangun’s admission that he did not ask the victim “Why did you try to hit me, if you are not
the one?” clearly belies their claim
The location of the entry of bullet belies their claim because it appears that the victim instinctively
shielded himself instead
Additionally, petitioner’s pretense that Contreras struck him was not initially reported to the desk
and was only conveniently remembered when the investigator found a pipe in the crime scene.

Acts in the fulfillment of duty and self-defense does not completely justify the petitioner’s firing
the fatal gunshot. The element of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim was absent, which
leads to the failure of the petitioner’s plea. Also, there can only be incomplete justification (a
privileged mitigating circumstance) in the absence of a necessary justifying circumstance the
injury was caused by necessary consequence of due performance of duty.

PEOPLE V BERONILLA

11 FEB
L – 4445 | February 28, 1955 | J. JBL Reyes
Obedience to Lawful Order of a Superior
Facts:
Manuel Beronilla, Policarpio Paculdo, Filipino Velasco and Jacinto Adriatico file an appeal from the
judgement of the Abra CFI, which convicted them of murder for the execution of Arsenio Borjal, the
elected mayor of La, Paz, Abra (at the outbreak of war), which was found to be aiding the enemy.
Borjal moved to Bangued because of death threats was succeeded by Military Mayor Manuel
Beronilla, who was appointed by Lt. Col. Arbold, regimental commander of the 15th Infantry of the
Phil. Army, operating as guerilla unit in Abra. Simultaneously upon his appointment, Beronilla
received a memorandum which authorized him to appoint a jury of 12 bolo men to try persons
accused of treason, espionage and aiding or abetting the enemy.
Upon the return of Borjal and his family to Abra, to escape bombing in Bangued, he was placed
under custody and tried and sentenced to death by the jury based on various complaints made by the
residents. Beronilla reported this to Col. Arnold who replied, saying “…I can only compliment you for
your impartial but independent way of handling the whole case.”

Two years thereafter, Beronilla, along with the executioner, digger and jury, were indicted for the
murder of Borjal. Soon after, President Manuel Roxas issued Executive Proclamation 8, which
granted amnesty to persons who committed acts in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy
against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy.

The rest of defendants applied and were granted amnesty, but Beronilla and others were convicted
on the grounds that the crime was made on purely personal motives and that the crime was
committed after the expiration of time limit for amnesty proclamation.

Issue: W/N the defendant-appellants’ actions are covered by justifying circumstances for obedience
to lawful order of superior

Held:
Yes. The accused acted upon orders of their superior officers, which as military subordinates, they
could not question and obeyed in good faith without the being aware of its illegality.
The evidence is sufficient to sustain the claim of the defense that arrest, prosecution and trial of
Borjal was done in pursuant to express orders of superiors. Additionally, it could not be established
that Beronilla received the radiogram from Colonel Volckmann, overall area commander, which
called attention to the illegality of Borjal’s conviction and sentence. Had Beronilla known the
violation, he would not have dared to report it to Arnold. The conduct of the accused also does not
show malice on their part because of the conduct of the trial, defense through counsel given to Borjal,
suspension of trial based on doubts of illegality and death sentence review sent to the superior
officers.

Criminal intent then could not be established. The maxim here is actus non facit reum, nisi mens
rea (Crime is not committed if the mind of the person performing the act complained of to be
innocent).
Additionally, the lower court should not have denied their claim to the benefits of the Guerilla
Amnesty Proclamation No. 8 inspite of contradictory dates of liberation of La Paz, Abra. Even if the
dates were contradictory, the court should have found for the Beronila, et al because if there are “any
reasonable doubt as to whether a given case falls within the (amnesty) proclamation should be
resolved in favor of the accused.”

Judgement reversed, appellants acquitted.

G.R. Nos. 103501-03 February 17, 1997

LUIS A. TABUENA, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

G.R. No. 103507 February 17, 1997

ADOLFO M. PERALTA, petitioner,

vs.
HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division), and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
represented by the OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, respondents.

Facts:
Then President Marcos instructed Luis Tabuena over the phone to pay directly to the
president’s office and in cash what the Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA)
owes the Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC), pursuant to the 7
January 1985 memorandum of then Minister Trade and Industry Roberto Ongpin.
Tabuena agreed. About a week later, Tabuena received from Mrs. Fe Roa-Gimenez,
then private secretary of Marcos, a Presidential Memorandum dated 8 January 1986
reiterating in black and white such verbal instruction. In obedience to President Marcos’
verbal instruction and memorandum, Tabuena, with the help of Gerardo G. Dabao and
Adolfo Peralta, caused the release of P55 Million of MIAA funds by means of three (3)
withdrawals. On 10 January 1986, the first withdrawal was made for P25 Million,
following a letter of even date signed by Tabuena and Dabao requesting the PNB
extension office at the MIAA the depository branch of MIAA funds, to issue a manager’s
check for said amount payable to Tabuena. The check was encashed, however, at the
PNB Villamor Branch. Dabao and the cashier of the PNB Villamor branch counted the
money after which, Tabuena took delivery thereof. The P25 Million in cash was
delivered on the same day to the office of Mrs. Gimenez. Mrs. Gimenez did not issue
any receipt for the money received. Similar circumstances surrounded the second
withdrawal/encashment and delivery of another P25 Million, made on 16 January 1986.
The third and last withdrawal was made on 31 January 1986 for P5 Million. Peralta was
Tabuena’s co-signatory to the letter- request for a manager’s check for this amount.
Peralta accompanied Tabuena to the PNB Villamor branch as Tabuena requested him
to do the counting of the P5 Million. After the counting, the money was loaded in the
trunk of Tabuena’s car. Peralta did not go with Tabuena to deliver the money to Mrs.
Gimenez’ office. It was only upon delivery of the P5 Million that Mrs. Gimenez issued a
receipt for all the amounts she received from Tabuena. The receipt was dated January
30,1986. Tabuena and Peralta were charged for malversation of funds, while Dabao
remained at large. One of the justices of the Sandiganbayan actively took part in the
questioning of a defense witness and of the accused themselves; the volume of the
questions asked were more the combined questions of the counsels. On 12 October
1990, they were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Tabuena and Peralta filed
separate petitions for review, appealing the Sandiganbayan decision dated 12 October
19990 and the Resolution of 20 December 1991.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioners are guilty of the crime of malversation.

Held:
Luis Tabuena and Adolfo Peralta are acquitted of the crime of malversation. Tabuena
acted in strict compliance with the MARCOS Memorandum. The order emanated from
the Office of the President and bears the signature of the President himself, the highest
official of the land. It carries with it the presumption that it was regularly issued. And on
its face, the memorandum is patently lawful for no law makes the payment of an
obligation illegal. This fact, coupled with the urgent tenor for its execution constrains one
to act swiftly without question. Records show that the Sandiganbayan actively took part
in the questioning of a defense witness and of the accused themselves. The questions
of the court were in the nature of cross examinations characteristic of confrontation,
probing and insinuation. Tabuena and Peralta may not have raised the issue as an
error, there is nevertheless no impediment for the court to consider such matter as
additional basis for a reversal since the settled doctrine is that an appeal throws the
whole case open to review, and it becomes the duty of the appellate court to correct
such errors as may be found in the judgment appealed from whether they are made the
subject of assignments of error or not.

People v. Taneo (CASE DIGEST)

G.R. No. L-37673

March 31, 1933

TOPICS: Criminal Law, Somnambulism, Sleep Walking, Legal Medicine

FACTS:

Potenciano Tadeo lived with his wife in his parent’s house. In January 1932, a fiesta
was being celebrated, and visitors were entertained in the house including Fred Tanner
and Luis Malinao. Early that afternoon, Potenciano Taneo, went to sleep and while
sleeping, he suddenly got up, left the room bolo in hand and, upon meeting his wife who
tried to stop him, he wounded her in the abdomen. Taneo attacked Tanner and Malinao
and tried to attack his father after which he wounded himself. Potenciano’s wife who
was then seven months pregnant, died five days later as a result of her wound, and also
the foetus which was asphyxiated in the mother’s womb.

Taneo was charged with parricide. From this sentence, the defendant appealed.

It appears from the evidence that the day before the commission of the crime the
defendant had a quarrel over a glass of “tuba” with Enrique Collantes and Valentin
Abadilla. On the day of the commission of the crime, it was noted that the defendant
was sad and weak, and early in the afternoon he had severe stomachache. The
defendant states that when he fell asleep, he dreamed that Collantes was trying to stab
him with a bolo while Abadilla held his feet, by reason of which he got up; and as it
seemed to him that his enemies were inviting him to come down, he armed himself with
a bolo and left the room. At the door, he met his wife who seemed to say to him that she
was wounded. Then he fancied seeing his wife really wounded and in desperation
wounded himself. As his enemies seemed to multiply around him, he attacked
everybody that came his way.

The evidence shows that the defendant not only did not have any trouble with his wife,
but that he loved her dearly. Neither did he have any dispute with Tanner and Malinao,
or have any motive for assaulting them.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Taneo is criminally liable.

RULING:

No. The Court concluded that the defendant acted while in a dream. His acts were not
voluntary in the sense of entailing criminal liability.

The Court took the special circumstances of the case, in which the victim was the
defendant’s own wife whom he dearly loved, and taking into consideration the fact that
the defendant tried to attack also his father, in whose house and under whose
protection he lived, besides attacking Tanner and Malinao, his guests, whom he himself
invited as may be inferred from the evidence presented, the Court found not only a lack
of motive for the defendant to voluntarily commit the acts complained of, but also
motives for not committing said acts.

Doctor Serafica, an expert witness in this case, is also of the same opinion. The doctor
stated that considering the circumstances of the case, the defendant acted while in a
dream, under the influence of a hallucination and not in his right mind.

The Court found that the defendant is not criminally liable for the offense with which he
is charged, and it is ordered that he be confined in the Government insane asylum,
whence he shall not be released until the director thereof finds that his liberty would no
longer constitute a menace.

PEOPLE V BONOAN

11 FEB
L-45130 | February 17, 1937 | J. Laurel
Imbecility
 Facts:
Celestino Bonoan is charged with the crime of murder for stabbing Carlos Guison with a knife, which
caused his death three days afterwards. An arraignment was then called, but the defense objected on
the ground that the defendant was mentally deranged and was at the time confined at the
Psychopatic Hospital. After several months of summons for doctors, production of the defendant’s
complete record of mental condition from the hospital and defendant’s admission to the hospital for
personal observation, assistant alienist Dr. Jose Fernandez finally reported to the court that Bonoan
may be discharged for being a “recovered case”. After trial, the lower court found Bonoan guilty and
sentenced him to life imprisonment.

The defense now appeals, claiming the lower court made errors in finding Bonoan suffered dementia
only occasionally and intermittently, did not show any kind of abnormality, that the defense did not
establish the defendant’s insanity and finding accused guilty.

Issue:
W/N the lower court erred in finding the accused guilty

Held:
Yes. The Court finds the accused demented at the time he perpetrated the crime, which
consequently exempts him from criminal liability, and orders for his confinement in San Lazaro
Hospital or other hospital for the insane. This ruling was based on the following evidence:
1. Uncontradicted evidence that accused was confined in the insane department of San Lazaro Hospital
and diagnosed with dementia praecox long before the commission of the offense and recurrence of
ailments were not entirely lacking of scientific foundation
2. Persons with dementia praecox are disqualified from legal responsibility because they have no
control of their acts; dementia praecox symptoms similar to manic depression psychosis
3. Accused had an insomnia attack, a symptom leading to dementia praecox, four days prior to act
according to Dr. Francisco
4. Accused was sent the Psychopatic hospital on the same day of crime and arrest, indicating the
police’s doubt of his mental normalcy
5. Defendant suffered from manic depressive psychosis according to Dr. Joson

Dissenting (Justices Imperial, Diaz and Concepcion):

1. The dissenting opinions pose that the accused committed the crime when he was sane, or at
least, during a lucid interval.
2. The legal presumption is always in favor of sanity; no positive evidence of accused mental state was
established
3. Based on expert testimonies, accused was cured of dementia praecox and later manic depressive
psychosis
4. Based on observance of arresting officer Damaso Arnoco, corrobating statement of Benjamin Cruz,
and other witnesses, accused appear sane at the time immediately after commission
5. There is a motive of aggression on part of accused is real and positive fact: deceased’s failure to pay
borrowed money

Case Title: PP vs Puno (Topic: Deceit/Dolo under General and specific intent)
G.R. No. 97471, 02/17/1993
Plaintiff-appellee: People of the Philippines (The Solicitor General)
Accused-appellants: Isabel “Beloy” Puno and Enrique “Enry” Puno (Edward C. Castañeda)
Facts:
  The accused are were charged with kidnapping for ransom, the accused pleaded not guilty during
the arraignment.
 September 26, 1990 they were sentenced of being guilty of robbery with extortion committed on a
highway, the said act was punishable under the PD No. 532 and was sentenced to jail to a term of
reclusion perpetua. They were also asked to pay the actual damages.
 Mrs. Maria Socorro Mutuc-Sarmiento (Sarmiento) an owner of a bakeshop in Araneta Avenue,
Quezon city. In January 13, 1988 the accused Isabelo Puno (Beloy) is the personal driver of
Sarmiento’s husband who is in Davao, Beloy said that he would be the one to substitute for the real
driver of Sarmiento because of the an emergency.
 Sarmiento was heading back to her home in Valle Verde Pasig, with Beloy as her driver and when
they are in a corner of Araneta Avenue, Beloy stopped which allowed Enrique Puno (Enry) to enter
the said car. Enry went to where Sarmiento was seated and pointed a gun towards Sarmiento and
said “Ma’a,m you know, I want to get money from you”. In response Sarmiento said that she has
money (amounting to P 7,000) inside her bag and get it so that they can let her go.
 Furthermore, Beloy and Enry demanded that they still want P100,000 more Sarmiento agreed with
them and asked them to drop her off at a gas station near Kamagong St. Makati When they are in
the area of Sta. Mesa, Sarmiento is holding to her rosary while Enry’s gun was pointing at her neck.
 They went towards the North superhighway. Beloy demanded Sarmiento to issue a check for the
said amount, Sarmiento did comply and issued a check in three denomination two for 30 thousand
and one for 40 thousand pesos. Beloy changed his mind going back to Metro Manila but did not
continue. Sarmiento jumped out of the car then crossed the superhighway and hailed a van,
Sarmiento’s dress had blood because she fell down on the ground and was injured when she jumped
out of the car.
 The statement above was contradicting to the statement of the accused, they allegedly stopped north
bound and they let Sarmiento to step out of the car and waited for her to get a ride. She fell down
when she stubbed her toe while crossing the highway.

