LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO etc v. to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens.

Without such
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA (No. L-63915. April 24, 1985) notice and publication, there would be no basis for the
application of the maxim “ignorantia legis non excusat.”
FACTS: Invoking the people’s right to be informed on matters
of public concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of The publication of all presidential issuances “of a public
the 1973 Philippine Constitution, as well as the principle that nature” or “of general applicability” is mandated by law.
laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines,
Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose
petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent a burden on the people, such as tax and revenue measures,
public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which
Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as
instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, administrative and executive orders need not be published on
letter of implementation and administrative orders. Petitioners the assumption that they have been circularized to all
maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public concerned. It is needless to add that the publication of
right and its object is to compel the performance of a public presidential issuances “of a public nature” or “of general
duty, they need not show any specific interest for their petition applicability” is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law
to be given due course. that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be
officially and specifically informed of its contents. The Court
Respondents contend that publication in the Official Gazette therefore declares that presidential issuances of general
is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws application, which have not been published, shall have no
where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity force and effect.
dates. It is thus submitted that since the presidential issuances
in question contain special provisions as to the date they are
to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not
indispensable for their effectivity.
(No. L-63915. December 29, 1986)

ISSUE: Is there still a need for publication of the decrees FACTS: Due process was invoked by the petitioners in
provided that they contain special provisions as to the date demanding the disclosure of a number of presidential decrees
they are to take effect? which they claimed had not been published as required by law.
The government argued that while publication was necessary
as a rule, it was not so when it was "otherwise provided," as
when the decrees themselves declared that they were to
HELD: Yes. The Court has ruled that publication in the Official become effective immediately upon their approval. In the
Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation decision of this case on April 24, 1985, the Court affirmed the
itself does not provide for its effectivity date— for then the date necessity for the publication of some of these decrees. The
of publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, petitioners are now before us again, this time to move for
which is the fifteenth day following its publication—but not reconsideration/clarification of that decision. Specifically, they
when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into ask the following questions:
effect. Respondents’ argument, however, is logically correct
only insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws with the fact of 1. What is meant by '' law of public nature'' or "general
publication. Considered in the light of other statutes applicable applicability"?
to the issue at hand, the conclusion is easily reached that said 2. Must a distinction be made between laws of general
Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in applicability and laws which are not?
the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date 3. What is meant by "publication"?
of its effectivity. Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 provides 4. Where is the publication to be made?
as follows: 5. When is the publication to be made?

“Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Resolving their own doubts, the petitioners suggest that there
Gazette [1] all important legislative acts and should be no distinction between laws of general applicability
resolutions of a public nature of the Congress of the and those which are not; that publication means complete
Philippines; [2] all executive and administrative publication; and that the publication must be made forthwith in
orders and proclamations, except such as have no the Official Gazette.
general applicability: [3] decisions or abstracts of
decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of In the Comment required of the then Solicitor General, he
Appeals as may be deemed by said courts of claimed first that the motion was a request for an advisory
sufficient importance to be so published; [4] such opinion and should therefore be dismissed, and, on the merits,
documents or classes of documents as may be that the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" in Article 2 of
required so to be published by law; and [5] such the Civil Code meant that the publication required therein was
documents or classes of documents as the President not always imperative; that publication, when necessary, did
of the Philippines shall determine from time to time not have to be made in the Official Gazette; and that in any
to have general applicability and legal effect, or case the subject decision was concurred in only by three
which he may authorize so to be published. justices and consequently not binding.

The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the

general public adequate notice of the various laws which are
ISSUE: whether or not the clause “UNLESS IT Under Article 2 of the Civil Code, the publication of laws must
ISOTHERWISE PROVIDED” solely refers to the fifteen-day be made in the Official Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a
period and not to the requirement of publication. requirement for their effectivity after fifteen days from such
publication or after a different period provided by the
legislature. We also hold that the publication must be made
HELD: The clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to forthwith, or at least as soon as possible, to give effect to the
the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication law pursuant to the said Article 2.
itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does
not mean that the legislature may make the law effective
immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without its
previous publication. Publication is indispensable in every
case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the PHILSA INTERNATIONAL PLACEMENT and SERVICES
usual fifteen day period shall be shortened or extended. It is CORPORATION vs. THE HON. SECRETARY OF LABOR
not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication AND EMPLOYMENT, VIVENCIO DE MESA, RODRIGO
may be dispensed with altogether. The reason is that such MIKIN and CEDRIC LEYSON (G.R. No. 103144. April 4,
omission would offend due process insofar as it would deny 2001)
the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern
it. Surely, if the legislature could validly provide that a law shall FACTS: Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the
become effective immediately upon its approval recruitment of workers for overseas employment. Sometime
notwithstanding the lack of publication (or after an in January 1985, private respondents, who were recruited by
unreasonably short period after publication), it is not unlikely petitioner for employment in Saudi Arabia, were required to
that persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a result; pay placement fees in the amount of P5,000.00 for private
and they would be so not because of a failure to comply with respondent Rodrigo L. Mikin and P6,500.00 each for private
it but simply because they did not know of its existence. respondents. While in Saudi Arabia, private respondents were
allegedly made to sign a second contract on February 4, 1985
The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those which changed some of the provisions of their original contract
of general application, for strictly speaking all laws relate to resulting in the reduction of some of their benefits and
the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply privileges. On April 1, 1985, their foreign employer allegedly
to them directly. In fact, a law without any bearing on the public forced them to sign a third contract which increased their work
would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class hours from 48 hours to 60 hours a week without any
legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, corresponding increase in their basic monthly salary. Upon
the law must invariably affect the public interest even if it might their arrival in the Philippines, private respondents demanded
be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the from petitioner Philsa the return of their placement fees and
people only, and not to the public as a whole. We hold for the payment of their salaries for the unexpired portion of
therefore that all statutes, including those of local application their contract. When petitioner refused, they filed a case
and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their before the POEA.
effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication
unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. Under the Rules and Regulations of the POEA, the decision
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive of the POEA-Adjudication Office on matters involving money
orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of claims arising from the employer-employee relationship of
legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated overseas Filipino workers may be appealed to the National
by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Labor Relations Commission. Thus, as both felt aggrieved by
Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also the said POEA Decision, petitioner and private respondents
be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement filed separate appeals from the August 31, 1988 POEA
existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation. Interpretative Decision to the NLRC. In a decision dated July 26, 1989,12
regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, the NLRC modified the appealed decision of the POEA
regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and Adjudication Office by deleting the award of salary deductions
not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication and differentials. These awards to private respondents were
required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by deleted by the NLRC considering that these were not raised
administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to in the complaint filed by private respondents. Private
be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their respondents then elevated the July 26, 1989 decision of the
duties. NLRC to the Supreme Court in a petition for review for
certiorari where it was docketed as G.R. No. 89089. However,
We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no in a Resolution dated October 25, 1989, the petition was
publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the dismissed outright for “insufficiency in form and substance,
contents of the laws, As correctly pointed out by the having failed to comply with the Rules of Court and Circular
petitioners, the mere mention of the number of the presidential No. 1-88 requiring submission of a certified true copy of the
decree, the title of such decree, its whereabouts (e.g., "with questioned resolution dated August 23, 1989.” Almost
Secretary Tuvera"), the supposed date of effectivity, and in a simultaneous with the promulgation of the August 31, 1988
mere supplement of the Official Gazette cannot satisfy the decision of the POEA on private respondents’ money claims,
publication requirement. This is not even substantial the POEA issued a separate Order dated August 29, 1988
compliance. resolving the recruitment violations aspect of private
respondents’ complaint. In this Order, the POEA found
petitioner guilty of illegal exaction, contract substitution, and UNCIANO PARAMEDICAL COLLEGE, INC. vs. THE
unlawful deduction. COURT OF APPEALS; Honorable LOURDES K. TAYAO-
JAGUROS, in her capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional
Under the POEA Rules and Regulations, the decision of the Trial Court, Branch 21, Manila (G.R. No. 100335. April 7,
POEA thru the LRO suspending or canceling a license or 1993)
authority to act as a recruitment agency may be appealed to
the Ministry (now Department) of Labor and Employment. FACTS: On April 16, 1990, private respondents Elena
Accordingly, after the denial of its motion for reconsideration, Villegas and Ted Magallanes, thru their mothers, Victoria
petitioner appealed the August 21, 1988 Order to the Villegas and Jacinta Magallanes, respectively, filed before the
Secretary of Labor and Employment. However, in an Order Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch
dated September 13, 1991, public respondent Secretary of 21, a petition for injunction and damages with prayer for a writ
Labor and Employment affirmed in toto the assailed Order. of preliminary mandatory injunction against petitioners
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but this was alleging that around the latter part of July 1989, they initiated
likewise denied in an Order dated November 25, 1991. a petition proposing to the school authorities the organization
of a student council in the school. On August 18, 1989, Elena
Villegas and Solomon Barroa were summoned to the Office of
ISSUE: Can PHILSA be held liable for illegal exaction as Dr. Moral and were admonished not to proceed with the
POEA Memorandum Circular No. II, Series of 1983, which proposal because, according to her, the school does not allow
enumerated the allowable fees which may be collected from and had never allowed such an organization. On September
applicants, is void for lack of publication? 12, 1989, when news leaked out that they would be barred
from enrollment, they sought confirmation with respondent Dr.
Moral, Dean of Discipline, who told them ‘it’s not true unless
HELD: No, as all statutes, including those of local application you violate the rules and regulations of the school and if you
and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their still insist with your student council.’
effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication
unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. On October 28, 1989, they met with Dean Vitug and Dr. Moral
Petitioner should be absolved from the three (3) counts of who informed them that they would be barred from enrollment
exaction as POEA Administrative Circular No. 2, Series of for the second semester because they supposedly harassed
1983 could not be the basis of administrative sanctions a female student, invited an outsider to the school to speak
against petitioner for lack of publication .POEA Memorandum before the students, and also because the school has an
Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 must likewise be declared arrangement with the Department of Education, Culture and
ineffective as the same was never published or filed with the Sports not to allow their students to put up a student council.
National Administrative Register. POEA Memorandum Order On November 6, 1989, the students again approached Dr.
No. 2, Series of 1983 provides for the applicable schedule of Moral who informed them that they were no longer allowed to
placement and documentation fees or private employment enroll because they are allegedly members of the National
agencies or authority holders. It is thus clear that the Union of Students of the Philippines (NUSP) and the League
administrative circular under consideration is one of those of Filipino Students (LFS), officers of the student organization
issuances which should be published for its effectivity, since they organized, and, moreover ‘drug addicts.’
its purpose is to enforce and implement an existing law
pursuant to a valid delegation. Considering that POEA On November 13, 1989, a few days after petitioners retained
Administrative Circular No. 2, Series, of 1983 has not as yet the services of counsel FREE LEGAL ASSISTANCE GROUP
been published or filed with the National Administrative (FLAG), counsel sent a letter to Mr. Mirando Unciano,
Register, the same is ineffective and may not be enforced. President of the College, demanding that the constitutional
requirements of due process be complied with prior to
The Office of the Solicitor General likewise argues that the unilaterally dismissing the students, and requesting that a
questioned administrative circular is not among those conference be held prior to 17 November 1989, as the
requiring publication contemplated by Tañada vs. Tuvera as it enrollment deadline was fast approaching. On 29 November
is addressed only to a specific group of persons and not to the 1989, the students were informed that the President had
general public. Again, there is no merit in this argument. The unilaterally refused to allow them to enroll and it was up to
fact that the said circular is addressed only to a specified their parents to request or appeal to the school officials to
group, namely private employment agencies or authority change their decision. On 11 December 1989, the students
holders, does not take it away from the ambit of our ruling in were informed that the Board of Trustees had refused to grant
Tañada vs. Tuvera. Our pronouncement in Tañada vs. Tuvera the parents’ request.
is clear and categorical. Administrative rules and regulations
must be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement On May 16, 1990, the trial court issued a temporary restraining
existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. The only order effective May 17, 1990, enjoining petitioner school from
exceptions are interpretative regulations, those merely not enrolling private respondents in its College of Nursing and
internal in nature, or those so-called letters of instructions setting the hearing for the issuance of the writ of preliminary
issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules and injunction on June 4, 1990. Petitioners filed an opposition to
guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the the prayer for a preliminary mandatory injunction on the
performance of their duties. Administrative Circular No. 2, ground that private respondents are not entitled thereto and
Series of 1983 has not been shown to fall under any of these have no clear legal right to the relief demanded. he Court of
exception. Appeals upheld the ruling of the RTC and based its the ruling
in the recent case of Ariel Non, et al. vs. Hon. Sancho Dames
II, the Supreme Court, abandoned and overruled its decision EMETERIO CUI vs. ARELLANO UNIVERSITY (No. L-
in Alcuaz and declared thus: “The contract between the school 15127. May 30, 1961)
and the student is not an ordinary contract. It is imbued with
public interest, considering the high priority given by the FACTS: Plaintiff, before the school year 1948-1949 took up
Constitution to education and the grant to the State of preparatory law course in the defendant University. After
supervisory and regulatory powers over all educational finishing his preparatory law course plaintiff enrolled in the
institutions. When a student registers in a school, it is College of Law of the defendant from the school year 1948-
understood that he is enrolling for the entire school year 'Every 1949. Plaintiff finished his law studies in the defendant
student has the right to enroll in any school, college or university up to and including the first semester of the fourth
university upon meeting its specific requirement and year. During all the school years in which plaintiff was studying
reasonable regulation: Provided, that except in the case of law in defendant law college, Francisco R. Capistrano, brother
academic delinquency and violation of disciplinary regulation, of the mother of plaintiff, was the dean of the College of Law
the student is presumed to be qualified for enrollment for the and legal counsel of the defendant university. Plaintiff enrolled
entire period he is expected to his complete his course without for the last semester of his law studies in the defendant
prejudice to his right to transfer.' university but failed to pay his tuition fees, because his uncle
Dean Francisco R. Capistrano having severed his connection
with defendant and having accepted the deanship and
ISSUE: Petitioners argue that under the then prevailing chancellorship of the College of Law of Abad Santos
Alcuaz doctrine which was promulgated on May 2, 1988, the University, plaintiff left the defendant’s law college and
contract between them and private respondents was validly enrolled for the last semester of his fourth year law in the
terminated upon the end of the first semester of school year college of law of the Abad Santos University graduating from
1989-1990. Although said doctrine was later abandoned in the college of law of the latter university. Plaintiff, during all the
Non, et al. v. Dames II, et al., supra, this case was time he was studying law in defendant university was awarded
promulgated much later or on May 20, 1990, when the scholarship grants, for scholastic merit, so that his semestral
termination of the contract between them had long become fait tuition fees were returned to him after the ends of semester
accompli. and when his scholarship grants were awarded to him. The
whole amount of tuition fees paid by plaintiff to defendant and
refunded to him by the latter from the first semester up to and
HELD: The ruling in the Non case should not be given a including the first semester of his last year in the college of law
retroactive effect to cases that arose before its promulgation or the fourth year, is in total P1,033.87. After graduating in law
on May 20, 1990, as in this case, which was filed on April 16, from Abad Santos University he applied to take the bar
1990. If it were otherwise, it would result in oppression to examination. To secure permission to take the bar he needed
petitioners and other schools similarly situated who relied on the transcripts of his records in defendant Arellano University.
the ruling in the Alcuaz case, promulgated on May 2, 1988, Plaintiff petitioned the latter to issue to him the needed
which recognized the termination of contract theory. In transcripts. The defendant refused until after he had paid back
addition, We reiterate Our earlier pronouncement in the case the P1,033.87 which defendant refunded to him as above
of People v. Jabinal, supra, that it is a settled rule that when a stated. As he could not take the bar examination without those
doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is transcripts, plaintiff paid to defendant the said sum under
adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively, protest.
and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old
doctrine and acted on the faith thereof. It is admitted that, on August 16, 1949, the Director of Private
Schools issued Memorandum No. 38, series of 1949, on the
In the present case, the contract between the parties was subject of “Scholarship,” addressed to “All heads of private
validly terminated upon the end of the first semester of school schools, colleges and universities stating that When students
year 1989-1990, or in October, 1989. This is the status quo. are given full or partial scholarships, it is understood that such
The trial court gravely abused its discretion in issuing the writ scholarships are merited and earned. The amount in tuition
of preliminary mandatory injunction which ordered petitioners and other fees corresponding to these scholarships should not
to allow private respondents “to enroll for the first semester of be subsequently charged to the recipient students when they
school year 1990-1991.”16 Guided by the Capitol case, decide to quit school or to transfer to another institution.
certainly, this writ will not restore the status quo but will go a
step backward, then restore the condition preceding the status Defendant reiterated the stand it took, vis-a-vis the Bureau of
quo. Private respondents do not possess any clear legal right Private Schools, namely, that the provisions of its contract with
to re-enroll, corollarily, petitioners are not obliged legally to re- plaintiff are valid and binding, and that the memorandum
admit them. above-referred to is null and void.

