416 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Gatbonton vs. National Labor Relations Commission
*
G.R. No. 146779. January 23, 2006.
RENATO S. GATBONTON, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, MAPUA
INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY and JOSE CALDERON,
respondents.
Labor Law; Preventive Suspension; Employer may place the
worker concerned under preventive suspension if his continued
employment poses a serious and imminent threat to the life or
property of the employer or of his co-workers; When it is determined
that there is no sufficient basis to justify an employeeÊs preventive
suspension, the latter is entitled to the payment of salaries during
the time of preventive suspension.·Preventive suspension is a
disciplinary measure for the protection of the companyÊs property
pending investigation of any alleged malfeasance or misfeasance
committed by the employee. The employer may place the worker
concerned under preventive suspension if his continued
employment poses a serious and imminent threat to the life or
property of the employer or of his co-workers. However, when it is
determined that there is no sufficient basis to justify an employeeÊs
preventive suspension, the latter is entitled to the payment of
salaries during the time of preventive suspension.
Same; Same; PetitionerÊs preventive suspension was based on
respondent Mapua Institute of TechnologyÊs (MITÊs) Rules and
Regulations for the Implementation of the Anti-Sexual Harassment
Act of 1995 or R.A. No. 7877.·R.A. No. 7877 imposed the duty on
educational or training institutions to „promulgate rules and
regulations in consultation with and jointly approved by the
employees or students or trainees, through their duly designated
representatives, prescribing the procedures for the investigation of
sexual harassment cases and the administrative sanctions
therefor.‰ PetitionerÊs preventive suspension was based on
respondent MITÊs Rules and Regulations for the Implementation of
the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995, or R.A. No. 7877.
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
417
VOL. 479, JANUARY 23, 2006 417
Gatbonton vs. National Labor Relations Commission
Same; Same; Administrative rules and regulations must also be
published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law
pursuant also to a valid delegation.·It must be noted however, that
respondent published said rules and regulations only on February
23, 1999. In Tañada vs. Tuvera, it was ruled that: . . . all statutes,
including those of local application and private laws, shall be
published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin
fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity is fixed by
the legislature. Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and
executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of
legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the
legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution.
Administrative rules and regulations must also be published
if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law
pursuant also to a valid delegation.
Same; Same; At the time of the imposition of petitionerÊs
preventive suspension on January 11, 1999, the Mapua Rules were
not yet legally effective, and therefore the suspension had no legal
basis.·The Mapua Rules is one of those issuances that should be
published for its effectivity, since its purpose is to enforce and
implement R.A. No. 7877, which is a law of general application. In
fact, the Mapua Rules itself explicitly required publication of the
rules for its effectivity, as provided in Section 3, Rule IV
(Administrative Provisions), which states that „[T]hese Rules and
Regulations to implement the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995
shall take effect fifteen (15) days after publication by the Committee.‰
Thus, at the time of the imposition of petitionerÊs preventive
suspension on January 11, 1999, the Mapua Rules were not yet
legally effective, and therefore the suspension had no legal basis.
Same; Same; Even assuming that the Mapua Rules are
applicable, the Court finds that there is no sufficient basis to justify
his preventive suspension.·Even assuming that the Mapua Rules
are applicable, the Court finds that there is no sufficient basis to
justify his preventive suspension. Under the Mapua Rules, an
accused may be placed under preventive suspension during
pendency of the hearing under any of the following circumstances:
(a) if the evidence of his guilt is strong and the school head is
morally convinced that the continued stay of the accused during the
period of investigation constitutes a distraction to the normal
operations of the institution;
418
418 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Gatbonton vs. National Labor Relations Commission
or (b) the accused poses a risk or danger to the life or property of the
other members of the educational community. In petitionerÊs case,
there is no indication that petitionerÊs preventive suspension may
be based on the foregoing circumstances.
Same; Same; Even under the Labor Code, petitionerÊs preventive
suspension finds no valid justification.·Even under the Labor
Code, petitionerÊs preventive suspension finds no valid justification.
As provided in Section 8, Rule XXIII, Book V of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code: Sec. 8. Preventive Suspension. The
employer may place the worker concerned under preventive
suspension if his continued employment poses a serious threat to
the life or property of the employer or of his co-workers. As
previously stated, there is nothing on record which shows that
respondent MIT imposed the preventive suspension on petitioner as
his continued employment poses a serious threat to the life or
property of the employer or of his co-workers; therefore, his
preventive suspension is not justified. Consequently, the payment of
wages during his 30-day preventive suspension, i.e., from January
11, 1999 to February 10, 1999, is in order.