Issues:
 W/N the accused-appellants committed the felony of kidnapping for ransom under article 267 of
the Revised Penal Code.

Rationale/Doctrines: WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the trial court is hereby SET ASIDE and another one is rendered
CONVICTING accused-appellants Isabelo Puno y Guevarra and Enrique Amurao y Puno of robbery as Punished in Paragraph 5 of Article 294, in
relation to Article 295, of the Revised Penal Code and IMPOSING on each of them an indeterminate sentence of four (4) years and two (2) months
of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as maximum, and jointly and severally pay the offended party, Maria del
Socorro M. Sarmiento, the amounts of P7,000.00 as actual damages and P20,000.00 as moral damages, with costs.

 The trial court cohered with the submission of the defense that the crime could not be
kidnapping for ransom as charged in the information. We likewise agree.
 there is no showing whatsoever that appellants had any motive, nurtured prior to or at the time they
committed the wrongful acts against complainant, other than the extortion of money from her
under the compulsion of threats or intimidation
 With respect to the specific intent of appellants vis-a-vis the charge that they had kidnapped the
victim, we can rely on the proverbial rule of ancient respectability that for this crime to exist, there
must be indubitable proof that
the actual intent of the malefactors was to deprive the offended party of her liberty
 That appellants in this case had no intention whatsoever to kidnap or deprive the complainant of
her personal liberty is clearly demonstrated in the veritably confessional testimony of appellant
Puno:
 o A Because while we were on the way back I (sic) came to my mind that if we reach
Balintawak or some other place along the way we might be apprehended by the police.
So when we reached Santa Rita exit I told her "Mam (sic) we will already stop and allow
you to get out of the car." 16

In relation to the topic of General and Specific Intent

There is no general intent in the case for the said felony committed by the accused is not
committed by dolus, in other words the accused does not have any malice intent to injure
Sarmiento. But however there is a specific intent coming from the accused because of the fact that
they only want to get money from Sarmiento for their needs (to cure the ulcer) so as to the specific
intent, they have the intent to gain.

PEOPLE v. DUNGO [199 SCRA 860 (1991)]

G.R. No. 89420. July 31, 1991.*

Nature: Automatic review of the decision of the RTC of Pampanga convicting the accused
of murder.

Facts: On March 16, 1987 between 2:00 and 3:00pm, the accused went to Mrs. Sigua's
office at the Department of Agrarian Reform, Apalit, Pampanga. After a brief talk, the
accused drew a knife from the envelope he was carrying and stabbed Mrs. Sigua several
times. After which he departed from the office with blood stained clothes, carrying a
bloodied bladed weapon. The autopsy report revealed that the victim sustained 14
wounds, 5 of which were fatal.

Rodolfo Sigua, husband of the deceased, testified that sometime in February 1987, the
accused Rosalino Dungo inquired from him why his wife was requiring so many
documents from him. Rodolfo explained to him the procedure at the DAR.

The accused, in defense of himself, tried to show that he was insane at the time of the
commission of the offense:
 Two weeks prior to March 16, 1987, Rosalino's wife noticed that he appears to be in
deep thought always, maltreating their children when he was not used to it before.
There were also times that her husband would inform her that his feet and head were
on fire when in truth they were not.
 On that fateful day, Rosalino complained of stomachache but they didn't bother to buy
medicine as the pain went away immediately. Thereafter, he went back to the store.
But when Andrea followed him to the store, he was no longer there. Worried, she
looked for him. On her way home, she heard people saying that a stabbing occurred.
She saw her husband in her parents-in-law's house with people milling around. She
asked her husband why he did the act, to which Rosalino answered, "That's the only
 cure for my ailment. I have cancer of the heart. If I don't kill the deceased in a number
of days, I would die.” That same day, the accused went to Manila.

Dr. Santiago and Dr. Echavez of the National Center for Mental Health testified that the
accused was confined in the mental hospital, as per order of the trial court dated Aug.
17, 1987. Based on the reports of their staff, they concluded that Rosalino was psychotic
or insane long before, during and after the commission of the alleged crime and classified
his insanity as an organic mental disorder secondary to cerebro-vascular accident or
stroke. But Dr. Balatbat who treated the accused for ailments secondary to stroke, and
Dr. Lim who testified that the accused suffered dorm occlusive disease, concluded that
Rosalino was somehow rehabilitated after a series of medical treatment in their clinic.

Issue: WON the accused was insane during the commission of the crime charged.

Held: No. For insanity to relieve the person of criminal liability, it is necessary that there
be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that he acts w/o the least
discernment and that there be complete absence or deprivation of the freedom of the
will.

Under Philippine jurisdiction, there's no definite test or criterion for insanity. However,
the definition of insanity under Sec 1039* of the Revised Administrative Code can be
applied. In essence, it states that insanity is evinced by a deranged and perverted
condition of the mental faculties, which is manifested in language or conduct. An insane
person has no full and clear understanding of the nature and consequence of his act.

Evidence of insanity must refer to the mental condition at the very time of doing the act.
However, it is also permissible to receive evidence of his mental condition for a reasonable
period before and after the time of the act in question. The vagaries of the mind can only
be known by outward acts.

It is not usual for an insane person to confront a specified person who may have wronged
him. But in the case at hand, the accused was able to Mrs. Sigua. From this, it can be
inferred that the accused was aware of his acts. This also established that the accused
has lucid intervals.
Moreover, Dr. Echavez testified to the effect that the appellant could have been aware of
the nature of his act at the time he committed it when he shouted (during laboratory
examination) that he killed Mrs. Sigua. This statement makes it highly doubtful that the
accused was insane when he committed the act.

The fact that the accused was carrying an envelope where he hid the fatal weapon, that
he ran away from the scene of the incident after he stabbed the victim several times, that
he fled to Manila to evade arrest, indicate that he was conscious and knew the
consequences of his acts in stabbing the victim. (This was taken from the TC's decision).
Judgment: questioned decision AFFIRMED.
 People vs. Madarang
G.R. No. 132319. May 12, 2000
Ponente: Puno, J.
Topic: Insanity/Imbecility: Basis of Exception

FACTS:
Fernando Madarang was charged with parricide for killing his wife Lillia Madarang. He
refused to enter a plea during arraignment, and so was entered as “not guilty” in accordance to
the rules of court. Counsel for the accused manifested that his client had been observed
exhibiting abnormal behavior. Court decided to transfer accused to the National Center for
Mental Health, after refusal to answer any question.
Initial examination at NCMH revealed Fernando as suffering from schizophrenia. He was
detained and medicated at the hospital. He was discharged after 2 years, and recommitted at
the provincial jail after being found fit to face charges.
 At the trial, it was established that the accused was legally married to the victim, and their
union resulted in 7 children. He worked as a seaman for 16 years, and thereafter started a
hardware store business. His venture failed, and he lost his entire fortune to cockfighting.
Fernando, his wife, and the children, were forced to move in with his mother-in-law ( Avelina
Mirador), because he could no longer support his family. Lillia was also heavily pregnant with
their 8th child, and was about to give birth.
On Sept. 3, 1993, Fernando and Lillia had because of jealousy. He was accusing her of
infidelity, and in the heat of the fight, stabbed her in front of the children. The children were
heard shouting and crying, and were brought out of the house by Avelina Mirador’s nephew. She
mentions seeing the accused emerge from the house, with a bolo. She declares no observation
of anything peculiar about accused before the event, nor does she know of any reason why he
killed Lillia, because she never saw the two engage in any argument while living with her. Accused
declares no recollection of any relevant events. He was sentenced with penalty of reclusion
perpetua. Accused appealed, insisting his criminal act was involuntary.

ISSUE: Whether or not evidence adduced by the defense is sufficient to establish appellant’s
insanity, which would be a basis for being free from criminal liability.

HELD: No. Philippine Courts have established a stringent criterion for insanity. To be exempting,
it is required that: (1) there must be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act;
(2) he acted without the least discernment because there is complete absence of power to
discern; (3) or that there is total deprivation of will.
Appellant was diagnosed to be suffering from schizophrenia AFTER he killed his wife.
Record is also bereft of even a single account of abnormal or bizarre behavior prior to event.
Evidence of insanity after the fact may be accorded weight only if there is also proof of abnormal
behavior immediately before or simultaneous to commission of crime. Appellant failed to
establish convincing evidence of alleged insanity at the time of killing his wife.

Case Title People v. Robios

Docket Number G.R. No. 138453

Date May 29, 2002

Digest by: Shanelle Napoles

Summary/Nature of the Case: Insanity as exempting circumstance

Facts of the Case:

Melencio Robios was found guilty with the complex crime of parricide with unintentional
abortion and was sentenced of death. May 31, 1995, he was accused of killing his
pregnant wife. March 25, 1995 Lorenzo Robios, son of Melencio heard his parents
quarreling and saw Melencio stab her mom Lorenza with an 8-inch double bladed knife
on the right shoulder. On the same day, Benjamin, brother of Lorenza reported that
Melencio has also killed their uncle. Benjamin knowing what Melencio did to her sister,
went to her sister’s house and when he was 150m away, saw Melencio and the latter
shouted “Its good you would see how your sister would die.” Benjamin sought the help
of the police.

SPO1 saw Melencio embracing her wife uttering the words “I will kill myself, I will kill
myself”. Lorenza, who was lying on her back and facing upward, was no longer breathing.
She appeared to be dead. Appellant dropped the knife which was taken by SPO3 Martin.
Appellant tried to resist the people who held him but was overpowered. The police, with
the help of the barangay officials present, tied his hands and feet with a plastic rope.
However, before he was pulled away from the body of his wife and restrained by the
police, appellant admitted to Rolando Valdez, a neighbor of his and a barangay kagawad,
that he had killed his wife, showing him the bloodstained knife.

Special report showed that Lorenza Robios was six (6) months pregnant. She suffered 41
stab wounds on the different parts of her body and that the appellant was under the
influence of alcohol and also stabbed himself.

Melencio admitted that she killed his wife but wish to be exempted of his criminal liability
invoking insanity. His son testified that Melencio saw someone in their house that wanted
to kill him. A nurse said that Melencio “isolated himself, laging nakatingin sa malayo,
rarely talked, just stared at her and murmured alone”. A detention prisoner witnessed
the appellant usually refusing to respond in the counting of prisoners. Sometimes, he
stayed in his cell even if they were required to fall in line in the plaza of the penal colony.
And another prisoner said that accused sometimes was lying down, sitting, looking, or
staring on space and without companion, laughing and sometimes crying. And Melencio
said that he did not know that he was charged for the crime of parricide with unintentional
abortion. He could not remember when he was informed by his children that he killed his
wife. He could not believe that he killed his wife

Issues at Hand:
1. Can he be exempted on the grounds of insanity?
2. What is the proper penalty for him?
Held:
1. Testimonies from both prosecution and defense witnesses show no substantial
evidence that appellant was completely deprived of reason or discernment when he
perpetrated the brutal killing of his wife. The fact that appellant admitted to responding
law enforcers how he had just killed his wife may have been a manifestation of
repentance and remorse -- a natural sentiment of a husband who had realized the
wrongfulness of his act. His behavior at the time of the killing and immediately thereafter
is inconsistent with his claim that he had no knowledge of what he had just done and he
was not insane during the commission of the crime.
2. Since appellant was convicted of the complex crime of parricide with unintentional
abortion, the penalty to be imposed on him should be that for the graver offense which
is parricide and punishable with reclusion perpetua to death.
Ruling:

Additional Relevant Notes:

People of the Philippines v. Anacito Opuran

RULING
FACTS
ISSUE
FACTS
Opuran, in his appeal with the Supreme Court, he contended that:

 the trial court erred in not considering the exempting circumstance of insanity
 that assuming he is criminally liable he should be entitled to a mitigating circumstance as he was
suffering from an illness that would diminish the exercise of the willpower of the offender without
however depriving him of the consciousness of his acts

Dacles, with the support of Bambi's brother and Jason, managed to run inside the house and locked the
doors. When the accused failed to enter the house, he left and stayed in the dark part of the highway
where the other victim was walking going home.
Tomas Baclas, a guest of the victim's wife was about to leave the house when he heard that the accused
stabbed someone. He was standing near the gate of the house when he saw the victim walking towards
the house and the accused hiding in the dark. The accused suddenly stabbed Patrimonio 4 times which
caused his instantaneous death.
Victims:

 Demetrio Patrimonio Jr.

 Allan Dacles

Accused: Anacito Opuran

Date of commission: November 19, 1998
Place of commission: Catbalogan, Samar
Witnesses: Tomas Baclas and Bambi Herrera
Opuran was charged with murder and homicide for killing Patrimonio, Jr. and Dacles, respectively.
During the trial, the accused was presented as a witness and contended that he was at his house at the
time of the incidents and that the police went to arrest him while he was sleeping that night. While the
sister of the victim claimed that Anacito was diagnosed with mental aberration in 1986 and stopped taking
his medicine in 1990. Hearings were postponed by the court to enable the victim to be examined by an
expert.
Eventually, the trial court found Anacito Opuran guilty of murder and homicide.
On the night of November 19, 1998, Anacito Opuran went to the front of the house of the Herreras where
Bambi's brother, a certain Jason Masabang were sitting and opposite them Allan Dacles was lying on a
bench.
The accused then suddenly stabbed Allan Dacles with a bladed weapon called as pisao. The victim died
due to a fatal wound in the upper right lobe of his lung and his bronchial vessels.