ISSUE: whether the above quoted provision of the contract

between plaintiff and the defendant, whereby the former
waived his right to transfer to another school without refunding
to the latter the equivalent of his scholarships in cash, is valid
or not.
HELD: Not valid. In determining a public policy of the state, Secret Agent from the Provincial Governor of
courts are limited to a consideration of the Constitution, the Batangas and an appointment as Confidential Agent
judicial decisions, the statutes, and the practice of government from the PC Provincial Commander, and the said
officers’ It might take more than a government bureau or office appointments expressly carried with them the
to lay down or establish a public policy, as alleged in your authority to possess and carry the firearm in
communication, but courts consider the practices of question. Indeed, the accused had appointments
government officials as one of the four factors in determining from the abovementioned officials as claimed by him.
a public policy of the state. It has been consistently held in His appointment from Governor Feliciano Leviste,
America that under the principles relating to the doctrine of dated December 10, 1962. On March 15, 1964, the
public policy, as applied to the law of contracts, courts of accused was also appointed by the PC Provincial
justice will not recognize or uphold a transaction which in its Commander of Batangas as Confidential Agent with
object, operation, or tendency, is calculated to be prejudicial duties to furnish information regarding smuggling
to the public welfare, to sound morality, or to civic honesty. If activities wanted persons, loose firearms,
Arellano University understood clearly the real essence of subversives and other similar subjects that might
scholarships and the motives which prompted this office to affect the peace and order condition in Batangas
issue Memorandum No. 38, s. 1949, it should have not province. The accused contended before the court a
entered into a contract of waiver with Cui on September 10, quo that in view of his above-mentioned
1951, which is a direct violation of our Memorandum and an appointments as Secret Agent and Confidential
open challenge to the authority of the Director of Private Agent, with authority to possess the firearm subject
Schools because the contract was repugnant to sound matter of the prosecution, he was entitled to acquittal
morality and civic honesty. on the basis of the Supreme Court’s decisions in
People v. Macarandang and People v. Lucero. The
The policy enunciated in Memorandum No. 38, s. 1949 is trial court, while conceding that on the basis of the
sound policy. Scholarships are awarded in recognition of merit evidence of record the accused had really been
not to keep outstanding students in school to bolster its appointed Secret Agent and Confidential Agent by
prestige. In the understanding of that university scholarships the Provincial Governor and the PC Provincial
award is a business scheme designed to increase the Commander of Batangas, respectively, with authority
business potential of an educational institution. Thus to possess and carry the firearm described in the
conceived it is not only inconsistent with sound policy but also complaint, nevertheless held the accused in its
good morals. But what is morals? Manresa has this definition. decision dated December 27, 1968, criminally liable
It is good customs; those generally accepted principles of for illegal possession of a firearm and ammunition on
morality which have received some kind of social and practical the ground that the rulings of the Supreme Court in
confirmation. The practice of awarding scholarships to attract the cases of Macarandang and Lucero were
students and keep them in school is not good customs nor has reversed and abandoned in People v. Mapa, supra.
it received some kind of social and practical confirmation
except in some private institutions as in Arellano University. It will be noted that when appellant was appointed Secret
The University of the Philippines which implements Section 5 Agent by the Provincial Government in 1962, an Confidential
of Article XIV of the Constitution with reference to the giving of Agent by the Provincial Commander in 1964, the prevailing
free scholarships to gifted children, does not require scholars doctrine on the matter was that laid down by Us in People v.
to reimburse the corresponding value of the scholarships if Macarandang (1959) and People v. Lucero (1958). Our
they transfer to other schools. decision in People v. Mapa reversing the aforesaid doctrine
came only in 1967.

ISSUE: Should appellant be acquitted on the basis of Our

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOSE JABINAL Y rulings in Macarandang and Lucero, or should his conviction
CARMEN (No. L-30061. February 27, 1974) stand in view of the complete reversal of the Macarandang
and Lucero doctrine in Mapa?
FACTS: Appeal from the judgment of the Municipal Court of
Batangas, Batangas, in Criminal Case No. 889, finding the
accused guilty of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearm HELD: Decisions of this Court, although in themselves not
and Ammunition and sentencing him to suffer an laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the laws mean, and
indeterminate penalty ranging from one (1) year and one (1) this is the reason why under Article 8 of the New Civil Code,
day to two (2) years imprisonment, with the accessories “Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
provided by law, which raises in issue the validity of his Constitution shall form a part of the legal system x x x.” The
conviction based on a retroactive application of Our ruling in interpretation upon a law by this Court constitutes, in a way, a
People v. Mapa – part of the law as of the date that law was originally passed,
The accused admitted that on September 5, 1964, since this Court’s construction merely establishes the
he was in possession of the revolver and the contemporaneous legislative intent that the law thus
ammunition described in the complaint, without the construed intends to effectuate. The settled rule supported by
requisite license or permit. He, however, claimed to numerous authorities is a restatement of the legal maxim
be entitled to exoneration because, although he had “legis interpretatio legis vim obtinet” — the interpretation
no license or permit, he had an appointment as placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force
of law. The doctrine laid down in Lucero and Macarandang
was part of the jurisprudence; hence, of the law, of the land, Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from
at the time appellant was found in possession of the firearm in the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves
question and when he was arraigned by the trial court. It is the marriage. Thus, pursuant to his national law, private
true that the doctrine was overruled in the Mapa case in 1967, respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would
but when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's
view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As
prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied he is bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which
on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof. validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he
does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation
before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged
conjugal property.