Same; Same; While petitionerÊs preventive suspension may have
been unjustified, this does not automatically mean that he is entitled
to moral or other damages.·With regard to petitionerÊs claim for
damages, the Court finds the same to be without basis. While
petitionerÊs preventive suspension may have been unjustified, this
does not automatically mean that he is entitled to moral or other
damages. x x x x x x The records of this case are bereft of any
evidence showing that respondent MIT acted in bad faith or in a
wanton or fraudulent manner in preventively suspending
petitioner, thus, the Labor Arbiter was correct in not awarding any
damages in favor of petitioner.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Samson S. Alcantara for petitioner.
Anna Maria D. Abad for respondents.
419
VOL. 479, JANUARY 23, 2006 419
Gatbonton vs. National Labor Relations Commission
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 1of the Rules of Court which seeks to set aside the
Decision dated November 10, 2000 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 57470, affirming the decision of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC); and the CA
Resolution dated2 January 16, 2001, denying the motion for
reconsideration.
Petitioner Renato S. Gatbonton is an associate professor
of respondent Mapua Institute of Technology (MIT),
Faculty of Civil Engineering. Some time in November 1998,
a civil engineering student of respondent MIT filed a letter-
complaint against petitioner for unfair/unjust grading
system, sexual harassment and conduct unbecoming of an
academician. Pending investigation of the complaint,
respondent MIT, through its Committee on Decorum and
Investigation placed petitioner under a 30-day preventive
suspension effective January 11, 1999. The committee
believed that petitionerÊs continued stay during the
investigation affects his performance as a faculty member,
as well as the studentsÊ learning; and that the suspension
will allow petitioner to „prepare himself for the
investigation and will prevent
3
his influences to other
members of the community.‰
Thus, petitioner filed with the NLRC a complaint
4
for
illegal suspension, damages and attorneyÊs fees, docketed
as NLRC-NCR Case No. 01-00388-99.
Petitioner questioned the validity of the administrative
proceedings with the Regional Trial Court of Manila in a
_______________
1 Penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr. and concurred in by
Associate Justices Buenaventura J. Guerrero (ret.) and Eliezer R. De los
Santos.
2 CA Rollo, pp. 223-224.
3 Rollo, p. 75.
4 Id., p. 49.
420
420 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Gatbonton vs. National Labor Relations Commission
petition for certiorari but the case was terminated on May
21, 1999 when the parties entered into a compromise
agreement wherein respondent MIT agreed to publish in
the school organ the rules and regulations implementing
Republic Act No. 7877 (R.A. No. 7877) or the Anti-Sexual
Harassment Act; disregard the previous administrative
proceedings and conduct anew an investigation on the
charges against petitioner. Petitioner agreed to recognize
the validity of the published rules and regulations, as well
as the authority of respondent to investigate,
5
hear and
decide the administrative case against him.
On June 18, 1999, the Labor Arbiter rendered a
decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
„Wherefore, premises considered, the thirty day preventive
suspension of complainant is hereby declared to be illegal.
Accordingly, respondents are directed to pay his wages during the
period of his preventive suspension.
The rest of complainantÊs claims are dismissed.
6
SO ORDERED.‰
Both respondents and petitioner filed their appeal from the
Labor ArbiterÊs Decision, with petitioner questioning the
dismissal of his claim for damages. In a Decision dated
September 30, 1999, the NLRC granted respondentsÊ
appeal and set aside the Labor ArbiterÊs decision. His
motion for reconsideration having been denied by the
NLRC on December 13, 1999, petitioner filed a special civil
action for certiorari with the CA.
On November 10, 2000, the CA promulgated the assailed
decision affirming the NLRC decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
_______________
5 Id., p. 159.
6 Id., p. 113.
421
VOL. 479, JANUARY 23, 2006 421
Gatbonton vs. National Labor Relations Commission
„WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the petition is
hereby DENIED DUE COURSE and ORDERED DISMISSED, and
the challenged decision and order of public respondent NLRC
AFFIRMED.
7
SO ORDERED.‰
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which the CA
denied in its Resolution dated January 16, 2001.
Hence, the present petition based on the following
grounds:
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING
THAT THE NLRC WAS NOT GUILTY OF GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN RENDERING BOTH THE APPEAL DECISION
AND THE NLRC RESOLUTION.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING
THE NLRCÊS DISMISSAL OF PETITIONERÊS CLAIM FOR
8
DAMAGES.
