An Endeavour for Learning and Excellence

Aano Bhadra Krtavo Yantu Vishwatah.(RIG VEDAM)

"Let Noble Thoughts Come To Me From All Directions"
 Preface

Sri G.Shivaiah requires very less introduction, at least for the prosecutors of
Telugu Speaking states, wherein he worked as prosecutor right from APP to
Addl.PP Gr-I. Suffice it to say that he was termed as an UNIVERSITY by one of
the senior academician and Prosecutor. Sir developed friends for his excellence in
academics, at all the places where he worked, what with prestigious organisations
and advocates from those places, still contacting him, whenever they are in a fix,
for solutions, and they are not disappointed at any time.

I had the occasion of being in proximity with Sir, when sir was executing the
responsibilities of Deputy Director of Prosecutions (Administration) Hyderabad,
wherein I was fortunate to have had the opportunity of interacting with him on
various academic pursuits.

I am also fortunate that Sir was kind enough to honor my request to share some of
outstanding precedents compiled by him and this book is his long cherished
dream, which in fact Sir wanted to bring it in hardcopy by Dushera for the
assistance of all prosecutors, but due to some constraints, the following soft copy
is being released on this Dushera,

I am confident that these precedents will pave way for easing the work of
prosecutors all over.

Grateful acknowledgment is here made to Ms Rita Lalchand and Sri

G.Raghavendra, and all those who helped me in giving a shape to the dream of
Sir, as it stands in this book. This work would not have reached its present form
without their invaluable help.

Hyderabad
Date: 29/09/2017 L.H.Rajeshwer Rao.

While due care is taken while preparing this information. The patrons are requested to verify and
bring it to the notice of the concerned regarding any misprint or errors immediately, so as to
bring it to the notice of all patrons. Needless to add that no responsibility for any result arising
out of the said error shall be attributable to the publisher as the same is inadvertent.
 CODE OF
CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE
JudgmEnts
1) 2000(2) ALT (CRI) 159 (KER) – BIJJU VS STATE OF KERALA
The legal position that when an accused has been released on bail under
Section 436 and later a non­bailable offence is added, even then the bail
granted cannot be cancelled, unless there is misuse of liberty granted. Bail
can be' cancelled only either under Section 439(2) or under Section 437(5)
Code of Criminal Procedure. It is also the settled position of law that once
bail is granted under Section 436 and a charge sheet for a non­bailable
offence is also filed, bail cannot be cancelled unless there is misuse of
liberty granted.
The Code of Criminal Procedure makes no express provision for
cancellation of bail granted under Section 436 and if at any subsequent
stage of the proceedings, it is found that any person accused of a bailable
offence is intimidating, bribing or tampering with prosecution witnesses or
is attempting to Abscond, High Court has power to cause him to be'
arrested, and commit him to custody for such period as High Court thinks
fit. This, Jurisdiction of High Court springs from the overriding inherent
powers of High Court and can .be invoked in exceptional cases only, when
the High Court is satisfied that the ends of justice will be defeated unless
the accused is committed to custody. The person committed to custody
under the orders of High Court cannot ask for his release on bail under
Section 436 Code of Criminal Procedure. The High Court or Court of
Session is conferred with power under Sub­section (2) of Section 439 Code
of Criminal Procedure to cancel bail in regard to cases of persons accused
of any offences where such persons were admitted to bail under Chapter
XXXIII of Code of Criminal Procedure.

2) 1996(1) ALT (CRL) 622 (DB) AP – MRS. IQBAL KAUR KWATRA VS THE
DGP, RAJASTHAN STATE, JAIPUR AND OTHERS
Sec 57 CRPC – in appropriate cases the court can award compensation to
the victim by awarding suitable monetary compensation moulding the
relief in view of the changed circumstances in the larger interest of justice.
Forcibly taking away and illegal detention of petitioner’s husband and not
producing him before the Judicial Magistrate on the same day is in gross
violation of fundamental rights. Such was an act of committing mental and
psychological torture to the petitioner and her husband. Case observed to
be fit for compensation
Police Custody also includes “some form of Police Surveillance and
restriction on movements of the person concerned by the Police”. The word
custody does not necessarily mean detention or confinement. A person is
said to be in custody as he comes in the hands of police officer.

3) 1984 CRLJ 1534 – KANAKLATHA SINHA VS NANI GOPAL SINGH

BURMAN AND OTHERS
Registrar of Firms is not a court within meaning of Section 195(1)(b)
Cr.P.C. if therefore offences for which the opposite parties have been
 arraigned have been committed in relation to the proceeding before the
Registrar of Firms no complaint of Registrar was necessary.

4) Dukhishyam Benupani, Asstt. Director, Enforcement Directorate

(FERA) vs Arun Kumar Bajoria 1998(1) ALD (Cri) 86, [1998] 91 Comp
Cas 413 (SC), 1998 CriLJ 841, JT 1997(9) SC 379, 1997(6) SCALE
351, 1997(7) SCALE 258, (1998)1SCC52, [1997]5 SuppSCR 566
Considerations to be weighed with the court while dealing with a prayer for
pre­arrest bail order are materially different from a post­arrest bail
application.

5) AIR 2008 SC 251 – INDER MOHAN GOSWAMI AND ANR VS STATE OF

UTTARANCHAL AND ORS.
Initiating Criminal Proceedings in a case of Civil Nature is mere abuse of
process of Court.

6) 2013 (1) ALT (CRL) 17 AP – KOTLA HARI CHAKRAPANI REDDY &

ANOTHER V/S THE STATE OF A.P. REP. BY ITS PUBLIC
PROSECUTOR
Name of the person cannot be deleted as accused unless there is a judicial
decisions.

7) 2008 CRLJ 148 – DR. SHASHIKANT D. KARNIK VS THE STATE OF

MAHARASTRA THROUGH ANTI CORRUPTION BUREAU
Noncompliance to Section 102 of Cr.P.C renders the entire order totally
illegal and perverse.

8) 1992 CRLJ 527 – STATE OF HARYANA AND OTHERS VS CH. BHAJAN

LAL AND OTHERS. Sec 154 – 155 ­ 156 CRPC explained in detailed
A noticeable feature of the scheme under Chapter XIV of the Code is that a
Magistrate is kept in the picture at all stages of the police investigation
but he is not authorised to interfere with the actual investigation or to
direct the police how that investigation is to be conducted. But if a
police officer transgresses the circumscribed limits and improperly and
illegally exercises his investigatory powers in breach of any statutory
provision causing serious prejudice to the personal liberty and also
property of a citizen, then the Court, on being approached by the person
aggrieved for the redress of any grievance has to consider the nature and
extent of the breach and pass appropriate orders as may be called for
without leaving the citizens to the mercy of police echelons since human
dignity is a dear value of our Constitution. No one can demand absolute
immunity even if he is wrong and claim unquestionable right and
unlimited powers exercisable upto unfathomable cosmos.

9) 1992 CRLJ 561 – SMT. KAMALA BAI AND OTHERS VS THE STATE OF
KARNATAKA
 Power of the High Court to grant bail under Section 439 CR.P.C is not
limited by Section 37 of NDPS Act.

10) AIR 2004 SC 261 – BANTI @ GUDDU VS STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH

No ground to discard the evidence of witness because they relate to the
deceased. It can be relied upon after careful scrutiny. Public Prosecutor is
not obliged to examine all witnesses. Delayed examination of prosecution
witnesses, not to render prosecution version suspect.
It is true, the evidence of defence witness is not to be ignored by the
Courts. Like any other witnesses, his evidence has to be tested on the
touchstone of reliability, credibility and trustworthiness particularly when
he attempts to resile and speak against records and in derogation of his
earlier conduct and behavior. If after doing so, the court finds it to be
untruthful, there is no legal bar in discarding it. If the lack of motive as
pleaded by the accused is a factor, at the same time, it cannot be lost sight
of that there is no reason as to why PW1 would falsely implicate the
accused persons.
If there are too many witnesses on the same point, the public prosecutor is
at liberty to choose two or some among them alone so that the time of the
Court can be saved from repetitious depositions on the same factual
aspects. That principle applies when there are too many witnesses cited, if
they all had sustained injuries at the occurrence. The public prosecutor, in
such cases is not obliged to examine all the injured witnesses. If he is
satisfied by examining any two or three of them, it is open to him to inform
the Court that he does not propose to examine the remaining persons in
that category. This will help not only the prosecution in relieving itself of
the strain of adducing repetitive evidence on the same point but also help
the Court considerably in lessening the workload.
It cannot be laid down as a rule of universal application that if there is any
delay in examination of a particular witness, the prosecution version
becomes suspect. It would depend upon several factors. If the explanation
offered for the delayed examination is plausible and acceptable and the
court accepts the same as plausible, there is no reason to interfere with
the conclusion.

11) 2006(2) ALT (Cri) 355 AP – SADHU NARAYAN VS SHO

Held that the Court can direct further investigation at the time of
cognizance and after cognizance is taken. But after appearance of the
accused and after commencement of trial on charge being framed, the
Court is not empowered to order further investigation. After appearance of
the accused and after commencement of the trial, the Court can only look
into the materials already on the record and either frame charge, if a
prima facie case is made out or discharge the accused bearing in mind
relevant provisions. Of course, the discharge of the accused would not
prevent further investigation by police and submission of charge­sheet
also thereafter, if a case for the same is made out. No doubt, police has got
 independent power to make further investigation and file any number of
additional charge­sheets but the Court cannot order further investigation
after commencement of trial. A judge shall be impartial and he cannot be a
party to the investigation.

12) 1973 CRLJ 869 – STATE OF KERALA VS M.K. PYLOTH

Before ordering remand or extension of remand, Court had to satisfy itself
on an examination of materials placed before it that there were reasonable
grounds for doing so

13) 1972 CRLJ 975 – VARINDER KUMAR AND ANOTHER VS STATE OF

PUNJAB
Where the charge against the accused is under Section 420 in that he
induced the complainant to part with his goods, on the understanding that
the accused would pay for the same on delivery but did not pay, if the
accused had at the time he promised to pay cash against delivery an
intention to do so. the fact that he did not pay would not convert the
transaction into one of cheating. But if on the other hand he had no
intention whatsoever to pay but merely said that he would do so in order
to induce the complainant to part with the goods then a case of cheating
would be established.

14) AIR 2001 SC 2637 – T.T. ANTHONY VS STATE OF KERALA AND

OTHERS
There can be no second F.I.R. and consequently there can be no fresh
investigation on receipt of every subsequent information in respect of the
same cognizable offence. It is quite possible and it happens not
infrequently that more information than one are given to a police officer in
charge of a police station in respect of the same incident involving one or
more than one cognizable offences. In such a case he need not enter every
one of them in the station house diary and this is implied in Section 154 of
Code of Criminal Procedure Apart from a vague information by a phone
call or a cryptic telegram the information first entered in the station house
diary, kept for this purpose, by a police officer in charge of a police station
is the First Information Report­­F.I.R. postulated by Section 154 of Code of
Criminal Procedure. All other information made orally or in writing after
the commencement of the investigation in the cognizable offence disclosed
from the facts mentioned in the First Information Report and entered in
the station house diary by the police officer or such other cognizable
offences as may come to his notice during the investigation, will be
statements falling under Section 162 of Code of Criminal Procedure. No
such information/statement can properly be treated as an F.I.R. and
entered in the station house diary again, as it would in effect be a second
F.I.R. and the same cannot be in conformity with the scheme of the Code
of Criminal Procedure.
 The report and findings of the Commission of Inquiry are meant for
information of the Government. Acceptance of the report of the
Commission by the Government would only suggest that being bound by
the Rule of law and having duty to act fairly, it has endorsed to act upon
it. The duty of the police investigating agency of the State is to act in
accordance with the law of the land. Acting thus the investigating agency
may with advantage make use of the report of the commission in its
onerous task of investigation agency from forming a different opinion
under Section 169/170 of Code of Criminal Procedure if the evidence
obtained by it supports such a conclusion. In our view, the Courts civil or
criminal are not bound by the report of findings of the Commission of
Inquiry as they have to arrive at their own decision on the evidence placed
before them in accordance with law.

15) 2000(4) Crimes 23 SC = 2001 CR.L.J 511 – HUKUM SINGH VS STATE

OF RAJASTHAN
Public prosecutor can skip prosecution witness not likely to support the
case. He has freedom to pick and choose witnesses. If the public
prosecutor got reliable information that any one among that category
would not support the prosecution version, he is free to state in Court
about that fact and skip that witness being examined as a prosecution
witness. It is open to the defence to cite him and examine as defence
witness. The decision in this regard has to be taken by the public
prosecutor in a fair manner. He can interview the witness beforehand to
enable him to know well in advance the stand which the particular person
would be adopting when examined as a witness in Court.

16) 2002 CRLJ 2029 – CBI VS R.S. PAI AND ANOTHER

The word “SHALL” u/sec 173(5) and Sec 205 CRPC cannot be interpreted
as mandatory but as directory. As such documents can be produced
subsequent to the filing of Charge Sheet before the court.

17) 2001 CRLJ 1254 SC – BIPIN SHANTILAL PANCHAL VS STATE OF

GUJRAT
Whenever an objection is raised during evidence taking stage regarding the
admissibility of any material or item of oral evidence the trial Court can
make a note of such objection and mark the objected document tentatively
as an exhibit in the case (or record the objected part of the oral evidence)
subject to such objections to be decided "at the last stage in the final
judgment. If the Court finds at the final stage that the objection so raised
is sustainable the Judge or Magistrate can keep such evidence excluded
from consideration. In our view there is no illegality in adopting such a
course. However, we make it­clear that if the objection relates to deficiency
of stamp duty of a document the Court has to decide the objection before
proceeding further.
18) 1979 CRLJ 1036 – HUSSAINARA KHATOON AND OTHERS VS HOME
SECRETARY STATE OF BIHAR, PATNA
Criminal ­ Under trials ­ The petition discloses shocking state of affairs in
the jails where people charged for minor offences were languishing in jail
for 5­10 years without initiation of trial ­ These prisoners keep on
languishing in jail as they were not in position to furnish bail – the Courts
by ignoring the differential capacity of the rich and the poor to furnish bail
and treating them equally produce inequality between the rich and the
poor; the rich who is charged with the same offence in the same
circumstances is able to secure his release while the poor is unable to do
so on account of his poverty ­ Another infirmity in the judicial system is
the gross denial of justice to the under trial prisoners ­ Speedy trial is of
the essence of criminal justice and delay in trial by itself constitutes denial
of justice ­ Court directed State Government to look into the matter and
set more Courts to speed up the trial, improve the conditions of service if
they wanted to improve the system of administration of justice.

19) 2003 Cri.L.J 2028 :: 2003 (2) ALT (CRL) 60 SC – B.S. JOSHI VS STATE
OF HARYANA
If for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of F.I.R.
becomes necessary, Section 320, Cr. P.C. would not be a bar to the
exercise of power of quashing. It is however a different matter depending
upon the facts and circumstances of each case whether to exercise or not
such a power.

20) 1978 CRLJ 391 –SS CHOUDARY VS STATE OF UP

Section 319 Cr.PC gives a discretion to a Court to proceed against a
person, who is not an accused at the trial. It does not make it incumbent
on the Court to postpone the trial and proceed against the person
concerned in the same trial.

21) 1999 CRLJ 3534 – ABHOY PRADHAN VS STATE OF WEST BENGAL

Sec 385 Cr.P.C ­ clearly provides that in an appeal from a case instituted
on a police report, only the representative of the State and the
accused/convict are entitled to notice and hearing. When such clear
provision has been made in the statute in unambiguous terms, there is
absolutely no justification for us to adhere to the "Settled practice" of this
Court. "Settled practice" of the Court, however, hallowed and sanctified
same may be, cannot prevail over clear legislative mandate.

22) 2008 CRLJ 1400 SC – RAMESHWAR DASS VS STATE OF PUNJAB

Section 304B IPC ­ in terms of Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act,
onus of proof was upon the Appellant ­ As the defence taken by the
Appellant had not been established, he could not be held to have
discharged the said onus ­ 21 years passed, Appellant married a cousin of
the deceased and an application had been filed for condoning the offence ­
 An offence under Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 was not
compoundable ­ Only because such a marriage with cousin had allegedly
taken place, the same by itself could not be said to be a ground for
rejecting the prosecution story.

23) 2002 (1) CRIMES 162 SC = 2002(1) ALT (Cri) 209 – STATE OF BIHAR
AND ANOTHER VS MD. KHALIQUE AND ANOTHER
Power of quashing a criminal proceeding can be exercised sparingly and
with circumspection that too in the rarest of the rare cases."

24) 1997(1) ALD (CRI) 415 SC= 1996 (6) SCC 435 – STATE OF ORISSA VA
SHARAT CHANDRA SAHU AND ANOTHER
While investigating a cognizable offence and presenting a charge­sheet for
it, the police are not debarred from investigating any non­cognizable
offence arising out of the same facts and including them in the charge
sheet.

25) 2002 (2) ALT (CRI) 193 AP = 2002 (1) ALD (CRI) 661 – P.KUMAR VS
THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR HIGH COURT OF AP, HYDERABAD
The contention that because of the delay in issuing the F.I.R. the case is to
be taken as false, cannot be accepted, because it is well known that mere
delay is not a ground for quashing the complaint, or the F.I.R. It is also
well known that in cases where offences are against women, the victim
woman would be slow in making a report to police, because her reputation
would be at stake, and therefore would, in many cases, take considerable
time to decide whether to give a police report about the incident or not.

26) 2005 CRLJ 100 SC – POONAM CHAND JAIN VS FAZRU

There is no statutory bar in filing a second complaint on the same facts. In
a case where a previous complaint is dismissed without assigning any
reason, the Magistrate under Section 204 Cr.P.C ay take cognizance of an
offence and issue process if there is sufficient ground for proceeding. But
the second complaint on the same facts could be entertained only in
exceptional circumstances, namely, where the previous order was passed
on an incomplete record or on a misunderstanding of the Nature of
complaint or it was manifestly absurd, unjust or where new facts which
could not, with reasonable diligence, have been brought on record in the
previous proceedings have been adduced. The second complaint could be
dismissed after a decision has been given against the complainant in
previous Matter upon a full consideration of his case. Further second
complaint on the same facts would be entertained only in exceptional
circumstances, namely, where previous order was passed on an
incomplete record or on misunderstanding of the complaint or it was
manifestly absurd or unjust.

27) 1999 CRLJ 4305 SC – STATE OF MAHARASTRA VS TAPAS D. NEOGY

 The bank account of the accused or any of his relation is 'property' within
the meaning of Section 102 of the Criminal Procedure Code and a police
officer in course of investigation can seize or prohibit the operation of the
said account if such assets have direct links with the commission of the
offence for which the police officer is investigating into.

28) 1998 (1) ALD (CRI) 415 AP – ANNIE KOSHY VS STATE OF AP AND
ANOTHER
In a private complaint, the Magistrate may either take cognizance of the
alleged offence under section 190, in which case, he has to follow the
procedure under Chapter XV and examine the complainant and his
witnesses if any under section 200, Cr.P.C. or order investigation and
report by police into the alleged offence under section 156 of the Code in
which case, he need not examine the complainant or his witnesses under
Section 200, Cr.P.C. before passing an order. This power under section
156, Cr.P.C. can be exercised by a Magistrate only at pre­cognizance stage,
but if he takes cognizance of the alleged offence as postulated under
Chapter XV, he cannot refer it u/S. 156, Cr.P.C. He has to take recourse
to Section 202, Cr.P.C. for post­cognizance investigation.

29) 2005(3) ALT (CRI) 285 AP – P.V.G.K.S. SASTRY VS THE STATE OF

ANDHRA PRADESH THROUGH PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
Parties shall avail of remedies available in statutory provisions, before
approaching Courts.

30) 1999 (1) ALD (Cri) 926 AP – MOGILI CHINNA BALAIAH VS K. SAMBA
MURTHY AND OTHERS
The sub­registrar’s appointing authority was the deputy inspector general
of registration and stamps and not the State Government. Hence sanction
u/sec 197 Cr.P.C. to prosecute the accused (sub – registrar) was not
necessary even they committed offence in discharging their official
functions.

31) AIR 2005 SC 3309 – SAMYA SETT VS SHAMBU SARKAR AND

ANOTHER
Application for default bail was allowed in absence of PP on pretext that
charge sheet was not filed. On same day at later stage Learned PP
appeared and submitted that Charge Sheet was already filed and that the
accused is not entitle for Default Bail. The Court recalled First Order of
bail and dismissed the bail application in the absence of accused. Held
that Once order was passed in favour of the accused releasing him on bail,
it could not have been recalled without observing principles of natural
justice, ie., without giving an opportunity to hear the accused.
Adverse remarks and strictures against judicial officers ­ justification
explained.
32) 2008(1) SCC (Crl) 36= AIR 2008 SC 78 – DINESH DALMIA VS CBI
"Bail ­ Right to bail does not revive only because a further investigation
remains pending.” (Statutory Bail u/sec 167(2) Proviso)
when a charge sheet is not filed and investigation is kept pending, benefit
of proviso appended to Sub­section (2) of Section 167 of the Code would be
available to an offender; once, however, a charge sheet is filed, the said
right ceases. Such a right does not revive only because a further
investigation remains pending within the meaning of Sub­section (8) of
Section 173 of the Code.
Law does not require that filing of the charge sheet must await the arrest
of the accused.

33) 2005(1) ALD (CRI) 717 SC = AIR 2005 SC 2119 – IQBAL SINGH
MARWAH VS MEENAKSHI MARWAH
Sec 195 CRPC ­ The principal controversy revolves round the
interpretation of the expression "when such offence is alleged to have been
committed in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a
proceeding in any Court" occurring in Clause (b)(ii) of Sub­section (1) of
Section 195 Code of Criminal Procedure On a plain reading Clause (b)(ii) of
Sub­section (1) of Section 195 is capable of two interpretations. One
possible interpretation is that when an offence described in Section 463 or
punishable under Section 471, Section 475 or Section 476 I.P.C. is alleged
to have been committed in respect of a document which is subsequently
produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any Court, a complaint by
the Court would be necessary. The other possible interpretation is that
when a document has been produced or given in evidence in a proceeding
in any Court and thereafter an offence described as aforesaid is committed
in respect thereof, a complaint by the Court would be necessary. On this
interpretation if the offence as described in the Section is committed prior
to production or giving in evidence of the document in Court, no complaint
by Court would be necessary and a private complaint would be
maintainable. The correct view Section 195(1)(b)(ii) Code of Criminal
Procedure would be attracted only when the offences enumerated in the
said provision have been committed with respect to a document after it
has been produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any Court i.e.
during the time when the document was in custodia legis.

34) 1997(2) ALT (Cri) 386 SC – A.A. MULLA VS STATE OF MAHARASTRA

No bar on retrial on same facts for distinct offences. If the ingredients of
offences at first trial distinct from that of offence at second trial then the
second trial is not barred u/sec 403 Cr.P.C

35) 1981 CRLJ 1553 (KERALA) – STATE VS MOHAMMAD ISMAIL

When there were specific provisions laying down the procedure to be
followed when the Magistrate finds that an accused could not be served
with summons (procedure contemplated u/Sec 82, 83, 299 proviso to be
 followed) there was no justification for not following those provisions and
granting permission to the Assistant Public Prosecutor to withdraw the
case without prejudice to the Right to file fresh complaint when the
accused becomes available

36) 1999 CRLJ 3479 – ARUN VYAS & ANR VS ANITHA VYAS
Discharge ­ if Magistrate finds that charge against accused do not make
out prima facie case and not furnish basis for framing charge he has no
option but to discharge accused

37) 2004(2) ALT (Crl) 532 AP – KOMMALAPLLI RAMA VENKATA

DANDAPANI AND OTHERS VS STATE OF AP THROUGH SHO AND
OTHERS
When both the complainant and the accused have entered into a
compromise and are willing to compound to offence which is
compoundable as per Section 320 Cr.P.C. merely because the charge sheet
is not filed, the Court need not shirk the responsibility to compound the
offence because there is Nothing in Section 320 Cr.P.C. to show that
compounding can be done only after filing of charge sheet. If the offence
which requires permission of the Court to do so is to be compounded, the
Court can examine the case and decide whether or not to accord
permissions to compound. If it feels that permission for compounding can
be accorded, it can give the permission even when the charge sheet is not
filed and the case is still under investigation. If the offence intended to be
compounded does not required permission of the Court and if the Court
finds that person with whose consent the offence compounded has
actually give the consent for compounding, it can compound the offences
even when it is at the stage of investigation.

38) 1975 CRLJ 1091 BHAGWANDAS JAGDISH CHANDER VS DELHI

ADMINISTRATION
Same Transaction in Sec 223 Crpc – where there is proximity of time or
place or unity of purpose and design or continuity of action in respect of a
series of acts, it may be possible to infer that they form part of the same
transaction. It is, however not necessary that everyone of these elements
should co­exist for a transaction to be regarded as the same. But if several
acts committed by a person show a unity of purpose or design that would
be a strong circumstance to indicate that those acts form part of same
transaction.

39) 1997 CRLJ 3954 – HARKIRAT SINGH VS STATE OF PUNJAB

If there is material contradictions in evidence of eye witnesses then person
is entitled to benefit of doubt.

40) 2006(2) ALT (Cri) 16 SC – STATE OF ORISSA AND ANOTHER VS

SAROJ KUMAR SAHOO
 The inherent powers u/sec 482 cr.p.c should not be exercised by the High
Court to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High Court being the highest
Court of a State should normally refrain from giving a proma facie decision
in a case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so when
the evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court and the
issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of magnitude and cannot be
seen in their true perspective without sufficient material. Of course, no
hard and fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in which the high
court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceeding
at any stage.
While exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C., it is not
permissible for the Court to act as if it was a trial court. Even when charge
is framed at that stage, the Court has to only prima facie be satisfied
about existence of sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
For that limited purpose, the Court can evaluate material and documents
on records but it cannot appreciate evidence. The Court is not required to
appreciate evidence to conclude whether the materials produced are
sufficient or not for convicting the accused.

41) 2008(10) SUPREME COURT CASES 394 – YOGESH @ SACHIN

JAGDISH JOSHI VS STATE OF MAHARASHTRA
Existence of the conspiracy and its objective can be inferred from the
surrounding circumstances and the conduct of the accused. But the
incriminating circumstances must form a chain of events from which a
conclusion about the guilt of the accused could be drawn.

42) 2006(3) CRIMES 203 SC – STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ANOTHER VS

PASTOR P RAJU
Cognizance takes place when Magistrate first takes judicial notice of
offence whether on complaint or police report or information. Taking
cognizance not same thing as issuance of process. Issuance of process is
stage subsequent to taking cognizance

43) AIR 2003 SC 2612 – UNION OF INDIA VS PRAKASH P. HINDUJA AND

ANOTHER
The court would not interfere with the investigation or during the course of
investigation which would mean from time of lodging FIR till the
submission of the report by the officer in charge of police station in court
u/sec 173(2) Cr.P.C this field being exclusively reserved for the
investigating agency.
If cognizance is in fact taken on a police report initiated by the breach of a
mandatory provision relating to investigation, there can be no doubt that
the result of the trial, which follows it cannot be set aside unless the
illegality in the investigation can be shown to have brought about a
miscarriage of justice and that an illegality committed in the course of
 investigation does not affect the competence and the jurisdiction of the
Court for trial.

44) 2001(2) ALT (CRI) 287 SC = AIR 2001 SCC 3014 – M. KRISHNAN VS
VIJAY SINGH AND ANOTHER
In all cases of cheating and fraud, in the whole transaction, there is
generally some element of civil nature. However, in this case, the
allegations were regarding the forging of the documents and acquiring
gains on the basis of such forged documents. The proceedings could not
be quashed only because the respondents had field a civil suit with respect
to the aforesaid documents. In a criminal court the allegations made in the
complaint have to be established independently, notwithstanding the
adjudication by a civil court Had the complainant failed to prove the
allegations made by him in the complaint, the respondent were entitled to
discharge or acquittal but not otherwise. If mere pendency of a suit is
made a ground for quashing the criminal proceedings, the unscrupulous
litigants, apprehending criminal action against them, would be encouraged
to frustrate the course of justice and law by filing suits with respect to the
documents intended to be used against them after the initiation of
criminal proceedings or in anticipation of such proceedings. Such a course
cannot be the mandate of law. Civil proceedings, as distinguished from the
criminal action, have to be adjudicated and concluded by adopting
separate yardsticks. The onus of proving the allegations beyond
reasonable doubt, in criminal case , is not applicable in the civil
proceedings which can be decided merely on the basis of the probabilities
with respect to the acts complained of.
revisional or inherent powers for quashing the proceedings at the initial
stage can be exercised only where the allegations made in the complaint or
the first information report, if taken at their face value and accepted in
their entirety, do not prima facie disclose the commission of an offence or
where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and
the evidence relied in support of the same do not disclose the commission
of any offence against the accused, or the allegations are so absurd and
inherently improper that on the basis of which no prudent, person could
have reached a just conclusion that there were sufficient grounds in
proceedings against the accused or where there is an express legal bar
engrafted in any provisions of the Code or any other statute to the
institution and continuance of the criminal proceeding or where a criminal
proceeding is manifestly actuated with malafide and has been initiated
maliciously with the ulterior motive for wrecking vengeance on the accused
and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.

45) 2011(2) SUPREME COURT CASES (CRI) 278 = 2011(4) SCC 426 –CBI
VS ABU SALEM ANSARI AND ANOTHER
In the present case the accused person, was absconding and that his case
was already split up and has to undergo the trial. Obviously, the evidence
 adduced in the earlier trial cannot be used against the said accused except
as provided in Sub­section (1) of Section 299 Cr.P.C. In the circumstances
of the absconding accused appears again, the prosecution witnesses have
to be examined afresh. But, if the deponent is dead or incapable of giving
evidence or cannot be found or his presence cannot be procured without
an amount of delay, expense or inconvenience, the prosecution would be
justified in relying on the evidence already on record taken in the earlier
trial in the absence of the absconding accused.

46) AIR 2006 SC 1892 = 2006 MADLJ (2) 173 LOK RAM VS NIHAL SINGH
AND ANOTHER
Power under Section 319, Cr. P.C. is discretionary and should be exercised
only to achieve criminal justice and that the Court should not turn against
another person whenever it comes across evidence connecting that other
person also with the offence. This Court further held that a judicial
exercise is called for, keeping a conspectus of the case, including the stage
at which the trial has proceeded already and the quantum, of evidence
collected till then, and also the amount of time which the Court had spent
for collecting such evidence. The Court, while examining an application
under Section 319 of the Code, has also to bear in mind that there is no
compelling duty on the court to proceed against other persons. In a
nutshell, for exercise of discretion under Section 319 of the Code all
relevant factors including those noticed above, have to be kept in view and
an order is not required to be made mechanically merely on the ground
that some evidence had come on record implicating the person sought to
be added as an accused.
It is further evident that such person even though initially been named in
the FIR as an accused, but not charge sheeted, can also be added to face
the trial. Power u/sec 319 can be exercised by the Court suo moto or an
application by someone including accused already before it, if it is satisfied
that any person other than accused has committed an offence he is to be
tried together with the accused.

47) (2011) 2 SCC (CRI) 272 = (2011)4 SCC 418 – CBI VS MUSTAFA AHMED
DOSSA
The evidence adduced in the earlier trial cannot be used against the said
accused except as provided in Sub­section (1) of Section 299 Cr.P.C. In the
circumstances of the absconding accused appears again, the prosecution
witnesses have to be examined afresh. But, if the deponent is dead or
incapable of giving evidence or cannot be found or his presence cannot be
procured without an amount of delay, expense or inconvenience, the
prosecution would be justified in relying on the evidence already on record
taken in the earlier trial in the absence of the absconding accused.

48) 2002 SCC (Cri) 1423 = AIR 2002 SC 2861 – RAJ KISHOR ROY VS
KAMLESHWAR PANDEY AND ANOTHER
 The legislative mandate engrafted in Sub­section (1) of Section 197 is a
prohibition imposed by the statute from taking cognizance. It has been
held that the offence alleged to have been committed must have something
to do, or must be related in some manner, with the charge of official duty.
It has been held that the only point for determination is whether the act
was committed in discharge of official duty. It has been held that there
must be a reasonable connection between the act and the official duty.

49) 1999(1) ALD (CRI) 468 SC = AIR 1999 SC 1765 – M. KRISHNA VS

STATE OF KARNATAKA
Variety of reasons cannot be ground for quashing of FIR and for injuncting
investigating authority to investigate into offence alleged.

50) 1984 LAW SUIT SC 349 = AIR 1985 SC 404 – HARJINDER SINGH VS
STATE OF PUNJAB
It is not permissible for Court under Section 223 to club and associate
case on police Challan and case on complaint where prosecution version
in police challan case and complaint case are materially different,
contradictory and mutually exclusive.
clubbing and consolidation of two cases, one instituted on police report
and the other instituted on private complaint (when both were triable by
the Sessions Court) is impermissible. It was directed that the two cases in
such a situation should be tried by the same judge but not consolidated.
The following direction was given in that case:
"The evidence should be recorded separately in both the cases, one after
the other, except to the extent that the witnesses for the prosecution who
are common to both the cases must be examined in one case and their
evidence be read as evidence in the other. The Sessions Judge should after
recording the evidence of the prosecution witnesses in one case, withhold
his judgment and then proceed to record the evidence of the prosecution
in the other case. Thereafter he will proceed to simultaneously dispose of
the cases by two separate judgments, taking care mat the judgment in one
case is not based on the evidence recorded in the other case,"

51) 2006(2) ALT (Cri) 224 SC = AIR 2006 SC 1599 - SANKARA MOITRA VS
SADHNA DAS AND ANOTHER
Section 197 (1), Cr. P.C. its opening words and the object sought to be
achieved by it, and the decisions of the Supreme Court, clearly indicate
that a prosecution hit by that provision cannot be launched without the
sanction contemplated. It is a condition precedent, as it were, for a
successful prosecution of a public servant when the provision is attracted,
though the question may arise necessarily not at the inception, but even at
a subsequent stage.

52) 1993 CRLJ 547 – STATE OF HARYANA VS SHIV SINGH AND OTHERS
 An offence u/Sec 471 IPC shall be punished in same manner as if he had
forged that document and that Sec 468 Cr.P.C shall not be applicable to
471 IPC as the punishment is life or imprisonment which may extend to
ten years.

53) 2000 CrLJ 169a SC = AIR 2000 SC 11 - BALBIR VS STATE OF

HARYANA AND ANOTHER
The appellant did not make any contention that a joint trial of both cases
must be ordered. Having not done so he cannot raise such a contention on
that score at any later stage (Appeal stage).

54) 1996 CRLJ 2231 ASHUTOSH CHOWDARY VS STATE AND ANOTHER

Sec 406 IPC is not a continuing offence. The Magistrate can exercise the
powers u/Sec 473 Cr.P.C independent of any application.

55) 1998 (2) ALD (Cri) 649 SC = AIR 1998 SC 3334 – LASHKARI RAM AND
OTHERS VS MASTRAM TANTA AND ANOTHER
The High Court finding that the sentence imposed upon Respondent No. 1
was inadequate, in exercise of its suo moto powers, issued notice to him
calling him to show cause why the sentence should not be enhanced.
During those proceedings the High Court found that the whole trial was
conducted in an unholy haste and there was plea bargaining. Therefore,
instead of enhancing the sentence it thought it proper to quash the whole
trial and remanded the case back to the trial court for conducting the trial
afresh.

56) 1996 SCC (CRL) 730 = 1996 CR.L.J 2503 – BABU SINGH VS STATE OF
PUNJAB
If witness found to be independent and reliable and believed to be present
during occurrence then his evidence cannot be rejected on sole ground
that his name had not been mentioned in FIR ­ non­mentioning of name of
witness may be honest omission, inadvertent mistake or may be due to
various other conceivable reasons.

57) 1996 (3) CRIMES 220 SC = AIR 1996 SC 2826 – YAMUNA SINGH AND
OTHERS ETC VS STATE OF BIHAR
Evidence of approver in all material particulars finds corroboration from
evidence of other witnesses. Approver's evidence apart from being reliable
does not suffer from any omission or contradiction vis­a­vis his statement
recorded under Section 164. Approver has given all minor details about
conspiracy hatched by appellants to murder. Conviction upheld on the
basis of statement of approver.

58) 1996 (1) CRIMES 20 SC = AIR 1997 SC 331 – OMKAR NAMDEO

JADHAO AND OTHERS VS SECOND ADDITIONAL SESSIONS JUDGE
BULDANA AND ANOTHER.
 Court should not come to conclusion on basis of statements which are not
evidence

59) 1972 CRLJ 1317 = AIR 1972 SC 2077 – NIKA RAM VS STATE OF
HIMACHAL PRADESH
Recording of confession requires compliance of provisions of Sec 164
cr.p.c.

60) 1967 CRLJ 248- STATE VS. LEKH RAJ FAQIR CHAND AND OTHERS
Section 351 Cr.P.C: The language of the section makes it clear that an
order under the section can be made only after cognizance of the offence
has been taken by a Magistrate and he is seized of the case. After
cognizance of the offence has been taken by a Magistrate he cannot be
deemed to get divested of that cognizance merely because of his passing an
order under Section 351, and it would, in my opinion, be an erroneous
approach to hold that after the making of an order under Section 351 by a
Magistrate, he takes fresh cognizance of the offence. The initial act of
taking cognizance of the offence is complete and cannot be undone by the
mere arraignment of another person as an accused consequent upon the
making of an order under Section 351 of the Code, and the reason for that
is that when a Magistrate takes cognizance he takes cognizance of the
offence as a whole and not merely in respect of the person who, for the
time being, is put in the dock as an accused.
Section 351 is an independent section in a Chapter of the Code distinct
and separate from the one in which Sections 190 and 191 find mention
and there is nothing in Section 351 to indicate that resort to it would bring
the case under Section 190 (1) (c) and thus make compliance with Section
191 imperative.

61) 1997 CRLJ 2989 = AIR 1997 SC 2494 – STATE THROUGH CBI VS.
DAWOOD IBRAHIM KASKAR AND OTHERS
Section 73 of the Code gives a power to the Magistrate to issue warrant of
arrest and that too during investigation is evident from the provisions of
part 'C of Chapter VI of the Code. Needless to say the provisions of
proclamation and attachment as envisaged therein is to compel the
appearance of a person who is evading arrest. Now, the power of issuing a
proclamation under Section 82 can be exercised by a Court only in respect
of a person 'against whom a warrant has been issued by it'. In other
words, unless the Court issues a warrant the provisions of Section 82, and
the other Sections that follow in that part, cannot be invoked in a situation
where inspite of its best efforts the police cannot arrest a person under
Section 41. Resultantly, if it has to take the coercive measures for the
apprehension of such a person it has to approach the Court to issue
warrant of arrest under Section 73; and if need be to invoke the provisions
of part 'C' of Chapter VI.
 Section 73 of the Code is of general application and that in course of the
investigation a Court can issue a warrant in exercise of power thereunder
to apprehend, inter alia, a person who is accused of a non­bailable offence
and is evading arrest. On such production, the Court may either release
him on bail under Section 439 or authorise his detention in custody
(either police or judicial) under Section 167 of the Code.

62) (2008) 2 SCC CRL 73= AIR 2008 SC 1528 - SOM MITTAL VS
GOVERNMENT OF KARNATAKA
The expression "rarest of rare cases" is used to emphasize that the power
under Section 482 Cr.P.C to quash the FIR or criminal proceedings should
be used sparingly and with circumspection."
Judgments are not to be construed as Statutes. Nor words or phrases in
judgment to be interpreted like provisions of statute.

63) 2006(1) ALT (CRI) 131 AP = 2005 CRLJ 3601 – UTTAM KUMAR JAIN
VS STATE OF AP
Under hire purchase agreement financier has a right to seize vehicle and
take possession, if there was a default in payment of one installment.

64) AIR 1994 SC 1349 – JOGINDER KUMAR VS STATE OF UP

The law of arrest is one of balancing individual rights, liberties and
privileges, on the one hand, and individual duties, obligation and
responsibilities on the other; of weighing and balancing the rights, liberties
and privileges of the single individual and those of individuals collectively;
of simply deciding what is wanted and where to put the weight and the
emphasis; of deciding which comes first ­ the criminal or society, the law
violator or the law abider; of meeting the challenge which Mr. Justice
Cardozo so forthrightly met when he wrestled with a similar task of
balancing individual rights against society's rights and wisely held that the
exclusion rule was bad law, that society came first, and that the criminal
should not go free because, the constable blundered.

65) 2010 (3) SCC CRL 1262 = 2010 (10) SCC 259 – ABDUL SAYED VS
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
Commission of offence with motive in a pre­planned manner shall always
justify conviction.

66) 2001 SUPREME APPEALS REPORT (CRL) 634 = AIR 2001 SC 2521 –
RAKESH AND ANOTHER VS STATE OF HARYANA
A person named in F.I.R. but dropped in charge­sheet can be summoned
under Section 319 (1) on evidence given by prosecution witness in
examination­in­chief without cross­examining him.

67) 2000 (1) ALD (CRI) 384 AP = 2000 CRLJ 2048 – KANTIPUDI
JAYASEELA VS STATE AND OTHERS
 It is true that the sub­section (4) of Section 319 Cr.PC in letter may sound
like contemplating 'de novo' trial. But this cannot be mechanically
followed. The Court has to see whether there is any incriminating material
against the newly added accused in the evidence of any one of the
prosecution witnesses examined earlier. If any such material is there,
certainly an opportunity should be given to the newly added accused to
cross­examine that witness. it is not necessary to examine all the
witnesses mechanically after impleadment of newly added accused. The
object of the section is to give opportunity to the newly added accused to
meet the incriminating material against him. It is futile to order re­
examination of the witness who did not say anything against the newly
added accused. It is true that the right of cross­examination is a valuable
right, however slender it may be as was held in the above case. Still, such
an opportunity cannot be mechanical.

68) 2002 SCC (Crl) 1203 = AIR 2002 SC 2031- SHASHIKANT SINGH VS
TARKESHWAR SINGH AND ANOTHER
Sec 319 CRPC: The mandate of the law of fresh trial is mandatory whereas
the mandate that newly added accused could be tried together with the
accused, directory.

69) 2010 SUPREME APPEAL REPORTER 117 = 2010 (11) SCC 520 –
HARINARAYANA G. BAJAJ VS STATE OF MAHARASTRA
"When an accused is summoned under Section 319 Cr.P.C. there has to be
De­novo trial."

70) 1996 CRLJ 1127 SC = AIR 1996 SC 722 – STATE OF MAHARASTRA

AND OTHERS VS ISHWAR PIRAJI KALPATRI AND OTHERS.
The emphasis of Section 197(1) of other similar provisions that "no court
shall take cognizance of such offence except with the previous sanction"
posits that before the taking cognizance of the offence alleged, there must
be before the court the prior sanction given by the competent authority.
Therefore, at any time before taking cognizance of the offence it is open to
the competent authority to grant sanction and the prosecution is entitled
to produce the order of sanction. Filing of charge­sheet before the court
without sanction per se is not illegal, nor a condition precedent.

71) 2004 CRLJ 2855 – ZAHEERA HABEEBULA SHAIK VS STATE OF

GUJRAT
The object of a criminal trial is to mete out justice and to convict the guilty
and to protect the innocent and therefore the trial should be a search for
truth and not about over technicalities, and must be conducted under
such rules as will protect the innocent and punish the guilty. Failure to
accord fair hearing either to accused or the prosecution violates even
minimum standards of due process of law. The Court is not merely to act
as tape recorder recording evidence, overloading the object of trial i.e. to
 get at the truth. Courts have to ensure that the accused persons are
punished and that the might or authority of the state is not used to shield
themselves or their man. If the appellate court considers additional
evidence to be necessary, the provisions inS.386 Cr.P.C and S.391 Cr.P.C.
have to be harmoniously considered to enable the appeal to be considered
and disposed of also in the light of additional evidence as well.

72) 2005 (2) ALT (CRI) 50 (AP) – M/S KVR ENTERPRISES PROP K.
SUBRAHAMANYAM VS. M/S MADRAS CEMENTS LTD AND ANOTHER
In case of proprietary concern proprietor was always an affected person,
who could either indict or to be indicted.

73) 2008(1) SCC (CRL) 571 = 2008 CR.L.J. 356 – RAJINDER SINGH
KATOCH VS CHANDIGARH ADMINISTRATION AND OTHERS
Registration of FIR – FIR Could not be directed if allegations do not
constitute an offence.

74) AIR 1996 SC 2452 CBI SPE SIU(X), NEWDELHI VS DUNCANS AGRA
INDUSTRIES LTD, CALCUTTA
The Banks had already filed suits for recovery of the dues of the Banks on
account of credit facility and the said suits have been compromised on
receiving the payments from the concerned companies. Even if an offence
of cheating is prima facie constituted, such offence is a compoundable
offence and compromise decrees passed in the suits instituted by the
Banks, for all intents and purposes, amount to compounding of the
offence of cheating.

75) 1992 CRLJ 1558 HP – MUNNA LAL VS STATE OF HIMACHAL

PRADESH AND OTHERS
The provision of law about the registration of FIR were very clear. When a
prayer for registration of FIR is made detailing the facts, then the police
had no option but to register it and thereafter start investigations. It was
another thing that after making investigations as a result whereof the
police may come to a conclusion that no offence was made out in which
eventuality it has to submit a report to the court for cancellation of the
FIR. Making an investigation and thereafter forming an opinion about the
non­commission of an offence followed by refusal to register FIR was a
procedure not known to law. It is in fact violative of the manner in which
FIR is to be registered and thereafter investigated.

76) 1992 CRLJ 2377 GUJRAT – JAYANTIBHAI LALUBHAI PATEL VS

STATE OF GUJRAT
FIR is a public document in view of Section 74 of the Evidence Act. It is a
document to which Section 162 of the Code does not apply and is of
considerable value as on that basis investigation commenced and that is
the first version of the prosecution.
77) 2013 (3) SCC (CRL) 227 - VAJRESH VENKATRAY ANVEKAR VS
STATE OF KARNATAKA
Sec 304B IPC ­ When a man looses his daughter due to cyanide poisoning,
he is bound to break down. He would take time to recover from the shock.
Six hours delay cannot make his case untrue. It is also not proper to
expect him to give all minute details at that stage. The F.I.R. contains
sufficient details. It is not expected to be a treatise.
It is one thing to say that every wear and tear of married life need not lead
to suicide and it is another thing to put it so crudely and suggest that one
or two assaults on a woman is an accepted social norm. Judges have to be
sensitive to women’s problems.

78) AIR 2009 SC 2513 - KIRENDER SARKAR AND ORS. VS. STATE OF
ASSAM
FIR is not substantive piece of evidence. If material facts are disclosed
therein it would be sufficient to set criminal law in motion. Mention of
name of accused in FIR is material fact. But mere non­mentioning of
names of some of accused persons would not render it totally
inadmissible.

79) AIR 2011 SC 280 - BRAHM SWAROOP AND ANR. VS. STATE OF U.P.
If evidence of eyewitnesses is trustworthy and believed by Court, question
of motive becomes totally irrelevant.
Delay in sending report can prove fatal for prosecution. But
creditworthiness of the ocular evidence adduced by the prosecution cannot
be ignored. If ocular evidence is worthy of acceptance, the element of delay
in registering a complaint or sending the same to the Jurisdictional
Magistrate by itself would not in any manner weaken the prosecution case.
An Appellate Court has full power to review, re­appreciate and reconsider
the evidence upon which the Order of acquittal is founded.

80) AIR 2009 SC 46 - STATE REP. BY D.S.P., S.B.C.I.D., CHENNAI VS. K.V.
RAJENDRAN AND ORS.
In view of the expressed prohibition in Section 362, under the inherent
powers of Section 482 of Cr. PC, an Order disposing of a criminal petition,
refusing to grant any relief, could not be modified.

81) AIR 2012 SC 364 – STATE OF PUNJAB VS DEVINDER PAL SINGH

BHULLAR JUDICIAL BIAS:
The allegations of judicial bias are required to be scrutinised taking into
consideration the factual matrix of the case in hand. The court must bear
in mind that a mere ground of appearance of bias and not actual bias is
enough to vitiate the judgment/order. Actual proof of prejudice in such a
case may make the case of the party concerned stronger, but such a proof
is not required. In fact, what is relevant is the reasonableness of the
 apprehension in that regard in the mind of the party. However, once such
an apprehension exists, the trial/judgment/order etc. stands vitiated for
want of impartiality. Such judgment/order is a nullity and the trial "coram
non­judice".
DOCTRINE OF WAIVER: Doctrine of waiver cannot be invoked against a
person who was not party to case.
ALTERATION: The prohibition contained in Section 362 Cr.P.C. is
absolute; after the judgment is signed, even the High Court in exercise of
its inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has no authority or
jurisdiction to alter/review the same.
Consequential proceedings Legality ­ Where initial action is not in
consonance with law, held, all subsequent and consequential proceedings
stand vitiated.

82) AIR 2011 SC 1232 – VISHNU AGARWAL VS STATE OF UP AND

ANOTHER
While in a review petition, the Court considers on merits whether there is
an error apparent on the face of the record, in a recall petition the Court
does not go into the merits but simply recalls an order which was passed
without giving an opportunity of hearing to an affected party. Hence Sec
362 Cr.P.C. not applicable.

83) AIR 2011 SC 1863 – BHAGWAN DASS VS STATE (NCT) OF DELHI

Person can be convicted on circumstantial evidence provided, links in
chain of circumstances connects the accused with crime beyond
reasonable doubt.

84) (2015) SUPREME SC 699 CHANDRA BABU @ MOSES VS STATE

THROUGH INSPECTOR OF POLICE & ORS
The Magistrate has the jurisdiction to ignore the opinion expressed by the
investigating officer and independently apply his mind to the facts that
have emerged from the investigation.
The magistrate does not have the jurisdiction to direct reinvestigation by
another agency.

85) AIR 2008 SC 1414 – SURESH NANDA VS CBI

Where there is a special Act dealing with specific subject, resort should be
had to that Act instead of general Act providing for the matter connected
with the specific Act.

86) AIR 2007 AP 40 - NORMAN SWAROOP ISSAC VS STATE BANK OF

INDIA AND ANR.
Passport could be seized only where reasonable suspicion exists that
holder of passport had committed an offence relating to passport or travel
document.
87) ANTHRU & ANOTHER V/S THE SUB INSPECTOR OF POLICE,
PANAMARAM POLICE STATION, WAYANAD & ANOTHER, 2015 0
Supreme(Ker) 793;
The statement of the learned Sessions Judge that the investigating officer
has no authority to grant bail for a non­bailable offence and that is the
prerogative of the judicial magistrate alone is a startling one. Section 437
of the Code relates to granting of bail in cases of non­bailable offences.
Sub­section (1) provides that when any person accused of or suspected of
the commission of any non­bailable offence is arrested or detained without
warrant by an officer­in­charge of a police station or appears or is brought
before the court other than the High Court or court of session, he may be
released on bail. Two situations are contemplated by this provision: (1)
accused is arrested or detained without warrant by a police officer and (2)
accused appears or is brought before the magistrate. No doubt, in both
these situations the accused may be released on bail. The question is who
has been empowered to grant bail in the first situation. In that situation
the only authority concerned is the Station House Officer. It is crystal clear
that it is to him the power to release the accused on bail is given in the
first situation. So, 8 when a person accused of or suspected of having
committed a non­bailable offence is arrested or detained without a
warrant, the station house officer has the power to release him on bail, but
the power is subject to the two exceptions given in sub­section 1 of Section
437 of the Code. At the same it may be noted that so far the magistrate is
concerned in the first and second provisos to the said Sub Section two
exceptions have been carved out of the above two exceptions and those
two exceptions given in the provisos are not applicable to a station house
officer.

88) DATLA ASHWINI SWETHA VS. STATE OF A P 2015 1 ALT(Cri) 164;

2014 0 Supreme(AP) 1217;
the bail now granted is since a anticipatory one, till end of trial (without
prejudice to the right to cancel meanwhile in case of need and/or for non­
compliance of conditions supra) any absence of petitioner/s as accused for
hearing/enquiry or trial, issuance of non­bailable warrant­NBW (unless
cancelled before execution) and even its execution and production of
accused as per the NBW; that does not tantamount to cancellation of bail
including from the wording of Section 439(2) Cr.P.C. and as such in such
an event no fresh bail application can be entertained. As it tantamounts to
only cancellation of bail bonds earlier executed, (leave about the power of
the court to issue surety notices by forfeiting bonds and for imposing
penalty on the bonds forfeited); the proper course it to direct the accused
to work out the remedy to pay penalty on the previous forfeited bonds as
per Sections 441 to 446 Cr.P.C. and to submit fresh solvency with self
bond for enlarging him by release from custody on payment of penalty of
the earlier bonds forfeited without need of enforcing against earlier
sureties again.
89) 2011(2) SCC (CRL) 618 CBI, HYDERABAD VS SUBRAMANI
GOPALKRISHNAN AND ANOTHER
Reliance on earlier orders of Apex Court in context of bail plea of A5, not
comparable because after grant of said order, entire scenario in trial
changed, hence said order cannot be cited as precedent. In view of
magnitude of scam, cancellation of bail of all other main accused, High
Court not justified in granting bail of Respondent Nos. A4 and A10 who
were auditors of company having paramount role in inflating assets and
bank balances of Company.

90) 1984 CriLJ 1056 RAMESH KUMAR VS STATE OF HIMACHAL

PRADESH
Cancellation of bail: The prosecution had to make out a case for
cancellation of that order based on some subsequent developments which
could show that the petitioner had abused his liberty.

91) 2004 CriLJ 924 - GORLE S. NAIDU VS. STATE OF A.P. AND ORS.
Mere acquittal of large number of co­accused does not per se entitle others
to acquittal

92) AIR 2003 SC 4259 - HEM RAJ AND ANR. VS. STATE OF PUNJAB
Report which discloses the commission of the cognizable offence must be
treated as the F.I.R. and does not matter whether the person lodging the
report had witnessed the commission of the offence or not.

93) 2007 CriLJ 1174 - RAJ KUMAR PRASAD TAMARKAR VS STATE OF

BIHAR AND ANR.
In case where High Court failed to take into consideration the relevant
facts and misapplied the legal principles, then Supreme Court can exercise
jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India as otherwise
there would be serious miscarriage of justice.

94) 2009 (1) ALD(Cri) 887 - KILARI MALAKONDIAAH @ MALAYADRI AND

ORS. VS STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH
To bring the charge of common intention, the prosecution has to establish
by evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, that there was plan or
meeting of mind of all the accused persons to commit the offence for which
they are charged with the aid of section 34, be it pre­arranged or on the
spur of moment but it must necessarily before the commission of the
crime.

95) 2003 CRILJ 1640 - KATURI SREENIVASA RAO VS STATE OF A.P. AND
ORS
Section 350 of Cr. P.C. when a witness fails to attend Court in obedience
to the summons issued to him, if after a summary enquiry it is found that
 he absented himself without a just cause, the maximum punishment that
can be imposed on him is a fine of Rs.100 and nothing more. This is not
applicable to witness. No other provision in Cr. P.C. also empowers a
Magistrate to remand a witness to judicial custody, if he fails to attend
Court.

96) AIR 2007 SC 1729 - RAVI @ RAVICHANDRAN VS. STATE REP. BY

INSPECTOR OF POLICE
Conviction of accused cannot be based on vague identification. In this case
identification of accused conducted after 8 days of publication of photos of
accused in newspaper. Held vague identification.

97) AIR 2008 SC 178 - : RAJINDER SINGH KATOCH VS. CHANDIGARH

ADMINISTRATION AND ORS.
Registration of FIR ­ FIR could not be directed to be registered if
allegations do not constitute an offence

98) 2004 CriLJ 4229 = (2004) 7 SCC 487 - STATE OF KARNATAKA VS.
BHASKAR KUSHALI KOTHARKAR AND ORS. ALSO HELD IN 2000 SCC
(CRL) 1186 BAHADUR NAIK VS STATE OF BIHAR
It is true that as part of fair trial investigating officer should be examined
in trial cases especially when a serious sessions trial was being held
against accused. If any of the prosecution witnesses give any evidence
contrary to their previous statement recorded under Section 161 CR.P.C.
or if there is any omission of certain material particulars, the previous
statement of witnesses could be proved only by examining the
investigating officer who must have recorded the statement of these
witnesses under Section 161 CR.P.C. if no serious contradiction appears
in respect of evidence of important eyewitnesses non examination of
investigating officer not fatal to prosecution.

99) AIR 1996 SC 2905 - BEHARI PRASAD ETC. VS. STATE OF BIHAR
Case of prejudice likely to be suffered by accused must depend on facts of
case and no universal straight jacket formula should be laid down that
non­examination of Investigating Officer per se vitiates criminal Trial.

100) STATE VS P. SESHAGIRI RAO AND ANOTHER 2002(1) ALD (CRL) 1

AP
Section 164 Cr.P.C. – The magistrate cannot directly record the statement
of a person unsponsored by the Investigating agency. Such statement
cannot be allowed to remain on record.

101) SHAIK BASHA VS STATE OF AP 2002 (1) ALD (CRL) 116 AP

Granting police custody after the expiry of 15 days prescribed u/Sec 167
stands illegal. The investigating agency ought to file application before
court seeking its assistance to send blood samples for DNA test.
102) BHAGWAN SINGH AND OTHERS VS STATE OF MP 2002 (1) ALD
(CRL) 710 SC
A miscarriage of justice which may arise from the acquittal of guilty is no
less than from conviction of an innocent. In a case where the trial court
has taken a view ignoring the admissible evidence a duty is cast upon
High Court to reappreciate the evidence in acquittal appeal for
ascertaining as to whether all or any of the accused has committed any
offence or not.

103) K. UMA MAHESWARI VS ADDITIONAL DIRECTOR GENERAL OF

POLICE, CID SAIFABAD HYDERABAD AND OTHERS 2002 (2) ALD
(CRL) 582 AP
Sec 173(8) Cr.P.C does not entitle the officers in charge of police station to
file a memo and seek to stop of all further proceedings in a case, until
further report is filed in pursuance of further investigation.

104) 2002 (2) ALD (CRL) 354 AP – RAVIKRINDI RAMASWAMY AND

ANOTHER VS STATE OF AP.
Case originally investigated by Renigutta police and charge sheet filed and
the same taken cognizance by the magistrate. Further investigation done
by CID into the same offence and a fresh charge sheet filed by it, without
permission of the magistrate. Held ILLEGAL. Further investigation cannot
be done without formal order by the concerned magistrate. The further
investigation can be done only by original Investigating Agency and not by
any other Investigating Agency.

105) 2002 (2) ALD (CRL) 358 AP – K. KRISHNA RAO VS STATE OF AP

Magistrate is to issue notice to Complainant before accepting closure
report and closing the proceedings. Magistrate has no power to review its
earlier order of closing the proceedings and assume the power of recording
sworn statement under the guise of review.

106) 2002 (2) ALD (CRL) 711 AP – KATURI SREENIVASA RAO VS STATE
OF AP AND OTHERS
Witness brought to the court on execution of warrant cannot be remanded
to Judicial Custody.

107) 2002 (2) ALT (Crl) 44 AP – MAKKENA SUBBA NAIDU VS STATE OF AP

AND OTHERS
Sec 452 Cr.P.C ­ Criminal Court is mainly concerned with right of
possession of property but not right over the property. The right over the
property can only be adjudicated by competent civil court having
jurisdiction.
108) 2004(2) ALT (CRL) 44 AP – ADUSMITHI RAJA RAO VS STATE OF AP
REP BY ITS PP, HIGH COURT OF AP, HYD AND OTHERS
Sec 156(3) – There is no provision in Cr.P.C or any other statute which
confers powers on Magistrate to direct any officer other than officer in
charge of police station to conduct investigation.

109) 1998 (1) ALT (CRL) 282 (KARN) – N. SHIVAKUMAR AND ANOTHER VS
N. RAMANA ADYANTHAYA
Police Officer disobeys law, fabricates official records and wrongfully
confines a citizen in police custody held to be acting in his official capacity.
Public Servant acting in discharge of official duties requires sanction for
prosecution.

110) 1999 (2) ALD (Crl) 951 AP – DARLA SRINIVAS VS DARLA SRIDEVI
AND OTHERS
Magistrate taking cognizance of offence u/Sec 494 on charge sheet filed by
the Police is illegal. As Sec 198 Cr.P.C prohibits the magistrate from taking
cognizance of said offences except on complaint filed by the aggrieved
party.

111) 1998(1) ALT (CRL) 286 AP – CHADALAVADA VENKATA NARAYANA

PRASAD VS STATE OF AP.
Sec 451 Cr.P.C – Petition of interim Custody for release of cash dismissed
on grounds of not furnishing the denomination and number of currency
notes seized. Held the decision of magistrate as improper.

112) PEDDA MAREPPA, S/O SHANMUKAPPA AND ORS V/S STATE OF

ANDHRA PRADESH - 2012 (3) ALT(Cri) 101, 2012 (8) RCR(Cri) 2
The High Court or Court of Sessions cannot exercise the jurisdiction under
Section 437 Cr.P.C. in granting or rejecting the bail. When a person is
detained in judicial custody, Section 439 bestows judicial discretion on the
High Court or Court of Sessions in the matter of granting or rejecting the
bail

113) GURVAIL SINGH @ GALA & ANOTHER V/S STATE OF Punjab – AIR
2013 SC 1177
The probability that the accused persons could be reformed and
rehabilitated is also a factor to be borne in mind. To award death
sentence, the aggravating circumstances (crime test) have to be fully
satisfied and there should be no mitigating circumstance (criminal test)
favouring the accused. Even if both the tests are satisfied as against the
accused, even then the Court has to finally apply the Rarest of Rare Cases
test (R­R Test), which depends on the perception of the society and not
"judge­centric", that is whether the society will approve the awarding of
death sentence to certain types of crime or not. While applying this test,
the Court has to look into variety of factors like society's abhorrence,
 extreme indignation and antipathy to certain types of crimes like rape and
murder of minor girls, especially intellectually challenged minor girls,
minor girls with physical disability, old and infirm women with those
disabilities etc. examples are only illustrative and not exhaustive. Courts
award death sentence, because situation demands, due to constitutional
compulsion, reflected by the will of the people, and not Judge centric.

114) MANDAGIRI KESHAVA RAO V/S STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH -

2000 (2) ALD(Cri) 772, 2000 (2) ALT(Cri) 477, 2001 CrLJ 13
The rule for relying on confession of an accused for the purpose of
conviction of another accused is that the confession should be used as a
piece of corroborative evidence which would mean that, if there is any
evidence against an accused person then that evidence may be
corroborated by the confession of another accused person. Courts should
not begin the process of dealing with conviction of a person on the basis of
a confession made by co­accused.

115) Our endeavour in this judgment is to ensure that police officers do not
arrest accused unnecessarily and Magistrate do not authorise detention
casually and mechanically. In order to ensure what we have observed
above, we give the following direction:
(1) All the State Governments to instruct its police officers not to
automatically arrest when a case under Section 498­A of the IPC is
registered but to satisfy themselves about the necessity for arrest under
the parameters laid down above flowing from Section 41, Cr.PC;
(2) All police officers be provided with a check list containing specified sub­
clauses under Section 41(1)(b)(ii);
(3) The police officer shall forward the check list duly filed and furnish the
reasons and materials which necessitated the arrest, while forwar­
ding/producing the accused before the Magistrate for further detention;
(4) The Magistrate while authorising detention of the accused shall peruse
the report furnished by the police officer in terms aforesaid and only after
recording its satisfaction, the Magistrate will authorise detention;
(5) The decision not to arrest an accused, be forwarded to the Magistrate
within two weeks from the date of the institution of the case with a copy to
the Magistrate which may be extended by the Superintendent of police of
the district for the reasons to be recorded in writing;
(6) Notice of appearance in terms of Section 41A of Cr.PC be served on the
accused within two weeks from the date of institution of the case, which
may be extended by the Superintendent of Police of the District for the
reasons to be recorded in writing;
(7) Failure to comply with the directions aforesaid shall apart from
rendering the police officers concerned liable for departmental action, they
shall also be liable to be punished for contempt of court to be instituted
before High Court having territorial jurisdiction.
 (8) Authorising detention without recording reasons as aforesaid by the
judicial Magistrate concerned shall be liable for departmental action by the
appropriate High Court.
14. We hasten to add that the directions aforesaid shall not only apply to
the cases under Section 498­A of the I.P.C. or Section 4 of the Dowry
Prohibition Act, the case in hand, but also such cases where offence is
punishable with imprisonment for a term which may be less than seven
years or which may extend to seven years; whether with or without fine.
2014 0 AIR(SC) 2756; 2014 0 CrLJ 3707; 2014 3 EastCrC(SC) 379;
2014 3 JLJR(SC) 313; 2014 3 PLJR(SC) 314; 2014 8 SCC 273; 2014 3
SCC(Cri) 449; 2014 5 Supreme 324; 2014 0 Supreme(SC) 489; Arnesh
Kumar Vs State of Bihar.

116) (A) Criminal Trial – Circumstantial Evidence – Conviction can be based

on circumstantial evidence provided the links in the chain of
circumstances connects the accused with the crime beyond reasonable
doubt. (Para 5)
(2010) 2 SCC 353; (2010) 2 SCC 583 – Relied upon
(b) Criminal Trial – Circumstantial Evidence – Motive assumes importance
in case of circumstantial evidence. (Para 6)
(2011) 3 SCC 306; Cr. Appeal 958/2011; (2006) 5 SCC 475 – Relied
upon
(c) Honour Killing – Wholly illegal. (Para 8)
(2006) 5 SCC 475 – Relied upon
(d) Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Section 302 – Apart from the appellant and
the deceased only two persons present in the house at relevant time –
Mother too old – There is no suggestion of the brother having committed
the crime – Deceased deserting her husband and living with her uncle –
Appellant having both motive and opportunity Clear motive – Appellant not
reporting death of his daughter even after ten hours – The entire
circumstances point to the guilt of the accused. (Para 8)
(e) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 162(1), Proviso – Statement
before Police may be treated as extra­judicial confession and can be taken
into consideration – Denial on confrontation may be an afterthought. (Para
8)
2011 0 AIR(SC) 1863; 2011 4 BBCJ(SC) 44; 2011 0 CrLJ 2903; 2011 3
JLJR(SC) 192; 2011 6 JT 345; 2011 2 RCR(Cri) 920; 2011 6 SCC 396;
2011 2 SCC(Cri) 985; 2011 3 Supreme 729; 2011 0 Supreme(SC) 502;
Bhagwan Das Vs State NCT Delhi.

117) the charges levelled against the petitioners herein cannot be said to be
vague and in a routine manner the petitioners are entitled for bail merely
because the entire investigation is over and charge sheet is filed.
2002 2 ALT(Cri) 204; 2002 0 Supreme(AP) 647; Syed Mohd.Raza
Abbass Vs State.
118) In S. 190, a distinction is made between the classes of persons who can
start a criminal prosecution. Under the three clauses of Section 190(1) to
which we have already referred, criminal prosecution can be initiated (i) by
a police officer by a report in writing, (ii) upon information received from
any person other than a police officer or upon the Magistrate s own
knowledge or suspicion, and (iii) upon receiving a complaint of facts. If the
report in this case falls within (i) above, then the procedure under Section
251A, Criminal Procedure Code, must be followed. If it falls in (ii) or (iii)
then, the procedure under Section 252, Criminal Procedure Code, must be
followed.
In our opinion, the position is clear that such reports, if they are regarded
as made under S.190(1) (b), must attract the provisions of S. 251 A of the
Code, because if the fiction is given full effect they cannot be regarded as
falling within complaints under S. 190(1)(a) or within S. 190(1)(c). In any
case, the Divisional Bench also said that S. 251 A is applicable to the trial
of a case which is initiated on a police report under S. 173 if the
investigation is one to which S. 173, Criminal Procedure Code may be
applied, and both the cohnditions are fulfilled in this case.
1965 0 AIR(SC) 1185; 1965 0 CrLJ 250; 1965 1 SCR 269; 1964 0
Supreme(SC) 219; Pravin Chandra Mody Vs State

119) At the stage of investigation, the material collected by an investigating

officer cannot be judicially scrutinized for arriving at a conclusion that
police station officer of particular police station would not have territorial
jurisdiction.
After investigation is over, if the Investigating Officer arrives at the
conclusion that the cause of action for lodging the F.I.R. has not arisen
within his territorial jurisdiction, then he is required to submit a report
accordingly under Section 170 of the Criminal Procedure Code and to
forward the case to the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the
offence.
1999 0 AIR(SC) 3596; 1999 0 AIR(SCW) 3607; 1999 3 Crimes(SC) 157;
1999 0 CrLJ 4566; 1999 8 JT 25; 1999 4 RCR(Cri) 503; 1999 6 Scale
323; 1999 8 SCC 728; 1999 8 Supreme 447; 1999 0 Supreme(SC)
1155; Satvinder Kaur Vs State Govt NCT DELHI

120) (i) Evidence ­ First Information Report Any telephonic information about
commission of a cognizable offence irrespective of the nature and details of
such information cannot be treated as First Information Report. (Criminal
Procedure Code, 1973 ­ Sections 2(h) and 154)
1994 1 Crimes(SC) 729; 1994 0 CrLJ 3067; 1994 0 SCC(Cri) 609;
Ramsinh Bavaji Jadeja Vs State of Gujarat.

121) Merely because an FIR and investigation for alleged offence u/s 13(1)(e)
r/w 13(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act for a particular check period
 culminated in acceptance of ‘B’ form by Court, fresh FIR and investigation
which covered earlier check period also cannot be quashed.
1999 0 AIR(SC) 1765; 1999 0 AIR(SCW) 1500; 1999 1 CCR(SC) 99;
1999 1 Crimes(SC) 109; 1999 0 CrLJ 2583; 1999 1 JCC 159; 1999 1
JT 540; 1999 2 RCR(Cri) 20; 1999 1 Scale 561; 1999 3 SCC 247; 1999
0 SCC(Cri) 397; 1999 2 SCT 165; 1999 2 Supreme 222; 1999 0
Supreme(SC) 225; M.Krishna Vs State of Karnataka.

122) the prosecution has failed to prove on record the writing of F. I. R. at the
time at which it is claimed to have been recorded. She also submitted that
there has not been any evidence on the record to prove motive of the
appellant forth commission of the offence and the witnesses examined by
the prosecution have, in fact, been introduced subsequently. She has also
submitted that the material witness Ram Avtar has been withheld by the
prosecution without any valid ground and the references have also been
planted upon the appellant.
1990 0 CrLJ 255; 1989 0 Supreme(Del) 421; Ramesh Kumar Vs. State
Delhi Admn

123) In both the messages, it was conveyed that cognizable offence of murder
had been committed. In the wireless message Ex. D­11, names of some of
the victims were also mentioned. Limiting ourselves to the requirement of
the present case, we are of the opinion that where messages are
transmitted between Police Officers inter se, the object and purpose in
transmitting the message must be ascertained before any message is
labelled as FIR. It is only if the object was to narrate the circumstances of
a crime, with a view that the receiving Police Officer might proceed to
investigate thereon, that the message would be FIR. But if the message
sent was cryptic because the object was merely to seek instructions from
higher Police Officers or because the object was to send direction for the
police force to reach the place of occurrence immediately or to merely give
information to superior Police Officers about the situation of law and
order, the message would not be FIR. The principle deducible from the
Supreme Court decision in Somabhai v. State of Madhya Pradesh AIR
1975 SC 1453 : 1975 Cri LJ 1201, is quite apposite here. In that case, the
complainant orally informed about the occurrence to Police Officer of
Police Station Olpad. The Police Officer instead of immediately reducing
the information into writing made a telephone call to the main Police
Station (Surat Police Station) with a view to seek further instructions.
Immediately thereafter the Police Officer of Olpad Police Station reduced
into writing the information given to him by the complainant. The
Supreme Court held that the information reduced, into writing at the
Police Station Olpad, though later in point of time to the telephonic
message recorded at Surat Police Station, was the real FIR. The telephonic
message recorded at Surat Police Station conveyed the information that
one Somabhai (the appellant in that case) had killed two persons by firing
 at them. The Supreme Court held that the telephonic information although
conveying the commission of a cognizable offence was too cryptic and was
meant only for the purpose of seeking further instructions. It had not been
made to the Police Officer of Surat Police Station for taking any action
thereon and was therefore not FIR.
1992 0 CrLJ 981; 1992 0 ILR(MP) 931; 1991 0 MPLJ 890; 1991 0
Supreme(MP) 34;Jagdish Vs State of Madhya Pradesh.