ALICE REYES VAN DORN vs. HON. MANUEL V.

ROMILLO, JR. and RICHARD UPTON (No. L-68470,
October 8, 1985)
EDELINA T. ANDO vs. DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN
FACTS: Petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private AFFAIRS (G.R. No. 195432. August 27, 2014)
respondent is a citizen of the United States; that they were
married in Hongkong in 1972; that, after the marriage, they FACTS: On 16 September 2001, petitioner married Yuichiro
established their residence in the Philippines; that they begot Kobayashi, a Japanese National, in a civil wedding
two children born on April 4, 1973 and December 18, 1975, solemnized at Candaba, Pampanga. On 16 September 2004,
respectively; that the parties were divorced in Nevada, United Yuichiro Kobayashi sought in Japan, and was validly granted
States, in 1982; and that petitioner has re-married also in under Japanese laws, a divorce in respect of his marriage with
Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn. Dated June 8, 1983, petitioner. A copy of the Divorce Certificate duly issued by the
private respondent filed suit against petitioner in Civil Case Consulate-General of Japan and duly authenticated by the
No. 1075-P of the Regional Trial Court, Branch CXV, in Pasay Department of Foreign Affairs, Manila and was duly registered
City, stating that petitioner's business in Ermita, Manila, is with the Office of the Civil Registry of Manila. Believing in
conjugal property of the parties, and asking that petitioner be good faith that said divorce capacitated her to remarry and that
ordered to render an accounting of that business, and that by such she reverted to her single status, petitioner married
private respondent be declared with right to manage the Masatomi Y. Ando on 13 September 2005 in a civil wedding
conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the celebrated in Sta. Ana, Pampanga. In the meantime, Yuichiro
ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment Kobayashi married Ryo Miken on 27 December 2005.
in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein
respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no Recently, petitioner applied for the renewal of her Philippine
community property" as of June 11, 1982. The Court below passport to indicate her surname with her husband Masatomi
denied the Motion to Dismiss in the mentioned case on the Y. Ando but she was told at the Department of Foreign Affairs
ground that the property involved is located in the Philippines that the same cannot be issued to her until she can prove by
so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case. competent court decision that her marriage with her said
husband Masatomi Y. Ando is valid until otherwise declared.
On 29 October 2010, petitioner filed with the RTC a Petition
ISSUE: What is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties for Declaratory Relief which was dismissed –
and their alleged conjugal property in the Philippines? Records of the case would reveal that prior to
petitioner’s marriage to Masatomi Y. Ando, herein
petitioner was married to Yuichiro Kobayashi, a
HELD: The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, Japanese National, in Candaba, Pampanga, on
had obtained jurisdiction over petitioner who appeared in September 16, 2001, and that though a divorce was
person before the Court during the trial of the case. It also obtained and granted in Japan, with respect to the
obtained jurisdiction over private respondent who, giving his their (sic) marriage, there is no showing that
address as No. 381 Bush Street, San Francisco, California, petitioner herein complied with the requirements set
authorized his attorneys in the divorce case, Karp & Gradt, forth in Art. 13 of the Family Code — that is obtaining
Ltd., to agree to the divorce on the ground of incompatibility in a judicial recognition of the foreign decree of
the understanding that there were neither community property absolute divorce in our country.
nor community obligations. There can be no question as to the
validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the Her 3 December 2010 petition for Ex Parte Motion for
United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as Reconsideration was granted. Thereafter, the case was raffled
an American citizen. to Branch 45 of the RTC. On 14 January 2011, the trial court
dismissed the Petition anew on the ground that petitioner had
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in no cause of action –
Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are The petition specifically admits that the marriage she
covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same seeks to be declared as valid is already her second
being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and marriage, a bigamous marriage under Article 35(4) of
morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which the Family Code considering that the first one,
may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid though allegedly terminated by virtue of the divorce
according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in obtained by Kobayashi, was never recognized by a
 Philippine court, hence, petitioner is considered as Leonardo Cabasal, which was resolved in favor of the latter.
still married to Kobayashi. Accordingly, the second On 7 October 1987 petitioner moved for the immediate
marriage with Ando cannot be honored and declaration of heirs of the decedent and the distribution of his
considered as valid at this time. estate. At the scheduled hearing on 23 October 1987, private
respondent as well as the six (6) Padlan children and Ruperto
failed to appear despite due notice. The trial court invoking
ISSUE: Can the State file a direct petition for the declaration Tenchavez v. Escaño which held that “a foreign divorce
of the absolute nullity of a void marriage provided that under between Filipino citizens sought and decreed after the
AM No. 02-11-10-SC, it is only the wife or husband who can effectivity of the present Civil Code (Rep. Act 386) was not
file such? entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction,” disregarded
the divorce between petitioner and Arturo. Consequently, it
expressed the view that their marriage subsisted until the
HELD: In Garcia v. Recio, we ruled that a divorce obtained death of Arturo in 1972. Neither did it consider valid their
abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, extrajudicial settlement of conjugal properties due to lack of
provided the decree is valid according to the national law of judicial approval. On the other hand, it opined that there was
the foreigner. The presentation solely of the divorce decree is no showing that marriage existed between private respondent
insufficient; both the divorce decree and the governing and Arturo, much less was it shown that the alleged Padlan
personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce children had been acknowledged by the deceased as his
must be proven. Because our courts do not take judicial notice children with her. Private respondent was not declared an heir.
of foreign laws and judgment, our law on evidence requires Although it was stated in the aforementioned records of birth
that both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien that she and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947, their
must be alleged and proven and like any other fact. While it marriage was clearly void since it was celebrated during the
has been ruled that a petition for the authority to remarry filed existence of his previous marriage to petitioner.
before a trial court actually constitutes a petition for
declaratory relief, we are still unable to grant the prayer of In their appeal to the Court of Appeals, Blandina and her
petitioner. As held by the RTC, there appears to be insufficient children assigned as one of the errors allegedly committed by
proof or evidence presented on record of both the national law the trial court the circumstance that the case was decided
of her first husband, Kobayashi, and of the validity of the without a hearing, in violation of Sec. 1, Rule 90, of the Rules
divorce decree under that national law. Hence, any of Court, which provides that if there is a controversy before
declaration as to the validity of the divorce can only be made the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person
upon her complete submission of evidence proving the or as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled
divorce decree and the national law of her alien spouse, in an under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as
action instituted in the proper forum. in ordinary cases .Respondent appellate court found this
ground alone sufficient to sustain the appeal.

ISSUE: Should this case be remanded to the lower court for

FE D. QUITA vs. COURT OF APPEALS and BLANDINA further proceedings?
DANDAN (G.R. No. 124862. December 22, 1998)

FACTS: FE D. QUITA and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, HELD: Yes. No dispute exists either as to the right of the six
were married in the Philippines on 18 May 1941. They were (6) Padlan children to inherit from the decedent because there
not however blessed with children. Somewhere along the way are proofs that they have been duly acknowledged by him and
their relationship soured. Eventually Fe sued Arturo for petitioner herself even recognizes them as heirs of Arturo
divorce in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. She submitted in Padlan; nor as to their respective hereditary shares. But
the divorce proceedings a private writing dated 19 July 1950 controversy remains as to who is the legitimate surviving
evidencing their agreement to live separately from each other spouse of Arturo.
and a settlement of their conjugal properties. On 23 July 1954
she obtained a final judgment of divorce. Three (3) weeks In her comment to petitioner’s motion private respondent
thereafter she married a certain Felix Tupaz in the same raised, among others, the issue as to whether petitioner was
locality but their relationship also ended in a divorce. Still in still entitled to inherit from the decedent considering that she
the U.S.A., she married for the third time, to a certain had secured a divorce in the U.S.A. and in fact had twice
Wernimont. remarried. To this, petitioner replied that Arturo was a Filipino
and as such remained legally married to her in spite of the
On 16 April 1972 Arturo died. He left no will. On 31 August divorce they obtained. Reading between the lines, the
1972 Lino Javier Inciong filed a petition with the Regional Trial implication is that petitioner was no longer a Filipino citizen at
Court of Quezon City for issuance of letters of administration the time of her divorce from Arturo. This should have prompted
concerning the estate of Arturo in favor of the Philippine Trust the trial court to conduct a hearing to establish her citizenship.
Company. Respondent Blandina Dandan (also referred to as Then in private respondent’s motion to set aside and/or
Blandina Padlan), claiming to be the surviving spouse of reconsider the lower court’s decision she stressed that the
Arturo Padlan, and Claro, Alexis, Ricardo, Emmanuel, citizenship of petitioner was relevant in the light of the ruling in
Zenaida and Yolanda, all surnamed Padlan, named in the Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. that aliens may obtain divorces
petition as surviving children of Arturo Padlan, opposed the abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided
petition and prayed for the appointment instead of Atty. they are valid according to their national law. She prayed
therefore that the case be set for hearing. Petitioner opposed dispose of his property in the way he desires, because the
the motion but failed to squarely address the issue on her right of absolute dominion over his property is sacred and
citizenship. The trial court did not grant private respondent’s inviolable.
prayer for a hearing but proceeded to resolve her motion with
the finding that both petitioner and Arturo were “Filipino
citizens and were married in the Philippines. ISSUE: Whether or not the Philippine Law shall govern the
administration of the will of Edward Christensen.
We emphasize however that the question to be determined by
the trial court should be limited only to the right of petitioner to
inherit from Arturo as his surviving spouse. Private HELD: There is no question that Edward E. Christensen was
respondent’s claim to heirship was already resolved by the a citizen of the United States and of the State of California at
trial court. She and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947 while the time of his death. But there is also no question that at the
the prior marriage of petitioner and Arturo was subsisting time of his death he was domiciled in the Philippines. In
thereby resulting in a bigamous marriage considered void arriving at the conclusion that the domicile of the deceased is
from the beginning under Arts. 80 and 83 of the Civil Code. the Philippines, we are persuaded by the fact that he was born
Consequently, she is not a surviving spouse that can inherit in New York, migrated to California and resided there for nine
from him as this status presupposes a legitimate relationship. years, and since he came to the Philippines in 1913 he
returned to California very rarely and only for short visits
(perhaps to relatives), and considering that he appears never
to have owned or acquired a home or properties in that state,
which would indicate that he would ultimately abandon the
IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF Philippines and make home in the State of California. As to his
EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED. ADOLFO C. citizenship, however, We find that the citizenship that he
AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the acquired in California when he resided in Sacramento,
deceased, Executor and Heir-appellees vs. HELEN California from 1904 to 1913, was never lost by his stay in the
CHRISTENSEN GARCIA (No. L-16749. January 31, 1963.) Philippines, for the latter was a territory of the United States
(not a state) until 1946 and the deceased appears to have
FACTS: This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First considered himself as a citizen of California by the fact that
Instance of Davao, Hon. Vicente N. Cusi, Jr., presiding, in when he executed his will in 1951 he declared that he was a
Special Proceeding No. 622 of said court, dated September citizen of that State; so that he appears never to have intended
14, 1949, approving among things the final accounts of the to abandon his California citizenship by acquiring another.
executor, directing the executor to reimburse Maria Lucy
Christensen the amount of P3,600 paid by her to Helen The law that governs the validity of his testamentary
Christensen Garcia as her legacy, and declaring Maria Lucy dispositions is defined in Article 16 of the Civil Code of the
Christensen entitled to the residue of the property to be Philippines. The “national law” indicated in Article 16 of the
enjoyed during her lifetime, and in case of death without issue, Civil Code above quoted cannot, therefore, possibly mean or
one-half of said residue to be payable to Mrs. Carrie Louise C. apply to any general American law. So it can refer to no other
Borton, etc., in accordance with the provisions of the will of the than the private law of the State of California. The next
testator Edward E. Christensen. The will was executed in question is: What is the law in California governing the
Manila on March 5, 1951. Opposition to the approval of the disposition of personal property? The decision of the court
project of partition was filed by Helen Christensen Garcia, below, sustains the contention of the executor-appellee that
insofar as it deprives her (Helen) of her legitime as an under the California Probate Code, a testator may dispose of
acknowledged natural child, she having been declared by Us his property by will in the form and manner he desires.
in G.R. Nos. L-11483-84 an acknowledged natural child of the Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the
deceased Edward E. Christensen. The legal grounds of Philippines pointed out as the national law is the internal law
opposition are (a) that the distribution should be governed by of California. But as above explained the laws of California
the laws of the Philippines, and (b) that said order of have prescribed two sets of laws for its citizens, one for
distribution is contrary thereto insofar as it denies to Helen residents therein and another for those domiciled in other
Christensen, one of two acknowledged natural children, one- jurisdictions. Reason demands that We should enforce the
half of the estate in full ownership. In amplification of the above California internal law prescribed for its citizens residing
grounds it was alleged that the law that should govern the therein, and enforce the conflict of laws rules for the citizens
estate of the deceased Christensen should not be the internal domiciled abroad. If we must enforce the law of California as
law of California alone, but the entire law thereof because in comity we are bound to go, as so declared in Article 16 of
several foreign elements are involved, that the forum is the our Civil Code, then we must enforce the law of California in
Philippines and even if the case were decided in California, accordance with the express mandate thereof and as above
Section 946 of the California Civil Code, which requires that explained, i.e., apply the internal law for residents therein, and
the domicile of the decedent should apply, should be its conflict-of-laws rule for those domiciled abroad.
applicable.

