Emilio A. Gonzales III vs. Office of the President, G.R. Nos.
196231 & 196232
September 4, 2012
Facts:
Sometime in 2008, a formal charge for Grave Misconduct was filed before the PNP-NCR
against Rolando Mendoza and four others. While said cases were still pending, the Office
of the Regional Director of the National Police Commission (NPC) turned over, upon the
request of petitioner Emilio A. Gonzales III, all relevant documents and evidence in
relation to said case to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for appropriate
administrative adjudication. On February 16, 2009, upon the recommendation of
petitioner Emilio Gonzales III, a Decision finding Rolando Mendoza and his fellow police
officers guilty of Grave Misconduct was approved by the Ombudsman. They filed a Motion
for Reconsideration. On December 14, 2009, the pleadings mentioned and the records
of the case were assigned for review and recommendation to Graft Investigation and
Prosecutor Officer Dennis L. Garcia, who released a draft Order on April 5, 2010 for
appropriate action by his immediate superior, Director Eulogio S. Cecilio, who, in turn,
signed and forwarded said Order to petitioner Gonzalez's office on April 27, 2010. Not
more than ten (10) days after, more particularly on May 6, 2010, petitioner endorsed the
Order, together with the case records, for final approval by Ombudsman Merceditas N.
Gutierrez, in whose office it remained pending for final review and action when Mendoza
hijacked a bus-load of foreign tourists on that fateful day of August 23, 2010 in a desperate
attempt to have himself reinstated in the police service.
In the aftermath of the hostage-taking incident, a public outcry against the blundering of
government officials prompted the creation of the Incident Investigation and Review
Committee (IIRC). It was tasked to determine accountability for the incident through the
conduct of public hearings and executive sessions. However, petitioner, as well as the
Ombudsman herself, refused to participate in the IIRC proceedings on the assertion that
the Office of the Ombudsman is an independent constitutional body. The IIRC eventually
identified petitioner Gonzales to be among those in whom culpability must lie. It
recommended that its findings with respect to petitioner Gonzales be referred to the Office
of the President (OP) for further determination of possible administrative offenses and for
the initiation of the proper administrative proceedings. On October 15, 2010, the OP
instituted a Formal Charge against petitioner. Petitioners asseverate that the President
has no disciplinary jurisdiction over them considering that the Office of the Ombudsman
to which they belong is clothed with constitutional independence and that they, as Deputy
Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor therein, necessarily bear the constitutional
attributes of said office.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the Office of the President, acting through individual respondents, has
constitutional or valid statutory authority to subject petitioner to an administrative
investigation and to thereafter order his removal as Deputy Ombudsman.
Ruling:
Yes. While the Ombudsman's authority to discipline administratively is extensive and
covers all government officials, whether appointive or elective, with the exception only of
those officials removable by impeachment, the members of congress and the judiciary,
such authority is by no means exclusive. Petitioners cannot insist that they should be
solely and directly subject to the disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman. For, while
Section 21 declares the Ombudsman's disciplinary authority over all government officials,
Section 8(2), on the other hand, grants the President express power of removal over a
Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor. It is a basic canon of statutory
construction that in interpreting a statute, care should be taken that every part thereof be
given effect, on the theory that it was enacted as an integrated measure and not as a
hodge-podge of conflicting provisions. A construction that would render a provision
inoperative should be avoided; instead, apparently inconsistent provisions should be
reconciled whenever possible as parts of a coordinated and harmonious whole.
Indubitably, the manifest intent of Congress in enacting both provisions - Section 8(2)
and Section 21 - in the same Organic Act was to provide for an external authority, through
the person of the President, that would exercise the power of administrative discipline
over the Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor without in the least diminishing the
constitutional and plenary authority of the Ombudsman over all government officials and
employees. Such legislative design is simply a measure of "check and balance" intended
to address the lawmakers' real and valid concern that the Ombudsman and his Deputy
may try to protect one another from administrative liabilities.