124) The provisions of law about the registration of F 1 R. are very clear.
When the petitioner approached the police on February 9, 1991 and
brought the facts which are given in this petition to their notice and
prayed for the registration of RI.R the police had no option but to register
it and thereafter start investigations It is another thing that after making
investigations as a result whereof the police may come to a conclusion that
no offence is made out in which eventuality it has to submit a report to the
Court for cancellation of the F.I.R. Making an investigation and thereafter
forming an opinion about the non­commission of an offence followed by
refusal to register F.I.R. is a procedure not known to law. It is in fact
violative of the manner in which F. I. R. is to be registered and thereafter
investigated. Cumulatively, we are, therefore, of the opinion that a
direction should issue to the State for the registration of the F. 1 R.
forthwith and, in the facts and circumstances of this case, for entrusting
the investigation of this case to a Police Officer not below the rank of
Inspector Police.
1992 0 CrLJ 1558; 1992 2 RCR(Cri) 254; 1991 0 Supreme(HP) 71;
MANNA LAL VS STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH

125) Whenever there is a bonafide requirement the court (to which FIR is
forwarded by Police) can grant certified copy of FIR or payment of legal fee
by the accused as it is a certified copy of a public document.
F.I.R. is a document to which Sec. 162 of the Code does not apply and is of
considerable value as on that basis investigation commenced and that is
the first version of the prosecution, as and when application is made by
accused for a certified copy of the complaint, the Court to which it is
forwarded should give certified copy of the F.I.R., if the application and
legal fees thereof have been tendered for the same in the Court of law.
JAYANTIBHAI LALUBHAI PATEL VS STATE 1992 2 Crimes(HC) 252;
1992 0 CrLJ 2377;

126) Constitution of India ­ Article 226 — Petitioner alleging beating inside the
prison by prison authorities — directions by Court to ADJ to enquire —
object of such enquiry is to form prima facie opinion — detailed objections
to report uncalled for. (Para 21 & 36)
Criminal Procedure Code 1973 ­ Section 157 — effect of — receipt of
information of commission of cognizable offence by police — it is bound to
 register the FIR unless the information is vague incomplete or does not
disclose cognizable offence. (Para 23 to 35)
Section 154 & 157 — allegations of beating causing injury to inmates of
prison out of vengeance — denial of animosity by prison officials — use of
fofce stated to be to control riot in prison — complicated questions of fact
— police directed to register F.I.R. and investigate the matter. (Para 1 to
24, 36 & 37)
1994 2 AD(Del) 445; 1994 2 CCR 1005; 1994 3 CCrC 44; 1994 0 CrLJ
2502; 1994 54 DLT 380; 1994 29 DRJ 407; 1995 1 ILR(Del) 352; 1994
0 JCC(Del) 414; 1994 2 RCR(Cri) 498; 1994 0 RLR 114; 1994 0
Supreme(Del) 266; KULDIP SINGH VS STATE OF DELHI

127) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973­Section 154, 156 and 197­Coginzable

offence committed by public servant can be investigated into sanction of
Government.
The Superme Court has also held in State of Andhra Pradesh v.
Venugopal, 1964 AIR(SC) 33, 1964 (70) CRLJ 16, 1964 (3) SCR 742, 1965
(2) MLJ(SC) 87, 1965 (2) MLJ 87 that this police Standing Order No. 145 is
nothing more than administrative instructions by the Government and has
no force of law.
1995 0 CrLJ 2754; 1995 1 MLJ(Cri) 522; 1995 0 Supreme(Mad) 240;
A. Nallasivan Vs State of Tamilnadu

128) When the deceased became unconscious they put the deceased on a cot
with a view to take him away somewhere ­ Thereafter dead body of the
deceased was never traced ­ No explanation given by the Police accused ­
The injured witnesses were left on a by­pass road ­ Prosecution case
cannot be disbelieved merely because the dead body is not traced ­ Under
these circumstances the only inference that can be drawn is that the
deceased expired because of the injuries caused by the accused ­
Convictions recorded are legally sustainable.
Held: It may be legitimate right of any police officer to interrogate or arrest
any suspect on some, credible material but it is needless to say that such
an arrest must be in accordance with the law and the interrogation does
not mean inflicting injuries. It should be in its true sense and purposeful
namely to make the investigation effective. Torturing a person and using
third degree methods are of medieval nature and they are barbaric and
contrary to law. The police would be accomplishing behind their closed
doors precisely what the demands of our legal order forbid.
It is a pity that some of the police officers, as it has happened in this case,
have not shed such methods even in the modem age. They must adopt
some scientific methods than resorting to physical torture. If the
custodians of law themselves indulge in committing crimes then no
member of the society is safe and secure. If police officers who have to
provide security and protection to the citizens indulge in such methods
 they are creating a sense of insecurity in the minds of the citizens. It is
more heinous than a game­keeper becoming a poacher. (para 7)
1992 0 AIR(SC) 1689; 1992 0 AIR(SCW) 1921; 1992 2 Crimes(SC) 329;
1992 0 CrLJ 3144; 1992 3 JT 216; 1992 2 RCR(Cri) 98; 1992 1 Scale
1274; 1992 3 SCC 249; 1992 0 SCC(Cri) 629; 1992 3 SCR 180; 1992 0
Supreme(SC) 397; Bhagwan Singh and another Vs State of Punjab.

129) The Investigating Officers, no doubt, suffer from a disadvantage as such

crimes are committed in secrecy and at odd hours of the night. The
intelligence on the basis of which the Investigating Officers act may
furnish accurate information and the interception of the contraband may
have been honest. But the intelligence on the basis of which the
Investigating Officers act, has to be transformed into legally valid
statements of the accused. There is no substatute for this legal
requirement. However honestly the Intelligence Officers believe that the
applicants are guilty of the crime, the subjective conviction of the
Investigating Officers about the guilt of the accused cannot be a substitute
for legally admissible evidence. The statements of the applicants procured
in their oppressed state of mind resulting from assault, fears denial of
access to the family, should be viewed with great caution. This is
especially so, at the state of granting ball, for the prospect conviction on
the basis of such material becomes poor.
"The Court" referred to in section 37 of the N.D.P.S. Act, being a legislative
substitute for the "Magistrate of the First Class" occurring in the repealed
section 36 is not intended to include the High Court Secondly, the
Parliament has identified the Special Court with the Court of the
Magistrate whose power to grant bail is restricted under section 437 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure. The restriction of the power of release on bail
created by section 37 of the N.D.P.S. Act being similar to that under
section 437 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Parliament did not
intend to include High Court within the words "Special Court". Thirdly,
section 37(2) of the N.D.P.S. Act has conceived the limitations on granting
bail specified in section 37(1)(b), as "in addition to the limitations under
the Code of Criminal Procedure". Therefore, in the Parliament's
conception, "the Court" is the Court whose power to grant bail is limited by
the Code of Criminal Procedure. The High Court, not being a Court of such
restricted power to grant bail, is not "the Court" conceived by section 37 of
the N.D.P.S. Act. Fourthly, the construction of the words "the Court" used
in section 37 of the N.D.P.S. Act deprives the High Court of its established
jurisdiction. There are no words in the N.D.P.S. Act which bring out the
intention to take away the jurisdiction of the High Court under section 439
of Code of Criminal Procedure.
1990 1 BomCR 451; 1990 0 CrLJ 2201; 1990 0 Supreme(Mah) 2;
Ashak Hussain Allah Detha @ Siddique & another VS Assistant
Collector of Customs (P) Bombay & another
130) Section 4 is comprehensive and that Section 5 is not in derogation of
Section 4(2) and it only relates to the extent of application of the Code in
the matter of territorial and other jurisdiction but does not nullify the
effect of Section 4(2). In short, the provisions of this Code would be
applicable to the extent in the absence of any contrary provision in the
Special Act or any special provision excluding the jurisdiction or
applicability of the Code. In fact" the second limb of Section 4(2) itself
limits the application of the provisions of the Code reading, but subject to
any enactment for the time being in force regulating the manner or place
of investigating, inquiring into, trying or otherwise dealing with such
offences." (Para 76)
1994 0 AIR(SC) 1775; 1994 0 AIR(SCW) 1656; 1994 1 Crimes(SC) 892;
1994 0 CrLJ 2269; 1994 70 ELT 12; 1994 1 JT 290; 1994 1 RCR(Cri)
690; 1994 1 Scale 294; 1994 3 SCC 440; 1994 0 SCC(Cri) 785; 1994 0
Supreme(SC) 147; Directorate of Enforcement Vs Deepak Mahajan and
another

131) thus from a reading of sub­section (1) of Section 46 of the Cr. P. C. it is

clear that a police officer while making arrest even if he actually touches
the body of the person to be arrested, he can be said to have arrested the
person. If a person is confined or kept in the police station or his
movements are restricted within the precincts of a police station, it would
undoubtedly be a case of arrest. In the instant case, the FIR specifically
states that Hardeep Singh was kept in the police station from the morning
of 27­9­1990. Section 57 of the Cr. P. C. provides that no police officer
shall detain in custody a person arrested without warrant for a longer
period than under all the circumstances of the case is reasonable and
such period shall not, in the absence of a special order, of a Magistrate
under Section 167, exceed twenty­four hours exclusive of the time
necessary for the journey from the place of arrest to the Magistrate's court.
Thus respondents 1 and 2 were required to produce Haerdeep Singh
within 24 hours from the time he was kept in the police station at
Savanur.
1992 0 CrLJ 1173; 1991 0 ILR(Kar) 3198; 1991 4 KarLJ 358; 1990 0
Supreme(Kar) 662; Kultej Singh Vs Inspector of Police.

132) Direction issued to ensure that ladles not be arrested by male policemen,
nor between sunset and sun­rise for separate lock­up for ladies.
The State Government is further directed to provide a complaint box duly
locked in every police lock­up and the keys of the complaint box should be
kept by the Officer in­charge of the Police Station. The Officer in­charge of
the concerned Police Station should provide paper and pen to the detainee
if so demanded for writing complaint and the Officer in charge of the
concerned Police Station should open the complaint box every day in the
morning and if any complaint is found in the complaint box, the officer in­
charge of the Police Station should produce such complaining detainee to
 the Magistrate immediately along with his complaint and the concerned
Magistrate would pass appropriate orders in the light of the complaint
made for medical examination, treatment, aid of assistance, as the case
may warrant;
1996 1 BomCR 70; 1995 0 CrLJ 4223; 1994 2 MhLJ 1769; 1994 0
Supreme(Mah) 449; Christian Community Welfare Council of India
(regd.) Vs. Government of Maharashtra and another.

133) In these affidavits the deponents have stated that no decision of this was
cited before the contemner on that date regarding handcuffing of
undertrial prisoners and that the contemner did not say that the decision
of this Court has no application and the police has the right to transport
the accused as they want, with or without handcuffs.
1996 0 CrLJ 1670; 1996 0 Supreme(SC) 78;RE : M. P. DWIVEDI AND
OTHERS,

134) (16) WE declare, direct and lay down as a rule that handcuffs or other
fetters shall not be forced on a prisoner _­ convicted or undertrial ­ while
lodged in a jail anywhere in the country or while transporting or in transit
from one jail to another or from jail to court and back. The police and the
jail authorities, on their own, shall have no authority to direct the
handcuffing of any inmate of a jail in the country or during transport from
one jail to another or from jail to court and back.
(17) WHERE the police or the jail authorities have well­grounded basis for
drawing a strong inference that a particular prisoner is likely to jump jail
or break out of the custody then the said prisoner be produced before the
Magistrate concerned and a prayer for permission to handcuff the prisoner
be made before the said Magistrate. Save in rare cases of concrete proof
regarding proneness of the prisoner to violence, his tendency to escape, he
being so dangerous/desperate and the finding that no other practical way
of forbidding escape is available, the Magistrate may grant permission to
handcuff the prisoner.
(18) IN all the cases where a person arrested by police, is produced before
the Magistrate and remand ­ judicial or non­judicial ­ is given by the
Magistrate the person concerned shall not be handcuffed unless special
orders in that respect are obtained from the Magistrate at the time of the
grant of the remand.
(19) WHEN the police arrests a person in execution of a warrant of arrest
obtained from a Magistrate, the person so arrested shall not be handcuffed
unless the police has also obtained orders from the Magistrate for the
handcuffing of the person to be so arrested.
(20) WHERE a person is arrested by the police without warrant the police
officer concerned may if he is satisfied, on the basis of the guidelines given
by us in para above, that it is necessary to handcuff such a person, he
may do so till the time he is taken to the police station and thereafter his
 production before the Magistrate. Further use of fetters thereafter can only
be under the orders of the Magistrate as already indicated by us.
(21) WE direct all ranks of police and the prison authorities to
meticulously obey the above­mentioned directions. Any violation of any of
the directions issued by us by any rank of police in the country or member
of the jail establishment shall be summarily punishable under the
Contempt of courts Act apart from other penal consequences under law.
The writ petition is allowed in the above terms. No costs
1996 0 AIR(SC) 2193; 1995 3 CCR(SC) 7; 1996 0 CrLJ 3247; 1995 0
JCC 378; 1995 4 JT 475; 1995 3 Scale 98; 1995 3 SCC 743; 1995 0
SCC(Cri) 600; 1995 2 SCJ 38; 1995 0 Supreme(SC) 621; Citizens For
Democracy Through Its President Versus State Of Assam

135) "1. The police personnel carrying out the arrest and handling the
interrogation of the arrestee should bear accurate, visible and clear
identification and name tags with their designations. The particulars of all
such police personne who handle interrogation of the arrestee must be
recorded in a register.
2. That the police officer carrying out the arrest of the arrestee shall
prepare a memo of arrest at the time of arrest and such memo shall be
attested by at least one witness, who may either be a member of the family
of the arrestee or a respectable person of the locality from where the arrest
is made. It shall also be countersigned by the arrestee and shall contained
the time and date of arrest.
3. A person who has been arrested or detained and in being held in
custody in a police station or interrogation centre or other lock­up, shall
be entitled to have one friend or relative or other person known to him of
having interest in his welfare being informed, as soon as practicable, that
he has been arrested and is being detained at the particular place, unless
the attesting witness of the memo of arrest is himself such a friend or a
relative of the arrestee.
4. The time, place of arrest and venue of custody of an arrestee must be
notified by the police where the next friend or relative of the arrestee lives
outside the district or town through the Legal Aid Organisation in the
District and the police station of the area concerned telegraphically within
a period of 8 to 12 hours after the arrest.
5. The person arrested must be made aware of this right to have someone
informed of his arrest or detention as soon as he is put under arrest or is
detained.
6. An entry must be made in the diary at the place of detention regarding
the arrest of the person which shall also disclose the name of the next
friend of the person who has been informed of the arrest and the names
and particulars of the police officials in whose custody the arrestee is.
7. The arrestee should, where he so requests, be also examined at the time
of his arrest and major and minor injuries, if any present on his/her body,
must be recorded at that time. The "Inspection Memo" must be signed
 both by the arrestee and the police officer effecting the arrest and its copy
provided to the arrestee and the police officer effecting the arrest and its
copy provided to the arrestee.
8. The arrestee should be subjected to medical examination by a trained
doctor every 48 hours during his detention in custody by a doctor on the
panel of approved doctors appointed by Director, Health Services of the
State or Union Territory concerned. Director, Health Services should
prepare such a peanel for all tehsils and districts as well.
9. Copies of all the documents including the memo of arrest, referred to
above, should be sent to the Illaqa Magistrate for his record.
10. The arrestee may be permitted to meet his lawyer during interrogation,
though not throughout the interrogation.
11. A police control room should be provided at all district and State
headquarters, where information regarding the arrest and the place of
custody of the arrestee shall be communicated by the officer causing the
arrest, within 12 hours of effecting the arrest and at the police control
room it should be displayed on a conspicuous notice board."
D.K. Basu v. State of W.B., 1997(1) SCC 416 : 1996(8) Supreme 581 :
1996(4) Crimes 233 (SC).

136) SO far as the recovery memo is concerned it is undoubtedly not signed

by the accused nor there is an endorsement at the foot of it that its copy
was given to the accused. It is disputed that the search of the person of
the accused­revisionist was taken under S. 51, Cr. P. C. It does not require
that when search of arrested person is made signature of the person
searched shall be taken on the memo of recovery and its copy should be
given to him. It simply requires that when any article is seized from the
arrested person a receipt showing the articles taken in possession by the
Police Officer shall be given to such person.
THE argument advanced by the learned counsel for the revisionist against
the credibility of the prosecution evidence is that only police witnesses
have been examined, no independent witness has been produced, copy of
recovery memo was neither signed by nor given to the accused and the
memo could not be prepared on the spot. In my opinion this criticism has
no force and does not lead to the inference that the finding arrived at is
perverse.
1989 2 AWC 1219; 1990 0 CrLJ 858; 1988 0 Supreme(All) 633;
MAHADEO VS STATE

137) Practice & Procedure ­ Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 ­ Section 167 ­
Applicability ­ There cannot be any detention in the police custody after
the expiry or First fifteen days even in a case where some more offences
either serious or otherwise committed by the accused in the same
transaction. come to light at a later stage ­ But such custody cannot
further held to be a bar for invoking a fresh remand to such custody like
police custody in respect of an altogether different case involving the same
 accused ­ The first period of fifteen days mentioned in Section 167(2) has
to be computed from the date of detention as per the orders of the
Magistrate and not from the date of arrest by the police ­ After the expiry
of the period of first fifteen days it should be only judicial custody.
1992 0 AIR(SC) 1768; 1992 2 Crimes(SC) 310; 1992 0 CrLJ 2768;
1992 3 JT 366; 1992 2 RCR(Cri) 147; 1992 1 Scale 1024; 1992 3 SCC
141; 1992 0 SCC(Cri) 554; 1992 3 SCR 158; 1992 0 Supreme(SC) 396;
Central Bureau of Investigation, Special Investigation Cell-I, New
Delhi Vs Anupam J. Kulkarni.

138) Inordinate delay in completing the investigation ipso facto is not a

ground for quashing the First Information Report or the proceedings
arising therefrom.
1990 0 AIR(SC) 1266; 1990 2 Crimes(SC) 40; 1990 0 CrLJ 1306; 1990
2 JT 43; 1990 3 RCR(Cri) 350; 1990 1 Scale 418; 1990 2 SCC 340;
1991 0 SCC(Cri) 7; 1990 1 SCR 746; 1990 0 Supreme(SC) 123; State
of A.P. Vs P.V. Pavithran.

139) THE framers of the Constitution had visualized the higher echelons of
the judiciary as comprised of men of strong moral and ethical fibre who
would provide moral leadership in the society of free India and function as
the sentinel of the other wings of the State not needing scrutiny
themselves. Our Constitution provides for separation of powers of the
three wings of the State with judicial review as one of the essential tenets
of the basic structure of the Constitution. It is thus the judiciary which is
entrusted with the task of interpretation of the Constitution and ensuring
that the other two wings do not overstep the limit delineated for them by
the Constitution. With this duty entrusted to the higher judiciary, it was
natural to expect that the higher judiciary would nol require any other
agency to keep a watch over it and the internal discipline flowing rrom the
moral sanction of the community itself will be sufficient to keep it on the
right track without the requirement of any external check which may have
the tendency to interfere with the independence of the judiciary, a
necessary concomitant of the proper exel­cise of its constitutional
obligation. It is for this reason that the higher judiciary was treated
dillcrent'ly in the Constitution indicating the great care and attention
bestowed in prescribing the machinery for making the appointments. It
was expected that any deviation from the path of rectitude at that level
would be a rare phenomenon and for the exceptional situation the
provision for removal in accordance with clause (4 of Article 124 was
made, the difficulty in adopting that course being itself indicative of the
rarity with which it was expected to be invoked. It appears that for a rare
aberrant at that level, unless he resigned when faced with such a
situation, removal from office in accordance with Article 124(4 was
envisaged as the only legal sanction. If this was the expectation of the
framers of the Constitution and their vision of the moral fibre in the higher
 echelons of the judiciary in free India, there is nothing surprising in t he
omission to bring them within the purview of the Prevention of Corruption
Act, 1947, or absence of a similar legislation for them alone. Obviously,
this position continued even during the deliberations of the Santhanam
Committee which clearly mentioned in its Report submitted in 1964 that it
has considered the judiciary outside the ambit of its deliberations. Clearly,
it was expected that the higher judiciary whose word would be final in the
interpretation of all laws including the Constitution, will he comprised of
men leading in the spirit of self­sacrifice concerned more with their
obligations than rights, so that there would be no occasion for anyone else
to sit in judgment over them. If it is considered that the situation has
altered requiring scrutiny of the conduct of even Judges at the highest
level, and that it is a matter for the Parliament to decide, then the remedy
lies in enacting suitable legislation for that purpose providing for
safeguards to ensure independence of judiciary since the existing law does
not provide for that situation. Any attempt to bring the Judges of the High
courts and the Supreme court within the purview of the Prevention of
Corruption Act by a seemingly constructional exercise of the enactment,
appears to me, in all humility, an exercise to fit a square peg in a round
hole when the two were never intended to match.
1991 3 JT 198; 1992 2 LLJ 53; 1991 2 RCR(Cri) 559; 1991 2 Scale
150; 1994 Supp1 SCC 274; 1991 0 SCC(Cri) 734; 1994 0 SCC(Cri) 577;
1991 3 SCR 189; 1991 0 Supreme(SC) 338; K.Veeraswami Versus
Union Of India

140) That takes us to the next question whether the Special Court can,
besides directing stoppage of investigation, entertain and act on a charge­
sheet or a police report submitted under section 173(2) of the Code in
such cases. The expression police report has been defined under the Code
to mean a report forwarded by a police officer to a Magistrate under sub­
section (2) of section 173 [section 2(r)]. Section 173 lays down that every
investigation under Chapter XII shall be completed without unnecessary
delay and as soon as it is completed, the officer­in­charge of the police
station shall forward to a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the
offence on a police report, a report in the form prescribed by the State
Government. It will thus be seen that the police report under section
173(2) has to be­submitted as soon as the investigation is completed. Now,
if the investigation has been stopped on the expiry of six months of the
extended period if any, by the Magistrate in exercise of power conferred by
sub­section (5) of section 167 of the Code, the investigation comes to an
end and, therefore, on the completion of the investigation section 173(2)
enjoins upon the officer­in­charge of the police station to forward a report
in the prescribed form. There is nothing in sub­section (5) of section 167 to
suggest that if the investigation has not been completed within the period
allowed by that subsection, the officer­in­charge of the police station will
 be absolved from the responsibility of filing the police report under section
173(2) of the Code on the stoppage of the investigation. (para 7)
1993 2 Crimes(SC) 321; 1993 3 JT 288; 1993 2 RCR(Cri) 431; 1993 2
Scale 743; 1993 3 SCC 288; 1993 3 SCR 570; 1993 0 Supreme(SC)
484; State of West Bengal Vs. Falguni Dutta & Anr

141) Sections 173 (2) (8),190 (1) (b) "2 (r)­There is no question of sending up of
a police report within meaning of Section 173 (2) until investigation is
completed­Report sent before investigation is completed will not be police
report within meaning of Section 173 read with Section 2 (r) and there Is
no question of Magistrate taking cognizance of­Offence within meaning of
Section 190 (1) (b) on basis of Incomplete charge­sheet.
1991 0 CrLJ 3329; 1991 1 MhLJ 656; 1991 0 MhLJ 656; 1991 0
MhLJ 666; 1991 0 Supreme(Mah) 85;Sharadchandra Vinayak Dongre
& others VS State of Maharashtra

142) A Magistrate is not entitled in the event of a police report, being a

negative report, to direct the police to file a charge sheet. All that he is
authorised to do is to direct a further investigation in the case. Similarly,
once a report under section 173 is submitted, taking of cognizance is the
exclusive province of the Magistrate. The police has no role to play in this
behalf.
1997 0 AllMR(Cri) 204; 1997 2 BomCR 51; 1997 0 CrLJ 617; 1997 1
MhLJ 412; 1996 0 Supreme(Mah) 526; Shravan Baburao Dinkar and
another VS N. B. Hirve and others

143) Whenever a Magistrates directs an investigation on a complaint the

police has to register a cognizable case on that complaint treating the
same as the FIR and comply with the requirements of the above Rules
1997 0 AIR(SC) 3104; 1997 0 AIR(SCW) 3146; 1997 2 CHN(SC) 78;
1997 3 Crimes(SC) 162; 1997 0 CrLJ 3757; 1997 7 JT 85; 1997 3
RCR(Cri) 679; 1997 5 Scale 70; 1997 8 SCC 476; 1997 7 Supreme
241; 1997 0 Supreme(SC) 993; Madhubala Vs Suresh Kumar

144) Criminal Procedure Code, 1973­Section 167(5) (as amended by State of

West Bengal)­Time limit for completion of investigation ­Extension of time
limit­Whether time could have been extended without the Investigating
Officer moving for such extension before the expiry of the period? (Yes)­
There is no conflict in 1993(3) SCC 288 & (1996) 1 SCC 34). (Para 11)
(ii) Criminal Procedure Code, 1973­Section 468­Limitation for cognizance
of offence­Offence u/s. 7 of Essential Commodities Act, 1955­Extent of
punishment­Section 7(1)(a)(ii) of E.C. Act stating ‘punishable with
imprisonment which may extend to 7 years’­Section 12AA(1)(f) ‘punishable
only upto 2 years’­Whether offence u/s. 7 E.C. Act is punishable only upto
2 years on a/c of Section 12AA of the Act? (No)­Effect­Offence will not
attract bar of limitation u/s. 468 of Cr.P.C. (Paras 17 & 18)
 There is no conflict between the ratio in State of West Bengal v. Falguni
Dutta & Ors., 1993(3) SCC 288 and that in Durgesh Chandra Shah v.
Vimal Chandra Shah 1996(1) SCC 341.
1998 0 AIR(SC) 2322; 1998 0 AIR(SCW) 2235; 1998 2 CCR(SC) 251;
1998 2 Crimes(SC) 267; 1998 0 CrLJ 3282; 1998 3 JT 436; 1998 2
RCR(Cri) 578; 1998 3 Scale 232; 1998 4 SCC 590; 1998 0 SCC(Cri)
1100; 1998 4 Supreme 209; 1998 0 Supreme(SC) 518; Nirmal Kanti
Roy etc. Vs State of West Bengal etc

145) When the Investigating Officer is of the opinion that there is no prima
facie case made out against the accused for filing report does not open to
any other authority to interfere with the discretion of the formation of
opinion and direct the Investigating Officer to prosecute the accused
It is settled principle of law that the report submitted by the Commission
of Inquiry under the Commission of Inquiries Act cannot be treated as a
police report under the provisions of Code of Criminal Procedure.
1997 3 ALD 784; 1997 1 ALD(Cri) 142; 1997 2 ALT(Cri) 53; 1997 0
CrLJ 3741; 1997 1 LS 533; 1997 0 Supreme(AP) 386; Mutharaju
Satyanarayan Vs. Government Of A.P.

146) "41.30 We find that policemen have a tendency to become cynical. We

also find that frequently such cynicism is developed, within very few years
of service. Policemen very rapidly pick up the knowledge that what the law
requires is one thing but what has actually to be done in practice is
another. Once this dichotomy takes root in their minds, all training, all
exhortations are a waste. Thus, the law is that third degree is not
permitted, but in practice that is the only way. Very often people
themselves expect the police to beat up goondas and when this is not done
charges of bribery and corruption are hurled at the police. People complain
that police are partial in their conduct, but policemen learn that while
under the law all are equal, as things happen, a rich man is more equal
than a poor man, a common citizen different from a politician or one who
has the support of a politician, a bureaucrat different from an ordinary
government employee ­ the list is endless."
130. It is the basic principle of legal jurisprudence that an enactment is
void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined. Vague laws
offend several important values. It is insisted or emphasised that laws
should give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to
know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. Vague laws may
trap the innocent by not providing fair warning. Such a law impermissibly
delegates basic policy matters to policemen and also judges for resolution
on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary
and discriminatory application. More so uncertain and undefined words
deployed inevitably lead citizens to "steer far wider of the unlawful
zone....than if the boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly marked."
 Powers of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to grant
bail cannot be affected by any legislation.
1994 1 Crimes(SC) 1031; 1994 0 CrLJ 3139; 1994 2 JT 423; 1994
Supp1 Scale 1; 1994 3 SCC 569; 1994 0 SCC(Cri) 899; 1994 0
Supreme(SC) 1; KARTAR SINGH Vs. STATE OF PUNJAB

147) THE basic idea embedded in Section 27 of the Evidence Act is the
doctrine of confirmation by subsequent events. The doctrine is founded on
the principle that if any fact is discovered in a search made on the
strength of any information obtained from a prisoner, such a discovery is a
guarantee that the information supplied by the prisoner is true. The
information might be confessional or non­inculpatory in nature, but if it
results in discovery of a fact it becomes a reliable information. Hence the
legislature permitted such information to be used as evidence by
restricting the admissible PORtion to the minimum. It is now well­settled
that recovery of an object is not discovery of a fact as envisaged in the
Section. The decision of Privy Council in Pullukurri Kottayya v. Emperor
AIR 1947 PC 67 is the most quoted authority for supPORting the
interpretation that the "fact discovered" envisaged in the Section embraces
the place from which the object was produced, the knowledge of the
accused as to it, but the information given must relate distinctly to that
effect.
2000 0 AIR(SC) 1691; 2000 0 AIR(SCW) 1617; 2000 3 CCR(SC) 41;
2000 0 CrLJ 2301; 2000 2 JCC 601; 2000 5 JT 575; 2000 2 RCR(Cri)
781; 2000 4 Scale 8; 2000 6 SCC 269; 2000 0 SCC(Cri) 1088; 2000 0
Supreme(SC) 920; State Of Maharashtra Vs Damu S/o Gopinath
Shinde

148) The lapse on the part of the Investigating Officer should not be taken in
favour of the accused, may be that such lapse is committed designedly or
because of negligence. Hence, the prosecution evidence is required to be
examined de hors such ommissions to find out whether the said evidence
is reliable or not.
Where Statements of the deceased to several witnesses including Police
Sub­Inspector who recorded the statement consistently and clearly stated
manner of assault and identified the accused, conviction treat¬ing
statements as dying declarations was justified.
1999 0 AIR(SC) 644; 1999 0 AIR(SCW) 296; 1999 1 CCR(SC) 1; 1999 0
CrLJ 1122; 1999 1 JCC 70; 1999 1 JT 25; 1999 1 PLJR(SC) 66; 1999
1 RCR(Cri) 627; 1999 1 Scale 26; 1999 2 SCC 126; 1999 0 SCC(Cri)
85; 1999 1 SCJ 299; 1999 1 Supreme 2; 1999 0 Supreme(SC) 22;
Paras Yadav & Ors. Vs. The State of Bihar

149) Statement recorded by Investigating Officer at hospital which was treated

as FIR—At the time of recording statement investigating officer did not
possess capacity of investigating officer as investigation had not
 commenced by then—Such statement could be treated as dying
declara¬tion in evidence under Section 32(1).
2000 3 Crimes(SC) 142; 2000 0 CrLJ 3949; 2000 0 SCC(Cri) 1343;
2000 5 Supreme 381; Gulam Hussain & Anr.Vs. State of Delhi

150) 1. Evidence of police officials, after careful scrutiny, if inspires,

confidence and is found reliable and trustworthy, if can form basis of
conviction.
2. Conscious possession of an unlicenced fire­arm, which answers the
discription of an arm under the Arms Act, in a Notified Area attracts
punishment under Section 5 of TADA Act.
3. Terrorists and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987­Section 5­
Even after expiry of the Act, proceedings vitiated under the Act wound not
come to an end. Without final conclusion. (Para 7)
1996 0 AIR(SC) 3079; 1996 0 AIR(SCW) 1534; 1996 2 CCR(SC) 54;
1996 1 Crimes(SC) 222; 1996 3 Scale 41; 1996 3 SCC 338; 1996 1
SCC(Cri) 515; 1996 3 Supreme 48; 1996 0 Supreme(SC) 637; Tahir Vs.
State (Delhi)

151) PW­3, Siri Chand, head Constable arrested the accused and on search
being conducted by him a pistol and the cartridges were recovered from
the accused. It was on his complaint a formal first information report was
lodged and the case was initiated. He being complainant should not have
proceeded with the investigation of the case. But is appears to us that he
was not only the complainant in the case but he carried on with the
investigation and examined witnesses under S. 161, Cr.P.C. Such practice,
to say the least, should not be resorted to so that there may not be any
occasion to suspect fair and impartial investigation.
The learned counsel in his fairness has submitted that although the
evidence given by the police personnel cannot be discarded as a matter of
rule but the rule of prudence requires that the prosecution case should
stand corroborated by an independent witness when such evidence can
easily be available so as to lend credence to the prosecution case. He has
also submitted that both the witnesses of the prosecution were police
personnel and they were examined shortly after the arrest of the accused.
In such circumstances, there should not have been any discrepancy about
the number of cartridges alleged to have been recovered from the person of
the accused. It has been submitted by the learned counsel that such
discrepancy only points out that the said police personnel were not
actually present at the time of search and seizure but a false case was
initiated against the appellant and precisely for the said reason the
discrepancy arose.
1995 0 AIR(SC) 2339; 1995 0 AIR(SCW) 3477; 1995 0 CrLJ 3988;
1997 2 RCR(Cri) 3; 1996 11 SCC 709; 1995 0 Supreme(SC) 219;
Megha Singh vs State of Haryana.
152) Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 ­ Section 172 ­ Scope of ­ Nature of
entries to be made in General diary as required u/s. 172 ­ Limited
permissible use by court or by accused indicated therein ­ Vagueness as to
nature of diary contemplated u/s. 172 ­ Some vagueness or confusion is
there in respect of meaning of word diary used in Sec. 172 and other
Sections of Cr. P.C. ­ A legislature change is necessary providing for
framing of appropriate and uniform regulations regarding maintenance of
diaries by police for purpose contemplated by Section 172 vis­a­vis other
sections.
1995 0 AIR(SC) 1748; 1995 0 AIR(SCW) 2741; 1995 3 CCR(SC) 54;
1995 2 Crimes(SC) 487; 1995 4 JT 159; 1995 3 Scale 236; 1995 4
SCC 430; 1995 0 SCC(Cri) 753; 1995 2 SCJ 466; 1995 0 Supreme(SC)
644; Shamshul Kanwar Vs State of U.P

153) The contradictions which persuaded the trial Court to disbelieve the eye­
witnesses related to their omissions to make certain statements before the
Investigating Officer, which they made before the Court. On perusal
thereof we find that the omissions were so minor and insignificant that
they did not amount to contradictions at all. (Para 7)
In responding to the next criticism of the trial Court regarding the failure
of the Investigating Officer to indicate in the site plan prepared by him the
spot wherefrom the shots were allegedly fired by the appellants and its
resultant effect upon the investigation itself, the High Court observed that
such failure did not detract from the truthfulness of the eye witnesses and
only amounted to an omission on the part of the Investigating Officer. In
our opinion neither the criticism of the trial Court nor the reason ascribed
by the High Court in its rebuttal can be legally sustained. While preparing
a site plan an Investigating Police Officer can certainly record what he sees
and observes, for that will be direct and substantive evidence being based
on his personal knowledge; but as, he was not obviously present when the
incident took place, he was to derive knowledge as to when, where and
how it happened from persons who had seen the incident. When a witness
testified about what he heard from somebody else it is ordinarily not
admissible in evidence being hearsay, but if the person for whom he heard
is examined to give direct evidence within the meaning of Section 60 of the
Evidence Act, the former s evidence would be admissible to corroborate the
latter in accordance with Section 157 Cr. P.C. However such a statement
made to a Police Officer, when he is investigating into an offence in
accordance with Chapter XII of the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be
used to even corroborate the maker thereof in view of the embargo in
Section 162 (1) Cr.P.C. appearing in that chapter and can be used only to
contradict, him (the maker) in accordance with the proviso thereof, except
in those cases where sub­section (2) of the section applies. That
necessarily means that if in the site plan P.W. 6 had even shown the place
from which the shots were allegedly fired after ascertaining the same from
 the eye witnesses it could not have been admitted in evidence being hit by
Section 162 Cr. P.C. (Para 9)
1996 0 AIR(SC) 3136; 1996 0 AIR(SCW) 1666; 1996 2 CCR(SC) 13;
1996 1 Crimes(SC) 174; 1996 3 JT 89; 1996 2 Scale 650; 1996 8 SCC
199; 1996 0 SCC(Cri) 565; 1996 2 Supreme 608; 1996 0 Supreme(SC)
544; Jagdish Narain & Anr.Vs. State of U.P.

154) It is the obligation of the police particularly after taking a person in

custody to ensure appropriate protection of the person taken into custody
including medical care if such person needs it.
1991 2 PLJR(SC) 76; 1991 3 SCC 482; 1991 0 SCC(Cri) 639; 1991 0
Supreme(SC) 130; SUPREME COURT LEGAL AID COMMITTEE
THROUGH ITS HONY. SECRETARY Vs. STATE OF BIHAR AND
OTHERS.

155) Constitution of India ­ Article 32 ­ Habeas Corpus Writ. Case u/s.

363/366/506 I.P.C. registered on the report of brother of girl­ Girl alleging
to have married accused boy on her own ­ Police alleging to have kept the
girl in police station for 3 days to get her radiological examination and
then for getting her statement recorded u/s. 164 Cr. P.C. ­ Girl imputing
constant threat and misbehaviour at the hands of police in the police
station ­ Though the girl had been released but the writ petition to
continue as one for qualified habeas corpus for examining the legality of
detention ­ In view of the allegations and counter allegations an inquiry
report called from Dist. Judge.
1993 3 Crimes(SC) 1062; 1993 4 Scale 418; 1994 Supp1 SCC 500;
1994 0 SCC(Cri) 584; 1993 0 Supreme(SC) 1072; Arvinder Singh
Bagga Vs State Of U.P.

156) The detention of a married woman in custody who is not an accused on

the pretext of her being a victim of abduction and rape which never was to
her knowledge and to the knowledge of the police officers concerned
aforesaid is itself a great mental torture for her which cannot be
compensated later but here we have found that she was tortured otherwise
also by threats of violence to her and to her husband and his family and
was given physical violence calculated to instil fear in her mind and
compel her to yield and to abondon her marriage with Charanjit Singh
Bagga which had been duly performed in Arya Samaj Bhoor and which
had been duly performed in Arya Samaj Bhoor and which had been duly
registered inthe officer of Registrar of Hindu Marriages under the U.P.
Hindu Marriage Registration Rules, 1973 framed by the Governor in
exercise of the powers conferred by section 8 of the Hindu Marriage Act,
1955 (Act No. xxv of 1995).
The State shall pay a compensation of Rs. 10,000 to Nidhi, Rs. 10,000/­to
Charanjit Singh Bagga and Rs. 5,000/­ to each of the other persons who
were illegally detained and humiliated for no fault of theirs. Time for
 making payment will be three months from the date of this Judgement.
Upon such payment it will be open to the State to recover personally the
amount of compensation from the concerned police officers. AIR 1995 SC
117= 1994(6) SCC 565 = 1994(6) JT 478 = 1994(4) Scale 466 = 1994(3)
Crimes 694 = Arvinder Singh Bagga Vs State Of U.P

157) International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966­Article 9(5)­To

what extent can the provisions of such international
covenants/conventions be read into national laws?
Held : It is not clear whether our Parliament has approved the action of the
Government of India ratifying the said 1966 Covenant. Assuming that it
has, the question may yet arise whether such approval can be equated to
legislation and invests the covenant with the sanctity of a law made by
Parliament. As pointed out by this Court in S.R. Bommai v. Union of India
(1994 (3) SCC 1), every action of Parliament cannot be equated to
legislation. Legislation is no doubt the main function of the Parliament but
it also performs many other functions all of which do not amount to
legislation. In our opinion, this aspect requires deeper scrutiny than has
been possible in this case. For the present, it would suffice to state that
the provisions of the covenant, which elucidate and go to effectuate the
fundamental rights guaranteed by our Constitution, can certainly be relied
upon by courts as facets of those fundamental rights and hence,
enforceable as such. So far as multi­lateral treaties are concerned, the law
is, of course, different ­ and definite. (Para 9)
1997 0 AIR(SC) 1203; 1997 0 AIR(SCW) 1234; 1997 1 CCR(SC) 187;
1997 1 CHN(SC) 57; 1997 1 Crimes(SC) 190; 1997 2 JT 311; 1997 2
RCR(Cri) 161; 1997 1 Scale 706; 1997 3 SCC 433; 1997 0 SCC(Cri)
434; 1997 1 SCJ 480; 1997 2 Supreme 429; 1997 0 Supreme(SC) 209;
People s Union for Civil Liberties Vs Union of India & Anr

158) It is the settled law that each case must be decided on its own facts and
that no rigid rule can be followed and every rule has its own exception. It
is also settled that the Courts of law are not to be carried away by mere
suspicions, conjectures and imaginary things but however, the Courts are
bound to follow the circumstances and the legal evidence alone. The
suspicion however it strong may be, may not be a good ground for the
Court to implement the law in any given case. Accordingly, if we consider
the contentions made by the learned counsel on behalf of the petitioners,
simply because some doubt arises or suspicion arises, it cannot be a
countenance for any moment in the light of our elaborate observations and
discussions given above.
We are quite sure to say that it is possible for the reasoning that with a
view to meet the three dreaded gangsters who are the notorious gangsters
indulging in extortion during the trap led by the police party. There is
evidence to show that the police party had selected three teams which
must be conversant with the retaliation work with all accurate aim,
 adequately too and that above all, the police personnel decided to lay the
trap and secured the accused as fully trained personnel used the fire arms
and it was thus while they retaliate against the untrained persons, the
injuries found on them could have been caused by the bullets fired by the
trained persons, may reach the vulnerable parts of the body. If this being
so, there is nothing strange for severe injuries found on the important
parts of the human anatomy and the three dreaded persons and it is not
possible for the policemen to sustain any injuries on their part. The
sending of the articles, according to the learned counsel for the petitioners,
for chemical analyser was very late in the instant case and that therefore
the case of the respondents could not be believed. We find hardly any
substance in the said contention. This is not a case of one side eliminated
the other by indirect manner. This is a case of encounter and immediately
after the encounter the case was registered and the investigation was
started and all the materials were collected to show that it was a true
encounter that had taken place at the time and day as claimed.
1998 0 CrLJ 4295; 1998 0 Supreme(Mah) 326; Vandana Vikas
Waghmare VS State of Maharashtra

159) Articles 21, 226­Persnnal liberty­Violation of­Under trial prisoner

handcuffed and paraded through streets­No justification­Rules of Bombay
Police Manual dis­regarded.
Article 226 of the Constitution specifically provides that the High Court
may issue to any person or authority directions for the enforcement of any
of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose. The 4th
respondent is a person. He is also a person in whom authority is vested
under the Code of Criminal Procedure. He has abused that authority. He
has acted outside the scope of that authority. He has acted outside the
scope of the law which given him that authority. He has acted outside the
rules which he must follow while exercising that authority. Court has
therefore, no hesitation in holding that in exercise of the powers of this
Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, Court can also direct that
compensation shall be paid by the State or a person acting on behalf of the
State to a citizen whose fundamental rights have been trampled upon.
1990 2 BomCR 242; 1991 0 CrLJ 2344; 1990 0 Supreme(Mah) 49 ;
Ravikant Patil VS Director General of Police & others

160) Sections 56, 59­Notice of externment to petitioner grounds­Beating

people. causing loss to peoples properties and witness not willing to come
forward out of fear challenged­Defects in notice­Held­Period during which
petitioner indulged in alleged antisocial activities not mentioned in notice­
Allegation of beating people and causing loss to peoples properties vague­
Not mentioned in notice that witnesses were not coming forward out of
fear­Such failure fatal to validity of notice­Order of externment illegal and
liable of be set aside.
 1991 0 CrLJ 1251; Prakash Sitaram Shelar VS State of Maharashtra
and others

161) TAKING out religious processions peaceably are traceable to both Arts.
19 (1) (b) as also 25 of the constitution of India. It is true that reasonable
restrictions can be placed as envisaged under Art. 19 (3) of the Indian
Constitution to maintain public order S. 30 of the Police Act referred to by
the 3rd respondent in his proceedings mentioned supra may be a
regulation in that regard. But the restriction under the said regulation
should be a reasonable restriction and should not be unreasonable so as
to exceed the necessity of placing such a restriction.
IN the writ petition, it is pleaded that the procession ought to be taken out
is a religious procession and the taking out of the same is a part of
fundamental rights and that discrimination is being played by respondents
2 and 3 in permitting the 4th respondent to take out such procession and
preventing the petitioner from doing so.
WHEN the fundamental rights are involved and when there is an allegation
of discrimination between the two similarly situated persons or
associations, no embargo can be placed on the powers of this Court in
exercise of Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. The law and order
problem is a problem which has to be tackled by the respondents 1 or 3
and it is their duty and obligation. In fact, in a police State like ours, the
State owes the said duty towards the citizens and the same has to be
carried out in full spirit by the respondents 2 and 3.
Allowed on condition to fix different timings and avoiding convergence of
both rallies.
1992 0 AIR(AP) 357; 1993 0 CrLJ 406; 1992 0 Supreme(AP) 334;
Gehohe-e-miran Shah VS Secretary, Home Department, Government
Of A. P

162) I am of the considered opinion that no person has any right under the
provisions of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder to get amusement
licence as a matter of right. No such right is conferred upon any individual
and similarly no such statutory duty is imposed upon the Commissioner of
Police to grant the amusement licence as and when asked for by an
interested person. It is true the statutory power conferred upon the
Commissioner of Police is required to be exercised fairly and reasonably.
Every person who applies for grant of amusement licence, undoubtedly,
has a right for consideration of his application in accordance with law. The
Commissioner of Police, while considering such application for granting
amusement licence is required to take decision in accordance with law and
provisions of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder. He is required to
take the relevant factors into consideration and eshew the irrelevant facts.
An important aspect that was not taken into consideration by this Court in
the earlier decisions is that there is no provision for renewal of amusement
licence. Every time the concerned individual has to apply afresh for grant
 of the licence and every time such request is required to be considered by
the authority afresh and in accordance with law. There is no provision for
granting renewal, as in the case of various other enactments.
THE petitioner is not doing any business in organising Indian Classical
dance. His business is running Restaurant. By the impugned order the
business and trade of the petitioner is in no way adversely effected.
Therefore, the question of infringement of the fundamental right
guaranteed under Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution of India does not
arise. At any rate, this point is not seriously pursued by the petitioner
and, therefore, no final opinion as such need be expressed. Variety of
questions may arise about the nature of the trade and business and the
extent of restrictions that could be imposed on such trade or business. No
opinion need be expressed on that count.
1998 3 ALD 346; 1998 3 ALT 613; 1998 1 APLJ(Cri) 352; 1998 0 CrLJ
4121; 1998 0 Supreme(AP) 283; Badshah Restaurant VS
Commissioner of Police, Hyderabad

163) THE Act called the "code of Criminal Procedure, 1973" (Central Act No. 2
of 1974) which, is not in dispute, applies in respect of all offences under
the Indian Penal Code as well as other laws, subject to any enactment for
the time being in force, regulating the manner or place of investigation
enquiring into crime or otherwise dealing with such offences in the State.
The Code has broadly recognised the role of Executive Magistrates and
Judicial Magistrates, the hierarchy of the investigation of the offences,
subject to the provisions of the Police Acts applicable in different areas of
the State and that of the Courts of Sessions.
The Director General of Police and such other Police Officers who are
empowered in this behalf shall have the powers of the Magistrate
(Executive Magistrate) throughout the territory for which they are
appointed such as the District Superintendent of Police shall have the
power of the Executive Magistrate under the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra
Area) District Police Act. Under the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area)
District Police Act, the police administration with the local jurisdiction of
the Collector of a District shall, under the general supervision and
direction of such Collector of a District, be vested in the District
Superintendent of Police who has the powers of the Executive Magistrate
and in the city governed by the Hyderabad City Police Act, the
Commissioner of Police shall have the said power. These Acts have
elaborately provided for deployment of the Police force for prevention as
well as, after the offence is committed, for investigation and such suitable
action as the law provides for and for many other matters in which the
Police has to play a positive role for prevention of crimes and investigation
of cases and in doing so, the power of the Executive Magistrate is vested in
the concerned Police Officer to discharge the duties of the Executive
Magistrate.
WE accordingly hold :­ (1) The State has a duty to provide necessary
security to the constitutional functionaries and if there is any expense
upon such security, the Government can do so out of the funds of the
exchequer of the State; (2) The Government has a duty to protect the
properties of the State including the Union and other State Governments
and any expenses for security of the properties of the State can
legitimately be borne out of the State s exchequer; (3) Depending upon the
threat perception in respect of such statutory functionaries which are
discharging duties on behalf of the State, the Government may take a
policy decision and provide security to such personnel to such extent as
decided by the Government and expenses for the same can legitimately be
borne by the State exchequer; (4) The State has a duty to maintain peace
to ensure that the public order is not threatened and to protect the life and
liberty of all persons living within the territory of the State as well as has a
duty to enforce effectively such measures as laws have permitted for
preventing any unlawful activity of any person or persons and the State,
for such failures or failings by its servants and agents, shall be answerable
to the Court as and when complaints in this behalf are made. (5)
Individual or individuals, who apprehend threat to peace and to his or
their lives can approach the competent authority at the first instance at
the district level and make application for deployment of special force for
maintaining peace and for protection of his or their lives and liberty. On
such application being made, the competent authority shall be duty bound
to promptly make suitable orders without any delay. In case the
application is rejected by the district authority, the applicant shall have
the right to make application before the superior authority in the hierarchy
as indicated above, the last being before the Government of the State. The
applicant/applicants for such security or deployment of Special Police
Force shall, however, be responsible for the cost as envisaged under the
Acts aforementioned and the Government shall have no authority at all to
make any expense upon such special force from and out of the revenue of
the State; (6) Any person or persons, who, however, have apprehension to
threat to their life or his or her property from the Government, its servants
or agents, in exceptional cases, can approach the Court for suitable orders
and the Court of the first instance, in our view, will be the Court of the
Magistrate, who may issue necessary directions for bonds to be executed.
In such cases, however, where the threat is from the police and the charge
is of police excess, the party concerned can move the Court for protection;
(7) Applicant, in case his applications have been refused, can approach
this Court seeking judicial review of the order of the Court with all
constraints self imposed and within the bounds of rules of judicial review
may examine individual cases strictly in accordance with law. Any
application, however, except for judicial review in the aforesaid
circumstances directly made to this Court shall not be entertainable as no
cause for a mandamus by the Court shall be deemed to have been arisen if
 the applicant made no efforts to approach the competent authority for
such security.
1997 2 ALD 694; 1997 4 ALD 588; 1997 1 ALD(Cri) 19; 1996 4 ALT
985; 1997 0 CrLJ 1296; 1996 0 Supreme(AP) 1043; G. Subas Reddy
VS State Of A. P

164) Since the Act is a special law which prescribes a period of limitation
different from the period prescribed in the Schedule to the Limitation Act
for suits against persons governed by the Act in relation to matters covered
by Section 140, by virtue of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, the period
of limitation prescribed by Section 140 of the Act would be the period of
limitation prescribed for such suits and not the period prescribed in the
Schedule to the Limitation Act.
1993 0 AIR(SC) 2579; 1993 0 AIR(SCW) 3240; 1993 0 CrLJ 3531;
1993 5 JT 189; 1994 1 RCR(Cri) 252; 1993 3 Scale 706; 1994 1 SCC
64; 1994 0 SCC(Cri) 99; 1993 4 SCT 320; 1993 0 Supreme(SC) 742;
1993 2 UJ 599; Prof. Sumer Chand Vs. Union of India and others

165) CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, Secs482 and 313 ­ After prosecution

evidence and examination of accused u/S313 CrPC, petition filed on
behalf of accused for appointment of Commissioner for examining a
wintess who is suffering from Diabetes, High BP and Chronic Heart
Disease requiring continuous medication, to prove plea of alibi ­ Sessions
Judge dismissing application on ground of directions of High Court to
dispose of case with in specified period ­ Trial Court is bound to comply
with a direction of High Court for disposal of case by particular date ­
Such direction can not be a ground for rejecting application on ground
that grant of such an application could disable Sessions Judge in
complying with directions of High Court for expeditious disposal ­ Order
passed by Sessions Judge ­ Quashed ­ Directions issued to appoint
Commissioner for examining witness on behalf of accused.
2000 1 ALD(Cri) 893; 2000 2 ALT(Cri) 248; 2000 0 CrLJ 2564; 2000 2
LS 157; 2000 0 Supreme(AP) 305; Pyboina Ravindra Kumar VS State
Of A. P.

166) Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, Sec. 14 (iii) ­Distributor whether a

seller­Sec.19 (2) & 20 (A)­Meaning and scope of­Code of Criminal
Procedure 1898, Sec. 239 (d) ­ Joint trial of manufacturer, distributor &
vendor whether proper­Their action when forms part of the same
transaction.
A vendor, distributor and a manufacturer can be tried together provided
the allegations made before the court show that there are connecting links
between their activities so, as to constitute the same transaction. (Para 23)
1975 0 AIR(SC) 1309; 1975 0 BBCJ(SC) 340; 1975 0 CrLJ 1091; 1975
1 SCC 866; 1975 0 SCC(Cri) 410; 1975 0 Supreme(SC) 137; M/s.
Bhagwan Das Jagdish Chander, Vs. Delhi Administration and another.
167) 1. If the witness who deposed one way earlier comes before the appellate
Court with a prayer that he is prepared to give evidence which is
materially different from what he has given earlier at the trial with the
reasons for the earlier lapse, the Court can consider the genuineness of
the prayer and in an appropriate case accept it.
2. Whether a re­trial under Section 386 Cr.P.C. or taking up of additional
evidence u/s 391 Cr.P.C. is the proper procedure will depend on the facts
and circumstances of each case for which no straight jacket formula of
universal and invariable application can be formulated.
3. In the case of defective investigation the Court has to be circumspect in
evaluating the evidence and may have to adopt an active and analystical
role.
A criminal trial is a judicial examination of the issues in the case and its
purpose is to arrive at a judgment on an issue as a fact or relevant facts
which may lead to the discovery of the fact issue and obtain proof of such
facts at which the prosecution and the accused have arrived by their
pleadings; the controlling question being the guilt or innocence of the
accused. Since the object is to mete out justice and to convict the guilty
and protect the innocent, the trial should be a search for the truth and not
a bout over technicalities, and must be conducted under such rules as will
protect the innocent, and punish the guilty. The proof of charge which has
to be beyond reasonable doubt must depend upon judicial evaluation of
the totality of the evidence, oral and circumstantial and not by an isolated
scrutiny. Failure to accord fair hearing either to the accused or the
prosecution violates even minimum standards of due process of law. It is
inherent in the concept of due process of law, that condemnation should
be rendered only after the trial in which the hearing is a real one, not
sham or a mere farce and pretence. Since the fair hearing requires an
opportunity to preserve the process, it may be vitiated and violated by an
overhasty stage­managed, tailored and partisan trial. The fair trial for a
criminal offence consists not only in technical observance of the frame and
forms of law, but also in recognition and just application of its principles
in substance, to find out the truth and prevent miscarriage of justice.
Criminal Trial­Fair trial, concept of­Prohibition against tampering with
witness, victim or informant­Courts have to take a participatory role in a
trial­Criminal Procedure Code, 1973­Sections 311 and 391­Evidence Act,
1872­Section 165.
In the case of a defective investigation the Court has to be circumspect in
evaluating the evidence and may have to adopt an active and analytical
role to ensure that truth is found by having recourse to Section 311 or at a
later stage also resorting to Section 391 instead of throwing hands in the
air in despair. It would not be right in acquitting an accused person solely
on account of the defect; to do so would tantamount to playing into the
hands of the investigating officer if the investigation is designedly
defective.
 Since we have directed re­trial it would be desirable to the investigating
agency or those supervising the investigation, to act in terms of Section
173(8) of the Code, as the circumstances seem to or may so warrant. The
Director General of Police, Gujarat is directed to monitor re­investigation,
if any, to be taken up with the urgency and utmost sincerity, as the
circumstances warrant.
2004 0 AIR(SC) 3114; 2004 3 BBCJ(SC) 194; 2004 2 CCR(SC) 187;
2004 2 Crimes(SC) 213; 2004 0 CrLJ 2050; 2004 1 JT 94; 2004 Supp1
JT 94; 2004 2 RCR(Cri) 836; 2004 4 Scale 375; 2004 4 SCC 158; 2004
0 SCC(Cri) 999; 2004 3 Supreme 210; 2004 0 Supreme(SC) 451;
Zahira Habibulla H. Sheikh & Anr. Vs. State of Gujarat & Ors.

168) The High Court has chosen to sidestep another incriminating

circumstance which is based on Section 27 of the Evidence Act on the
ground of delay in interrogating the accused by the investigating officer.
We are unable to appreciate the said reasoning for dispelling the evidence
which otherwise is a circumstance positively inculpating the respondent.
An Investigating Officer may have his own reasons for not interrogating the
accused as soon as he saw him. Court cannot overlook the realities that
Investigating Officer, who is otherwise a police officer, has to attend to
umpteen engagements and even in the investigation of the particular case
itself he may have to observe a number of formalities, even it is assumed
that he had only one case to investigate at that time. (Paras 17 & 18)
It is not correct to say that motive may not be very much material in cases
depending on direct evidence whereas motive is material only when the
case depends upon circumstantial evidence. There is no legal warrant for
making such a hiatus in criminal cases as for the motive for committing
the crime. Motive is a relevant factor in all criminal cases whether based
on the testimony of eye witnesses or circumstantial evidence. The question
in this regard is whether a prosecution must fail because it failed to prove
the motive or even whether inability to prove motive would weaken the
prosecution to any perceptible limit. No doubt, if the prosecution proves
the existence of a motive it would be well and good for it, particularly in a
case depending on circumstantial evidence, for such motive could then be
counted as one of the circumstances. However, it cannot be forgotten that
it is generally a difficult area for any prosecution to bring on record what
was in the mind of the respondent. Even if the Investigating Officer would
have succeeded in knowing it through interrogations that cannot be put in
evidence by them due to the ban imposed by law. (Para 11)
2000 0 AIR(SC) 1735; 2000 0 AIR(SCW) 1798; 2000 2 BBCJ(SC) 215;
2000 2 CCR(SC) 75; 2000 2 Crimes(SC) 260; 2000 0 CrLJ 2457; 2000
2 JCC 447; 2000 4 JT 456; 2000 3 PLJR(SC) 153; 2000 2 RCR(Cri)
618; 2000 3 Scale 215; 2000 4 SCC 515; 2000 0 SCC(Cri) 845; 2000 3
Supreme 722; 2000 0 Supreme(SC) 764; State of U.P. Vs. Babu Ram
169) Learned counsel for the petitioners has also drawn our attention to the
judgment and order dated 9.10.2013, passed by a Division Bench of Delhi
High Court dismissing the Writ Petition (C) No. 6384 of 2013 filed by
Rashtravadi Shiv Sena against Sanjay Leela Bhansali Films Pvt. Ltd. and
others challenging the exhibition of the said film (“Goliyon Ki Rasleela
Ram­Leela”) on the same ground i.e. the film attempts to hurt the religious
sentiments of Hindus at large. Delhi High Court, in this judgment, while
relying on the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Rajkapoor v.
Laxman, AIR 1980 SC 605, has held that in view of the bar as provided by
Section 5­A and also the provisions of 5­B of Cinematograph Act, criminal
prosecution is not maintainable.
In our opinion the circumstances relied upon by the High Court in holding
that the investigation was tainted are not of any substance on which such
an inference could be drawn and in a case like the present one where the
prosecution case is fully established by the direct testimony of the eye­
witnesses, which is corroborated by the medical evidence, any failure or
omission of the investigating officer cannot render the prosecution case
doubtful or unworthy of belief.
2003 0 AIR(SC) 1164; 2003 1 CCR(SC) 325; 2003 2 Crimes(SC) 186;
2003 0 CrLJ 1282; 2003 1 JCC 325; 2003 1 JT 130; 2003 2 JT 1;
2003 2 PLJR(SC) 10; 2003 1 Scale 529; 2003 2 SCC 518; 2003 2
Supreme 155; 2003 1 Supreme 353; 2003 0 Supreme(SC) 120; Amar
Singh Vs. Balwinder Singh & Ors.

170) Article 20(2) of Constitution provides that no person shall be prosecuted

and punished for the same offence more than once ­ In order to attract
Article 20(2) a person must be both prosecuted and punished ­ A
prosecution without punishment would not bring the case within Article
20(2)
1989CriLJ2374 E.K. Thankappan Vs. Respondent: Union of India
(UOI)

171) In Bindeshwari Prasad Singh v. Kali Singh MANU/SC/0100/1976 :

1978CriLJ187 the Supreme Court has held as follows (Para 4 of Cri
LJ) :- "There is no provision in Cr.P.C. empowering a Magistrate to review
or recall a judicial order passed by him. Inherent powers under S. 561­A
are only given

172) In Maj Genl. A. S. Gauraya v. S. N. Thakur MANU/SC/0185/1986 :

1986CriLJ1074 again the Supreme Court on this point of law has held as
follows (Paras 9, 10 (of Cri LJ) :­
"So far as the accused is concerned, dismissal of a complaint for non­
appearance of the complainant or his discharge or acquittal on the same
ground is a final order and in the absence of any specific provision in the
Code, a Magistrate cannot exercise any inherent jurisdiction, to restore
thecase. A second complaint is permissible in law if it could be brought
 within the limitations imposed by the Supreme Court in Pramatha Nath
Taluqdar v. Saroj Ranjan Sarkar, MANU/SC/0149/1961 : AIR1962SC876.
Filing of a second complaint is not the same thing as reviving a dismissed
complaint after recalling the earlier order of dismissal. The Criminal P.C.
does not contain any provision enabling the criminal court to exercise
such an inherent power. Also, what the Court has to see is not whether
the Code contains any provision prohibiting a Magistrate from entertaining
an application to restore a dismissed complaint, but the task should be to
find out whether the said Code contains any provision enabling a
Magistrate to exercise an inherent jurisdiction which he otherwise does
not have."
This Court in Laxminarayan v. Ramaswamy MANU/KA/0191/1988 has
held as follows :­ "Applying the Decision of the Supreme Court reported in
MANU/SC/0185/1986 : 1986CriLJ1074 , laying down that in the absence
of a provision empowering a Magistrate to review or recall an order passed
by him and in the absence of inherent powers in subordinate Criminal
Courts, the Magistrate has absolutely no jurisdiction to recall the order
dismissing the complaint, order in Revision affirmed, although rejecting
the reasons given by learned Sessions Judge."
1992 0 CrLJ 1727; 1992 65 FLR 391; 1992 0 ILR(Kar) 1165; 1991 3
KarLJ 63; 1991 0 Supreme(Kar) 389M/s Naga Theatre and another Vs.
Respondent: The Provident Fund Inspector, Bangalore

173) Criminal Procedure Code 1973 ­ Section 319 ­­ De novo trial of newly
added accused, mandatory ­ Such de novo trial against newly added
accused would not in any way affect trim which had already proceeded
against remaining accused ­ After completing de novo trim against newly
added accused, Sessions Judge to pronounce judgment simultaneously
against accused, who were earlier tried and also newly added accused.
2013 1 ALD(Cri) 902; 2014 1 ALT(Cri) 75; 2013 0 Supreme(AP) 218;
Vadde Veeresh & Another Vs The State of A.P.

174) National Investigation Agency Act 2008 ­ Section 21(4) ­ Unlawful

Activities (Prevention) Act 1967 ­ Section 43­D (5) ­ Appeal against order of
Sessions Judge granting bail to accused would lie to a Division Bench of
High Court
2013 1 ALD(Cri) 821; 2013 1 ALT(Cri) 167; 2012 0 Supreme(AP) 1264;
National Investigation Agency Chikoti Garden Vs Mohmed Anwar
Shak & Another
2013 1 ALD(Cri) 907; 2014 1 ALT(Cri) 109; 2013 0 Supreme(AP) 292;
National Investigation Agency Vs Devendra Gupta & Another

175) Indian Penal Code 1860 ­ Section 302 – Murder­­­Conviction ­ Any

normal man can understand fact that injury on neck in ordinary course
will cause death or cause severe bodily injury to deceased ­ Accused died
 due to neck injury ­­ Contention that accused had no motive to kill
accused, cannot be accepted ­ Conviction, upheld ­ Appeal dismissed.
2013 1 ALD(Cri) 939; 2013 3 ALT(Cri) 321; 2013 0 CrLJ 356; 2013 0
Supreme(AP) 72; Burka Kannaiah Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh

176) Held therefore, when so recast, the practice which can be a better
substitute is this : Whenever an objection is raised during evidence taking
stage regarding the admissibility of any material or item of oral evidence
the trial Court can make a note of such objection and mark the objected
document tentatively as an exhibit in the case (or record the objected part
of the oral evidence) subject to such objections to be decided at the last
stage in the final judgment. If the court finds at the final stage that the
objection so raised is sustainable the judge or magistrate can keep such
evidence excluded from consideration. In our view there is no illegality in
adopting such a course. (However, we make it clear that if the objection
relates to deficiency of stamp duty of a document the court has to decide
the objection before proceeding further. For all other objections the
procedure suggested above can be followed.) (Para 14)
2001 0 AIR(SC) 1158; 2001 0 AIR(SCW) 841; 2001 2 BBCJ(SC) 76;
2001 1 Crimes(SC) 288; 2001 0 CrLJ 1254; 2001 134 ELT 611; 2001
1 JCC 269; 2001 1 JLJR(SC) 725; 2001 3 JT 120; 2001 2 PLJR(SC)
132; 2001 1 RCR(Cri) 859; 2001 2 Scale 167; 2001 3 SCC 1; 2001 0
SCC(Cri) 417; 2001 1 SCJ 460; 2001 2 Supreme 65; 2001 0
Supreme(SC) 346; 2001 1 UJ 573; Bipin Shantilal Panchal Vs. State of
Gujarat & Anr.

177) A) CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, 1973, Section 173(5):­ Prosecution is

not barred from producing certified copies of the documents and marking
the same through the witness subject to proof of relevancy. (Para 4)
B) CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, 1973, Section 242(3):­ The words ”all
such evidence” mentioned in section 24(3) has an overriding over Section
175 and hence the Magistrate has all the powers to receive an additional
documents that may be produced by the prosecution. Revision against the
docket order of the Magistrate dismissed. (Paras 5 and 6)
2011 1 ALD(Cri) 822; 2011 2 ALT(Cri) 74; 2011 0 Supreme(AP) 126;
G.Saroja v. State of A.P. rep. by the Public Prosecutor and another

178) But the question is whether in this case appellants knew that the
substances in question were explosive substances. The knowledge whether
a particular substance is an explosive substance depends on different
circumstances and varies from person to person. An ignorant man or a
child coming across an explosive substance may pick it up out of curiosity
and not knowing that it is an explosive substance. A person of experience
may immediately know that it is an explosive substance. In the instant
case, the appellants had been dealing with the substances in question for
 a long time. They certainly knew or at least they shall be presumed to have
known what these substances were and for what purpose they were used.
1981 0 AIR(SC) 1062; 1981 0 CrLJ 588; 1981 1 Scale 445; 1981 2
SCC 443; 1981 0 SCC(Cri) 477; 1981 3 SCR 68; 1981 0 Supreme(SC)
144; Mohamad Usman Mohammad Hussain Maniyar and another Vs
The State of Maharashtra,

179) INDIAN PENAL CODE, Secs. 302 read with Sec. 149 and Sec. 325 read
with Sec. 34 ­ Accused persons inflicting grivous injuries on the head of
deceased with sticks in a Quarrel resulting in the death of deceased ­
Accused also causing injuries on other witnesses ­ Absence of knowledge
to accused that they caused injuries with the knowledge that injuries are
likely to cause death and absence of intention to cause death of deceased ­
Accused are not liable to conviction under Sec. 302 but they are liable to
conviction under Sec. 325 read with Sec. 34.
1995 1 ALT(Cri) 71; 1995 1 APLJ 127; 1995 0 CrLJ 701; 1995 1 LS
208; 1995 1 LS(SRC) 10; 1994 0 Supreme(AP) 451; Siddapuram Siva
Reddy alias Pyreedy Vs State OF A.P.

180) INVESTIGATION­Decision to investigate or decision on the agency which

should investigate, does not attract principles of natural justice­Accused
cannot have a say in who should investigate the offences he is charged
with­No requirement of recording reasons for such a decision­If
investigation by local police is not satisfactory­Further investigation by
CBI not precluded.
1997 0 AIR(SC) 93; 1996 0 AIR(SCW) 4249; 1996 4 Crimes(SC) 104;
1997 0 CrLJ 63; 1996 9 JT 131; 1996 7 Scale 508; 1996 11 SCC 253;
1996 7 Supreme 455; 1996 0 Supreme(SC) 1633; Central Bureau of
Investigation & Anr. Vs. Rajesh Gandhi & Anr

181) Case against the contesting accused ended in acquittal as eye witnesses
did not support the prosecution case. Split up case against the absconding
accused who has been apprehended is quashed.
2000 1 ALT(Cri) 174; 1999 0 Supreme(AP) 644; Thallapalli Rajaiah @
Pogula Rajaiah Vs State OF A.P.

182) I once again state that the principles laid down by Sri Justice M. Ranga
Reddy followed by Sri Justice Vaman Rao are on the right lines. If the
prosecution story is not adhered to before the court in respect of the
accused whose cases have been split up, then it must be taken that they
are not speaking truth and they are having reservations. More over, when
the witness turned hostile, it cannot be imagined that he will again speak
to the prosecution story and mention the name of the accused person, who
has been absconding and who has made appearance subsequently. There
is no slightest possibility of mentioning the name of the accused by the
witnesses, if they have not spoken to already regarding the overt acts of
 the absconding accused. Viewed from this angle, i disagree with the
reasoning mentioned in g. Venkataratnam Kumar s case (supra 3) and i
agree with the reasoning mentioned in the aforesaid decisions referred to
by the learned counsel for the petitioner. In that view of the matter, I am of
considered view that it is waste to continue the proceedings and it is abuse
of process of the court if the trial were continued knowing fully well that
the witnesses have already turned hostile in judicial proceedings. Hence,
the proceedings are liable to be quashed and I, accordingly, quash the
proceedings. The petition is, accordingly, allowed.
2002 2 ALD(Cri) 951; 2003 1 ALT(Cri) 56; 2002 0 Supreme(AP) 1237;
Azghar Ahmed Khan Vs. State OF A.P

183) IN view of these authoritative pronouncements of the Apex Court, it is

not permissible at this stage to sift the evidence or to see whether on
merits the case stands or falls against the petitioner even if the trial were
to be conducted. Paucity of evidence and the chance or possitbility of
conviction of accused being remote, due to weakness of the case of the
prosecution are not the relevant considerations for the Court at that stage.
The Splitup case cannot be quashed as the main case ended in acquittal.
2001 2 ALD(Cri) 851; 2001 2 ALT(Cri) 482; 2001 0 Supreme(AP) 1306;
G.VENKATARATNAM KUMAR Vs. State OF A.P.