The court below ruled that as Edward E. Christensen was a

citizen of the United States and of the State of California at the
time of his death, the successional rights and intrinsic validity
of the provisions in his will are to be governed by the law of
California, in accordance with which a testator has the right to
 MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT vs. THE Immigration (Bureau) of Identification (ID) Certificate No. RC
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and VICENTE 9778 and a Philippine Passport. On its face, ID Certificate No.
MADRIGAL BAYOT (G.R. No. 155635. November 7, 2008) RC 9778 would tend to show that she has indeed been
recognized as a Filipino citizen. It cannot be over-emphasized,
FACTS: Vicente and Rebecca were married on April 20, 1979. however, that such recognition was given only on June 8,
On its face, the Marriage Certificate identified Rebecca, then 2000 upon the affirmation by the Secretary of Justice of
26 years old, to be an American citizen born in Agana, Guam. Rebecca’s recognition pursuant to the Order of Recognition
USA to Cesar Tanchiong Makapugay, American, and Helen issued by Bureau Associate Commissioner Edgar L.
Corn Makapugay, American. On November 27, 1982 in San Mendoza. It is indubitable that Rebecca did not have that
Francisco, California, Rebecca gave birth to Marie Josephine status of, or at least was not yet recognized as, a Filipino
Alexandra or Alix. sometime in 1996, initiated divorce citizen when she secured the February 22, 1996 judgment of
proceedings in the Dominican Republic. Before the Court of divorce from the Dominican Republic.
the First Instance of the Judicial District of Santo Domingo,
Rebecca personally appeared, while Vicente was duly Going to the second core issue, we find Civil Decree Nos.
represented by counsel. On February 22, 1996, the 362/96 and 406/97 valid. First, at the time of the divorce, as
Dominican court issued Civil Decree No. 362/96, ordering the above elucidated, Rebecca was still to be recognized,
dissolution of the couple’s marriage and “leaving them to assuming for argument that she was in fact later recognized,
remarry after completing the legal requirements,” but giving as a Filipino citizen, but represented herself in public
them joint custody and guardianship over Alix. Over a year documents as an American citizen. At the very least, she
later, the same court would issue Civil Decree No. 406/97, chose, before, during, and shortly after her divorce, her
settling the couple’s property relations pursuant to an American citizenship to govern her marital relationship.
Agreement they executed on December 14, 1996. Said Second, she secured personally said divorce as an American
agreement specifically stated that the “conjugal property citizen. Third, being an American citizen, Rebecca was bound
which they acquired during their marriage consist[s] only of the by the national laws of the United States of America, a country
real property and all the improvements and personal which allows divorce. Fourth, the property relations of Vicente
properties therein contained at 502 Acacia Avenue, Alabang, and Rebecca were properly adjudicated through their
Muntinlupa.” Agreement. Be this as it may, the fact that Rebecca was
clearly an American citizen when she secured the divorce and
Meanwhile, on March 14, 1996, or less than a month from the that divorce is recognized and allowed in any of the States of
issuance of Civil Decree No. 362/96, Rebecca filed with the the Union, the presentation of a copy of foreign divorce
Makati City RTC a petition dated January 26, 1996, with decree duly authenticated by the foreign court issuing said
attachments, for declaration of nullity of marriage, docketed as decree is, as here, sufficient. Finally, the fact that Rebecca
Civil Case No. 96-378. Rebecca, however, later moved and may have been duly recognized as a Filipino citizen by force
secured approval of the motion to withdraw the petition. On of the June 8, 2000 affirmation by Secretary of Justice
May 29, 1996, Rebecca executed an Affidavit of Tuquero of the October 6, 1995 Bureau Order of Recognition
Acknowledgment stating under oath that she is an American will not, standing alone, work to nullify or invalidate the foreign
citizen; that, since 1993, she and Vicente have been living divorce secured by Rebecca as an American citizen on
separately; and that she is carrying a child not of Vicente. On February 22, 1996. For as we stressed at the outset, in
March 21, 2001, Rebecca filed another petition, this time determining whether or not a divorce secured abroad would
before the Muntinlupa City RTC, for declaration of absolute come within the pale of the country’s policy against absolute
nullity of marriage on the ground of Vicente’s alleged divorce, the reckoning point is the citizenship of the parties at
psychological incapacity. In it, Rebecca also sought the the time a valid divorce is obtained.
dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains with
application for support pendente lite for her and Alix. On Given the validity and efficacy of divorce secured by Rebecca,
August 8, 2001, the RTC issued an Order denying Vicente’s the same shall be given a res judicata effect in this jurisdiction.
motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 01-094 and granting As an obvious result of the divorce decree obtained, the
Rebecca’s application for support pendente lite. Pending marital vinculum between Rebecca and Vicente is considered
resolution of G.R. No. 155635, the CA, by a Decision dated severed; they are both freed from the bond of matrimony.
March 25, 2004, effectively dismissed Civil Case No. 01-094, Consequent to the dissolution of the marriage, Vicente could
and set aside incidental orders the RTC issued in relation to no longer be subject to a husband’s obligation under the Civil
the case. Code. He cannot, for instance, be obliged to live with, observe
respect and fidelity, and render support to Rebecca. Upon the
foregoing disquisitions, it is abundantly clear to the Court that
ISSUE: whether the judgment of divorce is valid and, if so, Rebecca lacks, under the premises, cause of action. One
what are its consequent legal effects? thing is clear from a perusal of Rebecca’s underlying petition
before the RTC, Vicente’s motion to dismiss and Rebecca’s
opposition thereof, with the documentary evidence attached
HELD: There can be no serious dispute that Rebecca, at the therein: The petitioner lacks a cause of action for declaration
time she applied for and obtained her divorce from Vicente, of nullity of marriage, a suit which presupposes the existence
was an American citizen and remains to be one, absent proof of a marriage. To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause
of an effective repudiation of such citizenship. And as aptly of action, the movant must show that the claim for relief does
found by the CA, Rebecca had consistently professed, not exist rather than that a claim has been defectively stated
asserted, and represented herself as an American citizen. It is or is ambiguous, indefinite, or uncertain. With the valid foreign
true that Rebecca had been issued by the Bureau of divorce secured by Rebecca, there is no more marital tie
binding her to Vicente. There is in fine no more marriage to be order of succession; (b) the amount of successional rights;
dissolved or nullified. (c) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the
capacity to succeed. Appellants would however counter that
Art. 17. Paragraph three, of the Civil Code prevails as the
exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code afore-quoted. This
is not correct. Precisely, Congress deleted the phrase,
TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased. "notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next preceding
PEOPLE'S BANK & TRUST COMPANY, executor. MARIA article" when they incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as
CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, vs. Art. 17 of the new Civil Code, while reproducing without
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL. (No. L-23678. June 6, 1967.) substantial change the second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old
Civil Code as Art. 16 in the new. It must have been their
FACTS: Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the purpose to make the second paragraph of Art. 16 a specific
State of Texas and of the United States." By his first wife, Mary provision in itself which must be applied in testate and
E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five legitimate children; intestate successions. It is therefore evident that whatever
by his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived him, he had public policy or good customs may be involved in our system
three legitimate children and finally, he had three illegitimate of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to
children. On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically
the Philippines, in which he directed that after all taxes, chosen to leave, inter. alia, the amount of successional rights,
obligations, and expenses of administration are paid for, his to the decedent's national law. Specific provisions must prevail
distributable estate should be divided, in trust. Subsequently, over general ones.
or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died, a resident of San
Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His will was admitted to probate in the The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a
Court of First Instance of Manila on September 15, 1958. The citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws
People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly,
paid all the bequests therein including the amount of since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the
$240,000.00 in the form of shares of stock to Mary E. Mallen amount of successional rights are to be determined under
and to the three (3) illegitimate children. In the project of Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied
partition, the executor —pursuant to the "Twelfth" clause of to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
the testator's Last Will and Testament—divided the residuary
estate into seven equal portions for the benefit of the testator's
seven legitimate children by his first and second marriages.
On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma
Bellis filed their respective oppositions to the project of PAULA T. LLORENTE vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
partition on the ground that they were deprived of their ALICIA F. LLORENTE (G.R. No. 124371. November 23,
legitimes as illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory 2000)
heirs of the deceased. The lower court, on April 30, 1964,
issued an order overruling the oppositions and approving the FACTS: Lorenzo N. Llorente was an serviceman of the United
executor's final account, report and administration and project States Navy from March 10, 1927 to September 30, 1957. On
of partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied February 22, 1937, Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente
the national law of the decedent, which in this case is Texas were married before a parish priest, Roman Catholic Church,
law, which did not provide for legitimes. Their respective in Nabua, Camarines Sur. On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo
motions for reconsideration having been denied by the lower was admitted to United States citizenship and Certificate of
court on June 11, 1964. Naturalization No. 5579816 was issued in his favor by the
United States District Court, Southern District of New York.
Upon the liberation of the Philippines by the American Forces
ISSUE: Which law must apply – Texas law or Philippine law? in 1945, Lorenzo was granted an accrued leave by the U.S.
Navy, to visit his wife and he visited the Philippines. He
discovered that his wife Paula was pregnant and was “living
HELD: In the present case, it is not disputed that the decedent in” and having an adulterous relationship with his brother,
was both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time Ceferino Llorente. On December 4, 1945, Paula gave birth to
of his death. So that even assuming Texas has a conflict of a boy registered in the Office of the Registrar of Nabua as
law rule providing that the domiciliary system (law of the “Crisologo Llorente,” with the certificate stating that the child
domicile) should govern, the same would not result in a was not legitimate and the line for the father’s name was left
reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still refer blank. Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her. In
to Texas law. Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule fact, on February 2, 1946, the couple drew a written
adopting the situs theory where the properties are situated, agreement to the effect that (1) all the family allowances
renvoi would arise, since the properties here involved are allotted by the United States Navy as part of Lorenzo’s salary
found in the Philippines. In the absence, however, of proof as and all other obligations for Paula’s daily maintenance and
to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be presumed support would be suspended; (2) they would dissolve their
different from ours. marital union in accordance with judicial proceedings. Lorenzo
returned to the United States and on November 16, 1951 filed
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render for divorce with the Superior Court of the State of California in
applicable the national law of the decedent, in intestate or and for the County of San Diego. Paula was represented by
testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the counsel, John Riley, and actively participated in the
proceedings. On November 27, 1951, the Superior Court of refer to no other than the law of the State of which the
the State of California, for the County of San Diego found all decedent was a resident. Second, there is no showing that the
factual allegations to be true and issued an interlocutory application of the renvoi doctrine is called for or required by
judgment of divorce. On December 4, 1952, the divorce New York State law. The hasty application of Philippine law
decree became final. and the complete disregard of the will, already probated as
duly executed in accordance with the formalities of Philippine
On January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia F. Llorente in law, is fatal, especially in light of the factual and legal
Manila. From 1958 to 1985, Lorenzo and Alicia lived together circumstances here obtaining. Likewise, as held in several
as husband and wife and their twenty-five (25) year union cases, as Lorenzo was no longer a Filipino citizen by the time
produced three children. On March 13, 1981, Lorenzo he obtained his divorce from Paula, said divorce was valid and
executed a Last Will and Testament. The will was notarized recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity.
by Notary Public Salvador M. Occiano, duly signed by Lorenzo
with attesting witnesses Francisco Hugo, Francisco Neibres The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property to his
and Tito Trajano. In the will, Lorenzo bequeathed all his second wife and children by her is glaringly shown in the will
property to Alicia and their three children. On December 14, he executed. We do not wish to frustrate his wishes, since he
1983, Lorenzo filed with the Regional Trial Court, Iriga, was a foreigner, not covered by our laws on “family rights and
Camarines Sur, a petition for the probate and allowance of his duties, status, condition and legal capacity.” Whether the will
last will and testament wherein Lorenzo moved that Alicia be is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from Lorenzo are
appointed Special Administratrix of his estate. On January 18, issues best proved by foreign law which must be pleaded and
1984, the trial court denied the motion for the reason that the proved. Whether the will was executed in accordance with the
testator Lorenzo was still alive. On January 24, 1984, finding formalities required is answered by referring to Philippine law.
that the will was duly executed, the trial court admitted the will In fact, the will was duly probated. As a guide however, the
to probate. On September 4, 1985, Paula filed with the same trial court should note that whatever public policy or good
court a petition for letters of administration over Lorenzo’s customs may be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress
estate in her favor. Paula contended (1) that she was did not intend to extend the same to the succession of foreign
Lorenzo’s surviving spouse, (2) that the various property were nationals. Congress specifically left the amount of
acquired during their marriage, (3) that Lorenzo’s will disposed successional rights to the decedent’s national law.
of all his property in favor of Alicia and her children,
encroaching on her legitime and 1/2 share in the conjugal
property.