Petitioner finds fault in the CAÊs decision, arguing that his
preventive suspension does not find any justification in the
Mapua Rules and Regulations considering that at the time
of his preventive suspension on January 11, 1999, the rules
have not been promulgated yet as it was published only on
February 23, 1999. Petitioner 9
also contests the lack of
award of damages in his favor.
The petition is partly meritorious.
Preventive suspension is a disciplinary measure for the
protection of the companyÊs property pending investigation
of any alleged malfeasance or misfeasance committed by
the
_______________
7 CA Rollo, p. 202.
8 Rollo, pp. 17-18.
9 Id., pp. 18-21.
422
422 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Gatbonton vs. National Labor Relations Commission
employee. The employer may place the worker concerned
under preventive suspension if his continued employment
poses a serious and imminent threat 10to the life or property
of the employer or of his co-workers. However, when it is
determined that there is no sufficient basis to justify an
employeeÊs preventive suspension, the latter is entitled to
the payment 11
of salaries during the time of preventive
suspension.
R.A. No. 7877 imposed the duty on educational or
training institutions to „promulgate rules and regulations
in consultation with and jointly approved by the employees
or students or trainees, through their duly designated
representatives, prescribing the procedures for the
investigation of sexual harassment 12
cases and the
administrative sanctions therefor.‰ PetitionerÊs preventive
suspension was based on respondent MITÊs Rules and
Regulations for the Implementation of the Anti-Sexual
Harassment Act of 1995, or R.A. No. 7877. Rule II, Section
1 of the MIT Rules and Regulations provides:
„Section 1. Preventive Suspension of Accused in Sexual Harassment
Cases.·Any member of the educational community may be placed
immediately under preventive suspension during the pendency of
the hearing of the charges of grave sexual harassment against him
if the evidence of his guilt is strong and the school head is morally
convinced that the continued stay of the accused during the period
of investigation constitutes a distraction to the normal operations of
the institution or poses a risk or danger to the life or property of the
other members of the educational community.‰
_______________
10 Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. National Labor Relations Commission,
354 Phil. 37, 43; 292 SCRA 40, 44 (1998).
11 Valiao vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 146621, July 30, 2004, 435
SCRA 543, 554.
12 Section 4(a), R.A. No. 7877.
423
VOL. 479, JANUARY 23, 2006 423
Gatbonton vs. National Labor Relations Commission
It must be noted however, that respondent published said
rules and regulations
13
only on February 23, 1999. In
Tañada vs. Tuvera, it was ruled that:
„. . . all statutes, including those of local application and private
laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which
shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different
effectivity is fixed by the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive
orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative
powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature
or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution.
Administrative rules and regulations must also be published
if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law
pursuant also to a valid delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature,
that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency
and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication
required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by
administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be
followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.
...
We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no
publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the
contents of the laws.‰ (Emphasis supplied)
The Mapua Rules is one of those issuances that should be
published for its effectivity, since its purpose is to enforce
and implement
14
R.A. No. 7877, which is a law of general
application. In fact, the Mapua Rules itself explicitly
required publication of the rules for its effectivity, as
provided in Section 3,
_______________
13 G.R. No. L-63915, December 29, 1986, 230 Phil. 528, 535-536; 146
SCRA 446, 453-454 (1986).
14 Pilipinas Kao, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 105014, December
18, 2001, 423 Phil. 834, 860; 372 SCRA 548, 574 (2001); Philippine
International Trading Corp. vs. Angeles, G.R. No. 108461, October 21,
1996, 331 Phil. 723, 750-751; 263 SCRA 421, 447 (1996).
424
424 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Gatbonton vs. National Labor Relations Commission
Rule IV (Administrative Provisions), which states that
„[T]hese Rules and Regulations to implement the Anti-
Sexual Harassment Act of 1995 shall take effect fifteen (15)
days after publication by the Committee.‰ Thus, at the time
of the imposition of petitionerÊs preventive suspension on
January 11, 1999, the Mapua Rules were not yet legally
effective, and therefore the suspension had no legal basis.
Moreover, even assuming that the Mapua Rules are
applicable, the Court finds that there is no sufficient basis
to justify his preventive suspension. Under the Mapua
Rules, an accused may be placed under preventive
suspension during pendency of the hearing under any of
the following circumstances:
(a) if the evidence of his guilt is strong and the school
head is morally convinced that the continued stay of
the accused during the period of investigation
constitutes a distraction to the normal operations of
the institution; or
(b) the accused poses a risk or danger to the life or
property of the other members of the educational
community.