RULING
The stringent standard established in People v. Formigones (87 Phil 658) requires that there be a
complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, i.e., the accused acted without the least
discernment because of a complete absence of the power to discern or a total deprivation of the will.
In People v. Rafanan, Jr. (204 SCRA 65), we analyzed the Formigones standard into two distinguishable
tests: (a) the test of cognition—whether there was a “complete deprivation of intelligence in committing
the criminal act” and (b) the test of volition—whether there was a “total deprivation of
freedom of the will.
Interestingly, Anacito failed to raise insanity at the earliest opportunity. He invoked it for the first time in
the year 2000 and only after he had already testified on his defenses of alibi and denial. It has been held
that the invocation of denial and alibi as defenses indicates that the accused was in full control of his
mental faculties.
Additionally, the trial judge observed that, during the hearings, Anacito was attentive, well-behaved, and
responsive to the questions propounded to him. Thus, the shift in theory from denial and alibi to a plea of
insanity, made apparently after the appellant realized the futility of his earlier defenses, is a clear
indication that insanity is a mere concoction or an afterthought.

# 52 SOLOMON VERDADERO Y GALERA, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

G.R. No. 216021 March 2, 2016

Facts:

On March 12, 2009, in the municipality of Baggao, Province of Cagayan, accused SOLOMON
VERDADERO armed with a Rambo knife, with intent to kill, assault and stab ROMEO B. PLATA, thereby inflicting
upon him stab wounds on the different parts of his body which caused his death. Before the incident, Maynard
Plata (Maynard) and his father Romeo were at the Baggao Police Station. Together with Ronnie Elaydo
(Ronnie), they went there to report that Verdadero had stolen the fan belt of their irrigation pump. Afterwards
they had a confrontation with Verdadero at the police station, the three men made their way home on a
tricycle and stopped at the drug store as Maynard intended to buy a baby supplies and the victim also followed
him, on his way the accused stabbed Romeo on the left side of the victim’s back twice and his shoulder.
Maynard tried to help his father but Verdadero attempted to attack him as well, he defended himself using a
small stool, which he used to hit Verdadero at the chest. Ronnie meanwhile got into the Police station to seek
assistance, Verdadero was arrested and Romeo was rushed into Cagayan Valley Medical Center, however he
is dead on arrival.

Prior to the incident, Solomon Verdadero was notably going in and out of CVMCs Psychiatric Department, in
the year 1999, 2000, 2003, and March of 2009, Doctors contended that he suffers a chronic mental disease
called Schizophrenia is a chronic mental disorder characterized by inability to distinguish between fantasy and
reality, and often accompanied by hallucinations and delusions. A showing that an accused is suffering from a
mental disorder, however, does not automatically exonerate him from the consequences of his act. Mere
abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude imputability.
On May 30, 2013, the RTC rendered a decision finding Verdadero guilty for the crime of homicide.

The RTC ruled that the crime committed was only homicide, as the prosecution failed to establish the presence
of treachery and evident premeditation to qualify the killing to murder. The trial court, however, opined that
Verdadero failed to establish insanity as an exempting circumstance. The trial court posited that Verdadero
was unsuccessful in establishing that he was not in a lucid interval at the time he stabbed Romeo or that he
was completely of unsound mind prior to or coetaneous with the commission of the crime.

Aggrieved, Verdadero appealed before the CA.

In its July 10, 2014 Decision, the CA upheld Verdadero's conviction of homicide. The appellate court agreed
that the defense was able to establish that Verdadero had a history of schizophrenic attacks, but was unable
to prove that he was not lucid at the time of the commission of the offense. The decretal portion of the decision
states:
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry

In view of the foregoing, the Appeal is DENIED on May 30, 2013, rendered by the Regional Trial Court of
Tuguegarao City, Branch 3 Verdadero moved for reconsideration, but his motion was denied by the CA in its
resolution, dated December 15, 2014.

ISSUE:

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE PETITIONER'S CONVICTION DESPITE
THE FACT THAT HIS INSANITY AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT WAS ESTABLISHED BY CLEAR AND
CONVINCING EVIDENCE.

RULING:

Supreme Court contends Verdadero insists that he was able to fully support his defense of insanity. He
claims that Maynard even admitted that he was not in the proper state of mind when they were at the police
station before the stabbing took place. Further, it appeared that Verdadero was having hallucinations after
the stabbing incident as testified to by Dr. Andres-Juliana. Verdadero notes that Dr. Pagaddu concluded that
he had a relapse at the time of the stabbing incident on March 12, 2009.

Moreover, it asserted that the CA did not misapprehend the facts as the evidence presented failed to
completely establish Verdadero's insanity at the time of the stabbing.

Insanity under Art. 12, par. 1, of The Revised Penal Code exists when there is a complete deprivation of
intelligence in committing the act, i.e., appellant is deprived of reason; he acts without the least
discernment because of complete absence of the power to discern; or, there is a total deprivation of freedom
of the will. The onus probandi rests upon him who invokes insanity as an exempting circumstance, and he
must prove it by clear and convincing evidence.

To completely evade culpability, Verdadero raises insanity as a defense claiming that he had suffered a relapse
of his schizophrenia. Under Article 12 of the RPC, an imbecile or an insane person is exempt from criminal
liability, unless the latter had acted during a lucid interval. The defense of insanity or imbecility must be clearly
proved for there is a presumption that the acts penalized by law are voluntary.18

In the case at bench, it is undisputed that (1) as early as 1999, Verdadero was brought to the Psychiatric
Department of CVMC for treatment; (2) he was diagnosed with depression in 2001; (3) he was diagnosed with
schizophrenia on July 21, 2003; (4) he was confined in the psychiatric ward sometime in 2009 due to a
relapse; (5) he was in and out of psychiatric care from the time of his first confinement in 1999 until the
stabbing incident; and (6) he was diagnosed to have suffered a relapse on March 20, 2009.

Thus, it is without question that he was suffering from schizophrenia and the only thing left to be ascertained
is whether he should be absolved from responsibility in killing Romeo because of his mental state. Supreme
Court ruled that Solomon Verdadero be acquitted but ordered to pay civil indemnity to the heirs of the victim
and be confined to National Center for Mental Health for treatment.
Ortega vs. People

G. R. No. 151085, August 20, 2008

Facts:

At the time of commission of rape, the accused was 13 years old while the victim was 6.
The case was pending when the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 (R.A. 9344)
was enacted amending among others the age of criminal irresponsibility being raised
from 9 to 15 years old. At the time of the promulgation of judgment, the accused already
reached the age of majority.
Issue:

Whether or not the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 (R.A. 9344) should be
applied, in the resolution of the case.

Held:

The Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 (R.A. 9344) should be applied. By virtue
of R.A. No. 9344, the age of criminal irresponsibility has been raised from 9 to 15 years
old, this law is evidently favorable to the accused. Petitioner was only 13 years old at
the time of the commission of the alleged rape. This was duly proven by the certificate
of live birth, by petitioner's own testimony, and by the testimony of his
mother. Furthermore, petitioner’s age was never assailed in any of the proceedings
before the RTC and the CA. Indubitably, petitioner, at the time of the commission of the
crime, was below 15 years of age. Under R.A. No. 9344, he is exempted from criminal
liability.

G.R. No. 186227, July 20, 2011

People of the Philippines
vs Allen Udtojan Mantalaba
Ponente: Peralta
Facts:
Task Forcer Regional Anti-Crime Emergency Response (RACER) in Butuan
City received a report that Mantalaba who was 17 yrs old was selling
shabu. After a buy-bust operation, two informations was filed against
Mantalaba which was later on consolidated. Mantalaba pleaded not
guilty.

RTC found Mantalaba guilty beyond reasonable doubt and was penalized
of reclusion perpetua to death and fine of 500k for selling shabu
and (2) for illegally possessing shabu, Mantalaba was penalized, in
application of the ISL, 6 yrs and 1 day as minimum and 8 yrs as
maximum of prision mayor and fine of 300k. CA affirmed in toto the
decision of the RTC. Thus, the present appeal.

Mantalaba: the lower court gravely erred in convicting him and that
there was no evidence of actual sale between him and the poser-buyer
during the buy-bust operation. He also claims that the chain of
custody of the seized shabu was not established.

Issue: Whether Mantalaba is guilty of drug trafficking and possession.

Ruling:
The petition is without merit.

The buy-bust operation was valid, establishing the following: (1) the
identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment
therefore. From the above testimony of the prosecution witness, it
was well established that the elements have been satisfactorily met.
The seller and the poseur-buyer were properly identified. The subject
dangerous drug, as well as the marked money used, were also
satisfactorily presented. The testimony was also clear as to the
manner in which the buy-bust operation was conducted.

Non-compliance by the apprehending/buy-bust team with Section 21 is

not fatal as long as there is justifiable ground therefor, and as
long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
confiscated/seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team. Its non-compliance will not render an accused arrest
illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible.

As to his minority, Mantalaba was minor during the buy-bust operation

but was of legal age during the promulgation of the decision. It must
be noted that RA 9344 took effect after the promulgation of the RTC's
decision against Mantalaba. The RTC did not suspend the sentence in
accordance with PD 603 (Child and Youth Welfare Code) and Rule on
Juveniles in Conflict with the Law that were applicable at the time
of the promulgation of the judgment. However, as ruled in People vs
Sarcia, suspension of sentence can still be applied but NOT when the
offender upon the promulgation of judgment is 21 yrs old. or older.
Mantalaba is now 21 yrs old, therefore his suspension of sentence is
already moot and academic.

But as to the penalty, CA must have appreciated Mantalaba's minority

as privileged mitigating circumstance in fixing the penalty. Thus,
applying the rules stated above, the proper penalty should be one
degree lower than reclusion perpetua, which is reclusion temporal,
the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority having been
appreciated. Necessarily, also applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law (ISLAW), the minimum penalty should be taken from the penalty
next lower in degree which is prision mayor and the maximum penalty
shall be taken from the medium period of reclusion temporal, there
being no other mitigating circumstance nor aggravating circumstance.

SAMAHAN NG MGA PROGRESIBONG KABATAAN

The Supreme Court (SC) has declared the curfew for minors implemented in the cities of Manila
and Navotas as unconstitutional.

However, the SC ruled that a similar ordinance on curfew in Quezon City — Ordinance No. SP
2301- 2014 — ” an Ordinance Setting for a [sic] Disciplinary Hours in Quezon City for Minors from
10 p.m. to 5 a.m. providing Penalties for Parent/Guardian, for Violation Thereof and for Other
Purposes” as constitutional.

In a 40-page decision in GR No. 225442 (Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan [SPARK] v.

Quezon City), promulgated on August 8, 2017 but was released to media on Sunday, the Court
En Banc declared Ordinance No. 8046 of the City of Manila entitled “An Ordinance Declaring the
Hours from 10 p.m. to 4 a.m. of the Following Day as ‘Barangay Curfew Hours’ for Children and
Youths Below 18 Years of Age; Prescribing Penalties Therefor; and for Other Purposes”).

The High Court also struck down “Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. No. 99-02, as amended by
Pambansang Ordinansa Blg. 2002-13 of Navotas City entitled ‘Nagtatakda ng Curfew’ ng mga
Kabataan na Wala Pang Labing Walong (18) Taong Gulang sa Bayan ng Navotas, Kalakhang
Maynila”.

In ruling on the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by SPARK questioning the
constitutionality of the curfew ordinances, the Court found it proper to examine the assailed
regulations under the strict scrutiny test — the test of judicial scrutiny which applies when a
classification interferes with the exercise of fundamental rights — as the ordinances set
restrictions on the minors’ exercise of their right to travel under Section 6, Art. III of the
Constitution.
Under the strict scrutiny test, the government has the burden of proving that the classification is
necessary to achieve a compelling state interest, and is the least restrictive means to protect such
interest or the means chosen is narrowly tailored to accomplish the interest.

The Court said that while all three curfew ordinances passed the first prong of the strict scrutiny
test in that “they not only conveyed but, in fact, attempted to substantiate legitimate concerns
on public welfare, especially with respect to minors,” each of the ordinances must still be
“narrowly tailored as to ensure minimal constraint not only on the minors’ right to travel but also
on their other constitutional rights.”

After a thorough evaluation of the provisions of the ordinances, the Court found that only the
Quezon City ordinance met the said requirement as the Manila and Navotas ordinances were not
narrowly drawn in that their exceptions were inadequate and run the risk of overly restricting
the minors’ fundamental freedoms.

“To be fair, both ordinances protect the rights to education, to gainful employment, and to travel
at night from school or work,” said the Court.

“However, even with those safeguards, the Navotas Ordinance and, to a greater extent, the
Manila Ordinance still do not account for the reasonable exercise of the minors’ rights of
association, free exercise of religion, rights to peaceably assemble, and of free expression, among
others.”

The Court added that the exceptions under the Manila ordinance were too limited and, thus,
unduly trample upon protected liberties.

It likewise observed that while the Navotas ordinance was apparently more protective of
constitutional rights than the Manila ordinance, it still provided insufficient safeguards in that it
hindered minors from engaging in legitimate non-school or non-church activities in the streets;
it effectively prohibited minors from attending traditional religious activities (such as simbang
gabi or dawn masses) at night without accompanying adults; and it did not accommodate
avenues for minors to engage in political rallies or attend city council meetings to voice out their
concerns in line with their right to peaceably assemble and to free expression.

In addition, the Court ruled that the penal provisions of the Manila Ordinance which impose
reprimand and fines/imprisonment on minors are in conflict with Section 57-A of RA 9344
(Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006), as amended, which provides that no penalty shall be
imposed on children for violations of juvenile status offenses.
“Hence, following the rule that ordinances should always conform with the law, these provisions
must be struck down as invalid,” the Court added.

The Court noted that the Quezon City ordinance “stands in stark contrast to the first two
ordinances as it sufficiently safeguards the minors’ constitutional rights” as its list of exceptions
is more narrowly drawn to sufficiently protect the minors’ rights of association, free exercise of
religion, travel, to peaceably assemble, and of free expression.

“In particular, the Quezon City Ordinance provides for adequate exceptions that enable minors
to freely exercise their fundamental rights during the prescribed curfew hours, and therefore,
narrowly drawn to achieve the State’s purpose,” said the Court.

The SC has lifted the temporary restraining order it issued on the three ordinances also in July
last year.

SPARK, a group of students in the three cities, argued in their petition filed through lawyer Jesus
Falcis III that the curfew ordinances are unconstitutional due to vagueness as they result in
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement and overbreadth as they impair legitimate activities of
minors during curfew hours.