On May 18, 1987, the Regional Trial Court issued a joint ALONZO Q. ANCHETA vs. CANDELARIA GUERSEY-
decision, thus: DALAYGON (G.R. No. 139868. June 8, 2006)
“Wherefore, considering that this court has so found
that the divorce decree granted to the late Lorenzo FACTS: Spouses Audrey O’Neill and W. Richard Guersey
Llorente is void and inapplicable in the Philippines, were American citizens who have resided in the Philippines
therefore the marriage he contracted with Alicia for 30 years. They have an adopted daughter, Kyle Guersey
Fortunato on January 16, 1958 at Manila is likewise Hill. On July 29, 1979, Audrey died, leaving a will. In it, she
void. On the other hand, the court finds the petition bequeathed her entire estate to Richard, who was also
of Paula Titular Llorente, meritorious, and so designated as executor. The will was admitted to probate
declares the intrinsic disposition of the will of Lorenzo before the Orphan’s Court of Baltimore, Maryland, U.S.A. In
Llorente dated March 13, 1981 as void and declares 1981, Richard married Candelaria Guersey-Dalaygon with
her entitled as conjugal partner and entitled to one- whom he has two children. On July 20, 1984, Richard died,
half of their conjugal properties, and as primary leaving a will, wherein he bequeathed his entire estate to
compulsory heir, Paula T. Llorente is also entitled to respondent, save for his rights and interests over the A/G
one-third of the estate and then one-third should go Interiors, Inc. shares, which he left to Kyle. The will was also
to the illegitimate children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, all admitted to probate by the Orphan’s Court of Ann Arundel,
surname (sic) Llorente Maryland, U.S.A., and James N. Phillips was likewise
appointed as executor, who in turn, designated Atty. William
On July 31, 1995, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Quasha or any member of the Quasha Asperilla Ancheta
decision, affirming with modification the decision of the trial Peña & Nolasco Law Offices, as ancillary administrator. On
court. October 19, 1987, petitioner filed in Special Proceeding No.
9625, a motion to declare Richard and Kyle as heirs of Audrey.
Petitioner also filed on October 23, 1987, a project of partition
ISSUE: What is the applicable law provided that Lorenzo of Audrey’s estate, with Richard being apportioned the 3/4
became an American citizen? undivided interest in the Makati property, 48.333 shares in A/G
Interiors, Inc., and P9,313.48 from the Citibank current
account; and Kyle, the 1/4 undivided interest in the Makati
HELD: There is no such thing as one American law. The property, 16,111 shares in A/G Interiors, Inc., and P3,104.49
“national law” indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code cannot in cash.
possibly apply to general American law. There is no such law
governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the United The trial court found merit in respondent’s opposition, and in
States. Each State of the union has its own law applicable to its Order dated December 6, 1991, disapproved the project of
its citizens and in force only within the State. It can therefore partition insofar as it affects the Makati property. The trial court
also adjudicated Richard’s entire 3/4 undivided interest in the such law is the same as the Philippine law on wills and
Makati property to respondent. On October 20, 1993, succession. Thus, the trial court peremptorily applied
respondent filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) an amended Philippine laws and totally disregarded the terms of Audrey’s
complaint for the annulment of the trial court’s Orders dated will. Moreover, whether his omission was intentional or not,
February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, issued in Special the fact remains that the trial court failed to consider said law
Proceeding No. 9625. Respondent contended that petitioner when it issued the assailed RTC Orders dated February 12,
willfully breached his fiduciary duty when he disregarded the 1988 and April 7, 1988, declaring Richard and Kyle as
laws of the State of Maryland on the distribution of Audrey’s Audrey’s heirs, and distributing Audrey’s estate according to
estate in accordance with her will. On March 18, 1999, the CA the project of partition submitted by petitioner. This eventually
rendered the assailed Decision annulling the trial court’s prejudiced respondent and deprived her of her full
Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, in Special successional right to the Makati property.
Proceeding No. 9625.
In this case, given that the pertinent law of the State of
Maryland has been brought to record before the CA, and the
ISSUE: Can the orders dated 12 February and 07 April be trial court in Special Proceeding No. M-888 appropriately took
annulled considering that it is a final judgment? note of the same in disapproving the proposed project of
partition of Richard’s estate, not to mention that petitioner or
any other interested person for that matter, does not dispute
HELD: The petition for annulment was filed before the CA on the existence or validity of said law, then Audrey’s and
October 20, 1993, before the issuance of the 1997 Rules of Richard’s estate should be distributed according to their
Civil Procedure; hence, the applicable law is Batas Pambansa respective wills, and not according to the project of partition
Blg. 129 (B.P. 129) or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of submitted by petitioner. In any case, the Court has also ruled
1980. An annulment of judgment filed under B.P. 129 may be that if land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently
based on the ground that a judgment is void for want of becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the
jurisdiction or that the judgment was obtained by extrinsic original transaction is considered cured and the title of the
fraud. For fraud to become a basis for annulment of judgment, transferee is rendered valid. In this case, since the Makati
it has to be from the discovery of the fraud. In the present property had already passed on to respondent who is a
case, respondent alleged extrinsic fraud as basis for the Filipino, then whatever flaw, if any, that attended the
annulment of the RTC Orders dated February 12, 1988 and acquisition by the Guerseys of the Makati property is now
April 7, 1988. The CA found merit in respondent’s cause and inconsequential, as the objective of the constitutional
found that petitioner’s failure to follow the terms of Audrey’s provision to keep our lands in Filipino hands has been
will, despite the latter’s declaration of good faith, amounted to achieved.
extrinsic fraud. It should be pointed out that the prescriptive
period for annulment of judgment based on extrinsic fraud
commences to run from the discovery of the fraud or
fraudulent act/s. Respondent’s knowledge of the terms of
Audrey’s will is immaterial in this case since it is not the fraud JOYCE V. ARDIENTE vs. SPOUSES JAVIER and MA.
complained of. Rather, it is petitioner’s failure to introduce in THERESA PASTORFIDE, CAGAYAN DE ORO WATER
evidence the pertinent law of the State of Maryland that is the DISTRICT and GASPAR GONZALEZ, JR. (G.R. No.
fraudulent act, or in this case, omission, alleged to have been 161921. July 17, 2013)
committed against respondent, and therefore, the four-year
period should be counted from the time of respondent’s FACTS: Joyce V. Ardiente and her husband Dr. Roberto S.
discovery thereof. Records bear the fact that the filing of the Ardiente are owners of a housing unit at Emily Homes,
project of partition of Richard’s estate, the opposition thereto, Balulang, Cagayan de Oro City. On June 2, 1994, Joyce
and the order of the trial court disallowing the project of Ardiente entered into a Memorandum of Agreement selling,
partition in Special Proceeding No. M-888 were all done in transferring and conveying in favor of [respondent] Ma.
1991. Respondent cannot be faulted for letting the assailed Theresa Pastorfide all their rights and interests in the housing
orders to lapse into finality since it was only through Special unit at Emily Homes in consideration of P70,000.00.
Proceeding No. M-888 that she came to comprehend the
ramifications of petitioner’s acts.
ISSUE:
Being a foreign national, the intrinsic validity of Audrey’s will,
especially with regard as to who are her heirs, is governed by
her national law, i.e., the law of the State of Maryland, as HELD:
provided in Article 16 of the Civil Code. Article 1039 of the Civil
Code further provides that “capacity to succeed is governed
by the law of the nation of the decedent.” While foreign laws
do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are
not authorized to take judicial notice of them; however,
petitioner, as ancillary administrator of Audrey’s estate, was
duty-bound to introduce in evidence the pertinent law of the
State of Maryland. Petitioner admitted that he failed to
introduce in evidence the law of the State of Maryland on
Estates and Trusts, and merely relied on the presumption that
 a Report for Duty after her return from compulsory summer
leave.]