In petitionerÊs case, there is no indication that petitionerÊs
preventive suspension may be based on the foregoing
circumstances. Committee Resolution No. 1 (Re: Preventive
Suspension of Engr. Renato Gatbonton) passed by the
Committee on Decorum and Investigation states the
reasons for petitionerÊs preventive suspension, to wit:
„Whereas, the committee believe[s] that the continued stay of the
respondent during the period of investigation,
1. Affects the respondentÊs performance as a faculty member
and laboratory head considering the psychological effects
depression and/or emotional stress during investigation;
2. Affects the student[Ês] learning and other members of the
Mapua Institute of Technology community.
425
VOL. 479, JANUARY 23, 2006 425
Gatbonton vs. National Labor Relations Commission
Whereas, the committee believe[s] that this preventive
suspension will allow the respondent to prepare himself for the
investigation and will prevent his influences to other members of
15
the community.‰
Said resolution does not show that evidence of petitionerÊs
guilt is strong and that the school head is morally
convinced that petitionerÊs continued stay during the
period of investigation constitutes a distraction to the
normal operations of the institution; or that petitioner
poses a risk or danger to the life or property of the other
members of the educational community.
Even under the Labor Code, petitionerÊs preventive
suspension finds no valid justification. As provided in
Section 8, Rule XXIII, Book V of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code:
„Sec. 8. Preventive Suspension.·The employer may place the
worker concerned under preventive suspension if his continued
employment poses a serious threat to the life or property of the
employer or of his co-workers.‰
As previously stated, there is nothing on record which
shows that respondent MIT imposed the preventive
suspension on petitioner as his continued employment
poses a serious threat to the life or property of the
employer or of his coworkers;
16
therefore, his preventive
suspension is not justified. Consequently, the payment of
wages during his 30-day preventive suspension, i.e., from
January 11, 1999 to February 10, 1999, is in order.
With regard to petitionerÊs claim for damages, the Court
finds the same to be without basis. While petitionerÊs
preventive suspension may have been unjustified, this does
not automatically mean that he is entitled to moral or other
dam-
_______________
15 Rollo, pp. 74-75.
16 Supra, Valiao case.
426
426 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Gatbonton vs. National Labor Relations Commission
17
ages. In Cocoland Development Corp. vs. NLRC, the Court
ruled:
„In Primero vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, this Court held that „.
. . an award (of moral damages) cannot be justified solely upon the
premise (otherwise sufficient for redress under the Labor Code) that
the employer fired his employee without just cause or due process.
Additional facts must be pleaded and proven to warrant the grant of
moral damages under the Civil Code, these being, to repeat, that
the act of dismissal was attended by bad faith or fraud, or was
oppressive to labor, or done in a manner contrary to morals, good
customs, or public policy; and of course, that social humiliation,
wounded feelings, grave anxiety, etc., resulted therefrom.‰ This was
reiterated in Garcia vs. NLRC, where the Court added that
exemplary damages may be awarded only if the dismissal was
shown to have been effected in a wanton, oppressive or malevolent
manner.
This the private respondent failed to do. Because no evidence
was adduced to show that petitioner company acted in bad faith or
in a wanton or fraudulent manner in dismissing the private
respondent, the labor arbiter did not award any moral and
exemplary damages in his decision. Respondent NLRC therefore
had no factual or legal basis to award such damages in the exercise
of its appellate jurisdiction. . . .‰
The records of this case are bereft of any evidence showing
that respondent MIT acted in bad faith or in a wanton or
fraudulent manner in preventively suspending petitioner,
thus, the Labor Arbiter was correct in not awarding any
damages in favor of petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED.
The Decision dated November 10, 2000 and Resolution
dated January 16, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 57470 as well as the NLRC Decision dated
September 30, 1999 together with its Resolution dated
December 13, 1999, are hereby SET ASIDE and the Labor
ArbiterÊs Decision dated June 18, 1999 is REINSTATED.
_______________
17 G.R. No. 98458, July 17, 1996, 328 Phil. 351, 365-366; 259 SCRA 51,
63-64 (1996).
427
VOL. 479, JANUARY 23, 2006 427
Viaje vs. Pamintel
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago, Callejo, Sr. and Chico-Nazario,
JJ., concur.
Panganiban (C.J., Chairperson), No Part. Former
partner of a partyÊs counsel.
Petition partially granted, judgment and resolution set
aside. That of Labor ArbiterÊs decision reinstated.
Note.·Where there is no showing of a clear, valid and
legal cause for termination of employment, the law
considers the case a matter of illegal dismissal. (Sevillana
vs. I.T. [International] Corporation, 356 SCRA 451 [2001])
··o0o··
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