Petitioner also claimed a violation of the right of minors to liberty and to travel without
substantive due process, adding that the curfew “deprives parents of the natural and primary
right in the rearing of the youth without substantive due process.” (PNA)

US vs Tanedo
G.R. NO 5418
February 12, 1910

PETITIONER: U.S
RESPONDENT: CECILIO TAÑEDO

Facts:
That on or about the 26th day of January of this year, the accused, with the intention of
killing Feliciano Sanchez, invited him to hunt wild chickens, and, upon reaching the forest,
with premeditation shot him in the breast with a shotgun which destroyed the heart and
killed him. After seeing that Sanchez was wounded, Tanedo ran back to his workers and
asked one,"Bernardino Tagampa, to help him hide the body, which they did by putting it
amidst the tallcogon grass, and later burying in an old well. Only one shot was heard that
morning and a chicken was killed by a gunshot wound. Chicken feathers were found at
the scene of the crime prior to the trial, the accused denied all knowledge of the crime,
but later confessed during the trial. The CFI of Tarlac found the accused guilty of
homicide, having invited the deceased into the forest and intentionally shooting him in the
chest So far as can be ascertained, there was no enmity and no unpleasant relations
between them. There appears to have been no motive whatever for the commission of
the crime. The only possible reason that the accused could have for killing the deceased
would be found in the fact of a sudden quarrel between them during the hunt. That idea
is wholly negative by the fact that the chicken and the man were shot at the same time,
there having been only one shot fired. Hence, the decision was appealed
Issue:
Whether or not the court is correct in ruling that there is criminal liability
Held:
NO, If life is taken by misfortune or accident while in the performance of a lawful act
executed with due care and without intention of doing harm, there is no criminal liability.
In the case where there is no evidence of negligence upon the part of the accused. Neither
is there any question that he was engaged in the commission of a lawful act when the
accident occurred. Neither is there any evidence of the intention of the accused to cause
the death of the deceased. The only thing in the case at all suspicious upon the part of
the defendant are his concealment and denial.
Where accidental killing is relied upon as a defense, the accused is not required to prove
such a defense by a preponderance of the evidence, because there is a denial of
intentional killing. The burden is upon the State to show that it was intentional.
Evidence of misadventure gives rise to an important issue in a prosecution for homicide,
which must be submitted to the jury, and since a plea of misadventure is a denial of
criminal intent which constitutes an essential element in criminal homicide, to warrant a
conviction it must be negative by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt.
Judgment is reversed.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ISAIAS CASTILLO y COMPLETO

G.R. No. 172695 June 29, 2007

FACTS: Appellant was charged with parricide for allegedly shooting his wife with a dart from a rubber sling,
hitting her at the neck and causing her instantaneous death. In his defense, the accused said that he had
no intention of killing his wife and that he was practicing the use of the weapon when his wife was
accidentally hit by the arrow. However, the trial court nonetheless found him guilty on the ground that the
evidence showed that the infliction of the fatal injury upon his wife was preceded by a quarrel between her
and the appellant, thus negating the latter’s defense. The same was affirmed on appeal. In the present
petition, the appellant contends that assuming that he was the one who killed his wife the same was
accidental and not intentional.

ISSUE: Is the exempting circumstance of accident applicable in the instant case?

HELD: No. Article 12, par. 4 of the Revised Penal Code, provides:

ART. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. — The following are exempt from criminal
liability:

xxx xxx xxx

4. Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by mere accident without
fault or intention of causing it.
"Accident" is an affirmative defense which the accused is burdened to prove, with clear and convincing
evidence. The defense miserably failed to discharge its burden of proof. The essential requisites for this
exempting circumstance, are:

1. A person is performing a lawful act;

2. With due care;
3. He causes an injury to another by mere accident;
4. Without fault or intention of causing it.

By no stretch of imagination could playing with or using a deadly sling and arrow be considered as
performing a "lawful act." Thus, on this ground alone, appellant's defense of accident must be struck down
because he was performing an unlawful act during the incident.
POMOY v. PEOPLE G.R. 150647, 29 September 2004
FACTS
A petition for Review by Appellant Pomoy, against the ruling of RTC Iloilo and the CA, that found
him guilty of homicide. The TC and CA found that the death of Tomas Balboa, “who was shot with
a .45 service pistol, with deliberate intent and decided purpose to kill, and without any justifiable
cause or motive, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault” the deceased
Balboa. Hence this petition.
Prosecution:
Balboa was a teacher in Concepcion College of Science and Fisheries in Concepcion, Iloilo. About
7:30 am of 4 January 1990, some policemen arrived to arrest Balboa, allegedly due to a robbery
back in December 1989. Balboa complied and was detained in Camp Jalandoni, Iloilo with Edgar
Samudio, another suspect of the robbery case.
About 2 pm, petitioner Pomoy, the police sergeant, came for Balboa for tactical interrogation at
the investigation room. At that time, Pomoy had a service gun (a .45 caliber pistol). When Pomoy
and Balboa were in the building near the investigation room, and two (2) gunshots were heard.
When they came to the source of the gunshot sounds, Pomoy was seen still holding the .45
caliber pistol, facing Balboa, who was lying in a pool of blood, about two (2) feet away.
When the Commanding Officer arrived, he disarmed Pomoy, and had Balboa brought to the
hospital but was stopped by a doctor in the premises, saying it was unnecessary as Balboa is
already dead. Upon the request of Mrs. Balboa, an autopsy was conducted in NBI Iloilo with
findings by the medicolegal officer, as follows: Cause of Death: Hemorrhage, massive secondary
gunshot wounds on chest and abdomen.
Defense:
Petitioner Pomoy generally adopts the narration of facts in the trail court and CA decisions,
Defense had the following witnesses:
Erna Basa (the lone eyewitness to the incident) who says, while she was working about 2pm,
heard some noise and exchange of words that were unclear but seemed like trouble. She opens
the door, and seeing one meter away, finds Pomoy and Balboa grappling for possession of the
gun from Pomoy’s holster. It all happened so fast that the gun was pulled out of the holster, a
shot was fired, but she wasn’t sure who pulled the trigger.
Eden Legaspi, she also hears the commotion from the outside, but remained seated where she
was. She witnesses Erna Basa go and open the door. Eden Legaspi only stood up after shots were
fired and hears on of the two men fall down.
Dr. Salvador Mallo Jr., the medico legal officer who conducted the autopsy. He finds two (2)
entrance wounds on Balboa, one’s trajectory going upward, and the other downward.
Pomoy the petitioner, he notes that once he opened the door to meet Balboa, the latter suddenly
approached him to take hold of the gun in the holster. Pomoy also notes he loaded and cocked
his gun before going to Camp Jalandoni that day. Though Balboa is shorter, Pomoy notes Balboa
was bigger in build. Pomoy however, prevented Balboa from taking his gun. After a few seconds
of grappling, the gun was forced out of the holster, it fired to the right side of the victim.
RTC and CA:
Pomoy was held guilty based on the following: 1) Petitioner had substantial control of the gun, 2) the
gun was locked prior to the grabbing incident, hence unlocked by the petitioner, 3) location of the
wounds do not support the assertion of the grabbing of the gun, 4) as the OSG said, an “accident” was
unlikely since there were two gunshot wounds, on two different angles and distant parts of the body,
instead of merely one. The OSG said that it is an oft repeated principle that the location, number and
gravity of the wounds inflicted on the victim have a more revealing tale of what actually happened
during the incident.

The appellate court cited People v. Reyes saying that revolvers are not prone to accidental firing since it
need to be cocked and pressure is needed to be exerted on the trigger. Furthermore, the CA debunked
the alternative plea of self defense. It held that petitioner had miserably failed to prove the attendance
of unlawful aggression, an indispensable element of this justifying circumstance. Also, the CA altered the
trial court’s ruling in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of abuse of public position. The CA said
that for the aggravating circumstance to apply, he must use his influence, prestige and ascendancy
which his office gives him in realizing his purpose. If the accused could have perpetrated the crime
without occupying his position, then there is no abuse of public position.’ (People vs. Joyno, 304 SCRA
655, 670). The CA ruled that in this case there was no showing of a premeditated plan, nor did the
petitioner take advantage of his public position. Hence there were neither aggravating nor mitigating
circumstances proven.

ISSUE:
a) Did Pomoy had “full control” of the gun, as the CA ruled?
b) Did the safety lock feature, requirement of pressure and two gunshots necessarily conclude a
determined effort to kill instead of an accident, as the CA held?
c) Did the number and location of the gunshot wounds necessarily conclude deliberate intent?
b) W/N there was a exempting circumstance of accident, as in Art 12, par. 4.
c) W/N there was Self Defense.

HELD:

The CA failed to see the prosecution’s failure to overturn the allegations of the accident, as an
exempting circumstance in Article 12, which exculpates the actor when the harm was done without his
fault or negligence but rather on circumstances unforeseen or out of his control. Thus, in determining
whether an “accident” attended the incident, courts must take into account the dual standards of (1)
lack of intent to kill and (2) absence of fault or negligence.

a. POMOY HAD NO FULL CONTROL. According to the facts, the Petitioner was NOT in control of the
gun when it fired, mainly through the testimonial evidence of Erna Basa. According to the cross,
when she began to see the incident, the gun was still in the holster, at the side of the petitioner. She
also mentioned both the petitioner and the deceased had their hands on the gun, while it was INSIDE
the holster, at that point they were both already grappling for possession. She mentions that both
gunshots happened during the grappling, but because of the wrestling of the two, she could not
see where the gun was pointed towards. This was because as Pomoy’s right hand and Balboa’s left
hand were scuffling for possession, Pomoy continued to use his left hand to subdue Balboa.
The foregoing account clearly demonstrates that the petitioner did NOT have control of the gun to
consider any willful intent to kill the deceased. According to the witness, the deceased persistently
tried to wrest the weapon from the petitioner, while he resolutely tried to thwart those attempts. The
CA therefore, had no firm basis to conclude that Pomoy had full possession of the gun.

b. NO CLEAR SHOWING OF DETERMINED EFFORT. Since it is now undisputed that both petitioner and
victim struggled aggressively for possession of the gun, the eyewitness account of Basa clearly illustrated
the fact that in the “fierce and vicious” frenzied grappling, it supports the conclusion that the safety lock
was accidentally released, and the force of either man was strong enough to fire the gun, putting the
necessary pressure. Not to mention that it was admitted that Pomoy cocked the gun earlier that day.
Also, the fact that two gunshots were fired were attributed to the nature of the gun and not a
conclusion of deliberate intent. As the petitioner himself testified, he said that “a caliber .45
semiautomatic pistol, when fired, immediately slides backward throwing away the empty shell and
returns immediately carrying again a live bullet in its chamber. Thus, the gun can, as it did, fire in
succession. Verily, the location of, and distance between the wounds and the trajectories of the
bullets jibe perfectly with the claim of the petitioner: the trajectory of the first shot going downward
from left to right thus pushing Balboa’s upper body, tilting it to the left while Balboa was still clutching
petitioner’s hand over the gun; the second shot hitting him in the stomach with the bullet going
upward of Balboa’s body as he was falling down and releasing his hold on petitioner’s hand”.
Thus the reliance of the CA in People v. Reyes was misplaced. This case involves a semi automatic
pistol, the mechanism of which is very different from that of a revolver, the gun used in Reyes. Unlike a
revolver, a semi automatic pistol, as sufficiently described by petitioner, is prone to accidental firing
when possession thereof becomes the object of a struggle.

c. THE LOCATION OF THE WOUNDS ARE IRRELEVANT, though ordinarily it would be. In this case though,
they are inconsequential where both the victim and the accused were grappling for possession of a gun,
the direction of its nozzle may continuously change in the process, such that the trajectory of the bullet
when the weapon fires becomes unpredictable and erratic. In this case, the eyewitness account of that
aspect of the tragic scuffle shows that the parties’ positions were unsteady, and that the nozzle of the
gun was neither definitely aimed nor pointed at any particular target.

1. The ELEMENTS of ACCIDENT WERE ALL PRESENT in this case.

The elements of accident are as follows: 1) the accused was at the time performing a lawful act with due
care; 2) the resulting injury was caused by mere accident; and 3) on the part of the accused, there was
no fault or no intent to cause the injury.
From the facts, it is clear that all these elements were present. At the time of the incident, petitioner
was an investigator for the PNP. Thus, he was in the lawful performance of his duties that, under the
instructions of his superior, he fetched the victim from the latter’s cell for a routine interrogation. Also,
it was in the lawful performance of his duty as a law enforcer that petitioner tried to defend his
possession of the weapon when the victim suddenly tried to remove it from his holster. As an enforcer
of the law, petitioner was duty bound to prevent the snatching of his service weapon by anyone,
especially by a detained person in his custody. Such weapon was likely to be used to facilitate escape
and to kill or maim persons in the
vicinity, including petitioner himself. Petitioner cannot be faulted for negligence. He exercised all the
necessary precautions to prevent his service weapon from causing accidental harm to others. As he so
assiduously maintained, he had kept his service gun locked when he left his house; he kept it inside its
holster at all times, especially within the premises of his working area. At no instance during his
testimony did the accused admit to any intent to cause injury to the deceased, much less kill him.
The participation of petitioner, if any, in the victim’s death was limited only to acts committed in the
course of the lawful performance of his duties as an enforcer of the law. The removal of the gun from its
holster, the release of the safety lock, and the firing of the two successive shots all of which led to the
death of the victim were sufficiently demonstrated to have been consequences of circumstances
beyond the control of petitioner. At the very least, these factual circumstances create serious doubt on
the latter’s culpability.

3. There was NO SELF DEFENSE. Pomoy put forth self defense as an alternative defense, that granting
arguendo that he intentionally shot Balboa, he claims he did so to protect his life and limb from real
and immediate danger. The SC said that Self defense is inconsistent with the exempting circumstance of
accident, in which there is no intent to kill. On the other hand, self defense necessarily contemplates a
premeditated intent to kill in order to defend oneself from imminent danger. Apparently, the fatal shots
in the instant case did not occur out of any conscious or premeditated effort to overpower, maim or kill
the victim for the purpose of self defense against any aggression; rather, they appeared to be the
spontaneous and accidental result of both parties’ attempts to possess the firearm. Since the death of
the victim was the result of an accidental firing of the service gun of petitioner an exempting
circumstance as defined in Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code a further discussion of whether the
assailed acts of the latter constituted lawful self defense is unnecessary.