In the meantime, on January 3, 1989, Diaz filed a complaint

with the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB-00-89-0049), against
Gemino H. Abad, Ernesto G. Tabujara and Georgina R.
Encanto, all officials of the University of the Philippines, for the
alleged violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019, involving the
legality of a Report for Duty Form as a prerequisite to the
payment of her salary. On May 4, 1989, the Ombudsman
dismissed the said complaint. On August 31, 1989, the
Supreme Court En Banc dismissed Diaz’s Petition in G.R. No.
89207. The RTC, ruling that a sabbatical leave is not a right
but a privilege, held that petitioner Diaz was entitled to such
privilege and found that the delay in the resolution of her
application was unreasonable and unconscionable. The Court
of Appeals trimmed down the issue to whether or not
respondents U.P., Tabujara and Abad were negligent or acted
in bad faith in denying petitioner Diaz’s application for
sabbatical leave and in withholding her salaries. In its Decision
HUMAN RELATIONS promulgated on April 28, 2005, it effectively reversed the
decision of the RTC.

ELIZABETH L. DIAZ vs. GEORGINA R. ENCANTO,

ERNESTO G. TABUJARA, GEMINO H. ABAD and ISSUE: whether or not the respondents acted in bad faith
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES (G.R. No. 171303. when they resolved petitioner Diaz’s application for sabbatical
January 20, 2016) leave and withheld her salaries

FACTS: Diaz has been in the service of U.P. since 1963. In

1987, during the second semester for Academic Year (AY) HELD: There is no dispute, and both the RTC and the Court
1987-1988, she was a full time member of the faculty. After 2 of Appeals agree, that the grant of a sabbatical leave is not a
to 3 weeks of teaching, she applied for sick leave effective matter of right, but a privilege. Moreover, the issue of whether
November 23, 1987 until March 1, 1988. She returned on or not the respondents acted in bad faith when they denied
March 2, 1988 and submitted a Report for Duty Form. On May petitioner Diaz’s application for sabbatical leave has been
3, 1988, Diaz filed a letter-application directly with U.P.’s answered several times, in separate jurisdictions. Petitioner
Office of the President for sabbatical leave with pay for one (1) Diaz’s complaint for recovery of damages before the RTC was
year effective June 1988 to May 1989, for “rest, renewal and based on the alleged bad faith of the respondents in denying
study.” Cecilia Lazaro, Chair of the Broadcast Department, on her application for sabbatical leave vis-à-vis Articles 19 and
May 10, 1988, recommended instead that Diaz be granted any 20 of the Civil Code. Article 19 of the Civil Code “prescribes
leave of absence she may be qualified for. Incidentally, Diaz a ‘primordial limitation on all rights’ by setting certain
received her salary for June 1988, indicating that her standards that must be observed in the exercise thereof.
sabbatical might be approved. Thereafter, Encanto referred Abuse of right under Article 19 exists when the following
Diaz’s sabbatical application to the Secretary of U.P., elements are present: (1) there is a legal right or duty; (2)
recommending its denial. On Diaz’s request to teach for that which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of
semester, AY 1988-89, the Vice Chancellor for Academic prejudicing or injuring another.
Affairs, Edgardo Pacheco, and the HRDO Director, Atty. Pio
Frago, instructed Encanto that “Until Prof. Diaz officially The Ombudsman and all three courts, starting from the RTC
reports for duty, accomplishes the Certificate of Report for to this Court, have already established that a sabbatical leave
Duty, and the Dean of CMC confirms her date of actual report is not a right and therefore petitioner Diaz cannot demand its
for duty, she is considered absent without official leave grant. It does not matter that there was only one reason for the
(AWOL) for the University.” On November 8, 1988, Abad, then denial of her application, as the approving authorities found
as OIC, issued a Memorandum to Diaz to confirm as valid that such reason was enough. Moreover, not only the Court of
Encanto’s reason of shortage of teaching staff in denying her Appeals but also the Ombudsman, and this Court, have ruled
sabbatical. [While Diaz was able to teach during the second that the respondents did not act in bad faith when petitioner
semester of AY 1988-89, she was not able to claim her Diaz’s sabbatical leave application was denied. Those three
salaries for her refusal to submit the Report for Duty Form. separate rulings verily must be given great weight in the case
She received her salaries for June to July 15, 1989, but could at bar. The RTC declared that petitioner Diaz should have
no longer claim her salary after July 15, 1989, when Encanto been granted a sabbatical leave, it is important to note that the
reminded the University Cashier, in a letter dated July 26, RTC awarded damages to petitioner Diaz merely for the
1989, that Diaz had to “accomplish the Report for Duty Form unreasonable and unconscionable delay in the resolution of
to entitle her to salaries and make official her return to the her sabbatical leave application, and not its denial per se.
service of the University.” Diaz’s name was subsequently
included in the payroll starting July 1990, when she submitted Nevertheless, on the question of whether or not there was bad
faith in the delay of the resolution of petitioner Diaz’s
sabbatical leave application, the Court still rules in the On January 30, 1984, Provincial Fiscal Mauro M. Castro of
negative. “It is an elementary rule in this jurisdiction that good Rizal reversed the finding of Fiscal Sumaway and exonerated
faith is presumed and that the burden of proving bad faith rests respondent Baltao. He also instructed the Trial Fiscal to move
upon the party alleging the same.” Petitioner Diaz has failed for dismissal of the information filed against Eugenio S.
to prove bad faith on the part of the respondents. There is Baltao. Fiscal Castro found that the signature in PBC Check
nothing in the records to show that the respondents purposely No. 136361 is not the signature of Eugenio S. Baltao. He also
delayed the resolution of her application to prejudice and found that there is no showing in the records of the preliminary
injure her. She has not even shown that the delay of six investigation that Eugenio S. Baltao actually received notice
months in resolving a sabbatical leave application has never of the said investigation. Because of the alleged unjust filing
happened prior to her case. On the contrary, any delay that of a criminal case against him for allegedly issuing a check
occurred was due to the fact that petitioner Diaz’s application which bounced in violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22,
for sabbatical leave did not follow the usual procedure; hence, Baltao filed before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a
the processing of said application took time. complaint for damages against herein petitioners Albenson
Enterprises, Jesse Yap, its owner, and Benjamin Mendiona,
Petitioner Diaz is entitled to her withheld salaries from July 1, its employee. In its decision, the lower court observed that “the
1988 to October 31, 1988, and from November 1, 1988 to May check is drawn against the account of ‘E.L. Woodworks,’ not
31, 1989, and July 16, 1989 to May 31, 1990, upon submission of Guaranteed Industries of which plaintiff used to be
of the required documents. The denial of petitioner Diaz’s President. Guaranteed Industries had been inactive and had
salaries during the first semester of Academic Year (AY) ceased to exist as a corporation since 1975. On appeal,
1988-1989 was due to the fact that she did not teach that respondent court modified the trial court’s decision.
semester. But when respondent Lazaro removed petitioner
Diaz’s name from the final schedule of teaching assignments Petitioners contend that the civil case filed in the lower court
in CMC for the first semester of AY 1988-89, it was without was one for malicious prosecution. Citing the case of Madera
petitioner Diaz’s prior knowledge, as admitted by respondent vs. Lopez, they assert that the absence of malice on their part
Lazaro herself. The Court, however, observes that respondent absolves them from any liability for malicious prosecution.
Lazaro, in so doing, did not act in bad faith as she expected Private respondent, on the other hand, anchored his complaint
petitioner Diaz’s application for leave, of whatever nature, to for Damages on Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code.
be granted. Given that the respondents have not abused their
rights, they should not be held liable for any damages
sustained by petitioner Diaz. ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of the criminal complaint by
Albenson Enterprises constituted an abuse of right?