184) There is nothing to indicate any scheme for the receipt of the money by
the firm from its depositors as a consideration for promise to pay the
interest in excess of the stipulated rate and also to pay back principal
amount on the expiry of the term dependent in any way on any event or
contingency relative or applicable to the enrolment of new depositors,
considering the depositors to be members. I am, therefore, of the opinion,
that not any of the requirements of a money circulation scheme is satisfied
in the instant case. As there is no money circulation scheme, there can be
no scheme as contemplated in the Act in view of the definition of scheme
in the Rules. The materials, appear to disclose violation of revenue laws.
They" however, do not disclose any violation of the Act.
1982 0 AIR(SC) 949; 1982 0 CrLJ 819; 1982 1 Scale 38; 1982 1 SCC
561; 1982 0 SCC(Cri) 283; 1982 3 SCR 121; 1982 0 Supreme(SC) 47;
State of W.B. and others Vs. Swapan Kumar Guha and others,

185) It is manifest that a conspiracy is always hatched in secrecy and it is

impossible to adduce direct evidence of the same. The offence can be only
proved largely from the inferences drawn from acts or illegal omission
committed by the Conspirators in pursuance of a common design which
has been amply proved by the prosecution as found as a fact by the High
Court.
We may point out that under the principle contained in Section 10 of the
Evidence Act, once a conspiracy to commit an illegal act is proved, act of
one conspirator becomes the act of the other.
 1980 0 AIR(SC) 439; 1980 0 CrLJ 388; 1980 2 SCC 465; 1980 1
SCC(Cri) 493; 1979 0 Supreme(SC) 421; Shivanarayan Laxminarayan
Joshi and others Vs. State of Maharashtra and others

186) Non­supply of copies of earlier detention order & its ground which order
was quashed by High Court on technical ground, can not be said that
some material documents affecting rights of detenu to make effective
representation were withheld.
National Security Act, 1980 ­ Section 3(3) ­ Preventive detention order ­ It
was not necessary to inform petitioner detenu that he could make a
representation to Distt. Magistrate himself.
1996 4 Crimes(HC) 343; 1996 0 CrLJ 3923; Gulam Hussain Vs. The
District Magistrate and Another

187) UNDER Section 340, Cr. P. C, when upon an application made to the
Court and if the Court is of the opinion that it is expedient in the interest
of justice that an enquiry should be made into the office referred to in
clause (b) of sub­section (1) of Section 195, Cr. P. C. which appears to
have been committed in or in relation to the proceeding in that Court in
respect of the evidence in a proceeding in that Court, such Court may after
such preliminary enquiry, if any, as it thinks necessary, make a complaint
thereof in writing and send it to the Magistrate of the I Class having
jurisdiction and take sufficient surety for the appearance of the accused
before such Magistrate.
2001 2 ALD(Cri) 415; 2001 2 ALT(Cri) 283; 2001 0 CrLJ 4891; 2002 2
RCR(Cri) 797; 2001 0 Supreme(AP) 777; State Of A. P. VS P.
Venugopal

188) S.C & S.T PREVENTION OF ATROCITIES ACT, Sec.3(x) ­ CRIMINAL

PROCEDURE CODE, Sec.482 ­ “Public view” ­ Interpretation of ­
Difference between “Public place” and “Public view” ­ Stated ­ Accused,
Officer abusing employee in the office uttering words “Malas and Madigas”
­ Magistrate taking cognizance of private complaint ­ Incident happened in
office cannot be construed that incident happened in “Public view” ­ Public
place and Public view are different ­ Interpretation given to “Public place”
cannot be given to “Public view” ­ Admittedly incident took place in office
and it cannot be construed to be “Public view” within the meaning of
Sec.3(x) of the Act ­ No offence is made out against accused under the Act
­ Proceedings against accused are liable to be quashed ­ Petition allowed.
2003 1 ALT(Cri) 246; 2002 3 LS 481; 2003 2 RCR(Cri) 503; 2002 0
Supreme(AP) 1326; J.SUMANA Vs. ENDLURI ASEERWADAMMA

189) No doubt, the petitioner is bound to prove that he stored the coconut oil
properly while that was in his possession and he sold it in the same state
as he purchased it. The petitioner has asserted in his evidence that he
stored the oil properly while it was in his possession and sold it in the
 same state as he purchased it. There is no reason to distrust his version.
It is true that when the plea of protection under S.19(2) of the Act is taken
by an accused, the burden is upon him to establish that plea. The burden
of proof on the accused is, however, not heavy as that of prosecution in
proving the accused guilty
2000 2 ALT(Cri) 482; 2000 3 KLT 693; 2001 1 RCR(Cri) 340; 2000 0
Supreme(Ker) 397; Koyakutty Vs. Food Inspector

190) Even when a search is made by a gazetted officer it is obligatory for the
prosecution to inform the accused of his right to be searched before a
gazetted officer or before a Magistrate, as provided under Section 50 of the
NDPS Act.
2000 0 AIR(SC) 2790; 2000 0 AIR(SCW) 2969; 2000 3 BBCJ(SC) 209;
2000 3 CCR(SC) 142; 2000 3 Crimes(SC) 188; 2000 0 CrLJ 4008; 2000
2 JCC 723; 2000 9 JT 416; 2000 4 PLJR(SC) 124; 2000 3 RCR(Cri)
759; 2000 6 Scale 94; 2000 7 SCC 477; 2000 0 SCC(Cri) 1407; 2000 3
SCJ 354; 2000 5 Supreme 731; 2000 0 Supreme(SC) 1391; 2000 2 UJ
1349; Ahmed Vs. State of Gujarat

191) TO summarize, in order that a bank is a banking company, it is in the

first place necessary that it must be a company registered under the
Companies Act and secondly it must do banking business. Only on
fulfilment of these two conditions, it can be termed as a "banking
company" within the meaning of Section 5 (c) of the Banking Regulation
Act. A society registered under the Societies Registration Act, whether
banking business is done by it or not, does not fall within the meaning of
"banking company" (sic) Section 5 (c) of the Banking Regulation Act.
THE other argument advanced by the learned senior counsel is that in the
first instance, resort must be had to the provisions under Sections 3, 7 to
10 of Act 17 of 1999 and after exhausting those remedies only, Section 5
of that Act must be pressed into service. This argument, in my opinion, is
devoid of merits for the reason that the interest of depositors is of
paramount consideration. Section 5 of the Act, which is a penal provision
for default committed by any financial establishment, is an independent
provision and can be invoked under the circumstances as mentioned
therein. Therefore, other remedies need not first be exhausted so as to
invoke this provision. As already observed supra, the main object of Act 17
of 1999 is to protect the interests of gullible and innocent depositors.
2003 1 ALD(Cri) 768; 2003 2 ALT(Cri) 233; 2003 0 CrLJ 2835; 2003 0
Supreme(AP) 481; K.Jayaprakash Ram Vs. Addl.Director General of
Police, Criminal Investigation Department

192) It would now be useful to refer to the object behind investing the police
with powers of seizure. Seizure and production in court of any property,
including those regarding which an offence appears to have been
committed or which appears to have been used for the commis¬sion of any
 offence or any other property will have a two­fold effect. Production of the
above property may be necessary as evidence of the commission of the
crime. Seizure may also have to be necessary, in order to preserve the
property, for the purpose of enabling the Court, to pass suitable orders
under S. 452 of the Criminal Procedure Code at the conclusion of the trial.
This order would include destruction of the property, confiscation of the
property or delivery of the property to any person claiming to be entitled to
possession thereto. It cannot be contended that the concept of restitution
of propety to the victim of a crime, is totally alien to the Criminal
Procedure Code. No doubt, the primary object of prosecution is punitive.
However, Criminal Procedure Code, does contain several provisions, which
seek to re­imburse or compensate victims of crime, or bring about
restoration of property or its restitution. As S. 452, Crl. P.C. itself
indicates, one of the modes of disposing of property at the conclusion of
the trial, is ordering their return to the person entitled to possession
thereto. Even interim custody of property under Ss. 451 and 457, Crl.
P.C., recognises the rights of the person entitled to the possession of the
properties. An innocent purchaser for value is sought to be re­imbursed by
S. 453, Crl. P.C. Restoration of immovable property under certain
circumstances, is dealt with under S. 456, Crl. P.C. Even, monetary
compensation to victims of crime or any bona fide purchaser of property,
is provided for under S. 357, Crl. P.C. Wherein when a Court while
convicting the accused imposes fine, the whole or any part of the fine, if
recovered, may be ordered to paid as compensation to any person, for any
lose or injury, caused by the offence or to any bona fide purchaser of any
property, after the property is restored to the possession of the person
entitled thereto. This two fold object of investing the police with the powers
of seizure, have to be borne in mind, while setting this legal issues.”
we have no hesitation to come to the conclu¬sion that the High Court of
Bombay committed error in holding that the police officer could not have
seized the bank account or could not have issued any direction to the
bank officer, prohibiting the account of the accused from being operated
upon.
1999 0 AIR(SCW) 3389; 1999 0 CrLJ 4305; 1999 2 JCC 534; 1999 7
JT 92; 1999 4 RCR(Cri) 232; 1999 5 Scale 613; 1999 7 SCC 685; 1999
8 Supreme 149; 1999 0 Supreme(SC) 1052; 2000 1 UJ 431; State of
Maharashtra Vs. Tapas D. Neogy

193) PROCEDURE OF ISSUANCE OF SOCIAL STATUS CERTIFICATE ­

GUIDELINES GIVEN BY SUPREME COURT.
1995 0 AIR(SC) 94; 1994 0 AIR(SCW) 4116; 1994 5 JT 488; 1994 3
Scale 935; 1994 6 SCC 241; 1994 0 Supreme(SC) 832; Kumari
Madhuri Patil and another Vs. Additional Commissioner, Tribal
Development and others.
194) Though under Section 357(1), Cr. P.C. the amount of compensation
forms part of sentence of fine, under Section 357(3), Cr. P.C. it is separate
and compensation can be awarded only where there is no sentence of fine.
2001 2 ALT(Cri) 142; 2001 3 Crimes 185; 2001 0 Supreme(AP) 442;
Suganthi Suresh Kumar Vs. Jagadeesan

195) In view of the aforesaid position in law, both on international law as well
as the relevant statute in this country, we dispose of these cases with the
conclusion that a fugitive brought into this country under an Extradition
Decree can be tried only for the offences mentioned in the Extradition
Decree and for no other offence and the Criminal Courts of this country
will have no jurisdiction to try such fugitive for any other offence. (Para 3)
2001 0 AIR(SC) 1716; 2001 0 AIR(SCW) 1731; 2001 0 CrLJ 2188;
2001 2 JLJR(SC) 66; 2001 5 JT 31; 2001 2 RCR(Cri) 535; 2001 3
Scale 370; 2001 4 SCC 516; 2001 0 SCC(Cri) 751; 2001 3 Supreme
363; 2001 0 Supreme(SC) 699; 2001 2 UJ 1002; Daya Singh Lahoria
etc. Vs. Union of India and Ors. Etc

196) HAVING regard to these facts I am of the view that prima facie there
appears to be a reason to believe that the provisions of S. C. and S. T.
(Prevention of Atrocities) Act are not clearly applicable in this case. Hence,
Sec 18 of the act does not get attracted and the anticipatory bail prayed for
can be granted.
2001 2 ALT(Cri) 159; 2001 0 Supreme(AP) 618;Koppathi Venkat
Subrahmanyam Vs. State OF A.P.

197) In order to establish a right by way of prescription one has to show that
the incumbent has been using the land as of right peacefully and openly
and without any interruption for the last 20 years.
2005 0 AIR(SC) 236; 2005 1 BBCJ(SC) 206; 2004 10 JT 228; 2005 1
PLJR(SC) 188; 2005 4 RCR(Civ) 505; 2004 9 Scale 593; 2005 1 SCC
471; 2004 8 Supreme 398; 2004 0 Supreme(SC) 1455; Justiniano
Antao and Ors.Vs. Smt. Bernadette B. Pereira

198) Therefore, merely because a given caste is specified in State A as a

Scheduled Caste does not necessarily mean that if there be another caste
bearing the same nomenclature in another State the person belonging to
the former would be entitled to the rights, privileges and benefits
admissible to a member of the Scheduled Caste of the latter State for the
purposes of this Constitution. This is an aspect which has to be kept in
mind and which was very much in the minds of the Constitution­makers
as is evident from the choice of language of Articles 341 and 342 of the
Constitution.
1994 0 AIR(SCW) 3305; 1994 4 JT 423; 1994 3 Scale 358; 1994 5 SCC
244; 1994 0 Supreme(SC) 601; Action Committee on Issue of Caste
 Certificate to scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in the State of
Maharashtra and Anr. Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Anr.

199) There are cases of persons claiming such a benefit on the basis of false
and fabricated community certificates and there are cases where the
children after reaching the stage of adolescence claiming reservation by
engineering adoptions into down­trodden families and there are cases
where the offsprings of inter­caste marriage couples though brought up in
the family of the parent belonging to forward caste, still claiming
reservation at crucial stage of education, for admission to professional
courses. If the persons are not allowed to enjoy the benefits of reservation
either in education or in public employment and the same are snatched
away by persons not legally entitled to, the same amounts to playing fraud
on the Constitution. A person takes a convenient advantageous position in
the society to which he/she is not entitled to by a process of novel
impersonation that he, in fact, belongs to reserved class. More often than
not, the authorities who are competent to issue community certificates
unwittingly or intentionally become part of the fraud. The Courts,
especially the constitutional Courts, alone can abet such a situation. As
otherwise, the philosophy of article 15 (4) and 16 (4) of the Constitution
aimed at Indian Constitution s preambular goal of social justice would be
an illusion. Therefore, this Court is under a duty to prevent such ill­
advised adventures like the petitioner in the present case. 2000 1 ALD
639; 2000 1 ALT 543; 1999 0 Supreme(AP) 1102; A.PRATHYUSHA Vs
Registrar., N.T.R. University of Health Sciences, Vijayawada.

200) As regards Section 17(1) of the Protection of Women from Domestic

Violence Act, 2005, the wife is only entitled to claim a right of residence, in
a shared household and a ‘shared household’ would only mean the house
belonging to or taken on rent by the husband, or the house which belongs
to the joint family of which the husband is a member. The property
belonging to her parents in laws cannot be called a shared household.
2007 0 AIR(SC) 1118(23); 2007 2 BBCJ(SC) 58; 2007 1 CivCC 351;
2007 2 PLR(SC) 425; 2007 1 RCR(Civ) 378; 2007 1 RCR(Cri) 403;
2006 13 Scale 652; 2007 3 SCC 169; 2007 2 SCC(Cri) 56; 2006 8
Supreme 1002; 2006 0 Supreme(SC) 1314; S.R. Batra & Anr. Vs. Smt.
Taruna Batra

201) CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, 1973 ­ Section 311 ­ Recall and re­
examine the witness must appear to be essential to the just decision of the
case ­ The interest of justice is the main touch­stone for deciding whether
to invoke Section 311 CrPC or not ­ Nor for the benefit of the Accused ­
Nor for the benefit of the Prosecution ­ It is only for the Court to decide.
IT was lastly contended that the Police have not choosen to cite another
witness in the charge­sheet and, therefore, it cannot be allowed to be
examined at this stage. This is a very dangerous proposition and it will
 mean that what ever the Police had done in the course of investigation is
binding on the Court. Therefore, this proposition urged has to be stated for
the purpose of rejection only.1997 2 ALD 819; 1997 1 ALD(Cri) 296;
1997 1 ALT(Cri) 167; 1997 1 APLJ 223; 1997 1 LS 166; 1996 0
Supreme(AP) 1114; Bhukya Babu Vs. State OF A.P.

202) THE main contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that
since section 161 Cr. P. C. statement of the witness, intended to be
examined as additional witness, is not recorded by the police, petitioners,
who are the accused, would be put to hardship and inconvenience as they
would not be having an opportunity to cross­ examine the witness with
reference to his earlier statement­ negatived.
The Investigating Officer did not record his statement under Section 161
cr. P. C. and cite him as a witness, and so de facto­complainant cannot be
put to prejudice for the laches on the part of the investigating officer.
2005 1 ALD(Cri) 6; 2004 2 ALT(Cri) 481; 2005 0 CrLJ 716; 2004 0
Supreme(AP) 804; Chemo Steel Ltd, Managing Director, Secunderabad
Vs. State OF A.P

203) 1. A lacuna in prosecution is not to be equated with the fallout of an

oversight committed by a public prosecutor during trial, either in
producing relevant materials or in eliciting relevant answers from
witnesses. Lacuna in the prosecution must be understood as the inherent
weak¬ness or a latent wedge in the matrix of the prosecution case.
2. It cannot be said as a legal proposition that the Court cannot exercise
power of re­summoning any witness if once that power was exercised, nor
can the power be whittled down merely on the ground that prosecution
discovered latches only when the defence highlighted them during final
arguments.1999 0 AIR(SC) 2292; 1999 0 AIR(SCW) 2356; 2000 1
BBCJ(SC) 37; 1999 3 Crimes(SC) 106; 1999 0 CrLJ 3529; 1999 2 JCC
441; 1999 4 JT 496; 1999 2 PLJR(SC) 81; 1999 3 RCR(Cri) 440; 1999
4 Scale 58; 1999 6 SCC 110; 1999 0 SCC(Cri) 1062; 1999 6 Supreme
4; 1999 0 Supreme(SC) 692; 1999 2 UJ 1315; Rajendra Prasad vs The
Narcotic Cell through its Officer-in-Charge, Delhi

204) It. has been observed that the rules of natural justice are not exclusively
principle of administrative law. They are part of judicial procedure which
are imported into the administrative process because of their universality.
At the same time, they can supplement the law, but cannot supplant it. If
a statutory provision either specifically or be inevitable implication
excludes the application of the rules or natural justice, then the court
cannot ignore the mandate of the legislature. Whether or not the
application of the principles of natural justice in a given case has been
excluded, wholly or in part, in the exercise of statutory power, depends
upon the language and basic scheme of the provision conferring the
power, the nature of the power, the purpose for which it is conferred and
 the effect of the exercise of that power. In the case of Swadeshi Cotton
Mills (supra), it has further been observed. . . . . . that this rule cannot be
sacrificed at the altar of administrative convenience or celerity. The general
principle­as distinguished from an absolute rule of uniform application­
seems to be that where a statute does not, in terms, exclude this rule of
prior hearing but contemplates a post­decisional hearing amounting to a
full review of the original order on merits, then such a statute would be
construed as excluding the Audi alter and partem rule at the pre­
decisional stage. Conversely if the statute conferring the power is silent
with regard to the giving of a pre­decisional hearing to the person affected
and the administrative decision taken by the authority involves civil
consequences of a grave nature, and no full review or appeal on merits
against that decision is provided, courts will be extremely reluctant to
construe such a statute as excluding the duty of affording even a minimal
hearing, shorn of all its formal trappings and dilatory features at the pre­
decisional stage, unless, viewed pragmatically, it would paralyse the
administrative process or frustrate the need for utmost promptitude. In
short, this rule of fair play must not be jettisoned save in very exceptional
circumstances where compulsive necessity so demands. The court must
make every effort to salvage this cardinal rule to the maximum extent
possible, with situational modifications. But the core of it must, however,
remain, namely, that the person affected must have reasonable
opportunity of being heard and the hearing must be a genuine hearing and
not an empty public relations exercise
1984 2 Crimes 819; 1985 27 DLT 17; 1985 8 DRJ 16; 1984 0
Supreme(Del) 236; BABU AHMCD,SADANAND AND MUSADDI LAI Vs.
STATE OF DELHI

205) It is not correct to say that section 167(5) of Criminal Procedure Code
1973 prescribes a period of limitation apart from section 468 Criminal
Procedure Code and there is no anomaly In taking cognizance after six
months on a private complaint. But in a summon case if the police does
not conclude investigation within 6 months from date of arrest and
without permission of court continues it, it is illegal and no cognizance can
be taken on it.
1984 1 Crimes(HC) 755; Raj Singh Vs. The State (Delhi
Administration)

206) 1984 CRLJ 239 (MAD) P.G. PERIASWAMY VS INSPECTOR OF

POLICE, PENNAGARAM PS A police officer who has filed a Charge sheet
in which he has not laid a charge against two of several persons against
whom information was received by him at the earlier stage of investigation,
could file a further Charge Sheet against those persons without further
investigation being done.
207) A reading of the above provision discloses that a forest officer who is
empowered by the Government in that behalf can compound an offence
other than an offence under Sections 52 and 55 of the Act. An offence of
theft under Section 379 of the IPC namely, taking away the property from
the custody of a person without that person's consent is altogether
different in comparison with the contravention for the offence
underSection 20 of the Act.A person who has grown timber or wood on a
patta land needs permission of the Forest officials either for felling trees or
for converting into charcoal. If such permission is not obtained, such
person is liable for an offence underSection 20(1)(a)(b)(c) read with Section
20(d) (ii) of the Act. If a person fells trees on the land belonging to the
Government or other person without obtaining permission from the
Government, it is an offence under Section 379 of the IPC and not under
Section 20 of the Act.
P. Venkataramaiah And Ors. vs The Station House Officer, 2003 (4)
ALT 494

208) In fact, in the definition under S. 141 I. P. C. the first, third, fourth and
fifth objects have been clearly proved in this case by the evidence of
innumerable witnesses. It is not possible for the prosecution to prove what
was in the minds of the persons assembled. That can only be inferred by
the subsequent conduct of the assembly. It is not necessary to prove that
there was a previous concert regarding the common object. It may even be
that when the crowd originally assembled there may not have been any
such common object. The common object can be even after the original
assembly was formed. In this case when the Magistrate asked them to
disperse and they refused and continued to be there and began to pelt
stones and create obstruction and cause mischief, it is clear that the
assembly had the common object mentioned in S. 141, first, third, fourth
and fifth. I am not therefore prepared to agree with the learned counsel for
the appellant that the common object has not been proved.
Coming now to the offences committed in prosecution of the common
object, it is clear that simple hurt under S. 323 mischief under S. 440 and
rioting under S. 147 I. P. C. have been clearly proved. In fact, there was
hardly any argument as to whether the said offences were committed by
the assembly. As to this appellant's part in it, it has to be held that when
he as a member of the unlawful assembly himself hurled stones, he is
guilty of rioting. Again, even though there was no proof that the stones
thrown by him caused the hurt and the mischief, he will be guilty when S.
149 is brought in, as he must be held to have known that the offences
which were committed by the members of the unlawful assembly were
likely to be committed in prosecution of the common object.
1962 0 CrLJ 147; 1961 0 Supreme(Gau) 27; Thokchom Bira Singh and
others v. Manipur Administration
209) FOR invoking the provisions of Section 319 Cr. PC, it is necessary that
the opinion of the Court that any person not being the accused has
committed any offence for which such person could be tried together with
the accused, must be based on the material brought forth during the
course inquiry or trial of an offence. 2000 2 ALD(Cri) 520; 2000 2
ALT(Cri) 476; 2000 0 Supreme(AP) 646; KASTURI RATNAM Versus
THATI LAKSHMI

210) "Each case depends on its own facts and a close similarity between one
case and another is not enough because even a single significant detail
may alter the entire aspect. In deciding such cases, one should avoid the
temptation to decide cases (as said by Cordozo) by matching the colour of
one case against the colour of another. To decide, therefore, on which side
of the line a case falls, the board resemblance to another case is not at all
decisive."
"Precedent would be followed only so far as it marks the path of justice,
but you must cut the dead wood and trim off the side branches, else you
will find yourself lost in thickets and branches. My plea is to keep the path
to justice clear of obstructions which could impede it." 2003 0 AIR(SC)
2661; 2003 6 JT 184; 2003 5 Scale 255; 2003 11 SCC 584; 2003 5
SLR 82; 2003 4 Supreme 573; 2003 0 Supreme(SC) 609; Ashwani
Kumar Singh versus U.P. Public Service Commission & Ors.

211) CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, 1973, Sections 154 (3) and 156 (3) ­ A.P.
Police Manual approved by Government under G.O. Ms. No.201, Home
(Pol.C) Dept., dated 8­9­2001:­ While declining a Mandamus to the
authorities in general to entrust the task of investigation to a separate
entity in view of repeated transgression of the rules by the SHOs in
registering FIR in spite of receiving complaint and even if FIR registered,
investigation is not done properly, directions given to the police authorities
in this regard o prevent filing of such writ petitions by the aggrieved public
in future. 2012 1 ALD(Cri) 778; 2012 2 ALT 495; 2012 2 ALT(Cri) 134;
2012 0 Supreme(AP) 35; Jidhav Seshu Rao Patel and others Versus
Station House Officer, Police Station Bhainsa, Adilabad District and
others

212) The bail now granted is since a anticipatory one, till end of trial (without
prejudice to the right to cancel meanwhile in case of need and/or for non­
compliance of conditions supra) any absence of petitioner/s as accused for
hearing/enquiry or trial, issuance of non­bailable warrant­NBW (unless
cancelled before execution) and even its execution and production of
accused as per the NBW; that does not tantamount to cancellation of bail
including from the wording of Section 439(2) Cr.P.C. and as such in such
an event no fresh bail application can be entertained. As it tantamounts to
only cancellation of bail bonds earlier executed, (leave about the power of
the court to issue surety notices by forfeiting bonds and for imposing
 penalty on the bonds forfeited); the proper course it to direct the accused
to work out the remedy to pay penalty on the previous forfeited bonds as
per Sections 441 to 446 Cr.P.C. and to submit fresh solvency with self
bond for enlarging him by release from custody on payment of penalty of
the earlier bonds forfeited without need of enforcing against earlier
sureties again." 2015 1 ALT(Cri) 164; 2014 0 Supreme(AP) 1217; Datla
Ashwini Swetha Vs. State of A.P. and Ors

213) Further the Apex Court in Sheonandan paswan s case (supra) held
thus:"section 321 enables the Public Prosecutor or Assistant Public
Prosecutor in­charge of a case to withdraw from the prosecution with the
consent of the Court. Before an application is made under Section 321, the
public Prosecutor has to apply his mind to the facts of the case,
independently without being subject to any outside influence. But it
cannot be said that a Public Prosecutor s action will be illegal if he receives
any communication or instruction from the government. Unlike the Judge,
the Public prosecutor is not an absolutely independent officer. He is an
appointee of the government, Central or State appointed for conducting in
Court any prosecution or other proceedings on behalf of the Government
concerned. So there is the relationship of counsel and client between the
Public prosecutor and the Government. A Public prosecutor cannot act
without instructions of the Government; a Public Prosecutor cannot
conduct a case absolutely on his own, or contrary to the instruction of his
client, namely, the Government in Section 321 does not lay any bar on the
Public Prosecutor to receive any instruction from the Government before
he files an application under that section. If the Public Prosecutor receives
such instructions, he cannot be said to act under extraneous influence.
On the contrary, the Public Prosecutor cannot file an application for
withdrawal of a case on his own without instructions from the
government. " 2003 1 ALD(Cri) 776; 2002 0 Supreme(AP) 1381;
V.THUKARAM GOUD Versus State OF A.P

214) The fact that a conspiracy is also an abutment within the meaning of S.
109 I. P. C. does not, in our view, make it any the less an offence by itself,
if it comes within the scope of the S. 120­B. but we are in respectful
agreement with him as regards the applicability of s. 182 Cr. P. C. ( 24 ) IN
(S) , AIR1957 SC 340 , 1957 Crilj422 the Supreme Court observed that
where the charge, as framed in that case, disclosed one single conspiracy,
although spread over several years, there is only one object of the
conspiracy and that is to cheat members of the public; the fact that in the
course of years joined the conspiracy or that several conspiracies. Their
Lordships held dated on the facts of that case the instances of cheating
were in pursuance of one conspiracy and were parts of the same
transaction. If we apply the ratio of that decision to the facts of the case
before us then it follows that the several acts committed by individual
conspirators are parts of the same transaction. 1962 0 AIR(Kar) 275;
 1962 0 CrLJ 765; 1961 0 Supreme(Kar) 38; V.GOVINDRAJALU Versus
STATE OF MYSORE

215) Scope and ambit of Section 197 Cr.P.C.­Protection is to protect

responsible public servant against possible vexatious criminal
proceedings­Protection is available only when alleged act done was
reasonably connected with discharge of official duty and was not merely a
cloak for doing an objectionable act­It was not the duty which required
examination so much as the act­It is no part of duty of public ­servant
while discharging his official duty to commit forgery­Want of sanction u/s
197 Cr.P.C. was no bar and High Courts view could not be maintained.
2003 0 AIR(SCW) 6887; 2004 1 RCR(Cri) 197; 2003 10 Scale 522;
2004 2 SCC 349; 2003 8 Supreme 706; 2003 0 Supreme(SC) 1230;
State of H.P.VS M.P. Gupta

216) MUBARIK ALI AHMED VS STATE OF BOMBAY AIR 1957 SC 858

The question whether the evidence discloses only a breach of civil liability
or a criminal offence under Sec 420 Penal code, depends upon whether the
complainant in parting with his money acted on the representations of the
aaccused and in belief of the truth thereof and whether those
representation , when made were in fact false to knowledge of the accused
and whether he had a dishonest intention from the outset. If the courts
below and these facts specifically against the accused in categorical terms,
the above questions of fact are not open to challenge in the Supreme Court
in an appeal on special leave.

217) DR. KISHAN PAL VS STATE OF UP 1996 SCC (Crl) 249 Criminal
Procedure code – S. 161 – Inordinate delay in examination of witness by
Police – Delay not explained – simply on that ground the convincing and
reliable evidences given by the eyewitnesses cannot be discarded. (Para 9)
S.174 – inquest report – omission to mention crime number in – Merely
because the investigating officer had not been diligent enough it would not
be proper to discard reliable and clinching evidence adduced by the
eyewitnesses. (Para 9)
Non­mention of the name of one of the eyewitnesses in the FIR not fatal
(Para 9)

218) SIDDHARAM SATLINGAPPA MHETRE VS STATE OF MAHARASTRA

AND OTHERS 2011 (1) ALT (CRL) 69 SC The courts considering the bail
application should try to maintain fine balance between the societal
interest vis­avis personal liberty while adhering to the fundamental
principle of criminal jurisprudence that the accused is presumed to be
innocent till he is found guilty by the competent court. (Para 93)
Arrest leads to many serious consequences not only for the accused but
for the entire family and at times for the entire community. (Para 97)
The court which grants the bail also has the power to cancel it (Para 103)
The discretion of grant or cancellation of bail can be exercised either at the
instance of the accused, the public prosecutor or the complainant on
finding new material or circumstances at any point of time. (Para 103)
Order granting anticipatory bail for a limited duration and thereafter
directing the accused to surrender and apply before a regular bail is
contrary to the legislative intention and the judgment of the Constitution
Bench. (Para 102)
The Court cannot rewrite the provisions of the statute in the grab of
interpreting it. (Para 113)
Benches of lesser strength are bound by the statements of the
Constitution Bench and any Bench of smaller strength taking contrary
view is per in curium. (Para 148)
Not only the judgment of a larger strength is binding on a judgment of
smaller strength but the judgment of a co­equal strength is also binding
on a Bench of judges of co­equal strength. (Para 14)
 indiAn
PEnAl
codE
JudgmEnts
1. It could not be said that merely because the proceedings before the
learned Sessions Judge were held up due to stay granted by the High
Court in that revision, the learned Single Judge could have taken recourse
to the inherent powers of the High Court under S. 482 of the Code, or that
it was necessary to do so either to prevent abuse of the process of Court or
otherwise to secure ends of justice.
1987 0 AIR(SC) 2104; 1987 3 Crimes(SC) 215; 1987 0 CrLJ 1929;
1987 3 JT 382; 1987 2 RCR(Cri) 461; 1987 2 Scale 337; 1987 4 SCC
170; 1987 0 SCC(Cri) 744; 1987 3 SCR 968; 1987 0 Supreme(SC) 648;
State of Karnataka Vs. Narsa Reddy
2. The Acquittal under Sec 304 B IPC does not bar the court from finding the
accused guilty of the offence under sec 498­A IPC.
1996 1 ALD 214; 1996 1 ALD(Cri) 406; 1996 1 ALT(Cri) 318; 1996 1
APLJ 157; 1996 0 CrLJ 1528; 1995 0 Supreme(AP) 702;
ReguriSampath Reddy Vs. State OF A.P

3. The three Oral dying Declarations and the two written Dying Declarations
were consistent, hence the court believed the same and convicted the
accused for the offence U/Sec. 304 B IPc and 498­A IPC.
2008 2 ALT(Cri) 220; 2008 0 Supreme(AP) 276; Giri Ravi Vs. State of
A.P.

4. it is held that it is not every harassment or every type of cruelty that would
attract section 498­A IPC. It should be remembered that the petitioner has
filed a petition U/s. 482 Cr. P. C. to quash the proceedings. Whether the
alleged harassment or cruelty would attract Section 498­A IPC or not, as
alleged in the charge­sheet are primarily questions of fact. It is settled
principle of law that questions of fact cannot be decided in a proceeding
under Section 482 Cr. P. C. It is alleged that the accused persons forcibly
took away gold ornaments of the complainant at the instigation of the
petitioner and also subjected her to harassment and cruelty with a view to
knock off her properties and also attempted to obtain signatures on stamp
papers and in the face of the said allegations, it cannot be said that there
is no material on record to proceed against the petitioner for the offence
u/s. 498­A r/w 109 IPC etc. The truth or otherwise of the said allegations
can be decided only after trial of the case. Therefore, on a careful
consideration of the material on record, I am inclined to hold that there is
no merit in the contention of the learned Counsel, for the petitioner and
the petitioner is not entitled to the relief of quashing the proceedings.1997
6 ALD 144; 1997 2 ALD(Cri) 905; 1998 1 ALT(Cri) 182; 1997 0 CrLJ
4668; 1997 2 LS 597; 1997 0 Supreme(AP)
881;SangabathulaBalusulaRao Vs. JujjavarapuSubbayamma

5. the question is whether in this case appellants knew that the substances
in question were explosive substances. The knowledge whether a
particular substance is an explosive substance depends on different
 circumstances and varies from person to person. An ignorant man or a
child coming across an explosive substance may pick it up out of curiosity
and not knowing that it is an explosive substance. A person of experience
may immediately know that it is an explosive substance. In the instant
case, the appellants had been dealing with the substances in question for
a long time. They certainly knew or at least they shall be presumed to have
known what these substances were and for what purpose they were used.
1981 0 AIR(SC) 1062; 1981 0 CrLJ 588; 1981 1 Scale 445; 1981 2
SCC 443; 1981 0 SCC(Cri) 477; 1981 3 SCR 68; 1981 0 Supreme(SC)
144; MohamadUsman Mohammad HussainManiyar and another Versus
The State of Maharashtra

6. In the light of the above observation, we have no hesitation to conclude

that in the absence of any explanation by the accused as to how the
occurrence took place inside his house in which deceased sustained
injuries, we could possibly infer that the accused had participated in the
Commission of Crime
Therefore we hold that the statement made by appellant to P.W. 1
immediately after the occurrence without any long time lag would
admissible under Section 6 of the Evidence Act.
1997 2 ALT(Cri) 554; 1997 0 CrLJ 3854; 1997 0 Supreme(Mad) 357;
Venkatesan Versus State

7. We do not think that this letter which has painted the accused with black
brush is sufficient to hold that she was so bad and she ill­treated the
deceased so much that the deceased was driven to commit suicide only
because of these factors.
In the matter of offence under Section 306, IPC we would expect much
stronger evidence than what is presented. True it is that the evidence
about what happens within the four corners of walls is not available to the
Investigating Agency. But in this case, very strangely, the Investigating
Agency has not proceeded against the husband against whom there was a
very strong suspicion. The Investigating Agency has instead made a
scapegoat of the old mother perhaps trying to rely on the age old concept
of bickerings between the mother­in­law and daughter­in­law. That is not
the universal truth. The courts below should have therefore in such a
matter appreciated the evidence with discerning eyes.
2010 0 AIR(SC) 499; 2009 4 JCC 3047; 2009 13 JT 402; 2010 1
RCR(Cri) 227; 2009 13 Scale 367; 2009 10 SCC 164; 2010 1 SCC(Cri)
281; 2009 0 Supreme(SC) 1633; Mankamma Versus State Of Kerala

8. The presumption of robbery has been drawn by us as against the

appellant in view of the fact that he was found in possession of looted
property the next day at about 1.30 p.m. which could be said to be soon
after the incident of robbery which may have taken place around 9.30 p.m.
 the previous day but thereafter drowning of the deceased any time before
his body was recovered on 30.6.95 cannot be linked with robbery.
2002 2 Crimes(SC) 129; 2002 0 CrLJ 2031; 2002 0 SCC(Cri) 824;
2002 3 Supreme 138;George versus State of Kerala

9. For all intent and purport Rule 72 of Criminal Rules of Practice has
become redundant and extrajudicial confession by an accused before the
Village Administrative Officer is admissible and can be relied upon.
It was further submitted that the purported extra­judicial confession
which was recorded by a person not authorized therefor in view of Rule 72
of Criminal Rules of Practice (CRP) in terms whereof a village magistrate is
prohibited from recording the extra judicial confession or statement
whatever made by an accused person after the police investigation has
begun.
Extra­judicial confession may or may not be a weak evidence. Each case is
required to be examined on its own fact
2006 0 AIR(SC) 653; 2005 0 AIR(SCW) 6360; 2006 2 BBCJ(SC) 1; 2006
0 CrLJ 536; 2005 10 JT 379; 2006 1 RCR(Cri) 208; 2006 1 Scale 1;
2006 1 SCC 714; 2005 8 Supreme 637; 2005 0 Supreme(SC) 1574;
Sivakumar Vs. State by Inspector of Police

10. Common intention to cause injuries, co accused cannot be punished

differently from that of the main accused.
1991 0 AIR(SC) 1225; 1991 0 CrLJ 1712; 1990 0 Supreme(SC) 717;
Balkar Singh and another Versus State of Punjab,

11. A girl after marriage goes to live with her husband and his people in a
totally new atmosphere. There might be lot of change in the way of life to
which she is used to and to the one in her husband's place. Before a
marriage can succeed there must be mental compatibility and mutual
understanding and an attitude of give and take between the spouses and
the close relatives of the husband. The marriage undergoes lot of stress
and strain in the first few years. Emotions, sentiments and attitudes may
make or mar a marriage. For various causes a married woman in Indian
set up may find it difficult to continue the married life or to come out of it
for social and other reasons and may in a weak moment decide to end her
life. As such, law, while trying to strengthen the hands of the prosecution
in cases of dowry death or abetment to suicide of a married woman within
7 years of marriage provided for some presumption to be drawn, has
scrupulously not permitted any presumption to be drawn on the question
of cruelty, which is one of the ingredients of the dowry death. Cruelty must
be established as any other fact.
THOUGH there is some evidence that prior to the marriage A2 and A3 had
demanded some dowry and had also received the same, there is no direct
evidence of the accused actually demanding or desiring further dowry after
the marriage.
 In SharadBirdhichandSarda v. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1984 S ­1622) :
(1984 Cri LJ 1738) the Supreme Court has made the following remarks
with regard to the assessment of the evidence of close relatives in such
cases :"before discussing the evidence of the witnesses we might mention a
few preliminary remarks against' the background of which the oral
statements are to be considered. All persons to whom the oral statements
are said to have been made by Manju when she visited Beed for the last
time, are close relatives and friends of the deceased. In view of the close
relationship and affection any person in the position of the witness would
naturally have a tendency to exaggerate or add facts which may not have
been stated to them at all. Not that this is done consciously but even
unconsciously the love and affection for the deceased would create a
psychological hatred against the supposed murderer and, therefore, the
Court has to examine such evidence with very great care and caution.
Even if the witnesses were speaking a part of the truth or perhaps the
whole of it, they would be guided by a spirit of revenge or nemesis against
the accused person and in this process certain facts which may not or
could not have been stated may be imagined to have been stated
unconsciously by the witnesses in order to see that the offender is
punished. This is human psychology and no one can help it. "
The evidence of PW 8 shows that when the first accused found his wife
hanging he broke down. His parents were not there and only the child was
with him. Obviously in that condition he himself could not have gone out
to give information either to PWs 1 and 2 or to the police. He states that he
requested one person to convey the information to PWs 1 and 2. PW 8 in
his statement before police has stated that A­1 gave one telephone number
and requested him to give information to the brother and mother of the
deceased. Possibly the person who gave information to PWs 1 and 2, in
order to avoid they being shocked, has told them that Shashikala was
serious. It is not the case of the prosecution that A­1 had made any
attempts to cremate the body in a hurry. He has waited till PWs 1 and 2
and others arrived. Though A­1 himself might not have given. information
to the police the evidence of PW 1 shows that even before he could secure
Ex. P3, chit, from the accused the police had come there. The complaint
has been lodged subsequently. As such some one must have given
information to the police. On the facts of this case it cannot be said that A­
1 had committed an offence under S. 202, I. P. C. without even a charge
being framed in that regard.
1996 1 ALT(Cri) 635; 1996 0 CrLJ 2628; 1996 0 ILR(Kar) 1107; 1996
2 KarLJ 1; 1996 0 Supreme(Kar) 103; State of Karnataka Versus
Dr.H.A.Ramaswam

12. When ocular evidence is consistent and wholly reliable, mere non­
examination of other witnesses who might have seen the incident would
not affect the prosecution case.
 Learned counsel also doubted the truthfulness of the prosecution case as
regards the place of occurrence. It was submitted that if several shots were
fired, some pellets would have been found at the place of occurrence. It is
the case of the prosecution that no pellets were found. For this reason
alone we cannot discard the case of the prosecution. If pellets were found
at the place of occurrence it would have further strengthened the case of
the prosecution, but in the absence of such evidence one has to rely upon
the ocular evidence which if found reliable, may be acted upon.
Unfortunately, in this case, despite the efforts of the prosecution, the
investigating officer could not be examined as a witness. The seizure
witness has also been declared hostile. There is really no corroborative
evidence, except the circumstantial evidence to corroborate the version
given by the witnesses. However, we find the eye witnesses to be straight
forward and reliable. Being rustic villagers, there is no effort on their part
to improve the case of the prosecution on the basis of imaginary facts.
They have deposed in a straight forward manner, and there is a ring of
truth in their testimony. We find them to be implicitly reliable.
2005 0 AIR(SC) 1284; 2004 0 AIR(SCW) 6950; 2005 1 BBCJ(SC) 418;
2005 2 JCR(SC) 38; 2004 10 Scale 84; 2005 9 SCC 719; 2004 8
Supreme 591; 2004 0 Supreme(SC) 1432; BirendraRai&Ors. Versus
State of Bihar

13. When there is imminent peril to life and limb, it is not expected to weigh
the situation in a golden scale. Although the appellant had a right of
private defence, it was not within his right to assault the deceased with the
yoke causing his death. Therefore, he is guilty of offence under Section
304, Part I, I. P. C. and not under Section 302, I. P. C
2003 0 CrLJ 3256; 2003 0 Supreme(Ori) 151; MINAKETAN BHOI
Versus STATE OF ORISSA

14. It is apparent that the case of the accused persons was that whatever
injuries had been inflicted on the deceased or on others had been inflicted
in exercise of the right of defence of person when the complainant party
came to Gopal s house and started attacking them
The injuries which were inflicted on the members of the accused party
were so numerous and extensive and even involved two ladies.
1972 0 AIR(SC) 1838; 1972 0 CrLJ 1191; 1972 3 SCC 486; 1972 0
SCC(Cri) 593; 1972 0 Supreme(SC) 101; Gopal and others Versus The
State of Rajasthan

15. Section 149, IPC consists of two parts. The first part of the section means
that the offence to be committed in prosecution of the common object
must be one which is committed with a view to accomplish the common
object. In order that the offence may fall within the first part, the offence
must be connected immediately with the common object of the unlawful
assembly of which the accused was member. Even if the offence committed
is not in direct prosecution of the common object of the assembly, it may
yet fall under Section 141, if it can be held that the offence was such as
the members knew was likely to be committed and this is what is required
in the second part of the section. The purpose for which the members of
the assembly set out or desired to achieve is the object. If the object
desired by all the members is the same, the knowledge that is the object
which is being pursued is shared by all the members and they are in
general agreement as to how it is to be achieved and that is now the
common object of the assembly. An object is entertained in the human
mind, and it being merely a mental attitude, no direct evidence can be
available and, like intention, has generally to be gathered from the act
which the person commits and the result therefrom. Though no hard and
fast rule can be laid down under the circumstances from which the
common object can be culled out, it may reasonably be collected from the
nature of the assembly, arms it carries and behaviour at or before or after
the scene of incident. The word `knew' used in the second part of the
section implies something more than a possibility and it cannot be made
to bear the sense of `might have been known'. Positive knowledge is
necessary. When an offence is committed in prosecution of the common
object, it would generally be an offence which the members of the unlawful
assembly knew was likely to be committed in prosecution of the common
object. That, however, does not make the converse proposition true;
there may be cases which would come within the second part but not
within the first part. The distinction between the two parts of Section
149 cannot be ignored or obliterated. In every case it would be an issue to
be determined, whether the offence committed falls within the first part or
it was an offence such as the members of the assembly knew to be likely to
be committed in prosecution of the common object and falls within the
second part. However, there may be cases which would be within the first
part, but offences committed in prosecution of the common object would
be generally, if not always, be within the second part, namely, offences
which the parties knew likely to be committed in the prosecution of the
common object.We shall also deal with the contention regarding
interestedness of the witnesses for furthering prosecution version.
Relationship is not a factor to affect credibility of a witness. It is more often
than not that a relation would not conceal actual culprit and make
allegations against an innocent person. Foundation has to be laid if plea of
false implication is made. In such cases, the court has to adopt a careful
approach and analyse evidence to find out whether it is cogent and
credible.
Maranadu vs. State by Inspector of Police, Tamil Nadu 2009 (1) JLJ
SC 4; 2008 0 AIR(SCW) 6210; 2008 0 CrLJ 4562; 2008 10 JT 164;
2009 1 RCR(Cri) 256; 2008 12 Scale 420; 2008 6 Supreme 677; 2008
0 Supreme(SC) 1366;
16. The earliest version of the case without any embellishment and
improvements should be placed before the court, which inspires
confidence of the court. Since the earliest version is suppressed in this
case, the only conclusion that can be drawn is that after due deliberations,
the FIR was brought into existence to suite the case of the prosecution.
2009 1 ALD(Cri) 720; 2009 2 ALT(Cri) 135; 2009 0 Supreme(AP) 153;
ThummalaLovaraju Versus The State of A.P.,

17. True, that the accused need not prove the existence of the right of private
defence beyond reasonable doubt and it is enough for him to show as in a
civil case that preponderance of probabilities is in favour of his plea­ Right
of private defence cannot be used to do away with a wrong doer unless the
person concerned has a reasonable cause to fear that otherwise death or
grievous hurt might ensue in which case that person would have full
measure of right to private defence
The mere fact that the other seven accused were acquitted or that some of
the prosecution witnesses were also convicted would not be sufficient to
hold that the appellant was not the aggressor.
2012 0 AIR(SC) 2181; 2012 2 BomCR(Cri)(SC) 614; 2012 2 CalCriLR
453; 2012 2 CCR(SC) 262; 2012 2 Crimes(SC) 248; 2012 0 CrLJ 2641;
2012 3 JLJR(SC) 8; 2012 4 JT 447; 2012 3 MLJ(Cri)(SC) 275; 2012 5
Scale 52; 2012 5 SCC 530; 2012 3 SCC(Cri) 224; 2012 3 Supreme 453;
2012 0 Supreme(SC) 343; ArjunVs State of Maharashtra.

18. Coming to the plea regarding absence of proper medical treatment the
argument is clearly unsustainable in view of the Explanation to Section
299 IPC.
The Explanation to Section 299 IPC clearly contemplates that where the
death is caused by bodily injury, the person who causes such bodily injury
shall be deemed to have caused the death, although by resorting to proper
remedies and skillfultreatment, the death might have been prevented.
2007 1 AD(Cr) 453; 2007 Supp AIR(SC) 350; 2007 0 AIR(SCW) 937;
2007 2 ALT(Cri)(SC) 276; 2007 1 AWC(SC) 494; 2007 3 BBCJ(SC) 17;
2007 1 Crimes(Sc) 289; 2007 0 CrLJ 1442; 2007 3 JT 247; 2007 1
RCR(Cri) 880; 2007 2 Scale 373; 2007 15 SCC 327; 2007 1 Supreme
830; 2007 0 Supreme(SC) 102; Sellappan versus State of Tamil Nadu

19. The actual manner of misappropriation, it is well settled, is not required to

be proved by the prosecution. Once entrustment is proved, it was for the
accused to prove as to how the property entrusted to him was dealt with in
view of Section 405 of the IPC. If the respondent had failed to produce any
material for this purpose, the prosecution should not suffer therefor. 2006
0 AIR(SC) 2211; 2006 0 AIR(SCW) 2853; 2006 3 BBCJ(SC) 274; 2006 2
Crimes(SC) 239; 2006 0 CrLJ 2917; 2006 0 CrLJ 507; 2006 2 JCC
946; 2006 5 JT 479; 2006 3 RCR(Cri) 379; 2006 5&6 SBR 256; 2006 5
Scale 654; 2006 5 SCC 381; 2006 2 SCC(Cri) 460; 2006 8 SCJ 93;
 2006 4 Supreme 319; 2006 0 Supreme(SC) 506; State of H.P. versus
Karanvir

20. Every breach of trust may not result in a penal offence of criminal breach
of trust unless there is evidence of a mental act of fraudulent
misappropriation. An act of breach of trust involves a civil wrong in
respect of which the person wronged may seek his redress for damages in
a civil court but a breach of trust with mensrea gives rise to a criminal
prosecution as well.
To hold a person guilty of cheating it is necessary to show that he had
fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making the promise. From
his mere failure to keep up promise subsequently such a culpable
intention right at the beginning, that is, when he made the promise cannot
be presumed.
It is further held that a provision made in the agreement for referring the
disputes to arbitration is not an effective substitute for a criminal
prosecution when the disputed act constitutes a criminal offence.
2001 0 AIR(SC) 2960; 2001 0 AIR(SCW) 4435; 2001 3 BBCJ(SC) 209;
2001 0 CrLJ 4765; 2001 2 JCC 361; 2001 9 JT 151; 2002 1 PLJR(SC)
247; 2001 4 RCR(Cri) 572; 2001 7 Scale 430; 2002 1 SCC 241; 2002 0
SCC(Cri) 129; 2001 8 Supreme 216; 2001 0 Supreme(SC) 1469; S.W.
Palanitkar&Ors. Versus State of Bihar &Ors

21. The Magistrate is entitled and indeed has a duty to consider the entire
material referred to in Section 239. In order to hold a charge groundless,
there should either be no iota of evidence or the evidence should contra­
indicate the offence or there should be other fundamental error in
assuming cognizance of the offence. This provision of law is calculated to
eliminate further harassment to the accused persons when the evidentiary
materials gathered after a prolonged and thorough investigation of the
occurrence falls short of minimum requirement, and therefore, the
provision of law cannot be reduced into a dead letter and the accused
persons made to understand the rigour of the futile trial where such a trial
of materials available is palpably, not warranted against him.
2004 2 ALD(Cri) 305; 2004 2 ALT(Cri) 360; 2004 0 CrLJ 4100; 2004 0
Supreme(AP) 691; Diamond Cables Ltd., Baroda Versus State OF A.P.

22. though the requisite intention to commit murder could not be attributed to
the accused, he wielded a weapon like a knife and therefore he could be
attributed with the knowledge that he was likely to cause an injury, which
was likely to cause death and in such a situation though he could not be
convicted under Section 302 IPC, he would be guilty of committing an
offence under section 304 Part II.
2003 1 ALT(Cri) 256; 2003 0 Supreme(AP) 104;
BayanaboinaSubbarayudu Versus State OF A.P.
23. Sections 299 and 300 ­ Academic distinction between "murder" and
"culpable homicide not amounting to murder" ­ All murder is culpable
homicide but not vice­versa­Distinction lies between a bodily injury likely
to cause death and a bodily injury sufficient in ordinary course of nature
to cause death ­ Distinction is fine but real and if overlooked, may result
in miscarriage of justice.
2007 0 AIR(SC) 3215; 2007 0 AIR(SCW) 5826; 2008 1 BBCJ(SC) 151;
2007 0 CrLJ 4690; 2007 11 JT 156; 2007 4 RCR(Cri) 211; 2007 11
Scale 103; 2007 14 SCC 588; 2009 3 SCC(Cri) 221; 2009 2 SCC(Cri)
221; 2007 0 Supreme(SC) 1177; PhuliaTudu and Anr Versus The State
of Bihar (now Jharkhand)

24. Section 188 r/w section 195, Code of Criminal procedure, 1973 – Section
195 being mandatory, cognizance cannot be taken u/s 188 unless the
public servant whose orders have not been complied with files a complaint
in writing – Non­compliance of section 195 would render trial and
conviction void ab initio – Instantly no such complaint filed – Charge could
not be framed u/s 188 IPC – Even if charges u/s 188 are quashed,
charges for other offences will remain unaffected.
Clubbing of cases – One occurrence fall out of the other – They would be
one and the same occurrence – Damage caused to the public transport
vehicles and consequential burning of the University bus – Part of one and
the same incident – Merely lodging of two separate complaints will not bar
clubbing together of these cases – No infirmity in filing one charge sheet.
Indian Evidence Act, 1872 – Section 9 – TI Parade – Part of the
investigation – Very useful where the accused are not known before­hand
to the witnesses – Used only to corroborate the evidence recorded in the
court – Therefore not substantive evidence – Accused should not be shown
to any of the witnesses after arrest, and before holding the Test
Identification Parade, he is required to be kept "baparda" – Witnesses
identifying accused in jail as well as in court – No infirmity.
Hostile witness – One witness turning hostile – In view of consistent
evidence of other witnesses, one witness turning hostile does not affect the
prosecution case
Defective investigation – Occurrence ugly and awful – Investigation in
highly charges atmosphere – Some irregularities bound to occur –
Investigation transferred to CBCID – Irregularities committed in
investigation lose relevance – However, defect in investigation by itself
cannot be a ground for acquittal.
Extra judicial confession – Only admissible part of such statement can
be exhibited – Instantly, full statement exhibited in court – Not permissible
– However in view of sufficiency of other materials on record it did not
prejudice the accused.
Hostile witness – Evidence of a hostile witness cannot be discarded as a
whole – Relevant parts thereof, admissible in law, can be used by the
prosecution or the defence.
 Appreciation of evidence – Discrepancies – Minor or trivial omissions or
discrepancies – Ought to be ignored.
2010 0 AIR(SC) 3178; 2010 3 CalCriLR 698; 2010 3 CCR(SC) 391;
2010 9 JT 95; 2010 4 RCR(Cri) 268; 2010 4 RLW(SC) 3096; 2010 9
SCC 567; 2010 3 SCC(Cri) 1402; 2010 6 SCJ 822; 2010 0 Supreme(SC)
796; C. Muniappan& Others Versus State of Tamil Nadu

25. It was open to the prosecution to negative the rival or the parallel version
about the incident. But as noticed above, in this case no evidence has
been produced by the prosecution to do so. There is not even a suggestion
by the Investigating Officers in their testimony to the effect that the other
version is ill­founded or has been brought up to "take the investigation for
a ride". It is our understanding that in such a situation, the prosecution
has firstly to establish that the second version, which according to it is
liable to be discredited, was false and the version on which they are relying
is the only one to be considered. In a case like the present, the accused are
not required to prove their innocence, they are not obliged to prove by
preponderance of probability or even that most probably they had not
committed the crime. They are just to bring on record that the defence put
forth is plausible.
1989 0 CCrC 625; 1990 0 CrLJ 337; 1989 39 DLT 449; 1989 2
ILR(Del) 24; 1989 0 Supreme(Del) 307; MOTI RAM Versus STATE OF
DELHI

26. the lapse of Investigating Officer should not prevent the Court from
accepting the evidence of the witnesses.
The Supreme Court in Pandurang v. State of Hyderabad, had cautioned
the Courts with regard to acceptance of omnibus inclusions where there
are number of accused. It is useful to refer paras (32) and (33) of the above
referred judgment and they are as follows :
"32. Now in the case of Section 34 we think it is well established that a
common intention presupposes prior concert. It requires a pre­arranged
plan because before a man can be vicariously convicted for the criminal
act of another, the act must have been done in furtherance of the common
intention of them all: Mahbub Shah v. King­Emperor (1945 (46) Cri LJ 689
: AIR 1945 PC 118). Accordingly there must have been a prior meeting of
minds. Several persons can simultaneously attack a man and each can
have the same intention, namely the intention to kill, and each can
individually inflict a separate fatal blow and yet none would have the
common intention required by the section because there was no prior
meeting of minds to form a pre­arranged plan. In a case like that, each
would be individually liable for whatever injury he caused but none could
be vicariously convicted for the act of any of the others; and if the
prosecution cannot prove that his separate blow was a fatal one he cannot
be convicted of the murder however clearly an intention to kill could be
 proved in his case: Barendra Kumar Ghosh v. King Emperor(1925 (26) Cri
LJ 431 : AIR 1925 PC 1) and Mahbub Shah v. King­Emperor (1945 (46) Cri
LJ 689 : AIR 1945 PC 118). As their Lordships say in the latter case, 'the
partition which divides their bounds is often very thin: nevertheless, the
distinction is real and substantial, and if overlooked will result in
miscarriage of justice'.
33. The plan need not be elaborate, nor is a long interval of time required.
It could arise and be formed suddenly, as for example, when one man calls
on bystanders to help him kill a given individual and they, either by their
words or their acts, indicate their assent to him and join him in the
assault. There is then the necessary meeting of the minds. There is a pre­
arranged plan however hastily formed and rudely conceived. But pre­
arrangement there must be and premeditated concert. It is not enough, as
in the latter Privy council case, to have the same intention independently
of each other, e.g., the intention to rescue another and, if necessary, to kill
those who oppose."
2004 1 ALD(Cri) 963; 2004 2 ALT(Cri) 603; 2004 0 CrLJ 4052; 2004 0
Supreme(AP) 372; EdigaJagannadhaGowd Versus State OF A.P.

27. A Magistrate who receives the case on transfer & takes cognizance would
not become incompetent to do so merely because the sanction of transfer
of case to his file is not in accordance with law.
1996 0 AIR(SC) 1840; 1995 0 AIR(SCW) 3937; 1995 3 Crimes(SC) 740;
1996 0 CrLJ 408; 1995 6 JT 428; 1996 1 PLJR(SC) 5; 1996 1 RCR(Cri)
43; 1995 5 Scale 216; 1995 6 SCC 142; 1995 0 SCC(Cri) 1051; 1995 0
Supreme(SC) 855; Anil Saran versus State of Bihar &Anr.

28. In the defnition of Section 415 there are set forth two separate classes of
acts which the person deceived may be induced to do. In the first place he
may be induced fraudulently or dishonestly to deliver any property to any
person. The second class of acts set forth in the section is the doing or
omitting to do anything which the person deceived would not do or omit to
do if he were not so deceived. In the first class of cases the inducing must
be fraudulent or dishonest. In the second class of acts, the inducing must
be intentional but not fraudulent or dishonest. In determining the
question it has to be kept in mind that the distinction between mere
breach of contract and the offence of cheat­ing is a find one. It depends
upon the intention of the accused at the time of inducement which may be
judged by his subsequent conduct but for this subsequent conduct is not
the sole test. Mere breach of contract cannot give rise to criminal
prosecution for cheating unless fraudulent or dishonest intention is shown
right at the beginning of the transaction, that is the time when the offence
is said to have been committed. Therefore it is the intention which is the
gist of the offence. To hold a person guilty of cheating it is necessary to
show that he had fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making
the promise. From his mere failure to keep up promise subsequently such
 a culpable intention right at the beginning that is, when he made the
promise cannot be presumed.
2000 2 Crimes(SC) 72; 2000 0 CrLJ 2983; 2000 3 Supreme 13;
HridayaRanjan Pd. Verma&Ors. Versus State of Bihar &Anr 2000 0
AIR(SC) 2341; 2000 0 AIR(SCW) 2077; 2000 2 CCR(SC) 62; 2000 1
JCC 362; 2000 3 JT 604; 2000 3 PLJR(SC) 137; 2000 2 RCR(Cri) 484;
2000 2 Scale 694; 2000 4 SCC 168; 2000 0 SCC(Cri) 786; 2000 3
Supreme 13; 2000 0 Supreme(SC) 667;

29. We have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that Section 49A of the Police
Act and Section 4 of the Gaming act are not applicable to wagering or
betting on a horse­race when such wagering or betting takes place within
the club premises and on the date on which such race is actually run on
the turf of the club. These Sections are applicable to the bucket­shops or
any house, house room, tent, enclosure, vehicle, etc. which are run in the
streets, bazaars or any other place away from the club.
1996 0 AIR(SC) 1153; 1996 0 AIR(SCW) 713; 1996 1 CCC(SC) 77; 1996
1 CLT(SC) 389; 1996 0 CrLJ 1635; 1996 1 JT 173; 1996 1 RCR(Cri)
468; 1996 1 Scale 208; 1996 2 SCC 226; 1996 1 Supreme 322; 1996 0
Supreme(SC) 91; Dr. K.R. Lakshmanan versusState of Tamil Nadu
&Anr.

30. The part of the body on which the blow was dealt, the nature of the injury
and the type of the weapon used will not always be determinative as to
whether an accused is guilty of murder or culpable homicide not
amounting to murder. The events which precede the incident will also
have a bearing on the issue whether the act by which death was caused
was done with an intention of causing death or knowledge that it is likely
to cause death but without intention to cause death.
The injuries received by accused, the imminence of threat to his safety,
injuries caused by accused and whether accused had time to have
recourse to public authorities are all relevant factors to be considered
while determining right to private defence.
2012 0 AIR(SC) 1856; 2012 1 BBCJ(SC) 431; 2012 0 CrLJ 2135; 2012
1 RCR(Cri) 117; 2012 1 SCC 414; 2012 1 SCC(Cri) 454; 2011 8
Supreme 260; 2011 0 Supreme(SC) 1104;Ranjitham versus
Basavaraj&Ors.

31. Though it cannot be laid as a rule of universal application that when ever
there is delay in lodging the FIR and/or there is delay in dispatching the
report to the Elaka Magistrate and/or the medical evidence is at some
variance with the ocular evidence, the prosecution has to fail. In the
instant case the combined effect of the three factors leave no manner of
doubt that prosecution has failed to establish the accusations. The view
taken by the High Court is a possible view and we do not consider that to
be a fit case where any interference is called for.
 2008 0 AIR(SCW) 5802; 2008 12 JT 309; 2009 1 RCR(Cri) 247; 2008
14 Scale 368; 2010 1 SCC(Cri) 435; 2008 0 Supreme(SC) 1557;State of
Punjab Versus Avtar Singh

32. Indian Penal Code, 1860 ­ Sections 498A and 306 ­ Death by hanging.
Deceased was subjected to abuses, humiliation and mental torture from
the very beginning of her married life. Her husband used to come home
drunk and abuse her and also used to assault her on occasions ­ Bridal
presents brought by her branded as goods of inferior quality. Case of
mental and physical torture ­ Depositions of close relations reliable in
such a case. Absence of any independent evidence given by the neighbours
and co­tenants about physical assault or the abuses hurled on the
deceased by her in laws, not fatal­ Conviction of mother­ in law and
husband u/s. 498A of the Code.
Such depositions by close relations, who may be interested in the
prosecution of the accused, need not be discarded simply on the score of
the absence of corroboration by independent witness. Whether the
evidence of interested witness is worthy of credence is to be judged in the
special facts of the case. In our view, the acts of cruelty by the accused
were expected to be known by the very close relations like mother, brother,
sister, etc. The evidence of the mother has been accepted by / the learned
Sessions Judge as worthy of credence and we do not think that the same
should be discarded, in the facts of the case.
1993 3 Crimes(SC) 518; 1994 0 CrLJ 2104; State of West Bengal
versus Sri OrilalJaiswal&Anr

33. It is well settled that a prosecutrix complaining of having been a victim of

the offence of rape is not an accomplice after the crime. There is no rule of
law that her testimony cannot be acted without corroboration in material
particulars. She stands at a higher pedestal than an injured witness. In
the latter case, there is injury on the physical form, while in the former it
is physical as well as psychological and emotional. However, if the court on
facts finds it difficult to accept the version of the prosecutrix on its face
value, it may search for evidence, direct or circumstantial, which would
lend assurance to her testimony. Assurance, short of corroboration as
understood in the context of an accomplice would suffice.
Indian Penal Code, 1860­Section 228­A­Disclosure of identity of victim of
rape is punishable­It would be appropriate that in judgments, be it of trial
Court, High Court or Supreme Court, name of victim should not be
indicated.
2004 0 AIR(SC) 4404; 2004 4 BBCJ(SC) 369; 2004 4 Crimes(SC) 32;
2004 0 CrLJ 4232; 2004 3 JCC 1442; 2005 1 JCR(SC) 108; 2004 8 JT
236; 2005 1 PLJR(SC) 52; 2004 4 RCR(Cri) 345; 2004 7 Scale 626;
2004 8 SCC 153; 2004 6 Supreme 550; 2004 0 Supreme(SC) 1065;
State of Himachal Pradesh versusShree Kant Shekari
34. Indian Penal Code, 1860­Sections 363 and 366­Victim child aged about 5
years was called and taken away by appellant who was known to her­
Grand mother of victim child found victim naked and appellant lying on
her­Conviction for offences by trial Court and High Court maintained­
Conviction and sentence of three years imprisonment but acquitted of
charge under Section 376 r/ws 511 IPC­Appeal­Evidence of grand mother
of victim had essence of credibility and truthfulness and was rightly relied
upon­Word "keeping" in offence of kidnapping connote idea of charge,
protection, maintenance and control­Provision was designed to protect the
scared right of guardians with respect to their minor wards­Trial Court
and High Court were justified in convicting appellant and sentence
imposed was liberal and called for no interference.
2004 0 AIR(SC) 227; 2003 0 AIR(SCW) 6485; 2004 1 Crimes(SC) 98;
2004 0 CrLJ 595; 2003 10 JT 58; 2004 1 RCR(Cri) 109; 2003 10 Scale
389; 2004 1 SCC 339; 2003 8 Supreme 555; 2003 0 Supreme(SC)
1217; Parkash versus State of Haryana

35. in view of Section 464 Cr.P.C., it is possible for the appellate or revisional
Court to convict an accused for an offence for which no charge was framed
unless the Court is of the opinion that a failure of justice would in fact
occasion. In order to judge whether a failure of justice has been
occasioned, it will be relevant to examine whether the accused was aware
of the basic ingredients of the offence for which he is being convicted and
whether the main facts sought to be established against him were
explained to him clearly and whether he got a fair chance to defend
himself.
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973­Sections 222 and 464­Court can convict
for a minor offence even though charge had been framed for major offence­
Even in appeal or revision, any error, omission or irregularity in the charge
including misjoinder of charges shall not result in invalidating conviction
unless the appellate or revisional Court comes to conclusion that failure of
justice had infact occasioned thereby.
2004 0 AIR(SC) 1990; 2004 0 AIR(SCW) 2119; 2004 2 BBCJ(SC) 305;
2004 2 CCR(SC) 134; 2004 2 Crimes(SC) 471; 2004 0 CrLJ 2025; 2004
1 DMC 680; 2004 4 JT 455; 2004 4 Scale 238; 2004 5 SCC 334; 2004
0 SCC(Cri) 1592; 2004 3 Supreme 506; 2004 0 Supreme(SC) 446;
Dalbir Singh versus State of U.P.

36. Section 366­Appellant convicted for kidnapping minor girl and

arrangement for marriage between victim­prosecutrix and appellant had
been made in house of appellant­Appeal­Doctor had opined that
prosecutrix was below 18 years and school record also showed girl was
minor on date of incident­Contention that appellant and victim were in
love and she voluntarily and willingly went with him without there being
any element of enticement or taking away­Finding of fact by Courts below
that appellant had promised to marry her on that promise she went away
 with appellant­It amounts to enticement of minor­Conviction called for no
interference.
2004 0 AIR(SC) 2472; 2004 3 BBCJ(SC) 75; 2004 2 CCR(SC) 293; 2004
2 Crimes(SC) 254; 2004 0 CrLJ 2553; 2004 2 JCC 777; 2004 Supp1
JT 44; 2004 4 Scale 539; 2004 5 SCC 120; 2004 0 SCC(Cri) 1545;
2004 3 Supreme 294; 2004 0 Supreme(SC) 475; MoniramHazarika
versus State of Assam

37. Date of birth recorded in birth register of Municipal Corporation and

register of Hospital where prosecutrix was born showed prosecutrix was
less than 16 years of age but school leaving certificate showed her age
more than 16 years—Evidence of parents corroborated by age recorded in
birth register of Municipal Corporation and register of hospital established
that prosecutrix was less than 16 years of age—Expert medical evidence
was not binding on ocular evidence as evidence given by medical officer is
really of an advisory character and not binding on witness of fact—
Ossification test in the case could not form basis for determination of age
of prosecutrix—Statement of prosecutrix that she was ravished by force
and against her will was quite natural, inspired confidence and merited
acceptance—Conviction could be sustained on sole testimony of
prosecutrix if it inspired confidence—Conviction and sentence called for no
interference.
2006 0 AIR(SC) 508; 2005 0 AIR(SCW) 6149; 2006 1 BBCJ(SC) 337;
2006 0 CrLJ 303; 2005 10 JT 174; 2006 1 PLJR(SC) 391; 2006 1
RCR(Cri) 201; 2005 9 Scale 510; 2006 1 SCC 283; 2005 8 Supreme
165; 2005 0 Supreme(SC) 1531; Vishnu @ Undrya versusState of
Maharashtra

38. No reason has been indicated by the High Court to discard the
documentary evidence produced i.e. school leaving certificate and the
school register. The Headmaster of the school also deposed and produced
the records before the trial Court. The High Court held that the entry in
the school register was not in the handwriting of the Headmaster and he
could not have deposed about the date of birth. There was no basis for the
High Court to conclude that the entry cannot be taken to be above
suspicion. On the basis of the evidence of the Headmaster and the original
school leaving certificate and the school register which were produced the
High Court came to abrupt conclusion that normally for various reasons
the guardians to understate the age of their children at the time of
admission in the school. There was no material or basis for coming to this
conclusion. The High Court in the absence of any evidence to the contrary
should not have come to hold that the date of birth of the prosecutrix was
not established and the school leaving certificate and the school register
are not conclusive. Interestingly, no question was put to the victim in
cross examination about the date of birth. The High Court also noted that
no document was produced at the time of admission and a horoscope was
 purportedly produced. There is no requirement that at the time of
admission documents are to be produced as regards the age of the
student. Practically, there was no analysis of the evidence on record and
abrupt conclusions, mostly based on surmises, were arrived at. The
inevitable conclusion is that the Judgment of the High Court is
unsustainable, deserves to be set aside which we direct. The respondent
shall surrender to custody to serve the remainder of the sentences.
2008 4 BBCJ(SC) 101; 2008 0 CrLJ 3549; 2008 7 JT 491; 2008 9
Scale 802; 2008 8 SCC 38; 2008 3 SCC(Cri) 418; 2008 5 Supreme 475;
2008 0 Supreme(SC) 1023; State of Maharashtra versus Gajanan @
HemantJanardhanWankhede

39. It is true that in an appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution this Court
normally does not interfere with findings of facts arrived at by the High
Court. But when it appears that the findings of facts arrived at are
bordering on perversity and result in miscarriage of justice, this Court will
not decline to quash such findings to prevent the miscarriage of justice.
In the depositions of witnesses there are always normal discrepancies
however honest and truthful they may be. These discrepancies are due to
normal errors of observation, normal errors of memory due to lapse of
time, due to mental disposition such as shock and horror at the time of
the occurrence, and the like. Material discrepancies are those which are
not normal, and not expected of a normal person.
Related is not equivalent to interested. A witness may be called interested
only when he or she derives some benefit from the result of a litigation; in
the decree in a civil case, or in seeing an accused person punished. A
witness who is a natural one and is the only possible eye witness in the
circumstances of a case cannot be said to be interested.
1981 0 AIR(SC) 1390; 1981 0 CrLJ 1012; 1981 1 Scale 645; 1981 2
SCC 752; 1981 0 SCC(Cri) 593; 1981 3 SCR 504; 1981 0 Supreme(SC)
267; State of Rajasthan VersusSmt. Kalki and another

40. Knowledge and intention are essential things of the mind and cannot be
demonstrated like physical objects. The existence of intention or
knowledge has to be culled out from various circumstances in which and
upon whom the offence is alleged to have been communicated. A victim of
molestation and indignation is in the same position as an injured witness
and her testimony should receive the same weight.
2004 1 ALD(Cri) 924; 2004 2 ALT(Cri) 421; 2004 0 CrLJ 4050; 2004 0
Supreme(AP) 483; HarijanaGadiLingappa @ Gadigadu Versus State OF
A.P.

41. Criminal trial of crimes against women­Evidence of prosecutrix how to be

appreciated (Para 20)­Harras­ment during her cross examination avoided­
(Para 21)­Trial should be in camera and name of victim be avoided.
 1996 0 AIR(SC) 1393; 1996 0 BBCJ(SC) 71; 1996 1 Crimes(SC) 37;
1996 0 CrLJ 1728; 1996 1 JT 298; 1996 1 RCR(Cri) 533; 1996 1 Scale
309; 1996 2 SCC 384; 1996 0 SCC(Cri) 316; 1996 1 Supreme 485;
1996 0 Supreme(SC) 114; The State of Punjab versus Gurmit Singh
&Ors

42. This Court in Willis (William) Slaney v. The State of Madhya Pradesh,
1955(2) SCR 1140 elaborately discussed the applicability of Sections 535
and 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, which correspond
respec­tively to Sections 464 and 465 of the Code, and held that in judging
a question of prejudice, as of guilt, courts must act with a broad vision
and look to the substance and not to technicalities, and their main
concern should be to see whether the accused had a fair trial, whether he
knew what he was being tried for, whether the main facts sought to be
established against him were explained to him fairly and clearly and
whether he was given a full and fair chance to defend himself. Viewed in
the context of the above observations of this Court we are unable to hold
that the accused persons were in any way prejudiced due to the errors and
omissions in the charges pointed out by Mr.Arunachalam. Apart from the
fact that this point was not agitated in either of the courts below, from the
fact that the materi­al prosecution witnesses (who narrated the entire
incident) were cross examined at length from all possible angles and the
suggestions that were put forward to the eye witnesses we are fully
satisfied that the accused persons were not in any way prejudiced in their
defence. While on this point we may also mention that in their
examination under Section 313 of the Code, the accused persons were
specifically told of their having committed offences (besides others) under
Sections 148 and 302/149 IPC.
1998 0 AIR(SC) 2702; 1998 0 AIR(SCW) 2750; 1999 1 BBCJ(SC) 49;
1999 1 CHN(SC) 27; 1998 3 Crimes(SC) 167; 1998 0 CrLJ 4035; 1998
2 JCC 55; 1998 5 JT 398; 1998 3 RCR(Cri) 749; 1998 4 Scale 416;
1998 6 SCC 554; 1998 0 SCC(Cri) 1488; 1998 6 Supreme 374; 1998 0
Supreme(SC) 785; State of A.P. etc. Versus Thakkidiram Reddy &Ors.

43. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 ­ Sections 154 and 157 – FIR ­ Earliest
information in regard to commission of a cognizable offence is to be treated
as FIR ­ Although FIR is not expected to be encyclopedia of events but an
information to police to be 'FIR' u/s 154(1), must contain some essential
and relevant details of incident ­ A cryptic information about commission
of a cognizable offence irrespective of nature and details of such
information may not be treated as FIR ­ If evidence of eyewitnesses is
found cogent, convincing and credible, delay in receipt of copy of FIR by
concerned Court would not be of much significance ­ FIR is not a
substantive piece of evidence ­ It can be used only to discredit testimony of
maker thereof ­ It cannot be utilized for contradicting or discrediting
testimony of other witnesses.
 Criminal Law ­ Appreciation of evidence ­ Where an occurrence takes place
involving rival factions, it is but inevitable that evidence would be of a
partisan nature ­ Rejection of such evidence on that ground may not be
proper.
2010 1 BBCJ(SC) 134; 2009 13 JT 242; 2010 1 RCR(Cri) 612; 2009 13
Scale 177; 2009 10 SCC 773; 2010 1 SCC(Cri) 413; 2009 0
Supreme(SC) 1631; 2009 10 UJ 4611; Pandurang Chandrakant Mhatre
& Others Versus State of Maharashtra

44. Cryptic telephonic messages cannot be treated as FIR as their object only
is to get the police to the scene of offence and not to register the FIR.
Merely because the information given on phone was prior in time would
not mean that the same would be treated as the First Information Report.
Dela y in recording the statement of the witnesses does not necessarily
discredit their testimonies. The court may rely on such testimonies if they
are cogent and credible.
There is no limitation on the part of the Appellate Court to review the
evidence upon which order of acquittal is found­Appellate Court in an
appeal against acquittal can review the entire evidence and come to its
own conclusions.
Evidence of phone calls is a very relevant and admissible piece of evidence.
Presumption of innocence of an accused is a legal presumption and should
not be destroyed at the very threshold through the process of media trial
and that too when the investigation is pending. In that event, it will be
opposed to the very basic rule of law and would impinge upon the
protection granted to an accused under Article 21 of the Constitution.
It is not as if every single leading question would invalidate the trial. The
impact of the leading questions, if any, has to be assessed on the facts of
each case.
Where an accused furnishes false answers as regards proved facts, Court
ought to draw an adverse inference qua him and such an inference shall
become an additional circumstance to prove the guilt of the accused.
2010 2 ACR(SC) 1645; 2010 0 AIR(SC) 2352; 2010 69 AllCriC(SC) 833;
2010 3 BBCJ(SC) 1; 2010 3 CalCriLR 91; 2010 2 CCR(SC) 179; 2010 2
Crimes(SC) 154; 2010 168 DLT(SC) 739; 2010 3 JLJR(SC) 1; 2010 4
JT 107; 2010 3 PLR(SC) 1; 2010 2 RCR(Cri) 692; 2010 6 SCC 1; 2010
2 SCC(Cri) 1385; 2010 3 SCJ 907; 2010 3 Supreme 190; 2010 0
Supreme(SC) 330; 2010 3 UJ 1650; Sidhartha Vashisht @ Manu
Sharma Versus State (NCT of Delhi)

45. Indian Penal Code, 1860—Section 302/34—Appellant inflicted knife blows

on deceased while other appellant caught hold of him—Conviction on
testimony of sole eye witness, brother of deceased—Sustainability—Other
eye witness had turned hostile—No legal impediment in convicting a
person on sole testimony of single witness—Minor details not indicated in
 FIR and later on elaborated in Court would not justify criticism—Evidence
of eye witness found truthful who had graphically described assault on
deceased—No reason to discard evidence of eye witness and conviction
called for no interference.
Criminal Law—Conviction on testimony of sole eye witness—Evidence is to
be weighed and not counted—Test would be whether evidence had a ring
of truth and was cogent, credible and trustworthy.
Sunil Kumar versus The State Govt. of NCT of Delhi 2003 4
Crimes(SC) 383; 2004 0 CrLJ 605;

46. Charge under sec 376 IPC r/w 511 IPC maintainable. Accused convicted
basing on the testimony of the prosecutrix, under the said sections,
though defence pleaded that sec 354 IPC was applicable.
2007 1 ALT(Cri) 456; 2007 0 CrLJ 1499; 2006 0 Supreme(AP) 1431;
DOKKA BHUSHAIAH Versus STATE OF A.P.