HELD: Though timeless is the legal adage that facts found by the trial court and appellate court are
conclusive, the Supreme Court however may overturn the same when certain crucial facts or details are
overlooked and when upon a petition, a reexamination is imperative. Due to the appreciation of facts of
the accident, credibility of the witnesses creating a reasonable doubt, and upholding the presumption of
innocence, the appellant was therefore ACQUITTED.

US vs. APOLONIO CABALLEROS G.R. No. 1352 March 29, 1905 Article 12 of the RPC, Irresistible
Force
NOVEMBER 20, 2017
FACTS:

The defendants have been sentenced by the CFI of Cebu to the penalty of seven years of presidio
mayor as accessories after the fact in the crime of assassination or murder perpetrated on the
persons of the American school-teachers , because, without having taken part in the said crime
as principals or as accomplices, they took part in the burial of the corpses of the victims in order
to conceal the crime.

The evidence does not justify, in our opinion, this sentence. As regards Roberto Baculi, although
he confessed to having assisted in the burial of the corpses, it appears that he did so because he
was compelled to do so by the murderers of the four teachers. And not only does the defendant
affirm this, but he is corroborated by the only eyewitness to the crime, Teodoro Sabate, who, by
the way, is a witness for the prosecution. This witness says he was present when the Americans
were killed; that Roberto Baculi was not a member of the group who killed the Americans, but
the he was in a banana plantation on his property gathering some bananas; that when he heard
the shots he began to run; that he was, however, seen by Damaso and Isidoro, the leaders of the
band; that the latter called to him and striking him with the butts of their guns they forced him
to bury the corpses.

ISSUE:

Whether or not defendants are criminally liable.

RULING:

The Penal Code exempts from liability any person who performs the act by reason of irresistible
force (par. 9, art. 8). Baculi acted, doubtless, under such circumstances when he executed the
acts which are charged against him.

As regards the other defendant, Apolonio Caballeros, there is no proof that he took any part in
any way in the execution of the crime with which he has been charged; there is conclusive proof
to the contrary, since Baculi, as well as one of the witnesses for the prosecution, Teodoro Sabate,
expressly declare that he, Caballeros, did not take any part in the burial of the aforesaid corpses,
nor was he even in the place of the occurrence when the burial took place. The confession of his
supposed liability and guilt, made before an official of the division of information of the
Constabulary, Enrique Calderon, as the latter states when testifying as a witness, can not be
considered as legal proof, because the same witness says that Roberto Baculi was the only one
of the defendants who made a confession to him voluntarily. It appears besides, from the
statements of another witness for the prosecution, Meliton Covarrubias, that the confession of
Caballeros was made through the promise made to him and to the other defendants that nothing
would be done to them. Confessions which do not appear to have been made freely and
voluntarily, without force, intimidation, or promise of pardon, can not be accepted as proof on a
trial. (Sec. 4, Act No. 619 of the Philippine Commission).

The fact of the defendants not reporting to the authorities the perpetration of the crime, which
seems to be one of the motives for the conviction and which the court below takes into
consideration in his judgment, is not punished by the Penal Code and therefore that cannot
render the defendants criminally liable according to law.

By virtue, then, of the above considerations, and with a reversal of the judgment appealed from,
we acquit the defendants, appellants, with the costs de officio in both instances.

PEOPLE vs. LORENO & MARANTAL (JULY 9, 1984)

Exempting Circumstances (RPC Art. 12) | Irresistible force or uncontrollable fear of greater injury

FACTS
LC Ruling: Loreno – Robbery wth double rape,

Jan. 7, 1978. Elias was at his house along with his daughters Monica (14), Cristina (22, married), Rachel (4 mos.) wife Beata,
sons Mario (11) and Nilo (13), and farm helper Fabie.

While Francisco was at the balcony, he saw four men with flashlights approaching. He then heard one of them calling Elias
that a he has a letter from the chief hepe. He then called Elias, who went out to the balcony where a man in dark sweater
(DS) handed him the letter. Because it was too dark for the letter to be read, Elias invited the man inside the sala. Once
inside, he called Monica to fetch his reading glasses and subsequently, read the letter: "Kami mga NPA." Monica, scared
(shitless), ran to her mother. Cristina attempted to get a bolo from the kitchen but was held back by the DS guy and
threatened her no to make any ruckus. When Elias went to the kitchen to see the commotion, a gun was pointed at his back
by the DS guy who ordered everyone inside to be on the floor.

Meanwhile, another man in a red shirt (RS), who stayed with Francisco in the balcony, asked Mario for a glass of water.
Mario did not obey so Francisco himself went inside to get a glass, only to be followed by the RS guy. When he reached the
sala, a gun was pointed at his back and a knife at his neck. Francisco then recognized RS guy as Loreno -- who was also
recognized by Monica and Cristina who were lying flat on their stomachs on the floor. Marantal (recognized by Francisco)
stayed as lookout outside the house.

DS guy then instructed Loreno to tie all their victims on the floor (hands behind backs) which he complied. DS guy then got
a hold of Monica and dragged her to a room where she was asked where her piggy bank is. When she said there was none,
he then forcibly removed her pants. She screamed for help to her parents, only to be boxed. Despite the struggle, he managed
to remove her panties and successfully had sex with her. After this, he dragged Monica back to the sala and proceeded to
do the same to Cristina

While of this was happening, the other men then proceeded to ransack the house and found and took a lot of valuables.
Thereafter, Loreno entered the room where Cristina was lying on the floor and proceeded to kiss and touch her vagina.
Suddenly, he was called to hurry up because someone was approaching the house. When he went back, DS guy warned
everyone not to tell anyone, got their valuables, and left.

They managed to untie themselves eventually and after positively affirming the identities of their malefactors, along with
Elias finding out the sexual abuse his daughters suffered, filed a report against the robbery-rape incident. After substantial
examination to his daughters and initial investigation, the accused were detained, charged, and found guilty. Accused are
before the SC claiming that they acted under the compulsion of an irresistible force and/or under the impulse of
uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury. Marantal admitted that they were in the house of Elias Monge on the night of
January 7, 1978, but they were only forced by a man wearing black sweater and his five companions who claimed to be
members of the New People's Army (NPA), operating in the locality, with the threat that if they did not obey, appellants and
their families would be killed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the act was done under compulsion of an irresistible force/uncontrollable fear of equal or
greater injury. NO.

HELD: Guilty of robbery with double rape.

A person who acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force, like one who acts under the impulse or uncontrollable
fear of equal or greater injury is exempt from criminal liability because he does not act with freedom. The force
must be irresistible to reduce him to a mere instrument who acts not only without will but against his will. The duress,
force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending and of such a nature as to induce a well-grounded
apprehension of death of serious bodily harm if the act is not done. A threat of future injury is not enough. The compulsion
must be of such a character as to leave no opportunity to the accused for escape or self-defense in equal combat (People vs.
Villanueva, 104 Phil. 450).

In the case at bar, it does not met the requirements of under compulsion of irresistible force or under the impulse
of uncontrollable fear. A perusal of the appellants' statement of the robbery-rape incident as, summarized in their joint
brief, showed that they admitted their participation in the commission of the crime of robbery and rape against Elias
Monge and his family on January 7, 1978. Further established were facts inconsistent with appellant's claim of having
acted under the compulsion of an irresistible force and/or under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of equal or greater
injury. The records likewise revealed that on the two occasions Eustaquio Loreno brought Beata Monge to the master's
room and the teacher's room where he made her open the trunk and the "aparador" with her keys and got the contents
which he brought and poured on the floor of the sala, appellant Loreno acted alone, without the threat and assistance
of the man in dark sweater. And after the man in the dark sweater consummated his lust on Cristina Monge in the
teacher's room and seeing Cristina Monge lying on the floor, Loreno embraced her and tried to kiss her and touch her
private parts.

Marantal, who was standing at the gate of the house below, must have heard the shouts of Monica Monge for help and must
have known by then that Monica Monge was being abused by his two companions who earlier went up the house. As a
"lookout" or guard, Marantal gave his companions effective means and encouragement to commit the crimes of robbery
and rape. There was no showing that he raised a voice of protest or did an act to prevent the commission of the crimes. All
these demonstrated the voluntary participation and the conspiracy of the appellants. The foregoing acts, though
separately performed from those of their unidentified companions, clearly showed their community of interest
and concert of criminal design with their unidentified companions which constituted conspiracy without the need
of direct proof of the conspiracy itself.

Conspiracy may be inferred and proven by the acts of the accused themselves and when said acts point to joint purpose and
concert of action and community of interest, which unity of purpose and concert of action serve to establish the existence
of conspiracy, and the degree of actual participation petition by each of the conspirators is immaterial. Conspiracy having
been establish, all the conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the extent and character of their participation
because in contemplation of law, the act of one is the act of all.

People vs. Joselito del Rosario – GR 127755, April 14, 1999

FACTS

The accused-appellant was convicted of the robbery with homicide and sentenced to death. The conviction
of the accused was based on the testimony of a tricycle driver who claimed that the accused was the one
who drove the tricycle, which the suspects used as their get-away vehicle. The accused was then invited
by the police for questioning and he pointed to the location where he dropped off the suspects. When the
police arrived at the supposed hide-out, a shooting incident ensued, resulting to the death of some of the
suspects.
After the incident, the accused was taken back to the precint where his statement was taken on May 14,
1996. However, this was only subscribed on May 22, 1996 and the accused was made to execute a waiver
of detention in the presence of Ex-Judge Talavera. It was noted that the accused was handcuffed through
all this time upon orders of the fiscal and based on the authorities' belief that the accused might attempt to
escape otherwise.

ISSUES

(1) Whether the Miranda rights of the accused-appellant were violated.

(2) Whether the warrantless arrest of the accused-appellant was lawful.

HELD

(1) YES. It was established that the accused was not apprised of his rights to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel in the course of the investigation. The Court held that the
accused should always be apprised of his Miranda rights from the moment he is arrested by the
authorities as this is deemed the start of custodial investigation. In fact, the Court included
“invitations” by police officers in the scope of custodial investigations.

It is evident in this case that when the police invited the accused-appellant to the station, he was already
considered as the suspect in the case. Therefore, the questions asked of him were no longer general
inquiries into an unsolved crime, but were intended to elicit information about his participation in the crime.

However, the Miranda rights may be waived, provided that the waiver is voluntary, express, in writing and
made in the presence of counsel. Unfortunately, the prosecution failed to establish that the accused made
such a waiver.

(2) NO. There are certain situations when authorities may conduct a lawful warrantless arrest: (a) when
the accused is caught in flagrante delicto; (b) when the arrest is made immediately after the crime
was committed; and © when the one to be arrested is an escaped convict. The arrest of the accused
in this case did not fall in any of these exceptions. The arrest was not conducted immediately after
the consummation of the crime; rather, it was done a day after. The authorities also did not have
personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person to be arrested had committed the offense
because they were not there when the crime was committed. They merely relied on the account of
one eyewitness.

Unfortunately, athough the warrantless arrest was not lawful, this did not affect the jurisdiction of the Court
in this case because the accused still submitted to arraignment despite the illegality of his arrest. In effect,
he waived his right to contest the legality of the warrantless arrest.

PEOPLE vs. BANDIAN G.R. No. 45186 September 30, 1936 Infanticide, Article 12 Exempting
Circumstances
NOVEMBER 20, 2017
FACTS:

At About 7 in the morning of January 31, 1936, Valentine Aguilar, the apellant’s neighbor, saw
the appellant go to the thicket about four or five brazas from her house, apparently to respond
to a call of nature because it was there that the people of the place used to go for that purpose.
A few minutes later, he then again saw her emerge from the thicket with her clothes stained with
blood both in front and back, stagerring and visibly showing signs of not being able to support
herself. He ran to her aid and having noted that she was very weak and dizzy, he supported and
helped her back to her house and placed her in her bed.

Aguilar asked what had happened to her. The appellant answered that she was very dizzy. Aguilar
called Adriano Comcom who lived nearby to be there and help. He asked Comcom to take
bamboo leaves to stop the hemhorrage of the appellant. Comcom had scarcely gone about five
brazas when he saw the body of newborn baby near a path adjoining the thicket where the
appellant had gone a few moments before. Comcom informed Aguilar of it and the latter told
him to bring the body to the appellant’s house. Upon being asked whether the baby was hers or
not, the appellant answered in the affirmative.

In the afternoon of the said day, Dr. Emilio Nepomuceno went to the appellant’s house and found
her still lying in bed still bleeding. In his opinion, the physician declared that the appellant gave
birth in her house, and afterwhich, she threw the child into the thicket to kill it for the purpose
of concealing her dishonor from her husband, because the child was not his but with another
man with whom she had previously has amorous relations. Nepomuceno testified that the
appellant admitted killing her child.

ISSUE:

What was the crime committed by appellant?

RULING:

The evidence certainly does not show that the appellant , in causing her child’s death in one way
or another, or in abandoning it in the thicket, did so willfully, consciously, or imprudently. She
had no cause to kill or abandon it, to expose it to death, because her affair with a former lover,
Kirol took place three years before the incident. The husband of the appellant testified at the trial
affirming the belief that the child was his.

Infanticide and abandonment of a minor, to be punishable must be committed willfully and

consciously, or at least it must be the result of a voluntary, conscious and free act or omission.
Even in cases where said crimes are committed through mere imprudence, the person who
commits them, under said circumstances, must be in the full enjoyment of his mental facilities,
or must be conscious of his acts, in order that he may be held liable.

The law exempts from criminal liability any person who acts under the circumstances in which
the appellant acted in this case, by giving birth to a child in the thicket and later abandoning it,
not because of imprudence or any other cause than that she was overcome by severe dizziness
and extreme debility, with no fault or intention on her part, she should not be blamed therefor
because it all happened by mere accident, from liability any person who so acts and behaves
under such circumstances (Art. 12, subsection 4, RPC).
Taking into account the foregoing facts and considerations, and granting that the appellant was
aware of her involuntary childbirth in the thicket and that she later failed to take her child
therefrom, having been so prevented by reason of causes entirely independent of her will, and it
appearing that under such circumstances said appellant has the fourth and seventh exempting
circumstances in her favor, is hereby acquitted of the crime of which she had bee accused and
convicted.
PEOPLE vs. DORIA G.R. No. 125299. January 22, 1999 Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs, Warrantless
Arrests, Search and Seizure, Plain View Doctrine
OCTOBER 26, 2017
FACTS:

Accused-appellants Florencio Doria and Violeta Gaddao were charged with violation of Section
4, in relation to Section 21 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.

