People of the Philippines vs.
Robinos
G.R. no. 138453 (May 29, 2002)
Panganiban, J.
The defense of mental incapacity can be applied if the the fact of insanity was
established at the very moment when the crime was committed.
FACTS:
On March 25, 1995, at around seven o'clock in the morning, fifteen-year old Lorenzo
Robiños was at their home in Barangay San Isibro in Camiling, Tarlac cooking dinner,
heard his parents, appellant Melecio Robiños and Lorenza Robiños – victim, who
were at the sala, quarrelling. Lorenzo heard his mother saying, 'Why did you come
home, why don't you just leave?' After hearing what his mother said, Lorenzo, saw his
father, with a double-bladed knife, stab his mother on the right shoulder. Upon
witnessing appellant's attack on his mother, Lorenzo immediately left their house and
ran to his grandmother's house where he reported the incident.
Benjamin Bueno, the brother of the victim Lorenza Robiños, was was informed by his
nephew of the incident immediately called the police station and reported the said
incident. The police, together with Benjamin Bueno and some barangay officials
proceeded to the scene of the crime. When appellant failed to come out, the police,
with the help of barangay officials, detached the bamboo wall from the part of the
house where blood was dripping. The removal of the wall exposed that section of the
house where they saw appellant, lying on his side and holding a bloodstained double-
bladed knife with his right hand, embracing his wife, uttering the words, “I will kill
myself, I will kill myself.” Lorenza, who was lying on her back and facing upward,
appeared to be dead. The police and the barangay officials tried to pull appellant
away from Lorenza's body, appellant tried to resist the people who held him but was
overpowered. The police, with the help of the barangay officials present, tied his
hands and feet with a plastic rope. However, before he was pulled away from the
body of his wife and restrained by the police, appellant admitted to Rolando Valdez, a
neighbor of his and a barangay kagawad, that he had killed his wife.
Appellant does not refute the factual allegations of the prosecution that he indeed
killed his wife, but seeks exoneration from criminal liability by interposing the defense
of insanity.
ISSUE:
WON APPELLANT WAS INDEED INSANE AT THE TIME OF THE COMMISSION
OF THE CRIME?
HELD:
NO. A defendant in a criminal case who relies on the defense of mental incapacity
has the burden of establishing the fact of insanity at the very moment when the crime
was committed. Only when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence at the time
of the commission of the crime should the exempting circumstance of insanity be
considered. Testimonies from both prosecution and defense witnesses show no
substantial evidence that appellant was completely deprived of reason or discernment
when he perpetrated the brutal killing of his wife. It was also admitted that a domestic
altercation preceded the fatal stabbing. Thus, it cannot be said that appellant attacked
his wife for no reason at all and without knowledge of the nature of his action. The
bulk of the defense evidence points to his allegedly unsound mental condition after
the commission of the crime. (Prison inmates testified that he was not engaging,
quiet, and seen talking to himself) – baka tanungin ni sir, examples
As to the contention of the defense of the testimony of Dr. Maria Mercidita Mendoza,
who examined accused, was still mentally ill; that accused was experiencing
hallucination and suffering from insanity. The court noted that when Dr. Mendoza, she
conducted the mental, physical and neurological examinations on the accused 7
months after the commission of the offense. That span of seven 7 months has given
the accused an opportunity to contrive and feign mental derangement. Dr. Mendoza
had no opportunity to observed and assessed the behavior of the accused before,
during and immediately after the commission of the offense. Thus making her findings
inconclusive.
As to the penalty imposed, although the RTC correctly rejected the defense of
insanity, it nonetheless erred in imposing the death penalty on appellant. It imposed
the maximum penalty without considering the presence or the absence of aggravating
and mitigating circumstances. Since appellant was convicted of the complex crime of
parricide with unintentional abortion, the penalty to be imposed on him should be that
for the graver offense which is parricide. The rules with respect to the application of a
penalty consisting of two indivisible penalties are prescribed by Article 63 of the
Revised Penal Code, the pertinent portion of which is quoted as follows:
"In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible
penalties, the following rules shall be observed in the application thereof:
xxx xxx xxx
2. When there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the
commission of the deed, the lesser penalty shall be applied."
Hence, when the penalty provided by law is either of two indivisible penalties and
there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances, the lower penalty shall be
imposed. Considering that neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances were
established in this case, the imposable penalty should only be reclusion perpetua.
Final Ruling: The SC affirmed with modifications the decision of the RTC. Reducing
the penalty imposed to reclusion per petua.