47. A plethora of decisions by this Court as referred to above would show that
once the statement of prosecutrix inspires confidence and accepted by the
courts as such, conviction can be based only on the solitary evidence of
the prosecutrix and no corroboration would be required unless there are
compelling reasons which necessitate the courts for corroboration of her
statement. Corroboration of testimony of the prosecutrix as a condition for
judicial reliance is not a requirement of law but a guidance of prudence
under the given facts and circumstances. It is also noticed that minor
contradictions or insignificant discrepancies should not be a ground for
throwing out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. Non­examination of
doctor and non­production of doctors report would not cause fatal to the
prosecution case, if the statements of the prosecutrix and other
prosecution witnesses inspire confidence. It is also noticed that the Court
while acquitting the accused on benefit of doubt should be cautious to see
that the doubt should be a reasonable doubt and it should not reverse the
findings of the guilt on the basis of irrelevant circumstances or mere
technicalities.
2005 0 AIR(SC) 3570; 2005 0 AIR(SCW) 4839; 2006 1 BBCJ(SC) 47;
2005 4 Crimes(SC) 92; 2005 0 CrLJ 4375; 2005 12 JT 150; 2006 1
PLJR(SC) 69; 2005 7 Scale 663; 2005 8 SCC 122; 2005 0 SCC(Cri)
1988; 2005 6 Supreme 583; 2005 0 Supreme(SC) 1263; State of M.P.
Versus DayalSahu

48. Section 376­Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973­Section 378­Rape­

Conviction by trial Court­Acquittal by High Court on ground prosecutrix
was above 16 years of age and she was consenting party­Medical evidence
on basis of X­ray revealing prosecutrix to be 15 years­Doctor admitting
possibility that age may be 15 to 16 years because of variation of 3 on plus
or minus side as described in medical jurisprudence­Nothing to positively
hold age was less than 16 years­Delay of 4 days in lodging FIR due to
 community people of accused trying to settle matter by convening
panchayat­Delay reasonably explained­Absence of injury on prosecutrix
not ground to hold she was consenting party­Incident narrated by
prosecutrix supported by medical evidence inspite of delay in medical
examination and evidence of father of prosecutrix­High Court not justified
in interfering with conviction remanded by trial Court­Acquittal order set
aside and conviction order restored.
2000 0 AIR(SC) 1812; 2000 0 AIR(SCW) 1407; 2000 2 Crimes(SC) 84;
2000 0 CrLJ 2205; 2000 3 JT 643; 2000 2 RCR(Cri) 471; 2000 2 Scale
652; 2000 5 SCC 30; 2000 0 SCC(Cri) 898; 2000 3 Supreme 70; 2000
0 Supreme(SC) 651; 2000 1 UJ 762; State of Rajasthan versus Noore
Khan

49. There is a need to indicate in the order, reasons for prima facie concluding
why bail was being granted particularly where an accused was charged of
having committed a serious offence. However, only broad features of the
case are to be noted. Elaborate analysis of the evidence is to be avoided.
Merely because the family members of the deceased spoke about the
alleged dowry demand and not others that cannot be certainly a ground to
conclude that same throws doubt on the alleged torture.
2007 3 AD(Cr) 69; 2007 0 AIR(SCW) 2857; 2007 2 ALD(Cri)(SC) 284;
2007 0 AllMR(Cri)(SC) 1721; 2007 3 ALT(Cri)(SC) 56; 2007 3 BBCJ(SC)
260; 2007 2 Crimes(Sc) 275; 2007 0 CrLJ 2752; 2007 1 JCR(SC) 313;
2007 3 JLJR(SC) 1; 2007 2 RCR(Cri) 672; 2007 5 Scale 639; 2007 14
SCC 537; 2009 1 SCC(Cri) 883; 2007 1 SCC(Cri) 568; 2007 3 Supreme
434; 2007 0 Supreme(SC) 498; GajanandAgrawal versus State of
Orissa and Ors

50. In view of Section 464 Cr.P.C., it is possible for appellate Court to convict
an accused for offence u/s 306 IPC for which no charge was framed as
accused was tried and convicted u/s 302 IPC and Court finds that no
failure of justice would in fact occasion.
2007 1 AD(Cr) 297; 2007 0 AIR(SCW) 854; 2007 0 AllMR(Cri)(SC)
1382; 2007 3 ALT(Cri)(SC) 101; 2007 2 BBCJ(SC) 146; 2007 1
CalCriLR 733; 2007 1 Crimes(Sc) 370; 2007 0 CrLJ 1435; 2007 2 JT
452; 2007 1 RCR(Cri) 858; 2007 2 Scale 103; 2007 9 SCC 211; 2007 3
SCC(Cri) 120; 2007 1 Supreme 191; 2007 0 Supreme(SC) 55; Virendra
Kumar versus State of U.P.

51. Contention that offence of rape was not made out from evidence of doctor
& only offence u/s 354 IPC could be said as Committed – Out rage to
female modesty – Essence of woman’s modesty was her sex – Modesty was
an attribute associated with female human being as a class – Distinction
between offence of attempt to commit rape & to commit indecent assault –
It attempt succeeds, accused commits offence & if he fails due to reasons
beyond his control, he is said to have attempted to commit the offence –
 Sine qua non of offence of rape was penetration & not ejaculation –
Evidence of Prosecution & evidence of doctor who examined her after
incident showed that Commission of actual rape was established – No
interference in conviction & sentence of 7 years imprisonment was called
for.
2007 0 AIR(SC) 49; 2007 0 AIR(SCW) 2198; 2007 2 ALD(Cri)(SC) 940;
2007 3 ALT(Cri)(SC) 135; 2007 3 Crimes(Sc) 115; 2007 0 CrLJ 2302;
2007 4 JT 393; 2007 1 OLR(SC) 803; 2007 2 RCR(Cri) 391; 2007 4
Scale 438; 2007 11 SCC 265; 2007 5 Supreme 297; 2007 0
Supreme(SC) 373; Ramkripal S/o ShyamlalCharmakar versus State of
Madhya Pradesh

52. Indian Penal Code, 1860­Section 376/511­Appellant convicted by Courts

below for committing rape on a girl­Appeal­Sine quo non of offence of rape
is penetration and not ejaculation­Ejaculation without penetration would
constitute an attempt to commit rape and not actual rape­Appellant took
off sari of victim, got on top of her but before actual intercourse
ejaculated­He left victim on hearing some sound and went away­
Intercourse means sexual connection and in the case that connection had
not been established­Appellant was liable to be convicted for offence of
attempt to rape and awarded sentence of 3½ years.
2004 0 AIR(SC) 1874; 2004 2 BBCJ(SC) 289; 2004 2 CCR(SC) 70; 2004
2 Crimes(SC) 306; 2004 0 CrLJ 1804; 2004 1 JCC 620; 2004 3 JT
328; 2004 3 Scale 96; 2004 3 SCC 602; 2004 0 SCC(Cri) 840; 2004 2
Supreme 358; 2004 0 Supreme(SC) 288; KoppulaVenkatRao versus
State of Andhra Pradesh

53. A promise of marriage deliberately made by the accused with a view to

elicit the assent of the victim without having the intention or inclination to
marry her, will vitiate the consent.
Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Section 90 – Second part of the definition of
consent in Section 90 lays emphasis on the knowledge or reasonable belief
of the person who obtains the tainted consent – Court has to see whether
the person giving the consent has given it under fear or misconception of
fact and the court should also be satisfied that the person doing the act
i.e. the alleged offender is conscious of the fact or should have reason to
think that but for the fear or misconception, the consent would not have
been given – This is the scheme of Section 90 – However, Section 90
cannot be considered as an exhaustive definition of consent for the
purposes of IPC; the normal connotation and concept of consent is not
intended to be excluded.
2007 4 AD(Cr) 413; 2007 0 AIR(SC) 3059; 2007 0 AIR(SCW) 5532;
2007 3 Crimes(Sc) 346; 2007 0 CrLJ 4333; 2007 4 JLJR(SC) 59; 2007
10 JT 246; 2007 2 MhLJ(Cri)(SC) 930; 2007 4 RCR(Cri) 51; 2007 10
Scale 97; 2007 7 SCC 413; 2007 5 Supreme 918; 2007 0 Supreme(SC)
 1080; Pradeep Kumar @ Pradeep Kumar Verma versus State of Bihar
and Anr.

54. Raja Lal Singh Vs. The State of Jharkhand - 2007(3)ACR2427(SC),

AIR2007SC2154, 2007(2)ALD(Cri)264, 2007CriLJ3262,
I(2007)DMC811SC, JT2007(7)SC77, 2007(6)SCALE568,
[2007]6SCR105, 2007(4)UC541
Dowry Death ­ In case of dowry death 'soon before her death' does not
necessarily mean that demand of dowry must be within few days of death
but means that there should be perceptible nexus between the death of
deceased and dowry related harassment inflicted on her.

55. Ananda Mohan Sen and Anr. Vs. State of West Bengal -
2007(3)ACR2730(SC), 2007(2)ALD(Cri)611, 2008(1)ALT(Cri)83,
2007CriLJ2770, I(2007)DMC860SC, 2007(7)SCALE254,
(2007)10SCC774, [2007]6SCR1088, 2007(4)UC403
Indian Penal Code, 1860­­Section 498A­­Explanation­­Cruelty­­
Ascertaining thereof­­Held­­Clause (a) of said explanation is in two parts­­
One is any willful conduct which is of such nature as is likely to drive the
woman to commit suicide and second part as to cause grave injury or
danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of woman­­It
may be that death by itself may not lead to an inference that cruelty was
meted out to the deceased. [Para­­27]
Dowry death­­Involvement therein­­Assessment of­­Held­­Involvement may
be determined having regard to the entirety of situation and materials
brought on records­­Section 113­A of Evidence Act raises a presumption
against the accused subject of course of certain conditions­­Discuss.
[Para­­37]
"Accused shall be convicted if prosecution established his guilt in facts
and circumstances of case."

56. Shaik Ibrahim Vs The State of A.P., rep. by the Public Prosecutor,
High Court of A.P. - 2005(1)ALD163, 2005(1)ALD(Cri)163,
I(2005)DMC535
"If utterances of words compel some one to commit suicide, it would
amount to abetment."

57. Om Prakash Vs. State of U.P. - 2006(2)ACR1540(SC), AIR2006SC2214,

2006(1)ALD(Cri)933, 2006((3))ALT(Cri)152, 2006CriLJ2913,
JT2006(5)SC460, RLW2006(3)SC2555, 2006(5)SCALE614,
(2006)9SCC787, [2006](2)SuppSCR318
Indian Penal Code, 1860 ­ Sections 376 (1) and 376 (2) (e)­­Rape­­
Conviction and sentence­­Whether no corroboration to testimony of
prosecutrix required when it is trustworthy?­­Held, "yes"­­No evidence to
show that accused knew that prosecutrix was pregnant­­Hence, Section
376 (2) (e) not attracted­­Case falls under Section 376 (1)­­Accordingly,
sentence reduced to 7 years from 10 years.
It is settled law that the victim of sexual assault is not treated as
accomplice and as such, her evidence does not require corroboration from
any other evidence including the evidence of a doctor. In a given case even
if the doctor who examined the victim does not find sign of rape, it is no
ground to disbelieve the sole testimony of the prosecutrix. In normal
course, a victim of sexual assault does not like to disclose such offence
even before her family members, much less before public or before the
police. The Indian woman has tendency to conceal such offence because it
involves her prestige as well as prestige of her family. Only in few cases,
the victim girl or the family members have courage to go before the police
and lodge a case. In the instant case, the suggestion given on behalf of the
defence that the victim has falsely implicated the accused does not appeal
to reasoning. There was no apparent reason for a married woman to falsely
implicate the accused after scatting her own prestige and honour.
What is necessary is that the Court must be conscious of the fact that it is
dealing with the evidence of a person who is interested in the outcome of
the charge levelled by her. If the Court keeps this in mind and feels
satisfied that it can act on the evidence of the prosecutrix, there is no rule
of law or practice incorporated in the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 similar to
Illustration (b) to Section 114 which requires it to look for corroboration. If
for some reason the Court is hesitant to place implicit reliance on the
testimony of the prosecutrix it may look for evidence which may lend
assurance to her testimony short of corroboration required in the case of
an accomplice. The nature of evidence required to lend assurance to the
testimony of the prosecutrix must necessarily depend on the facts and
circumstances of each case. But if a prosecutrix is an adult and of full
understanding the Court is entitled to base a conviction on her evidence
unless the same is shown to be infirm and not trustworthy. If the totality
of the circumstances appearing on the record of the case discloses that the
prosecutrix does not have a strong motive to falsely involve the person
charged, the Court should ordinarily have no hesitation in accepting her
evidence.
While considering the case covered by Section 376 (2) (e), what is needed
to be seen is whether evidence establishes knowledge of the accused. Mere
possibility of knowledge is not sufficient. When a case relates to one where
because of the serious nature of the offence, as statutorily prescribed,
more stringent sentence is provided, it must be established and not a
possibility is to be inferred. The language of Section 376 (2) (e) is clear. It
requires prosecution to establish that the accused knew her to be
pregnant. This is clear from the use of the expression "knowing her to be
pregnant". This is conceptually different from that there is a possibility of
his knowledge or that probably he knew it. Positive evidence has to be
adduced by the prosecution about the knowledge. In the absence of any
 material brought on record to show that the accused knew the victim to be
pregnant Section 376 (2) (e), I.P.C. cannot be pressed into service.

58. PadigiNarasimhaVs State - 1996(2)ALD585, 1996(1)ALD(Cri)555,

1996CriLJ2997
Criminal ­ rape ­ Sections 376 and 450 of Indian Penal Code, 1860,
Sections 154, 154 (1), 162, 162 (1) and 313 of Criminal Procedure Code,
1973 and Section 145 of Indian Evidence Act ­ accused convicted for
committing rape by intimidation ­ medical enquiry conducted within four
hours proves forceful sexual intercourse ­ accused failed to take defence to
establish omissions and contradictions in testimonies of witnesses ­
statements of victim corroborated with medical evidence ­ circumstantial
evidence proves that accused trespassed into victim's house to commit
rape ­ defence of false implication not sustainable ­ held, conviction
justified.

59. Angad Ram Vs. State of Bihar - 2007CriLJ2337

"Once person admitted their offence, there is no need of any evidence."

60. RajendraDattaZarekar Vs. State of Goa - 2008(1)ACR165(SC),

AIR2008SC572, 2008CriLJ710, JT2007(13)SC387,
RLW2008(2)SC1227, [2007]12SCR840, 2008(1)UJ1
"For reduction of sentence awarded under Section 376(2)(f) of the Indian
Penal Code, 1860, presence of adequate and special reasons must."

61. State of Madhya Pradesh VsBabulal - 2008(1)ACR235(SC),

AIR2008SC582, 2008CriLJ714, ILR[2008]MP6, 2008(3)JLJ53(SC),
JT2007(13)SC272, 2008(1)KarLJ551, 2008-1-LW(Crl)633,
2008(2)MPHT350(SC), (2008)39OCR251, 2008(1)OLR483,
2008(I)OLR(SC)483, (2008)1SCC234, [2007]12SCR795
Indian Penal Code, 1860 ­ Section 376 (1)­­Rape­­Sentencing­­Principles­­
Rape cases to be dealt with sternly and severely­­Offender of rape, once
convicted, should be treated with heavy hand.
Sexual violence apart from being a dehumanizing act is also an unlawful
intrusion of the right to privacy and sanctity of a female. It is a serious
blow to her supreme honour and offends her self­esteem and dignity. It
degrades and humiliates the victim and leaves behind a traumatic
experience. It has been rightly said that whereas a murderer destroys the
physical frame of a victim, a rapist degrades and defiles the soul of a
helpless female. The Courts are, therefore, expected to try and decide
cases of sexual crime against women with utmost sensitivity. Such cases
need to be dealt with sternly and severely. A socially sensitized Judge is a
better armour in cases of crime against women than long clauses of penal
provisions, containing complex exceptions and complicated provisos.
Once a person is convicted for an offence of rape, he should be treated
with a heavy hand. An undeserved indulgence or liberal attitude in not
 awarding adequate sentence in such cases would amount to allowing or
even to encouraging 'potential criminals'. The society can no longer endure
under such serious threats. Courts must hear the loud cry for justice by
society in cases of heinous crime of rape and impose adequate sentence.
Public abhorrence of the crime needs reflection through imposition of
appropriate sentence by the Court.
"If a Court of Law finds evidence of prosecutrix truthful, trustworthy and
reliable, conviction can be recorded solely on the basis of her testimony
and no further corroboration is necessary."

62. HeeralalYadavVs. State of M.P. and Ors. - 2006(2)ACR2219(SC),

AIR2006SC2535, 2006(2)ALD(Cri)338, 2007(1)ALT(Cri)260,
2006CriLJ3301, ILR[2006]MP1351, 2007(2)JLJ48(SC),
JT2006(6)SC210, 2006(6)SCALE517, (2006)10SCC718,
[2006](3)SuppSCR147
Whether Dying Declaration recorded by doctor stands admissible? The
principle that "no man at the point of his death is presumed to lie. A man
will not meet his maker with lie in his mouth" is based on sound public
policy. No doubt, as the dead man would not be available for cross­
examination, a duty is cast upon the Court to examine the dying
declaration with care and caution as to whether the dying declaration is
creditworthy for acceptance. In other words whether it inspires confidence
on the basis of which alone conviction can be recorded. Similarly, it is also
an accepted principle of law that the dying declaration, keeping in view the
above principles in mind, if inspiring confidence could be the sole basis for
conviction.
The dying declaration of the deceased recorded by PW­1 Dr. A.S. Khan and
well corroborated with other attending circumstances inspires confidence,
on the basis of which conviction could be sustained.

63. Kollam Brahmananda Reddy Vs. State of A.P - 1999(2)ALD405,

1999(1)ALD(Cri)525, 1999(1)ALT(Cri)529, 1999CriLJ2368
a. Criminal ­ benefit of conflicting evidences ­ oral and medical evidence
contrary to each other ­ held, benefit of such vagueness should be
granted to accused.
b. Evaluation of evidence ­ accusation on group ­ evidence should be taken
leaving out improbabilities and exaggerations ­ held, it is quality and not
quantity of evidence that matters.
c. Burden of proof ­ plea of alibi raised ­ party pleading alibi liable to prove
it ­ burden to disprove falls on prosecution if alibi pleaded with
supporting evidence.

64. Rama Nand and Ors. Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh - AIR1981SC738,
1981CriLJ298, 1981(1)SCALE24, (1981)1SCC511, (1981)SCC(Cri)197,
[1981]2SCR444, 1981(13)UJ424
 Criminal ­ murder ­ Sections 302 and 364 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 ­
appellants challenged their conviction under Section 302 ­ marks of
violence on vital part of body of victim proved homicidal death of victim ­
circumstantial evidence are of such definite and clinching character which
leads inferences that victim met homicidal death ­ circumstances
established that in all human probabilities victim was murdered by
accused concerned ­ circumstances in their cumulative effect established
that accused intentionally caused death of victim ­ conviction upheld.

65. The State of Bombay Vs. KathiKaluOghad and Ors. - AIR1961SC1808,

1961AWR(S.C.)31736, (1962)64BomLR240, 1961CriLJ856,
[1962]3SCR10
substantial Question of law regarding interpretation of Article 20 (3) of
constitution before Supreme Court ­ whether act compelling accused to
give his specimen handwriting or signature or impression of finger tips
amounts to compelling him 'to be witness' against himself within meaning
of Article 20 (3) ­ mere questioning of accused person by police officer
resulting in voluntary statement which may ultimately turn out to be
incriminatory is not compulsion ­ to be witness is not equivalent to
'furnishing evidence' in its wide significance that is to say as including not
merely making of oral or written statement but also production of
documents or giving materials which may be relevant at trial to determine
the guilt innocence of accused ­ to be a witness means imparting
knowledge in respect of relevant facts by an oral statement or a statement
in writing made or given in Court or otherwise ­ to bring statement in
question within prohibition of Article 20 (3) the person accused must have
stood in character of an accused person at time he made statement and it
is not enough that he should become an accused any time after the
statement has been made.

66. Rajbabu and Anr. Vs. State of M.P. - 2008(3)ACR2510(SC),

AIR2008SC3212, 2009(1)ALD(Cri)122, 2008(56)BLJR2551,
2008CriLJ4301, II(2008)DMC624SC, ILR[2009]MP1, JT2008(8)SC250,
2008(4)MPJR(SC)188, (2008)41OCR195, 2009(1)OLR97,
2009(I)OLR(SC)97, 2008(10)SCALE437, 2008(2)UJ973
"When there is no direct evidence to establish that the Accused either
aided or instigated the deceased to commit suicide or entered into any
conspiracy to aid her in committing suicide then conviction under Section
306 will not be sustainable."

67. Karre Mohan Krishna S/o Krishnaiah Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh
through Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P. - 2009(2)ALD(Cri)82,
2009((2))ALT(Cri)344, 2009(2)APLJ417, 2009CriLJ3375
"Legal evidence must be proved while convicting accused under Section
306 of IPC."
68. Anicete Lobo and Ashok DattaNaik and ChandrashekharShantaram
Desai Vs. The State Goa, Daman and Diu - AIR1994SC1613a,
1994CriLJ1582
Admittedly, A­5 was good in drawing and his services were utilised by A­4
and A­1 to forge the signature. On his own admission A­5 stated that he
forged the signature on a form of the bank. At that time he must have fully
known that it is going to be used as a genuine document. It was this draft
ultimately which was deposited by A­3 by opening an account in the name
of a fictitious person and the amount was withdrawn. The plea of A­5 that
he only tried to oblige A­4 and that he did not know anything more,can not
be accepted under the circumstances. Therefore it has been rightly held by
both the courts below that he was a co­conspirator.

69. Vishnu @ Undrya Vs. State of Maharashtra - 2006(1)ACR328(SC),

AIR2006SC508, 2006(1)ALD(Cri)22, 2006((1))ALT(Cri)217,
2005CriLJ303, JT2005(10)SC174, 2006(1)PLJR391,
RLW2006(1)SC662, (2006)1SCC283, 2006(1)UJ130
Indian Penal Code, 1860 ­ Sections 375, Clause thirdly, 376/366­­Rape,
etc.­­Conviction and sentence by trial court­­High Court maintaining
conviction and enhancing sentence ­­ Whether justified?­­Held, "yes"­­Age
of prosecutrix below 16 years on date of incident­­Hence, question of
consent immaterial­­Date of birth of prosecutrix proved by father and
mother­­Correct­­Date shown in school leaving certificate not correct­­Age
in opinion of doctor being expert medical evidence­­Not binding in face of
ocular evidence­­Evidence of doctor­­Really of advisorycharacter­­Not
binding on witness of fact­­Evidence of prosecutrix inspiring confidence­­It
is showing forcible sexual intercourse­­No girl/woman of self­respect and
dignity would depose falsely implicating somebody of ravishing her
chastity­­Conduct of first investigator rightly commented upon by courts
below­­No infirmity in well­merited concurrent findings recorded by two
courts below.
In the case of determination of date of birth of the child, the best evidence
is of the father and the mother. In the present case, the father and the
mother­P.W. 1 and P.W. 13 categorically stated that P.W. 4 the prosecutrix
was born on 29.11.1964, which is supported by the unimpeachable
documents, in all material particulars. These are the statements of facts. If
the statements of facts are pitted against the so­called expert opinion of
the doctor with regard to the determination of age based on ossification
test scientifically conducted, the evidence of facts of the former will prevail
over the expert opinion based on the basis of ossification test. Even as per
the doctor's opinion in the ossification test for determination of age, the
age varies. In the present case, therefore, the ossification test cannot form
the basis for determination of the age of the prosecutrix on the face of
witness of facts tendered by P.W. 1 and P.W. 13, supported by
unimpeachable documents. Normally, the age recorded in the school
certificate is considered to be the correct determination of age provided the
 parents furnish the correct age of the ward at the time of admission and it
is authenticated. In the present case, the parents had admitted to have
given an incorrect date of birth of their daughter, presumably with a view
to make up the age to secure admission in the school. Apart from this, as
noticed earlier, the school certificate collected by P.W. 15 S.I. Bagal was
not an authenticated document. Nobody was produced to prove the date of
birth recorded in the school certificate. The date of birth recorded in the
school certificate as 29.6.1963 is, therefore, belied by the unimpeachable
evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 13 and contemporaneous documents like date of
birth register of Greater Bombay Municipal Corporation and the register of
the Nursing Home where the prosecutrix was born and proved by Dr.
The statement of the prosecutrix, is quite natural, inspires confidence and
merits acceptance. In the traditional non­permissive bounds of society of
India, no girl or woman of self­respect and dignity would depose falsely
implicating somebody of ravishing her chastity by sacrificing and
jeopardizing her future prospect of getting married with suitable match.
Not only she would be sacrificing her future prospect of getting married
and having family life, but also would invite the wrath of being ostracized
and outcast from the society she belongs to and also from her family
circle. From the statement of the prosecutrix, it is revealed that the
accused induced her to a hotel by creating an impression that his wife was
admitted in the hospital and that he would see her first and then drop the
prosecutrix at her residence whereas, in fact, she was not admitted in the
hospital. On the pretext of going to Nanawati Hospital, he took her to a
hotel, took her inside a room, closed the door of the room, threatened her
to finish her if she shouted and then forcibly ravished her sexually. Hence,
a clear case of rape, as defined under Section 375 clause thirdly of I.P.C.
has been established against the accused. It is now a well­settled principle
of law that conviction can be sustained on the sole testimony of the
prosecutrix, if it inspires confidence.

70. JiwanDass Vs. State - 1999(1)ACR575(SC), AIR1999SC1301,

1999(1)ALD(Cri)471, (1999)2CALLT44(SC), 1999CriLJ2034,
1999(1)Crimes119(SC), JT1999(2)SC1, 2000-1-LW(Crl)133,
1999(1)SCALE648, (1999)2SCC530, [1999]1SCR922, 1999(1)UJ544
To bring home a charge under Section 409, what is necessary to be proved
is that the accused is a public servant and in such capacity he was
entrusted with the property in question or with dominion over it and that
he committed criminal breach of trust in respect of it. The necessary
elements constituted in the offence must be strictly proved by the
prosecution. It is true that prosecution need not prove the actual mode of
misappropriation and once entrustment of or dominion over the property
is established, then it would be for the accused to explain as to how the
property was dealt with.
71. Manilal Vs. State of Kerala - 1998(2)ALT(Cri)369, 1998CriLJ3785,
ILR1998(3)Kerala552
The prosecution is expected to establish that Ext. P­8 document was
forged by the revision Petitioner/accused. Then only Section 471 is
attracted to be established by the prosecution. The specimen thumb
impressions of P. W.1 and the revision Petitioner were compared with the
thumb impression found in Ext. P­8 and as per the expert's opinion, given
in Exts. P­20 and P­21, the left thumb impression in Ext. P­8 is not that of
either P.W.1 or the revision Petitioner/accused. So, in that situation, the
burden lies on the prosecution to establish that the thumb impression
found in Ext. P­8 was put at the instigation of the revision Petitioner. In
other words, such document was forged with the connivance of the
revision Petitioner and then such document was used as genuine one in
transferring the property to P.W 7. In the instant case, practically, there is
no evidence as to, who forged Ex P8.
Before convicting an accused under Section 471 I.P.C., the prosecution
ought to have established beyond all doubt, as to who has forged the
document. Then only the next stage comes that such forged document has
been used by the accused as a genuine one. In the absence of the proof as
to forgery, no conviction can be rendered u/sec 471 IPC.

72. P.S. Prasad Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and Anr. - 1998(1)ALD554,
1998(1)ALD(Cri)132, 1998(1)ALT(Cri)268
Criminal ­ forgery and cheating ­ Section 173 (2) of Criminal Procedure
Code, 1973, Sections 120B, 471, 420 and 421 of Indian Penal Code, 1860
and Section 482 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 ­ forgery and cheating
case registered against petitioner in obtaining licence ­ Collector opined
special licence could only be obtained by manipulation ­ Court to decide
whether offences constituted against petitioner and whether criminal
proceedings to continue ­ document to be used with an intention to
defraud and making mere fraud representation not sufficient to be guilty ­
held, proceedings devoid of merit thus quashed.

73. 2006(1)ACR250(SC), AIR2006SC381, 2006((1))ALT(Cri)225,

2005CriLJ139, 2006(1)PLJR476, 2005(9)SCALE371, (2005)13SCC766
- State of Himachal Pradesh Vs. Asha Ram
It is now well­settled principle of law that conviction can be founded on the
testimony of the prosecutrix alone unless there are compelling reasons for
seeking corroboration. The evidence of a prosecutrix is more reliable than
that of an injured witness. The testimony of the victim of sexual assault is
vital unless there are compelling reasons which necessitate looking for
corroboration of her statement, the Courts should find no difficulty in
acting on the testimony of a victim of sexual assault alone to convict an
accused where her testimony inspires confidence and is found to be
reliable. It is also well­settled principle of law that corroboration as a
condition for judicial reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix is not a
 requirement of law but a guidance of prudence under given circumstances.
Even minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the statement
of the prosecutrix should not be a ground for throwing out an otherwise
reliable prosecution case.
From the evidence, it is clearly established that P.Ws. 1 and 2, despite
strained relationship between their mother and father, were happily
staying with the accused and there is no rhyme or reason as to why the
daughter should depose falsely so as to expose her honour and dignity and
also expose the whole family to the society risking the outcasting or
ostracization and condemnation by the family circle as well as by the
society. No girl of self respect and dignity who is conscious of her chastity
having expectations of married life and livelihood would accuse falsely
against any other person of rape, much less against her father, sacrificing
thereby her chastity and also expose the entire family to shame and at the
risk of condemnation and ostracization by the society. It is unthinkable to
suggest that the mother would go to the extent of inventing a story of
sexual assault of her own daughter and tutor her to narrate a story of
sexual assault against a person who is no other than her husband and
father of the girl, at the risk of bringing down their social status and spoil
their reputation in the society as well as in the family circle to which they
belong to.

74. HimadriAdhikari Vs. The State - 1986CriLJ337

"Party shall not convict for an offence, which is not proved by evidence."

75. Hindustani Andolan and Ors. Vs. State of Punjab and Ors. -
1984(8)ACR51(SC), AIR1984SC582, 1984CriLJ299, 1983(2)SCALE855,
(1984)1SCC204, [1984]1SCR902, 1984(16)UJ165
Criminal ­ Power of Government ­ Whether the Government could ask the
police not to enter a place of worship, even if criminals were reported to be
hiding or harboured therein ­ Held, it was impossible and undesirable for
any Court to issue a general writ of mandamus to the effect that whenever
a criminal was suspected to have taken shelter in a place of worship ­
Police must enter that place, regardless of the overall situation of law and
order.

76. Lal Chand and Ors. Vs. State of Haryana - 1984(8)ACR13(SC),

AIR1984SC226, 1984CriLJ164, 1983(2)SCALE1038,
1984(1)SCALE690, (1984)1SCC686
Prosecution to establish beyond reasonable doubt that a fraud had been
practised on P.W. 27, Smt. Ghogari, the prosecution must fail as against
all the persons arraigned as accused at the trial on all counts.

77. L. ChandraiahVs. State of A.P. and Anr. - AIR2004SC252,

2004CriLJ365, JT2003(10)SC165, 2003(9)SCALE537,
(2003)12SCC670, [2003]5SuppSCR336
 Criminal ­ Prevention of Corruption Act ­ Sections 5(1) and 5(2)­ Indian
Penal Code ­ Sections 405, 409, 467 and 471 ­ No evidence to show that
the appellants forged the documents which purported to be a valuable
security as the evidence is only to the effect that they had negligently put
their signatures on those vouchers while passing the vouchers for
payment ­ There is no evidence to show that the appellants had knowledge
of the fact that the vouchers were forged vouchers ­ It may be, that they
acted in a negligent manner and if they had takendue care they would
have detected the fraud, but they failed to do so but that by itself would
not constitute an offence under Section 409 IPC though it may expose the
appellants to disciplinary action under the relevant rules ­ No evidence to
show that the accused were acting in conspiracy with each other.

78. Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P. Vs.P. HanumanthaRao -

2006(1)ALD(Cri)332, 2006((1))ALT(Cri)368, 2006CriLJ1675
Criminal ­ Misappropriation of document ­ Sections 409, 471, 420, 468
and 474(a)Indian Penal Code 1860 ­ Respondent abused his official
position and misappropriated various amounts by manipulating and
destroying the records on various occasions ­ Whether, Respondent was
responsible for misappropriation of document ­ Held, the prosecution did
not let in any evidence from the Central Accounts and office about the
debits made in the branch ­ The alleged documents marked were not
authorized by any officer ­ However, prosecution did not produce relevant
ledgers and folios into Court to prove exactly to which account number the
amounts were received ­ The authors of documents were not examined in
the Court ­ Prosecution did not produce the relevant ledgers and folios into
Court to prove that exactly to which account number the amounts were
credited and through which cheques the amounts were received ­ Thus
,confession statement was not signed by the accused and no panchas were
present at the time of recording the confession statement ­ All these
omissions clearly establish that the prosecution had miserably failed to
bring the guilt of accused ­ Appeal dismissed.

79. R. Venkatakrishnan Vs.Central Bureau of Investigation -

AIR2010SC1812, 2010(2)ALD(Cri)208, JT2009(10)SC597,
2009(11)SCALE102, (2009)11SCC737, [2009]96SCL143(SC),
[2009]13SCR762
Criminal ­ Conspiracy ­ Section 120B of Indian penal Code, 1860 and
National Housing Bank Act, 1987 (1987 Act)­ Appellants convicted for
criminal conspiracy ­ Held, under 1987 Act, NHB cannot advance loans to
anybody except housing finance institutions, scheduled banks and
statutory slum clearance body, and in case it advances any loan to any
individual the same would amount to an offence under the provisions of
the 1987 Act ­ Advancement of loan to Harshad Mehta by NHB under the
disguise of a call money transaction was illegal ­ Appellants had the
knowledge of the said transaction and committed criminal conspiracy.
 Criminal ­ Initiation of Prosecution ­ Section 409 of Indian Penal code,
1860 ­ Appellants challenged conviction under Section 409 ­ Held,
complaint petition under all circumstances must be made by the banks
and financial institutions whose money had been the subject matter of
offence and criminal law can be set in motion by anybody ­ Prosecution
was initiated on the basis of the information received by the Central
Bureau of Investigation ­ It would entitled to do so not only in regard to its
statutory powers contained in the Delhi Special Police Act but it was also
entitled to take cognizance in terms of the report submitted by
Janakiraman Committee.
Criminal ­ Criminal Breach of Trust ­ Section 409 of Indian Penal code,
1860 ­ Conviction for criminal breach of trust challenged ­ Held, an
amount of Rs. 40 crore was entrusted to Accused No. 6 to be dealt with in
accordance with the provisions of the 1987 Act and 1987 Act does not
permit grant of loan to an individual ­ Accused No. 4 in violation of the law
handed over the amount to the UCO Bank with full knowledge that the
amount would be credited to the account of Accused No. 4 ­ Call money
transaction with UCO Bank was only a cover up and Accused No.6
misappropriated the property which was trusted to him.

80. State of Himachal Pradesh Vs. Karanvir - 2006(2)ACR1899(SC),

AIR2006SC2211, 2006(1)ALD(Cri)941, 2006((3))ALT(Cri)290,
2006CriLJ2917, JT2006(5)SC479, 2006(5)SCALE654, (2006)5SCC381,
[2006](3)SuppSCR666
The actual manner of misappropriation, it is well­settled, is not required to
be proved by the prosecution. Once entrustment is proved, it was for the
accused to prove as to how the property entrusted to him was dealt with in
view of Section 405 of the I.P.C. If the respondent had failed to produce
any material for this purpose, the prosecution should not suffer therefor.

81. State of Gujarat Vs. ChhotalalVallabhji Brahmin - 1992CriLJ2689

Prosecution could not explain the delay of lodging the complaint after
lapse of more than six months. Moreover the prosecution dis not specify
the reasons for non­examination of the eye witness. Hence acquittal held
proper.

82. Jassa Singh and Ors. Vs. Respondent: State of Haryana -

2002(3)ACR2386(SC), AIR2002SC520, 2002(1)ALT(Cri)115,
2002CriLJ563, 2002(1)Crimes236(SC), JT2002(Suppl1)SC593,
2002(1)SCALE26, (2002)2SCC481, 2002(1)UC464
If all the accused persons had formed an unlawful assembly and their
common object was to do away with these two persons, necessarily, the
other six accused also should have been present at the second stage of the
incident. Except the testimony of P.W. 9 and P.W. 10, there is no evidence
to speak about the presence of ten accused persons together at the place
 of incident. The 'gandasis' were alleged to have been recovered pursuant to
their statement. But the recovery of these weapons was not proved by
independent witnesses. There is also no evidence to show that these
'gandasis' were stained with human blood. All possible independent
evidence to connect these five appellants to the crime is lacking. That
apart, the second incident wherein Tehal Singh was done to death, is
projected by the prosecution as a sequel to the first incident , but there is
no explanation as to where the six persons had gone leaving the four
persons who allegedly caused the death of Tehal Singh. The presence of
one injury on the body of Surmukh Singh alleged to have been caused by
'gandasis' casts serious doubts about the presence of all the appellants at
the place of occurrence. However, the evidence of P.W. 14 and P.W. 15 can
safely be accepted as regards the presence of Jassa Singh, Bakha Singh,
Lakha Singh and Sukha Singh. The other appellants are certainly entitled
to benefit of doubt that arises out of this weak and fragile evidence. As the
presence of other accused, namely, Kabul Singh, Jeet Singh, Sarang
Singh, Swaran Singh and Satnam Singh is doubtful, they are entitled to be
acquitted.
In the instant case, the appellants went to the place of occurrence with
guns and deadly weapons. This would clearly indicate that there was pre­
meditation on the part of the appellants and from the acts committed by
the appellant, it is evident that they had intention of doing more harm
than was necessary for the purpose of self­defence. Therefore, the acts
committed by the appellants will not come within Exception 2 of Section
300, I.P.C. so as to make it culpable homicide not amounting to murder.
There were disputes between the parties and there was also pending
litigation. The appellants had also resorted to civil remedies. That apart,
the evidence also does not indicate that there was a serious apprehension
that death or grievous hurt would be the consequence of the act allegedly
committed by Surmukh Singh and others. Therefore, the assailants had
no right to take away the life of Surmukh Singh in exercise of the alleged
right of private defence.

83. Sham @ KishorBhaskarraoMatkari Vs.The State of Maharashtra -

AIR2012SC301, 2011(4)RCR(Criminal)750, 2011(11)SCALE206
"Court shall award death sentence only in rarest of rare case."

84. State, Govt. of NCT of Delhi Vs.Sunil and Another -

2001(1)ACR17(SC), 2001(1)ALD(Cri)54, 2001CriLJ504,
JT2000(Suppl3)SC267, RLW2001(1)SC3, 2000(7)SCALE692,
[2000]5SuppSCR144
(2) Evidence Act, 1872 ­ Section 27 ­ Recovery of article­Resulting from
statement of accused­No independent witness of recovery­Whether
recovery of article can be discarded?­Held, "no".
There is no requirement either under Section 27 of the Evidence Act or
under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to obtain signature
of independent witnesses on the record in which statement of an accused
is written. The legal obligation to call independent and respectable
inhabitants of the locality to attend and witness the exercise made by the
police is cast on the police officer when searches are made under Chapter
VII of the Code. Section 100 (5) of the Code requires that such search shall
be made in their presence and a list of all things seizedin the course of
such search and of the places in which they are respectively found, shall
be prepared by such officer or other person "and signed by such
witnesses". It must be remembered that search is made to find out a thing
or document which the searching officer hashas no prior idea where the
thing or document is kept. He prowls for it either on reasonable suspicion
or on some guess work that it could possibly be ferreted out in such
prowling. It is a stark reality that during searches, the team which
conducts search would have tomeddle with lots of other articles and
documents also and in such process, many such articles or documents are
likely to be displaced or even strewn helter­skelter. The legislative idea in
insisting on such searches to be made in the presence of two independent
inhabitants of the localityis to ensure the safety of all such articles
meddled with and to protect the rights of the persons entitled thereto. But
recovery of an object pursuant to the information supplied by an accused
in custody is different from the searching endeavour envisaged in Chapter
VII of the Code.Hence, it is a fallacious impression that when recovery is
effected, pursuant to any statement made by the accused, the document
prepared by the Investigating Officer, contemporaneous with such
recovery, must necessarily be attested by independent witnesses. Of
course,if any such statement leads to recovery of any article, it is open to
the Investigating Officer to take the signature of any person present at that
time, on the document prepared for such recovery. But if no witness was
present or if no person had agreed to affix hissignature on the document,
it is difficult to lay down, as a proposition of law, that the document so
prepared by the police officer must be treated as tainted and the recovery
evidence unreliable. The Court has to consider the evidence of the
Investigating Officer who deposed to the factof recovery based on the
statement elicited from the accused on its own worth.
(3) Evidence Act, 1872 ­ Sections 3, 27 and 114­Police witness­Reliability­
Initial trust on actions and documents made by police to be placed­Not
legally approvable that police action unreliable to start with.
We feel that it is an archaic notion that actions of the police officer should
be approached with initial distrust. We are aware that such a notion was
lavishly entertained during British period and policemen also knew about
it. Its hangover persisted during post­independent years but it is timenow
to start placing at least initial trust on the actions and the documents
made by the police. At any rate, the Court cannot start with the
presumption that the police records are untrustworthy. As a proposition of
 law, the presumption should be the other way around. That officialacts of
the police have been regularly performed is a wise principle of presumption
and recognised even by the Legislature. Hence, when a police officer gives
evidence in Court that a certain article was recovered by him on the
strength of the statement made by the accusedit is open to the Court to
believe the version to be correct if it is not otherwise shown to be
unreliable. It is for the accused, through cross­examination of witnesses or
through any other materials, to show that the evidence of the police officer
is either unreliable or atleast unsafe to be acted upon in a particular case.
If the Court has any good reason to suspect the truthfulness of such
records of the police, theCourt could certainly take into account the fact
that no other independent person was present at the time of recovery. But
it is not a legally approvable procedure to presume the police action as
unreliable to start with, or to jettison such action merely for the reason
that police didnot collect signatures of independent persons in the
documents made contemporaneous with such actions.

85. GosuJairami Reddy and Anr. Vs. State of A.P. - 2011(3)ACR3167(SC),

AIR2011SC3147, 2011CriLJ4387, 2011(4)Crimes244(SC),
2011(3)JCC2160(SC), JT2011(8)SC263, 2011(4)KCCRSN468, 2011 (3)
KLT(SN) 103, 2011(4)PLJR273, 2011(4)RCR(Criminal)540,
2011(8)SCALE58, (2011)11SCC766, 2011(2)UC1531
"In cases based on eye witness account of the incident proof or absence of
a motive is not of any significant consequence."

86. AIR2001SC2842, 2002(1)ALD(Cri)43, 2001ALLMR(Cri)2384(SC),

2001(2)ALT(Cri)296, 2002(3)CGLJ64, 2001CriLJ4632,
JT2001(8)SC110, 2001(6)SCALE490, (2001)8SCC311, 2001(2)UC602 -
Ram GulamChaudhury and ors. vs. State of Bihar
Evidence Act, 1872 ­ Section 106­­Indian Penal Code, 1860­­ Sections 302
read with 149 or 302 read with 149 and 201­­Murder­­ Conviction­­
Corpus delicti not recovered­­After incident appellants took away the body­
­Non­examination of IO­­Blood stained mud and Lungi seized but not
produced­­ Lantern not seized­­HELD ­­Appellant should explain that
what they did with­­After took him away­­IO not eye­witness­­He can't give
any evidence about place of occurrence­­Non production of said items not
resulted in any prejudice to appellants­­And deceased with his father
having meals ­­Sister and mother serving­­It is clear that they had put
source of light­­Appeal dismissed. (Para­­23 and 29 to 31)

87. KumudiLal Vs. State of U.P. - 1999(1)ACR856(SC), AIR1999SC1699,

1999(1)ALT(Cri)237, 1999CriLJ2523, 1999(31)Crimes1(SC),
JT1999(3)SC121, 1999(2)SCALE622, (1999)4SCC108
Criminal ­ rape with murder ­ Sections 302 and 376 of Indian Penal Code,
1860 ­ deceased initially gave liberty to accused to touch body ­ accused
later forced her for sexual intercourse against her will ­ deceased denied
 for sexual intercourse ­ deceased raped by accused and on her crying she
was murdered ­ accused guilty of rape and murder but on account of
initial conduct of deceased death sentence reduced to life imprisonment.

88. 1996(1 )ALD1, 1996(1)ALD(Cri)358, 1996(1)ALT(Cri)180,

1996CriLJ2196 DudekulaKhabalaSaheb alias Khabala Vs. Respondent:
State of Andhra Pradesh
Nature of offence ­ Section 300 (3) of Indian Penal Code, 1860 ­ under
Clause (3) of Section 300 an intention to cause death not a mandatory
requirement ­ intention to cause such bodily injury being sufficient in the
ordinary course of nature to cause death brings the offence underculpable
homicide amounting to murder.

89. 2005 1 ALD(Cri) 163; 2006 1 ALT(Cri) 234; Shaik Ibrahim Versus
State of A.P.
Indian Penal Code, 1860 ­ Section 305 ­ Appeal against conviction ­
Benefit of Doubt ­ Where evidence on record not discloses direct abetment
by accused, the accused is entitled to benefit of doubt. Abetment
discussed.

90. 2008 1 ALD(Cri) 532; 2008 1 ALT(Cri) 385; 2008 0 Supreme(AP) 22;
NandikanumaLakshmamma and another Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh
A direct decision on the point namely, when two sets of statements are
recorded under Section 161 of the Code from the same witnesses, the
effect of non­production or of supply one of them, to the Court or the
accused was rendered by the Privy Council in PulukuriKottaya v. Emperor,
AIR (34) 1947 PC 67. The importance of the statements recorded under
Section 161 Cr.P.C. for an accused was emphasized. As in the present
case, in that case also, two Investigating Officers have recorded the
statements of the witnesses separately and one set of statement was not
produced before the Court at the initial stage, though, made available, at
later stage.

91. 2004 0 AIR(SC) 1677; 2004 1 CCR(SC) 349; 2004 2 Crimes(SC) 204;
2004 2 Crimes(SC) 166; 2004 0 CrLJ 1446; 2004 0 CrLJ 1441; 2004 1
JCC 488; 2004 2 JT 425; 2004 3 PLJR(SC) 72; 2004 2 RCR(Cri) 936;
2004 2 Scale 408; 2004 4 SCC 371; 2004 0 SCC(Cri) 1259; 2004 2
Supreme 234; 2004 0 Supreme(SC) 174; RajuPandurangMahale versus
State of Maharashtra and Anr.
Test to determine if modesty of woman was outraged was whether action of
offender was such as could be perceived as one which was capable of
shocking the sense of decency of a woman.

92. 2001 0 AIR(SC) 393; 2000 0 AIR(SCW) 4303; 2001 1 JLJR(SC) 417;
2000 Supp3 JT 213; 2000 7 Scale 628; 2001 1 SCC 4; 2000 8
 Supreme 429; 2000 0 Supreme(SC) 1903; 2001 1 UJ 271; State of
Maharashtra versus Milind&Ors
The rule of stare decisis is not inflexible so as to preclude a departure
therefrom in any case but its application depends on facts and
circumstances of each case. It is good to proceed from precedent to
precedent but it is earlier the better to give quietus to the incorrect one by
annulling it to avoid repetition or perpetuation of injustice, hardship and
anything ex­facie illegal more particularly when a precedent runs counter
to the provisions of the Constitution.

93. 1996 0 AIR(SC) 1011; 1996 0 AIR(SCW) 492; 1996 33 ATC 713; 1996
1 JT 57; 1996 0 LIC 919; 1996 1 Scale 85; 1996 3 SCC 545; 1996 0
SCC(L&S) 772; 1996 1 SLR 655; 1996 0 Supreme(SC) 25; 1996 1 UJ
626; VALSAMMA PAUL Vs. COCHIN UNIVERSITY As a part of it, the
officer concerned should also verify, as a fact, whether a convert has
totally abjured his old faith and adopted, as a fact, the new faith; whether
he suffered all the handicaps as a Dalit or Tribe; whether conversion is
only a ruse to gain constitutional benefits under Articles 15 (4)or 16 (4);
and whether the community has in fact recognised his conversion and
treated him as a member of the community and the issue such a
certificate.

94. 1976 0 AIR(SC) 939; 1976 1 SCC 863; 1976 3 SCR 82; 1975 0
Supreme(SC) 543; C. M. Arumugam Versus S. Rajgopal and others
These cases show that the consistent view taken in this country from the
time Administrator­General of Madras v. Anandachari, (1886) ILR 9 Mad
466 (supra) was decided, that is, since 1886, has been that on
reconversion to Hinduism, a person can once again become a member of
the caste in which he was born and to which he belonged before
conversion to another religion, if the members of the caste accept him as a
member. There is no reason either on principle or on authority which
should compel us to disregard this view which has prevailed for almost a
century and lay down a different rule on the subject. If a person who has
embraced another religion can be reconverted to Hinduism, there is no
rational principle why he should not be able to come back to his caste, if
the other members of the caste are prepared to readmit him as a member.
It stands to reason that he should be able to come back to the fold to
which he once belonged, provided of course the community is willing to
take him within the fold. It is the orthodox Hindu society still dominated to
a large extent, particularly in rural areas, by medievalistic outlook and
status­oriented approach which attaches social and economic disabilities
to a person belonging to a Scheduled Caste and that is why certain
favoured treatment is given to him by the Constitution. Once such a
person ceases to be a Hindu and becomes a Christian, the social and
economic disabilities arising because of Hindu religion cease and hence it
is no longer necessary to give him protection and for this reason he is
 deemed not to belong to a Scheduled Caste. But when he is reconverted to
Hinduism, the social and economic disabilities once again revive and
become attached to him because these are disabilities inflicted by
Hinduism. A Mahar or a Koli or a Mala would not be recognised as
anything but a Mahar or a Koli or a Mala after reconversion to Hinduism
and he would suffer from the same social and economic disabilities from
which he suffered before he was converted to another religion. It is,
therefore, obvious that the object and purpose of the Constitution
(Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950 would be advanced rather than retarded
by taking the view that on reconversion to Hinduism, a person can once
again become a member of the Scheduled Caste to which he belonged
prior to his conversion.

95. 1995 0 AIR(SC) 1506; 1995 0 AIR(SCW) 2289; 1995 30 ATC 166; 1995
3 JT 684; 1995 2 Scale 815; 1995 4 SCC 32; 1995 2 SLR 595; 1995 0
Supreme(SC) 547; 1995 2 UJ 535; Director of Tribunal Welfare,
Government of Andhra Pradesh Versus LavetiGiri and another
PROCEDURE FOR ISSUING SOCIAL STATUS CERTIFICATE.
The admission wrongly gained or appointment wrongly obtained on the
basis of false social status certificate necessarily has the effect of depriving
the genuine Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes or OBC candidates
envisaged of the benefits conferred on them by the Constitution. By reason
thereof, the genuine candidates would be denied admission to professional
course etc. or appointments to office or posts under a State
instrumentialites. More often they are denied social status certificates
while ineligible or spurious persons easily would secure them. After falsely
gaining entry, resort to dilatory tactics and create hurdles in completion of
the inquiries by the Scrutiny Committee. It is the parent or the guardian
who may play fraud claiming false status certificate of his child. It is,
therefore, necessary that the certificates issued are scrutinised at the
earliest and with utmost expedition and promptitude. For that purpose, it
is necessary to streamline the procedure for the issuance of social status
certificates, their scrutiny and their approval, which may be the following
:­
1. The application for grant of social status certificate shall be made to the
Revenue Sub­Divisional Officer and Deputy Collector or Deputy
Commissioner and the certificate shall be issued by such officer rather
than by the Officer like Taluk or Mandal level.
2. The parent, guardian or the candidate, as the case may be, shall file an
affidavit duly sworn and attested by a competent gazetted officer or non­
gazetted officer with particulars of castes and sub­castes, tribe, tribal
community, parts or groups of tribes or tribal communities, the place from
which he originally hails from and other particulars as may be prescribed
by the Directorate concerned.
3. Application for verification of the caste certificate by the Scrutiny
Committee shall be filed at least six months in advance before seeking
admission into educational institution or an appointment to a post.
4. All the State Governments shall constitute a Committee of three officers,
namely (1) an Additional or Joint Secretary or any officer higher in rank of
the Director of the department concerned. (II) the Director, Social
Welfare/Tribal Welfare/Backward Class Welfare, as the case may be. and
(III) in the case of Scheduled Castes another officer who has intimate
knowledge in the verification and issuance of the social status certificates.
In the case of the Scheduled Tribes, the Research Officer who has intimate
knowledge in identifying the tribes, tribal communities parts of or groups
of tribes or tribal communities.
5. Each Directorate should constitute a vigilance cell consisting of Senior
Deputy Superintendent of Police in over­all­change and such number of
Police Inspectors to investigate into the social status claims. The Inspector
would go to the local place of residence and original place from which the
candidate hails and usually resides or in case of migration to the town or
city, the place from which he originally hailed from. The vigilance office
should personally verify and collect all the facts of the social status
claimed by the candidate or the parent or guardian, as the case may be.
He should also examine the school records, birth registration, if any. He
should also examine the parent, guardian or the candidate in relation to
their caste etc. or such other persons who have knowledge of the social
status of the candidate and then submit a report to the Directorate
together with all particulars as envisaged in the pro forma, in particular, of
the Scheduled Tribes relating to their peculiar anthropological and
ethnological traits, deity, rituals, customs, mode of marriage, death
ceremonies, method of burial of dead bodies etc. by the castes or tribes or
tribal communities concerned etc.
6. The Director concerned, on receipt of the report from the vigilance
officer if he found the claim for social status to be "not genuine" or
doubtful or spurious or falsely or wrongly claimed, the Director concerned
should issue show cause notice supplying a copy of the report of the
vigilance officer to the candidate by a registered post with acknowledgment
due or through the head of the educational institution concerned in which
the candidate is studying or employed. The notice should indicate that the
representation or reply, if any, would be made within two weeks from the
date of the receipt of the notice and in no case on request not more than
30 days from the date of the receipt of the notice. In case, the candidate
seeks for an opportunity of hearing and claims an inquiry to be made in
that behalf, the Director on receipt of such representation / reply shall
convene the committee and the Joint / Additional Secretary as
Chairperson who shall give reasonable opportunity to the candidate /
parent / guardian to adduce all evidence in support of their claim. A
public notice by beat of drum or any other convenient mode maybe
published in the village or locality and if any person or association opposes
such a claim, an opportunity to adduce evidence may be given to him/it.
After giving such opportunity either in person or through counsel, the
Committee may make such inquiry as it deems expedient and consider the
claims vis­a­vis the objections raised by the candidate or opponent and
pass an appropriate order with brief reasons in support thereof.
7. In case the report is in favour of the candidate and found to be genuine
and true, no further action need be taken except where the report or the
particulars given are procured or found to be false or fraudulently
obtained and in the latter event the same procedure as is envisaged in
para 6 be followed.
8. Notice contemplated in para 6 should be issued to the parents /
guardian also in case candidate is minor to appear before the Committee
with all evidence in his or their support of the claim for the social status
certificates.
9. The inquiry should be completed as expeditiously as possible preferably
by day­to­day proceedings within such period not exceeding two months. If
after inquiry, the Caste Scrutiny Committee finds the claim to be false or
spurious, they should pass an order cancelling the certificate issued and
confiscate the same. It should communicate within one month from the
date of the conclusion of the proceedings the result of enquiry to the
parent / guardian and the applicant.
10. In case of any delay in finalising the proceedings, and in the mean
while the last date for admission into an educational institution or
appointment to an officer post, is getting expired, the candidate be
admitted by the Principal or such other authority competent in that behalf
or appointed on the basis of the social status certificate already issued or
an affidavit duly sworn by the parent / guardian / candidate before the
competent officer or non­official and such admission or appointment
should be only provisional, subject to the result of the inquiry by the
Scrutiny Committee.
11. The order passed by the Committee shall be final and conclusive only
subject to the proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution.
12. No suit or other proceedings before any other authority should lie.
13. The High Court would dispose of these cases as expeditiously as
possible within a period of three months. In case, as per its procedure, the
writ petition / miscellaneous petition / matter is disposed of by a Single
Judge, then no further appeal would lie against that order to the Division
Bench but subject to special leave under Article 136.
14. In case, the certificate obtained or social status claimed is found to be
false, the parent / guardian / the candidate should be prosecuted for
making claim. If the prosecution ends in a conviction and sentence of the
accused, it could be regarded as an offence involving moral turpitude,
disqualification for elective posts or offices under the State or the Union or
elections to any local body, legislature or Parliament.
15. As soon as the findings is recorded by the Scrutiny Committee holding
that the certificate obtained was false, on its cancellation and confiscation
 simultaneously, it should be communicated to the educational institution
concerned or the appointing authority by registered post with
acknowledgment due with a request to cancel the admission of the
appointment. The Principal etc. of the educational institution responsible
for making the admission or the appointing authority, should cancel the
admission / appointment without any further notice to the candidate and
debar the candidate from further study or continue in office in a post.

96. 2004 0 Supreme(Mad) 1738; Arumugham Versus State represented by

its The Sub Inspector of PoliceElectification of the fence is more an act
of rashness and negligence than an intentional act. No infirmity in
conviction u/Sec 304 (II) IPC instead of 304 A IPC.

97. 2005 0 AIR(SC) 800; 2005 0 AIR(SCW) 718; 2006 2 JCR(SC) 236; 2005
2 JLJR(SC) 33; 2005 1 JT 496; 2005 1 PLJR(SC) 457; 2005 1
RCR(Civ) 799; 2005 1 Scale 626; 2005 2 SCC 244; 2005 1 Supreme
617; 2005 0 Supreme(SC) 155 SobhaHymavathi Devi Versus
SettiGangadharaSwamy and Ors.
The recognition of a lady as a member of a backward community in view of
her marriage would not be relevant for the purpose of entitlement to
reservation under Article 16(4) of the Constitution for the reason that she
as a member of the forward caste, had an advantageous start in life and a
marriage with a male belonging to a backward class would not entitle her
to the facility of reservation given to a backward community.

98. 2005 0 AIR(SC) 4313; 2005 0 AIR(SCW) 5185; 2005 12 JT 569; 2005 4
PLJR(SC) 321; 2005 8 Scale 288; 2005 8 SCC 283; 2005 7 SCJ 779;
2005 7 Supreme 424; 2005 0 Supreme(SC) 1331; Lilly Kutty versus
Scrutiny Committee, S.C. & S.T. &Ors
When a person claims to be a member of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled
Tribe, burden of proof that he or she belongs to such caste or tribe is on
him/her.
The caste certificate issued to the petitioner who was born and practised
Christianity was rightly cancelled.

99. 2012 0 AIR(SC) 3336; 2012 0 CrLJ 4443; 2012 7 Scale 520; 2012 9
SCC 257; 2012 6 Supreme 177; 2012 0 Supreme(SC) 557;
SUBRAMANIAN SWAMY VS A. RAJA
Indian penal Code, 1860 ­ Section 120B ­ Criminal conspiracy ­ Cannot be
inferred merely on the basis of official discussions.
A wrong judgment or an inaccurate or incorrect approach or poor
management by itself, even after due deliberations between Ministers or
even with Prime Minister, by itself cannot be said to be a product of
criminal conspiracy.
100. 2002 1 ALD(Cri) 393; 2002 1 ALT(Cri) 459; 2002 0 CrLJ 2110; 2001 0
Supreme(AP) 1630; SadashivaRao Versus State OF A.P. in view of the
wider sense given to the term agent by the Supreme Court which include
all cases in which property is voluntarily handed over for specific purpose,
under S. 409 of the Indian Penal Code, he can be treated as an agent.
When the accused has not completed the work of contract, and he failed to
account the steel entrusted to him, he has dishonestly and fraudulently
misappropriated the steel entrusted by P. W. 1. Thus, the accused is guilty
of the criminal breach of trust and, therefore, he is liable to be punished
for the offence under S. 409 of the Indian Penal Code, inasmuch as, the
accused as an agent on behalf of his Principal P. W. 1, has
misappropriated the steel entrusted to him.

101. 2005 2 ALT(Cri) 38; 2004 0 Supreme(AP) 976; P.Prem Kumar Versus
State OF A.P. THE test in such cases would appear to be as to whether it
is a civil remedy which is sought to be converted into a criminal profile or
not; or where both the remedies are available unless one comes to the
conclusion that it is a case of wanton conversion of civil case into a
criminal case purposefully, the civil remedy cannot exclude the criminal
remedy. It is for the Court, with reference to the facts in each case, to
decide whether it is a wanton conversion of civil remedy into a criminal
remedy or not.

102. 1996 0 CrLJ 3921; 1996 0 Supreme(Raj) 338; DALPAT SINGH Versus
STATE OF RAJASTHAN THERE is hand­writing experts opinion also that
the signatures of Teka and thumb impressions of Chatra on Ex. P/1 to Ex­
P/3 resemble the specimen hand­writing and signatures taken from
accused Bhera and specimen thumb impressions taken from Khuma. The
learned Addl. Sessions Judge concluded that there is no reason to
disbelieve the handwriting experts opinion as they have not been called for
cross­examination.
UNDER these circumstances conviction cannot be based merely on the
basis of the handwriting experts opinion.

103. 1997 1 ALD(Cri) 360; 1996 2 ALT(Cri) 682; 1996 0 Supreme(AP) 606;
M.V.SubbaLaxmi and P.Seetharamaiah Versus State rep.by
P.P.(C.B.I./s.P.E.Hyderabad)
It is thus obvious that the Officers had signed those documents carelessly
and that was not with an intention to cause benefit to oneself or i. e. cause
loss to the bank. The signing was done merely carelessly. The proper
remedy for the bank was to file civil suits or departmental enquiry against
these Officers. There is absolutely nothing to show that there was any
Mensrea in signing the documents by accused No. 2.

104. 2012 0 AIR(SC) 1185; 2012 2 BomCR(Cri)(SC) 495; 2012 2 CalCriLR

241; 2012 1 CCR(SC) 266; 2012 0 CrLJ 1519; 2012 1 JLJR(SC) 574;
 2012 2 JT 203; 2012 1 MLJ(Cri)(SC) 484; 2012 1 RCR(Cri) 720; 2012
2 Scale 12; 2012 3 SCC 64; 2012 1 SCC(Cri) 1041; 2012 2 SCJ 355;
2012 1 Supreme 577; 2012 0 Supreme(SC) 78; Dr. Subramanian
Swamy versus Dr.Manmohan Singh and another
Any citizen may make representation for sanction of prosecution of a
public servant whereupon the competent authority shall act within the
time frame in accordance with (1998) 1 SCC 226 and CVC guidelines.

105. 2013 0 AIR(SC) 3622; 2013 0 CrLJ 1559; 2013 2 JT 182; 2013 3
SCC 294; 2013 1 Supreme 452; 2013 0 Supreme(SC) 97;MOHINDER
SINGH VS STATE OF PUNJAB
Code of Criminal procedure, 1973 ­ Section 366(1) ­ Murder reference ­
High Court has to come to its own independent conclusion as to the guilt
or innocence of the accused, independently of the opinion of the trial judge
­ High Court must examine the entire evidence for itself independent of the
Session Courts views ­ Onerous duty is bestowed on the reference court to
balance the aggravating and mitigating circumstances
Criminal Trial ­ Life imprisonment ­ Cannot be equivalent to imprisonment
for 14 years or 20 years or even 30 years ­ Rather it always means the
whole natural life subject to any remission granted by the appropriate
Government under Section 432, Cr.P.C. which in turn is subject to the
procedural checks mentioned in the said provision and further substantive
check in Section 433­A, Cr.P.C.

106. 2012 3 ACC 379; 2012 0 AIR(SC) 3104; 2012 3 CalCriLR 527; 2012
3 CCR(SC) 272; 2012 3 Crimes(SC) 336; 2012 0 CrLJ 4174; 2012 132
DRJ(SC) 485; 2012 7 JT 251; 2012 3 LS(SC) 26; 2013 1 RLW(SC) 629;
2012 7 Scale 120; 2012 8 SCC 450; 2012 3 SCC(Cri) 899; 2012 7 SCJ
753; 2012 5 Supreme 321; 2012 0 Supreme(SC) 514; STATE
TR.P.S.LODHI COLONY NEW DELHI Vs. SANJEEV NANDA
Indian Penal Code, 1860 ­ Section 304 Part II ­ Offender having knowledge
that rash and negligent driving under intoxication might cause death ­
Still he did not have any knowledge of the victims being there and had no
intention to cause death or such bodily injury to them as is likely to cause
death ­ Offence falls under Section 304 Part II.
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 ­ Section 185 r/w sections 203 and 205 ­
Drunken driving ­ Breath tests are to be carried out while driving or
attempting to drive ­ Accused escaping from scene of occurrence ­ Breath
tests not possible or feasible ­ Blood tests soon after and clinical tests next
morning confirming drunken state of accused at the time of occurrence ­
Acceptable.
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 ­ Section 134 ­ Duty of driver in accident ­
Accused escaping from scene of occurrence instead of helping victims ­
Liable for punishment under section 187 ­ Direction for providing medical
assistance on Highways reiterated.
 Criminal Trial ­ Hostile witness ­ A growing menace ­ Courts should made
efforts to unearth truth ­ Section 193 IPC should be invoked where
necessary.
Interpretation of Section 304 Part II and Section 304 A of the IPC falls for
consideration in this appeal.

107. Mohan Vs. State by Inspector of Police - 1997CriLJ22

"Section 27 is brought into operation where a person in police custody
produces from some place of concealment some object said to be
connected with the crime of which the information is the accused. The
concealment of the fact which is not known to the police is what is
discovered by the information and lends assurance that the information
was true. No witness with whom some material fact, such as the weapon
of murder, stolen property or other incriminating article is not hidden or
sold or kept and which is unknown to the police can be said to be
discovered as a consequence of the information furnished by the accused.
A witness cannot be said to be discovered if nothing is to be found or
recovered from him as a consequence of the information furnished by the
accused and information which disclosed the identity of the witness will
not be admissible. But even apart from the admissibility of the information
under Section 27, the evidence of the Investigating Officer and the panches
that the accused had taken them to P.W. 11 and pointed him out and as
corroborated by P.W. 11 himself would be admissible under Section 8 of
the Evidence Act as conduct of the accused.
the fact of the accused pointing out P.W. 9 as the person from whom he
purchased M.O. 3 knife, cannot come under Section 27 of the Evidence
Act and nothing has been recovered form that witness, who was pointed
out by the accused, but the conduct of the accused could be considered
under Section 8 of the Evidence Act. Moreover, P.W. 9 being an important
witness, was traced out only at the instance of the accused, during the
course of the investigation. So, since it does not come under Section 27 of
the Evidence Act, there is no bar for this court to consider and act upon
the evidence of PW9.

108. State of Kerala Vs. M.K. Pyloth - 1973CriLJ869

"Before ordering remand or extension of remand, Court had to satisfy itself
on an examination of materials placed before it that there were reasonable
grounds for doing so."

109. Rajbir Singh Vs. State of U.P. and Anr. - 2006(1)ACR1131(SC),

2006(9)ADJ640, AIR2006SC1963, 2006((2))ALT(Cri)211,
2006(2)ALT(Cri)211, 101(2006)CLT788(SC), 2006CriLJ2458,
JT2006(3)SC372, 2006-2-LW(Crl)503, 2006(2)PLJR327,
2006(3)SCALE125, (2006)4SCC51
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 ­ Sections 227 and 228­­Indian Penal
Code, 1860­­Sections 301, 302 and 201­­Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
 Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989­­Section 3 (2) (v)­­Framing of
charge­­Charge framed by trial court against second respondent under
Section 302/34 and Section 3 (2) (v) of S.C./S.T. Act­­High Court setting
aside order framing charge­­High Court reasoned that respondent neither
intended to kill deceased nor she was aimed at because she was
Scheduled Caste­­Whether High Court justified?­­Held, "no"­­High Court
completely ignored Section 301, I.P.C.­­Reasons given by High Court for
quashing charges wholly erroneous in law­­High Court's order quashed­­
Matter remitted to trial court with direction to amend charges.

110. SantoshDevidasBehade and Ors. Vs. State of Maharashtra -

2009(3)ACR2523(SC), 2009(2)ALD(Cri)217, JT2009(7)SC417,
2009(3)SCALE727, (2009)13SCC680, [2009]4SCR83
Indian Penal Code, 1860­­Section 149­­Constructive liability under Section
149­­Mere presence in unlawful assembly cannot render person liable­­
Unless there was common object­­And he was actuated by that common
object­­When common object of unlawful assembly not proved­­Accused
persons cannot be convicted with aid of Section 149. [Paras 5 to 9].
(3) Evidence Act, 1872­­Sections 3 and 9­­Appreciation of evidence­­Close
relatives will not conceal real culprits­­And make allegations against
innocent persons­­It cannot be said that close relatives are not
independent witnesses.
(4) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973­­Sections 156 and 162­­
Investigation­­Identification tests do not constitute substantive evidence­­
They are primarily meant for helping investigating agency­­Identification
can be used only as corroborative of statement in Court­­T.I.Ps. generally
governed by Section 162­­Failure to hold T.I.P.­­Would not make in­
admissible evidence of identification in Court.

111. Boddella Babul Reddy Vs. Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P. -
2010(1)ACR340(SC), AIR2010SC3231, JT2010(1)SC24,
2010(1)SCALE60, (2010)3SCC648, [2010]1SCR149
Indian Penal Code, 1860 ­ Section 302­Murder­Conviction and sentence
by High Court­Reversing acquittal by trial court­Whether liable to
interference?­Held, "yes"­Conviction of appellant by High Court set aside.
The role of Y. ChinnaNarayana Reddy (P.W. 1), K. Sudhakar Reddy (P.W.
2), G. Raghurami Reddy (P.W. 3), R. VenkataSubba Reddy (P.W. 4) and K.
GopalYadav (P.W. 5) and more particularly, their evidence regarding the
overt act attributed to the appellant herein was not above suspicion. We
are also surprised that insofar as BodellaMalikarjuna Reddy (A­2),
YedulaNagamuni Reddy (A­3), YeddulaMaruthi Prasad Reddy (A­5),
YeddulaManohar Reddy (A­7) and YeddulaPrabhakar Reddy (A­14) are
concerned, the High Court chose to disbelieve the evidence of Y.
ChinnaNarayana Reddy (P.W. 1), K. Sudhakar Reddy (P.W. 2), G.
Raghurami Reddy (P.W. 3), R. VenkataSubba Reddy (P.W. 4) and K.
GopalYadav (P.W. 5) on the ground that there was no corroboration to the
 evidence of each witness about the injuries received by the respective
accused person. The High Court expressed the view that the prosecution
witness might have received splinter injuries while running away from the
scene and it was not possible for them to observe as to which accused
hurled bombs against each of them. Once the benefit of such kiosk has
been given to the other accused against whom the appeal was filed by the
State, the same advantage should have been given even to the appellant
herein, more particularly because he was admittedly a leader and the
version against him was absolutely parrot­like. The High Court has not
exercised the caution that was expected to while dealing with the
judgment of acquittal by the trial court. It has also left out of consideration
the important findings regarding the F.I.R. and the other important
circumstance that before the F.I.R. was given, the lawyers/legal advisors
had already reached the place alongwith their leader, who was a Member
of Legislative Assembly. The High Court has also not further considered
the contradictions between the evidence of Y. ChinnaNarayana Reddy
(P.W. 1), Dr. K. VenkataNarayana (P.W. 11), the Medical Officer, E. V.
Rami Reddy (P.W. 14), Head Constable and S. Ramakrishna Reddy (P.W.
15), Circle Inspector inter se. The High Court was not justified in
interfering with the well considered judgment of the trial court.

112. Banti @ Guddu Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh - 2004(1)ACR308(SC),

AIR2004SC261, 2004(1)ALD(Cri)94, 2004CriLJ372,
2004(2)JLJ194(SC), JT2003(8)SC392, 2003(9)SCALE215,
(2004)1SCC414, [2003]5SuppSCR119, 2004(1)UJ321
Indian Penal Code, 1860 ­ Section 302/34­­Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973­­Sections 226 and 231­­Murder­­Conviction and sentence­­Whether
sustainable?­­Held, "yes"­­D.W. 1, though being with complainant and
witnessing incident becoming compulsive liar to help accused­­­His
evidence rightly discarded­­Merely because P.W. 1 is relation of deceased
and P.W. 2 known to him­­No ground to discard their evidence found to be
acceptable on careful scrutiny­­Public prosecutor not obliged to examine
all witnesses­­Delayed examination of prosecution witness not to render
prosecution version suspect­­No ground to interfere with concurrent
findings recorded by both courts below.
It is true, the evidence of defence witness is not to be ignored by the
Courts. Like any other witnesses, his evidence has to be tested on the
touchstone of reliability, credibility and trustworthiness particularly when
he attempts to resile and speak against records and in derogation of his
earlier conduct and behaviour. If after doing so, the Court finds it to be
untruthful, there is no legal bar in discarding it.
If the lack of motive as pleaded by the accused appellants is a factor, at
the same time, it cannot be lost sight of that there is no reason as to why
P.W. 1 would falsely implicate the accused persons. There was no
suggestion of any motive for such allegedfalse implication. Merely because
P.W. 1 is a relation of the deceased, and P.W. 2 was known to him, that
 per se cannot be a ground to discard their evidence. Careful scrutiny has
been done of their evidence and it has been found acceptable by both the
trial court and the High Court. There is no reason to take a different view.
If there are too many witnesses on the same point, the public prosecutor is
at liberty to choose two or some among them alone so that the time of the
Court can be saved from repetitious depositions on the same factual
aspects. That principle applies when there are too manywitnesses cited, if
they all had sustained injuries at the occurrence. The public prosecutor, in
such cases is not obliged to examine all the injured witnesses. If he is
satisfied by examining any two or three of them, it is open to him to inform
the Court that he does not propose to examine the remaining persons in
that category. This will help not only the prosecution in relieving itself of
the strain of adducing repetitiveevidence on the same point but also help
the Court considerably in lessening the workload.
It cannot be laid down as a rule of universal application that if there is any
delay in examination of a particular witness, the prosecution version
becomes suspect. It would depend upon several factors. If the explanation
offered for the delayed examination is plausible and acceptable and the
court accepts the same as plausible, there is no reason to interfere with
the conclusion.