Members of PNP Narcotics Command (Narcom), received information from two civilian
informants (CI) that one “Jun” who was later identified to be Florencio Doria was engaged in
illegal drug activities and decided to entrap and arrest “Jun” in a buy-bust operation.
During the buy-bust operation”Jun” took out from his bag an object wrapped in plastic and gave
it to PO3 Manlangit. PO3 Manlangit forthwith arrested “Jun” as SPO1 Badua rushed to help in the
arrest. They frisked “Jun” but did not find the marked bills on him. Upon inquiry, “Jun” revealed
that he left the money at the house of his associate named “Neneth” (Violeta Gaddao) “Jun” led
the police team to “Neneth’s” house.

The team found the door of “Neneth’s” house open and a woman inside. “Jun” identified the
woman as his associate. SPO1 Badua asked “Neneth” about the P1,600.00 as PO3 Manlangit
looked over “Neneth’s” house. Standing by the door, PO3 Manlangit noticed a carton box under
the dining table. He saw that one of the box’s flaps was open and inside the box was something
wrapped in plastic. The plastic wrapper and its contents appeared similar to the marijuana earlier
“sold” to him by “Jun.” His suspicion aroused, PO3 Manlangit entered “Neneth’s” house and took
hold of the box. He peeked inside the box and found that it contained 10 bricks of what appeared
to be dried marijuana leaves.

The prosecution story was denied by accused-appellants.

Gaddao testified that inside her house were her co-accused Doria and three (3) other persons.
They asked her about a box on top of the table. This was the first time she saw the box. The box
was closed and tied with a piece of green straw. The men opened the box and showed her its
contents. She said she did not know anything about the box and its contents.

She denied the charge against her and Doria and the allegation that marked bills were found in
her person.
The RTC convicted the accused-appellants.

ISSUES:

(1) the validity of the buy-bust operation in the apprehension of accused-appellant Doria;
(2) the validity of the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Gaddao, the search of her person
and house, and the admissibility of the pieces of evidence obtained therefrom.
RULING:

The warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Doria is not unlawful. Warrantless arrests are
allowed in three instances as provided by Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, to wit:

“Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without
a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

Under Section 5 (a), as above-quoted, a person may be arrested without a warrant if he “has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.” Appellant Doria was
caught in the act of committing an offense. When an accused is apprehended in flagrante delicto
as a result of a buy-bust operation, the police are not only authorized but duty-bound to arrest
him even without a warrant.

The warrantless arrest of appellant Gaddao, the search of her person and residence, and the
seizure of the box of marijuana and marked bills are different matters.

Our Constitution proscribes search and seizure without a judicial warrant and any evidence
obtained without such warrant is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The rule is,
however, not absolute. Search and seizure may be made without a warrant and the evidence
obtained therefrom may be admissible in the following instances:(1) search incident to a lawful
arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of customs laws; (4) seizure
of evidence in plain view; (5) when the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable
searches and seizures.

The prosecution admits that appellant Gaddao was arrested without a warrant of arrest and the
search and seizure of the box of marijuana and the marked bills were likewise made without a
search warrant. It is claimed, however, that the warrants were not necessary because the arrest
was made in “hot pursuit” and the search was an incident to her lawful arrest.
To be lawful, the warrantless arrest of appellant Gaddao must fall under any of the three (3)
instances enumerated in Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as
aforequoted.

Accused-appellant Gaddao was not caught red-handed during the buy-bust operation to give
ground for her arrest under Section 5 (a) of Rule 113. She was not committing any crime. Contrary
to the finding of the trial court, there was no occasion at all for appellant Gaddao to flee from
the policemen to justify her arrest in “hot pursuit.” In fact, she was going about her daily chores
when the policemen pounced on her.

Neither could the arrest of appellant Gaddao be justified under the second instance of Rule 113.
“Personal knowledge” of facts in arrests without warrant under Section 5 (b) of Rule 113 must be
based upon “probable cause” which means an “actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion.”
The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting
officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense,
is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to
create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore
must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers
making the arrest.

Accused-appellant Gaddao was arrested solely on the basis of the alleged identification made by
her co-accused. PO3 Manlangit, however, declared in his direct examination that appellant Doria
named his co-accused in response to his (PO3 Manlangit’s) query as to where the marked money
was. Appellant Doria did not point to appellant Gaddao as his associate in the drug business, but
as the person with whom he left the marked bills. This identification does not necessarily lead to
the conclusion that appellant Gaddao conspired with her co-accused in pushing drugs. Appellant
Doria may have left the money in her house,
with or without her knowledge, with or without any conspiracy. Save for accused-appellant
Doria’s word, the Narcom agents had no reasonable grounds to believe that she was engaged in
drug pushing. If there is no showing that the person who effected the warrantless arrest had, in
his own right, knowledge of facts implicating the person arrested to the perpetration of a criminal
offense, the arrest is legally objectionable.

2. Since the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Gaddao was illegal, it follows that the search
of her person and home and the subsequent seizure of the marked bills and marijuana cannot
be deemed legal as an incident to her arrest. This brings us to the question of whether the trial
court correctly found that the box of marijuana was in plain view, making its warrantless seizure
valid.

Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view
are subject to seizure even without a search warrant and may be introduced in evidence.

The “plain view” doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement
officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from
which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent;
(c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime,
contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an
initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can particularly view the area. In the
course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating
the accused. The object must be open to eye and hand and its discovery inadvertent.

It is clear that an object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed to sight. The difficulty
arises when the object is inside a closed container. Where the object seized was inside a closed
package, the object itself is not in plain view and therefore cannot be seized without a warrant.
However, if the package proclaims its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its
transparency, or if its contents are obvious to an observer, then the contents are in plain view
and may be seized. In other words, if the package is such that an experienced observer could
infer from its appearance that it contains the prohibited article, then the article is deemed in
plain view. It must be immediately apparent to the police that the items that they observe may
be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.

PO3 Manlangit and the police team were at appellant Gaddao’s house because they were led
there by appellant Doria. The Narcom agents testified that they had no information on appellant
Gaddao until appellant Doria named her and led them to her. Standing by the door of appellant
Gaddao’s house, PO3 Manlangit had a view of the interior of said house. Two and a half meters
away was the dining table and underneath it was a carton box. The box was partially open and
revealed something wrapped in plastic.

He did not know exactly what the box contained that he had to ask appellant Gaddao about its
contents. It was not immediately apparent to PO3 Manlangit that the content of the box was
marijuana. The marijuana was not in plain view and its seizure without the requisite search
warrant was in violation of the law and the Constitution. It was fruit of the poisonous tree and
should have been excluded and never considered by the trial court.

The fact that the box containing about six (6) kilos of marijuana was found in the house of
accused-appellant Gaddao does not justify a finding that she herself is guilty of the crime charged.

In every prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, what is material is the submission of
proof that the sale took place between the poseur-buyer and the seller thereof and the
presentation of the drug, i.e., the corpus delicti, as evidence in court.The prosecution has clearly
established the fact that in consideration of P1,600.00 which he received, accused-appellant
Doria sold and delivered nine hundred seventy (970) grams of marijuana to PO3 Manlangit, the
poseur-buyer. The prosecution, however, has failed to prove that accused-appellant Gaddao
conspired with accused-appellant Doria in the sale of said drug.

1. Accused-appellant Florencio Doria is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua

2. Accused-appellant Violeta Gaddao is acquitted.
Intestate Estate of Manolita Gonzales Vda. De Carungcong , G.R. No. 181409, February 11, 2011
October 12, 2016
by Rossville “Aeron” B. Violanta

Article 38 of Void and Voidable Marriages

Facts:

Mediatrix Carungcong, in her capacity as the duly appointed administratrix of petitioner intestate
estate of her deceased mother Manolita Gonzales vda. De Carungcong, filed a complaint-affidavit
for estafa against her brother-in-law, William Sato, a Japanese national. It was alleged that the
said accused feloniously induced Manolita Gonzales, the owner of the estate and herein
deceased, to sign and thumb mark a special power of attorney (in the pretense of presenting a
document pertaining to taxes) which authorized the sale, assignment, transfer and disposition of
the latter’s properties. In relation to this, the accused moved for the dismissal of the case.

As a defense against his arrant prosecution, the accused here applies Art 332 of the Revised Penal
Code. He cites that he falls under the enumeration of those relatives who shall be exempt from
criminal prosecution. Being a relative by affinity, he cannot be held liable for the crime of estafa
as stated in the law. He further counters that the same law makes no distinction that the
relationship may not be invoked in case of death of spouse at the time the crime was allegedly
committed. Thus, the death of his spouse Zenaida Carungcong Sato though dissolved the
marriage with the accused, did not on the other hand dissolve the mother in-law and son-law
relationship between Sato and his wife’s mother, Manolita. He then cannot be removed from the
protective mantle of Art 332.

Issues:

Whether or not the death of William’s wife and Manolita’s daughter, Zenaida, extinguished the
relationship by affinity between William and Manolita.
Whether or not William should be exempt from criminal liability for reason of his relationship to
Manolita.

Held:

No. Relationship by affinity between the surviving spouse and the kindred of the deceased spouse
continues even after the death of the deceased spouse, regardless of whether the marriage
produced children or not.
No. The absolutory cause under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code only applies to the felonies
of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. Under the said provision, the State condones the
criminal responsibility of the offender in cases of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. As an
act of grace, the State waives its right to prosecute the offender for the said crimes but leaves
the private offended party with the option to hold the offender civilly liable.
However, the coverage of Article 332 is strictly limited to the felonies mentioned therein. The
plain, categorical and unmistakable language of the provision shows that it applies exclusively to
the simple crimes of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. It does not apply where any of the
crimes mentioned under Article 332 is complexed with another crime, such as theft through
falsification or estafa through falsification.

Sato, the accused, could not avail of the beneficial application of ART 332 considering that the
crime he committed falls under the nature of a complex crime which is the crime estafa through
falsification of public document and does not anymore concern private relations of family
members. He then can be held criminally liable.

ULEP v. PEOPLE
BY MAROON 5 PARTNERS AND ASSOCIATES JUNE 1, 2012 ART. 11 BLOWING BRAINS OUT RPC
Facts:

-On Dec 22 1995, Buenaventura Wapili appeared to have gone crazy and kept on running without
any particular direction.

-SPO1 Ulep, together with Espadera and Pillo, arrived at the scene armed with M-16 rifles and
saw the naked Wapili approaching them.

-The police claimed that Wapili was armed with a bolo and a rattan stool, while Wapili’s relatives
and neighbours said he had no bolo, but only a rattan stool.

-SPO1 Ulep fired a warning shot in the air and told Wapili to put down his weapons ar they would
shoot him.

-When Wapili was only about 2-3 meters away from them, SPO1 Ulep shot the victim with his M-
16 rifle, hitting him in various parts of his body. As the victim slumped to the ground, SPO1 Ulep
came closer and pumped another bullet into his head and literally blew his brains out.

Issue: w/n accussed should be acquitted on the basis of his claim that the killing of the victim was
in the course of the performance of his official duty as a police officer, and in self-defense

Held: It cannot be said that the fatal wound in the head of the victim was a necessary
consequence of accused-appellant’s due performance of a duty or the lawful exercise of a right
or office.

The evidence does not favour his claim of self-defense.

Accused-appelant SPO1 ERNESTO ULEP is found guilty of Homicide, instead of murder.

RD:

-The accused must prove the presence of 2 requisites: (1) that he acted in the performance of a
duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or an office, and (2) the injury caused or the offense
committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of the duty or the lawful
exercise of such right or office.

There were two stages of the incident:

1. The victim threatened the safety of the police officers by menacingly advancing towards them.
Up to that point, his decision to respond with a barrage of gunfire to halt the victim’s further
advance was justified under the circumstances.

2.When he fatally shot the victim in the head, perhaps in his desire to take no chances, even after
the latter slumped to the ground due t multiple gunshot wounds sustained while charging at the
police officers. He cannot be exonerated from overdoing his duty.

-The aggression that was initially begun by the victim already ceased when accused-appellant
attacked him. From that moment, there was no longer any danger to his life.

-No treachery, thus the offense is only murder. Victim was given more than sufficient warning
before he was shot.

–Art. 69 of RPC is applicable. (tignan nyo na lang) :)

Incomplete justification is a special or privileged mitigating circumstance, which, not only cannot
be offset by aggravating circumstances but also reduces the penalty by one or two degrees than
that prescribed by law.

The instant case would have fallen under Art. 11, par 5 had the two conditions therefore
concurred.