HELD: No, petitioners could not be said to have violated the

ALBENSON ENTERPRISES CORP., JESSE YAP, AND aforestated principle of abuse of right. What prompted
BEN-JAMIN MENDIONA vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS petitioners to file the case for violation of Batas Pambansa
AND EUGENIO S. BALTAO Bilang 22 against private respondent was their failure to
collect the amount of P2,575.00 due on a bounced check
FACTS: In September, October, and November 1980, which they honestly believed was issued to them by private
petitioner Al-benson Enterprises Corporation delivered to respondent. Petitioners had conducted inquiries regarding the
Guaranteed Industries, Inc. the mild steel plates which the origin of the check. .
latter ordered. As part payment thereof, Albenson was given
Pacific Banking Corporation Check No. 136361 in the amount Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as
of P2,575.00 and drawn against the account of E.L. the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards which
Woodworks. When presented for payment, the check was may be observed not only in the exercise of one’s rights but
dishonored for the reason “Account Closed.” Thereafter, also in the performance of one’s duties. There is however, no
petitioner Albenson, through counsel, traced the origin of the hard and fast rule which can be applied to determine whether
dishonored check. From the records of the Securities and or not the principle of abuse of rights may be invoked. The
Exchange Commission (SEC), Albenson discovered that the question of whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has
president of Guaranteed, the recipient of the unpaid mild steel been violated, resulting in damages under Articles 20 and 21
plates, was one “Eugenio S. Baltao.” Upon further inquiry, or other applicable provision of law, depends on the
Albenson was informed by the Ministry of Trade and Industry circumstances of each case. The elements of an abuse of right
that E.L. Woodworks, a single proprietorship business, was under Article 19 are the following: (1) There is a legal right or
registered in the name of one “Eugenio Baltao”. Respondent duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent
Baltao, through counsel, denied that he issued the check, or of prejudicing or injuring another. Article 20 speaks of the
that the signature appearing thereon is his. He further alleged general sanction for all other provisions of law which do not
that Guaranteed was a defunct entity and hence, could not especially provide for their own sanction. Thus, anyone who,
have transacted business with Albenson. It appears, however, whether willfully or negligently, in the exercise of his legal right
that private respondent has a namesake, his son Eugenio or duty, causes damage to another, shall indemnify his victim
Baltao III, who manages a business establishment, E.L. for injuries suffered thereby. Article 21 deals with acts contra
Woodworks with the very same business address of bonus mores, and has the following elements: 1) There is an
Guaranteed. act which is legal; 2) but which is contrary to morals, good
custom, public order, or public policy; 3) and it is done with
intent to injure. There is a common element under Articles 19
and 21, and that is, the act must be intentional. However, P4,102,438.30. These wires and cables were in turn sold,
Article 20 does not distinguish: the act may be done either pursuant to previous arrangements, by plaintiff to MERALCO,
“willfully”, or “negligently”. the former being the accredited supplier of the electrical
requirements of the latter. On September 7, 1987, plaintiff paid
It is pivotal to note at this juncture that in this same letter, if defendant the amount of P300,000.00 out of its total
indeed private respondent wanted to clear himself from the purchases as above-stated, thereby leaving an unpaid
baseless accusation made against his person, he should have account on the aforesaid deliveries of P3,802,478.20. On
made mention of the fact that there are three (3) persons with several occasions, defendant wrote plaintiff demanding
the same name. He, however, failed to do this. Thus, payment of its outstanding obligations due plaintiff. In
petitioners had every reason to believe that the Eugenio response, defendant wrote defendant on October 5, 1987
Baltao who issued the bouncing check is respondent Eugenio requesting the latter if it could pay its outstanding account in
S. Baltao when their counsel wrote respondent to make good monthly installments of P500,000.00 plus 1% interest per
the amount of the check and upon refusal, filed the complaint month commencing on October 15, 1987 until full payment.
for violation of BP Blg. 22. Private respondent, however, did Defendant, however, rejected plaintiff’s offer and accordingly
nothing to clarify the case of mistaken identity at first hand. reiterated its demand for the full payment of defendant’s
Instead, private respondent waited in ambush and thereafter account.
pounced on the hapless petitioners at a time he thought was
propitious by filing an action for damages. The Court will not Phelps then filed a complaint before the Pasig RTC for the
countenance this devious scheme. recovery of the unpaid amount. Petitioner, in its answer,
admitted purchasing the wires and cables from private
To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that respondent but disputed the amount claimed by the latter.
the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and Petitioner likewise interposed a counterclaim against private
humiliate a person, and that it was initiated deliberately by the respondent, alleging that it suffered injury to its reputation due
defendant knowing that his charges were false and to Phelps Dodge’s acts. Such acts were purportedly
groundless. Concededly, the mere act of submitting a case to calculated to humiliate petitioner and constituted an abuse of
the authorities for prosecution does not make one liable for rights. The RTC rendered a decision in favor of Phelps. On 25
malicious prosecution. In order that such a case can prosper, June 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision
however, the following three (3) elements must be present, to modifying the decision of the trial court (with regard to amount
wit: (1) The fact of the prosecution and the further fact that the of monetary award).
defendant was himself the prosecutor, and that the action was
finally terminated with an acquittal; (2) That in bringing the
action, the prosecutor acted without probable cause; (3) The ISSUE: whether or not private respondent is guilty of abuse of
prosecutor was actuated or impelled by legal malice. Thus, a right
party injured by the filing of a court case against him, even if
he is later on absolved, may file a case for damages grounded
either on the principle of abuse of rights, or on malicious HELD: No. It is an elementary rule in this jurisdiction that good
prosecution. As earlier stated, a complaint for damages based faith is presumed and that the burden of proving bad faith rests
on malicious prosecution will prosper only if the three (3) upon the party alleging the same. In the case at bar, petitioner
elements aforecited are shown to exist. In the case at bar, the has failed to prove bad faith on the part of private respondent.
second and third elements were not shown to exist. In the Petitioner’s allegation that private respondent was motivated
case at bar, there is no proof of a sinister design on the part by a desire to terminate its agency relationship with petitioner
of petitioners to vex or humiliate private respondent by so that private respondent itself may deal directly with Meralco
instituting the criminal case against him. While petitioners may is simply not supported by the evidence. At most, such
have been negligent to some extent in determining the liability supposition is merely speculative. Moreover, we find that
of private respondent for the dishonored check, the same is private respondent was driven by very legitimate reasons for
not so gross or reckless as to amount to bad faith warranting rejecting petitioner’s offer and instituting the action for
an award of damages. collection before the trial court.

Likewise ART. 1248 provides that “Unless there is an express

stipulation to that effect, the creditor cannot be compelled
partially to receive the prestations in which the obligation
BARONS MARKETING CORP. vs. COURT OF APPEALS consists. Neither may the debtor be required to make partial
and PHELPS DODGE PHILS, INC. (G.R. No. 126486. payments. However, when the debt is in part liquidated and in
February 9, 1998) part unliquidated, the creditor may demand and the debtor
may effect the payment of the former without waiting for the
FACTS: On August 31, 1973, Phelps Dodge, Philippines, Inc. liquidation of the latter.” Tolentino concedes that the right has
appointed Barons Marketing, Corporation as one of its dealers its limitations: Partial Prestations.—Since the creditor cannot
of electrical wires and cables effective September 1, 1973. As be compelled to accept partial performance, unless otherwise
such dealer, Barons was given by Phelps 60 days credit for its stipulated, the creditor who refuses to accept partial
purchases of its electrical products. This credit term was to be prestations does not incur in delay or mora accipiendi, except
reckoned from the date of delivery by plaintiff of its products when there is abuse of right or if good faith requires
to plaintiff. During the period covering December 1986 to acceptance.6 Indeed, the law, as set forth in Article 19 of the
August 17, 1987, plaintiff purchased, on credit, from defendant Civil Code, prescribes a “primordial limitation on all rights” by
various electrical wires and cables in the total amount of
setting certain standards that must be observed in the favor of respondent. The CA opined that the letter addressed
exercise thereof. to Cebu Pacific’s director was sent to respondent’s employer
not merely to ask for assistance for the collection of the
Consequently, petitioner’s prayer for moral and exemplary disputed payment but to subject her to ridicule, humiliation and
damages must thus be rejected. Petitioner’s claim for moral similar injury such that she would be pressured to pay. The
damages is anchored on Article 2219(10) of the Civil Code. appellate court thus held that petitioners are guilty of abuse of
Having ruled that private respondent’s acts did not transgress right entitling respondent to collect moral damages and
the provisions of Article 21, petitioner cannot be entitled to attorney’s fees. Petitioner California Clothing Inc. was made
moral damages or, for that matter, exemplary damages. While liable for its failure to exercise extraordinary diligence in the
the amount of exemplary damages need not be proved, hiring and selection of its employees; while Ybañez’s liability
petitioner must show that he is entitled to moral, temperate or stemmed from her act of signing the demand letter sent to
compensatory damages before the court may consider the respondent’s employer.
question of whether or not exemplary damages should be
awarded. Petitioner has failed to discharge this burden.
ISSUE: Was the letter sent by petitioner(s) made to subject
the respondent to ridicule, humiliation and similar injury?