113. VajralaParipunachary Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh -

1998(1)ACR442(SC), AIR1998SC2680, 1998(2)ALD(Cri)391,
1998(2)ALT(Cri)238, 1998CriLJ4031, JT1998(5)SC224,
1998(4)SCALE293, (1998)6SCC463, (1998)6SCC663
Dying declaration of deceased recorded by Magistrate ­ In dying
declaration recorded before Magistrate deceased stated that she was burnt
by appellant ­ Dispute on fact of place of incident does not affect credibility
of dying declaration

114. State of U.P. Vs. Dan Singh and others - 1997(21)ACR262(SC),

AIR1997SC1654, 1997(1)ALD(Cri)470, 1997(1)ALT(Cri)644,
1997(2)BLJR1662, 1997CriLJ1150, 1997(1)Crimes121(SC),
JT1997(2)SC149, 1997(1)SCALE626, (1997)3SCC747, [1997]1SCR764
Criminal ­ unlawful assembly ­ Sections 149 and 302 of Indian Penal
Code, 1860 ­ marriage party was passing through village of accused ­
accused attacked this marriage party ­ following precedent set by Apex
Court it was observed that in order to held accused responsible for
unlawful assembly they should be identified by atleast four witnesses.
a Court has to deal with the evidence pertaining to the commission of an
offence involving a large number of offenders and a large number of
victims, it is usual to adopt the test that the conviction could be sustained
only if it is supported by 2/3 or more witnesses who give a consistent
account of the incident, in a sense the test may be described as
mechanical; but it cannot be treated as irrational or unreasonable".
(Relied on Masalti v. State of Uttar Pradesh)
115. Mani Kumar Thapa Vs. State of Sikkim - 2002(3)ACR2844(SC),
AIR2002SC2920, 2002(2)ALD(Cri)410, 2002(2)ALT(Cri)288,
2002(4)CGLJ374, 2002CriLJ4069, 2002(3)Crimes138(SC),
JT2002(6)SC349, 2002(6)SCALE1, (2002)7SCC157
Indian Penal Code, 1860 ­ Sections 364, 302 and 201, read with Section
34­­Abduction, murder, etc.­­A­1 dying during trial and proceedings
against him abated­­Appellant's conviction and sentence by trial court­­
Upheld by High Court­­Whether valid?­­Held, "yes"­­Circumstantial
evidence­­Deceased taken away in jeep by A­1 in association with
appellant­­Absence of motive and corpus delicti (dead body) immaterial­­
Appellant failed to show that he did not share common intention with A­1­
­All circumstances clearly proving guilt of appellant­­Appellant rightly
convicted and sentenced.
It is a well­settled principle in law that in a trial for murder, it is neither an
absolute necessity nor an essential ingredient to establish corpus delicti.
The fact of the death of the deceased must be established like any other
fact. Corpus delicti in some cases may not bepossible to be traced or
recovered. There are a number of possibilities where a dead body could be
disposed of without trace, therefore, if the recovery of the dead body is to
be held to be mandatory to convict an accused,in many a case, the
accused would manage to see that the dead body is destroyed which would
afford the accused complete immunity from being held guilty or from being
punished. What is, therefore, required in law to base a conviction for an
offenceof murder is that there should be reliable and plausible evidence
that the offence of murder like any other factum of death was committed
and it must be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence albeit the dead
body may not be traced. 1992 ACrR 39 (SC), relied on.

116. Ram Saran Mahto and Anr. Vs. The State of Bihar -
1999(3)ACR2202(SC), AIR1999SC3435, 1999(2)ALT(Cri)331,
1999(3)BLJR2345, 1999CriLJ4311, 1999(3)Crimes125(SC),
JT1999(6)SC501, 1999(5)SCALE396, (1999)9SCC486,
[1999]2SuppSCR250
Criminal ­ ingredients ­ Section 201 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 ­ two
indispensable ingredients must be satisfied for convicting accused under
Section 201 ­ firstly accused should have had knowledge that offence has
been committed or at least that he should have reason to believe it ­
secondly he should then have caused disappearance of evidence of
commission of that offence.­ unless prosecution proves the two ingredients
conviction of accused under Section 201 cannot be upheld.

117. ThathadiAppala Naidu Vs. Inspector of Police, Gagapathinagaram

Circle, Vizianagaram District - 1999(1)ALD597, 1999(1)ALD(Cri)308,
1999(1)ALT(Cri)301, 1999CriLJ1186
 Criminal ­ change in sentence ­ Sections 304 and 324 of Indian Penal
Code, 1860 ­ accused convicted under Section 304 for causing death of
deceased by hitting him on head and chest ­ deceased died due to chest
injuries ­ beating on chest not recorded in FIR – circumstances depicting
chest injuries might have been caused on way to hospital ­ conviction
altered to one under Section 324 from sentence given under Section 304.

118. Damodar Vs. State of Karnataka - 1999(3)ACR2289(SC),

AIR2000SC50, 1999(2)ALD(Cri)852, 2000CriLJ175, JT1999(8)SC62,
1999(6)SCALE306, (2000)10SCC328
Criminal ­ conviction ­ Sections 201, 302, 364 and 377 of Indian Penal
Code, 1860 ­ appellant convicted by Trial Court for offence punishable
under Sections 302 and 377 ­ appellant alleged to have sexually assaulted
deceased, killed and buried body ­ High Court while confirming findings of
Trial Court modified sentence in respect of Section 377 as proper charges
not framed ­ Courts below justified in coming to conclusion that it was
appellant who kidnapped deceased, committed murder and concealed
dead body ­ findings of Trial Court along with modifications of High Court
confirmed ­ appeal dismissed.

119. ChiguripatiSuryanarayana and another Vs. State of A.P. -

1999(1)ALD590, 1999(1)ALD(Cri)300, 1999(1)ALT(Cri)219,
1999CriLJ1201
Criminal ­ evidentiary value of FIR ­ Section 154 of Criminal Procedure
Code, 1973 and Section 302 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 ­ accused and
deceased were in enmity ­ alleged that accused armed with deadly
weapons attacked deceased along with others with common object ­ appeal
filed against conviction ­ no FIR or even entry in daily diary recorded ­
medical evidence to be believed as it is ­ oral evidence suffers from
discrepancies ­ prosecution witnesses not trustworthy as they are follower
witnesses ­ held, evidence not reliable and accused cannot be convicted.

120. Bhupendra Singh and Ors. Vs. State of U.P. - 2009(2)ACR1659(SC),

AIR2009SC3265, 2009(57)BLJR1885, JT2009(6)SC79,
2009(5)SCALE653, (2009)12SCC447, [2009]6SCR262, 2009(5)UJ2383
(2) Indian Penal Code, 1860­­Section 149­­Common object of unlawful
assembly ­­ Scope and applicability of Section 149.
The emphasis in Section 149, I.P.C. is on the common object and not on
common intention. Mere presence in an unlawful assembly cannot render
a person liable unless there was a common object and he was actuated by
that common object and that object is one of those set out in Section 141,
I.P.C. Where common object of an unlawful assembly is not proved, the
accused persons cannot be convicted with the help of Section 149. The
crucial question to determine is whether the assembly consisted of five or
more persons and whether the said persons entertained one or more of the
common objects, as specified in Section 141.
 A common object may be formed by express agreement after mutual
consultation, but that is by no means necessary. It may be formed at any
stage by all or a few members of the assembly and the other members may
just join and adopt it. Once formed, it need not continue to be the same. It
may be modified or altered or abandoned at any stage. The expression "in
prosecution of common object" as appearing in Section 149 has to be
strictly construed as equivalent to "in order to attain the common object".
It must be immediately connected with the common object by virtue of the
nature of the object. There must be community of object and the object
may exist only up to a particular stage, and not thereafter. Members of an
unlawful assembly may have community of object up to a certain point
beyond which they may differ in their objects and their knowledge,
possessed by each member of what is likely to be committed in
prosecution of their common object which may vary not only according to
the information at his command, but also according to the extent to which
he shares the community of object, and as a consequence of this the effect
of Section 149, I.P.C. may be different on different members of the same
assembly.
(3) Evidence Act, 1872­­Sections 3 and 9­­Appreciation of evidence­­
Related witness cannot be said to be not independent witness­­Merely
because eye­witnesses are family members­­Their evidence cannot per se
be discarded.

121. Jarnail Singh and Ors. Vs. State of Punjab - AIR2010SC3699,

CLT(<(Sup)CLTCryear>2009)Supp.Crl.<(Sup)CLTCrpage>1666,
JT2009(11)SC282, 2009(12)SCALE47, (2009)9SCC719,
[2009]13SCR774
FIR is not encyclopedia of all the facts relating to crime. The only
requirement is that at the time of lodging FIR, the informant should state
all those facts which normally strike to mind and help in assessing the
gravity of the crime or identity of the culprit briefly.

122. State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Imrat and Anr. - AIR2008SC2967,

2009((2))ALT(Cri)108,CLT(<(Sup)CLTCryear>2008)Supp.Crl.<(Sup)CLTC
rpage>1108, 2008CriLJ3869, 2008(10)SCALE143, (2008)11SCC523
Accused charged under Section 307 IPC cannot be acquitted merely
because the injuries inflicted on the victim were in the nature of a simple
hurt.

123. Ratan Singh Vs. State of M.P. and Anr. - 2009(2)ACR1969(SC),

AIR2010SC597, ILR[2009]MP1866, 2009(3)JLJ169(SC),
JT2009(6)SC166, 2010(II)MPJR(SC)259, (2009)43OCR409,
(2009)12SCC585, [2009]6SCR976
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 ­ Sections 482 and 228­­Charge
framing­­Charge under Section 307 r/w Section 149­­High Court quashing
charge on ground that no injury caused on vital part of body ­­ Whether
justified?­­Held, "no" ­­ Accused charged under Section 307 cannot be
acquitted ­ Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 ­ Sections 482 and 228­­
Charge framing­­Charge under Section 307 r/w Section 149­­High Court
quashing charge on ground that no injury caused on vital part of body ­­
Whether justified?­­Held, "no" ­­ Accused charged under Section 307
cannot be acquitted ­Merely because injuries inflicted on victim were in
nature of simple hurt­­Intention or knowledge is determinative factor­­
Order of High Court set aside.
In order to justify conviction under Section 307, I.P.C. it is not essential
that bodily injury capable of causing death should have been inflicted.
Although the nature of injury actually caused may often give considerable
assistance in coming to a finding as to the intention of the accused, such
Intention may also be deduced from other circumstances, and may even,
in some cases, be ascertained without any reference at all to actual
wounds. The section makes a distinction between an act of the accused
and its result, if any. Such an act may not be attended by any result so far
as the person assaulted is concerned, but still there may be cases in which
the culprit would be liable under this section. It is not necessary that the
injury actually caused to the victim of the assault should be sufficient
under ordinary circumstances to cause the death of the person assaulted.
What the Court has to see is whether the act, irrespective of its result, was
done with the intention or knowledge and under circumstances mentioned
in the section. An attempt in order to be criminal need not be the
penultimate act. It is sufficient in law, if there is present an intent coupled
with some overt act in execution thereof.
It is sufficient to justify a conviction under Section 307 if there is present
an intent coupled with some overt act in execution thereof. It is not
essential that bodily injury capable of causing death should have been
inflicted. The section makes a distinction between the act of the accused
and its result, if any. The Court has to see whether the act, irrespective of
its result, was done with the intention or knowledge and under
circumstances mentioned in the section. Therefore, an accused charged
under Section 307, I.P.C. cannot be acquitted merely because the injuries
inflicted on the victim were in the nature of a simple hurt.
The mere fact that the injury actually inflicted by the accused did not cut
any vital organ of the victim, is not by itself sufficient to take the act out of
the purview of Section 307.
Whether there was intention to kill or knowledge that death will be caused
is a question of fact and would depend on the facts of a given case. The
circumstances that the injury inflicted by the accused was simple or minor
will not by itself rule out application of Section 307, I.P.C. The
determinative question is intention or knowledge, as the case may be, and
not nature of the injury.
124. Pratap Singh Vs. State of Jharkhand and Anr. - 2005(1)ACR819(SC),
AIR2005SC 2731, 2005((1))ALT(Cri)294, 2005(1)ALT(Cri)294,
2005(2)ALT14(SC), 2005(1)BLJR434, 2005CriLJ3091,
[2005(3)JCR244(SC)], 2005(2)JLJ40(SC), JT2005(2)SC271, 2005-1-
LW(Crl)405, 2005(2)OLR191, 2005(II)OLR(SC)191, RLW2005(2)SC261,
(2005)3SCC551, [2005]1SCR1019, 2005(1)UJ587
(1) Juvenile Offender­­Determination of age of juvenile­­Whether date of
occurrence is reckoning date for determining age of alleged offender as
juvenile offender or date when he is produced before Court/Competent
authority?­­Held, "it is date of commission of offence and not date of
production before Court/Competent authority.
The field covered by the Act includes a situation leading to juvenile
delinquency vis­a­vis commission of an offence. In such an event, he is to
be provided the post­delinquency care and for the said purpose, the date
when delinquency took place would be the relevant date. It must,
therefore, be held that the relevant date for determining the age of the
juvenile would be one on which the offence has been committed and not
when he is produced in Court. (Arnit Das v. State of Bihar – overruled)
(2) Juvenile Offender­­Proceedings initiated under old Act­­And pending on
1.4.2001 when new Act came into force­­Whether provisions of new Act to
apply to such proceedings?­­Held, "yes" but only when offender had not
completed 18 years of age on 1.4.2001.

125. GallaNageswaraRao Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh -

1993Supp(I)ALT239, 1992CriLJ2601
Criminal ­ dishonest intention ­ Sections 420, 463 to 471 and 511 of
Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Sections 239 and 313 of Criminal Procedure
Code, 1973 ­ ­ appellant was convicted under Sections 471 and 420 ­
Sessions Judge confirmed conviction of accused ­ Court observed that
accused tried to derive benefits with dishonest intention by using forged
documents ­ both Court below rightly convicted accused ­ High Court
reduced sentence from one year to six months.

126. SoneLal and Ors. Vs. State of U.P. - 1981()ACR222(SC),

AIR1981SC1379, 1981CriLJ1027, 1981(1)SCALE604, (1981)2SCC531,
(1981)SCC(Cri)556, [1981]3SCR352
Criminal ­ conviction ­ Sections 302, 307 and 323 of Indian Penal Code,
1860 ­ long standing dispute between appellants and deceased ­ fresh
dispute arose due to throwing of rubbish ­ appellant fire from pistol
resulted in death of deceased ­ convicted under Sections 302, 307 and 323
sentenced to life imprisonment ­ appeal ­ facts revealed that appellants
were aggressors ­ deceased had right to private defence ­ aggressors
cannot have right of private defence ­ deceased died due to shot from
weapon of appellants ­ appeal dismissed.
127. Deepak gulati Vs State of Haryana; 2013 0 AIR(SC) 2071; 2013 0
CrLJ 2990; 2013 7 SCC 675; 2013 3 Supreme 727; 2013 0
Supreme(SC) 494;
Rape and consensual sex distinguished. Intention of accused to deceive
from the very beginning essential for charge of deceit/rape.

128. Arvind Kumar and Anr. Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh -

2007(3)ACR3197(SC), AIR2007SC2674, 2007CriLJ3741,
II(2007)DMC178SC, JT2007(9)SC398, 2007(9)SCALE324,
[2007]8SCR474
Abetment of suicide ­ Presumption under Section113 will be applicable if
the accused failed to lead any evidence to rebut the presumption.

129. Iqbal Vs. State of Kerala - AIR2008SC288, 2008CriLJ436,

JT2007(12)SC311, (2008)39OCR241, [2007]11SCR655
Criminal ­ Convicted ­ Sections 366A and 376 read with Section 34 of the
Indian Penal Code, 1860 ­ Accused were convicted under Sections 366A
and 376 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code ­ Hence this appeal
­ Whether, the order of conviction could be set aside ­ Held, girl was left in
the company of the accused of her own will and that she was not forced to
sexual intercourse with any person other than the accused ­ However, she
had sexual intercourse with the accused for which, considering her age,
conviction under Section 376 IPC has been maintained ­ Since the
essential ingredient that the intercourse must be with a person other than
the accused had not been established, Section 366A had no application ­
Thus, conviction for offence punishable under Section 366A IPC was set
aside while the conviction and sentence imposed in respect of offence
punishable under Section 376 IPC was maintained ­ Appeal allowed.
There can be no conviction without evidence

130. Sushil Kumar Sharma Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Ors. -
2005(2)ACR2070(SC), AIR2005SC3100, 2005(2)ALD(Cri)633,
2005(5)ALLMR(SC)982, 2005CriLJ3439, II(2005)DMC325SC,
JT2005(6)SC266, 2005(3)KLT611(SC), RLW2005(3)SC433,
(2005)6SCC281, [2005](2)SuppSCR730, 2005(2)UJ1057
Indian Penal Code, 1860 ­ Section 498A ­­ Whether Section 498A dealing
with offence of husband or relative of husband of woman subjecting her to
cruelty and punishment­­Whether ultra vires Constitution? ­­ Held, "no" ­­
Mere possibility of abuse of provision of law­­Does not per se invalidate
legislation ­­If provision of law is misused or subjected to abuse of process
of law­­It is for Legislature to amend, modify or repeal it, if deemed
necessary.
From the decided cases in India as well as in United States of America, the
principle appears to be well­settled that if a statutory provision is
otherwise intra vires, constitutional and valid, mere possibility of abuse of
power in a given case would not make it objectionable, ultra vires or
 unconstitutional. In such cases, "action" and not the "section" may be
vulnerable. If it is so, the Court by upholding the provision of law, may still
set aside the action, order or decision and grant appropriate relief to the
person aggrieved.
Merely because the provision is constitutional and intra vires, does not
give a licence to unscrupulous persons to wreck personal vendetta or
unleash harassment. It may, therefore, become necessary for the
Legislature to find out ways how the makers of frivolous complaints or
allegations can be appropriately dealt with. Till then, the Courts have to
take care of the situation within the existing framework. As noted above,
the object is to strike at the roots of dowry menace. But by misuse of the
provision, a new legal terrorism can be unleashed. The provision is
intended to be used a shield and not an assassin's weapon.

131. 2009 4 SCC 26; 2009 2 SCC(Cri) 40;2009 0 AIR(SC) 1642; 2009 0
CrLJ 1530; State of M.P. Versus Kashiram&Ors- Indian Penal Code,
1860, Section 307, 326:­ Where the intention to commit murder of the
victim is established, that the injury caused actually is only simple in
nature is immaterial in convicting the accused for the offence under
section 307 IPC.

132. 2009 10 SCC 477; 2010 1 SCC(Cri) 302; VISHNU Vs STATE OF

RAJASTHAN, The common object my be commission of one offence while
there may be likelihood of commission of yet another offence, the
knowledge whereof is capable of being safely attributable to the members
of the unlawful assembly. Whether a member of such unlawful assembly
was aware as regards likelihood of commission of another offence or not
would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Background
of the incident, the motive, the nature of the assembly, the nature of the
arms carried by the members of the assembly, their common object and
the behavior of the members soon before, at or after the actual
commission of the crime would be relevant factors for drawing an
inference in that behalf.

133. 2009 0 AIR(SC) 3265; 2009 2 Crimes(SC) 253; 2009 12 SCC 447; 2010
1 SCC(Cri) 275; Bhupendra Singh &Ors. Vs. State of U.P. Criminal Trial
–Interested witness – Merely because the eye­witnesses are family
members their evidence cannot per se be discarded – The allegation of
interestedness has to be established.
Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Section 149 – Emphasis in Section 149 IPC is
on the common object and not on common intention – Scope and ambit of
the provision discussed.

134. 2000 1 Crimes(SC) 1; 2000 1 SCC 471; 2000 0 SCC(Cri) 263; State of
Maharashtra versus Suresh, If potholes were to be ferreted out from the
proceedings of the magistrate holding such parades possibly no Test
 Identification Parade can escapte from one or two lapses. If a scrutiny is
made from that angle alone and the result of the parade is treated as
vitiatd every Test Identification Parade would become unusable. We
remind ourselves that identification parades are not primarily meant for
the court. They are meant for investigation purposes. The object of
conducting test identification parade is two fold. First is to enable the
witnesses to satisfy themselves that the prisoner whom they suspect is
really the one who was seen by them in connection with the commission of
the crime. Second is to satisfy the investigating authorities that the
suspect is the real person whom the witnesses had seen in connection
with the said occurrence. So the officer conducting the test identification
parade should ensure that the said object of the parade is achieved. If he
permits dilution of the modality to be followed in a parade, he should see
to it that such relaxation would not impair the purpose for which the
parade is held.
False answer offered by an accused when his attention is drawn to
incriminating circumstance would render that circumstance capable of
inculpating him. In a situation like this such a false answer can also be
counted as providing “a missing link” for completing the chain.
There are three possibilities when an accused points out the place where a
dead body or an incriminating material was concealed without stating that
it was concealed by himself. One is that he himself would have concealed
it. Second is that he would have seen somebody else concealing it. And the
third is that he would have been told by another person that it was
concealed there. But if the accused declines to tell the criminal court that
his knowledge about the concealment was on account of one of the last
two possibilities the criminal court can presume that it was concealed by
the accused himself.

135. 2010 0 AIR(SC) 85; 2009 0 CrLJ 4454; 2009 9 SCC 152; Pannayar
Vs. State of T. Nadu
The purpose of the re­examination is only to get the clarifications of some
doubts created in the cross examination. One cannot supplement the
examination­in­chief by way of a re­examination and for the first time,
start introducing totally new facts, which have no concern with the cross
examination

136. 2010 AIR(SC) 2119; 2010 CrLJ 2840; ABU THAKIR & ORS.Vs. STATE
This Court in State of Karnataka Vs. K. Yarappa Reddy4 held that "even if
the investigation is illegal or even suspicious the rest of the evidence must
be scrutinized independently of the impact of it. Otherwise the criminal
trial will plummet to the level of the investigating officers ruling the roost.
... Criminal justice should not be made a casualty for the wrongs
committed by the investigating officers in the case. In other words, if the
court is convinced that the testimony of a witness to the occurrence is
true, the Court is free to act on it albeit the investigating officer's
 suspicious role in the case". The ratio of the judgment in that case is the
complete answer to the 4 (1999) 8 SCC 715 2 submission made by the
learned senior counsel for the appellants.
Indian Penal Code, 1860­Section 302­Murder­Partial confirmation by High
Court, Prosecution case fully corroborated by medical evidence and
evidence of PWs­Mere fact that they were not examined during inquest is
of no consequence­They are all independent witnesses, whose evidence
cannot be rejected on any ground­Delay in despatch of statement of
witnesses explained­Statements recorded under Section 161 CrP.C. could
not be promptly dispatched to Court for reasons beyond control of
Investigating Officer­No reason to interfere with concurrent findings of
conviction recorded by Court­Appeal dismissed.
Criminal Law­Appreciation of evidence­Response of every and any human
being cannot be similar on such occasions.

137. 1999 1 ALD(Cri) 930; 1999 2 ALT(Cri) 1; GERA PULLAIAH Vs. State
INSPECTOR OF POLICE, NARASARAOPET, It has been elicited from PW2
that while shifting the deceased to hospital, his clothes were also got btood
stained but the police has not seized those blood stained clothes. The
omission on the part of the police to seize the blood stained clothes on
PW2 cannot be pressed into service as a circumstance to discredit PW2
when his presence was otherwise assured by dependable evidence on
record.
It is true that a dying declaration purported to have been recorded by a
Head Constable may not stand on the same footing as to its credibility as
the one recorded by a Judicial magistrate. But, for that reason alone the
evidence of dying declaration cannot be shut out from consideration.

138. 2001 0 AIR(SC) 979; 2001 1 Crimes(SC) 268; 2001 0 CrLJ 1231;
2001 0 SCC(Cri) 449; SANJAY @ KAKA Versus State (N. C. T.) of Delhi,
The words do not implicate the accused with the commission of the crime
but refer only to the nature of the property hidden by them which were
ultimately recovered consequent upon their disclosure statements.
Hypertechnical approach, as projected by the defence counsel would
defeat the ends of justice and have disastrous effect. The property
recovered consequent upon the making of the disclosure statements has
been proved to be the property of the deceased, stolen after the
commission of the offence of robbery and murder.
BESIDES Section 27, the courts can draw presumptions under Section
114, Illustration (a) and Section 106 of the Evidence Act.
failure of the Serologist to detect the origin of the blood due to
disintegration of the serum in the meanwhile does not mean that the blood
stuck on the axe would not have been human blood at all. Sometimes it
happens, either because the stain is too insufficient or due to
haematological changes and plasmatic coagulation that a serologist might
fail to detect the origin of the blood.
139. 1997 2 ALD 754; 1997 1 ALD(Cri) 150; 1997 1 ALT(Cri) 235; 1997 2
APLJ 142; S.Narasingam Versus State OF A.P. the constitutional
mandate is that no person shall be forced to give evidence against his own
case. Therefore, oiling the petitioner as LW­19 and at the same time
accusing him of the offence under Section 211 IPC in the same case and
showing him as A. 5, is in violation of the constitutional mandate and also
in violation of the fundamental rights.
as stated supra, charge­sheet is laid for an offence under section 211 IPC
against the petitioner and it is not indispute that complaint is not filed by
the Munsif Magistrate, Luxettipet There is bar for taking cognizance of
offence under section 195 (1) Cr. P. C. unless the complaint is filed as per
the procedure prescribed under section 340 read with 195 Cr. P. C. So on
this ground itself, the proceedings against the petitioner are liable to be
quashed.
THAT there can be two categories of cases that fall under the protection of
section 197 Cr. P. C. They are (i) the act complained of is one authorised
by a statute or law but became questionable on account of the fact that it
was done with fradulent or dishonest intention and (ii) the act complained
of, though not authorised by statute or law, is intimately and integrally
connected with his official or statutory duty and has thus a reasonable
nexus to the discharge of duty. In finding whether or not a complaint falls
under either or neither of the above two categories, the facts and
circumstances of the case have to be appreciated so as to arrive at a
balance between the protection available under Section 197 Cr. P. C. and
the protection of the private citizen from the onslaughts under the colour
of office. It is only when the act on such appreciation does not fall under
either of the above two categories and amounts to an offence that no
sanction under Section 197 Cr. P. C. is necessary for purposes of
prosecution of the accused.

140. 2013 0 AIR(SC) 1085; 2012 0 CrLJ 4707; 2012 10 SCC 433; KURIA &
ANR. Versus STATE OF RAJASTHAN, Appreciation of evidence —
Discrepancies, variation or improvements in statements — Significance
and appreciation of — Discrepancies or improvements which do not
materially affect the prosecution case and are insignificant cannot be
made the basis for doubting the veracity of prosecution case — A principle
of law is that every improvement or variation cannot be treated as an
attempt to falsely implicate the accused by the witness — And approach of
the Court should be reasonable and practical.
Single eye­witness — Testimony — Basing conviction — Propriety — No
legal impediment in convicting an accused on the sole testimony of a
single witness.
Relative witness — Testimony — Cannot be discarded merely because the
eye witness is a relative of the deceased — Court may base its judgment on
the statement of such witnesses, if his statement is fully corroborated or
 supported by other ocular and documentary evidence. Appreciation of
Evidence — In any event unless the oral evidence is totally irreconcilable
with the medical evidence, it has primacy.
Words and expressions — Expression ‘Sterling worth’ — Such an
expression in the context of criminal jurisprudence means a witness
worthy of credence — Linguistically, ‘sterling worth’ means ‘thoroughly
excellent’ or ‘of great value’.
Criminal Trial – Appreciation of evidence – Medical and ocular evidence –
Except totally irreconcilable with the medical evidence, oral evidence has
primacy – Large number of accused persons assaulting one person –
Witnesses not expected to see and remember role played by each accused
precisely – No discrepancy in ocular and medical evidence – No infirmity in
conviction.

141. 1998 2 ALD(Cri) 816; 1999 1 ALT(Cri) 1; NAGALLA MUKHALINGAM

Versus State OF A.P. When once a free fight between two groups resulting
in injuries to both the groups is established, there is no scope to convict
members of one of the groups for substantive offences with the aid of
Section 149 IPC. "in such a case, the accused persons would be liable for
their individual acts and would not be liable vicariously " vide the decision
of the Supreme court in AnanthaKathod v. State of maharashtra, 1998
SCC (Crl.) 199. That in a case of free fight, Section 149 IPC cannot be
applied was A1so laid down by the Supreme court in State of Haryana v.
Chand Veer, 1996 SCC (Crl.) 728.

142. 2009 0 AIR(SC) 214; 2008 15 SCC 115; 2009 3 SCC(Cri) 736; Ravi
versus State, A court can and may act on the testimony of a single
witness though uncorroborated. One credible witness outweighs the
testimony of a number of other witnesses of indifferent character.

143. 2013 1 ALD(Cri) 8; 2013 2 ALT(Cri) 332; Angishetty Chandra Shekar

Versus The State of Andhra Pradesh, Penal Code 1860 ­ Section 420 ­
Criminal Procedure Code 1973, Section 482­­­Cheating ­ Agreement to sell
immovable property – Land dispute cropped up after agreement of sale­­­
No prima facie evidence that petitioners were knowing that there was
litigation and dispute regarding title of property before they entered into
agreement with complainant­­­Criminal complaint quashed.

144. 2013 1 ALD(Cri) 366; 2013 1 ALT(Cri) 81; 2013 0 CrLJ 2764; D.
Sudhakar Versus PanapuSreenivasulu @ Evone Water Sreenivasulu&
Others; Criminal Procedure Code 1973 ­ Sections 2(wa) and 372 Proviso –
Meaning of victim ­ Expression ’legal heir’ in S.2(wa) refers to a person who
is entitled to property of victim under applicable law of inheritance ­
Parties being Hindus, law of heritance applicable to them is Hindu
Succession Act ­ Appellant being a Class II heir would not inherit anything
from his deceased brother, as he is survived by his wife, he is not entitled
 to succeed property of victim—Even though word "victim" has been given a
wide meaning in Declaration of United Nations, but Legislature has given a
very narrow meaning.

145. 2013 0 AIR(SC) 3602; 2013 0 CrLJ 1540; 2013 12 SCC 689; 2014 4
SCC(Cri) 483; ChinnamKameswaraRao& Others Versus State of A.P.
Various expressions, such as, "substantial and compelling reasons", "good
and sufficient grounds", "very strong circumstances", "distorted
conclusions", "glaring mistakes", etc. are not intended to curtail extensive
powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such
phraseologies are more in the nature of "flourishes of language" to
emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal
than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come
to its own conclusion.
The 'failure of justice' is an extremely pliable or facile expression, which
can be made to fit into any situation in any case. The court must
endeavour to find the truth. There would be 'failure of justice'; not only by
unjust conviction, but also by acquittal of the guilty, as a result of unjust
failure to produce requisite evidence. of course, the rights of the accused
have to be kept in mind and also safeguarded, but they should not be over
emphasized to the extent of forgetting that the victims also have rights. It
has to be shown that the accused has suffered some disability or
detriment in respect of the protections available to him under Indian
Criminal Jurisprudence. 'Prejudice', is incapable of being interpreted in its
generic sense and applied to criminal jurisprudence. The plea of prejudice
has to be in relation to investigation or trial, and not with respect to
matters falling outside their scope. Once the accused is able to show that
there has been serious prejudice caused to him, with respect to either of
these aspects, and that the same has defeated the rights available to him
under jurisprudence, then the accused can seek benefit under the orders
of the Court.”
It is well settled that the common intention may develop during the course
of the commission of the offence but the fact that the incident in instant
case had a history behind it and that the appellants had not only
threatened the deceased previously but were lying in wait for his arrival at
the place of occurrence clearly showed that the commission of the offence
was preconcerted.

146. 2012 0 AIR(SC) 3311; 2012 0 CrLJ 4550; 2012 8 SCC 651; 2012 3
SCC(Cri) 937; 2012 6 Supreme 571; 2012 0 Supreme(SC) 600; SHYAM
BABU VERSUS STATE OF U.P.
(a) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 ­ Section 368 ­ While setting aside an
order of acquittal the appellate court must specifically return a finding
that the order of acquittal is perverse ­ Instantly trial court erring in
disbelieving eye witnesses and doubting their presence at the place of
occurrence ­ No infirmity in High Court order.
 (b) Criminal Trial ­ Related witnesses ­ Eye witness account ­ Cannot be
discarded only on ground of being related to deceased.

147. 2013 0 AIR(SC) 274; 2012 11 JT 165; 2012 10 SCC 383; 2012 0
Supreme(SC) 729; Murugesan& Others Versus State through Inspector
of Police,
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 379 – Interference with order
of acquittal is different from interfering with order of conviction – In case of
appeal Supreme Court against order of interference with conviction
requires leave of the Court – In case of appeal against interference with
order of acquittal, requirement of leave is dispensed with.

148. 2009 1 ALD(Cri) 155; 2009 1 ALT(Cri) 279; 2008 0 Supreme(AP) 964;
SammangiNagabhushanam Versus State of A.P.,
Indian Penal code, 1860—Sections 338, 417 and 307—Cheating and
attempt to murder—Cheating in love affair—Appellant slapped and pushed
the girl away from upstairs on account of which she fell down and became
unconscious—It could not be shown that appellant had fraudulent
intention to sexually exploit the girl—Similarly, it could not be proved that
appellant had intention or knowledge so as to attract provisions of Section
307—Conviction of appellant u/s. 417 and 307 IPC set aside—Appellant
convicted u/s 388 IPC—Sentence of imprisonment already undergone by
appellant sufficient—Appellant directed to pay compensation of Rs.
25,000/­ to the girl.

149. 2011 0 AIR(SC) 972; 2011 0 CrLJ 1693; 2011 3 SCC 530; 2011 1
SCC(Cri) 1199; 2011 2 Supreme 80; 2011 0 Supreme(SC) 200;
Gurjinder Singh versus State of Punjab,
A police officer can be a reliable witness if the court finds him to be a
truthful person and in that event there is no harm in relying upon his
statement.

150. 2002 1 ALD(Cri) 812; 2002 1 ALT(Cri) 470; 2002 0 CrLJ 3201; 2002
1 LS 345; 2002 0 Supreme(AP) 186; V.Shankaraiah Versus State OF
A.P., Hyderabad.
Various High Courts have taken a view that merely because a person
committed suicide by feeling insulted or humiliated, due to the comments
or utterances made by the accused, the accused cannot be said to be
guilty of an offence under Section 306 IPC. In DEVRAJ VS. STATE OF H.
P. 3, a partner in a firm committed suicide due to the other partners
[accused] taking away large sums of money out of partnership fund for
various purposes and their not rendering an account to the deceased, and
for not permitting the deceased utilizing the profits. The other partners in
the firm, who are accused of an offence under Section 306 IPC for the
suicide of the deceased, were held to be not guilty of such offence. In ALKA
 GREWAL VS. STATE OF M. P. 4, the woman was held to be not guilty of an
offence under Section 306 IPC, for her husband committing suicide, after
feeling insulted and humiliated due to her immoral conduct. The Court
specifically held that though she may be the cause for suicide of her
husband, she cannot be said to have abetted his suicide. In STATE OF
GUJARAT VS. PRADYUMAN RAMANLAL MEHTA5, the publishers and
others responsible for publication of a defamatory article are held to be not
guilty an offence under Section 306 IPC, for the defamed persons suicide
on feeling humiliated due to the defamatory publication. V. ADINARAYANA
VS. STATE OF A. P. 6, is a case where a woman committed suicide when
the accused threatened her that he would reveal her illicit connection to
her husband. The accused was held to have not committed an offence
under Section 306 of IPC. The Supreme Court in MAHENDRA SINGH VS.
STATE OF M. P. 7, held that merely because the deceased woman stated
in her dying declaration that she was harassed by the accused, the
accused cannot be held guilty of an offence under Section 306 IPC.

151. 1996 1 ALD 328; 1996 1 ALD(Cri) 892; 1996 1 ALT(Cri) 200; 1996 1
APLJ 121; 1996 0 APLJ(Cri) 16; 1996 0 CrLJ 1249; 1996 2 DMC 162;
1996 1 LS 120; 1995 0 Supreme(AP) 541; SanagalaYagnaSree Versus
State OF A.P.
INDIAN PENAL CODE, Secs.107, 306 & 498­A ­ EVIDENCE ACT Sec.113­
A ­ Cruelty under Section 498­A ­ Defined ­ Ingredients to an abetment ­
Stated ­ Instigation by husband to wife for committing suicide not proved ­
Presumption under Sec.113­A cannot be drawn ­ Accused husband can be
convicted only under Sec.498­A but not under Sec.306 of IPC.

152. 2014 0 AIR(SC) 384; 2014 0 CrLJ 540; 2013 16 SCC 651; 2014 6
SCC(Cri) 364; 2014 2 Supreme 542; 2013 0 Supreme(SC) 1043; State
of U.P. Vs. Naushad
Indian Penal Code, 1860­Section 376 read with Section 90­Criminal
Procedure Code, 1973­Section 378­Rape­Misconception of fact­If consent
is given by prosecutrix under misconception of fact, it is vitiated­Accused
had sexual intercourse with prosecutrix by giving false assurance to
prosecutrix that he would marry her­After she got pregnant, he refused to
do so­accused only wanted to indulge in sexual intercourse with her and
was under no intention of actually marrying the prosecutrix­He never
intended to marry her and procured her consent only for reason of having
sexual relations with her which act of accused falls squarely under
definition of rape­He brazenly raped her for two years giving her false
assurance that he would marry her­High Court has gravely erred in fact
and in law by reversing conviction of accused for offence of rape­Trial
court was absolutely correct in appreciating evidence on record and
convicting and sentencing accused for offence of rape­Trial court was
correct in awarding maximum sentence of life imprisonment to accused as
 he has committed a breach of trust that prosecutrix had in him­Impugned
order set aside.

153. Bhupinder Sharma Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh -

2004(1)ACR573(SC), AIR2003SC4684, 2003(6)ALT44(SC), 2004CriLJ1,
(2004)1GLR761, JT2003(Suppl2)SC493, 2003(8)SCALE735,
(2003)8SCC551, [2003]4SuppSCR792, 2004(1)ShimLC150,
2004(1)UC379, 2004(1)UJ495
Indian Penal Code, 1860 ­ Section 376 (2) (i) (g) with Explanation (1)­­
Rape­­Gang rape­­Corroboration of evidence of victim not to be insisted on
as it would be adding insult to injury­­Trial court convicting and
sentencing accused appellant for gang rape to 4 years on ground that he
did not actually commit rape­­High Court enhancing sentence to minimum
10 years as prescribed­­Whether justified?­­Held, "yes"­­Ground for
reducing sentence from minimum prescribed given by trial court
untenable.
In the Indian setting, refusal to act on the testimony of the victim of sexual
assault in the absence of corroboration as a rule, is adding insult to
injury. A girl or a woman in the tradition bound non­permissive society of
India would be extremely reluctant even to admit that any incident, which
is likely to reflect on her chastity, had ever occurred. She would be
conscious of the danger of being ostracized by the society and when in the
face of these factors, the crime is brought to light, there is inbuilt
assurance that the charge is genuine rather than fabricated. Just as a
witness who has sustained an injury, which is not shown or believed to be
self­inflicted, is the best witness in the sense that he is least likely to
exculpate the real offender, the evidence of a victim of sex offence is
entitled to great weight, absence of corroboration notwithstanding. A
woman or a girl who is raped is not an accomplice. Corroboration is not
the sine qua non for conviction in a rape case.
To insist on corroboration except in the rarest of rare cases is to equate
one who is a victim of the lust of another with an accomplice to a crime
and thereby insult womanhood. It would be adding insult to injury to tell a
woman that her chain of rapewill not be believed unless it is corroborated
in material particulars as in the case of an accomplice to a crime.
State of Maharashtra v. Chandra Prakash, 1990 ACR 212 (SC) : AIR 1990
SC 658, applied.Why should be the evidence of the girl or the woman who
complains of rape or sexual molestation be viewed with the aid of
spectacles fitted with lenses tinged with doubt, disbelief or suspicion? The
plea of lack of corroboration is of no substance.
In cases of gang rape, the proof of completed act of rape by each accused
on the victim is not required. The statutory intention in introducing
Explanation 1 in relation to Section 376 (2) (g), I.P.C. appears to have been
done with a view to effectively deal with the growingmenace of gang rape.
In such circumstances, it is not necessary that the prosecution should
adduce clinching proof of a completed act of rape by each one of the
 accused on the victim or on each one of the victims where there are more
than one in order to findthe accused guilty of gang rape and convict them
under Section 376, I.P.C.
PramodMahto v. State of Bihar, 1989 ACR 622 (SC) : AIR 1989 SC 1475,
relied on.Both in cases of sub­sections (1) and (2) of Section 376, I.P.C. the
Court has the discretion to impose a sentence of imprisonment less than
the prescribed minimum for 'adequate and special reasons'. Ifthe Court
does not mention such reasons in the judgment, there is no scope for
awarding a sentence lesser than the prescribed minimum.

154. Vishal Jeet Vs. Union of India and others - AIR1990SC1412,

1990(38)BLJR1384, 1990CriLJ1469, JT1990(2)SC354,
(1990)3SCC318, [1990]2SCR861, 1990(2)UJ385
Criminal ­ Prostitution ­ Article 39 of Constitution of India ­ Petitioner filed
public interest litigation seeking directions to Central Bureau of
Investigation to institute enquiry against those police officers under whose
jurisdiction red light areas are flourishing ­ Further sought direction to
bring all the inmates of the red light areas who were engaged in 'flesh
trade' to protective homes of the respective States and to provide them
with proper medical aid shelter education and training in various
disciplines of life so as to enable them to choose a more dignified way of
life and (3) to bring the children of those prostitutes and other children
found begging in streets and also the girls pushed into 'flesh trade' to
protective homes and then to rehabilitate them ­ Objectives of Article 39 (e)
is to see that children are not abused ­ Objective of Article 39 (f) was that
State should direct its policy towards securing such childhood and youth
against exploitation and against moral and material abandonment ­
Desired result had not been achieved despite stringent and rehabilitative
provisons of law under various Act ­ ­ Held, a roving enquiry through the
CBI throughout length and breadth of country was not practicable and
possible and no useful purpose will be served by issuing such direction ­
Directed all State Governments and Government of Union Territories to
take appropriate and speedy action under existing laws in eradicating
child prostitution ­ Concerned members can constitute committee and can
include any members in it

155. MadanLalSarma Vs. The State - 1990 CriLJ 215 - "If Accused has no
knowledge that note in question is forged one, then he is not liable for
conviction."

156. State of Haryana Vs. Surender and Ors. etc. - 2007(3)ACR2905(SC),

AIR2007SC2312, 2008(1)ALT(Cri)28, JT2007(8)SC490,
2007(2)OLR486, 2007(II)OLR(SC)486, 2007(8)SCALE259,
(2007)11SCC281, [2007]7SCR885
When admissible evidence is ignored it is the duty of appellate Court to re­
appreciate the evidence where the accused had been acquitted for the
 purpose of ascertaining as to whether any accused really committed any
offence or not

157. Ananta Deb SinghaMahapatra and Ors. Vs. State of West Bengal -
2007(3)ACR2888(SC), AIR2007SC2524, 2007(2)ALD(Cri)710,
2008(1)ALT(Cri)215, JT2007(8)SC633, 2007(8)SCALE448,
(2007)13SCC374, [2007]7SCR974, 2007(4)UC143
The right to private defense commences, as soon as a reasonable
apprehension of danger to the body arises from an attempt, or threat, to
commit the offence and lasts so long as the reasonable apprehension of
the danger to the body continues."
Criminal Law­­Right of private defence­­Burden of proof­­Held­­ Accused
need not prove the existence of right of private defence beyond reasonable
doubt­­It is enough for accused to show as in a civil case that
preponderance of probabilities is in favour of his plea. [Para­­11]
Criminal Law­­"Right of private defence"­­Justification of­­Held­­ There
was not even a single injury on accused persons while prosecution witness
sustained large number of injuries and was hospitalized for more than a
month­­A plea of right of private defence cannot be based on surmises and
speculation. [Para­­12]

158. GollaHanumanthu Vs. The State of A.P., Rep. by Public Prosecutor,

High Court of A.P. - 2004(2)ALD(Cri)430, 2004(2)ALT(Cri)546,
2004CriLJ4009, I(2005)DMC144
Criminal ­ Conviction ­ Section 498­A IPC and 306 of Indian Penal Code,
1860 ­ Sessions Judge, convicted Appellant for offence under Section 498­
A IPC and 306 IPC ­ Hence, this Appeal ­ Whether, Appellant was rightly
convicted on appreciation of evidence ­ Held, P.Ws 4 and 5 had
turnedhostile, and they had not supported case of prosecution ­ Therefore,
prosecution intended to sustain its case that there was some material
relating to harassment as she was not begetting children and such
harassment would amount to intentional aiding ­ As per Section 107 of
IPCand Section 306 of IPC, on careful scrutiny of oral and documentary
evidence and also oral dying declaration, there was suspicion in relation
thereto ­ Very cause of death was not proved in accordance with law ­
Thus, conviction could not be sustained ­ Hence, the appellant­
accusedwas entitled for acquittal ­ Appeal allowed.
Ratio Decidendi: "Person cannot be held guilty of offence if prosecution
does not prove his case as per provisions of Act."

159. Neelam @ BendilaLachaiah and Anr. Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh -

2002(2)ALT(Cri)186, 2002(1)APLJ291, II(2003)DMC268
Criminal ­ Benefit of Doubt ­ Sections 107 and 306 of Indian Penal Code,
1860(IPC) ­ Present revision filed against order whereby petitioners
convicted under Section 306 of IPC ­ Held, considering 107 of IPC, it is
clear that person must have been instigated by another person to do
 particularthing ­ Similarly, person shall intentionally aid other person in
doing of thing ­ According to evidence of witnesses ManthraBiyyam was
administered by petitioners on deceased and theft was detected ­
Subsequently they made him naked ­ This had happened in other village­
Whereas deceased committed suicide after one day of said incident in
other village ­ From evidence of concerned witnesses, it is clear that there
was some humiliation to deceased but it cannot be said that said
humiliation caused by petitioners amounts to instigation whichprompted
deceased to commit suicide ­ Therefore it is difficult to hold that
petitioners have abetted commission of suicide by deceased ­ Therefore
evidence is not sufficient to hold that petitioners have committed offence
punishable under Section 306 of IPC ­ Therefore petitionersare entitled for
acquittal ­ Hence, revision allowed and judgments of both Courts set
aside.

160. Smt. Shanti AndAnrvs State Of Haryana - 1991 AIR 1226, 1990 SCR
Supl. (2) 675 ­ The view of the.High Court that Sections 304­B and 498­
A I.P.C are mutually exclusive Is not correct. Sections 304­B and
498­A cannot be held to be mutually exclusive. These provisions deal
with two distinct offences. It is true that "cruelty" is a common essential to
both the Sections and that has to be proved. The Explanation to
Section 498­A gives the meaning of "cruelty". In Section 304­B there is
no such explanation about the meaning of "cruelty" but having
regard to the common background to these offences, the meaning of
"cruelty or harassment" will be the same as found in the explanation to
Section 498­A under which "cruelty" by itself mounts to an offence and is
punishable. Under Section 304­B, it is the "dowry death" that is
punishable and such death should have occurred withinseven years of
the marriage. No such period is mentioned in Section 498­A and the
husband or his relativewould be liable for subjecting the woman to
"cruelty" anytime after the marriage. Further a person charged and
acquitted under section 304­B can be convicted under Section498­A
without charge being there, if such a case, is madeout. But from the
point of view of practice and procedureand to avoid technical defects it is
necessary in such casesto frame charges under both the Section and if
the case isestablished they can be convicted under both the Sectionsbut
no separate sentence need be awarded under Section 498­Ain view of the
substantive sentence being awarded for themajor offence under
Section 304­B.
1.1 In the instant case, the High Court has not held that the
prosecution has not established cruelty on the part of the appellants but
on the other hand it considered the entire evidence and held that the
element of cruelty which is also an essential of Section 304­B I.P.C. has
been established. In these circumstances, therefore, the mere acquittal of
the appellants under Section 498­A I.P.C. makes nodifference for the
purpose of this case.
161. Ram Badan Sharma vs State Of Bihar 2006(3)ACR2390(SC),
AIR2006SC2855, 2006(2)ALD(Cri)606, 2007(1)ALT(Cri)162,
2006CriLJ4070, II(2006)DMC368SC, [2006(4)JCR215(SC)],
JT2006(7)SC490, 2007-1-LW(Crl)391, 2006(4)PLJR86,
2006(8)SCALE210, (2006)10SCC115, [2006](4)SuppSCR795
Indian Penal Code, 1860 ­ Sections 304B and 201­­Evidence Act, 1872­­
Section 113B­­Dowry death, etc.­­Conviction and sentence­­Whether
justified?­­Held, "yes"­­Persistent demand of dowry­­And harassment,
humiliation, physical violence and beating by husband and in­laws of
deceased­Deceased died under unnatural circumstances within seven
years of marriage­­Trial court properly analysed evidence and rightly
convicted appellants­­High Court also examined entire evidence on record­
­And came to same conclusion­­No infirmity can be found with impugned
judgment of High Court.
In cases where it is proved that it was neither a natural death nor an
accidental death, then the obvious conclusion has to be that it was an
unnatural death either homicidal or suicidal. But, even assuming that it is
a case of suicide, even then it would be deathwhich had occurred in
unnatural circumstances. Even in such a case, Section 304B, I.P.C. is
attracted.

162. State Of Punjab vsDaljit Singh And Others - 1999 CriLJ 2723 ­ after
four or five years of marriage, the husband, being in some difficulty in his
business, requests or demands some money from his father­in­law directly
or through his wife, only with a view that he is able to advance in life. Can
such a demand be termed as 'dowry' ? In our view, the answer has to be in
negative. The demand and allegations for non­fulfilment of the same, are
not necessarily dependent upon the financial status of the parties. This all
depends upon the nature of the persons involved in the matter. Quite
often, the poorest of poor have made no demand whereas in some cases,
even the richest of rich have made such a demand. There is
unimpeachable evidence on record, mention whereof has been made
above, which unmistakably points towards the demand made by the
appellants.

163. Raj Kumar Prasad TamarkarVs. State of Bihar and Anr. -

2007(1)ACR566(SC), 2007(1)ALD(Cri)192, 2007(1)BLJR790,
CLT(2007)Supplement886, 2007CriLJ1174, I(2007)DMC164SC,
[2007(2)JCR80(SC)], JT2007(1)SC239, 2007(1)SCALE19,
(2007)10SCC433, [2007]1SCR13, 2007(1)UJ0082
"In case where High Court failed to take into consideration the relevant
facts and misapplied the legal principles, then Supreme Court can exercise
jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India as otherwise
there would be serious miscarriage of justice."
164. ArunGargVs. State of Punjab and Anr. - 2004(3)ACR2812(SC),
2004(2)ALD(Cri)941, 2005(1)ALT9(SC), 2004(5)CTC150,
II(2004)DMC570SC, [2005(1)JCR157(SC)], JT2004(8)SC124,
2004(3)KLT435(SC), RLW2004(4)SC621, 2004(8)SCALE273,
(2004)8SCC251, 2005(1)UC55, 2005(1)UJ235
Indian Penal Code, 1860­Section 304­B and 498­A­Scope of­ Held­Not
mutually exclusive­ They deal with different and distinct offences­But
cruelty is common­And a person charged and acquitted under Section
304­B can be convicted under Section 498­A­Without a specific charge
being there. [Para­27]
Indian Penal Code, 1860­ Section 304­B­Scope of­Fine­ Not prescribed as
a punishment. [Para­29]
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973­Section 357­Scope and ambit of­
Discussed and explained. [Para­30 and 31]

165. Rajbir @ Raju and Anr. Vs. State of Haryana - AIR2011SC568,

[2011(1)JCR287(SC)], JT2010(12)SC544, 2010(4)KLT751,
2011(1)OLR(SC)341, 2011(1)RCR(Criminal)69, 2010(12)SCALE319,
2011(1)UC76
Indian Penal Code, 1860­­Section 304­B­­Life sentence awarded by trial
court but reduced to 10 years R.I. by High Court­­Legality­­Held­­In the
matters of crimes against woman a harsh punishment is to be given­­
Notices issued to petitioner as to why the life sentence be not enhanced to
deathsentence­­Directed trial courts in India that ordinarily add Section
302 I.P.C. to charge of Section 304­B, I.P.C., so that death sentence can be
imposed in such heinous crime. [Para­­5, 6, 7 and 11]

166. SunkaraSuriBabu Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh - 1996(1)ALD40,

1996(1)ALD(Cri)366, 1996(1)ALT(Cri)165, 1998CriLJ1480,
II(1996)DMC590 - Criminal ­ suicide ­ Sections 201, 202, 304B, 306 and
498A of Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Sections 227, 397 and 401 of
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 ­ deceased committed suicide by burning
herself ­ before death of deceased accused alleged had demanded dowry
and subjected her to cruelty ­­ demand of dowry not proved ­ cremation of
dead body without informing police and immediately after death attracted
provisions of Section 201 ­ held, offence under Sections 304B and 498A
could not be proved but accused liable to be convicted under Section 201.

167. MODINSAB KASIMSAB KANCHAGAR VS STATE OF KARNATAKA -

[2013] 0 AIR(SC) 1504 / [2013] 0 CrLJ 2056 / [2013] 4 JT 41 / [2013]
4 SCC 551 / [2013] 0 Supreme(SC) 228 – the demand of amount may
not be a demand in connection with dowry but is certainly an unlawful
demand for a property or valuable security.

168. VajreshVenkatrayAnvekar VS State of Karnataka - [2013] 0 AIR(SC)

329 / [2013] 2 JBCJ(SC) 350 / [2013] 1 JLJR(SC) 353 / [2013] 1 JT
 238 / [2013] 3 SCC 462 / [2013] 1 Supreme 79 / [2013] 0
Supreme(SC) 4 –
Evidence of interested witnesses­Admissibility­It is true that chances of
exaggeration by the interested witnesses cannot be ruled out­ Witnesses
are prone to exaggeration­ It is for the trained judicial mind to find out the
truth­ If the exaggeration is of such nature as to make the witness wholly
unreliable, the court would obviously not rely on him­ If attendant
circumstances and evidence on record clearly support and corroborate the
witness, then merely because he is interested witness he cannot be
disbelieved because of some exaggeration, if his evidence is otherwise
reliable (Para 9)
Criminal Trial­Delay in lodging FIR­ When a man looses his daughter due
to cyanide poisoning, he is bound to break down­ He would take time to
recover from the shock­ Six hours delay could not make his case untrue­
It was also not proper to expect him to give all minute details at that stage­
The F.I.R. contained sufficient details­ It is not expected to be a treatise
(Para 10)

169. Krishan Kumar Malik VS State of Haryana - [2011] 0 AIR(SC) 2877 /

[2011] 0 AIR(SC) 2970 / [2011] 0 CrLJ 4274 / [2011] 7 JT 94 / [2011]
3 RCR(Cri) 589 / [2011] 7 SCC 130 / [2011] 3 SCC(Cri) 61 / [2011] 0
Supreme(SC) 584
The Prosecutrix admitted in her cross examination that she had come to
know the namesof all the accused during the course of occurence, as they
were taking each other's names. If thatbe so, then why she did not name
the Appellant in the FIR is a million dollar question? These ommissions
speak volumes against her and her credibility stands shaken.
6. Relevancy of facts forming part of same transaction ? Facts which,
though not in issue, areso connected with a fact in issue as to form part of
the same transaction, are relevant, whetherthey occurred at the same time
and place or at different times and places. Black's Law Dictionarydefines
Res Gestae as follows:
(Latin: "things done") The events at issue, or other events
contemporaneous with them Inevidence law, words and statements about
the res gestae are usually admissible under a hearsayexception (such as
present sense impression or excited utterance).The said evidence thus
becomes relevant and admissible as res gestae under Section 6 ofthe Act.

170. A. Venkat Reddy VS UkantiJanardhan Reddy - [2003] 1 ALD(Cri) 248 /

[2003] 1 ALT(Cri) 326 / [2003] 1 LS 21 / [2002] 0 Supreme(AP) 1319 -
INDIAN PENAL CODE, Secs.306 & 107 ­ Abetment ­ Deceased committed
suicide due to threats from accused ­ Accused charge sheeted for an
offence u/S.306 ­ Assistant Sessions Judge passing order dismissing
petition filed seeking discharge and framing charge u/S.306 IPC ­
Prosecution contends that accused not entitled to discharge, because of
their intimidation only deceased seems to have committed suicide as per
 suicide note and they are liable for offence of intimidation ­ Allegations in
FIR and evidence collected by police show that accused coerced deceased
and his father to abide by their decision holding out a threat ­ Threat
cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be said to be an ‘instigation’ of
deceased to commit suicide ­ No evidence to show that accused have had
mensrea to ‘abet’ suicide of deceased ­ Three types of ‘abetments’
contemplated by Sec.107 IPC, not found in prosecution case ­ Necessary
ingredients for attracting Sec.306 IPC, not found ­ Evidence on record does
not warrant framing of charge u/S.306 IPC ­ Charge framed by Assistant
Sessions Judge ­ Quashed.

171. Gita Ram VS State of H. P. - [2013] 0 AIR(SC) 641 / [2013] 2

BBCJ(SC) 329 / [2013] 2 JBCJ(SC) 279 / [2013] 1 JLJR(SC) 461 /
[2013] 2 JT 354 / [2013] 2 SCC 694 / [2013] 1 Supreme 617 / [2013]
0 Supreme(SC) 116 –
Sec 292 IPC ­ “There are certain exceptions to this section with which we
are not concerned. This section was amended by Act XXXVI when apart
from enlarging the scope of the exceptions, the penalty was enhanced
which was earlier up to three months or with fine or with both. By the
amendment a dichotomy of penal treatment was introduced for dealing
with the first offenders and the subsequent offenders. In the case of even a
first conviction the accused shall be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to two years and with fine which
may extend to two thousand rupees. The intention of the legislature is,
therefore, made clear by the amendment in 1969 in dealing with this type
of offences which corrupt the minds of people to whom these objectionable
things can easily reach and it needs not be emphasized that the corrupting
influence of these pictures is more likely to be upon the younger
generation who has got to be protected from being easy prey to these
libidinous appeals upon which this illicit trade is based. We are, therefore,
not prepared to accept the submission of the learned counsel to deal with
the accused leniently in this case.”

172. LahuKamlakarPatil VS State of Maharashtra - [2013] 1 BBCJ(SC) 232

/ [2013] 0 CrLJ 603 / [2013] 1 OLR(SC) 1018 / [2013] 6 SCC 417 /
[2012] 0 Supreme(SC) 934
Criminal Law­Appreciation of evidence­Human reaction­Court has to keep
in mind that different witnesses react differently under different
situations­It differs from individuals to individuals­There cannot be
uniformity in human reaction­If conduct of witness is so unnatural and is
not in accord with acceptable human behaviour allowing of variations,
then his testimony becomes questionable and is likely to be discarded.
(Para 26)

173. VIPIN JAISWAL VS STATE OF A. P. REP. BY PUB. PROSECUTOR -

[2013] 0 AIR(SC) 1567 / [2013] 0 CrLJ 2095 / [2013] 3 JBCJ(SC) 86 /
[2013] 2 JLJR(SC) 440 / [2013] 4 JT 188 / [2013] 3 SCC 684 / [2013]
2 Supreme 485 / [2013] 0 Supreme(SC) 238
a. Indian Penal Code, 1860 ­ Section 304B ­ Dowry ­ Husband
demanding money to purchase computer to start his own business
­ Not connected with marriage ­ Not a dowry demand. (Para 6)
b. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 ­ Sections 73 and 45 ­ Genuineness of
document ­ Suicide note claimed to have been written by deceased
­ Court should compare sample with handwriting of deceased u/s
73 ­ Alternatively services of handwriting expert should be availed
u/s 45. (Para 8)
 indiAn
EvidEncE
Act
JudgmEnts
Sec 113A Presumption.
Before the presumption may be raised, the foundation thereof must exist.
A bare reading of Section 113A shows that to attract applicability of
Section 113A, it must be shown that (i) the woman has committed suicide,
(ii) such suicide has been committed with a period of seven years from the
date of her marriage, (iii) the husband or his relatives, who are charged
had subjected her to cruelty. On existence and availability of the
above­said circumstances, the Court may presume that such suicide had
been abetted by her husband or by such relatives of her husband. The
Parliament has chosen to sound a note of caution. Firstly, the
pre­sumption is not mandatory; it is only permissive as the employment of
expression “may presume” suggests. Secondly, the existence and
availability of the abovesaid three circumstances shall not, like a formula,
enable the presumption being drawn; before the presumption may be
drawn the Court shall have to have regard to `all the other circumstances
of the case’. A consideration of all the other circum­stances of the case
may strengthen the presumption or may dictate the conscience of the
Court to abstain from drawing the presumption. The expression – ‘The
other circumstances of the case’ used in Section 113A suggests the need
to reach a cause and effect relationship between the cruelty and the
suicide for the purpose of raising a presumption. Last but not the least the
presumption is not an irrebuttable one. In spite of a presumption having
been raised the evidence adduced in defence or the facts and
circumstances otherwise available on record may destroy the presumption.
The phrase `May presume’ used in Section 113A is defined in Section 4 of
the Evidence Act, which says —`whenever it is provided by this Act that
Court may presume a fact, it may either regard such fact as proved, unless
and until it is disproved or may call for proof of it.’
2001 4 Crimes(SC) 360; 2001 0 CrLJ 4724; 2002 0 SCC(Cri) 1088;
2001 7 Supreme 737; Ramesh Kumar versus State of Chhattisgarh

We are unable to accept the contention that wrong identification by one

witness by itself would be fatal to the case of the prosecution. A case is
required to be decided on the examination of entire evidence. Mere wrong
identification by one of the eye­witnesses by itself cannot be fatal to the
case of the prosecution. There can be variety of reasons for wrong
identification. The witness may be won over. There may be loss of memory
or any other reason.
Under Section 9 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, the identity of the
accused persons is a relevant fact. We have no difficulty in accepting the
contention that evidence of mere identification of an accused person at the
trial for the first time is from its very nature inherently of a weak
character. The purpose of a prior test identification is to test and
strengthen the trustworthiness of that evidence. Courts generally look for
corroboration of the sole testimony of the witnesses in court so as to fix
the identity of the accused who are strangers to them in the form of earlier
identification proceedings. This rule of prudence, however, is subject to
exceptions, when, for example, the court is impressed by a particular
witness on whose testimony it can safely rely, without such or other
corroboration. It has also to be borne in mind that the aspect of
identification parade belongs to the stage of investigation, and there is no
provision inthe Code of Criminal Procedure which obliges the investigating
agency to hold, or confers a right upon the accused to claim a test
identification parade. Mere failure to hold a test identification parade
would not make inadmissible the evidence of identification in court. What
weight is to be attached to such identification is a matter for the courts of
fact to examine. In appropriate cases, it may accept the evidence of
identification even without insisting on corroboration {see Malkhansingh &
Ors. v. State of M.P. [(2003) 5 SCC 746]}.
It was pointed out that the evidence of these witnesses shows that each of
the witness had to go close to the accused and then alone it was possible
to identify them. We find no substance in the contention. The reason for
going near the accused was that out of a large number of 50 accused
present in the court, only the four appellants were identified and it was
proper to identify them by going near them. It is quite difficult to identify
an accused from a distance in a court hall by pointing out a finger towards
the accused by the witness when the accused are large in number. It is in
this context that the trial court has recorded that after going near the
accused, the witness has identified them. It does not mean that testimony
of witnesses in court becomes doubtful on their having identified the
accused after going near them.
2004 0 AIR(SC) 2775; 2004 2 JT 124; 2004 2 Scale 112; 2004 2 SCC
694; 2004 1 Supreme 577; 2004 0 Supreme(SC) 113; Simon & Ors.
Versus State of Karnataka.

(a) Criminal Trial ­ Related witnesses ­ Evidence ­ Presence established ­

Evidence reliable ­ Cannot be discarded merely because of relationship.
(Paras 9 and 10)
(2010) 7 SCC 759; 2012 (3) SCALE 219; (2009) 13 SCC 790 ­ Relied upon
(b) Criminal Trial ­ Investigation ­ Medical doctor and investigating officer
not discharging duties properly ­ Accused cannot draw any benefit
therefrom. (Para 13)
AIR 2010 SC 3718 : (2010) 9 SCC 567 ­ Relied upon
(c) Criminal Trial ­ Investigating officer and medical doctor ­ Flagrant
defaults and omissions ­ No prejudice to prosecution ­ Still cannot be
ignored. (Para 16)
(d) Words and Phrases ­ Dereliction of duty and misconduct ­ Dereliction
of duty or carelessness is an abuse of discretion under a definite law and
misconduct is a violation of indefinite law ­ Misconduct is a forbidden act
whereas dereliction of duty is the forbidden quality of an act and is
necessarily indefinite ­ One is a transgression of some established and
definite rule of action, with least element of discretion, while the other is
primarily an abuse of discretion. (Para 21)
(1992) 4 SCC 54; (1995) 6 SCC 31 ­ Relied upon
(e) Criminal Trial ­ Defective investigation ­ Evidence of defective
investigation should be appreciated with circumspection ­ Accused
however will not draw any advantage out of it. (Para 22)
(1972) 3 SCC 613; (2004) 3 SCC 654; AIR 1999 SC 644; (2006) 3 SCC 374;
(2009) 6 SCC 767; 2000 SCC (Crl.) 61; (2004) 10 SCC 598; (1995) 5 SCC
518 ­ Relied upon
(f) Criminal Trial ­ Medical evidence cannot prevail over reliable eye
witness accounts. (Para 29)
2004 Cri. LJ 28; (1992) 2 SCR 921: (1992) 3 SCC 204 ­ Relied upon
(g) Indian Penal Code, 1860 ­ Section 302 ­ Offence premeditated ­
Conviction not improper. (Para 38)
(h) Administrative Law ­ Dereliction of duty ­ Trial court censuring police
officials and medical doctor for dereliction of duty ­ Still no action taken by
higher authorities of these departments ­ Deprecated ­ Directions issued.
(Paras 35, 36 and 39)
2012 0 AIR(SC) 3046; 2012 4 BBCJ(SC) 104; 2012 3 CCR(SC) 310;
2012 0 CrLJ 4323; 2012 7 JT 353; 2012 7 Scale 165; 2012 8 SCC
263; 2012 3 SCC(Cri) 838; 2012 6 SCJ 283; 2012 5 Supreme 260;
2012 0 Supreme(SC) 513; 2012 2 UD(SC) 137; Dayal Singh & Others
Versus State of Uttaranchal

1.If a dying declaration is not elaborate but consists of only a few

sentences and is in actual words of maker, the mere fact that it is not in
question answer form cannot be ground against its acceptability or
reliability.
2.It is not essential that a Dying Declaration should be made only before a
magistrate.
3. It was contended that the evidence of the said three witnesses in court
was inadmissible as there was no record of their statement under section
161 Cr.P.C. The contention was repelled and it was held that while the
failure to comply with the requirements of section 161(3) Cr.P.C. might
affect the weight to be attached to the evidence of the witnesses, it does
not render it inadmissible.
2007 0 AIR(SCW) 3326; 2007 2 ALD(Cri)(SC) 326; 2007 3 ALT(Cri)(SC)
285; 2007 3 Crimes(Sc) 129; 2007 0 CrLJ 3265; 2007 6 JT 424; 2007
6 Scale 464; 2007 12 SCC 452; 2007 4 Supreme 1; 2007 0
Supreme(SC) 655; Dayal Singh Vs State of Maharashtra.

Injury on body of person of victim of rape is not sine­qua non to prove a

charge of rape.
No law states that non­holding of Test Identification Parade would by itself
disprove the prosecution case. To what extent and if at all the same would
adversely affect the prosecution case, would depend upon the facts and
circumstances of each case.
2004 0 AIR(SC) 2884; 2004 2 CCR(SC) 34; 2004 2 Crimes(SC) 15;
2004 1 JCC 336; 2004 1 JT 635; 2004 2 Scale 8; 2004 3 SCC 106;
2004 0 SCC(Cri) 678; 2004 1 Supreme 918; 2004 0 Supreme(SC) 87;
Dastagir Sab and Anr. Vs State of Karnataka

Where the transaction consists of different acts, in order that the chain of
such acts may constitute same transaction, they must be connected
together by ­
(a) proximity of time, (b) proximity of unity of place, (c) continuity of action,
and (d) community purpose or design
Where the incidents consist of declarations accompanying an act they are
subject to three important qualifications
(1) They must not be made at such an interval as to allow of fabrication or
to reduce them to the mere narrative of a past event;
(2) They must relate to, and can only be used to explain, the act they
accompany and not independent facts prior or subsequent thereto;
evidence as to other offences would be relevant and admissible, if there is
a nexus between the offence charged with the other offences of the two
acts forming part of the same transaction, so as to fall within this section
(3) Though admissible to explain, they are not always taken as proof of the
truth of the matter stated, that is, as hearsay
Declaration to be admissible as res gestae should be contemporaneous
with the transactions in issue, that is, the interval should not be such as
to give time or opportunity for fabrication, and they should not amount to
a mere narrative of a past occurrence
Of course, criminal jurisdiction does not contemplate the proof of fact by
the accused. It is only for the prosecution to establish the case beyond
reasonable doubt. However, in the case of circumstantial evidence, the
Court could take into consideration the reply of the accused made in the
statement under Section 313, Cr.P.C. also.
1997 2 ALT(Cri) 554; 1997 0 CrLJ 3854; 1997 0 Supreme(Mad)
357;Venkatesan Vs State (MAD)(DB)

It was contended that identification by photo is inadmissible in evidence

and, therefore, the same cannot be used. No legal provision has been
brought to our notice which inhibits the admissibility of such evidence.
However, learned counsel invited our attention to the observations of the
consti­tution bench in Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab(1994 1 Crimes(SC)
1031; 1994 0 CrLJ 3139; 1994 2 JT 423; 1994 Supp1 Scale 1; 1994 3
SCC 569; 1994 0 SCC(Cri) 899; 1994 0 Supreme(SC) 1) which struck
down Section 22 of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Pre­ven­tion)
Act, 1987. By that provision the evidence of a witness regarding
identifica­tion of a proclaimed offender in a terrorist case on the basis of
the photograph was given the same value as the evidence of a test
identification parade.
1999 0 AIR(SC) 2562; 1999 0 AIR(SCW) 2732; 1999 3 Crimes(SC) 204;
1999 0 CrLJ 3972; 1999 2 JCC 388; 1999 5 JT 394; 1999 3 RCR(Cri)
658; 1999 4 Scale 497; 2000 1 SCC 138; 1999 6 Supreme 385; 1999 0
Supreme(SC) 815; Umar Abdul Sakoor Sorathia Vs Intelligence Officer,
Narcotic Control Bureau.