Guillermo vs People
GR 153287
June 30, 2008
In re: Article 13, Par 1 and Article 69
Facts: Noel Guillermo, Arnaldo Socias, and Joemar Palma was charged for the killing of Winnie
Alon, of the 3, only Guillermo, was found guilty of Homicide with the special or privileged
mitigating circumstance of incomplete justification, and sentenced to 6 years of prision
correccional, as minimum, to 10 years of prision mayor, as maximum, with indemnity of P50,000.
Appellant contends that self-defense should have been appreciated.
ISSUE: WON self-defense should be appreciated.
HELD: Yes. Self-defense must be appreciated as Alon was about to attack Guillermo with a broken
bottle when Guillermo realized he had a knife. Guillermo had attacked Alon in self-defense, albeit
the reasonable necessity of the means employed to repel it was not found as he stabbed Alon 3
times. There was also a disproportionate difference between an actual blade and a broken beer
bottle. All this would lead to an incomplete self-defense, which is a mitigating circumstance only,
and not a justifying one. His sentence is modified accordingly.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE) VS. DOMINGO URAL (ACCUSED-APPELLANT)

L-30801 MARCH 27 1974
J. AQUINO
APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT OF THE CFI OF ZAMBOANGA DEL SUR

FACTS:
- Alberio went to the municipal building and saw Ural, a policeman inside the jail where he was
boxing prisoner Napola (who was imprisoned for being drunk). When Napola fell to the ground
he U kicked him and poured some liquid on N and then ignited N’s body.
- Dr. Luzonia Bakil who treated the victim, said that he sustained 2nd degree burns on the arms,
neck, left side of the face and one half of the body including the back. She also testified that
without any medical intervention, the burns would have caused death
- Napola died on Aug 25 1966. Death certificate indicated burn as the cause of death.
- During the trial, the prosecutors failed to present the detention prisoners who saw the burning
of Napola as witnesses as well as the wife of the deceased
- Nevertheless, Ural was convicted of murder, was sentenced to reclusion perpetua and was
ordered to pay for costs

ISSUE: Whether the evidence of the prosecution was sufficient to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
Held: TC did not err in convicting Ural for murder.
- Ural had his own version of the story. According to him he heard a scream for help from Napola
whose shirt was in flames when found by him, he removed the shirt, but did not summon the
doctor because he thought that the burns were not serious.
o SC: this statement cannot prevail over the testimony of Alberio
o This statement does not prove that he was not the one who burned Napola, at most this
could only mean that he was alarmed by the consequences of his evil act
- Ural assailed the credibility of Alberio as a witness, saying that he was not listed as a prosecution
witness and that he was convicted of murder in the past
o Wouldn’t preclude him from being a credible witness.
o Since there was no police investigation (accused a police officer), the investigation that
ensued was done by a special counsel of the fiscal’s office. A possible explanation of
alberio not being listed at first.
o The statements of the witnesses for the defense were not inconsistent with that of
Alberio’s.
 Therefore, there is no reason to not believe in Alberio’s testimony.
- The present case is covered by article 4 (par.1-result greater than what was intended).
o Aggravating circumstance: art 14(1).
o TC erred in not appreciating the Mitigating circumstance “that the offender had no
intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed”
 No intent to kill but only to maltreat the drunk napola who might have been
making a nuisance of himself
 He realized the fearful consequence of his felonious act, he allowed Napola to
secure medical treatment at the municipal dispensary
- Since the mitigating circumstance offset the aggravating circumstance, TC correctly imposed the
penalty of reclusion perpetua which is the medium period of the penalty for murder.

DECISION: TC decision AFFIRMED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. INOCENCIO GONZALEZ, JR.

G.R. No. 139542 June 21, 2001

FACTS: After their vehicles almost collided with each other, Andres and Appellant had an altercation. Thereafter,
Andres went back inside to his car when he was blocked by the appellant’s son who said, "Anong problema mo sa
erpat ko." Andres testified that he felt threatened and so he immediately boarded his vehicle, sat at the driver’s
seat, closed the door, and partially opened the car window just wide enough to talk back to appellant’s son, Dino. In
the meantime, appellant, thinking that Andres was going to get something from his car, took a gun. However, he
was pushed by his daughter-in-law which made him lost his balance and accidentally fired the gun hitting Andres’
wife, and two sons.Appellant was charged and convicted of Murder, Double Frustrated Murder and Attempted
Murder in the RTC.
The appellant seeks a reversal and prays that judgment be rendered exempting him from criminal and civil liabilities
contending that he had no intention to shoot Noel Andres much less his wife nor the children. He lost his balance
when his daughter Trisha approached and pushed him backwards to stop him from joining Dino and Noel Andres
but the appellant tried to free his right hand holding the gun and it accidentally fired.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was treachery attendant in the crime.

RULING: No. Treachery under par.16 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code is defined as the deliberate employment
of means, methods or forms in the execution of a crime against persons which tend directly and specially to insure
its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the intended victim might raise. For
treachery to be appreciated two elements must concur: 1) the employment of means of execution that would insure
the safety of the accused from retaliatory acts of the intended victim and leaving the latter without an opportunity
to defend himself and 2) the means employed were deliberately or consciously adopted by the offender. 8
We affirm the recommendation of the Solicitor-General that the shooting was not attended by treachery and
accordingly the crime committed for the death of Feliber Andres is homicide and not murder.

FILOMENO URBANO vs. CA (G.R. No. 72964 January 7, 1988)

SEPTEMBER 9, 2016 / RUSSELL JAY
Subject: Criminal Law- Proximate Cause

Ponente: Justice Hugo Guitierrez, Jr.

Doctrine: Proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately
or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events,
each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain
immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted,
under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily
prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or
default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.

FACTS: Marcelino Javier opened the irrigation of a canal by means of cutting grass which caused
the flooding of the storage area of the petitioner. Petitioner got angry and demanded Javier to
pay for the soaked palay. Javier refused and a quarrel between them ensued. Urbano unsheathed
his bolo and hacked Javier hitting him on the right hand and left leg. Javier went to the hospital
for the treatment of the wounds. Two weeks after, Javier returned to his farm and tended to his
tobacco plants.

Then, on a fateful day of November 14, Javier was rushed to the hospital. Doctors findings
showed that he was suffering from tetanus infection. The next day, Javier died.

RTC and CA found the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide. Petitioner raised
the case to the SC arguing that the cause of the death of Javier was due to his own negligence.

ISSUE: WON Urbano’s action was the proximate cause of the death of Javier.

RULING: NO. Pursuant to this provision “an accused is criminally responsible for acts committed
by him in violation of law and for all the natural and logical consequences resulting therefrom.
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of
the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused

The petitioner reiterates his position that the proximate cause of the death of Marcelo Javier was
due to his own negligence, that Dr. Mario Meneses found no tetanus in the injury, and that Javier
got infected with tetanus when after two weeks he returned to his farm and tended his tobacco
plants with his bare hands exposing the wound to harmful elements like tetanus germs.

Consequently, Javier’s wound could have been infected with tetanus after the hacking incident.
Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier’s death, his wound could have been infected by
tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died. The medical findings, however, lead
us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening
cause later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The infection was,
therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime.
And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the instances
which result in injury because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or condition
is the proximate cause.

CA’s decision was SET ASIDE and petioner is ACQUITED of the crime of homicide.

People vs. Pagal

GR No. L-32040, October 25, 1977 EN BANC
Ponente: Conception, Jr., J.
Topic: Sufficient provocation or threat

FACTS:

Pedro Pagal and Jose Torcelino were charged with the crime of robbery with homicide,
with 4 generic aggravating circumstances. They stole the amount of P1,281.00 and killed Gaugan,
their then employer, by stabbing him with an ice pick and clubbing him with an iron pipe.
During the arraignment, the counsel for the accused informed the court of their
intention to plead guilty, provided that they be allowed afterwards to prove the mitigating
circumstances of sufficient provocation on the part of the victim immediately preceding the act,
and that of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as to produce passion and obfuscation.
The judge asked if that is truly what the accused wanted to do, and the accused agreed.
The accused were arraigned and both pleaded guilty. The accused were then allowed to
present their evidence, which were claims of maltreatment/ill-treatment by the deceased. After
they rested their case, the prosecution presented the statements of the accused and other
pertinent documents. After considering the aggravating circumstances, and accepting only the
mitigating circumstance of pleading guilty, the court rendered its decision finding both accused
GUILTY, and sentenced to death. The case was elevated to the SC for mandatory review on
account of the death penalty imposed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in not appreciating the mitigating circumstances of
sufficient provocation, and passion or obfuscation as claimed via evidence by the accused.

HELD: No. The trial court found the appellant’s contention devoid of merit.
First, mitigating circumstances presented can only be counted as one, because they arose from
the same incident. Second, the circumstance of passion and obfuscation cannot be mitigating in
a crime which is planned and calmly meditated before its execution. Third, The maltreatment
that appellants claim the victim to have committed against them occurred much earlier than the
date of the commission of the crime. Provocation, in order to be a mitigating circumstance
must be sufficient and immediately preceding the act.
[When the accused pleaded guilty to the charge, he is deemed to have admitted all the material
facts alleged in the information. A plea of guilty when formally entered on arraignment, is
sufficient to sustain a conviction even for a capital offense without the introduction of further
evidence. ] (optional, not necessary to the topic, just an FYI)
After reviewing the case, the court held that there was only one generic aggravating
circumstance, instead of four, and this was then offset by the only accepted mitigating
circumstance of the guilty plea. Through this, the appellants were each imposed upon with the
lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua.
 RICARDO BACABAC v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES 532 SCRA 557
(2007)

Bacabac’s failure to assist the victims after the shooting reinforces this Court’s
appreciation of community of design between him and his co-accused to harm the victims.
Following a heated argument in a dance hall which resulted in a brawl, Jose Talanquines,
Jr. (Jose), and Edzel Talanquines (Edzel), herein referred to as Talanquines brothers,
proceeded to confront their enemies armed with guns. They were accompanied by
Jonathan Bacabac, Pat. Ricardo Bacabac, and Jesus Delfin (Jesus). In the dance hall, they
encountered Hernani Quidato and Eduardo Selibio. After a physical confrontation, The
Talanquines brothers shot Quidato and Selibio. Quidato and Selibio later died from their
wounds. The Talanquines brothers, together with Jonathan Bacabac, Pat. Ricardo
Bacabac, and Jesus Delfin was charged and found guilty of the crime of Murder. Ricardo
Bacabac (Bacabac) appealed his conviction, contending that he cannot be deemed to be
in conspiracy with the other accused because he was not the one who pulled the trigger.
He also alleged that even if he was convicted of Murder, in gratis argumenti, the
correctness of the pronouncement of guilt should have been attended by the mitigating
circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave offense, in the same manner as the other
accused.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is conspiracy among Jonathan Bacabac, Pat. Ricardo Bacabac, and
Jesus Delfin in the murder of the victims.

HELD:

Bacabac‘s failure to assist the victims after the shooting reinforces this Court’s
appreciation of community of design between him and his co-accused to harm the victims.
What is decisive in treachery is that “the attack was executed in such a manner as to make
it impossible for the victim to retaliate.” In the case at bar, petitioner, a policeman, and
his co-accused were armed with two M-16 armalites and a revolver. The victim and his
companions were not armed. The attack was sudden and unexpected, and the victim was
already kneeling in surrender when he was shot the second time. Clearly, the victim and
his companion Eduardo had no chance to defend themselves or retaliate. Conspiracy
presupposes the existence of evident premeditation does not necessarily imply that
the converse ─ that evident premeditation presupposes the existence of a conspiracy ─ is
true. In any event, a link between conspiracy and evident premeditation is presumed only
where the conspiracy is directly established and not where conspiracy is only implied, as
in the present case.

US v. HICKS
September 23, 1909 | Torres, J.
Passion & obfuscation – Arising from sentiments

DOCTRINE: The only causes which mitigate the criminal responsibility for the loss of self-control are such which
originate from legitimate feelings, not those which arise from vicious, unworthy, and immoral passions.
CASE SUMMARY: Hicks visited the house of Sola, who was his former mistress. When he was talking to Sola’s new
lover, Current, Hick drew his revolver and shot Sola in the chest, which caused his death. The trial court convicted him of
muder with a penalty of death. SC upheld the decision, because of the presence of treachery and other aggravating
circumstances of premeditation and the fact the crime was committed in the dwelling place of the deceased. The mitigating
circumstance of loss of reason and self-control was also not afforded to the accused.

FACTS:
 For 5 years, Augustus Hicks, an Afro-American, and his mistress Agustina Sola, a Christian Moro woman, were
illicitly living together. However, Sola quitted living with Hicks.
 A few days later, she contracted a new relationship with Corporal Wallace Current, another negro, who then
went to live with her in the house of her brother-in-law.
 One evening, Hicks, with soldier Lloyd Nickens, went to the said house. He shooked hands and started
conversing with Current. But, Current told Hicks that Sola did not want to live with Hicks anymore, which
promted Hicks to pull out his revolver and fired at Sola who was close by in the sala. The bullet hit the left side
of her breast.
 Hicks gave himself up to the police even before the police received the information of the killing.
 He pleaded not guilty. His defense was that when he fell backward when Current seized him, his revolver wen
off hitting the deceased. The trial court convicted him with the crime of murder with the penalty of death.

ISSUE: WON Hicks can avail of himself of the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation when he killed Sola,
his former mistress? NO

RULING:
 The only causes which mitigate the criminal responsibility for the loss of self-control are such which originate
from legitimate feelings, not those which arise from vicious, unworthy, and immoral passions.
 Likewise, the crime was committed with the presence of treachery (alevosia), as Sola was unexpectedly fired at
close range while she was unarmed and unprepared at a time she was just listening to a conversation.
 The presence of other aggravating circumstances, such as premeditation and the fact that the crime was
committed in the dwelling of the deceased. Premeditation was proven when Hicks asked a leave to be
absent from work and that he was carrying a loaded revolver when he had lunch that day. It was also testified
that Hicks was heard that the time of Sola had come.

DISPOSITION: The decision of the trial court is affirmed.

NOTES:
This should be compared with People v. Dela Cruz, wherein the accused killed his querida when he saw her sleeping with
his acquaintance. In the latter case, the SC held that there was the mitigating circumstance of passion of obfuscation. While
in this case, the SC did not grant the same mitigating circumstance.

Once you go black, you’ll never go black. :)))

 1. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EDUARDO GELAVER,
G.R. No. 95357 June 9, 1993
Facts:
The prosecution presented Randy Mamon, who testified that at 7:00 a.m. of March 24,
1988, he heard shouts coming from the house of Tessie Lampedario in Barangay Poblacion,
Municipality of Sto. Niño, South Cotabato. He saw the appellant and a woman having a heated
argument. Thereafter, appellant held the neck of the victim, dragged her and with a knife on his
right hand, stabbed the latter three times on the breast. Appellant then went out of the gate and fled
in the direction of the public market of Sto Niño. (TSN, June 27, 1988, pp. 7-10)
Appellant Eduardo Gelaver admitted killing his wife but claimed that he did so after catching her
having carnal act with her paramour. Appellants version of the killing was that when his wife saw
him, she pushed her paramour aside. Her paramour immediately stood up, took a knife placed on
top of the bedside table and attacked appellant. The latter was able to wrest possession of the knife
and then used it against the paramour, who evaded the thrusts of the appellant by hiding behind
the victim. Thus, it was the victim who received the stab intended for the paramour.
As to why he continued to stab his wife, appellant said that his mind had been "dimmed" or
overpowered by passion and obfuscation by the sight of his wife having carnal act with her
paramour.

Issue: is the accused guilty of the crime parricide?