In this case we get from the evidence of the I.O. (P.W.6) that there is no
recorded version of the statement made by the accused persons in
consequence whereof the stolen articles were recovered Mr. Talukdar
complained that the practice of not recording statement is unwholesome
and ought to be deprecated. In support of this contention he referred to
the decision in the case of Nathu v. State, AIR 1958 All 467 : (1958 Cri LJ
821). That decision lays down that under Section 27 that part only of the
information given by an accused is admissible as distinctly relates to the
facts discovered. Unless therefore the exact words used by an accused
person in giving the information are known the court is not in a position to
decide to what extent the particular statement of the accused is admissible
in evidence. The practice of not recording the actual words by the
investigating agency was therefore disapproved. In the case of
Panchugopal v. State, AIR 1968 Cal 38 : (1968 Cri LJ 40), somewhat
similar observations were made. It was observed that it is only proper for
prosecution if they want to adduce evidence under Section 27 of the
Evidence Act which is an exception to the power enjoined by Section 25 of
that Act, to prove by production of written record only of so much of the
statement as led to the discovery of the article. It is unsafe to rely on the
oral statement of witnesses without corroboration by any written record of
any such statement contemporaneously made, even if admissible. The
decision does not in terms say that an oral statement not recorded is on
that score alone inadmissible. All that it says is that it may be unsafe to
rely on such evidence. In the present case we have in evidence that the 4
petitioners made statements pursuant to which the I.O. was led to a tank
close to the town of Rampurhat and that the stolen articles were recovered
from under the water of the tank which was not an ordinary place for
keeping objects like a sewing machine or a table fan. The evidence also
indicates that the articles were brought out by the petitioners. The
evidence of the I.O. in particular is that the suspects took him to
Dhenuburi tank within Kalishar mouza and that the accused persons
brought out 2 Usha sewing machines and 1 Usha deluxe table fan from
the pond. He prepared a seizure­list in presence of witnesses which was
signed by the. accused persons and one of whom being illiterate put his
L.T.I. Mr. Talukdar drew our attention to the evidence of the search
witnesses (P.Ws.2 and 3) who while admitting the fact of recovery in cross­
examination said as if they did not see the accused persons there. To this
extent their evidence stands condemned by the petitioners Nos.2 and 4 in
their statement under Section 313, Cr.P.C. They admitted that they were
there at the time and that they were taken in a police jeep. The evidence of
the I.O. that the accused persons made statements, led the police to the
pond and brought out the articles from inside the pond was not even
challenged in cross­examination. Part of it is admitted by at least two of
the petitioners in their statement under Section 313, Cr.P.C. Even though
the statements made by the accused persons were not recorded, the fact
remains that the accused persons led the police to the tank and brought
out the stolen articles from inside the tank. This is evidence of a conduct
which is relevant under Section 8 of the Evidence Act even if it may be
otherwise not admissible under Section 27 of the Evidence Act (See
Prakash hand v. State, AIR 1979 SC 400 : (1979 Cri LJ 329).
1984 0 CrLJ 518; 1983 0 Supreme(Cal) 170; BEJOY MONDAL AND
OTHERS VS STATE OF WEST BENGAL AND OTHERS

explanation to Section 30 of the Evidence Act clarifies that "offence" as

used in the Section includes the abetment of, or attempt to commit, the
offence. Dealing with the scope ofSection 30, this Court in State vs.
Nalini [(1999) 5 SCC 253] has held that a plain reading thereof discloses
that when the following conditions exist, namely, (i) more persons than
one are being tried jointly; (ii) the joint trial of the persons is for the same
offence; (iii) a confession is made by one of such persons (who are being
tried jointly for the same offence); (iv) such a confession affects the maker
as well as such persons (who are being tried jointly for the same offence);
and (v) such a confession is proved in court, the court may take into
consideration such confession against the maker thereof as well as against
such persons (who are being jointly tried for the same offence). The Court
further observed thus:­
"In Kashmira Singh vs.State of MP [1952 SCR 526] this Court approved
the principles laid down by the Privy Council in Bhuboni Sahu vs. R. [AIR
1949 PC 257] and observed:
"But cases may arise where the Judge is not prepared to act on the other
evidence as it stands even though, if believed, it would be sufficient to
sustain a conviction. In such an event the Judge may call in aid the
confession and use it to lend assurance to the other evidence and thus
fortify himself in believing what without the aid of the confession he would
not be prepared to accept."
In this case, the High Court has not relied upon the confessional
statement as a substantive piece of evidence to convict accused no.1. It
has been used for lending assurance to the proved circumstances. The
High Court held that the proved circumstances would not involve accused
no.2 for the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC and the
circumstantial evidence does not establish that there was any common
intention or conspiracy between the father and the son to commit the
offence. However, the Court held that Sandeep had seen his father
committing multiple murders and when he destroyed the evidence relating
to those murders by throwing the articles from Mhatre bridge on two
separate occasions, it was absolutely clear that he did this with primary
object of saving his father and, therefore, he would be liable to be
convicted for the offence under Section 201 IPC. Hence, it cannot be said
that confessional statement is wholly exculpatory.
Prakash Dhawal Khairnar (Patil) vs State Of Maharastra 2002 0
AIR(SC) 340; 2001 0 AIR(SCW) 5111; 2002 1 CCR(SC) 40; 2002 1
Crimes(SC) 18; 2002 0 CrLJ 928; 2002 1 RCR(Cri) 212; 2001 8 Scale
482; 2002 2 SCC 35; 2001 8 Supreme 709; 2001 0 Supreme(SC) 1666;
2002 1 UJ 137;

If the statement is one of an incriminating nature, it would also be ruled

out as a confession under s. 25 of the Evidence Act. " Confession " is not
defined. But, upon the authorities, it appears that if the statement of the
accused proves facts which are part of the incriminating facts of the
prosecutions case, if the accused says something which can fairly be
construed as " I committed the offence," his statement would be a
confession. If the statement is a mere admission which simply provides a
fact which is not sinister, then it is not a confession.
In this case the words themselves declare the intention of the Legislature.
It therefore appears inadmissible to con sider the advantages or
disadvantages of applying the plain meaning whether in the interests of
the prosecution or the accused. It would appear that one of the difficulties
that has been felt in some of the Courts in India in giving the words their
natural construction has been the supposed effect on ss. 25, 26 and 27 of
the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Sect. 25 provides that no confession made
to a police officer shall be proved against an accused. Sect. 26 No
confession made by any person whilst he is in the custody of a police
officer shall be proved as against such person. Sect. 27 is a proviso that
when any fact is discovered in consequence of information received from a
person accused of any offence whilst in the custody of a police officer, so
much of such information, whether it amounts to a confession or not, may
be proved. It is said that to give s. 162 of the Code the construction
contended for would be to repeal s. 27 of the Evidence Act, for a statement
giving rise to a discovery could not then be proved. It is obvious that the
two sections can in some circumstances stand together. Sect. 162 is
confined to statements made to a police officer in course of an
investigation. Sect. 25 covers a confession made to a police officer before
any investigation has begun or otherwise not in the course of an
investigation. Sect. 27 seems to be intended to be a proviso to s. 26, which
includes any statement made by a person whilst in custody of the police,
and appears to apply to such statements to whomsoever made, e.g., to a
fellow prisoner, a doctor, or a visitor. Such statements are not covered by
s. 162. Whether to give to s. 162 the plain meaning of the words is to leave
the statement still inadmissible, even though a discovery of fact is made
such as is contemplated by s. 27, it does not seem necessary to decide. In
the present case the declarant was not in the custody of the police, and no
alleged discovery was made in consequence of his statement. The words of
s. 162 are in their Lordships view plainly wide enough to exclude any
confession made to a police officer in course of investigation, whether a
discovery is made or not. They may therefore pro tan to repeal the
provisions of the section which would otherwise apply. If they do not,
presumably it would be on the ground that s. 27 of the Evidence Act is a "
special law " within the meaning of s. 1, sub­s. 2, of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, and that s. 162 is not a specific provision to the contrary. Their
Lordships express no opinion on this topic, for whatever be the right view,
it is necessary to give to s. 162 the full meaning indicated. It only remains
to add that any difficulties to which either the prosecution or the defence
may be exposed by the construction now placed on s. 162 can in nearly
every case be avoided by securing that statements and confessions are
recorded under s. 164. In view of their Lordships decision that the alleged
statement was inadmissible by reason of s. 162, the appellants contention
that it was inadmissible as a confession under s. 25 of the Evidence Act
becomes unnecessary. As the point was argued, however, and as there
seems to have been some discussion in the Indian Courts on the matter, it
may be useful to state that in their Lordships view no statement that
contains self exculpatory matter can amount to a confession, if the
exculpatory statement is of some fact which if true would negative the
offence alleged to be confessed. Moreover, a confession must either admit
in terms the offence, or at any rate substantially all the facts which
constitute the offence. An admission of a gravely incriminating fact, even a
conclusively incriminating fact, is not of itself a confession, e.g., an
admission that the accused is the owner of and was in recent possession
of the knife or revolver which caused a death with no explanation of any
other mans possession. Some confusion appears to have been caused by
the definition of confession in art. 22 of Stephens Digest of the Law of
Evidence which defines a confession as an admission made at any time by
a person charged with a crime stating or suggesting the inference that he
committed that crime. If the surrounding articles are examined, it will be
apparent that the learned author after dealing with admissions generally is
applying himself to admissions in criminal cases, and for this purpose
defines confessions so as to cover all such admissions, in order to have a
general term for use in the three following articles— confession secured by
inducement, made upon oath, made under a promise of secrecy. The
definition is not contained in the Evidence Act, 1872 and in that Act it
would not be consistent with the natural use of language to construe con
fession as a statement by an accused u suggesting the "inference that he
committed " the crime.
PAKALA NARAYANA SWAMI Vs THE KING-EMPEROR; 1939 0 AIR(PC)
47; 1938 66 LawReportsInd.App. 66; 1939 0 Supreme(SC) 1;
The section is manifestly in two parts. Whereas the word used in the first
part is "may", the second part uses "shall". In consequences, the first part
gives purely discretionary authority to a Criminal Court and enables it at
any stage of an enquiry, trial or proceeding under the Code (a) to summon
any one as a witness, or (b) to examine any person present in Court, or (c)
to recall and re­examine any person whose evidence has already been
recorded. On the other hand, the second part is mandatory and compels
the Court to take any of the aforementioned steps if the new evidence
appears to it essential to the just decision of the case. This is a
supplementary provision enabling, and in certain circumstances imposing
on the Court the duty of examining a material witness who would not be
otherwise brought before it. It is couched in the widest possible terms and
calls for no limitation, either with regard to the stage at which the powers
of the Court should be exercised, or with regard to the manner in which it
should be exercised. It is not only the prerogative but also the plain duty of
a Court to examine such of those witnesses as it considers absolutely
necessary for doing justice between the State and the subject. There is a
duty cast upon the Court to arrive at the truth by all lawful means and
one of such means is the examination of witnesses of its own accord when
for certain obvious reasons either party is not prepared to call witnesses
who are known to be in a position to speak important relevant facts. The
object underlying Section 311 of the Code is that there may not be failure
of justice on account of mistake of either party in bringing the valuable
evidence on record or leaving ambiguity in the statements of the witnesses
examined from either side. The determinative factor is whether it is
essential to the just decision of the case. The section is not limited only for
the benefit of the accused, and it will not be an improper exercise of the
powers of the Court to summon a witness under the Section merely
because the evidence supports the case for the prosecution and not that of
the accused. The section is a general section which applies to all
proceedings, enquiries and trials under the Code and empowers
Magistrate to issue summons to any witness at any stage of such
proceedings, trial or enquiry. In Section 311 the significant expression that
occurs is "at any stage of inquiry or trial or other proceeding under this
Code". It is, however, to beborne in mind that whereas the section confers
a very wide power on the Court on summoning witnesses, the discretion
conferred is to be exercised judiciously, as the wider the power the greater
is the necessity for application of judicial mind. As indicated above, the
Section is wholly discretionary. The second part of it imposes upon the
Magistrate an obligation: it is, that the Court shall summon and examine
all persons whose evidence appears to be essential to the just decision of
the case. It is a cardinal rule in the law of evidence that the best available
evidence should be brought before the Court. Sections 60, 64 and 91 of
the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short, ‘Evidence Act’) are based on this
rule. The Court is not empowered under the provisions of the Code to
compel either the prosecution or the defence to examine any particular
witness or witnesses on their side. This must be left to the parties. But in
weighing the evidence, the Court can take note of the fact that the best
available evidence has not been given, and can draw an adverse inference.
The Court will often have to depend on intercepted allegations made by the
parties, or on inconclusive inference from facts elicited in the evidence. In
such cases, the Court has to act under the second part of the section.
Sometimes the examination of witnesses as directed by the Court may
result in what is thought to be "filling of loopholes". That is purely a
subsidiary factor and cannot be taken into account. Whether the new
evidence is essential or not must of course depend on the facts of each
case, and has to be determined by the Presiding Judge. The object of the
Section 311 is to bring on record evidence not only from the point of view
of the accused and the prosecution but also from the point of view of the
orderly society. If a witness called by Court gives evidence against the
complainant he should be allowed an opportunity to cross­examine. The
right to cross­examine a witness who is called by a Court arises not under
the provision of Section 311, but under the Evidence Act which gives a
party the right to cross­examine a witness who is not his own witness.
Since a witness summoned by the Court could not be termed a witness of
any particular party, the Court should give the right of cross­examination
to the complainant. (Paras 25 to 28)
2006 0 AIR(SC) 1367; 2006 0 AIR(SCW) 1340; 2006 3 BBCJ(SC) 151;
2006 2 Crimes(SC) 36; 2006 0 CrLJ 1694; 2006 1 JCC 374; 2006 3
JLJR(SC) 96; 2006 3 JT 399; 2006 3 PLJR(SC) 83; 2006 2 RCR(Cri)
448; 2006 3 SBR 262; 2006 3 Scale 104; 2006 3 SCC 374; 2006 2
SCC(Cri) 8; 2006 5 SCJ 536; 2006 2 Supreme 598; 2006 0
Supreme(SC) 218; Zahira Habibullah Sheikh & Anr. Vs State of Gujarat
& Ors

The position therefore is that in this case evidence has been admitted
which ought not to have been admitted, and the duty of the Court in such
circumstances is stated in Section 167 of the Indian Evidence Act which
provides:
The improper admission or rejection of evidence shall not be ground of
itself for a new trial or reversal of any decision in any case, if it shall
appear to the Court before which such objection is raised that,
independently of the evidence objected to and admitted, there was
sufficient evidence to justify the decision, or that, if the rejected evidence
had been received, it ought not to have varied the decision.
Section 27, which is not artistically worded, provides an exception to the
prohibition imposed by the preceding section, and enables certain
statements made by a person in police custody to be proved. The condition
necessary to bring the section into operation is that the discovery of a fact
in consequence of information received from a person accused of any
offence in the custody of a Police officer must be deposed to, and
thereupon so much of the information as relates distinctly to the fact
thereby discovered may be proved. The section seems to be based on the
view that if a fact is actually discovered in consequence of information
given, some guarantee is afforded thereby that the information was true,
and accordingly can be safely allowed to be given in evidence; but clearly
the extent of the information admissible must depend on the exact nature
of the fact discovered to which such information is required to relate.
Normally the section is brought into operation when a person in police
custody produces from some place of concealment some object, such as a
dead body, a weapon, or ornaments, said to be connected with the crime of
which the informant is accused. Mr. Megaw, for the Crown, has argued
that in such a case the "fact discovered" is the physical object produced,
and that any information which relates distinctly to that object can be
proved. Upon this view information given by a person that the body
produced is that of a person murdered by him, that the weapon produced
is the one used by him in the commission of a murder, or that the
ornaments produced were stolen in a dacoity would all be admissible. If
this be the effect of Section 27, little substance would remain in the ban
imposed by the two preceding sections on confessions made to the police,
or by persons in police custody. That ban was presumably inspired by the
fear of the legislature that a person under police influence might be
induced to confess by the exercise of undue pressure. But if all that is
required to lift the ban be the inclusion in the confession of information
relating to an object subsequently produced, it seems reasonable to
suppose that the persuasive powers of the police will prove equal to the
occasion, and that in practice the ban will lose its effect. On normal
principles of construction their Lordships think that the proviso to Section
26, added by Section 27, should not be held to nullify the substance of the
section. In their Lordships' view it is fallacious to treat the "fact
discovered" within the section as equivalent to the object produced; the
fact discovered embraces the place from which the object is produced and
the knowledge of the accused as to this, and the information given must
relate distinctly to this fact. Information as to past user, or the past
history, of the object produced is not related to its discovery in the setting
in which it is discovered. Information supplied by a person in custody that
"I will produce a knife concealed in the roof of my house" does not lead to
the discovery of a knife; knives were discovered many years ago. It leads to
the discovery of the fact that a knife is concealed in the house of the
informant to his knowledge; and if the knife is proved to have been used in
the commission of the offence, the fact discovered is very relevant. But if to
the statement the words be added "with which I stabbed A", these words
are inadmissible since they do not relate to the discovery of the knife in
the house of the informant. Pulukuri Kottaya vs King-Emperor AIR
1947 PC 67; AIR 1947 PC 67

The witnesses, who were treated as hostile by the Prosecution were

confronted with their earlier statements to the Police and their evidence
was rejected as it was contradicted by their earlier statements. Such use of
the statements is permissible under Section 155 of the Evidence Act and
the proviso to S.162 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure read with S.145,
Evidence Act.
There is a clear distinction between the conduct of a person against whom
an offence is alleged, which is admissible under Section 8 of the Evidence
Act, if such conduct is influenced by any fact in issue or relevant fact and
the statement made to a Police Officer in the course of an investigation
which is hit by Section 162 Criminal Procedure Code. What is excluded by
Section 162 Criminal Procedure Code is the statement made to a Police
Officer in the course of investigation and not the evidence relating to the
conduct of an accused person (not amounting to a statement) when
confronted or questioned by a Police Officer during the course of an
investigation. For example, the evidence of the circumstance, simpliciter,
that an accused person led a Police Officer and pointed out the place
where stolen Articles or weapons which might have been used in the
commission of the offence were found hidden, would be admissible as
conduct, under Section 8 of the Evidence Act, irrespective of whether any
statement by the accused contemporaneously with or antecedent to such
conduct falls within the purview of section 27 of the Evidence Act (vide
Himachal Pradesh Administration v. Om Prakash (AIR 1972 SC
975)).1979 0 AIR(SC) 400; 1979 0 CrLJ 329; 1979 3 SCC 90; 1979 0
SCC(Cri) 656; 1979 2 SCR 330; 1978 0 Supreme(SC) 365; 1979 0 UJ
17; Prakash Chand, Appellant Vs State (Delhi Admn.),

To establish a charge of conspiracy knowledge about indulgence in either

an illegal act or a legal act by illegal means is necessary and the
prosecution has not to establish that a particular unlawful use was
intended, so long as the goods or service in question could not be put to
any lawful use.
lf on the basis of materials on record, a court could come to the
conclusion that commission of the offence is a probable consequence, a
case for framing of charge exists.1996 2 Crimes(SC) 64; 1996 0 CrLJ
2448; 1996 0 SCC(Cri) 920; 1996 3 Supreme 539;State of
Maharashtra. Vs Sam Nath Thapa; 1996 0 AIR(SC) 1744; 1996 0
AIR(SCW) 1977; 1996 4 JT 615; 1996 2 RCR(Cri) 480; 1996 3 Scale
449; 1996 4 SCC 659; 1996 0 SCC(Cri) 820; 1996 0 Supreme(SC) 767

Section 120B ­ Criminal conspiracy­meeting of minds of two or more

persons for doing an illegal act or an act by illegal means is sine quo non
of the criminal conspiracy­It is well settled that an offence of conspiracy is
a substantive offence and renders the mere agreement to commit an
offence punishable even if an offence does not take place pursuant to the
illegal agreementYOGESH @ SACHIN JAGDISH JOSHI Vs. STATE OF
MAHARASHTRA; 2008 0 AIR(SC) 2991; 2008 0 AIR(SCW) 5043; 2008
4 BBCJ(SC) 329; 2008 0 CrLJ 3872; 2008 6 JT 299; 2008 2 RCR(Cri)
896; 2008 6 Scale 469; 2008 10 SCC 394; 2009 1 SCC(Cri) 51; 2008 0
Supreme(SC) 707;

To constitute a conspiracy, meeting of mind of two or more persons for

doing an illegal act or an act by illegal means is the first and primary
condition and it is not necessary that all the conspirators must know each
and every detail of conspiracy. Neither it is necessary that every one of the
conspirators takes active part in the commission of each and every
conspiratorial acts. The agreement amongst the conspirators can be
inferred by necessary implications. In most of the cases, the conspiracies
are proved by the circumstantial evidence, as the conspiracy is seldom an
open affair. The existence of conspiracy and its objects are usually
deducted from the circumstances of the case and the conduct of the
accused involved in the conspiracy. While appreciating the evidence of the
conspiracy, it is incumbent on the Court to keep in mind the well­known
rule governing circumstantial evidence viz., each and every incriminating
circumstance must be clearly established by reliable evidence and the
circumstances proved must form a chain of events from which the only
irresistible conclusion about the guilt of the accused can be safely drawn,
and no other hypothesis against the guilt is possible. The criminal
conspiracy is an independent offence in Indian Penal Code. The unlawful
agreement is sine quo non for constituting offence under Indian Penal
Code and not an accomplishment. Conspiracy consists of the scheme or
adjustment between two or more persons which may be express or implied
or partly express and partly implied. Mere knowledge, even discussion, of
the Plan would not per se constitute conspiracy. The offence of conspiracy
shall continue till the termination of agreement.K.R. Purushothaman Vs
State of Kerala; 2006 0 AIR(SC) 35; 2005 0 AIR(SCW) 5437; 2006 1
BBCJ(SC) 454; 2005 4 Crimes(SC) 191; 2005 9 JT 38; 2005 4 RCR(Cri)
848; 2005 8 Scale 618; 2005 7 Supreme 323; 2005 0 Supreme(SC)
1395

It is true that all these witnesses were to some extent interested and
inimical because they belonged to the faction headed by the deceased. But
that by itself was no ground to reject their testimony in toto. The High
Court rightly observed that in view of the fact that these witnesses were
interested, their evidence should be scrutinized with great caution. Babu
and others Vs State of U.P 1980 0 AIR(SC) 443; 1980 0 CrLJ 392;
1979 4 SCC 483; 1980 0 SCC(Cri) 99; 1979 0 Supreme(SC) 33;

NON­EXAMINATION of Anari has been explained which would be evident

from the order dated 13­1­1999 of the learned Judge. He was given­up the
prosecution on the ground that he was gained over by the accused
persons. In such a situation, his non­examination shall not affect the case
of the prosecution in any way and in that view of the matter, the authority
relied on by Sri Dutt is clearly distinguishable.
Here the eye­witnesses who are related to the deceased have consistently
stated about the participation of the accused persons in the crime, which
finds support from the medical evidence and corroborated by the material
seized from the place of occurrence. The evidence of these witnesses
inspire confience and the same cannot be discarded on the ground that
they are related to the deceased and non­examination of all the witnesses
collected at the place of occurrence. STATE OF M.P. Vs PATTU ALIAS
PRATAP SINGH; 2001 0 CrLJ 3217; 2001 0 Supreme(MP) 55;

Section 162, Criminal Procedure Code does not impair the special powers
of the Court under Sec. 165, Indian Evidence Act. It is certainly quite
arguable that Section 162, Criminal Procedure Code does amount to a
prohibition against the use even by the Court of statements mentioned
there. Nevertheless, the purpose of the prohibition of Section 162,
Criminal Procedure Code being to prevent unfair use by the prosecution of
statements made by witnesses to the Police during the course of
investigation, while the proviso is intended for the benefit of the defence, it
could also be urged that, in order to secure the ends of justice, which all
procedural law is meant to subserve, the prohibition by taking into
account its purpose and the mischief it was designed to prevent as well as
its context must be confined in its scope to the use by parties only to a
proceeding of statements mentioned there. 1974 0 AIR(SC) 463; 1974 0
CrLJ 453; 1974 4 SCC 186; 1974 0 SCC(Cri) 355; 1974 3 SCR 92;
1974 0 Supreme(SC) 7; Ganga Sahai and others Vs State of U.P.

Before the Courts exercise their jurisdiction under Section 311 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure for calling or summoning a new witness or recalling
or re­examining a witness who has earlier been examined, the Courts have
to satisfy themselves that recalling or calling of such a witness is essential
to the just decision of the case. Such a satisfaction can only be recorded
by the Courts if facts are brought to the notice of the Court suggesting
that recalling of a particular witness would be necessary in order to reach
to the just decision of the Court. In the application no reason as such was
given by the petitioners. It was only stated that some questions needed to
be asked with regard to the F. I. R. and it was also stated that since the
lawyer was changed by the parties, therefore, the witnesses are need to be
re­examined.
1998 2 ALD(Cri) 627; 1998 2 ALT(Cri) 353; 1998 3 APLJ 162; 1998 2
APLJ(Cri) 489; 1999 0 CrLJ 1713; 1998 2 LS 296; 1998 0
Supreme(AP) 599; Beagari Pentaiah and others Vs State OF A.P.

THE prosecution agency may afford to be unmindful of the importance of

examining a prosecution witness, but if the Court finds that the evidence
of such a witness is material, essential for just decision of the case, the
Court is certainly empowered to examine such a witness though not
summoned by the prosecution. The prosecution may afford to close its
evidence being unmindful of the importance of the evidence of a particular
witness or witnesses but it does not mean that by such act on the part of
the prosecution, the Court is prohibited from examining such a witness or
witnesses if the Court finds that the evidence of such a witness or
witnesses is essential for just decision of the case. After all, the Court has
to give just decision in the case placed before it and tried by it, by
considering the material collected during the investigation keeping in view
the legal provisions. The Court has also to keep in mind the golden
principle of innocence and it has also to see that no prejudice is caused to
the defence of accused. After examination of such a witness or witnesses,
the accused should be given opportunity to cross­examine him/them. The
Court is also entitled to put questions to such a witness or witnesses if the
Court finds proper in the interest of justice.
1997 0 CrLJ 1879; 1996 0 ILR(MP) 560; 1997 2 MPLJ 271; 1997 4
RCR(Cri) 664; 1996 0 Supreme(MP) 886; LALU ALIAS LAL SINGH AND
ANOTHER Vs STATE OF M.P.

Criminal Procedure Cod, 1973 ­ Section 278 ­ Correction of the recorded

evidence of any witness­Procedure in regard to­Correction slip not filed
when the day to day evidence of P.W. 34 was recorded and read over to
him­Nor was it filed on the last day of recording his evidence­It does not
bear any signature or the date­Held: trial court was right in not tinkering
with the substantive part of the evidence on the basis of an unsigned
correction slip.
Held: The object of section 278 is two fold:, firstly to ensure that the
evidence of the witness as recorded, is accurate and secondly to give the
witness concerned an opportunity to point out mistakes, if any. If the
correction suggested by the witness is one which the Judge considers
necessary he will make it atonce as required by sub­section (1) but if the
correction is such that the Judge does not consider necessary, sub­
section' (2) requires that a memorandum of the objection be made and the
Judge add his remarks, if any, thereto. In the present case, the learned
trial Judge corrected all the typographical errors which he considered
necessary but refused to carry out the substantive part of his deposition.
The section is not intended to permit a witness to resile from his statement
in the name of correction. The learned trial Judge was justified in refusing
to effect the change which he thought was intended to change t, e earlier
version. He did not make a memorandum as the correction slip was
unsigned and was not properly filed. (Para 12)
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 ­ Section 313 ­ Examination of the
accused under ­. Prosecution has closed the evidence­Prosecution did not
at any stage move the trial Judge for recalling P.W. 34 for further
examination­Liberty reserved to the prosecution to recall P.W. 34 for re­
examination is not sustainable­It is, however, open to the prosecution to
invite the attention of the court if any incriminating circumstance is left
out and not put to the accused. (Paras 13 and 14) 1989 0 AIR(SC) 1785;
1989 2 Crimes(SC) 698; 1989 0 CrLJ 2070; 1989 3 JT 316; 1989 2
RCR(Cri) 346; 1989 2 Scale 292; 1989 4 SCC 436; 1989 0 SCC(Cri)
750; 1989 3 SCR 735; 1989 0 Supreme(SC) 394; Mir Mohd. Omar and
others Vs State of West Bengal

On a reading of the language that has been introduced in Sections

154 and 155 of the Indian Evidence Act it can be said that the grant of
leave to cross­examine their own witnesses at any stage has been left
completely to the discretion of the trial Court, and such exercise is not
fettered by or dependant upon the hostility or adverseness of the witness.
Even after the cross­examination is over and even in the last sentence if
any statement is made inconsistently or an improved statement or a
statement which destroys the prosecution case, the prosecution which has
called the witness is entitled to ask the Court and the Court is competent
to grant permission and such permission cannot be treated as an act on
the part of the Sessions Judge that he has made up his mind or he has
biased towards one party or the other 1989 APLJ (Crl.) 378 A.P. Rao v.
State

Section 137 of the Evidence Act gives only the three stages, in the
examination of a witness, namely mination­in­chief, cross­examinationexa
and re­examination. This is a routine sequence in the examination of a
witness. This has no relevance to the question when a party calling a
witness can be permitted to put to him questions under S. 154 of the
Evidence Act: that is governed by the provisions of S. 154 of the said Act,
which confers a discretionary power on the court to permit a person who
calls a witness to put any questions to him which might be put in cross­
examination by the adverse party. Section 154 does not in terms, or by
necessary implication confine the exercise of the power by the court before
the examination­in­chief is concluded or to any particular stage of the
examination of the witness. It is wide in scope and the discretion is
entirely left to the court to exercise the power when the circumstances
demand. To confine this power to the stage of examination­in­chief is to
make it ineffective in practice. A clever, witness in his examination­in­chief
faithfully conforms to what he stated earlier to the police or in the
committing court, but in the cross­examination introduces statements in a
subtle way contradicting in effect what he stated in the examination­in­
chief. If his design is obvious, we do not see why the court cannot, during
the course of his cross­examination, (sic­re­examination) permit the
person calling him as witness to put questions to him which might be put
in cross­examination by the adverse party. To confine the operation of S.
154 of the Evidence Act to a particular stage in the examination of a
witness is to read words in the section which are not there. We cannot also
agree with the High Court that if a party calling a witness is permitted to
put such questions to the witness after he has been cross­examined by the
adverse party, the adverse party will not have any opportunity to further
cross­examine the witness on the answers elicited by putting such
questions. In such an event the court certainly, in exercise of its
discretion, will permit the adverse party to cross­examine the witness on
the answers elicited by such questions. The court, therefore, can permit a
person, who calls a witness, to put questions to him which might be put in
the cross­examination at any stage of the examination of the witness,
provided it takes care to give an opportunity to the accused to cross­
examine him on the answers elicited which do not find place in the
examination­in­chief.Dahyabhai Chhaganbhai Thakker vs State Of
Gujarat 1964 0 AIR(SC) 1563; 1964 0 CrLJ 472; 1964 7 SCR 361;
1964 0 Supreme(SC) 91;

“ATTESTED” ­ Defined ­ Neither Sec.3 of T.P Act nor Sec.68 of Evidence

Act stipulates qualifications or disqualifications, for persons to figure as
attesting witness ­ Only requirement is that attestor must have seen
executant of document, sign, or affix his mark on document, or has seen
some other person sign instrument, in presence and on directions of
executant, and thereafter must have signed instrument, in presence of
executant.
The rule of the common law is that no evidence shall be admitted but what
is or might be under the examination of both parties. But if the adverse
party has had liberty to cross­examine and has not chosen to exercise it,
the case is then the same in effect as if he had crossexamined. Here then
the question is whether the defendant had an opportunity of cross­
examining. 2007 0 AIR(AP) 137; 2007 2 ALD 817; 2007 4 ALT 260;
2007 1 LS 217; 2006 0 Supreme(AP) 1581; Peddavandla
Narayanamma Vs. Peddasani Venkata Reddy

The offence of cheating is made of two ingredients. Deception of any

person and fraudulently or dishonestly inducing that person to deliver any
property to any person or to consent that any person shall retain any
property. To put it differently, the ingredients of the offences are that the
person deceived delivers to some one a valuable security or property, that
the person so deceived was induced to do so, that such person acted on
such inducement in consequence of his having been deceived by the
accused and that the accused acted fraudulently or dishonestly when so
inducing the person. To constitute the offence of cheating, it is not
necessary that the deception should be by express words, but it may be by
conduct or implied in the nature of the transaction itself.
In dealing with the aspect of criminal conspiracy, it was observed by the
Supreme Court in Nazir khan v. State of Delhi, 2003 (2) ALD (Crl.) 651
(SC) = AIR 2003 SCW 5068, as follows:"as noted above, the essential
ingredient of the offence of criminal conspiracy is the agreement to commit
an offence. In a case where the agreement is for accomplishment of an act
which by itself constitutes an offence, then in that event no overt act is
necessary to be proved by the prosecution because in such a situation,
criminal conspiracy is established by proving such an agreement.
Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P., Hyd Vs. Gopichetty Rajendran;
2004 1 ALD(Cri) 833; 2004 2 ALT(Cri) 462; 2003 0 Supreme(AP) 1531;

MOTIVE for doing a criminal act is generally a difficult area for the
Prosecution. One cannot normally see into the mind of another. Motive is
the emotion which impels a man to do a particular act. In some cases it
maybe difficult to establish motive through direct evidence while in some
cases inference from circumstances may help in discerning the mental
propensity of the person concerned. Though motive established is a weak
one, it does not mean that it is by itself sufficient to lead any inference
against the prosecution.
THERE cannot be any dispute that the burden of proof of the plea of alibi
is on the person pleading it. In this case, it is for the accused to establish
his plea. The plea of alibi postulates the physical impossibility of the
accused at the scene of occurrence by reasons of his presence at some
other place. Accused must be so far away at the relevant time that he
could not be present at the place where the crime was committed.
Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P., Hyd Vs. Dasari Siva Prasad
Reddy; 2003 2 ALD(Cri) 347; 2004 1 ALT(Cri) 178; 2003 0
Supreme(AP) 848;

A criminal trial is not like a fairy tale wherein one is free to give fight to
ones imagination and phantasy. It concerns itself with the question as to
whether the accused arraigned at the trial is guilty of the crime with which
he is charged. Crime is an event in real life and is the product of interplay
of different human emotions. In arriving at the conclusion about the guilt
of the accused charged with the commission of a crime, the court has to
judge the evidence by the yardstick of probabilities, its intrinsic worth and
the animus of witnesses. Every case in the final analysis would have to
depend upon its own facts. Although the benefit of every reasonable doubt
should be given to the accused, the courts should not at the same time
reject evidence which is ex facie trustworthy on grounds which are fanciful
or in the nature of conjectures
This Court again in State of Himachal Pradesh v. Lekh Raj & Sons
[JT 1999 (9) SC 43] reiterated the position of law and while reminding the
criminal courts of their obligations held: "The criminal trial cannot be
equated with a mock scene from a stunt film. The legal trial is conducted
to ascertain the guilt or innocence of the accused arraigned. In arriving at
a conclusion about the truth, the Courts are required to adopt rational
approach and judge the evidence by its intrinsic worth and the animus of
the witnesses. The hypertechnicalities or figment of imagination should
not be allowed to divest the court of its responsibility of sifting and
weighing the evidence to arrive at the conclusion regarding the existence
or otherwise of a particular circumstances keeping in view the peculiar
facts of each case, the social position of the victim and the accused, the
larger interests of the society particularly the law and order problem and
degrading values of life inherent in the prevalent system. The realities of
life have to be kept in mind while appreciating the evidence for arriving at
the truth. The courts are not obliged to make efforts either to give latitude
to the prosecution or loosely construe the law in favour of the accused.
The traditional dogmatic hypertechnical approach has to be replaced by
rational, realistic and genuine approach for administering justice in a
criminal trial. Criminal jurisprudence cannot be considered to be a
Utopian thought but have to be considered as part and parcel of the
human civilization and the realities of life. The courts cannot ignore the
erosion in values of life which are a common feature of the present system.
Such erosions cannot be given a bonus in favour of those who are guilty of
polluting society and the mankind."
Defective investigation­Cannot be made basis for acquitting accused if
despite such defects and failures of investigation, a case is made out.
State Of U.P vs Hari Mohan & Ors 2001 0 AIR(SC) 142; 2000 0
AIR(SCW) 4012; 2001 1 BBCJ(SC) 102; 2001 1 CHN(SC) 9; 2000 4
Crimes(SC) 234; 2001 0 CrLJ 170; 2001 1 JLJR(SC) 22; 2000 Supp2
JT 467; 2001 1 PLJR(SC) 68; 2000 4 RCR(Cri) 667; 2000 7 Scale 348;
2000 8 SCC 598; 2000 7 Supreme 516; 2000 0 Supreme(SC) 1747;
2001 1 UJ 293;

Discovery of incriminating articles ­ Reliability of­Actual words in verbatim

leading to recovery not recorded by investigating officer­Statement as
recorded cannot be treated as statement of accused leading to recovery­
Witnesses to recovery co­drivers of deceased driver­Recoveries not legally
acceptable.
Mujeeb & Anr.Vs State of Kerala; 2000 0 AIR(SC) 591; 2000 0
AIR(SCW) 15; 1999 4 CCR(SC) 294; 2000 0 CrLJ 742; 2000 1 JCC 108;
1999 9 JT 299; 2000 1 RCR(Cri) 156; 1999 7 Scale 249; 2000 10 SCC
315; 2000 0 SCC(Cri) 78; 2000 1 SCJ 183; 1999 10 Supreme 8; 1999
0 Supreme(SC) 1386;

Delayed examination of witness during investigation—Unless Investigating

Officer is categorically asked why there was delay, ­defence cannot gain
any advantage there­from.
Where a case rests squarely on circumstantial evidence, inference of guilt
could be justified only when all incriminating facts and circumstances are
found to be incompatible with the innocence of accused or the guilt of any
other person.
In an appeal against acquittal, appellate Court has the power to revise
evidence but scope of revision is to be guided by the principle that
miscarriage of justice is prevented.
State of U.P. Vs Satish; 2005 0 AIR(SC) 1000; 2005 0 AIR(SCW) 905;
2005 2 BBCJ(SC) 183; 2005 1 Crimes(SC) 146; 2005 0 CrLJ 1428;
2005 1 JCC 408; 2005 2 JT 153; 2005 2 Scale 33; 2005 3 SCC 114;
2005 0 SCC(Cri) 642; 2005 5 SCJ 471; 2005 2 Supreme 13; 2005 0
Supreme(SC) 213; 2005 1 UJ 367;

INDIAN PENAL CODE ­ Sec. 302 ­ Dying declaration ­ Accused convicted

for offence causing death of deceased by pouring kerosene on the body and
set her fire with intention to kill ­ Deceased alleged to have been made an
oral dying declaration at first instance before neighbour, P.W2 stating that
as her husband was not providing food she herself had set fire to her body
­ P.P did not avail opportunity of discarding evidence of P.W2 bringing
contradictions on record in accordance with Sec.145 Cr.P.C. ­ In
subsequent dying declaration recorded by Magistrate it is stated by
deceased that accused poured kerosene on her and set fire to her body as
she refused to have sexual intercourse with him ­ When there are two sets
of dying declarations inconsistant with each other, then dying declaration
which is in favour of accused has to be accepted.
Subsequent dying declaration involving accused in the Crime appears
to be after thought ­ Prosecution failed to establish guilt of accused ­
Conviction set aside. 1999 2 ALD(Cri) 942; 1999 2 ALT(Cri) 460; 1999 3
LS 502; 1999 0 Supreme(AP) 854; CHINNAPATTUNAGAN Vs State OF
A.P.

Statement made to police officer by an alleged rape victim, after 11 days of

incident, who allegedly committed suicide after 5½ months of alleged
incident but had not disclosed her mind at or about the time of making
the statement for committing suicide on account of humiliation could not
be treated/relied upon as dying declaration especially when prosecution
even did not disclose cause of action for death. Sudhakar & Anr.Vs State
of Maharashtra 2000 0 AIR(SC) 2602; 2000 0 AIR(SCW) 2630; 2000 3
CCR(SC) 66; 2000 3 Crimes(SC) 122; 2000 0 CrLJ 3490; 2000 2 JCC
657; 2000 8 JT 184; 2000 3 PLJR(SC) 225; 2000 3 RCR(Cri) 383;
2000 5 Scale 157; 2000 6 SCC 671; 2000 0 SCC(Cri) 1250; 2000 5
Supreme 205; 2000 0 Supreme(SC) 1080; 2000 2 UJ 1234;

If the said statement had been made when the deceased was under
expectation of death it becomes dying declaration in evidence after her
death. Nonetheless, even if she was nowhere near expectation of death,
still the statement would become admissible under Section 32(1) of the
Evidence Act, though not as dying declaration as such, provided it satisfies
one of the two conditions set forth in the sub­section. This is probably the
one distinction between English law and the law in India on dying
declaration. In English law, unless the declarant is under expectation of
death his statement cannot acquire the passport of admissibility. ,
AIR1997SC768, 1997(1)ALD(Cri)410, 1997CriLJ833,
1996(4)Crimes282(SC), JT1996(11)SC218, RLW1997(1)SC73,
1996(9)SCALE258, (1997)4SCC161, [1996]Supp9SCR938 :Rattan
Singh Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh

IN Sanju alias Sanjay Singh Sengar v. State of M. P. , 2002 (1) ALD (Crl)
956 (SC) = (2002) 5 SCC 371, the Supreme court while considering the
ingredients of section 107 held that instigating a person to do a thing
denotes incitement or urging to do some drastic or inadvisable action or to
stimulate or incite, and, further held that presence of mens rea is the
necessary concomitant for instigation. The Supreme court also held that
words uttered in a quarrel or on the spur of moment, such as "to go and
die" cannot be taken to be uttered with mens rea.
IN Neelam @ Bondila Lachaiah v. State of A. P. , 2002 (1) ALD (Crl) 539 (A.
P.), where the deceased committed suicide due to humiliation by the
appellants and appellants suspecting toe deceased for the offence of theft
humiliated him on the previous day, that does not by itself amount to
abetting the suicide by the deceased on the next day and the conviction
was set aside and appellants were acquitted.
The words "as to any of the circumstances of the transaction which
resulted in his death"appearing in Section 32 must have some proximate
relations to the actual occurrence. In other words the statement of the
deceased relating to the cause of death or the circumstances of the
transaction which resulted in his death must be sufficiently or closely
connected with the actual transaction. To make such statement as
substantive evidence, the person or the agency relying upon it is under a
legal obligation to prove the making of such statement as a fact. If it is in
writing, the scribe must be produced in the Court and if it is verbal, it
should be proved by examining the person who heard the deceased
making the statement. 2005 1 ALD(Cri) 163; 2006 1 ALT(Cri) 234; 2004
0 Supreme(AP) 783; Shaik Ibrahim Vs State OF A.P.

INDIAN PENAL CODE, Sec.306 ­ Asst. Sessions Judge convicting accused

for abusing deceased with filthy language by making false accusation of
theft and sexual advances resulting committing suicide by deceased ­
Sessions Judge confirming conviction.
In dying declaration, deceased stated that accused attributed theft and
sexual advances to him and on account of false allegations made by
accused and threat that police case would be filed, caused fear and he felt
death is only solution and as such he set fire himself.
It may be on account of attempted theft or on account of deceased making
some advances towards accused, accused scolded deceased ­ It cannot be
believed that without there being any incident, accused abused deceased ­
When attempted theft or attempted sexual assault has taken place and
when victim scolds are abuses or threatens culprit of giving police
complaint on account of which deceased committed suicide would not
constitute offence u/Sec.306 IPC.
In this case, by no stretch of imagination it can be held that there was
mens rea and abusing would amount to instigation ­ No offence
2006 1 ALT(Cri) 455; 2006 1 LS 480; 2005 0 Supreme(AP)
1155;Allaveni Rajeshwari Vs State OF A.P.

DRUGS AND COSMETICS ACT, 1940, Secs27(d) and 18(a) (i), 20 & 21 ­
Petitioners/accused convicted for alleged stocking for sale of Gelusil MPS
not of standard quality ­ Sessions Judge confirmed conviction and
sentence passed by trial Court ­ Contention that there is no material filed
by prosecution to show that Drug Inspector appointed for area in which
samples were taken and that sample analyzed by the Analyst is duly
appointed by Govt
In this case, inspite of objection taken by petitioners/accused, prosecution
not come forward with any such notification in Official Gazette for purpose
of showing appointment of public analyst ­ There is evidence on record to
show that at relevant point of time of incident PW1 working as Drug
Inspector in Hayatnagar Zone and he cannot have jurisdiction to lift
samples of Koti Zone in Hyderabad
Provisions of Secs20 & 21 of Act relating to appointment of analyst and
Inspectors have not been complied with inspite of fact that
petitioner/accused raised objection before trial Court as well as appellate
Court ­ Prosecution is expected to produce Gazette notifications in this
regard ­ Since, Gazette notifications as published in Official Gazette not
placed before Courts below, illegal and improper findings were given ­
Judgment impugned liable to be set aside ­ Criminal Revision, allowed
2006(1) ALD (Crl) 980; 2007 2 Crimes(HC) 358; 2006 3 LS 367; 2006 0
Supreme(AP) 479;M/s. Gaba Pharmaceuticals Hyd., & Anr.Vs. State of
A.P.

THE Hon ble Supreme Court made the following further observations :
against the concurrent findings of fact, the High Court has interfered in its
revisional Jurisdiction and that too without even noticing the findings
recorded by the court s below and giving reasons for disagreeing with the
conclusions reached by them. As it is, the revisional Jurisdiction of the
High Court in such cases is limited and only in cases where there appears
a manifest illegality or injustice, or the order suffers from any error of law
the High Court would be Justified in exercising its revisional jurisdiction.
Even if a wider jurisdiction is assumed in favour of the High Court in
revisional jurisdiction, it cannot be wider than the power of the High Court
exercising appellate jurisdiction.
306 IPC case law Discussed.
2006 1 ALD(Cri) 66; 2006 1 ALT(Cri) 250; 2006 0 CrLJ 27; 2005 0
Supreme(AP) 920; Pothyamsetti Satyanarayana Reddy Vs State OF
A.P.

Pendency of Insolvency not a bar for criminal proceedings

1997(2)ALD(Cri)249, 1997((2))ALT(Cri)626, 1997(2)APLJ418,
1998CriLJ903 Sri Srinivasa Trading Co. and Ors. Vs. Respondent:
State of Andhra Pradesh and Anr.

an infirmity arising from investigation by a Head Constable who was

himself the person to whom the bribe was alleged to have been offered and
who lodged the First Information Report as informant or complainant. This
is an infirmity which is bound to reflect on the credibility of the
prosecution case.
1976 0 AIR(SC) 985; 1976 0 CrLJ 713; 1976 1 SCC 15; 1975 0
SCC(Cri) 737; 1975 0 Supreme(SC) 278; 1975 0 UJ 680; Bhagwan
Singh,Vs.The State of Rajasthan,

Evidence Act, 1872—Sections 17, 23, 24 to 30—Confessions—Law

regarding—Confessions are considered highly reliable—Evidentiary value
of confessions which are retracted.
Held : It is trite to say that every confession must necessarily be an
admission, but, every admission does not necessarily amount to a
confession. While Section 17 to 23 deals with admissions, the law as to
confessions is embodied in Sections 24 to 30 of the Evidence Act. Section
25 bars proof of a confession made to a police officer. Section 26 goes a
step further and prohibits proof of confession made by any person while
he is in the custody of a police officer, unless it be made in the immediate
presence of a Magistrate. Section 24 lays down the obvious rule that a
confession made under any inducement, threat or promise becomes
irrelevant in a criminal proceeding. Such inducement, threat or promise
need not be proved to the hilt. If it appears to the court that the making of
the confession was caused by any induce­ment, threat or promise
proceeding from a person in authority, the confession is liable to be
excluded from evidence. The ex­pression ‘appears’ connotes that the Court
need not go to the extent of holding that the threat etc. has in fact been
proved. If the facts and circumstances emerging from the evidence
adduced make it reasonably probable that the confession could be the
result of threat, inducement or pressure, the court will refrain from acting
on such confession, even if it be a confession made to a Magistrate or a
person other than police officer. Confessions leading to discovery of fact
which is dealt with under Section 27 is an exception to the rule of
exclusion of confession made by an accused in the custody of a police
officer. Consideration of a proved confession affecting the person making it
as well as the co­accused is provided for by Section 30. Briefly and
broadly, this is the scheme of the law of evidence vis­a­vis confessions.
(Para 8)
Confessions are considered highly reliable because no rational person
would make admission against his interest unless prompted by his
conscience to tell the truth. “Deliberate and voluntary confessions of guilt,
if clearly prove are among the most effec­tual proofs in law”. (vide Taylor’s
Treatise on the Law of Evi­dence Vol. I). However, before acting upon a
confession the court must be satisfied that it was freely and voluntarily
made. A confession by hope or promise of advantage, reward or immunity
or by force or by fear induced by violence or threats of violence cannot
constitute evidence against the maker of confes­sion. The confession
should have been made with full knowledge of the nature and
consequences of the confession. If any reasonable doubt is entertained by
the court that these ingredients are not satisfied, the court should eschew
the confession from considera­tion. So also the ­authority recording the
confession ­ be it a Magistrate or some other statutory func­tionary at the
pre­trial stage, must address himself to the issue whether the accused has
come forward to make the confession in an atmosphere free from fear,
duress or hope of some advantage or reward induced by the persons in
authority. Recognizing the stark reality of the ac­cused being enveloped in
a state of fear and panic, anxiety and despair while in police custody, the
Indian Evidence Act has excluded the admissibility of a confession made to
the police officer. Section 164 of Cr.P.C. is a salutary provision which lays
down certain precautionary rules to be followed by the Magistrate a
confession so as to ensure the voluntariness of the confession and the
accused being placed in a situation free from threat or influence of the
police. (Para 8)
The crucial expression used in Section 30 is “the Court may take into
consi­deration such confession”. These words imply that the confession of
a co­accused cannot be elevated to the status of substantive evidence
which can form the basis of conviction of the co­accused
According to Section 63, secondary evidence means and includes, among
other things, “copies made from the original by mechanical processes
which in themselves ensure the accuracy of the copy, and copies
compared with such copies”. Section 65 enables secondary evidence of the
contents of a document to be adduced if the original is of such a nature as
not to be easily movable. It is not in dispute that the information
contained in the call records is stored in huge servers which cannot be
easily moved and produced in the Court. That is what the High Court has
also observed at para 276. Hence, printouts taken from the
computers/servers by mechanical process and certified by a responsible
official of the service providing Company can be led into evidence through
a witness who can identify the signatures of the certifying officer or
otherwise speak to the facts based on his personal knowledge. Irrespective
of the compliance of the requirements of Section 65B which is a provision
dealing with admissibility of electronic records, there is no bar to adducing
secondary evidence under the other provisions of the Evidence Act, namely
Sections 63 & 65. It may be that the certificate containing the details in
sub­Section (4) of Section 65B is not filed in the instant case, but that
does not mean that secondary evidence cannot be given even if the law
permits such evidence to be given in the circumstances mentioned in the
relevant provisions, namely Sections 63 & 65. (Para 15)
There is one more point which we would like to discuss i.e. whether
pointing out a material object by the accused furnishing the information is
a necessary concomitant of Section 27. We think that the answer should
be in the negative. Though in most of the cases the person who makes the
disclosure himself leads the Police Officer to the place where an object is
concealed and points out the same to him, however, it is not essential that
there should be such pointing out in order to make the information
admissible under Section 27. It could very well be that on the basis of
information furnished by the accused, the Investigating Officer may go to
the spot in the company of other witnesses and recover the material
object. By doing so, the Investigating Officer will be discovering a fact viz.,
the concealment of an incriminating article and the knowledge of the
accused furnishing the information about it. In other words, where the
information furnished by the person in custody is verified by the Police
Officer by going to the spot mentioned by the informant and finds it to be
correct, that amounts to discovery of fact within the meaning of Section
27. Of course, it is subject to the rider that the information so furnished
was the immediate and proximate cause of discovery. If the Police­ Officer
chooses not to take the informant­accused to the spot, it will have no
bearing on the point of admissibility under Section 27, though it may be
one of the aspects that goes into evaluation of that particular piece of
evidence. (Para 13) 2005 0 AIR(SC) 3820; 2005 0 AIR(SCW) 4148; 2005
0 AIR(SCW) 4146; 2006 1 BBCJ(SC) 96; 2005 3 Crimes(SC) 87; 2005 0
CrLJ 3950; 2005 3 JCC 1404; 2005 7 JT 1; 2005 6 Scale 177; 2005
11 SCC 600; 2005 0 SCC(Cri) 1715; 2005 6 SCJ 210; 2005 5 Supreme
414; 2005 0 Supreme(SC) 985; State (N.C.T. of Delhi) Vs. Navjot
Sandhu @ Afsan Guru

the revision cannot be entertained by both the High Court and Sessions
Judge and when the learned Sessions Judge refused to interfere with the
order of Magistrate, the High court has no power to set aside the order of
the Magistrate in view of the bar under Section 397 (3) Cr. P. C. and that
the said bar cannot be circumvented by treating the revision application as
directed against the order of the Sessions Judge. So from the facts of the
cited case, it is clear that the application filed before the high Court was a
second revision filed against the orders of the Sessions Judge under
Section 397 Cr. P. C. As there is a bar to entertain a second revision, the
Apex Court held that the High Court has no power to entertain the second
revision. But, in the instant case, the application is not filed under Section
397 Cr. P. C. but filed under Section 482 Cr. P. C. invoking the inherent
jurisdiction of the High Court. Even otherwise, the decision of the Apex
Court relied on by the counsel for the petitioners (Jitender Kumar Jain s
Case 2 supra) is the later decision this Court has to follow the later
decision of the Apex Court. 2006 2 ALT(Cri) 337; 2006 0 Supreme(AP)
455; Revensasiddesehwara Traders Vs. State OF A.P.
Held, that it is true that the court must make an attempt to separate grain
from the chaff, the truth from the falsehood, yet this could only be possible
when the truth is seperable from the falsehood. When the grain can not be
separated from the chaff because the grain and chaff are so inextricably
mixed up that in the process of separation the Court would have to
reconstruct an absolutely new case for the prosecution by divorcing the
essential details presented by the prosecution completely from the context
and the background against which they are made, then this principle will
not apply. Having regard to the partisan and interested evidence of the
prosecution witnesses who can implicate appellants and the four accused
equally with regard to assault on the deceased it is not possible to reject
the prosecution with respect to the four accused and accept it with respect
to the appellants. If all the witnesses in one breath implicate the four
accused who appear to be innocent, then one can not vouchsafe for the
fact that even the acts attributed to the appellants may have been
conveniently made to suit the needs of the prosecution case.....If the case
against the four accused fails, then the entire prosecution case will have to
be discarded.
1975 0 AIR(SC) 1962; 1975 0 BBCJ(SC) 559; 1975 0 CrLJ 1734; 1975
4 SCC 511; 1975 0 SCC(Cri) 601; 1975 Supp SCR 129; 1975 0
Supreme(SC) 160; 1975 0 UJ 529; Balaka Singh and others.Vs.The
State of Punjab,

The recovery of a bloodstained spear becomes incriminating not because of

its recovery at the instance of the accused but the element of criminality
tending to connect the accused with the crime lies in the authorship of
concealment, namely, that the appellant who gave information leading to
its discovery was the person who concealed it. And in this case Bhamta
was another co­accused. The appellant may have only the knowledge of
the place where it was hidden. To make such a circumstance
incriminating it must be shown that the appellant himself had concealed
the bloodstained spear which was the weapon of offence and on this point
the language used in the contemporaneous record Ext. 28 is not free from
doubt and when two constructions are possible in a criminal trial, the one
beneficial to the accused will have to be adopted. Therefore, this linchpin
of the prosecution case ceases to provide any incriminating evidence
against the appellant. 1979 0 AIR(SC) 1949; 1979 0 CrLJ 1310; 1980 1
SCC 530; 1980 0 SCC(Cri) 261; 1979 0 Supreme(SC) 275; Pohalya
Motya Valvi Vs. State of Maharashtra,

The role of the police and the Investigating Officer in this case has been
most unfortunate. It is the duty of the investigating agency to bring before
the courts the accused persons and see that justice is done, but it is
equally the duty of the investigating officers to see that no innocent person
is implicated in an offence. The investigating agencies can also commit
mistakes and those can be pardoned. Once the Investigating agency comes
to a conclusion that a particular person is innocent person but still
implicates in a charge like charge of murder, it is not pardonable.
Although the Investigating agency knew that atleast two of the accused
were innocent still they prefer a charge­sheet against them which shows
that there was a hidden hand at work at whose instance the prosecuting
agency was working along with the projected eye­ witnesses. In these
circumstances, it could be dangerous to rely on the evidence of the so
called eye­witnesses even for other accused. 2004 1 ALD(Cri) 510; 2004
1 ALT(Cri) 433; 2003 0 Supreme(AP) 1141; High Court of A.P.,
Hyderabad Vs Chinnakkagari Nagi Reddy

(a) Code of Criminal procedure, 1973 – Section 195(a)(i) – Exception to

section 190 – Bars cognizance of any offence punishable under section 188
IPC or abetment or attempt to commit the same, unless, there is a written
complaint by the public servant concerned for contempt of his lawful order
– Similarly sections 196 and 198 also bar cognizance unless some
requirements are complied with. (Para 20)
AIR 1971 SC 1708; AIR 1971 SC 1935; (1996) 3 SCC 533; (1998) 2
SCC 391; (2005) 7 SCC 352; AIR 2005 SC 2119 – Relied upon
(b) Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Section 188 r/w section 195, Code of
Criminal procedure, 1973 – Section 195 being mandatory, cognizance
cannot be taken u/s 188 unless the public servant whose orders have not
been complied with files a complaint in writing – Non­compliance of
section 195 would render trial and conviction void ab initio – Instantly no
such complaint filed – Charge could not be framed u/s 188 IPC – Even if
charges u/s 188 are quashed, charges for other offences will remain
unaffected. (Para 25, 27)
AIR 1953 SC 293; AIR 1966 SC 1775; AIR 2000 SC 168; (1998) 2 SCC
493; AIR 1962 SC 1206 – Relied upon
(c) Criminal Trial – Clubbing of cases – One occurrence fall out of the other
– They would be one and the same occurrence – Damage caused to the
public transport vehicles and consequential burning of the University bus
– Part of one and the same incident – Merely lodging of two separate
complaints will not bar clubbing together of these cases – No infirmity in
filing one charge sheet. (Para 28)
(2001) 6 SCC 181 – Relied upon
(d) Indian Evidence Act, 1872 – Section 9 – TI Parade – Part of the
investigation – Very useful where the accused are not known before­hand
to the witnesses – Used only to corroborate the evidence recorded in the
court – Therefore not substantive evidence – Accused should not be shown
to any of the witnesses after arrest, and before holding the Test
Identification Parade, he is required to be kept "baparda" – Witnesses
identifying accused in jail as well as in court – No infirmity. (Para 36, 39,
40)
AIR 2004 SC 299; AIR 1994 SC 2420; AIR 2003 SC 2669; (2009) 6
SCC 667; (2009) 9 SCC 719; AIR 1998 SC 1922; (2003) 12 SCC 666;
(2004) 3 SCC 106; (2007) 12 SCC 654; (2008) 9 SCC 227; (2006) 12 SCC
512; AIR 1999 SC 3916; (2010) 3 SCC 508; AIR 1971 SC 1050; AIR 1973
SC 2190; (1994) 3 SCC 569; AIR 1999 SC 2562 – Relied upon
(e) Criminal Trial – Hostile witness – One witness turning hostile – In view
of consistent evidence of other witnesses, on witness turning hostile does
not affect the prosecution case. (Para 42)
(f) Criminal trial – Defective investigation – Occurrence ugly and awful –
Investigation in highly charges atmosphere – Some irregularities bound to
occur – Investigation transferred to CBCID – Irregularities committed in
investigation lose relevance – However, defect in investigation by itself
cannot be a ground for acquittal. (Para 43, 44)
AIR 1974 SC 220; (1995) 5 SCC 518; AIR 1998 SC 1850; AIR 1999 SC
644; AIR 2000 SC 185; AIR 2003 SC 1164; AIR 2002 SC 1051; AIR 2004
SC 2329 – Relied upon
(g) Criminal trial – Extra judicial confession – Only admissible part of
such statement can be exhibited – Instantly, full statement exhibited in
court – Not permissible – However in view of sufficiency of other materials
on record it did not prejudice the accused. (Para 67, 68)
(2007) 12 SCC 230; AIR 1947 PC 67; AIR 2000 SC 1691; AIR 2004 SC
2865 – Relied upon
(h) Criminal trial – Hostile witness – Evidence of a hostile witness cannot
be discarded as a whole – Relevant parts thereof, admissible in law, can be
used by the prosecution or the defence. (Para 70)
AIR 1976 SC 202; AIR 1977 SC 170; AIR 1979 SC 1848; AIR 1991 SC
1853 – Relied upon
(i) Criminal trial – Appreciation of evidence – Discrepancies – Minor or
trivial omissions or discrepancies – Ought to be ignored. (Para 71)
AIR 1972 SC 2020; AIR 1985 SC 48; AIR 1983 SC 753; AIR 2007 SC
2257; (2009) 11 SCC 588; (2009) 9 SCC 626; AIR 2009 SC 151 – Relied
upon
(j) Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Section 302 – Appellants may have had a
grievance and a right of peaceful demonstration, but they cannot claim a
right to cause grave inconvenience and humiliation to others, merely
because a competent criminal court has handed down a judicial
pronouncement that is not to their liking – Some of the appellants had evil
designs to cause damage to a greater extent so that people may learn a
"lesson" – No provocation – Accused sprinkling petrol in a bus full of girl
students and setting it on fire with the students still inside the bus – As a
result three girls burnt alive – Offence committed after previous planning
and with extreme brutality – Murders of helpless, innocent, unarmed,
young girl students in a totally unprovoked situation – Death sentence
rightly awarded. (Para 77)
AIR 1980 SC 898; AIR 1983 SC 957; AIR 2002 SC 1661; JT 2010 (8)
SC 372; AIR 1987 SC 1346; AIR 2009 SC 391; (2009) 11 SCC 798; (2008)
11 SCC 113; AIR 1991 SC 1463 – Relied upon
2010 0 AIR(SC) 3178; 2010 3 CalCriLR 698; 2010 3 CCR(SC) 391;
2010 9 JT 95; 2010 4 RCR(Cri) 268; 2010 4 RLW(SC) 3096; 2010 9
SCC 567; 2010 3 SCC(Cri) 1402; 2010 6 SCJ 822; 2010 0 Supreme(SC)
796; C. Muniappan & Others Vs. State of Tamil Nadu

(i) Indian Evidence Act, 1872 – Section 118 – Chance witness – Evidence
of a chance witness requires a close scrutiny. (Para 36)
(2004) 11 SCC 253 – Relied upon.
(ii) Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Section 302/149 r/w Section 7, Indian
Evidence Act, 1972 – A3 and A6 were identified by the child witnesses, but
they were not included in the TI parade – There was un­explained delay in
conducting the TI parade and it was conducted in a slipshod manner –
accused are entitled to benefit of doubt. (Paras 40 and 41)
(iii) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 231 – It would be too
much to expect of any person to say everything in his statement before the
police – To see a person by face is one thing but to know him by his name
is different – Some improvements in the testimony of a witness would not
lead to rejection thereof in its entirety. (Para 46)
(iv) Indian Evidence Act, 1872 – Section 118 – It is also an accepted norm
that if after careful scrutiny of their evidence the court comes to the
conclusion that there is an impress of truth in it, there is no obstacle in
the way of accepting the evidence of child witnesses – The opinion of the
learned Judge had been recorded and, thus, it satisfies the test laid down
by this Court – On the said premise the child witness was believed – PW5,
therefore, had been corroborated by PWs 3, 4 and 6 – This is a case where
the children have shown a rare and strong courage, which their teachers
have failed to show. It was expected that the teachers would speak out the
truth but they did not – The prosecution witnesses are also supported by
the medical evidence.(Paras 53, 56, 60, 62)
AIR 1952 SC 54; (2004) 1 SCC 64; 2006 (10) SCALE 369; (2003) 5 SCC
746 – Relied upon.
(v) Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Section 302/149 – Testimonies of PWs 3 to 6
so far as A1 is concerned being trustworthy and can be believed
notwithstanding delayed and defective investigation – Defective
investigation by itself may not lead to a conclusion that the accused is
innocent – The case of A1 cannot be said to be a rarest of rare case
warranting imposition of the extreme punishment – Death penalty
converted to rigorous imprisonment of life. (Paras 69, 70, 73 and 75)
(2003) 6 SCC 73; (2003) 10 SCC 414; Criminal Appeal Nos. 867­868
of 2005 – Relied upon.
2007 0 AIR(SCW) 2140; 2007 2 BBCJ(SC) 67; 2007 1 RCR(Cri) 928;
2008 1 SCC(Cri) 241; 2006 8 Supreme 1014; 2006 0 Supreme(SC)
1317; Acharaparambath Pradeepan & Anr. Vs. State of Kerala

Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Section 302 – The prosecution case in our
opinion stands proved from the evidence of the first informant and PW. 2 –
The manner in which the occurrence had taken place is clearly
corroborated by the medical evidence, the correctness whereof is not in
question – As regards lapse of time since death, it is now well settled that
the same cannot be accurately stated – First Information Report was
lodged at the quickest possible time and essential material facts were
disclosed therein – Only because P.W. 8 in his evidence did not state that
the recovered empty cartridge was sealed at the spot, the same would not
mean that it was planted later on, particularly when recovery of the gun
and the report of the expert has not been disputed – The very fact that the
FIR was recorded almost immediately after taking place of the occurrence,
the question of its being an ante timed one would not arise – A defective
investigation by itself cannot be a ground for acquittal – There being no
ground to differ from the concurrent findings of the trial and the High
Court, appeal dismissed. (Paras 11, 12, 14, 20 to 23 and 26).
AIR 2007 SC 132; AIR 2006 SC 1656; 2006 (8) SCALE 440; 2006(12)
SCALE 354; (1994) 5 SCC 188 – Relied upon.
(2002) 9 SCC 408; AIR 2004 SC 1169 – Distinguished
2007 3 AD(Cr) 420; 2007 Supp AIR(SC) 267; 2007 0 AIR(SCW) 4196;
2007 2 ALD(Cri)(SC) 620; 2007 4 BBCJ(SC) 362; 2007 3 RCR(Cri) 256;
2007 10 SCC 496; 2008 1 SCC(Cri) 64; 2007 4 Supreme 528; 2007 0
Supreme(SC) 826;Budh Singh Vs. State of M.P.

(a) Criminal Trial – FIR – Recording of – Chain of sequences showing two

hours was actually taken in filing the FIR – Cannot be inferred that the
time was utilized for falsely implicating the accused. (Para 15)
(2009) 13 SCC 480 – Distinguished
(b) Judicial Review – No need to interfere with concurrent findings of the
Courts below supported by evidence. (Para 21)
(2010) 5 SCC 63 – Relied upon
(c) Evidence Act – Section 154 – Hostile Witness – Evidence of a hostile
witness is admissible evidence – Open to the court to rely upon its
dependable and acceptable part duly corroborated by some other reliable
evidence available on record. (Para 23)
(2010) 8 SCC 536 – Relied upon
2011 1 JCR(SC) 281; 2011 1 RCR(Cri) 405; 2011 2 SCC 36; 2011 1
SCC(Cri) 593; 2011 1 Supreme 33; 2011 0 Supreme(SC) 12;Himanshu
@ Chintu Vs. State of NCT of Delhi

(a) Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Section 96 – Self defence – Injuries on

accused persons superficial and self­sustained – Case of self defence not
made out. (Para 15)
(b) Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Section 302 – Altercation in early
morning and appellant threatening to kill deceased – Appellant following
deceased to place of occurrence, armed with knife – Inflicting two knife
blows, first in the back and second on chest with full force with intention
to kill – Held, guilty of offence u/s 302. (Para 16)
 (c) Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Section 304 Part I – Ingredients
discussed – Instantly, premeditation between the appellant and his father
to cause the death of the deceased – Appellant carrying lethal weapon like
knife – Inflicting second blow of knife with full force to cause death of
deceased – All ingredients of section 304 Part­I not satisfied – Instead
ingredients of section 302 satisfied – Held guilty of offence u/s 302. (Para
17)
(d) Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Section 307 and 308 – Appellant
injuring witness while he was attempting to save the deceased –
Conviction u/s 308 not justified – Appellant held guilty of offence u/s 307.
(Para 18)
2010 2 ACR(SC) 2096; 2010 2 CCR(SC) 423; 2010 0 CrLJ 1310; 2010
4 JT 314; 2010 7 RCR(Cri) 1356; 2010 5 SCC 68; 2010 2 SCC(Cri)
1238; 2010 0 Supreme(SC) 352; Shaukat & Another Vs . State of
Uttaranchal & Another

Criminal Trial – Evidence – The evidence of an injured witness lends more

credence, because normally he would not falsely implicate a person
thereby protecting the actual assailant – Trial Court and the High Court
rightly placing reliance on the evidence of the eye­witnesses as their
evidence was clear and cogent – No interference warranted. (Paras 9 to 11)
2008 0 AIR(SC) 1198; 2008 2 BBCJ(SC) 186; 2008 2 BBCJ(SC) 52;
2008 0 CrLJ 1632; 2008 2 RCR(Cri) 847; 2008 1 Scale 379; 2008 2
SCC 670; 2008 1 SCC(Cri) 535; 2008 1 Supreme 294; 2008 0
Supreme(SC) 64; Vijay Shankar Shinde & Ors. Vs. State of
Maharashtra

The border line between abetment of the offence and giving false
information to screen the offender is rather thin in her case, but it is
prudent to err on the safe side, and hold her guilty only of an offence
under Section 201. It was held by the Privy Council in Begu v. Emperor ,
1925 AIR(PC) 130 (L), that in a charge of murder under Section 302, a
conviction under Section 201, without a further charge being made was
warranted by the provisions of Section 237, Criminal P. C. 1957 0
AIR(HP) 15; 1955 0 CrLJ 679; 1955 0 Supreme(HP) 1; RUP DEVI AND
ANR V/S STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH

AS regards the framing of a charge under Section 420 of IPC. , it has to be

stated that in view of Sections 78 and 79 of the said Act providing penalty
for applying false trade descriptions etc. , and selling goods to which a
false Trade Mark or false trade description is applied, a charge under
Section 420 of IPC becomes wholly inapt,
The scope and ambit of Sections 105 and 106 of the Trade and
Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 are altogether different from Chapter X of
the Trade and Merchandise Marks, Act, 1958. Sections 105 and 106 of the
said Act do not affect the jurisdiction of the criminal Courts to punish the
persons committing offences under Chapter X of the said Trade and
Merchandise Marks Act, 1958. Therefore, there is no substance in the
contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that in view of Section
105 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 the aggrieved party
has to approach only a Civil Court and not a Criminal Court.
On the other hand, a property mark under Section 479 of IPC means a
mark for denoting that a moveable property belongs to a particular person,
whereas Trade Mark denotes manufacture or quality of goods to which it is
attached, the property mark denotes the ownership in them. It is not clear
either from the complaint or the impugned order whether the complainant
had got his Trade Mark registered. However, in State of Uttar Pradesh v.
Ramanath, AIR 1972 SC 232 : (1972 Cri LJ 52) the Supreme Court held
that a Trade Mark includes a registered as well as unregistered Trade
Mark and an offence under Sections 78 and 79 therefore relates to a Trade
Mark whether it is registered or unregistered. The offences under these
Sections consist in deception and application of a Trade Mark which is in
use and which signifies a particular type of goods contained in the Mark.
1993 1 ALT(Cri) 64; 1993 0 CrLJ 232; 1992 0 ILR(Kar) 2614; 1992 3
KarLJ 581; 1992 0 Supreme(Kar) 227; Syed Kaleem Vs. Mysore
Lakshmi Beedi Works

Under S. 161 of the Code, the police officer may examine orally any person
supposed to be acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the case.
He may also reduce into writing any statement made to him in the course
of such examination, and if he does so, he must make a separate record of
the statement of each such person.
44. The legislature has, however, put restrictions upon the use of
such statements at the inquiry or trial of the offence. The first restriction is
that no statement made by any person to a police officer, if reduced into
writing, be signed by the person making it. The intention behind the
provision is easy to understand. The legislature probably thought that the
making of statements by witnesses might be thwarted, if the witnesses
were led to believe that because they had signed the statements they were
bound by them, and that whether the statements were true or not, they
must continue to stand by them. The legislature next provides that a
statement, however recorded, or any part of it shall not be used for any
purpose (save as provided in the section) at the inquiry or trial in respect
of any offence under investigation at the time such statement is made. The
object here is not easily discernible, but perhaps is to discourage
overzealous police officers who might otherwise exert themselves to
improve the statements made before them. The Privy Council considered
the intention to be :
"If one had to guess at the intention of the legislature in framing a
section in the words used, one would suppose that they had in mind to
encourage the free disclosure of the information or to protect the person
making the statement from a supposed unreliability of police testimony as
to alleged statements or both."
It is possible that the legislature had also in mind that the use of
statements made under the influence of the investigating agency might,
unless restricted to a use for the benefit of the accused, result in
considerable prejudice to him. But whatever the intention which, led to the
imposition of the restrictions, it is manifest that the statements, however
recorded, cannot be used except to the extent allowed by the section. The
prohibition contained in the words "'any purpose" is otherwise absolute.
45. Then follow two provisos. The first gives the right to the accused
to make use of the statements for contradicting a witness for the
prosecution in the manner provided by S. 145 of the Indian Evidence Act.
It also gives a right to the prosecution to use the statement for purposes of
re­examination of the same witness but only to explain any matter referred
to in the cross­examination of the witness.
46. The first proviso, when analysed, gives the following ingredients :
(i) A prosecution witness is called for the prosecution ;
(ii) whose statement has previously been reduced to writing;
(iii) The accused makes a request;
(iv) The accused is furnished with a copy of the previous statement;
(v) In order that any part of such statement, if duly proved, may be
used to contradict such witness in the manner provided by S. 145 of the
Indian Evidence Act.
If the accused exercises the right in (v) above in any instance, then the
prosecution has the right to use the statement in the re­examination of the
witness but only to explain any matters referred to by him in cross­
examination.
47. Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act reads :
"Cross­examination as to previous statements in writing: A witness
may be cross­examined as to previous statements made by him in writing
or reduced into writing, and relevant to matters in question, without such
writing being shown to him, or being proved; but, if it is intended to
contradict him by the writing, his attention must, before the writing can be
proved, be called to those parts of it which are to be used for the purpose
of contradicting him."
The section analysed gives the following result :
(1) Witnesses can be cross­examined as to previous statements in
writing or reduced into writing;
(2) These writings need not be shown to the witnesses or proved
beforehand;
(3) But if the intention is to contradict them by the writings,
(a) their attention must be drawn to those parts which are to be used
for contradiction;
(b) This should be done before proving the writings.
47a. Our learned brother, Subba Rao, J. restricts the use by the
accused of the previous statements to the mechanism of contradiction as
detailed in (3) above, but says that the accused has no right to proceed
under (1) and (2). He deduces this from the words of S. 162 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, where it is provided :
"in order that any part of such statement, if duly proved, may be used
to contradict such witness in the manner provided by S. 145 of the Indian
Evidence Act 1872."
The fact that the accused can use the previous statement for the
purpose of contradicting, shows that the previous statement cannot be
used for corroborating the witness. Also there must be some basis for
contradicting. This may arise, because of there being a contrary statement,
irreconcilable statement or even material omissions. The accused can
establish a contradiction by cross­examining the witness but only so as to
bring out a contradiction and no more. We regret we cannot agree (and we
say this with profound respect) that the accused is not entitled to cross­
examine but only to contradict. In our opinion, the reference to S. 145 of
the Indian Evidence Act brings in the whole of the manner and machinery
of S. 145 and not merely the second part. In this process, of course, the
accused cannot go beyond S. 162 or ignore what the section prohibits but
cross­examination to establish a contradiction between one statement and
another is certainly permissible.
48. This question loses much of its importance when there are patent
contradictions and they can be put to the witness without any cross­
examination as in the two statements :
(a) I saw A hit B,
(b) I did not see A hit B.
But there are complex situations where the contradiction is most vital
and relevant but is not so patent. There are cases of omissions on a
relevant and material point. Let us illustrate our meaning by giving two
imaginary statements :
(a) When I arrived at the scene I saw that X was running away, chased
by A and B who caught him.
(b) When I arrived at the scene I saw X take out a dagger from his
pocket, stab D in his chest and then take to his heels. He was chased by A
and B who caught him.
There is an omission of two facts in the first Statement, viz., (a) X took
out a dagger from his pocket, and (b) he stabbed D in the chest. These two
statements or their omission involve a contradiction as to the stage of the
occurrence, when the observation of the witness began.
49. What S. 145 of the Indian Evidence Act provides is that a witness
may be contradicted by a statement reduced into writing and that is also
the use to which the earlier statement can be put under S. 162 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure. When some omissions occur, there is contradiction
in one sense but not necessarily on a relevant matter. The statements of
witnesses may and do comprise numerous facts and circumstances, and it
happens that when they are asked to narrate their version over again they
omit some and add others. What use can be made of such omissions or
additions is for the accused to decide, but it cannot be doubted that some
of the omissions or additions may have a vital bearing upon the truth of
the story given. We do not think that by enacting S. 162 in the words
used, the legislature intended a prohibition of cross­examination to
establish which of the two versions is an authentic one of the events as
seen by the witness. The use of the words "re­examination" and "cross­
examination" in the same proviso shows that cross­examination is
contemplated or in other words, that the manner of contradiction under S.
145 of the Indian Evidence Act comprises both cross­examination and
contradiction. Indeed, the second part is only the final stage of the
contradiction, which includes the earlier stages. Re­examination is only
permissible where there is cross­examination.
50. It must not be overlooked that the cross­examination must be
directed to bringing out a contradiction between the statements and must
not subserve any other purpose. If the cross­examination does anything
else, it will be barred under S. 162, which permits the use of the earlier
statement for contradicting a witness and nothing else. Taking the
example given above, we do not see why cross­examination may not be like
this :
Q. I put it to you that when you arrived on the scene X was already
running away and you did not actually see him stab D as you have
deposed today?
A. No. I saw both the events,
Q. If that is so, why is your statement to the police silent as to
stabbing?
A. I stated both the facts to the police.
The witness can then be contradicted with his previous statement. We
need hardly point out that in the illustration given by us, the evidence of
the witness in Court is direct evidence as opposed to testimony to a fact
suggesting guilt. The statement before the police can only be called
circumstantial evidence of complicity and not direct evidence in the strict
sense.
51. Of course, if the questions framed were :
Q. What did you state to the police? or
Q. Did you state to the police that D stabbed X?
they may be ruled out as infringing S. 162 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, because they do not set up a contradiction but attempt to get a
fresh version from the witnesses with a view to contradicting him. How the
cross­examination can be made must obviously vary from case to case,
counsel to counsel and statement to statement. No single rule can be laid
down and the propriety of the question in the light of the two sections can
be found only when the facts and questions are before the Court. But we
are of opinion that relevant and material omissions amount to vital
contradictions, which can be established by cross­examination and
confronting the witness with his previous statement.
 52. The word "contradict'' has various meanings, and in the Oxford
English Dictionary it is stated as "To be contrary to in effect, character,
etc.; to be directly opposed to; to go counter to, go against" as also "to
affirm the contrary of; to declare untrue or erroneous; to deny
categorically" and the word "contradiction" to mean "A state or condition of
opposition in things compared; variance; inconsistency, contrariety". In
Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, "contradict" is said to mean "To speak
against; to oppose in speech; to forbid ; to oppose; to affirm the contrary
of; to declare untrue or erroneous; to deny; to be contrary to; to go counter
to and go against" and "contradiction" to mean "A state of opposition in
things compared; variance; inconsistency". The meaning given to the
words "contradict" and "contradiction" in these Dictionaries must at least
include the case of an omission in a previous statement which by
implication amounts to contradiction and therefore such an omission is a
matter which is covered by the first proviso to S. 162 and questions in
cross­examination can be put with respect to it in order to contradict the
witness. It is difficult to say as an inflexible rule that any other kind of
omission cannot be put to a witness in order to contradict him, when the
proper foundation had been laid for putting such questions. The words "to
contradict him" appearing in S. l45 of the Evidence Act must carry the
same meaning as the words "to contradict such witness" in S. 162 of the
Code. In a civil suit, where the provisions of S. 162 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure have no application, would it be correct to say that only
questions concerning omissions of the kind suggested by our learned
brother could be put and none other? We cannot see why a question of the
nature of cross­examination regarding an omission with respect to a
matter which the witness omitted to make in his previous statement and
which, if made, would have been recorded, cannot be put. The facts and
circumstances of each case will determine whether any other kind of
omission than that referred to by our learned brother could be put to a
witness in order to contradict him. It would be for the Judge to decide in
each case whether in the circumstances before him the question could be
put. The purpose of cross­examination is to test the veracity of the
statement made by a witness in his examination­in­cheif as also to
impeach his credit. Not only is it the right of the accused to shake the
credit of a witness, but it is also the duty of the Court trying an accursed
to satisfy itself that the witnesses are reliable. It would be dangerous to lay
down any hard and fast rule.
53. We pause to look at the matter from another angle. We shall
assume that the interpretation which the State claims should be put upon
S. 162(1) is correct and compare the respective rights of the accused and
the prosecution. According to this interpretation, the accused has no right
of, cross­examination in respect of the contradiction. This means that no
question can be put about the previous statement but only the part in
which there is a contradiction can be brought to the witness's notice and
his explanation, if any, obtained. In other words, there is only
"contradiction" and no more. But when the accused has used the
statement to contradict the witness ­ it may be only on one point ­ what
are the rights of the prosecution? The prosecution can use any part of the
statement in the re­examination not only to explain the 'contradiction' but
also to explain any matter referred to in the cross­examination of the
witness.
54. If 'contradiction' does not include the right of cross­examination, the
right of the prosecution must necessarily extend to re­examination in
respect of any other matter needing explanation in the cross­examination
at large. Thus, the accused cannot ask a single question of the nature of
cross­examination but because he sets up a 'contradiction' in the narrow
sense, the prosecution can range all over the previous statement and
afford the witness a chance of explaining any matter in his cross­
examination by re­examining him which right includes the possibility of
asking leading questions with the permission of the Court.
55. Thus, the accused makes a 'contradiction' at his own peril. By
making single 'contradiction', the accused places the entire statement in
the hands of the prosecution to explain away everything with its
assistance. One wonders if the legislature intended such a result, for it is
too great a price for the accused to pay for too small a right. Fortunately,
that is not the meaning of S. 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and it
is not necessary to read the word "cross­examination" in the proviso in a
sense other than what it has.
56. The right of both the accused and the prosecution is limited to
contradictions. It involves cross­examination by the accused as to that
contradiction within S. 145 of the Indian Evidence Act and re­examination
in relation to the matters 'referred to in the cross­examination of the
witness'. The prosecution cannot range at will to explain away every
discrepancy but only such as the accused under his right has brought to
light. In our opinion, reading the section in this way gives effect to every
part and does not lead to the starting and, if we may say so, the absurd
results which we have endeavoured to set out above.
57. The question may be asked, how is there to be a cross­
examination about a previous statement? It is difficult to illustrate one's
meaning by entering into such an exposition. Any one interested to see the
technique is invited to read Mrs. Maybrick's trial in the Notable English
Trials (1912) at pages 77­79, the trial of William Palmer pages 35­36, 50­
51. Examples will be found in every leading trial. The question is, did the
legislature intend giving this right? In our opinion, the legislature did and
for the very obvious reason that it gave the prosecution also a chance to
re­examine the witness, to explain 'any matter referred to in the cross­
examination of the witness.'
58. We respectfully do not agree that the section should be construed in
the way our learned brother has construed it. Though we agree as to the
result, our opinion cannot be left unexpressed. If the section is construed
too narrowly, the right it confers will cease to be of any real protection to
the accused, and the danger of its becoming an impediment to effective
cross­examination on behalf of the accused is apparent.
59. This brings us to the consideration of the questions, which were asked
and disallowed. These were put during the cross­examination of Bankey,
P. W. 30. They are :
Q. Did you state to the investigating officer that the gang rolled the
dead bodies of Nathi, Saktu, and Bharat Singh and scrutinized them, and
did you tell him that the face of Asa Ram resembled that of the deceased
Bharat Singh?
Q. Did you state to the investigating offcer about the presence of the
gas lantern?
These questions were defective, to start with. They did not set up a
contradiction but attempted to obtain from the witness a version of what
he stated to the police, which is then contradicted. What is needed is to
take the statement of the police as it is, and establish a contradiction
between that statement and the evidence in Court. To do otherwise is to
transgress the bounds set by S. 162 which, by its absolute prohibition;
limits even cross­examination to contradictions and no more. The cross­
examination cannot even indirectly subserve any other purpose. In the
questions with which we illustrated our meaning, the witness was not
asked what he stated to the police, but was told what he had stated to the
police and asked to explain the omission. It is to be borne in mind that the
statement made to the police, 'duly proved' either earlier or even later to
establish what the witness had then stated.
1959 0 AIR(SC) 1012; 1959 0 CrLJ 1231; 1959 Supp2 SCR 875; 1959
0 Supreme(SC) 88; Tahsildar Singh and another Vs.State of U.P.

It is to be noted that the offences punishable under Sections 304­B and

302 read with Section 498­A IPC are distinct. Nevertheless, the offence
under Section 304­B IPC is slightly inferior to Section 302 IPC. Even
though there was no charge framed under Section 304­B IPC and the
charge was under Sections 302 and 498­A IPC only, in the event of the
Court coming to the conclusion that the offence allegedly committed by the
accused does not amount to the offence punishable under Section 302
IPC, but amounts to an offence punishable under Section 304­B IPC, it is
imperative for the trial court to put the accused while examining him
under Section 313 Cr.P.C., which is in a way giving the accused an
opportunity of audi alterim partem to explain whether he was liable for the
said offence.
Section 222(1) of the Code deals with a case "when a person is charged
with an offence consisting of several particulars." The Section permits the
Court to convict the accused "of the minor offence, though he was not
charged with it." Sub­section (2) deals with a similar, but slightly different
situation. "When a person is charged with an offence and facts are proved
which reduce it to a minor offence, he may be convicted of the minor
offence although he is not charged with it."
16. What is meant by "a minor offence" for the purpose of Section 222 of
the Code? Although the said expression is not defined in the Code it can
be discerned from the context that the test of minor offence is not merely
that the prescribed punishment is less than the major offence. The two
illustrations provided in the section would bring the above point home
well. Only if the two offences are cognate offences, wherein the main
ingredients are common, the one punishable among them with a lesser
sentence can be regarded as minor offence vis­­vis the other offence.
2008 1 ALT(Cri) 22; 2008 0 CrLJ 206; 2007 0 Supreme(AP) 765;
Godugula Adellu s/o Malkanna Vs The State of Andhra Pradesh

If a lawyer was falsely implicated and if he was not a member of the

unlawful assembly, he could have examined defence witnesses to prove his
purported alibi. He is presumed to know his rights. Presumably he knows
as to how to establish a fact in a court of law.
We may notice that in Munivel v. State of Tamil Nadu [(2006) 9 SCC 394],
this Court held :
"36. Section 149 of the Penal Code provides for vicarious liability. If an
offence is committed by any member of an unlawful assembly in
prosecution of a common object thereof or such as the members of that
assembly knew that the offence to be likely to be committed in prosecution
of that object, every person who at the time of committing that offence was
member would be guilty of the offence committed. The common object may
be commission of one offence while there may be likelihood of commission
of yet another offence, the knowledge whereof is capable of being safely
attributable to the members of the unlawful assembly. Whether a member
of such unlawful assembly was aware as regards likelihood of commission
of another offence or not would depend upon the facts and circumstances
of each case. Background of the incident, the motive, the nature of the
assembly, the nature of the arms carried by the members of the assembly,
their common object and the behaviour of the members soon before, at or
after the actual commission of the crime would be relevant factors for
drawing an inference in that behalf. (See Rajendra Shantaram Todankar v.
State of Maharashtra)"
2008 3 AD(CR) 353; 2008 0 AIR(SC) 1860; 2008 0 AIR(SCW) 2608;
2008 0 CrLJ 2992; 2008 4 JT 477; 2008 6 Scale 17; 2008 11 SCC
337; 2009 1 SCC(Cri) 143; 2008 0 Supreme(SC) 559; Shivappa & Ors.
Vs. State of Karnataka

In terms of section 113b of the Indian Evidence Act, onus of proof was
upon the appellant. [see State of Karnataka v. M. V. Manjunathegowda
and Anr. , (2003) 2 SCC 188] As the defence taken by the appellant has
not been established, he cannot be held to have discharged the said onus.
2008 0 AIR(SC) 890; 2008 0 CrLJ 1400; 2008 2 JCR(SC) 13; 2008 3
JLJR(SC) 340; 2008 1 RCR(Cri) 382; 2009 1 Scale 452; 2007 14 SCC
696; 2009 3 SCC(Cri) 237; 2007 0 Supreme(SC) 1624; RAMESHWAR
DASS Vs. STATE OF PUNJAB

In the former case it has been held that if two cases exclusively triable by
the Court of Sessions arising out of the same transaction, are tried by two
different Courts, there is a risk of two Courts coming to conflicting findings
and to obviate such a risk, it is ordinarily desirable that the two cases
should be tried separately but by the same Court. In the latter case, it has
been held by their Lordships that even where one case is sessions triable
and the other is triable by the Magistrate but they having arisen out of the
same transaction, it is the salutary principle that such two cases,
sometimes called case and counter­case, should be tried by the same
Court because according to their Lordships, when two criminal cases
relate to the same incident, if they are not tried and disposed of by the
same Court by pronouncing the judgment on the same day, two different
versions may come out in case of their separate trial by separate Courts.
Hence it was the mandate of their Lordships that in such an exigency such
pair of cases arising out of the same transaction must be heard and
disposed of by the same Court and the judgments are to be pronounced on
the same day, although however there is no necessity that they should be
tried analogously or together.
2005 2 AllCriR 287; 2005 0 CrLJ 433; 2005 2 RCR(Cri) 226; 2002 0
Supreme(Cal) 635; BADAL CHOWDHURY Vs. STATE OF WEST
BENGAL.

At the stage of Sections 203 and 204, Criminal Procedure Code in a case
exclusively triable by the Court of Session, all that the Magistrate has to
do is to see whether on a cursory perusal of the complaint and the
evidence recorded during the preliminary inquiry under Sections 200 and
202, Criminal Procedure Code, there is prima facie evidence in support of
the charge levelled against the accused. All that he has to see is whether
or not there is "sufficient ground for proceeding" against the accused. At
this stage, the Magistrate is not to weigh the evidence meticulously as if he
were the trial court. The standard to be adopted by the Magistrate in
scrutinising the evidence is not the same as the one which is to be kept in
view at the stage of framing charges. This Court has held in Ramesh
Singhs case (ibid), that even at the stage of framing charges the truth,
veracity and effect of the evidence which the complaint produces or
proposes to adduce at the trial, is not to be meticulously judged. The
standard of proof and judgment, which is to be applied finally before
finding the accused guilty or otherwise, is not exactly to be applied at the
stage of framing charges. A fortiori, at the stage of Sections 202/204, if
there is prima facie evidence in support of the allegations in the complaint
relating to a case exclusively triable by the Court of Session, that will be a
sufficient ground for issuing process to the accused and committing them
for trial to the Court of Session. 1980 0 AIR(SC) 1780; 1980 0 CrLJ
1271; 1980 Supp1 SCC 499; 1981 1 SCC(Cri) 438; 1980 0
Supreme(SC) 330; Kewal Krishan Vs. Suraj Bhan and another

In the Law Lexicon by P. Ramanatha Aiyar (2nd Edition), the word

impound has been defined to mean
“to take possession of a document or thing for being held in custody
in accordance with law”.
Thus, the word “impounding” really means retention of possession of
a good or a document which has been seized.
16. Hence, while the police may have power to seize a passport under
Section 102 Cr.P.C. if it is permissible within the authority given under
Section 102 of Cr.P.C., it does not have power to retain or impound the
same, because that can only be done by the passport authority under
Section 10(3) of the Passports Act. Hence, if the police seizes a passport
(which it has power to do under Section 102 Cr.P.C.), thereafter the police
must send it along with a letter to the passport authority clearly stating
that the seized passport deserves to be impounded for one of the reasons
mentioned in Section 10(3) of the Act. It is thereafter the passport
authority to decide whether to impound the passport or not. Since
impounding of a passport has civil consequences, the passport authority
must give an opportunity of hearing to the person concerned before
impounding his passport. It is well settled that any order which has civil
consequences must be passed after giving opportunity of hearing to a
party vide State of Orissa Vs. Binapani Dei [Air 1967 SC 1269].
17. In the present case, neither the passport authority passed any
order of impounding nor was any opportunity of hearing given to the
appellant by the passport authority for impounding the document. It was
only the CBI authority which has retained possession of the passport
(which in substance amounts to impounding it) from October, 2006. In our
opinion, this was clearly illegal. Under Section 10A of the Act retention by
the Central Government can only be for four weeks. Thereafter it can only
be retained by an order of the Passport authority under Section 10(3).
18. In our opinion, even the Court cannot impound a passport.
Though, no doubt, Section 104 Cr.P.C. states that the Court may, if it
thinks fit, impound any document or thing produced before it, in our
opinion, this provision will only enable the Court to impound any
document or thing other than a passport. This is because impounding a
“passport” is provided for in Section 10(3) of the Passports Act. The
Passports Act is a special law while the Cr.P.C. is a general law. It is well
settled that the special law prevails over the general law vide G.P. Singh's
Principles of Statutory Interpretation (9th Edition pg. 133). This principle
is expressed in the maxim “Generalia specialibus non derogant”. Hence,
impounding of a passport cannot be done by the Court under Section 104
Cr.P.C. though it can impound any other document or thing. 2008 0
AIR(SC) 1414; 2008 0 CrLJ 1599; 2008 2 JLJR(SC) 117; 2008 2 JT
174; 2008 1 RCR(Cri) 897; 2008 2 Scale 46; 2008 3 SCC 674; 2008 2
SCC(Cri) 121; 2008 0 Supreme(SC) 119; SURESH NANDA Vs. C.B.I.

The perusal of Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure would show
that this Section would apply in those cases where the public servant is
removable with the sanction of the State Government. In the present case,
it is not the case of the accused that at the time of commission of the
offence, he was removable by the State Government. Moreover, it was not
part of the duty of the accused while acting as Police Officer to commit
offence of the nature for which he was tried and hence for prosecuting
accused for the offence under Section 376, IPC no sanction is required
under Section 197, Cr. P.C. The act for which the appellant was tried and
stands convicted has no relation, even the remotest, with his duties and
functions as a public servant. Section 197, Cr. P.C. comes into play when
the offence is committed while acting or purporting to act in the discharge
of one's official duty. Here the appellant committed the act of gratifying his
sexual lust, which had no link with the discharge of his duties as
Investigating Officer. In this view of the matter, we are supported by a
judgment of the Apex Court in Parkash Singh Badal v. State of Punjab
(2007) 1 SCC 1 : AIR 2007 SC 1274. In any case, the objection of want of
sanction under Section 197, Cr. P.C. is for the benefit of the accused,
which he was required to take at an early stage. In the preset case he
never took this objection during trial, therefore, in appeal this objection is
not available to him. Hence, this submission of the learned counsel for the
accused is rejected. 2008 0 CrLJ 1350; 2007 0 Supreme(HP) 356;Gulzar
Muhamad Vs. State of H. P. and Anr.

we have found from the record that no plea of alibi was raised. Although
some suggestions were put to some of the witnesses that the accused was
a farm servant and he was working in the farms of one Vittal Reddy, even
that Vittal Reddy was not produced as a witness, and as a matter of fact,
no proof was produced before the Court that the accused was not present
in the house when the occurrence took place. Even in his examination
under S. 313, Cr. P. C. , such a plea was not raised. It is a settled law that
when a plea of alibi is taken, it is for the person raising the plea of alibi, to
prove such a plea. 2007 1 ALD(Cri) 891; 2007 2 ALT(Cri) 210; 2007 3
Crimes 234; 2007 0 CrLJ 1572; 2006 0 Supreme(AP) 1577; RAVELLI
YELLAIAH Vs. P. S. TOOPRAN

Dying declaration – Clause (1) of Section 32 of the Evidence Act makes

relevant what is generally described as dying declaration, though such an
expression has not been used in any Statute – It essentially means
statements made by a person as to the cause of his death or as to the
circumstances of the transaction resulting in his death – Such statements
are admitted on two grounds – Firstly, necessity for the victim being
generally the only principal eye­witness to the crime, the exclusion of the
statement might deflect the ends of justice – Secondly, the sense of
impending death, which creates a sanction equal to the obligation of an
oath – The general principle on which this species of evidence is admitted
is that they are declarations made in extremity; a situation so solemn and
so lawful is considered by the law as creating an obligation equal to that
which is imposed by a positive oath administered in a Court of justice –
The principle on which dying declaration is admitted in evidence is
indicated in legal maxim “nemo moriturus proesumitur mentiri, a man will
not meet his maker with a lie in his mouth.” (Para 7)
(1789) 1 Leach 500 – Relied upon.
The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 – Section 32 – Dying declaration – The
situation in which a person is on deathbed is so solemn and serene when
he is dying that the grave position in which he is placed, is the reason in
law to accept veracity of his statement – Besides, should the dying
declaration be excluded it will result in miscarriage of justice because the
victim being generally the only eye­witness in a serious crime, such
exclusion would leave the Court without a scrap of evidence – Because in
case of dying declaration, the accused is deprived of cross­examination,
the dying declaration should be of such a nature as to inspire full
confidence of the Court in its correctness – However it cannot be laid down
as an absolute rule of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole
basis of conviction unless it is corroborated. (Paras 8, 9,
AIR 1992 SC 1817 – Relied upon.
Indian Evidence Act, 1872 – Section 32 – If after careful scrutiny the
Court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and free from any effort
to induce the deceased to make a false statement and if it is coherent and
consistent, there shall be no legal impediment to make it basis of
conviction, even if there is no corroboration. (Para 10)
JT 1992 (2) SC 417; JT 1993 (5) SC 87; JT 1994 (3) SC 232; JT 1996
(2) SC 595 – Relied upon.
Indian Evidence Act, 1872 – Section 32 – There being no material
showing the dying declaration to be result of product of imagination,
tutoring or prompting; rather the same appearing to have been made by
the deceased voluntarily; it is trustworthy, credible and believable. (Para
11 and 12)
2007 0 CrLJ 3747; 2007 3 RCR(Cri) 925; 2007 5 Supreme 668; 2007
0 Supreme(SC) 1004; 2007 4 AD(Cr) 349; 2007 0 AIR(SC) 2709; 2007
0 AIR(SCW) 4895; 2008 1 BBCJ(SC) 273; 2007 4 Crimes(Sc) 315; 2007
3 Crimes(Sc) 265; 2007 9 JT 433; 2007 9 Scale 423; 2007 10 SCC
168; 2007 8 Supreme 155; 2007 0 Supreme(SC) 1003;Smt.
Shakuntala Vs. State of Haryana

The contention of the learned counsel for the accused that the
presumption enumerated under Section 113A of the Indian Evidence Act is
not attracted in the present case does not merit acceptance. It is well­
settled law that presumption with respect to the procedural matters is
normally to be construed as prospective. Section 113A does not create any
new offence or make it punishable. It only deals with presumption which
the Court may draw in particular facts situation. This Court in Gurbachan
Singh v. Satpal Singh reported in AIR 1990 SC 2009 held in para 36 as
under:­ 36. The provisions of the said Section do not create any new
offence and as such it does not create any substantial right but it is
merely a matter of procedure of evidence and as such it is retrospective
and will be applicable to this case. It is profitable to refer in the connection
to Halsbury s Laws of England, (Fourth Edition), Volume 44 page 570
wherein it has been stated that:
The general rule is that all statutes, other than those which are merely
declaratory or which relate only to matters or procedure or of evidence, are
prima facie prospective and retrospective effect are not to be given to them
unless, by express words or necessary implication, it appears that this was
the intention of the legislature. 2007 5 AD(Cr) 490; 2007 0 AIR(SC)
2674; 2007 0 AIR(SCW) 4830; 2007 0 CrLJ 3741; 2007 9 JT 398;
2007 3 RCR(Cri) 885; 2007 9 Scale 325; 2007 12 SCC 681; 2007 0
Supreme(SC) 993; Arvind Kumar & Anr Vs State of Madhya Pradesh.

(i) Explosive Act, 1884­Section 9B(i)(b)­Conviction for possession of

explosive without licence­Prior sanction for prosecution as provided for
under Explosive Substances Act was not a requirement under the Act­
Conviction could not be challenged on the ground. (Para 5)
(ii) Explosive Act, 1884­Section 4(d)­Explosive­Appellants were found
in possession of detonators­Courts below on evidence found that
Ammonium tubes with electrical red wire were recovered­Articles were
covered by Class­6 of Schedule I of the Act. (Paras 7 & 8)
(iii) Explosive Act, 1884­Section 9B(i)(b)­Recovery of 180 detonators
from possession of appellants­Sentence­Value of detonators was Rs. 900/­
­Quantity seized disproved plea that seized articles were intended to be
used for digging wells­Fact that accused tried to run away on seeing police
was significant factor­Sentence of one year imprisonment with file could
not be interfered with. (Para 9) 2004 0 AIR(SC) 4645; 2004 4 BBCJ(SC)
382; 2004 4 Crimes(SC) 18; 2004 0 CrLJ 4241; 2004 8 JT 226; 2005
1 PLJR(SC) 60; 2004 4 RCR(Cri) 374; 2004 7 Scale 644; 2004 7 SCC
566; 2004 0 SCC(Cri) 1996; 2004 6 Supreme 525; 2004 0
Supreme(SC) 1045; Lopchand Naruji Jat & Anr. Versus State of
Gujarat

Non explanation of injuries of the accused is one of the factors that could
be taken into account in evaluating the prosecution evidence and the
intrinsic worth of the defence version. 2004 0 AIR(SC) 4488; 2004 4
BBCJ(SC) 160; 2004 3 CCR(SC) 100; 2004 3 Crimes(SC) 298; 2004 3
JCC 1266; 2004 6 JT 217; 2004 3 RCR(Cri) 973; 2004 7 Scale 3; 2004
7 SCC 408; 2004 0 SCC(Cri) 1932; 2004 6 Supreme 248; 2004 0
Supreme(SC) 877;Dashrath Singh Versus State of U.P
A plethora of decisions by this Court as referred to above would show that
once the statement of prosecutrix inspires confidence and accepted by the
courts as such, conviction can be based only on the solitary evidence of
the prosecutrix and no corroboration would be required unless there are
compelling reasons which necessitate the courts for corroboration of her
statement. Corroboration of testimony of the prosecutrix as a condition for
judicial reliance is not a requirement of law but a guidance of prudence
under the given facts and circumstances. It is also noticed that minor
contradictions or insignificant discrepancies should not be a ground for
throwing out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. Non­examination of
doctor and non­production of doctors report would not cause fatal to the
prosecution case, if the statements of the prosecutrix and other
prosecution witnesses inspire confidence. It is also noticed that the Court
while acquitting the accused on benefit of doubt should be cautious to see
that the doubt should be a reasonable doubt and it should not reverse the
findings of the guilt on the basis of irrelevant circumstances or mere
technicalities. 2005 0 AIR(SC) 3570; 2005 0 AIR(SCW) 4839; 2006 1
BBCJ(SC) 47; 2005 4 Crimes(SC) 92; 2005 0 CrLJ 4375; 2005 12 JT
150; 2006 1 PLJR(SC) 69; 2005 7 Scale 663; 2005 8 SCC 122; 2005 0
SCC(Cri) 1988; 2005 6 Supreme 583; 2005 0 Supreme(SC) 1263; State
of M.P. Versus Dayal Sahu

There is no material to show that the accused were determined to have

sexual intercourse in all events. In the aforesaid background, the offence
cannot be said to be an attempt to commit rape to attract culpability
under Section 376/511 IPC. But the case is certainly one of indecent
assault upon a woman. Essential ingredients of the offence punishable
under Section 354 IPC are that the person assaulted must be a woman,
and the accused must have used criminal force on her intend­ing thereby
to outrage her modesty. What constitutes an outrage to female modesty is
nowhere defined. The essence of a woman’s modesty is her sex. The
culpable intention of the accused is the crux of the matter. The reaction of
the woman is very relevant, but its absence is not always decisive. Modesty
in this Section is an attribute associat­ed with female human beings as a
class. It is a virtue which attaches to a female owing to her sex. The act of
pulling a woman, removing her dress coupled with a request for sexual
intercourse, is such as would be an outrage to the modesty of a woman,
and knowledge, that modesty is likely to be outraged, is sufficient to
constitute the offence without any deliberate intention having such
outrage alone for its object. As indicated above, the word ‘modesty’ is not
defined in IPC. The Shorter Oxford Dictionary (Third Edn.) defines the
word ‘modesty’ in relation to woman as follows :
“Decorous in manner and conduct; not forward or lowe; Shame­fast;
Scrupulously chast.”
 14. Modesty can be described as the quality of being modest; and in
relation to woman, “womanly propriety of behaviour; scrupulous chasti­ty
of thought, speech and conduct.” It is the reserve or sense of shame
proceeding from instinctive aversion to impure or coarse sugges­tions. As
observed by Justice Patterson in Rex v. James Lloyd (1876) 7 C&P 817. In
order to find the accused guilty of an assault with intent to commit a rape,
court must be satisfied that the accused, when he laid hold of the
prosecutrix, not only desired to gratify his passions upon her person but
that he intended to do so at all events, and notwithstanding any resistance
on her part. The point of distinction between an offence of attempt to
commit rape and to commit indecent assault is that there should be some
action on the part of the accused which would show that he was just going
to have sexual connection with her. 2004 2 Crimes(SC) 66; 2004 0 CrLJ
1399; 2004 0 SCC(Cri) 1266; 2004 2 Supreme 5;Aman Kumar & Anr.
Versus State of Haryana.

To insist on corroboration except in the rarest of rare cases is to equate

one who is a victim of the lust of another with an accomplice to a crime
and thereby insult womanhood. It would be adding insult to injury to tell a
woman that her chain of rape will not be believed unless it is corroboration
in material particulars as in the case of an accomplice to a crime. (See
State of Maharashtra v. Chandra Prakash Kewalchand Jain (AIR 1990 SC
658). Why should be the evidence of the girl or the woman who complains
of rape or sexual molestation be viewed with the aid of spectacles fitted
with lenses tinged with doubt, disbelief or suspicion? The plea about lack
of corroboration has no substance.
13. It is unfortunate that respect for womanhood in our country is on the
decline and cases of molestation and rape are steadily growing. Decency
and morality in public and social life can be protected only if Courts deal
strictly with those who violate the social norms. Two alternative custodial
punishments are provided; one is imprisonment for life or with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten
years. The latter is the minimum, subject of course to the proviso which
authorizes lesser sentence for adequate and special reasons.
14. In cases of gang rape the proof of completed act of rape by each
accused on the victim is not required. The statutory intention in
introducing Explanation (1) in relation to Section 376 (2) (g) appears to
have been done with a view to effectively deal with the growing menace of
gang rape. In such circumstances, it is not necessary that the prosecution
should adduce clinching proof of a completed act of rape by each one of
the accused on the victim or on each one of the victims where there are
more than one in order to find the accused guilty of gang rape and convict
them under Section 376 IPC. (See Promod Mahto and Ors. v. The State of
Bihar (AIR 1989 SC 1475). 2003 4 Crimes(SC) 327; 2004 0 CrLJ 1;
Bhupinder Sharma Versus State of Himachal Pradesh.
Absence of injuries on the person of the prosecutrix is not necessarily an
evidence of falsity of the allegation or an evidence of consent on the part of
the prosecutrix. It will all depend on the facts and circumstances of each
case.
Even assuming that the victim was previously accustomed sexual
intercourse, that is not a determinative question. On the contrary, the
question which was required to be adjudicated was did the accused
commit rape on the victim on the occasion complained of. Even if it is
hypothetically accepted that the victim had lost her virginity earlier, it did
not and cannot in law give license to any person to rape her. It is the
accused who was on trial and not the victim. Even if the victim in a given
case has been promiscuous in her sexual behaviour earlier, she has a
right to refuse to submit herself to sexual intercourse to anyone and
everyone because she is not a vulnerable object or prey for being sexually
assaulted by anyone and everyone. 2004 0 AIR(SC) 1290; 2003 0
AIR(SCW) 6947; 2004 1 CCR(SC) 41; 2004 1 Crimes(SC) 149; 2004 1
JCC 55; 2003 10 JT 416; 2003 2 Scale 645; 2003 10 SCC 675; 2004 0
SCC(Cri) 307; 2003 8 Supreme 791; 2003 0 Supreme(SC) 1290;State
Of Punjab Versus Ramdev Singh

1. While dealing with judgments and orders of the lower courts, the High
Court should exercise judicial restraint as unsavoury remarks against a
judicial personage of the lower hierarchy should be avoided.
2. The right of private defence would not enure to an aggressor and any
step resorted the thwart an act of aggression is regarded as defensive act.
Evidence Act, 1872, Sec. 9, 3 – Identification – Trial Court disbelieved the
statements of eye­witnesses, due to failure of Investigating Officer to
conduct Test Identification parade – Held – Failure to hold Test
Identification parade can not vitiate the evidence. 1998 1 Crimes(SC)
187; 1998 0 AIR(SC) 1185; 1998 0 AIR(SCW) 1005; 1998 1 Crimes(SC)
187; 1998 0 CrLJ 1617; 1998 1 RCR(Cri) 801; 1998 1 Scale 577; 1998
2 SCC 700; 1998 0 SCC(Cri) 673; 1998 2 Supreme 65; 1998 0
Supreme(SC) 216; Pammi @ Brijendra Singh Versus Government of
Madhya Pradesh

1. Information which an accused furnishes leading to recovery of weapon

is admissible in evidence under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, but
admissibility alone would not render the evidence, pertaining to the above
information, reliable. While testing the reliability of such evidence the
Court has to see whether it was voluntarily stated by the accused.
2. Re­examination need not be confined to clarification of ambigui­ties.
Questions to elicit new matters can be put with permission of Court. Re­
examination is not limited to one or two questions. Any number of
questions can be asked if exigency so requires. If the Court thinks new
matters are necessary, Court must be liberal in granting permission to put
necessary questions.
3. It is only when discrepancies in the evidence of a witness are so
incompatible with the credibility of his version that the Court is justified in
jettisoning his evidence.
4. To contradict a witness must be to discredit the particular version of the
witness. Unless the former statement has the potency to discredit the
present statement, even if the latter is at variance with the former to some
extent it would not be helpful to contradict that witness. 1999 4
Crimes(SC) 32; 1999 0 AIR(SC) 3544; 1999 0 AIR(SCW) 3546; 1999 0
CrLJ 4561; 1999 7 JT 247; 1999 4 RCR(Cri) 246; 1999 6 Scale 69;
1999 8 SCC 649; 1999 8 Supreme 364; 1999 0 Supreme(SC) 1087;
Rammi @ Rameshwar etc. Versus State of Madhya Pradesh.

While drawing the presumption under Section 114 on the basis of recent
possession of belongings of the victim with the accused, the Court must
adopt a cautious approach and have an assurance from all angles that the
accused not merely committed theft or robbery but also killed the victim.
The case rests on circumstantial ­evidence of recovery of ornaments worn
by deceased, pursuant to information furnished by the accused to the
police u/s.27 of Evidence Act, 1872. But High Court was not right to press
into service Section 114(9) of Evidence Act in support of its conclusion that
accused can be held guilty u/s. 302 r/w 34 IPC on that basis. 2002 0
AIR(SC) 491; 2002 0 AIR(SCW) 22; 2002 1 CCR(SC) 1; 2002 1
Crimes(SC) 63; 2002 0 CrLJ 590; 2002 1 JCC 294; 2001 Supp2 JT 79;
2002 1 RCR(Cri) 266; 2001 8 Scale 822; 2001 10 SCC 340; 2001 8
Supreme 722; 2001 0 Supreme(SC) 1678; 2002 1 UJ 307; 2002 1
Crimes(SC) 63; 2002 0 SCC(Cri) 1044; 2001 8 Supreme 722; Limbaji
& Others Versus State of Maharashtra

We have no difficulty in accepting the contention that evidence of mere

identification of an accused person at the trial for the first time is from its
very nature inherently of a weak character. The purpose of a prior test
identification is to test and strengthen the trustworthiness of that
evidence. Courts generally look for corroboration of the sole testimony of
the witnesses in court so as to fix the identity of the accused who are
strangers to them in the form of earlier identification proceedings. This
rule of prudence, however, is subject to exceptions, when, for example, the
court is impressed by a particular witness on whose testimony it can
safely rely, without such or other corroboration. It has also to be borne in
mind that the aspect of identification parade belongs to the stage of
investigation, and there is no provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure
which obliges the investigating agency to hold, or confers a right upon the
accused to claim a test identification parade. Mere failure to hold a test
identification parade would not make inadmissible the evidence of
identification in court. What weight is to be attached to such identification
is a matter for the courts of fact to examine. In appropriate cases, it may
accept the evidence of identification even without insisting on
corroboration (Para 14) 2004 0 AIR(SC) 2775; 2004 2 JT 124; 2004 2
Scale 112; 2004 2 SCC 694; 2004 1 Supreme 577; 2004 0
Supreme(SC) 113; 2004 0 Supreme(SC) 115; Simon & Ors. Vs. State of
Karnataka.

"19. An extra­judicial confession, if voluntary and true and made in a fit

state of mind, can be relied upon by the court. The confession will have to
be proved like any other fact. The value of the evidence as to confession,
like any other evidence, depends upon the veracity of the witness to whom
it has been made. The value of the evidence as to the confession depends
on the reliability of the witness who gives the evidence. It is not open to
any court to start with a presumption that extra­ judicial confession is a
weak type of evidence. It would depend on the nature of the
circumstances, the time when the confession was made and the credibility
of the witnesses who speak to such a confession. Such a confession can be
relied upon and conviction can be founded thereon if the evidence about
the confession comes from the mouth of witnesses who appear to be
unbiased, not even remotely inimical to the accused, and in respect of
whom nothing is brought out which may tend to indicate that he may have
a motive of attributing an untruthful statement to the accused, the words
spoken to by the witness are clear, unambiguous and unmistakably
convey that the accused is the perpetrator of the crime and nothing is
omitted by the witness which may militate against it. After subjecting the
evidence of the witness to a rigorous test on the touchstone of credibility,
the extra­judicial confession can be accepted and can be the basis of a
conviction if it passes the test of credibility. State of Rajasthan v. Raja
Ram, (2003) 8 SCC 180; 2003 0 AIR(SC) 3601; 2003 0 AIR(SCW) 4097;
2003 3 BBCJ(SC) 228; 2003 3 Crimes(SC) 346; 2003 0 CrLJ 3901;
2003 7 JT 399; 2003 4 RCR(Cri) 238; 2003 6 Scale 489; 2003 8 SCC
180; 2003 8 SCC(Cri) 1965; 2003 6 Supreme 11; 2003 0 Supreme(SC)
749; 2003 2 UJ 1501;

EVIDENCE ACT : S.137, INDIAN PENAL CODE : S.302:­ The appeal

against the concurrent findings of conviction and sentence for murder
under Section 302 is rejected stating that there is no ground for
interference including the reliance on the extra­judicial confessions made
to P.W.No:10 in view of the absence of any denial it is he who has
produced them to the police during the investigation. 2011 0 AIR(SC)
1777; 2011 0 CrLJ 2633; 2011 3 JCR(SC) 108; 2011 4 JT 512; 2011 8
RCR(Cri) 1120; 2011 5 SCC 258; 2011 2 SCC(Cri) 608; 2011 0
Supreme(SC) 401;Kulvinder Singh & Anr. Versus State of Haryana

When it is according to the medical evidence, that the deceased received

ante mortem injuries and also post mortem burns, there was no need to
mention that, if the burn injuries were ante mortem in nature there would
be redness over the corresponding margins. In any case, nothing was
elicited from the medical evidence, which is in favour of the defence.
Thereby it is established that her death was caused by means of axphyxia
due to throttling and after her death, the post mortem burns were caused
to the dead body.
In the decision Trimukh Maroti Krikhan, it is further held:
"12. If an offence takes place inside the privacy of a house and in such
circumstances where the assailants have all the opportunity to plan and
commit the offence at the time and in circumstances of their choice, it will
be extremely difficult for the prosecution to lead evidence to establish the
guilt of the accused if the strict principle of circumstantial evidence, as
noticed above, is insisted upon by the Courts. A Judge does not preside
over a criminal trial merely to see that no innocent man is punished. A
Judge also presides to see that a guilty man does not escape. Both are
public duties. (See Striland v. Director of Public Prosecution 1944 AC 315
­ quoted with approval by Arijit Pasayat, J. in State of Punjab v. Karnail
Singh (2003) 11 SCC 271). The law does not enjoin a duty on the
prosecution to lead evidence of such character which is almost impossible
to be led or at any rate extremely difficult to be led. The duty on the
prosecution is to lead such evidence which it is capable of leading, having
regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. Here it is necessary to
keep in mind Section 106 of the Evidence Act which says that when any
fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of
proving that fact is upon him. Illustration (b) appended to this section
throws same light an the content and scope of this provision and it reads:
(b) A is charged with traveling on a railway without ticket. The burden
of proving that he had a ticket is an him."
Where an offence like murder is committed in secrecy inside a house, the
initial burden to establish the case would undoubtedly 151 be upon the
prosecution, but the nature and amount of evidence to be led by it to
establish the charge cannot ~e of the same degree as is required in other
cases of circumstantial evidence. The burden would be of a comparatively
lighter character. In view of Section 106 of the Evidence Act there will be a
corresponding burden on the inmates of the house to give a cogent
explanation as to how the crime was committed. The inmates of the house
cannot get away by simply keeping quiet and offering no explanation on
the supposed premise that the burden to establish its case lies entirely
upon the prosecution and there is no duty at all on an accused to offer any
explanation. 2012 1 ALD(Cri) 48; 2011 3 ALT(Cri) 269; 2011 0
Supreme(AP) 763; Pedda Tayanna Vs State of A.P.

a director was clearly in the position of a trustee and being a trustee of the
assets which has come into his hand he had dominion and control over
the same. 1980 0 AIR(SC) 439; 1980 0 CrLJ 388; 1980 2 SCC 465;
1980 1 SCC(Cri) 493; 1979 0 Supreme(SC) 421; Shivanarayan
Laxminarayan Joshi and others Versus State of Maharashtra and
others
Evidence of close relation witnesses—No ground to reject it—Normal
discrepancies in evidence were those which were due to normal error of
observation, normal error of memory due to lapse of time, due to mental
disposition such as shock and horror—Normal discrepancies would not
corrode the credibility of the case.
Exaggerated devotion to the rule of benefit of doubt must not nurture
fanciful doubts or lingering suspicion and thereby destroy social defence.
Justice cannot be made sterile on the plea that it is better to let hundred
guilty escape than punish an innocent. Letting guilty escape is not doing
justice according to law. [See: Gurbachan Singh v. Satpal Singh and
Others [AIR 1990 SC 209]. Prosecution is not required to meet any and
every hypothesis put forward by the accused. [See State of U.P. v. Ashok
Kumar Srivastava [AIR 1992 SC 840]. A reasonable doubt is not an
imaginary, trivial or merely possible doubt, but a fair doubt based upon
reason and common sense. It must grow out of the evidence in the case. If
a case is proved perfectly, it is argued that it is artificial; if a case has
some flaws inevitable because human beings are prone to err, it is argued
that it is too imperfect. One wonders whether in the meticulous
hypersensitivity to eliminate a rare innocent from being punished, many
guilty persons must be allowed to escape. Proof beyond reasonable doubt
is a guide­line, not a fetish. [See Inder Singh and Anr. v. State (Delhi
Admn.) (AIR 1978 SC 1091)]. Vague hunches cannot take place of judicial
evaluation. “A judge does not preside over a criminal trial, merely to see
that no innocent man is punished. A judge also presides to see that a
guilty man does not escape. Both are public duties.” (Per Viscount Simon
in Stirland v. Director of Public Prosecution (1944 AC (PC) 315) quoted in
State of U.P. v. Anil Singh (AIR 1988 SC 1998). Doubts would be called
reasonable if they are free from a zest for abstract speculation. Law cannot
afford any favourite other than truth. (See: Shivaji Sahebrao Bobade &
Anr. v. State of Maharashtra (1974 (1) SCR 489), State of U.P. v. Krishna
Gopal and Anr. (AIR 1988 SC 2154), and Gangadhar Behera and Ors. v.
State of Orissa (2002 (7) Supreme 276). (Para 12)
Conviction by trial Court set aside in appeal by High Court—State
appeal—No embargo on appellate Court reviewing evidence—Paramount
consideration of Court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice in
prevented. 2003 3 Crimes(SC) 292; 2003 0 CrLJ 3822; 2003 5
Supreme 508; 2003 0 AIR(SC) 3609; 2003 3 CCR(SC) 261; 2003 0
CrLJ 3892; 2003 3 JCC 1313; 2003 7 JT 543; 2004 1 RCR(Cri) 156;
2003 6 Scale 434; 2003 11 SCC 271; 2003 5 Supreme 508; 2003 0
Supreme(SC) 760; State of Punjab Versus Karnail Singh

Code of Criminal Procedure 1973, Sec. 360­Release on Probation­

Principles. 1978 0 AIR(SC) 1091; 1978 0 BBCJ(SC) 53; 1978 0 CrLJ
766; 1978 4 SCC 161; 1978 0 SCC(Cri) 564; 1978 3 SCR 393; 1978 0
Supreme(SC) 81; Inder Singh and another Versus State (Delhi
Administration),

Where an offence like murder is committed in secrecy inside a house, the

initial burden to establish the case would undoubtedly be upon the
prosecution, but the nature and amount of evidence to be led by it to
establish the charge cannot be of the same degree as is required in other
cases of circumstantial evidence. The burden would be of a comparatively
lighter character. In view of Section 106 of the Evidence Act there will be a
corresponding burden on the inmates of the house to give a cogent
explanation as to how the crime was committed. The inmates of the house
cannot get away by simply keeping quiet and offering no explanation on
the supposed premise that the burden to establish its case lies entirely
upon the prosecution and there is no duty at all on an accused to offer any
explanation.(Para 12)
In a case based on circumstantial evidence where no eye­witness account
is available, there is another principle of law which must be kept in mind.
The principle is that when an incriminating circumstance is put to the
accused and the said accused either offers no explanation or offers an
explanation which is found to be untrue, then the same becomes an
additional link in the chain of circumstances to make it complete. This
view has been taken in a catena of decisions of this Court. [See State of
Tamil Nadu v. Rajendran (1999) 8 SCC 679 (para 6); State of U.P. v. Dr.
Ravindra Prakash Mittal AIR 1992 SC 2045 (para 40); State of
Maharashtra v. Suresh (2000) 1 SCC 471 (para 27); Ganesh Lal v. State of
Rajasthan (2002) 1 SCC 731 (para 15) and Gulab Chand v. State of M.P.
(1995) 3 SCC 574 (para 4)].(Para 16)
2006 0 AIR(SCW) 5300; 2007 1 BBCJ(SC) 68; 2006 4 Crimes(SC) 212;
2007 0 CrLJ 20; 2006 2 DMC 757; 2007 1 JCR(SC) 293; 2006 9 JT 50;
2006 10 Scale 190; 2006 10 SCC 681; 2007 1 SCC(Cri) 80; 2006 8
Supreme 58; 2006 0 Supreme(SC) 939;Trimukh Maroti Kirkan Versus
State of Maharashtra

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 ­ Sections 164 and 463 ­ Whether the
confession of accused Satwant Singh being not made, in the manner
prescribed under section 164 of Criminal Procedure Code is admissible in
evidence and whether the same can be relied upon? (Yes)
Held, that where the High Court has reached conclusions based on partly
inadmissible evidence and partly on circumstances which are not justified
on the basis of evidence, or partly on facts which are not borne out from
the evidence on record it cannot be contended that in an appeal under
Article 136 this Court will not go into the facts of the case and come to its
own conclusions.
Commission of Enquiry Act, 1951 ­ Section 6 ­ Evidence Act, 1872 ­
Section 145 read with Sections 155(3) and 157 ­ Thakkar Commission
appointed to enquire into, inter alia, sequence of events and facts leading
to assassination of Late Prime Minister Smt. Indira Gandhi and any
conspiracy­Appellants i.e., accused before trial court whether were entitled
to copies of statements of those prosecution witnesses who were, examined
by Thakkar Commission.? (No) ­ Or summoning the Commission. Report?
(No).
Held, the language (of Section 327, Cr. P.C.) itself indicates that even if a
trial is held in a private house or is held inside Jailor anywhere no sooner
it becomes a venue of trial of a criminal case it is deemed to be in law an
open place and everyone who wants to go and attend the trial has a right
to go and attend the trial except the only restriction contemplated is
number of persons which could be contained in the premises where the
Court sits. It appears that the whole argument advanced on behalf of the
appellants is on the basis of an assumption inspite of the provisions of
Section 327 that as the trial was shifted from the ordinary place where the
Sessions Courts are sitting to Tihar Jail it automatically became a trial,
which was not open to public but in our opinion in view of Section 327
this assumption, the basis of the argument itself is without any foundation
and cannot be accepted and argument on the basis of the foreign decisions
loses all its significance. So far as this country is concerned the law is very
clear that as soon as a trial of a criminal case is held whatever may be the
place it will be an open trial. The only thing that is necessary for the
appellant is to point out that in fact that it was not an open trial. It is not
disputed that there is no material at all to suggest that anyone who
wanted to attend the trial was prevented from so doing or one who wanted
to go into the Court room was not allowed to do so and in­. absence of any
such material on actual facts all these legal arguments loses its
significance.
1988 0 AIR(SC) 1883; 1988 2 Crimes(SC) 981; 1988 3 Crimes(SC) 209;
1989 0 CrLJ 1; 1988 3 JT 191; 1988 2 Scale 117; 1988 3 SCC 609;
1988 0 SCC(Cri) 711; 1988 Supp2 SCR 24; 1988 0 Supreme(SC) 475;
Kehar Singh & ors Vs State Delhi Administration.

It is trite to say that every confession must necessarily be an admission,

but, every admission does not necessarily amount to a confession. While
Section 17 to 23 deals with admissions, the law as to confessions is
embodied in Sections 24 to 30 of the Evidence Act. Section 25 bars proof
of a confession made to a police officer. Section 26 goes a step further and
prohibits proof of confession made by any person while he is in the
custody of a police officer, unless it be made in the immediate presence of
a Magistrate. Section 24 lays down the obvious rule that a confession
made under any inducement, threat or promise becomes irrelevant in a
criminal proceeding. Such inducement, threat or promise need not be
proved to the hilt. If it appears to the court that the making of the
confession was caused by any induce­ment, threat or promise proceeding
from a person in authority, the confession is liable to be excluded from
evidence. The ex­pression ‘appears’ connotes that the Court need not go to
the extent of holding that the threat etc. has in fact been proved. If the
facts and circumstances emerging from the evidence adduced make it
reasonably probable that the confession could be the result of threat,
inducement or pressure, the court will refrain from acting on such
confession, even if it be a confession made to a Magistrate or a person
other than police officer. Confessions leading to discovery of fact which is
dealt with under Section 27 is an exception to the rule of exclusion of
confession made by an accused in the custody of a police officer.
Consideration of a proved confession affecting the person making it as well
as the co­accused is provided for by Section 30. Briefly and broadly, this is
the scheme of the law of evidence vis­a­vis confessions. (Para 8)
Confessions are considered highly reliable because no rational person
would make admission against his interest unless prompted by his
conscience to tell the truth. “Deliberate and voluntary confessions of guilt,
if clearly prove are among the most effec­tual proofs in law”. (vide Taylor’s
Treatise on the Law of Evi­dence Vol. I). However, before acting upon a
confession the court must be satisfied that it was freely and voluntarily
made. A confession by hope or promise of advantage, reward or immunity
or by force or by fear induced by violence or threats of violence cannot
constitute evidence against the maker of confes­sion. The confession
should have been made with full knowledge of the nature and
consequences of the confession. If any reasonable doubt is entertained by
the court that these ingredients are not satisfied, the court should eschew
the confession from considera­tion. So also the ­authority recording the
confession ­ be it a Magistrate or some other statutory func­tionary at the
pre­trial stage, must address himself to the issue whether the accused has
come forward to make the confession in an atmosphere free from fear,
duress or hope of some advantage or reward induced by the persons in
authority. Recognizing the stark reality of the ac­cused being enveloped in
a state of fear and panic, anxiety and despair while in police custody, the
Indian Evidence Act has excluded the admissibility of a confession made to
the police officer. Section 164 of Cr.P.C. is a salutary provision which lays
down certain precautionary rules to be followed by the Magistrate a
confession so as to ensure the voluntariness of the confession and the
accused being placed in a situation free from threat or influence of the
police. (Para 8)
The crucial expression used in Section 30 is “the Court may take into
consi­deration such confession”. These words imply that the confession of
a co­accused cannot be elevated to the status of substantive evidence
which can form the basis of conviction of the co­accused. (Para 8)
There is one more point which we would like to discuss i.e. whether
pointing out a material object by the accused furnishing the information is
a necessary concomitant of Section 27. We think that the answer should
be in the negative. Though in most of the cases the person who makes the
disclosure himself leads the Police Officer to the place where an object is
concealed and points out the same to him, however, it is not essential that
there should be such pointing out in order to make the information
admissible under Section 27. It could very well be that on the basis of
information furnished by the accused, the Investigating Officer may go to
the spot in the company of other witnesses and recover the material
object. By doing so, the Investigating Officer will be discovering a fact viz.,
the concealment of an incriminating article and the knowledge of the
accused furnishing the information about it. In other words, where the
information furnished by the person in custody is verified by the Police
Officer by going to the spot mentioned by the informant and finds it to be
correct, that amounts to discovery of fact within the meaning of Section
27. Of course, it is subject to the rider that the information so furnished
was the immediate and proximate cause of discovery. If the Police­ Officer
chooses not to take the informant­accused to the spot, it will have no
bearing on the point of admissibility under Section 27, though it may be
one of the aspects that goes into evaluation of that particular piece of
evidence. (Para 13)
(viii) Evidence Act, 1872—Sections 65B and 63—Call details of mobile
phones—Proof and authenticity—Printouts taken from computers/servers
by mechanical process—Whether can be led into evidence—(Yes)—There is
no bar to adducing secondary evidence under Sections 63 and 65 of
Evidence Act.
2005 0 AIR(SC) 3820; 2005 0 AIR(SCW) 4148; 2005 0 AIR(SCW) 4146;
2006 1 BBCJ(SC) 96; 2005 3 Crimes(SC) 87; 2005 0 CrLJ 3950; 2005
3 JCC 1404; 2005 7 JT 1; 2005 6 Scale 177; 2005 11 SCC 600; 2005
0 SCC(Cri) 1715; 2005 6 SCJ 210; 2005 5 Supreme 414; 2005 0
Supreme(SC) 985; State (N.C.T. of Delhi) Vs Navjot Sandhu @ Afsan
Guru.

Evidence – Special court taking contents of Jankiraman Committee as

evidence to indict accused 6 – Committee not a court, merely a fact finding
committee – Contents of the report could not be admitted in evidence
without formal proof. (Para 77, 80)
Criminal conspiracy – Independent offence punishable separately – Must
be proved independently – Ingredients – Prosecution must establish
meeting point of two or more persons for doing or causing to be done an
illegal act or an act by illegal means – Conspiracy may be general or
separate – May develop in successive stages – A smaller conspiracy may be
a part of a larger conspiracy.
Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Section 43 – Illegal – What is? – Everything
constituting an offence; everything prohibited by law; and everything
furnishing ground for civil action.
Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Section 409 – CBI initiating action on basis of
Janakiraman Committee report – Concerned Banks are not required by
law to make a complaint – It is also not the requirement that the Banks
must have ultimately suffer some loss – Commission of criminal breach of
trust attracts section 409 – That apart, such act may amount to temporary
embezzlement of public money.
Criminal and civil breach of trust – Breach of trust simpliciter involves civil
wrong – Can be redressed by damages – Breach of trust with mens rea is
criminal breach of trust giving rise to criminal prosecution as well –
Misappropriation with a dishonest intention, even temporary
misappropriation – Most essential ingredient of proof of criminal breach of
trust
2010 0 AIR(SC) 1812; 2009 3 CCR(SC) 658; 2009 10 JT 597; 2009 4
RCR(Cri) 140; 2009 11 SCC 737; 2010 1 SCC(Cri) 164; 2009 0
Supreme(SC) 1417; R.Venkatakrishnan Vs C.B.I.

It is now well settled that the discovery of fact referred to in Section 27 of

the Evidence Act is not the object recovered but the fact embraces the
place from which the object is recovered and the knowledge of the accused
as to it.
It is not the requirement of law that unless prosecution establishes a
motive of the accused to murder the deceased prosecution must
necessarily fail. No doubt it is a sound principle to remember that every
criminal act was done with a motive but its corollary is not that no
criminal offence would have been committed if prosecution has failed to
prove the precise motive of the accused to commit it.
There is nothing in Section 27 of the Evidence Act which renders the
statement of the accused inadmissible if re­covery of the articles was made
from any place which is ‘open or accessible to others’; the crucial question
is not whether the place was accessible to others or not but whether it was
ordinarily visible to others. If it is not, then it is immaterial that the
concealed place is accessible to others. 1999 0 AIR(SC) 1293; 1999 0
AIR(SCW) 982; 1999 1 BBCJ(SC) 177; 1999 2 CCR(SC) 8; 1999 1
CHN(SC) 103; 1999 2 Crimes(SC) 31; 1999 0 CrLJ 2025; 1999 1 JCC
215; 1999 2 JT 99; 1999 2 KLT(SC) 902; 1999 2 RCR(Cri) 167; 1999 2
Scale 19; 1999 4 SCC 370; 1999 0 SCC(Cri) 539; 1999 3 Supreme 230;
1999 0 Supreme(SC) 312; State of H.P. Vs Jeet Singh.

Evidence Act, 1872 ­ Sections 32 and 62, Explanation 2 ­ Offence of rape

The Doctor was not available for giving evidence as she had proceeded on
long leave­Carbon copy of the medical certificate was admissible in
evidence. (Para 4)
Indian Penal Code, 1860 ­Section 376 ­Conviction under­Appeal­Medical
evidence showing signs of inflammation around the vulva; the vagina
bleeding, the hymen absent with the edges torn, and tenderness and
around­Hymen was bleeding on touch and the vagina admitted one finger
with difficulty­The appellant, 18 years of age was fit to indulge in sexual
intercourse­Radiological examination­Prosecutrix was between 8½ and 12
years of age­Human blood on her salwar­No spermatozoa detected­
Prosecution case of profuse bleeding ­ Longstanding enmity between two
families­Possibility of false implication ruled out­Conviction is legally
sustainable. (Para 10)
1989 1 Crimes(SC) 384; 1989 0 CrLJ 841; 1989 0 SCC(Cri) 702; 1989
1 JT 106; 1989 1 Scale 74; 1989 1 SCC 432; 1989 0 SCC(Cri) 206;
1989 1 SCR 123; 1989 0 Supreme(SC) 28; Prithi Chand Vs State of
H.P.

Indian Penal Code, 1860 ­ Section 376 ­ Prosecutrix a poor labourer,

working in factory, taken & lifted to machine room & raped by appellant ­
Prosecutrix had no reason to falsely involve appellant ­ Semen stains on
her petticoat & in vagina lend corroboration to her evidence ­ Absence of
injury explained by her that she was laid on minute sand found acceptable
­ It is safe to place reliance on her testimony ­ Conviction calls for no
interference. (Para 7)
Indian Penal Code, 1860 ­ Section 376 ­ Delay in lodging FIR ­ In such
cases no inference can be drawn that complaint is false. (Para 6)
Indian Penal Code 1860 ­ Section 376 Defective investigation ­ Two
independent witnesses who could have corroborated prosecutrix not
examined ­ I.O. not referring to attachment of semen stained chaddi of
accused ­ Court however would not be right in acquitting accused solely
on account of such defects. (Paras 3 to 5)
1995 0 AIR(SC) 2472; 1995 0 AIR(SCW) 3644; 1995 4 CCR(SC) 10;
1995 3 Crimes(SC) 527; 1995 0 CrLJ 4173; 1995 6 JT 437; 1996 1
PLJR(SC) 11; 1995 3 RCR(Cri) 526; 1995 4 Scale 752; 1995 5 SCC
518; 1995 0 SCC(Cri) 977; 1995 0 Supreme(SC) 805; 1995 2 UJ 646;
Karnel Singh Vs State of M.P.

The probative value of the evidence is the weight to be given to it which

has to be judged having regard to the facts and circumstances of each
case.
2. Generally, the dying declaration u/s. 32(1) of Evidence Act, 1872 ought
to be recorded in the form of questions­answers but if a dying declaration
is not elaborate but consists of only a few sentences and is in the actual
words of the maker, the mere fact that it is not in question­answer form
cannot be a ground against its acceptability or reliability.
3. The mental condition of the maker of the dying declaration, alert­ness of
mind, memory and understanding of what he is saying, are matters which
can be observed by any person. But to lend assurance to those factors
having regard to the importance of the dying declara­tion, the certificate of
a medically trained person is insisted upon. In the absence of availability
of a doctor to certify the above­men­tioned factors, if there is other
evidence to show that the recorder of the statement has satisfied himself
about those requirements before recording the dying declaration, there is
no reason as to why the dying declaration u/s. 32(1) of Evidence Act, 1872
should not be accepted.
1998 0 AIR(SC) 1850; 1998 0 AIR(SCW) 1647; 1998 0 BBCJ(SC) 198;
1998 2 Crimes(SC) 254; 1998 0 CrLJ 2515; 1998 3 JT 290; 1998 2
PLJR(SC) 169; 1998 2 RCR(Cri) 403; 1998 3 Scale 200; 1998 4 SCC
517; 1998 4 Supreme 178; 1998 0 Supreme(SC) 503; Ram Bihari
Yadav Vs State of Bihar.

Where Statements of the deceased to several witnesses including Police

Sub­Inspector who recorded the statement consistently and clearly stated
manner of assault and identified the accused, conviction treat­ing
statements as dying declarations was justified.
1999 0 AIR(SC) 644; 1999 0 AIR(SCW) 296; 1999 1 CCR(SC) 1; 1999 0
CrLJ 1122; 1999 1 JCC 70; 1999 1 JT 25; 1999 1 PLJR(SC) 66; 1999
1 RCR(Cri) 627; 1999 1 Scale 26;; 1999 0 SCC(Cri) 85; 1999 1 SCJ
299; 1999 1 Supreme 2; 1999 0 Supreme(SC) 22; (1999 2 SCC 1260 :
1999 SCC (Crl. ) 104 : 1999 Crl. L.J. 1122 : 1999(1) JT 25 : 1999(1)
CCR 1 : 1999(1) SCJ 299 Paras Yadav & Ors. v. State of Bihar,

that invariably the witnesses and embroidery to prosecution story,

perhaps for the fear of being disbelieved. But that is no ground to throw
the case overboard, if true, in the main. If there is a ring of truth in the
main, the case should not be rejected. It is the duty of the Court to cull
out the nuggets of truth from the evidence unless there is reason to believe
that the inconsistencies or falsehood are so glaring as utterly to destroy
confidence in the witnesses. It is necessary to remember that a Judge does
not preside over a criminal trial merely to see that no innocent man is of
punished. A Judge also presides to see that as guilty man does not escape.
One is as important as the other. Both are public duties which the Judge
has to perform. (Para 10) 1988 3 Crimes(SC) 367; 1989 0 CrLJ 88; 1989
0 SCC(Cri) 58; State of U.P. Vs Anil Singh.

It is not unknown that where serious offences like the present are
committed and a large number of accused persons are tried, attempts are
made either to terrorise or win over prosecution witnesses, and if the
prosecutor honestly and bona fide believes that some of his witnesses have
been won over, it would be unreasonable to insist that he must tender
such witnesses before the Court. It is undoubtedly the duty of the
prosecution to lay before the Court all material evidence available to it
which is necessary for unfolding its case; but it would be unsound to lay
down as a general rule that every witness must be examined even though
his evidence may not be very material or even if it is known that he has
been won over or terrorised. In such a case, it is always open to the
defence to examine such witnesses as their witnesses and the Court can
also call such witnesses in the box in the interest of justice under S. 540,
Cr. P. C.
It may be conceded that if a point of fact which plainly arises on the
record, or a point of law which is relevant and material and can be argued
without any further evidence being taken was urged before the trial Court
and after it was rejected by it was not repeated before the High Court, it
may, in a proper case be permissible to the appellants to ask this Court to
consider that point in an appeal under Art. 136 of the Constitution;
1965 0 AIR(SC) 202; 1965 0 CrLJ 226; 1964 8 SCR 133; 1964 0
Supreme(SC) 164; Masalti Vs State of U.P.

Evidence Act 1872, Sections 134 and Penal Code 1860, section 149 ­
Criminal trial unlawful Assemble ­ Identification of accused ­ There is no
rule of evidence that no conviction can be based unless a certain minimum
number of witnesses have identified a particular accused as a member of
unlawful assembly ­ Evidence is not to be counted but only weighed ­ It is
not the quantity of evidence but the quality that matters ­ Even the
testimony of one single witness if wholly reliable is sufficient to establish
identification of an accused ­ when, size of unlawful assembly is quite
large a formula should be adopted to insist all at least two reliable
witnesses. (Para 30)
Evidence Act 1872, section 11 ­ "Alibi" ­ Meaning of ­ "Alibi" not an
exception (special or general) ­ It is only a rule of evidence recognised in
section 11 that facts which are inconsistent with the fact in issue are
relevant. Strict proof is required for establishing the plea of alibi. (Para
21 & 22)
Evidence Act 1872, section 3 ­ Appreciation of evidence of eye­witnesses ­
Re­appreciation of evidence on the strength of some discrepancies which
do not appear to be material or serious ­ Held ­ Concurrent finding
regarding reliability of evidence of those witnesses can not be disturbed.
(Para 29)
Evidence Act 1872, section 3 ­ Massacre ­ Identification of assailants ­
There is no justification in drawing a hiatus between injured witnesses
and non injured witnesses as for capacity to identify the assailants while
in action ­ Held ­ No fault can be found with them as to their inability to
identify assailants. (Para 15)
1997 0 AIR(SC) 322; 1997 0 AIR(SCW) 78; 1998 0 BBCJ(SC) 1; 1997 0
CrLJ 362; 1996 10 JT 79; 1997 1 PLJR(SC) 159; 1997 1 PLJR(SC) 24;
1998 1 RCR(Cri) 620; 1997 1 RCR(Cri) 178; 1996 7 Scale 910; 1997 1
SCC 283; 1996 0 Supreme(SC) 1810; Binay Kumar Singh Vs State of
Bihar.

Non­framing of charge would not vitiate the conviction if no prejudice is

caused thereby to the accused. As observed in the aforesaid case, the trial
should be fair to the accused, fair to the State and fair to the vast mass of
the people for whose protection penal laws are made and administered.
Criminal Procedure Code is a procedural law and is designed to further the
ends of justice and not to frustrate them by the introduction of endless
technicalities.
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 ­ Section 464­Non­framing of charge­
Would not vitiate conviction if no prejudice is caused to accused.
1999 0 AIR(SC) 775; 1999 0 AIR(SCW) 390; 1999 2 BBCJ(SC) 26; 1999
1 CCR(SC) 54; 1999 1 Crimes(SC) 50; 1999 0 CrLJ 1134; 1999 1 JT
259; 1999 1 RCR(Cri) 839; 1999 1 Scale 235; 1999 2 SCC 522; 1999 0
SCC(Cri) 281; 1999 1 Supreme 308; 1999 0 Supreme(SC) 116;
Kammari Brahmiah And Ors vs Public Prosecutor, High Court

There is neither any rule of law no of prudence that evidence furnished by

extra­judicial confession cannot be relied upon unless corroborated by
some other credible evidence. The Courts have considered the evidence of
extra­judicial confession a weak piece of evidence. (See Jagta v. State of
Haryana (1975) 1 SCR 165 at. P. 170 and State of Punjab v. Bhajan Singh
(1975) 1 SCR 747 at. P. 751. In Sahoo v. State of U. P. (1965) 3 SCR 86 it
was held that an extra­judicial confession may be an expression of conflict
of emotion, a conscious effort to stifle the pricked conscience; an argument
to find excuse or justification for his act; or a penitent or remorseful act of
exaggeration of his part in the crime. Before evidence in this behalf is
accepted, it must be established by cogent evidence what were the exact
words used by the accused. The Court proceeded to state that even if so
much was extablished, prudence and justice demand that such evidence
cannot be made the sole ground of conviction. It may be used only as a
corroborative piece of evidence. In that case, the evidence was that after
the commission of murder the accused was heard muttering to himself
that he has finished the deceased. The High Court did not interfere with
the conviction observing that the evidence of extra­judicial confession is
corroborated by circumstantial evidence. However in Pyara Singh v. State
of Punjab (1978) 1 SCR 597 this Court, observed that the law does not
require that evidence of an extra­judicial confession should in all cases be
corroborated. It thus appears that extra­judicial confession appears to
have been treated as a weak piece of evidence but there is no rule of law
nor rule of prudence that it cannot be acted upon unless corroborated. If
the evidence about extra­judicial confession comes from the mouth of
witness / witnesses who appear to be unbiased, not even remotely inimical
to the accused, and in respect of whom nothing is brought out Which may
tend to indicate that he may have a motive for attributing an untruthful
statement to the accused; the words spoken to by the witness are clear,
unambiguous and unmistakably convey that the accused is the
perpetrator of the crime and nothing is omitted by the witness which may
militate against it, then after subjecting the evidence of the witness to a
rigorous test, on the touchstone of credibility, if it passes the test, the
extra­judicial confession can be accepted and can be, the basis of a
conviction. In such a situation to go in search of corroboration itself tends
to cast a shadow of doubt over the evidence. If the evidence of extra­
judicial confession is reliable, trustworthy and beyond reproach the Same
can be relied upon and a conviction can be founded thereon.
While appreciating the evidence of a witness, the approach must be
whether the evidence of the witness read as a whole appears to have a ring
of truth. Once that impression is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary for
the Court to scrutinise the evidence more particularly keeping in view the
deficiencies drawbacks and infirmities pointed out in the evidence, as a
whole and evaluate them to find out whether it is against the general tenor
of the evidence given by the witness and whether the earlier, evaluation of
the evidence. is shaken as to render it unworthy of belief. Minor
discrepancies on trivial matters not touching the core of the case, hyper­
technical approach by taking sentences torn out of context here or there
from the evidence, Attaching importance to some technical error
committed by/ the investigating officer not going to the root of the matter
would not ordinarily permit rejection of the evidence as hole. It the Court
before whom the witness gives evidence had the opportunity to form the
opinion About the general tenor of evidence given by the witness, the
appellate Court which had not this benefit will have to attach due weight
to the appreciation of evidence by the trial Court and unless there are
reasons weighty and formidable it would not be proof to reject the evidence
on the ground of minor variations or infirmities in the matter of trivial
details. Even honest and truthful witnesses may differ in some details
unrelated to the main incident because power of observation, retention
and reproduction differ with individuals. Cross examination is an unequal
duel between a rustic and refined lawyer. Having examined the evidence of
this witness, a friend and well­wisher of the family carefully giving due
weight to the comments made­by the learned counsel for the respondent
and the reasons assigned to by the High Court for rejecting his evidence
simultaneously keeping in view the appreciation of the evidence of this
witness by the trial Court, we have no hesitation in holding that the High
Court was in error in rejecting the testimony of witness Nair whose
evidence appears to us trustworthy and credible.
If the investigating officer did obtain the signature of Nair an intimate
friend of the ,respondent speaking about the confession of the respondent,
it may be that it may be a violation of See. 162 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure but no attempt was made to verify this fact by referring to the
case diary. The Court is always entitled to look into the case diary.
Assuming that Nairs admission that his signature was obtained on the
statement recorded by the investigating officer on March 1, 1973, is
correct, it does not render his evidence inadmissible. It merely puts the
Court on caution and may necessitate indepth scrutiny of the evidence.
But the evidence on this account cannot be, rejected outright. Sec. 162 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure does not provide that evidence of a witness
given in the Court becomes inadmissible if it is found that the statement of
the witness recorded in course of the investigation was signed by the
witness at the instance of the investigating officer. Such is not the effect of
contravention of Sec. 162 Code of Criminal Procedure.
1985 0 AIR(SC) 48; 1985 0 CrLJ 493; 1985 1 RCR(Cri) 87; 1984 2
Scale 728; 1985 1 SCC 505; 1985 0 SCC(Cri) 105; 1984 0
Supreme(SC) 322; State of U.P. Vs. M.K. Anthony.

Though the trial court referred to the evidence of the eye­witnesses, it

chose to disbelieve them merely on account of minor inconsistencies in
their evidence, relating to the exact site of occurrence and failure to name
all who landed blows and the exact nature of injuries. The High Court, on
the other hand, held that minor inconsistencies and discrepancies
regarding the exact place or the point at which the incident took place or
as to who landed the blows is not sufficient to disbelieve the evidence of
injured eye­witnesses. It is not necessary that all eye­witnesses should
specifically refer to the distinct acts of each member of an unlawful
assembly. In fact, it is difficult, if not impossible. (Para 14)
The contention that when only four persons are found guilty, there cannot
be conviction under section 149 IPC, has no merit. Section 149 provides
that if an offence is committed by any member of an unlawful assembly in
prosecution of the common object of that assembly, or such as the
members of that assembly knew to be likely to be committed in
prosecution of that object, every person who, at the time of the committing
of that offence, is a member of the same assembly, is guilty of that offence.
Section 141 requires a minimum of five persons for being designated as an
‘unlawful assembly’. The question has been specifically considered by this
Court. (Paras 17 & 18)
2006 0 AIR(SC) 831; 2006 0 AIR(SCW) 177; 2006 2 BBCJ(SC) 64; 2006
1 Crimes(SC) 1; 2006 0 CrLJ 799; 2006 1 JCC 163; 2006 2 JT 631;
2006 1 RCR(Cri) 427; 2006 1 SBR 493; 2006 1 Scale 100; 2006 10
SCC 313; 2006 3 SCC(Cri) 546; 2006 3 SCJ 141; 2006 1 Supreme 30;
2006 0 Supreme(SC) 14 Kallu @ Masih & Ors. Vs State of M.P.

Criminal Trial – Unlawful Assembly – It is well­settled that where a crowd

of assailants who are members of an unlawful assembly proceeds to
commit an offence in pursuance of common object of unlawful assembly, it
is often not possible for witnesses to describe accurately part played by
each one of the assailants­ Besides, if a large crowd of persons armed with
weapons assaults a victim, it is not necessary that all of them must take
part in the actual assault – Even in absence of actual assault, all members
of unlawful assembly may be held vicariously liable for the acts of others
provided there was common object to commit a crime – Appreciation of
evidence in such a complex situation is indeed a difficult task, but courts
exercising powers in administering criminal justice have to do their best in
dealing with such cases and it is expected of them to discharge their duty
to sift the evidence carefully and to decide which part of it is true and
which is not. (Para 15)
2008 11 JT 435; 2009 3 SCC(Cri) 1214; 2008 7 Supreme 578; 2008 0
Supreme(SC) 1547; Viji & Anr Vs State of Karnataka.
Relationship is not a factor to affect credibility of a witness. It is more often
than not that a relation would not conceal actual culprit and make
allegations against an innocent person. Foundation has to be laid if plea of
false implication is made. In such cases, the court has to adopt a careful
approach and analyse evidence to find out whether it is cogent ad credible.
(Para 11)
Exaggerated devotion to the rule of benefit of doubt must not nurture
fanciful doubts or lingering suspicion and thereby destroy social defence.
Justice cannot be made sterile on the plea that it is better to let hundred
guilty escape than punish an innocent. Letting guilty escape is not doing
justice according to law. (Para 18)
Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make a
world of difference between conclusions in two cases (see Padamasundara
Rao (dead) and Ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors. [JT 2002 (3) SC 1]. It is
more so in a case where conclusions relate to appreciation of evidence in a
criminal trial, as was observed in Krishna Mochi s case (supra). The
inevitable result of this appeal is dismissal which we direct. (Paras 29 and
30)
2002 0 AIR(SC) 3633; 2002 0 AIR(SCW) 4271; 2002 3 BBCJ(SC) 220;
2003 1 Crimes(SC) 28; 2003 0 CrLJ 41; 2002 8 JT 135; 2002 7 Scale
402; 2002 8 SCC 381; 2003 0 SCC(Cri) 32; 2002 7 Supreme 276; 2002
0 Supreme(SC) 1028; Gangadhar Behera & Ors Vs State of Orissa.