Held:
Yes. Appellant's claim that on the day prior to his killing of the victim, his daughter Sheryl
had confided to him that her mother was living with a paramour at the house in front of the Sto.
Niño Catholic Church was belied by Sheryl herself. In her testimony, she stated that she did not
know the house where the crime was committed and she had not gone to that place. She further
testified that she had not seen her mother in any other house except that of her grandfather's. (TSN,
January 17, 1989, p. 5)
If there was a naked man with the victim, he would have had no time to get dressed because he
was then under attack by appellant. There would then have been the spectacle of a man in the nude
running in the streets.

CASE DIGEST: People v. Bello

Posted on October 14, 2012 by Intentional Lacunae
G.R. No. L-18792 February 28, 1964

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. GUILLERMO BELLO, Defendant-

Appellant.

Facts:

Guillermo and Alicia lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage.
Guillermo was a 54 year old widower, and Alicia’s senior by 30 years. Prior to Alicia’s employment
at Maring’s Place, the couple led a ‘blissful’ life. Due to poverty, Alicia became an
entertainer/public hostess at the said bar, and Guillermo used to watch her there everyday; very
much smitten by her beauty[1].

However, on May 16, Guillermo saw Alicia enter the Gumaca theater with a man, and surprised
the man caressing her inside the movie house. Guillermo dragged her outside.

Two weeks later, Guillermo visited Maring’s Place to ask Alicia for money, but the owner, Maring
(who was fantastically creative enough to name the bar after him), told him to go home and to
leave Alicia alone because he was an old invalid. He proceeded to walk home empty handed, but
upon passing Bonifacio Street, he came across the Marasigan brothers who mocked him with the
above stated remark. The self-loathing Guillermo proceeded to Paty’s place and downed give
glasses of Tuba.

By nighttime of the same day, Guillermo returned to Maring’s Place and did then and there stab
Alicia several times. Realizing what he had done, he ran to Gumarca and surrendered to the police
there. He was found guilty by the Court of First Instance of Quezon City of murder attended by
the aggravating circumstances of nighttime, alevosia, and abuse of confidence and
ungratefulness; The penalty for which is death; thus the automatic review of the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the victim should be given the benefit of the mitigating circumstance of passion
or obfuscation, albeit his relationship with the victim being merely a common-law marriage?

HELD:

Yes. By stare decisis, passion or obfuscation on the part of the offender must arise from legitimate
and moral sentiments. Since common-law marriages are considered unlawful in the Philippines,
Obfuscation, when relationship is illegitimate, cannot be appreciated as a mitigating
circumstance.

To answer this question, we must first differentiate the circumstances of this case with that of
U.S. v Hicks. In the said case, the common-law wife of Mr. Hicks terminated her relations with
the American, and contracted new relations with a certain corporal. Mr. Hicks shot his ex-
common-law-wife when she refused to go home with him and resume their relationship. Since
they were not married, she was entitled to do so. What she did – cruel as it may be – was legal
in the eyes of law. Passion and obfuscation were not appreciated in such a case, since:

The common-law wife had a right to leave her common-law husband, as they were not united in
holy matrimony. He had no right to compel her to go with him. Remember that the first
requirement of passion or obfuscation is that there be an unlawful act, sufficient to produce
diminution of self-control or the exercise of will power.

Returning now to the case at hand, what Guillermo was asking from Alicia was that she (1) quit
her job as a hostess; an ill-reputed profession corroborated by her promiscuous relations with
other men, and (2) resume her job as a hostess.

The Supreme Court held that Alicia’s flat out refusal was an exhibition of immorality itself. A
monogamous illegitimate relationship is definitely of higher standing than illicit relationship for
the sake of gain – or gainful promiscuity as the court put it.

This, coupled with the cruel words against him were enough to constitute passion and
obfuscation in the old soul. Thus, he is entitled to a mitigating circumstance.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.WILLIE AMAGUIN, GILDO
AMAGUIN AND CELSO AMAGUIN, accused.

January 10, 1994

(Accused) brothers Willie, Gildo and Celso, all surnamed Amaguin, being charged with
the murder of the Oro brothers Pacifico and Diosdado.

Facts: On their way to the plaza, Pacifico (deceased) was called by accused Celso Amaguin. After
the refusal of the deceased, the accused, Celso, with a butcher's knife in hand, rushed towards
Pacifico. Gildo, Celso's younger brother, followed with a knife and slingshot.

Celso hacked Pacifico. Gildo then stabbed Diosdado with a knife. Thereafter, Willie, the
eldest of the Amaguin brothers, appeared with a handgun and successively shot the brothers
Pacifico, Diosdado and the fleeing Danilo.

Diosdado, own kneeling, gasping for breath and pleading for his life, was again shot by
Willie who next fired anew at Pacifico. Meanwhile, Gildo and Celso repeatedly stabbed Pacifico
who already lying prostrate and defenseless.

*Other survivors also gave their respective versions.

The defense however maintains that it was the Oro brothers who started the fight. Accused
Gildo Amaguin recounted that Pacifico with five others went to their house and approached his
brother Celso and there deceased together with his companions initiated a fight.

Nenita Amaguin, mother of the accused brothers, affirmed that her son Celso was indeed
troublesome, but added that Willie had no prior violations against the law.

After a joint trial, and finding the version of the prosecution to be more credible, the CIF
of Iloilo found Gildo Amaguin, guilty of murder and Willie Amaguin as accomplice.

Issue: Whether or not the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender be appreciated in favor
of the accused?

Ruling: Yes. While it may have taken both Willie and Gildo a week before turning themselves in,
the fact is, they voluntarily surrendered to the police authorities before arrest could be effected.
For voluntary surrender to be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance, the following elements
must be present: (a) the offender has not been actually arrested; (b) the offender surrendered
himself to a person in authority; and (c) the surrender must be voluntary. All these requisites appear
to have attended their surrender.
People of the Philippines vs. Edgar Legaspi y Libao [G.R. Nos. 136164-65 April 20, 2001]

PONENTE: Melo, J.:

SUBJECT:

Evidence:
i. Credibility
ii. Alibi
Criminal Law:
i. Rape – Absence of spermatozoa
II. Exempting Circumstance – Insanity
“Among poor couples with big families living in small quarters, copulation does not seem to be a
problem despite the presence of other persons around them.”

FACTS: On February 17, 1997, Edgar Legaspi was charged with the crimes of rape and robbery
in two separate Informations filed with the Regional Trial Court.

REPORT THIS AD

At around 2:00 in the morning of February 11, 1997, Honorata was sleeping inside her house with
her three daughters. She was awakened by the sound of their door opening. She thought it was
her husband. When Honorata opened her eyes, however, she saw a man armed with a knife
standing by her feet. More terrifying, the man already had his pants and briefs down on his knees
and he was pointing to her eldest daughter.

Alarmed, Honorata told the man not to touch her daughter. The man poked his knife at her and
told her to stand up and then was made to lie down on the adjacent sofa. Thereafter, the man
removed Honorata’s panties and had sex with her. All this time, he had his knife at Honorata’s
neck. Honorata noticed that the man reeked of alcohol. After slaking his lust, Honorata’s assailant
stood up then asked for money. Since the man still had his knife pointed at her, Honorata could
do nothing but comply. She gave him the only money she had, several bills amounting to P500.00.

After threatening Honorata and her daughters with death if she reports the incident, the man
left. Honorata, out of fear, could do nothing but close the door. Later that day, however,
Honorata mustered enough courage to narrate her defilement to her sister-in-law.

The trial court found Legaspi guilty of rape and imposed upon him the supreme penalty of death.

The supreme penalty of death having been imposed for the rape, the case was elevated to the
Supreme Court on automatic review.

Legaspi prays for his acquittal, raising the following arguments:

The facial features of Legaspi differ from the description of Honorata’s assailant as found in the
police blotter.
If Honorata were indeed raped on the sofa of her one-room house, the creaking of the sofa and
her moans would have awakened her three sleeping daughters. Strangely, this did not happen.
There is absence of spermatozoa in Honorata’s organ.
Legaspi also avowed that he had been previously convicted of homicide and Roberto Eugenio,
the victim therein, was a resident of the exact same address where complainant Honorata was
living. Legaspi hinted at the possibility that relatives of Roberto Eugenio had conspired with
complainant Honorata to get rid of him.
He was asleep at his house at #86 Manapat Street, Tañong, Malabon at the time of the incident.
Legaspi claims that he is entitled to the exempting circumstance of insanity. To prove his insanity,
Legaspi’s counsel points to his confinement at the National Center for Mental Health prior to the
incident in question.

REPORT THIS AD

ISSUE: Whether the defenses raised by Legaspi are meritorious.

RULING:

A) That the facial features of Legaspi differ from the description of Honorata’s assailant as found
in the police blotter do not affect the credibility of Honorata’s testimony. It must be kept in mind
that Honorata positively identified Legaspi as her rapist, not only during the investigation
conducted by the police on the morning of January 15, but also during the trial.

During the trial Honorata identified Legaspi as the person who sexually violated her. She testified
that she was able to recognize Legaspi because the fluorescent lamp inside her house was lit at
the time of the incident.

Coupled with the oft-quoted doctrine that entries in police blotters, though regularly done in the
course of the performance of official duty, are not conclusive proof of the truth stated in such
entries since they are usually incomplete and inaccurate, we hold that any discrepancy in the
police blotter entry and the open court testimony of Honorata does not affect her credibility.

It must also be remembered that the entry in the police blotter was made at 6:30 on the morning
of February 12, 1997, only a few hours after the rape and robbery. At that time, Honorata may
not have yet fully recovered from the traumatic ordeal she had gone through, resulting in an
inaccurate entry in the police blotter. Besides, minor lapses are to be expected when a person is
recounting details of a traumatic experience too painful to recall (People vs. Sta. Ana, 291 SCRA
188 [1998]).

REPORT THIS AD

B) That Honorata’s daughters, all minors, did not wake up during the assault is not as incredible
as Legaspi would make it out. The failure of the three children to wake up during the commission
of the rape was probably due to the fact that they were sound asleep. It is not unusual for children
of tender ages to be moved from their sleeping mats and transferred to another bed without
eliciting the least protest from them, much less, awakening them. It is also to be noted that
among poor couples with big families living in small quarters, copulation does not seem to be a
problem despite the presence of other persons around them. One may also suppose that growing
children sleep more soundly than grown-ups and are not easily awakened by adult exertions and
suspirations in the night (People vs. Ignacio, 233 SCRA 1 [1994]).

C) The presence or absence of spermatozoa is immaterial in the prosecution of a rape case. It is

well-settled that it is penetration, however slight, and not ejaculation, that constitutes rape

D) Legaspi has not presented proof that Honorata knew Roberto Eugenio or his relatives. Neither
has he shown that any relative of Eugenio still resides at Honorata’s address, 27-D Rivera Street.
Moreover, mere residence at the same address is not proof that Honorata conspired with the
relatives of Roberto Eugenio in an attempt to get rid of Legaspi. False testimony or incriminatory
machinations must be proved by evidence more substantial than a voter’s registration record.

E) Legaspi’s defense of alibi must, however, be looked upon with suspicion, not only because it
is inherently weak and unreliable, but also because it can be easily fabricated and concocted. For
alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was at some other place at the time of
the commission of the crime, but also that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus
delicti or within its immediate vicinity.

REPORT THIS AD

In the case at bar, Legaspi has failed to meet both requisites. Aside from his testimony that he
was asleep at the time of the incident, no other witness came forward to corroborate his version.
Moreover, Manapat Street is only two streets away from Rodriguez Street, the scene of the
crime. Legaspi even admitted during the trial that this was only a five-minute walk from his
residence. Counterbalanced against Honorata’s conduct immediately after the incident and her
positive identification of Legaspi as her assailant, Legaspi’s defense of alibi is unavailing.

F) For insanity to be considered, Paragraph 1, Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code requires a
complete deprivation of rationality in committing the act, i.e., that the accused be deprived of
reason, that there be no consciousness of responsibility for his acts, or that there be complete
absence of the power to discern. The defense of insanity or imbecility must be clearly proved,
however, for there is a presumption that acts penalized by law are voluntary.

To prove his insanity, Legaspi’s counsel points to his confinement at the National Center for
Mental Health prior to the incident in question. Likewise, his counsel claims that when Honorata
saw Legaspi, the latter’s pants and briefs were already down on his knees. He takes this to be an
indicium of insanity.

Mere prior confinement does not prove that Legaspi was deprived of reason at the time of the
incident. Firstly, Legaspi did not submit proof that he was adjudged insane by the National Center
for Mental Health, only that he had been confined therein. Note also that Legaspi had already
been discharged from the Center prior to the incident. Even if Legaspi were adjudged insane prior
to the incident, his discharge implies that he was already considered well. In fact, the psychiatric
evaluation report of Legaspi states that his disorder “runs a chronic course with periods of
exacerbations and remissions.” If the insanity is only occasional or intermittent in nature, the
presumption of its continuance does not arise. He who relies on such insanity proved at another
time must prove its existence also at the time of the commission of the offense (People vs.
Bonoan, 64 Phil. 87). This, Legaspi has failed to do.

REPORT THIS AD

Neither does having one’s pants and briefs on one’s knees indicate deprivation of reason. If
anything else, it shows the lechery and depravity of Legaspi. Mental depravity which results not
from any disease of the mind, but from a perverted condition of the moral system, where the
person is mentally sane, does not exempt one from responsibility for crimes committed under its
influence (People vs. Medina, supra). The Court cannot, therefore, appreciate the defense of
insanity brought by Legaspi.
————————————————-

THINGS DECIDED:

A) Entries in police blotters, though regularly done in the course of the performance of official
duty, are not conclusive proof of the truth stated in such entries since they are usually incomplete
and inaccurate.

B) The presence or absence of spermatozoa is immaterial in the prosecution of a rape case. It

is well-settled that it is penetration, however slight, and not ejaculation, that constitutes rape

C) False testimony or incriminatory machinations must be proved by evidence more substantial

than a voter’s registration record.

D) For alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was at some other place at
the time of the commission of the crime, but also that it was physically impossible for him to be
at the locus delicti or within its immediate vicinity.

E) For insanity to be considered, Paragraph 1, Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code requires a
complete deprivation of rationality in committing the act, i.e., that the accused be deprived of
reason, that there be no consciousness of responsibility for his acts, or that there be complete
absence of the power to discern.