The learned defence counsel contended that these judicial confessions

should not have been admitted into evidence at all in absence of
examining the Magistrate who recorded the same. We think this
contention has no force. Section 80 of the Evidence Act provides that
whenever any document is produced before any Court purporting to be a
statement or concession by any prisoner or accused person, taken in
accordance with law, and purporting to be signed by any Judge or
Magistrate, or by any officer authorised by law to take evidence, the Court
shall presume that the document is genuine; that any statements as to the
circumstances under which it was taken, purporting to be made by the
person signing it, are true, and that such statement or confession was
duly taken. The Supreme Court in the case of Kashmira Singh v. State of
Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1952 SC 159 : (1952 Cri LJ 839), repelled the
defence criticism in that case based on the fact that the Magistrate who
recorded the confession had not been examined as a witness. Their
Lordships endorsed the remarks of the Privy Council in Nazir Ahmed's
case (AIR 1936 PC 253) : (37 Cri LJ 897) regarding the undesirability of
calling the Magistrate who recorded the confession as a witness. This
Court in the case of Bisipati Padhan v. State, 1969 O.JD. 71 : (1969 Cri LJ
1517), has also taken the view that the confessional statement can be
admitted into evidence and made an exhibit without examining the
Magistrate in court. This is what has exactly been done in this case by
exhibiting the two judicial confessions as Exts. 18 and 18/1. If the defence
had brought out such facts as would have destroyed the presumption of
Section 80 of the Evidence Act, then, in such a contingency the
prosecution may probably have had to examine the Magistrate to
corroborate the presumption and to prove that all the formalities required
by law had been complied with before recording the Judicial confession.
The appellants 1 and 2, however do not take any such plea that the
formalities were not complied with. On the contrary, appellant No. 2
completely denied to have made a confession, a statement which is
palpably false.
1976 0 CrLJ 325; 1975 0 Supreme(Ori) 60; BANDHU KICHEI AND
OTHERS VERSUS THE STATE.

the court dealt with the meaning of the word "instigation" and "goading".
The court has opined that there should be intention to provoke, incite or
encourage the doing of an act by the latter. Each person's suicidability
pattern is different from the other. Each person has his own idea of self­
esteem and self­respect. Therefore, it is impossible to lay down any
straitjacket formula in dealing with such cases. Each case has to be
decided on the basis of its own facts and circumstances. Abetment
involves a mental process of instigating a person or intentionally aiding a
person in doing of a thing. Without a positive act on the part of the
accused to instigate or aid in committing suicide, conviction cannot be
sustained. The intention of the legislature and the ratio of the cases
decided by the apex court were clear that in order to convict a person
under section 306 of the IPC, there has to be a clear mens rea to commit
the offence and it also requires an active act or direct act which lead the
deceased to commit suicide seeing no option and that act must have been
intended to push the deceased into such a position that he committed
suicide.
Indian Penal Code, 1860 ­ Sections 107 and 306 ­ Abetment of suicide ­
direct involvement of person concerned in the commission of offence of
suicide is essential to bring home offence u/s 306 word uttered in a fit of
anger or emotion without intending consequences to actually follow,
cannot be said to be instigation ­ presence of mens rea is necessary
concomitant of instigation ­ to constitute an offence u/s 306, prosecution
has to establish that a person committed suicide, and that such suicide
was abetted by accused ­ any willful misrepresentation or willful
concealment of material fact which accused is bound to disclose, may also
come within contours of abetment. (Paras 11 to 15) Chitresh Kumar
Chopra Vs State (Govt. NCT of Delhi) 2009 3 ACR(SC) 2608; 2010 0
AIR(SC) 1446; 2009 4 BBCJ(SC) 311; 2009 4 CCR(SC) 1; 2009 4 JCC
2507; 2009 4 JLJR(SC) 150; 2009 10 JT 698; 2009 4 RCR(Cri) 196;
2009 16 SCC 605; 2009 0 Supreme(SC) 1432;
Two panch witnesses on the fact of recovery turned hostile­Testimony of
police official was however supported by fact that lethal weapons were
produced before the Court after recovery­No reason to reject the testimony
of police witness and conviction called for no interference. (Para 7)
2000 4 Crimes(SC) 290; 2000 8 JT 104; 2001 9 SCC 362; 2000 7
Supreme 687; 2000 0 Supreme(SC) 881;Mohd Aslam Vs State of
Maharasthra.

CRIMINAL TRIAL ­ Adjournment of trial of sessions case for cross­

examination of prosecution witnesses ­witnesses resiling from their earlier
statements on the adjourned date ­Court can take earliest version given by
witnesses ­ Duty of court to proceed for perjury against hostile witnesses ­
Adjournment of case for recording evidence by Sessions Court ­
Deprecated
1995 0 CrLJ 1738; 1994 1 LS 255; 1994 0 Supreme(AP) 175; Pubi
Satyanarayana @ Satteyya Vs State of A.P.

Penal Code Sec. 408 & 109 ­ Prosecution of Chairman and member of the
Co­operative Society for conspiracy to commit criminal breach of trust ­
Facts found leading to no case of defalcation ­ Prosecution must prove
cohesion and collusion between all the accused ­ Conviction can not be
based on the principles of vicarious liability. (Para 8)
1984 0 AIR(SC) 151; 1984 0 BBCJ(SC) 1; 1983 2 Crimes(SC) 942;
1984 0 CrLJ 162; 1983 2 Scale 709; 1984 Supp1 SCC 207; 1984 0
SCC(Cri) 474; 1984 1 SCR 797; 1983 0 Supreme(SC) 366; Jethsur
Surangabhai Vs. State of Gujarat

It is now well settled that FIR need not be encyclopedic.

Non recovery of incriminating material from accused cannot be a ground
to exonerate them of charges when eye witnesses examined by prosecution
were found to be trustworthy. . 2008 1 AD(Cr) 21; 2008 0 CrLJ 816;
2008 1 RCR(Cri) 574; 2007 14 SCC 711; 2009 3 SCC(Cri) 244; 2007 8
Supreme 573; 2007 0 Supreme(SC) 1591; Umar Mohammed Vs State
of Rajasthan.

Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 9 — Test identification parade — When FIR

is lodged against unknown person, a test identification parade is held for
testing veracity of witness in regard to his capability of identifying person
— Holding of a test identification parade after a long time will loose its
significance. (Paras 17 and 20)
It is no doubt true that the substantive evidence of identification of an
accused is the one made in the court. A judgment of conviction can be
arrived at even if no test identification parade has been held. But when a
First Information Report has been lodged against unknown persons, a test
identification parade in terms of Section 9 of the Evidence Act, is held for
the purpose of testing the veracity of the witness in regard to his capability
of identifying persons who were unknown to him.
2007 0 AIR(Kar)(R) 30; 2007 0 AIR(SC) 1729; 2007 0 AIR(SCW) 2740;
2007 0 CrLJ 2740; 2007 3 JCR(SC) 47; 2007 7 JT 55; 2007 3
RCR(Cri) 97; 2007 6 Scale 216; 2007 3 Supreme 781; 2007 0
Supreme(SC) 610; Ravi @ Ravichandran Vs State.

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973­Section 239­Indian Evidence Act, 1872­

Section 10­Discharge of accused­Legality of­Offence under Section 409
r/w 120­B of IPC and Section 13(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act­
Respondent Ex­Chief Minister arraigned as prime accused along with
other accused persons who were Minister and Government Officers­Trial
Court discharging respondent on ground material were insufficient to
frame charge against her but framing charges against other accused
persons­Reasoning of trial Court any High Court that while signing
concerned file objection note of Secretary was not there and Chief
Minister, respondent, would not have known conspiracy­Held, on basis of
material available on record there is strong presumption, under
respondent affords satisfactory explanation, that respondent was aware of
serious consequence of dial on State exchequer as pointed out by
Secretary­Court can presume there are reasonable ground to believe she
was involved in conspiracy envisaged in Section 10 of Evidence Act­
Exercise at stage of discharge must be confined to considering police
report and documents to decide allegations against accused­Discharge
order of trial Court as confirmed by High Court set aside.
2000 0 AIR(SC) 1589; 2000 0 AIR(SCW) 1737; 2000 3 CCR(SC) 25;
2000 2 Crimes(SC) 292; 2000 2 JCC 514; 2000 6 JT 260; 2000 3
RCR(Cri) 407; 2000 4 Scale 390; 2000 5 SCC 440; 2000 0 SCC(Cri)
981; 2000 3 Supreme 768; 2000 0 Supreme(SC) 1016; State of Tamil
Nadu Vs. J. Jayalalitha

Criminal trial­Appreciation of evidence­Evidence of investi­gation officer­

Even if investigation is illegal or even suspicious rest of evidence must be
scrutinised independently­Court must have predomi­nence and pre­
eminence in criminal trials over action by investigating officers­If Court is
convinced that testimony of witness to occurrence is true Court is free to
act on it albeit investigation officer’s suspicious role in the case.
Trial Court cannot overlook the reality that an investigating officer comes
to the Court for giving evidence after conducting inves­tigation in many
other cases also in the meanwhile. Evidence giving process should not bog
down to memory tests of witnesses. An investi­gating officer must answer
the questions in Court, as far as possible, only with reference to what he
had recorded during investigation. Such records are the contemporaneous
entries made by him and hence for refreshing his memory it is always
advisable that he looks into those records before answering any question.
(Para 21)
Criminal Courts should not expect a set reaction from any eye witness on
seeing an incident like murder. If five persons witness one incident there
could be five different types of reactions from each of them. It is neither a
tutored impact nor a structured reaction which the eye witness can make.
It is fallacious to suggest that PW­11 would have done this or that on
seeing the incident. Unless the reaction demonstrated by an eye witness is
so improbable or so inconceivable from any human being pitted in such a
situation it is unfair to dub his reactions as unnatural. (Para 26)
The general rule of evidence is that no witness shall be cited to contradict
another witness if the evidence is intended only to shake the credit of
another witness. The said rule has been incorporated in Section 153 of the
Evidence Act. The basic requirement for adducing such contradictory
evidence is that the witness, whose impartiality is sought to be
contradicted with the help of such evidence, should have been asked
about it and he should have denied it. Without adopting such a
preliminary recourse it would be meaningless, if not unfair, to bring in a
new witness to speak something fresh about a witness already examined.
As the general rule of evidence is one of prohibiting evidence on collateral
issues and since it is only by way of exception that such evidence can be
permitted, the Court must guard that the defence evidence falls strictly
within the exception. (Paras 28, 30 & 31).
2000 0 AIR(SC) 185; 1999 0 AIR(SCW) 4276; 1999 3 Crimes(SC) 171;
2000 0 CrLJ 400; 1999 8 JT 10; 2000 1 PLJR(SC) 42; 1999 4 RCR(Cri)
508; 1999 6 Scale 330; 1999 8 SCC 715; 1999 8 Supreme 496; 1999 0
Supreme(SC) 1149; State of Karnataka Vs. K. Yarappa Reddy

There is no legal requirement that a confession should be made to an

authorised officer. Any person can give evidence in a court regarding a
confession made by an accused to him. If such confession was made to a
Magistrate the law requires the same to be recorded in the manner
prescribed by law. If a confession is made to any other person the court
has to consider whether the evidence of that person can be believed which
depends upon the credibility of the witness giving such evidence in court.
2000 10 SCC 360; 1999 0 Supreme(SC) 826; Sasi Vs State of Kerala

By virtue of Section 8 of the Evidence Act, the conduct of the accused

person is relevant, if such conduct influences or is influenced by any fact
in issue or relevant fact. The evidence of the circumstance, simplicitor,
that the accused pointed out to the police officer, the place where the dead
body of the kidnapped boy was found and on their pointing out the body
was exhumed, would be admissible as conduct under Section 8
irrespective of the fact whether the statement made by the accused
contemporaneously with or antecedent to such conduct falls within the
purview of Section 27 or not as held by this Court in Prakash Chand Vs.
State (AIR 1979 SC 400). Even if we hold that the disclosure statement
made by the accused appellants (Ex. P14 and P15) is not admissible under
Section 27 of the Evidence Act, still it is relevant under Section 8.
2005 0 AIR(SC) 3809; 2005 0 AIR(SCW) 3914; 2005 4 BBCJ(SC) 152;
2005 3 Crimes(SC) 231; 2005 0 CrLJ 3732; 2005 3 JCC 1331; 2005 7
JT 246; 2005 6 Scale 348; 2005 7 SCC 714; 2005 0 SCC(Cri) 1938;
2005 5 Supreme 746; 2005 0 Supreme(SC) 1008; A.N.Venkatesh & anr
Vs. State of Karnataka.

True that these PWs are the Gotias of the deceased, but that by itself
would be no reason to discard their evidence. The appellant was also their
Gotia. Therefore, these PWs can be termed as independent witnesses.
1989 0 CrLJ 1516; 1988 0 Supreme(Pat) 321; Sarbeshwar Pragnait Vs
State of Bihar.

Non­cross examination on a vital aspect is deemed to have been admitted.

1966 0 AIR(Cal) 620; 1964 0 Supreme(Cal) 234; SUKHRAJI BHUJ vs
CALCUTTA STATE TRANSPORT CORPORATION

Freedom of expression, which is legitimate and constitutionally protected,

cannot be held to ransom by an intolerant group of people. The
fundamental freedom under Article 19 (l) (a) can be reasonably restricted
only for the purposes mentioned in Article 19 (2 and the restriction must
be justified on the anvil of necessity and not the quicksand of convenience
or expediency. Open criticism of government policies and operations is not
a ground for restricting expression. We must practice tolerance to the
views of others. Intolerance is as much dangerous to democracy as to the
person himself.
IT is really absurd to say that speeches of this kind amount to sedition. If
such were the case. then every argument against the present form of
government and in favour of some other form of government might be
alleged to lead to hatred of the government, and it might be suggested that
such ideas brought the government into contempt. To suggest some other
form of government is not necessarily to bring the present government into
hatred or contempt.
1989 2 JT 70; 1989 1 Scale 812; 1989 2 SCC 574; 1989 2 SCR 204;
1989 0 Supreme(SC) 195; S. RANGARAJAN Vs. P. JAGJIVAN RAM

a Writ Petition being W.P.(Crl.) No.155/2014 titled All India Human

Rights and Social Justice Front vs. Union of India, filed in the Supreme
Court seeking ban on another forthcoming movie „PK‟ on the ground of
the same promoting obscenity and hurting religious sentiment with the
posters of the film actor Amir Khan standing in nude on a railway track
with only a transistor protecting his modesty, was dismissed in limine.
Though the order of dismissal does not give any reasons but the news
media widely reported, the Court during the hearing having observed that
if any such restrictions were imposed, the same could affect the
Constitutional right of the film maker and that our society is a very mature
society and the petitioners therein should not be so sensitive about such a
thing.
K.A. Abbas vs. Union of India, (1970) 2 S.C.C. 780 The case related to the
documentary A tale of 4 cities, which was not given UCertificate, against
which the writ petition was filed challenged.
It was held that pre­censorship was correct as per the Constitution. The
Court observed that standards of obscenity must not be at the level of the
most depraved to determine what is morally healthy for a normal person.
It is not the elements of rape, leprosy and other social problems that
should be censored, it is the manner in which such themes are handled.
2) Maqbool Fida Hussain vs. Rajkumar Pandey, 2008 Cr. L.J.4107 This
case, which was decided by one of us (S.K. Kaul, C.J.), related to private
complaints filed against the noted painter M.F. Hussain for allegedly
vilifying Hindu Gods and Goddesses through his art work.
It was observed therein, quoting with approval the ratio of Samaresh Bose
vs. Amal Mitra (1985) 4 SCC 289), that for the purposes of judging
obscenity, the judge must first place himself in the shoes of the author in
order to appreciate what the author really wishes to convey, and
thereafter, he must place himself in that position of the reader of every age
group in whose hands the book may fall and then arrive at a dispassionate
conclusion. The complaints were thus quashed.
3) Nandini Tiwari vs. Union of India, 2014 S.C.C. Online Del. 4662 This
case involved a writ petition filed to ban the Hindi film Finding Fannyfor
using the word Fanny.
The writ petition was dismissed observing that obscenity has to be judged
from the point of view of an average person, by applying contemporary
community standards. It was held that if a reference to sex by itself is
considered to be obscene and not fit to be read by adolescents, the
adolescents will not be in a position to read any novel and will have to read
books which are purely religious.
A film that illustrates the consequences of a social evil necessarily must
show that social evil. The guidelines must be interpreted in that light. No
film that extols the social evil or encourages it is permissible, but a film
that carries the message that the social evil is evil cannot be made
impermissible on the ground that it depicts the social evil. At the same
time, the depiction must be just sufficient for the purpose of the film. The
drawing of the line is best left to the sensibilities of the expert Tribunal.
The Tribunal is a multi­member body. It is comprised of persons who
gauge public reactions to films and, except in cases of stark breach of
guidelines, should be permitted to go about its task
The guidelines are broad standards. They cannot be read as one would
read a statute.
1996 0 AIR(SC) 1846; 1996 0 AIR(SCW) 2156; 1996 2 CCC(SC) 193;
1996 2 CLT(SC) 333; 1996 4 JT 533; 1996 4 Scale 75; 1996 4 SCC 1;
1996 3 SCJ 70; 1996 3 Supreme 772; 1996 0 Supreme(SC) 885; Bobby
Art International Vs. Om Pal Singh Hoon & Ors

Were there serious merit in the charge, a criminal prosecution would serve
to sanitize the polluted celluloid, handcuff cinemas running erotic and
amok, and become a curial super­censorship of salacious films. Why not?
Were it otherwise, the precarious film producer had to face a new menace
to public exhibition easily set in motion through the process of the court
by any busybody willing to blackmail or wanting to harass, prodded by
rival producers. Especially when a special statute (the Cinematograph Act)
has set special standards for films for public consumption and created a
special board to screen and censor from the angle of public morals and the
like with its verdicts being subject to higher review, inexpert criminal
courts must be cautious to rush in and, indeed, must fear to tread, lest
the judicial process should become a public footpath for any highway man
wearing a moral mask holding up a film­maker who has travelled the
expensive and perilous journey to exhibition of his certificated picture.
Omniscience, if one may adapt a great thought of Justice Holmes, is not
the property of a Judge.
1980 0 AIR(SC) 258; 1980 0 CrLJ 202; 1980 1 SCC 43; 1980 0
SCC(Cri) 72; 1980 1 SCR 1081; 1979 0 Supreme(SC) 453; Raj Kapoor
Vs State

Once an expert body has considered the impact of the film on the public
and has cleared the film, it is no excuse to say that there may be a law and
order situation and that it is for the State Government concerned to see
that the law and order situation is maintained and that in any democratic
society there are bound to be divergent views.
2011 4 JLJR(SC) 112; 2011 10 JT 102; 2011 8 SCC 372; 2011 6
Supreme 109; 2011 0 Supreme(SC) 793; M/s Prakash Jha Productions
& Anr Vs. Union of India & Ors

THE question, further arises whether by interpretative process, would it be

permissible to fill in the gaps. THOugh it is settled law that in working the
law and finding yearning gaps therein, to give life and force to the
legislative intent, instead of blaming the draftsman, the courts ironed out
the creases by appropriate technique of interpretation and infused life into
dry bones of law. But such an interpretation in our respectful view is not
permissible, when we are called upon to interpret the organic Constitution
and working the political institutions created therein. When Parliament
has had an opportunity to consider what exactly is going wrong with the
political system designed by the Constitution but took no steps to amend
the Constitution in this behalf, it is a principle of legal policy, that the law
should be altered deliberately, rather than casually by a sidewind only, by
major and considered process. Amendment of the Constitution is a serious
legislative business and change in the basic law, carefully work out, more
fundamental changes are brought out by more THOrough­going and in­
depth consideration and specific provisions should be made by which it is
implemented. Such is the way to contradict the problem by the legislative
process of a civilised State. It is a well­established principle of construction
that a statute is not to be taken as affecting parliamentary alteration in
the general law unless it shows words that are found unmistakably to that
conclusion. No motive or bad faith is attributable to the legislature.
Bennion at page 338 extracting from the Institute of the Law of Scotland
Vol. 3, page I of The Practice by David Maxwell at page 127 abstracted that
"where a matter depends entirely on the construction of the words of a
statute, there cannot be any appeal to the nobile officium". He stated at
page 344 that
"where the literal meaning of the enactment goes narrower than the
object of the legislator, the court may be required to apply a rectifying
construction. Nowadays it is regarded as not in accordance with public
policy to allow a draftsman's ineptitude to prevent justice being done. This
was not always the case. "where the language of a statute is clear and
unambiguous, there is no room for the application either of the doctrine of
casus omissus or of pressing into service external aid, for in such a case
the words used by the Constitution or the statute speak for themselves
and it is not the function of the court to add words or expressions merely
to suit what the court thinks is the supposed intention of the legislature.
In American Jurisprudence 2d Series, Vol. 73 at page 397 in para 203 it is
stated that:
"it is a general rule that the courts may not, by construction insert
words or phrases in a statute or supply a casus omissus by giving force
and effect to the language of the statute when 'applied to a subject about
which nothing whatever is said, and which, to all appearances, was not in
the minds of the legislature at the time of the enactment of the law. "under
such circumstances new provisions or ideas may not be interpolated in a
statute or engrafted thereon. At page 434 in para 366 it is further stated
that:
"while it has been held that it is duty of the courts to interpret a statute as
they find it without reference to whether its provisions are expedient or
unexpedient, it has also been recognised that where a statute is
ambiguous and subject to more than one interpretation, the expediency of
one construction or the other is properly considered. Indeed, where the
arguments are nicely balanced, expediency may tip the scales in favour of
a particular construction. It is not the function of a court in the
interpretation of statutes, to vindicate the wisdom of the law. The mere
fact that the statute leads to unwise results is not sufficient to justify the
court in rejecting the plain meaning of unambiguous words or. in giving to
a statute a meaning of which its language is not susceptible, or in
restricting the scope of a statute. By the same token, an omission or
failure to provide for contingencies, which it may seem wise to have
provided for specifically, does not justify any judicial addition to the
language of the statute. To the contrary, it is the duty of the courts to
interpret a statute as they find it without reference to whether its
provisions are wise or unwise, necessary or unnecessary, appropriate or
inappropriate or well or ill conceived
( 239 ) CRAIES on Statute Law, 7th Edn. , at page 69, states that the
second consequence of the rule of casus omissus is that the statute may
not be extended to meet a case for which provision has clearly and
undoubtedly not been made. In Construction of Statutes by Crawford at
page 269 in paragraph 169 it is stated that omissions in a statute cannot,
as a general rule, be supplied by construction. Thus, if a particular case is
omitted from the terms of a statute, even THOugh such a case is within
the obvious purpose ofthe statute and the omission appears to have been
due to accident or inadvertence, the court cannot include the omitted case
by supplying the omission. This is equally true where the omission was
due to the failure of the legislature to foresee the missing case. As is
obvious, to permit the court to supply the omissions in statutes, would
generally constitute an encroachment upon the field of the legislature. In
construing the Constitution we cannot look beyond the letter of the
Constitution to adopt something which would command itself to our
minds as being implied from the context. In State of Tasmania v.
Commonwealth of Australia and State of Victoria" Connor, J. dealing with
the question observed thus :
"it appears to me that the only safe rule is to look at the statute itself
and to gather from it what is its intention. If we depart from that rule we
are apt to run the risk of the danger described by Pollack, C. J. , in Mille v.
Solomons. 'if, he says, 'the meaning of the language be plain and clear, we
have nothing to do but to obey it ­ to administer it as we find it; and, I
think, to take a different course is to abandon the office of Judge, and to
assume the province of legislation'. Some passages were cited by Mr Glynn
from Black on the Interpretation of Laws, which seem to imply that there
might be a difference in the rules of interpretation to be applied to the
Constitution and THOSE to be applied to any other Act of Parliament, but
there is no foundation for any such distinction. The intention of the
enactment is to be gathered from its words. If the words are plain, effect
must be given to them; if they are doubtful, the intention of legislature is
to be gathered from the other provisions of the statute aided by a
consideration of surrounding circumstances. In all cases in order to
discover the intention you may have recourse to contemporaneous
circumstances ­ to the history of the law, and you may gather from the
instrument itself the object of the legislature in passing it. In considering
the history of the law, you may look into previous legislation, you must
have regard to the historical facts surrounding the bringing of law into
existence. In the case of a Federal Constitution the field of inquiry is
naturally more extended than in the case of a State Statute, but the
principles to be applied are the same. You may deduce the intention of the
legislature from a consideration of the instrument itself in the light of
these facts and circumstances, but you cannot go beyond it. If that
limitation is to be applied in the interpretation of an ordinary Act of
Parliament, it should at least be as stringently applied in the interpretation
of an instrument of this kind, which not only is a statutory enactment, but
also embodies the compact by which the people of the several colonies of
Australia agreed to enter into an indissoluble Union
( 240 ) IN Encyclopaedia of the American Judicial System ­ The
Constitutional Interpretation by Craig R. Ducat it is stated that the
standard for assessing constitutionality must be the words of the
Constitution, notwhat the judges would prefer the Constitution to mean.
The constitutional supremacy necessarily assumes that a superior rule is
what the Constitution says, it is not what the judges prefer it to be. (Vide
page 973. (emphasis supplied) In judicial tributes balancing the competing
interest Prof Ducat quoted with approval the statement of Bickel at page
798 thus :
"the judicial process is too principle­prone and principle­bound ­ it
has to be, there is no other justification or explanation for the role it plays.
It is also too remote from conditions, and deals, case by case, with too
narrow a slice of reality. It is not accessible to all the varied interests that
are in play in any decision of great consequence. It is, very properly,
independent. It is passive. It has difficulty controlling the stages by which
it approaches a problem. It rushes forward too fast, or it lags; its pace
hardly ever seems just right. For all these reasons, it is, in a vast, complex,
changeable society, a most unsuitable instrument for the formation of
policy
( 241 ) IN the Modes of Constitutional interpretation by Craig R.
Ducat, 1978 Edn. at p. 125, he stated that the judges' decision ought to
mean society's values not their own. He quoted Cardozo's passage from the
Nature of Judicial Process at page 108 that, "ajudge, I think would err if he
were to impose upon the community as a rule of life his own idiosyncracies
of conduct or belief'. The court when caught in a paralysis of dilemma
should adopt self­restraint, it must use the judicial review with greatest
caution. In clash of political forces in political statement the interpretation
should only be in rare and auspicious occasions to nullify ultra vires
orders in highly arbitrary or wholly irrelevant Proclamation which does not
bear any nexus to the predominant purpose for which the Proclamation
was issued, to declare it to be unconstitutional and no more
( 242 ) FRANKFURTER, J. says in Dennis v. US thus :
"but how are competing interests to be assessed? Since they are not
subject to quantitative ascertainment, the issue necessarily resolves itself
into asking, who is to make the adjustment? ­ who is to balance the
relevant factors and ascertain which interest is in the circumstances to
prevail? Full responsibility for the choice cannot be given to the courts.
courts are not representative bodies. They are not designed to be a good
reflex of a democratic society. Their judgment is best informed, and
therefore most dependable, within narrow limits. Their essential quality is
detachment, founded on independence. History teaches that the
independence of the judiciary is jeopardized when courts become
embroiled in the passions of the day and assume primary responsibility in
choosing between competing political, economic and social pressures
( 243 ) REGIONALISM, linguism and religious fundamentalism have
become divisive forces to weaken the unity and integrity of the country.
Linguistic chauvinism adding its fuel to keep the people poles apart.
Communalism andcasteism for narrow political gains are creating foul
atmosphere. The cessationist forces are working from within and outside
the country threatening national integration. To preserve the unity and
integrity of the nation, it is necessary to sustain the power of the President
to wisely use Article 356 to stem them out and keep the government of the
State functioning in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.
Article 356 should, therefore, be used sparingly in only cases in which the
exercise of the power is called for. It is not possible to limit the scope of
action under Article 356 to specific situations, since the failure of the
constitutional machinery may occur in several ways due to diverse causes
be it political, internal subversion or economic causes and no strait­jacket
formula would be possible to evolve. The Founding Fathers thus confided
the exercise of the power in the highest executive, the President of India,
through his council of Ministers headed by the Prime Minister of the
country who is accountable to the people of the country. 1994 0 AIR(SC)
1918; 1994 0 AIR(SCW) 2946; 1994 2 JT 215; 1994 2 Scale 1; 1994 3
SCC 1; 1994 0 Supreme(SC) 337; S.R.Bommai Vs Union of India.

Similarly, failure of the investigating officer to seize blood­stained clothes

of P. Ws. l to 4, and to produce the F. S. L. Report cannot be made a
ground to disbelieve the prosecution case.
When prosecution case is fully established by direct testimony of eye­
witnesses which is corroborated then any failure or omission of
investigating officer cannot render prosecution case doubtful or unworthy
of belief.
2006 1 ALT(Cri) 294; 2005 0 Supreme(AP) 728; 2005 CRLJ 3896 (AP)
2006(1)ALD(Cri)125, Kunduru Vinaya Reddy alias Fathima Mareddy
Vs. State of A.P.

as a general rule the court can and may act on the testimony of a single
witness provided he is wholly reliable. There is no legal impediment in
convicting a person on the sole testimony of a single witness. That is the
logic of Section 134 of the Indian Evidence
2008(1)ACR783(SC), AIR2008SC1381, 105(2008)CLT513(SC),
2008CriLJ1804, JT2008(1)SC450, 2008-1-LW(Crl)423,
2008(1)SCALE479, (2008)2SCC151 Kunju @ Balachandran Vs. State of
Tamil Nadu
It is also our experience that invariably the witnesses add embroidery to
prosecution story, perhaps for the fear of being disbelieved. But that is no
ground to throw the case overboard, if true, in the main. If there is a ring
of truth in the main, the case should not be rejected. It is the duty of the
Court to cull out the nuggets of truth from the evidence unless there is
reason to believe that the inconsistencies or falsehood are so glaring as
utterly to destroy confidence in the witnesses. It is necessary to remember
that a Judge does not preside over a criminal trial merely to see that no
innocent man is of punished. A Judge also presides to see that as guilty
man does not escape. One is as important as the other. Both are public
duties which the Judge has to perform.
1988 0 AIR(SC) 1998; 1988 3 Crimes(SC) 367; 1989 0 CrLJ 88; 1988 3
JT 491; 1990 3 RCR(Cri) 585; 1988 2 Scale 436; 1988 Supp1 SCC
686; 1988 Supp2 SCR 611; 1988 0 Supreme(SC) 532; State of U.P. Vs
Anil Singh.

(i) Criminal ­ benefit of conflicting evidences ­ oral and medical evidence

contrary to each other ­ held, benefit of such vagueness should be granted
to accused. (ii) Evaluation of evidence ­ accusation on group ­ evidence
should be taken leaving out improbabilities and exaggerations ­ held, it is
quality
1999(2)ALD405, 1999(1)ALD(Cri)525, 1999(1)ALT(Cri)529,
1999CriLJ2368 Kollam Brahmananda Reddy Vs. State of A.P

Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Section 34 – Common intention prior to the

commission of the offence in point of time is essential – Persons having
similar intention which is not the result of the pre­arranged plan cannot
be held guilty of the criminal act u/s 34 – Even if some of the co­accused
have been acquitted, rest can be convicted invoking S. 34. (Paras 45, 51
and 52)
Criminal trial – Framing of charge – Non­framing of charge is not fatal if it
did not cause prejudice to the accused. (Paras 39 and 43)
Criminal trial – Eye witness and medical evidence – Consistent and reliable
evidence of eye witness will prevail upon medical evidence even if at
variance. (Paras 31 to 33 and 36)
Criminal trial – Injured witness – An injured witness comes with a built­in
guarantee of his presence at the scene of the crime – He is unlikely to
spare his actual assailant(s) in order to falsely implicate someone else –
Testimony of such a witness is generally considered to be very reliable –
Convincing evidence is required to discredit an injured witness. (Paras 26
and 28)
Criminal Trial – Identification – Where the number of assailants is large it
is difficult to identify each assailant and attribute a specific role to him.
(Para 22)
2010 71 AllCriC(SC) 555; 2010 4 CCR(SC) 245; 2010 4 Crimes(SC) 86;
2010 10 JT 434; 2011 1 RCR(Cri) 550; 2010 10 SCC 259; 2010 3
SCC(Cri) 1262; 2010 6 Supreme 489; 2010 0 Supreme(SC) 869; 2010
8 UJ 4037; Abdul Sayeed Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh.

Related and Interested witnesses – Mere relationship is not a factor to

affect the credibility of a witness – It is more often than not that a relation
would not conceal actual culprit and make allegations against an innocent
person – Foundation has to be laid if plea of false implication is made.
Testimony of an eye­witness, who received injuries in the occurrence, if
found to be trustworthy of belief, cannot be discarded merely for non­
examination of the independent witnesses. (Para 39)
Merely because prosecution has failed to explain injuries on the accused,
the same cannot be a solitary ground for doubting the prosecution case, if
otherwise, evidence relied upon is found to be credible. (Para 46)
2008 3 AD(CR) 365; 2008 0 AIR(SCW) 4231; 2008 2 ALT(CRI)(SC) 381;
2008 0 CrLJ 3602; 2008 6 JT 1; 2008 7 Scale 10; 2008 13 SCC 271;
2009 3 SCC(Cri) 543; 2008 2 Supreme 898; 2008 1 SUPREME 898;
2008 0 Supreme(SC) 634; Mahesh s/o Janardhan Gonnade Vs. State
of Maharasthra.

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 174 – Proceedings u/s 174

have limited scope – Inquest report cannot be treated as substantive
evidence. (Paras 17 and 18)
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Though ordinarily investigation is
undertaken on information received by a police officer, the receipt of
information is not a condition precedent for investigation – Information
regarding a cognizable offence furnished to the police will be regarded as
FIR – All enquiries held by the police subsequent thereto would be treated
as investigation, even though the formal registration of the FIR takes place
only later. (Paras 22 and 23)
2010 0 AIR(SC) 3300; 2010 71 AllCriC(SC) 367; 2010 4 BBCJ(SC) 442;
2010 4 JCR(SC) 182; 2010 9 JT 470; 2010 4 RCR(Cri) 799; 2010 10
SCC 374; 2010 3 SCC(Cri) 1301; 2010 6 Supreme 475; 2010 0
Supreme(SC) 872; Sri Sambhu Das @ Bijoy Das & Anr. Vs State of
Assam.

Mere non­recovery of pistol or cartridge does not detract the case of the
prosecution where clinching and direct evidence is acceptable. Likewise,
absence of evidence regarding recovery of used pellets, blood stained
clothes etc. cannot be taken or construed as no such occurrence had
taken place.
Motive for doing a criminal act is generally a difficult area for the
prosecution to prove since one cannot normally be seen into the mind of
another. Motive is the emotion which impels a man to do a particular act.
Even in the absence of specific evidence as to motive,
2011 0 AIR(SC) 3380; 2012 1 BBCJ(SC) 120; 2011 0 CrLJ 4943; 2011
4 JCR(SC) 138; 2011 10 JT 112; 2011 4 RCR(Cri) 270; 2011 9 SCC
115; 2011 6 Supreme 69; 2011 0 Supreme(SC) 842; State of
Rajasthan Vs. Arjun Singh.

Again mere non­recovery of pistol or cartridge does not detract the case of
prosecution where clinching and direct evidence is acceptable­ Likewise,
absence of evidence regarding recovery of used pellets, blood stained
clothes etc. could not be taken or construed as no such occurrence had
taken place­ Apart from that gun shot injuries tallied with medical
evidence­Deposition of doctor PW1 that deceased received 8 and 7 gun
shot wounds respectively while PW­2 also received 8 gun shots scattered
in front of left thigh­ The reliable eye­witnesses stated that there was
previous enmity between them and litigation was going on between the
accused and the complainant­Even in absence of motive, in view of
assertion of eye­witnesses, coupled with the medical evidence case of
prosecution could not be thrown out­
1997(2)ALD(Cri)656, 1998(1)ALT(Cri)1, 1998CriLJ335,
JT1997(8)SC492, 1997(6)SCALE435 State of Maharashtra Vs.
Manohar

(i) Indian Penal Code, 1860­Section 302­Appeal against conviction for

murder ­ For same offence another accused tried earlier and acquitted­Eye
witnesses same for both trial­Eye witnesses in earlier trial attributed fatal
assault to accused in that case­In present trial attributing assault to
present accused­No explanation for difference in their evidence­Evidence
of witnesses unreliable­Conviction set aside. (Para 7)
1999(3)ACR2880(SC), AIR2000SC366, 2000(1)ALD(Cri)78,
2000CriLJ494, JT1999(9)SC342, 1999(7)SCALE254, (2000)1SCC295,
L.L. Kale Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors

IT is not necessary that number of prosecution witnesses will come before

the Court and it is the quality of the evidence has to be weighed.
2000 1 ALD(Cri) 557; 2000 1 ALT(Cri) 471; 2000 0 CrLJ 3396; 2000 0
Supreme(AP) 34; Padigapati Sanjeevarayudu alias Kethanna VS State
Of A. P

Where in a sudden fight accused and deceased started grappling and

accused took out a scissors and assaulted deceased on his abdomen and
chest, offence would fall u/s 304 part II and not u/s 302 IPC.
Relationship is not a factor to affect credibility of a witness. It is more often
than not that a relation would not conceal actual culprit and make
allegations against an innocent person. Foundation has to be laid if plea of
false implication is made. In such cases, the court has to adopt a careful
approach and analyse evidence to find out whether it is cogent and
credible.(Para 11)
2007 2 JCR(SC) 213; 2007 1 RCR(Cri) 924; 2007 1 SCC 699; 2007 1
SCC(Cri) 425; 2006 9 Supreme 613; 2006 0 Supreme(SC) 1234; Salim
Sahab Vs State of Madhya Pradesh.

If ocular testimony is such that it is not possible to relate injuries with

circumstances in which they were said to have been inflicted, Court has
discretion not to accept the ocular evidence.
The present case is an example of contradiction between the ocular
evidence and the medical evidence, where the medical evidence is not
borne out by the ocular evidence. In such a situation it was suggested on
behalf of the appellants on the authority of a decision of this Court in the
case of State of M.P. vs. Dharkole alias Govind Singh and Ors., reported in
(2004) 13 SCC 308, where the medical evidence was at variance with the
ocular evidence, the testimony of the eye­witness should be decided
independently and if found trustworthy, the same could not be discarded
merely because it is at variance with medical opinion. While there can be
no difference of opinion with the principle explained in the aforesaid
decision, the application thereof will depend on whether the story as made
out by the prosecution is trustworthy and can be related to the injuries
suffered by the victim in the manner as sought to be projected. If the
ocular testimony is such that it is not possible to relate the injuries with
the circumstances in which they were said to have been inflicted, the court
has the discretion not to accept the ocular evidence. The principle
enunciated in Dharkoles case (supra) may be applied in an appropriate
case, but each case has to be determined having regard to its own set of
facts. (Para 19)
2006 0 AIR(SC) 3236; 2006 0 AIR(SCW) 5021; 2007 1 BBCJ(SC) 95;
2006 4 Crimes(SC) 71; 2006 0 CrLJ 4652; 2006 3 JCC 1775; 2006 12
JT 164; 2006 4 RCR(Cri) 459; 2006 9 Scale 438; 2006 11 SCC 239;
2007 1 SCC(Cri) 431; 2006 7 Supreme 33; 2006 0 Supreme(SC) 878;
Khambam Raja Reddy & Anr. Vs PP, High Court of A.P.

The prosecution version essentially rested on circumstances. The trial

court found that the circumstances were sufficient to hold the accused
guilty. Accordingly, conviction, as noted above, was recorded. In appeal,
the High Court did not find any substance in the plea of the appellant and
upheld the conviction.
The circumstances clearly establish that the accused was employed in the
hotel and used to sleep in the hotel and on the night of occurrence, both
the deceased and the accused were alone in the hotel. The evidence of
PW1, PW2 and PW3 in this regard are clear, cogent and credible.
Additionally, the accused and the deceased were last seen together on the
previous night. The appellant was arrested long after the incident, i.e., on
29.11.1998 and was absconding during the aforesaid period. The
circumstances, according to us, are sufficient to hold the accused guilty.
2009 0 AIR(SC) 712; 2008 12 JT 306; 2009 1 RCR(Cri) 250; 2008 14
Scale 370; 2008 15 SCC 122; 2009 3 SCC(Cri) 742; 2008 0
Supreme(SC) 1573; Ramachami Vs. State rep. By State Prosecutor

that, in spite of the order dated 4.11.1982 made by that court granting the
possessory remedy of temporary injunction in favour of the complainant­
plaintiff in respect of the premises concerned in that suit, you, in spite of
that injunction order having been brought to your notice, acted in aid of
the interests of the defendant in that suit and denied the complainant­
plaintiff, by benefit of that order of temporary injunction by locking up the
suit premises, putting your seal on the locks and taking away the keys
and in warning the complainant­plaintiff not to enter upon the suit
premises;
the appellant had intentionally and knowingly flouted the order of the
Court and had thereby interfered with the course of justice. He has been
rightly convicted under the Contempt of Courts Act.
AIR 1999 SC 2140, 1999 (1) ALD Cri 346, 1999 (1) ALD Cri 759, 1999
(1) ALT Cri 212, 1999 CriLJ 3487, JT 1999 (1) SC 294, (1999) 123
PLR 592, 1999 (1) SCALE 321, (1999) 9 SCC 79, 1999 (1) UJ 447 SC,
(1999) 2 UPLBEC 955 Shri K.S. Villasa vs M/S. Ladies Corner And Anr

A case, when rests upon circumstantial evidence, all circumstances must

be firmly and cogently be established and those circumstances should be
of a definite tendency unerringly pointing towards accused Further, all
proved circumstances must form a chain so complete, that within all
human probability, crime was committed by accused and none else. [Para
11, 13]
There cannot be any dispute that evidence means viz., the chief­
examination, cross­examination and re­examination in any. A part of the
statement of the witness viz., chief­examination or cross­examination
cannot be taken so as to assess the credibility of a witness or to evaluate
the evidence of a witness.
The plea of the accused was that on the date of the incident he was
present at Hyderabad. The burden is on the accused to show that he was
somewhere else other than the place of occurrence at the time of incident.
He has to establish his plea of alibi by positive evidence. But he failed to
establish the same by preponderance of probability. This plea appears to
be false in view of the fact that prosecution discharged its burden in
proving the charge beyond all reasonable doubt. This false plea can be
taken as additional link to the chain of circumstances.
THE MITIGATING FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED FOR AWARDING
PUNISHMENT are discussed.
2013 2 ALD(Cri) 956; 2014 1 ALT(Cri) 324; 2013 0 Supreme(AP) 273;
Borgam Rajender vs State of A.P.
It is not inconceivable that a child of tender age would be able to
recapitulate facts in his memory witnessed by him long ago.
Oral dying declaration can also be made basis for conviction.
(a) Criminal Trial – Appreciation of oral evidence – While appreciating the
evidence of a witness, the approach must be to find out whether the
evidence of witness read as a whole appears to have a ring of truth. (Para
8)
(b) Criminal trial – Minor discrepancies in the evidence are not
fatal. (Para 8)
(c) Criminal trial – Evidence – A rustic witness is not expected to
always have an alert mind and so have an idea of direction, area and
distance with precision from which he had witnessed the incident – Non­
examination of all witnesses is not always fatal. (Para 10)
AIR 1988 SC 1998 – Relied upon
(d) Criminal Trial – High Court erred in taking the view that it is
inconceivable that a child of tender age would not be able to recapitulate
facts in his memory witnessed by him long ago. (Para 13)
(e) Indian Evidence Act, 1881 – Section 134 – No particular
number of witnesses shall be required for the proof of any fact – Reliance
can be placed on the solitary statement of a witness if it is reliable and
correct version of the occurrence. (Para 15)
(f) Indian Evidence Act, 1881 – Section 32 – Dying declaration –
High Court erred in not believing the oral dying declaration given by the
deceased to his brother. (Para 16)
2010 0 AIR(SC) 3071; 2010 0 CrLJ 3889; 2010 4 JCR(SC) 18; 2010 8
JT 240; 2010 3 LS(SC) 42; 2010 3 RCR(Cri) 843; 2010 12 SCC 324;
2011 1 SCC(Cri) 381; 2010 6 SCJ 232; 2010 6 Supreme 193; 2010 0
Supreme(SC) 673; State of U.P. Vs Krishna Master

When statement of an injured witness is recorded in anticipation of death

and he survives, the statement cannot be treated as dying declaration.
Such statement can be used as provided u/s 157 CrPC.
Criminal trial – FIR – Informant failing to name a particular accused – Said
accused named at earliest opportunity thereafter when the statement of
witnesses are recorded – Will not adversely affect the prosecution. (Para 9)
(2006) 12 SCC 64; AIR 1997 SC 768; AIR 1975 SC 1252; AIR 1978 SC
1142; AIR 1981 SC 631; (2009) 12 SCC 342; (2008) 5 SCC 368 – Relied
upon
(b) Maxim – Falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus (false in one false in all)
– Does not apply in criminal cases in India – A witness may be partly
truthful and partly false in the evidence he gives to the Court. (Para 16)
AIR 1975 SC 1962; AIR 1965 SC 277; (2002) 10 SCC 366; (2007) 9
SCC 589; (2007) 10 SCC 455; (2008) 17 SCC 152; (2009) 12 SCC 275;
(2009) 12 SCC 288; (2010) 6 SCC 673; (2009) 14 SCC 494 – Relied upon
(c) Criminal Trial – Conviction – Number of witnesses – No bar on
conviction on testimony of sole eye­witness, if reliable – Corroboration is a
rule of prudence – More than one witness required in case a witness
deposes in general and vague terms, or in case of riot. (Para 22)
AIR 1965 SC 202; AIR 1978 SC 1647; AIR 1997 SC 322; (1999) 8 SCC
701; (2001) 8 SCC 690 – Relied upon
(d) Indian Evidence Act, 1872 – Section 32 – Statement of injured
witness recorded in anticipation of death – Injured witness survives –
Cannot be treated as dying declaration – It has to be treated as of a
superior quality/high degree than that of a statement recorded under
Section 161 Cr.P.C. – Can be used as provided u/s 157 – On the hand if
maker of statement u/s 164 CrPC dies, the statement can be used as
dying declaration. (Para 24, 25)
AIR 1997 SC 940; AIR 1983 SC 126; AIR 1999 SC 1969; AIR 1996 SC
2791; AIR 2004 SC 4614 – Relied upon
(e) Criminal Trial – Injured witnesses – Their evidence has to be given
due weightage – More so when the injury was grievous and one witness
was under apprehension of death – Evidence of witnesses reliable and
consistent not shaken by vigorous cross­examination. (Para 30)
AIR 2002 SC 3652; (2003) 1 SCC 456; (2004) 7 SCC 629; (2006) 12
SCC 459; AIR 2009 SC 2661; (2010) 6 SCC 673 – Relied upon
(f) Criminal Trial – Close relatives of deceased and injured witnesses –
Not expected to shield real culprits by naming somebody else in their
place. (Para 32)
(2008) 8 SCC 270; (2008) 15 SCC 604; (2009) 13 SCC 722 – Relied
upon
2011 0 CrLJ 283; 2011 1 RCR(Cri) 44; 2011 4 SCC 336; 2011 2
SCC(Cri) 227; 2010 0 Supreme(SC) 1042; Ranjit Singh Vs State of A.P.

Criminal Trial – Circumstantial Evidence – Conviction can be based on

circumstantial evidence provided the links in the chain of circumstances
connects the accused with the crime beyond reasonable doubt. (Para 5)
(2010) 2 SCC 353; (2010) 2 SCC 583 – Relied upon
(b) Criminal Trial – Circumstantial Evidence – Motive assumes
importance in case of circumstantial evidence. (Para 6)
(2011) 3 SCC 306; Cr. Appeal 958/2011; (2006) 5 SCC 475 –
Relied upon
(c) Honour Killing – Wholly illegal. (Para 8)
(2006) 5 SCC 475 – Relied upon
(d) Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Section 302 – Apart from the
appellant and the deceased only two persons present in the house at
relevant time – Mother too old – There is no suggestion of the brother
having committed the crime – Deceased deserting her husband and living
with her uncle – Appellant having both motive and opportunity Clear
motive – Appellant not reporting death of his daughter even after ten hours
– The entire circumstances point to the guilt of the accused. (Para 8)
(e) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 162(1), Proviso –
Statement before Police may be treated as extra­judicial confession and
can be taken into consideration – Denial on confrontation may be an
afterthought. (Para 8)
2011 0 AIR(SC) 1863; 2011 4 BBCJ(SC) 44; 2011 0 CrLJ 2903; 2011 3
JLJR(SC) 192; 2011 6 JT 345; 2011 2 RCR(Cri) 920; 2011 6 SCC 396;
2011 2 SCC(Cri) 985; 2011 3 Supreme 729; 2011 0 Supreme(SC) 502;
Bhagwan Das Vs State NCT Delhi.

Principle of falsus in uno falsus in omnibus­Scope and ambit of­The

doctrine merely involves the question of weight of evidence which a Court
may apply in a given set of circumstances, but it is not what may be called
“a mandatory rule of evidence”­ Merely because some of the accused
persons have been acquitted, though evidence against all of them, so far
as direct testimony went, was the same does not lead as a necessary
corollary that those who have been convicted must also be acquitted­ It is
always open to a Court to differentiate accused who had been acquitted
from those who were convicted­ Doctrine is a dangerous one specially in
India for if a whole body of the testimony were to be rejected, because
witness was evidently speaking an untruth in some aspect, it is to be
feared that administration of criminal justice would come to a dead­stop­
The witnesses just cannot help in giving embroidery to a story, however,
true in the main­ Therefore, it has to be appraised in each case as to what
extent the evidence is worthy of acceptance, and merely because in some
respects the Court considers the same to be insufficient for placing
reliance on the testimony of a witness, it does not necessarily follow as a
matter of law that it must be disregarded in all respects as well­ The
evidence has to be shifted with care. (Para10)
2008 0 AIR(SC) 2389; 2008 0 AIR(SCW) 3957; 2008 0 CrLJ 3061;
2008 3 RCR(Cri) 353; 2008 8 Scale 504; 2008 11 SCC 425; 2009 2
SCC(Cri) 553; 2008 3 Supreme 629; 2008 0 Supreme(SC) 895; Dalbir
Singh Vs State of Haryana.

the evidence of the circumstance, simpliciter, that an accused person led a

Police Officer and pointed out the place where stolen Articles or weapons
which might have been used in the commission of the offence were found
hidden, would be admissible as conduct, under Section 8 of the Evidence
Act, irrespective of whether any statement by the accused
contemporaneously with or antecedent to such conduct falls within the
purview of section 27 of the Evidence Act (vide Himachal Pradesh
Administration v. Om Prakash (AIR 1972 SC 975)).
1979 0 AIR(SC) 400; 1979 0 CrLJ 329; 1979 3 SCC 90; 1979 0
SCC(Cri) 656; 1979 2 SCR 330; 1978 0 Supreme(SC) 365; Prakash
Chand Vs State Delhi Adminsitration.

Indian Penal Code, 1860­Section 300 Exception I­Wounds caused to wife

by the husband cannot be held to have been caused under grave and
sudden provocation.
1997 0 CrLJ 22; 1997 1 MLJ(Cri) 1; 1996 0 Supreme(Mad) 707; Mohan
Vs State.

While it is not the function of this Court to determine who other than the
person who has been charged with the murder had committed it, the line
which the defence adopted was to establish that the witnesses referred to
above had an interest in implicating the accused or at any rate to create
uncertainty and dobut sufficient to give the benfit to the accused. It is not
beyond the ken of experienced able and astute lawyers to raise doubts and
uncertainties in respect of the prosecution evidence either during trial by
cross­examination or by the marshalling of that evidence in the manner in
which the emphasis is placed there on. But what has to be borne in mind
is that penumbra of uncertainty in the evidence before a Court is generally
due to the nature and quality of that evidence. It may be the witnesses are
lying or where they are honest and truthful, they are not certain. It is
therefore difficult to expect a scientific or mathematical exactitude while
dealing with such evidence or arriving at a true conclusion. Because of
these difficulties corroboration is sought wherever possible and the maxim
that the accused should be given the benefit of doubt becomes pivotal in
the prosecution of offenders which in other words means that the
prosecution must prove its case an accused beyond reasonable doubt by a
sufficiency of credible evidence. The benefit of doubt to which the assused
in entitled is reasonable doubt ­ the doubt which rational thinking men
will reasonably honestly and conscientiously entertain and not the doubt
of a timid mind which fights shy ­ though unwittingly it may be ­ or is
afraid of the logical consequences, if that benefit was not given or as one
great Judge said it is "not the doubt of a vacillating mind that has not the
moral courage to decide but shelters itself in a vain and idle scepticism". It
does not mean that the evidence must be so strong as to exclude even a
remote possibility that the accused could not have committed the offence.
If that were so the law would fail to protect society as in no case can such
a possibility be excluded. It will give room for fanciful conjectures or
untenable dubts and will result in deflecting the course of justice if not
thwarting it altogehter, It is for this reason the phrase has been criticised.
Lord Goddard C. J. in Rex v. Kritz, (1950) 1 KB 82 at p. 90 said that when
in explaining to the juries what the prosection has to establish a Judge
begins to use the words "reasonable doubt" and to try explain what is a
reasonable doubt and what is not, he is more much likely to confuse the
jury than if he tells them in plain language. "It is the duty of the
prosecution to satisfy you of the prisoner s quilt". What in effect this
approach amounts to is that the greatest possible care should be taken by
the Court in conviting an accused who is presumed to be innocent till the
contrary is clearly established which burden is always in the accusatory
system, on the prosecution. The mere fact that there is only a remote
possibility in favour of the accused is itself sufficient to establish the case
beyond reasonable doubt. This then is the approach.
Further having held this it nonetheless said that there was no injunction
against the same set of witnesses being present at the successive enquiries
if nothing could be urged against them. In our view the evidence relating to
recoveries is not similar to that contempaled under Sec. 103 of the
Criminal Procedure Code where searches are required to be made in the
presence of two or more inhabitants of the locality in which the place to be
serached is situate. In an investigation under section 157 the recoveries
could be proved even by the solitary evidence of the Investigating Officer if
his evidence could otherwise be believed. We cannot as a matter of law or
practice lay down that where recoveries have to be effected from different
places on the information furnished by the accused different sets of
persons should be called in to witness them.
The reason why the reports of the Director of the Finger Print Bureau is
treated as evidence without examining the persons giving the report is that
the comparison and identification of Finger Prints has now developed into
a science and the results derived therefrom have reached a stage of
exactitude. As long as the report shows that the opinion was based on
observations which lead to a conclusion that opinion can be accepted, but
should there be any doubt it can always be decided by the calling of the
person making the report. When once the report is proved, neither the
prosecution nor the accused nor yet the Court thought it necessary to
require the person making the report to be examined.
There is in our view no justification for the High Court in jettisoning this
cogent evidence of a conclusive nature on mere conjectures and on the
omnibus ground that the witnesses were not independent or impartial
which as we have shown is without justification.
1972 0 AIR(SC) 975; 1972 0 CrLJ 606; 1972 1 SCC 249; 1972 0
SCC(Cri) 88; 1972 2 SCR 765; 1971 0 Supreme(SC) 654;H.P.
Administration Vs Om Prakash.

Indian Evidence Act, 1882 – Section 32 – Dying declaration – Corroborated

and reliable – Can be relied upon notwithstanding aberrations in
deposition of one witness due to efflux of time. (Para 13)
2012 0 AIR(SC) 2176; 2012 0 CrLJ 2645; 2012 3 JLJR(SC) 24; 2012 5
JT 351; 2012 3 MLJ(Cri)(SC) 270; 2012 5 Scale 249; 2012 6 SCC 606;
2012 3 SCC(Cri) 293; 2012 3 Supreme 616; 2012 0 Supreme(SC) 372;
Salim Gulab Pathan Vs. State of Maharasthra.

Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Section 34 – The true contents of the Section
are that if two or more persons intentionally do an act jointly, the position
in law is just the same as if each of them has done it individually by
himself – The existence of a common intention amongst the participants in
a crime is the essential element for application of this Section – As a result
when an accused is convicted under Section 302 read with Section 34, in
law it means that the accused is liable for the act which caused death of
the deceased in the same manner as if it was done by him alone – Section
34 is applicable even if no injury has been caused by the particular
accused himself. (Paras 7 and 10)
2007 4 BBCJ(SC) 394; 2007 9 JT 191; 2007 4 RCR(Cri) 20; 2007 10
SCC 225; 2007 4 Supreme 824; 2007 0 Supreme 824; 2007 0
Supreme(SC) 900; Lala Ram Vs State of Rajasthan.

It is well settled that dying declaration must be dealt with caution for the
reason that the maker of the statement had not been subjected to cross­
examination. There is no rule of law or rule of prudence that dying
declaration cannot be accepted unless it is corroborated. (Para 11)
Section 32 of the Evidence Act is an exception to the general rule of
exclusion of hearsey evidence and the statement made by a person written
or verbal of relevant facts after his death is admissible in evidence if it
refers to the cause of his death or any circumstances of the transactions
which resulted in his death. To attract the provisions of Section 32, the
prosecution is required to prove that the statement was made by a person
who is dead or who cannot be found or whose attendance cannot be
procured wihout any amount of delay or expense or he is incapable of
giving evidence and that such statement had been made under any of the
circumstances specified in sub­sections (1) to (8) of Section 32 of the
Evidence Act. (Para 8)
Indian Evidence Act, 1872­Section 32­Dying declaration­Statement
recorded by Investigating Officer at hospital which was treated as FIR­At
the time of recording statement investigating officer did not possess
capacity of investigating officer as investigation had not commenced by
then­Such statement could be treated as dying declaration in evidence
under Section 32(1).
2000 0 AIR(SC) 2480; 2000 0 AIR(SCW) 2772; 2000 3 CCR(SC) 111;
2000 2 CHN(SC) 37; 2000 3 Crimes(SC) 142; 2000 0 CrLJ 3949; 2000
2 JCC 565; 2000 8 JT 466; 2000 3 RCR(Cri) 714; 2000 5 Scale 430;
2000 7 SCC 254; 2000 0 SCC(Cri) 1343; 2000 5 Supreme 381; 2000 0
Supreme(SC) 1267; Ghulam Hussain Vs State.

Evidence Act, 1882 ­ Section 32(1) ­ Dying declaration ­ Four dying

declarations recorded ­ All statements fulfilling requirements of section 32
­ All statements made in fit state of mind and consistent ­ Recorded by
competent persons who were examined and cross­examined ­ No infirmity
in relying on such statements. (Para 13)
2013 0 AIR(SC) 341; 2013 1 JBCJ(SC) 491; 2013 1 JLJR(SC) 426;
2013 1 JT 376; 2013 1 NCC(SC) 505; 2013 2 SCC 224; 2013 1
Supreme 97; 2013 0 Supreme(SC) 9; Asha Bai Vs State of
Maharasthra.

Claim of juvenility can be raised at any stage even after final disposal of
the case – For making a claim of juvenility after conviction some material
referred to in Rule 12(3)(a)(i) to (iii) must be produced to prima facie satisfy
the court – An affidavit will not be sufficient – Principles discussed. (Para
36)
2013 0 AIR(SC) 1020; 2012 10 JT 453; 2012 10 JT 454; 2012 10 SCC
489; 2012 8 SCJ 470; 2012 0 Supreme(SC) 719; Abuzar Husain Vs
State of West Bengal.

Testimony of ­ Credibility ­ A child witness, by reason of his tender age, is

a pliable witness ­ He can be tutored easily either by threat, coercion or
inducement ­ Hence, his statement can be accepted only if court comes to
conclusion that child understands questions put to him and he is capable
of giving rational answers and that child is not tutored and his evidence
has a ring of truth ­ Careful evaluation of evidence of a child witness in the
background and context of other evidence on record for purposes of
corroboration is a must before court decides to rely upon it,
Acquittal not on merits, but on insufficiency of evidence ­ Appellant
acquitted as a result of being given benefit of doubt though needle of
suspicion pointing at him ­ If trial of a criminal charge results in
conviction, disciplinary proceedings are bound to follow ­ But even in case
of acquittal, when acquittal is other than honourable, departmental
proceedings may follow ­ Disciplinary proceedings if pending against
appellant, authority concerned to proceed with them independently,
uninfluenced by this judgment and in accordance with law,
2012 0 AIR(SC) 2955; 2012 4 BomCR(Cri)(SC) 488; 2012 3 CalCriLR
519; 2012 0 CrLJ 4388; 2012 7 JT 392; 2013 1 RLW(SC) 176; 2012 7
Scale 397; 2012 8 SCC 73; 2012 3 SCC(Cri) 795; 2012 5 Supreme 412;
2012 0 Supreme(SC) 537; K.Venkateshwarlu Vs State of A.P.

Criminal Trial – Last seen theory – Circumstance of last seen together does
not necessarily lead to the inference that it was the accused who
committed the crime – There must be something more establishing
connectivity between the accused and the crime – Mere non­explanation
by the accused cannot lead to proof of guilt against him. (Para 17, 18)
2014 0 CrLJ 1950; 2014 3 EastCrC(SC) 157; 2014 4 SCC 715; 2014 2
SCC(Cri) 413; 2014 0 Supreme(SC) 205; Kanhaiya Lal Vs State of
Rajasthan.

It is also not clear as to why the occurrence itself having taken place at
bus stop where ordinarily people must be there the prosecution has not
examined any outsider witness in support of the prosecution case. At least
the passenger, who is said to have got down from the bus, could have been
the most natural witness, who has also not been examined by the
prosecution. Even the passengers, who were travelling in bus, some of
them could have been examined but no attempt has been made by the
prosecution to examine any of them. In this state of affairs, we do not
think it safe to rely upon the evidence of Public witness .1 alone to base
the conviction of these accused persons.
2001 0 AIR(SCW) 2322; 2000 8 JT 513; 2001 9 SCC 704; 2000 0
Supreme(SC) 956; Jang Singh Vs State of Rajasthan

There is no requirement either under Section 27 of the Evidence Act or

under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to obtain signature
of independent witnesses on the record in which statement of an accused
is written. The legal obligation to call independent and respectable
inhabitants of the locality to attend and witness the exercise made by the
police is cast on the police officer when searches are made under Chapter
VII of the Code. Section 100(5) of the Code requires that such search shall
be made in their presence and a list of all things seized in the course of
such search and of the places in which they are respectively found, shall
be prepared by such officer or other person “and signed by such
witnesses”. It must be remembered that search is made to find out a thing
or document which the searching officer has no prior idea where the thing
or document is kept. He prowls for it either on reasonable suspicion or on
some guess work that it could possibly be ferreted out in such prowling. It
is a stark ­reality that during searches the team which conducts search
would have to meddle with lots of other articles and documents also and
in such process many such articles or documents are likely to be displaced
or even strewn helter­skelter. The legislative idea in insisting on such
searches to be made in the presence of two independent inhabitants of the
locality is to ensure the safety of all such articles meddled with and to
protect the rights of the persons entitled thereto. But recovery of an object
pursuant to the information supplied by an accused in custody is different
from the searching endeavour envisaged in Chapter VII of the Code. (Para
18
It is a fallacious impression that when recovery is effected pursuant to
any statement made by the accused the document prepared by the
Investigating Officer contemporaneous with such recovery must
necessarily be attested by independent witnesses. Of course, if any such
statement leads to recovery of any article it is open to the Investigating
Officer to take the signature of any person present at that time, on the
document prepared for such recovery. But if no witness was present or if
no person had agreed to affix his signature on the document, it is difficult
to lay down, as a proposition of law, that the document so prepared by the
police officer must be treated as tainted and the recovery evidence
unreliable. The court has to consider the evidence of the Investigating
Officer who deposed to the fact of recovery based on the statement elicited
from the accused on its own worth. (Para 19) 2001 1 Crimes(SC) 176;
2001 0 CrLJ 504; 2001 0 SCC(Cri) 248; 2000 7 Supreme 728; 2000 0
AIR(SCW) 4398; 2000 7 Scale 692; 2001 1 SCC 652; 2000 0
Supreme(SC) 1913;State Govt of NCT Delhi Vs Sunil & ors.

The maxim “falsus in uno falsus in omnibus” has no application in India –

Where chaff can be separated from grain, it would be open to the Court to
convict an accused notwithstanding the fact that evidence has been found
to be deficient, or to be not wholly credible.
Doctrine of “falsus in uno falsus in omnibus” – The doctrine is not what
may be called `a mandatory rule of evidence’ – In a given case, it is always
open to a Court to differentiate accused who had been acquitted from
those who were convicted where there are a number of accused persons.
(Para 4)
Material and Normal discrepancies – While normal discrepancies do not
corrode the credibility of a party’s case, material discrepancies do so. (Para
4)
Where it is not feasible to separate truth from falsehood, and in the
process of separation an absolutely new case has to be reconstructed by
divorcing essential details presented by the prosecution completely from
the context and the background against which they are made, the only
available course to be made is to discard the evidence in toto. (Para 4)
Merely because the accused were investigated in the case of murder of the
elder son of PW1, her evidence cannot be disregarded on ground of false
implication.
2009 2 CCR(SC) 197; 2009 1 Crimes(SC) 479; 2009 0 CrLJ 2268; 2009
4 JT 169; 2010 5 RCR(Cri) 56; 2009 3 Scale 431; 2009 12 SCC 288;
2010 1 SCC(Cri) 563; 2009 2 Supreme 356; 2009 0 Supreme(SC) 361;
Mani @ Udattu Man & Ors Vs State.

In the case of Abdul Aziz v. State of Rajasthan [(2007) 10 SCC 283] it was
held by this Court that if a person is charged under a grave Section, but
however, if acquitted under the said grave section by the Trial Court, then
it would amount to travesty of Justice if in his own appeal he is convicted
under that grave section, without there being any appeal from the State
and without there being prior notice of enhancement issued by the
appellate Court. Jarnail Singh vs State Of Punjab.

1.In an appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution, Apex Court does not
enter into detailed examination and re­appraisal of the evidence,
particularly when there is concurrence of opinion between the two courts
below.
2.Evidence of a prosecution witness cannot be rejected in toto merely
because the prosecution chose to treat him as hostile and cross­examined
him
2010 4 BBCJ(SC) 111; 2010 3 CCR(SC) 268; 2010 3 Crimes(SC) 225;
2010 7 JT 567; 2011 1 RCR(Cri) 262; 2010 8 SCC 536; 2010 3
SCC(Cri) 960; 2010 5 Supreme 601; 2010 0 Supreme(SC) 626; Prithi
Vs State of Haryana.

The overturning of a well considered and well analysed judgment of Trial

Court for conviction and sentence in the instant case of a youth guilty of
child rape by the High Court on the grounds like non­examination of other
independent evidence and minor contradictions in medical evidence and
recovery of one or two underwear was not justified when the case against
the respondent otherwise stood proved, beyond any reasonable doubt, by
the true and reliable testimony of prosecutrix, her parents and doctors.
2002 0 AIR(SC) 2235; 2002 0 AIR(SCW) 2346; 2002 0 CrLJ 2951;
2002 Supp1 JT 304; 2002 2 RCR(Cri) 764; 2002 5 SCC 745; 2008 1
SCC(Cri) 411; 2002 3 Supreme 655; 2002 0 Supreme(SC) 614; 2002 1
UJ 759; State of Rajasthan Vs Om Prakash.

The prosecution cannot be accused of withholding these witnesses since it

made every effort to trace and produce them at the trial but failed on
account of the fact that they had left the addresses furnished by them at
the time of search and their whereabouts could not be traced despite
diligent efforts made in that behalf. We, therefore, do not find any reason
to doubt the correctness of the prosecution version relating to the
apprehension of the appellant, the search and seizure by the raiding party
and the recovery from the appellant of the country­made revolver and
cartridges for which he could produce no licence or authority because of
the non­examination of the panch witnesses. We find that the evidence of
PW1 to PW5 is reliable, cogent and trustworthy. (Para 4)
The conviction of appellant under Sections 5 r/w 3(1) of TADA r/w Section
25(1­B)(a) of Arms Act is not affected due to 15 days delay in sending fire
Arms to Ballastic expert or due to search and seizure by Police Officers or
due to absence of any expert opinion about the status of recovered
cartridges in the facts of this case. (p. 214)
1996 0 AIR(SC) 2943; 1996 3 CCR(SC) 100; 1996 1 Crimes(SC) 103;
1996 0 CrLJ 1698; 1996 3 JT 120; 1996 2 Scale 264; 1996 2 SCC
589; 1996 1 SCC(Cri) 356; 1996 2 Supreme 213; 1996 0 Supreme(SC)
421; Anil @ Andya Sadashiv Vs State of Maharasthra.

Indian Evidence Act, 1872—Sections 63 and 65 read with Sections 65A

and 65B—Electrnic records—Admissibility in evidence—Special provisions
on evidence relating to electronic record shall be governed by procedure
prescribed under Section 65B of Evidence Act—That is a complete code in
itself—Being a special law, general law under Sections 63 and 65 has to
yield—Sections 63 and 65 have no application in case of secondary
evidence by way of electronic record—Same is wholly governed by Sections
65A and 65B. (Paras 19 and 22)
Words and Phrases—Connive—Connive’ means to secretly allow a wrong
doing where as ‘consent’ is permission.—Proof required is of consent for
publication and not connivance on publication—It is not true to say that
‘connivance’ invariably and necessarily means or amounts to consent,
irrespective of context of given situation—Two cannot be equated—
Consent implies that parties are ad idem—Connivance does not
necessarily imply that parties are of one mind.
2015 0 AIR(SC) 180; 2014 3 GLH(SC) 305; 2014 4 JLJR(SC) 593; 2014
4 PLJR(SC) 334; 2014 10 SCC 473; 2015 3 Supreme 453; 2014 0
Supreme(SC) 685; 2014 2 UAD(SC) 577; P.V.Anvar Vs P.K.Basheer.

Sections 498­A and 396 IPC are independent and constitute differ­ent
offences. Though, depending on the facts and circumstances of an
individual case, subjecting a woman to cruelty may amount to an of­fence
under Section 498­A and may also, if a course of conduct amount­ing to
cruelty is established leaving no other option for the woman except to
commit suicide, amount to abetment to commit suicide. Howev­er, merely
because an accused has been held liable to be punished under Section
498­A IPC it does not follow that on the same evidence he must also and
necessarily be held guilty of having abetted the commission of suicide by
the woman concerned.
The deceased has not committed suicide because of demand of dowry or
on instigation. It is a case of cruelty. The appellant deserves acquittal of
the charge under Section 306 IPC but his conviction under Section 498A
IPC is maintained
2001 4 Crimes(SC) 360; 2001 0 CrLJ 4724; 2002 0 SCC(Cri) 1088;
2001 7 Supreme 737; Ramesh Kumar Vs State of Chhattisgarh.

Indian Evidence Act, 1872 ­ Section 8 r/w section 27 ­ Statement made

before police ­ Admissibility ­ Part of the statement, whether confessional
or not, which was exclusively within the knowledge of the accused ­ Will be
admissible in evidence. (Para 15)
Criminal Trial ­ Discrepancies in evidence ­ Discrepancies of trivial nature
are immaterial and should be ignored. (Para 18)
2013 0 AIR(SC) 3013; 2013 0 CrLJ 3895; 2013 3 JBCJ(SC) 392; 2013
4 JLJR(SC) 21; 2013 10 JT 424; 2013 12 SCC 383; 2014 1 SCC(Cri)
664; 2013 5 Supreme 605; 2013 0 Supreme(SC) 676; Anuj Kumar
Gupta @ Sethi Gupta Vs State of Bihar.

What we find from the materials made available to us is that the only
evidence appearing against the accused is the confession of the co­
accused, as the petitioner states. We are confident that the learned Addl.
Deputy Commissioner, Aizawl, is fully aware as to the evidentiary value of
the confession of a co­accused. We refer to (1) Kashmira Singh, AIR 1952
SC 159: (1952 Cri LJ 839. (2) Kalawati, AIR 1953 SC 131 : (1953 Cri LJ
668), (3) Nathu, AIR 1956 SC 56 (58) : (1956 Cri LJ 152 (154) (4)
Ramchandra. AIR 1957 SC 381: (1957 Cri LJ 559), (5) AIR 1968 SC 832:
(1968 Cri LJ 1017). Haroon Haji Abdullah v. State of Maharashtra, as
some of the important decisions in point. The confession of an accused
can only be used for leading assurance to other evidence against the
accused. On the basis of a confession of a co­accused alone a conviction is
not sustainable.
1984 0 CrLJ 1055; 1983 0 Supreme(Gau) 78 ZOHMINGLIANA Vs State
of Mizoram

None of the prosecution witnesses who have been examined bore any ill
will or malice against the appellant. Of course, they all belong to the police
force but merely on that account their evidence cannot be said to be
tainted. Since the departmental witnesses would be interested in the
success of the prosecution case prudence requires that their evidence be
scrutinized with more care. We have critically and carefully analysed the
evidence of all the prosecution witnesses and find that despite lengthy
cross­examination nothing has been brought out which may in any way
discredit their testimony at all. These witnesses had no reason to falsely
implicate the appellant. They have stood the test of cross­examination. The
report of the CFSL lends enough corroboration to their evidence. It is in
the evidence of PW.1 that when the appellant was over­powered, some
persons were looking from a distance but none of them came at the spot.
Under these circumstances not joining any of those witnesses cannot
affect the credit­worthiness of the prosecution case. (Para 6)
1996 4 Crimes(SC) 131; 1996 9 JT 158; 1997 1 RCR(Cri) 151; 1996 7
Scale 450; 1996 11 SCC 139; 1996 7 Supreme 661; 1996 0
Supreme(SC) 1554; Balbir Singh Vs State of Punjab.

1. It is settled law that FIR is not a substantive piece of evidence.

However the FIR can not be given a complete go­by since it can be used to
corroborate the evidence of the person lodging the same.
2. In criminal jurisprudence, evidence has to be evaluated on the
touchstone of consistency. Consistency is the keyword for upholding the
conviction of an accused.
2010 0 AIR(SC) 2768; 2010 69 AllCriC(SC) 801; 2010 3 BBCJ(SC) 78;
2010 3 CalCriLR 526; 2010 3 CCR(SC) 7; 2010 3 Crimes(SC) 52; 2010
2 JCC 1429; 2010 4 JT 467; 2010 4 KarLJ(SC) 161; 2010 3 RCR(Cri)
382; 2010 5 SCC 645; 2010 2 SCC(Cri) 1318; 2010 4 Supreme 180;
2010 0 Supreme(SC) 386; 2010 4 UJ 2007; C.Magesh Vs State of
Karnataka.
 Sri G.Shivaiah, Addl PP Gr-I (Retired)

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