HELD: Respondent’s complaint against petitioners stemmed

from the principle of abuse of rights provided for in the Civil
Code on the chapter of human relations. Respondent cried
CALIFORNIA CLOTHING, INC. and MICHELLE S. foul when petitioners allegedly embarrassed her when they
YBAÑEZ vs. SHIRLEY G. QUIÑONES (G.R. No. 175822. insisted that she did not pay for the black jeans she purchased
October 23, 2013) from their shop despite the evidence of payment which is the
official receipt issued by the shop. The issuance of the receipt
FACTS: On July 25, 2001, respondent Shirley G. Quiñones, a notwithstanding, petitioners had the right to verify from
Reservation Ticketing Agent of Cebu Pacific Air in Lapu Lapu respondent whether she indeed made payment if they had
City, went inside the Guess USA Boutique at the second floor reason to believe that she did not. However, the exercise of
of Robinson’s Cebu. She fitted four items: two jeans, a blouse such right is not without limitations. Any abuse in the exer-cise
and a shorts, then decided to purchase the black jeans worth of such right and in the performance of duty causing damage
P2,098.00. Respondent allegedly paid to the cashier or injury to another is actionable under the Civil Code.
evidenced by a receipt5 issued by the store. While she was
walking through the sky-walk connecting Robinson’s and Under the abuse of rights principle found in Article 19 of the
Mercury Drug Store where she was heading next, a Guess Civil Code, a person must, in the exercise of legal right or duty,
employee approached and informed her that she failed to pay act in good faith. He would be liable if he instead acted in bad
the item she got. She, however, insisted that she paid and faith, with intent to prejudice another. Good faith refers to the
showed the employee the receipt issued in her favor. When state of mind which is manifested by the acts of the individual
she arrived at the Cebu Pacific Office, the Guess employees concerned. It consists of the intention to abstain from taking
allegedly subjected her to humiliation in front of the clients of an unconscionable and unscrupulous advantage of another.
Cebu Pacific and repeatedly demanded payment for the black Malice or bad faith, on the other hand, implies a conscious and
jeans. They supposedly even searched her wallet to check intentional design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose
how much money she had, followed by another argument. On or moral obliquity. It is evident from the circumstances of the
the same day, the Guess employees allegedly gave a letter to case that petittioners went overboard and tried to force
the Director of Cebu Pacific Air narrating the incident, but the respondent to pay the amount they were demanding. In the
latter refused to receive it as it did not concern the office and guise of asking for assistance, petitioners even sent a demand
the same took place while respondent was off duty. Another letter to respondent’s employer not only informing it of the
letter was allegedly prepared and was sup-posed to be sent incident but obviously imputing bad acts on the part of
to the Cebu Pacific Office in Robinson’s, but the latter again respondent.
refused to receive it. Respondent also claimed that the Human
Resource Department (HRD) of Robinson’s was furnished Complementing the principle of abuse of rights are the
said letter and the latter in fact conducted an investigation for provisions of Articles 20 and 21 of the Civil Code. In view of
purposes of canceling respondent’s Robinson’s credit card. the foregoing, respondent is entitled to an award of moral
Respondent further claimed that she was not given a copy of damages and attorney’s fees. Moral damages may be
said damaging letter. awarded whenever the defendant’s wrongful act or omission
is the proximate cause of the plaintiffs physical suffering,
On June 20, 2003, the RTC rendered a Decision dismissing mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
both the complaint and counterclaim of the parties. The trial wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and similar
court concluded that the petitioners and the other defendants injury in the cases specified or analogous to those provided in
believed in good faith that respondent failed to make payment. Article 2219 of the Civil Code. Moral damages are given to
Considering that no motive to fabricate a lie could be attributed ease the defendant’s grief and suffering. They should, thus,
to the Guess employees, the court held that when they reasonably approximate the extent of hurt caused and the
demanded payment from respondent, they merely exercised gravity of the wrong done.
a right under the honest belief that no payment was made. On
appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision in
 At the time petitioners implemented the order of demolition,
VICENTE RELLOSA, CYNTHIA ORTEGA assisted by barely five days after respondents received a copy thereof, the
husband Roberto Ortega vs. GONZALO PELLOSIS, same was not yet final and executory. The law provided for a
INESITA MOSTE, and DANILO RADAM (G.R. No. 138964. fifteen-day appeal period in favor of a party aggrieved by an
August 9, 2001) adverse ruling of the Office of the Building Official but by the
precipitate action of petitioners in demolishing the houses of
FACTS: Respondents were lessees of a parcel of land, owned respondents (prior to the expiration of the period to appeal),
by one Marta Reyes, located at San Pascual Street, Malate, the latter were effectively deprived of this recourse. The fact
Manila. Respondents had built their houses on the land which, that the order of demolition was later affirmed by the
over the years, underwent continuous improvements. After the Department of Public Works and Highways was of no
demise of Marta, the land was inherited by her son Victor moment. The action of petitioners up to the point where they
Reyes. Sometime in 1986, Victor informed respondents that, were able to secure an order of demolition was not
for being lessees of the land for more than twenty (20) years, condemnable but implementing the order unmindful of the
they would have a right of first refusal to buy the land. right of respondents to contest the ruling was a different matter
Sometime in the early part of 1989, without the knowledge of and could only be held utterly indefensible.
respondents, the land occupied by them was sold to petitioner
Cynthia Ortega who was able to ultimately secure title to the
property in her name.
PREJUDICIAL QUESTION
On 25 May 1989, Cynthia Ortega, filed a petition for
Condemnation. On 31 May 1989, respondents filed with the JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI vs. PEOPLE OF THE
Regional Trial Court of Manila a suit for the “Declaration of PHILIPPINES and SHIRLEY TISMO-CAPILI (G.R. No.
Nullity of the Sale,” docketed as Civil Case No. 89-49176, 183805. July 3, 2013)
made in favor of petitioner Cynthia Ortega predicated upon
their right of first refusal which was claimed to have been FACTS: On June 28, 2004, petitioner was charged with the
impinged upon the sale of the land to petitioner Ortega without crime of bigamy before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
their knowledge. After due hearing in the condemnation case, Pasig City. Petitioner thereafter filed a Motion to Suspend
the Office of the Building Official issued a resolution, dated 27 Proceedings alleging that: (1) there is a pending civil case for
November 1989, ordering the demolition of the houses of declaration of nullity of the second marriage before the RTC
respondents. The following day, or on 08 December 1989, of Antipolo City filed by Karla Y. Medina-Capili; (2) in the event
Cynthia Ortega, together with her father and co-petitioner, that the marriage is declared null and void, it would exculpate
Vicente Rellosa, hired workers to commence the demolition of him from the charge of bigamy; and (3) the pendency of the
respondents’ houses. Due to the timely intervention of a civil case for the declaration of nullity of the second marriage
mobile unit of the Western Police District, the intended serves as a prejudicial question in the instant criminal case.
demolition did not take place following talks between petitioner
Rellosa and counsel who pleaded that the demolition be In the interim, the RTC of Antipolo City rendered a decision
suspended since the order sought to be implemented was not declaring the voidness or incipient invalidity of the second
yet final and executory. Resultantly, respondents filed Civil marriage between petitioner and private respondent on the
Case No. 89-49176 before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, ground that a subsequent marriage contracted by the husband
Branch 54, praying that petitioners be ordered to pay moral during the lifetime of the legal wife is void from the beginning.
and exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees, for the Thereafter, the petitioner accused filed his Manifestation and
untimely demolition of the houses. After trial, the court Motion (to Dismiss) praying for the dismissal of the criminal
dismissed the complaint of respondents and instead ordered case for bigamy filed against him on the ground that the
them to pay petitioners moral damages. On appeal, the Court second marriage between him and private respondent had
of Appeals, on the basis of its findings and conclusions, already been declared void by the RTC. In an Order dated July
reversed the decision of the trial court and ordered petitioners 7, 2006, the RTC of Pasig City granted petitioner’s
to pay respondents. Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss. In a Decision dated
February 1, 2008, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC’s
decision and the case was remanded to the trial court for
ISSUE: Are the respondents entitled to damages due to the further proceedings.
untimely demolition of their houses?

ISSUE: whether or not the subsequent declaration of nullity of

HELD: Yes. Petitioner might verily be the owner of the land, the second marriage is a ground for dismissal of the criminal
with the right to enjoy and to exclude any person from the case for bigamy
enjoyment and disposal thereof, but the exercise of these
rights is not without limitations. The abuse of rights rule
established in Article 19 of the Civil Code requires every HELD: No. The elements of the crime of bigamy, therefore,
person to act with justice, to give everyone his due; and to are: (1) the offender has been legally married; (2) the marriage
observe honesty and good faith. When a right is exercised in has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is
a manner which discards these norms resulting in damage to absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead
another, a legal wrong is committed for which the actor can be according to the Civil Code; (3) that he contracts a second or
held accountable. subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent
marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. In the court denied the motion to dismiss contained in petitioner's
present case, it appears that all the elements of the crime of affirmative defenses.
bigamy were present when the Information was filed on June
28, 2004. It is undisputed that a second marriage between Meanwhile, the Land Authority filed an Urgent Motion for
petitioner and private respondent was contracted on Leave to Intervene in Civil Case No. C-1576 alleging the
December 8, 1999 during the subsistence of a valid first pendency of an administrative case between the same parties
marriage between petitioner and Karla Y. Medina-Capili on the same subject matter in L.A. Case No. 968 and praying
contracted on September 3, 1999. Notably, the RTC of that the petition for certiorari be granted, the ejectment
Antipolo City itself declared the bigamous nature of the complaint be dismissed and the Office of the Land Authority
second marriage between petitioner and private respondent. be allowed to decide the matter exclusively. Finding the issue
Thus, the subsequent judicial declaration of the second involved in the ejectment case to be one of prior possession,
marriage for being bigamous in nature does not bar the the CFI dismissed the petition for certiorari and lifted the
prosecution of petitioner for the crime of bigamy. restraining order previously issued. Petitioner's motion for
Jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that the accused reconsideration of the dismissal order, adopted in toto by
may still be charged with the crime of bigamy, even if there is Intervenor Land Authority was denied for lack of merit.
a subsequent declaration of the nullity of the second marriage,
so long as the first marriage was still subsisting when the
second marriage was celebrated. ISSUE: whether or not the administrative case between the
private parties involving the lot subject matter of the ejectment
What makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he case constitutes a prejudicial question which would operate as
contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the a bar to said ejectment case
subsistence of a valid first marriage. It further held that the
parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for
themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the HELD: The actions involved in the case at bar being
judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the respectively civil and administrative in character, it is obvious
marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as that technically, there is no prejudicial question to speak of.
there is no such declaration the presumption is that the Equally apparent, however, is the intimate correlation between
marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second said two [2] proceedings, stemming from the fact that the right
marriage before the judicial declaration of the first marriage of private respondents to eject petitioner from the disputed
assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy. portion depends primarily on the resolution of the pending
administrative case. For while it may be true that private
respondents had prior possession of the lot in question, at the
time of the institution of the ejectment case, such right of
possession had been terminated, or at the very least,
RICARDO QUIAMBAO vs. HON. ADRIANO OSORIO, suspended by the cancellation by the Land Authority of the
ZENAIDA GAZA BUENSUCERO, JUSTINA GAZA Agreement to Sell executed in their favor. Whether or not
BERNARDO, and FELIPE GAZA, LAND AUTHORITY (No. private respondents can continue to exercise their right of
L-48157. March 16, 1988) possession is but a necessary, logical consequence of the
issue involved in the pending administrative case assailing the
FACTS: In a complaint for forcible entry filed by herein private validity of the cancellation of the Agreement to Sell and the
respondents against herein petitioner before the then subsequent award of the disputed portion to petitioner. Faced
Municipal Court of Malabon, Rizal, it was alleged that private with these distinct possibilities, the more prudent course for
respondents were the legitimate possessors of a 30,835 sq.m. the trial court to have taken is to hold the ejectment
lot known as Lot No. 4, Block 12, Bca 2039 of the Longos proceedings in abeyance until after a determination of the
Estate situated at Barrio Longos, Malabon Rizal, by virtue of administrative case. If a pending civil case may be considered
the Agreement to Sell No. 3482 executed in their favor by the to be in the nature of a prejudicial question to an administrative
former Land Tenure Administration [which later became the case, We see no reason why the reverse may not be so
Land Authority, then the Department of Agrarian Reform]; that considered in the proper case, such as in the petition at bar.
under cover of darkness, petitioner surreptitiously and by
force, intimidation, strategy and stealth, entered into a 400 sq. A prejudicial question is understood in law to be that which
m. portion thereof, placed bamboo posts "staka" over said arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent
portion and thereafter began the construction of a house of the issue involved in said case and the cognizance of which
thereon; and that these acts of petitioner, which were unlawful pertains to another tribunal. The doctrine of prejudicial
per se, entitled private respondents to a writ of preliminary question comes into play generally in a situation where civil
injunction. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint and criminal actions are pending and the issues involved in
averring that the Agreement upon. which private respondents both cases are similar or so closely-related that an issue must
base their prior possession over the questioned lot had be preemptively resolved in the civil case before the criminal
already been cancelled by the Land Authority in an Order action can proceed. The essential elements of a prejudicial
signed by its Governor. By way of affirmative defense and as question as provided under Section 5, Rule 111 of the Revised
a ground for dismissing the case, petitioner alleged the Rules of Court are: [a] the civil action involves an issue similar
pendency of L.A. Case No. 968, an administrative case before or intimately related to the issue in the criminal action; and [b]
the Office of the Land Authority between the same parties and the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the
involving the same piece of land. After hearing, the municipal criminal action may proceed.
 such agreement is asserted by private respondent. Rather
private respondent claims the right to possession based on
her claim of ownership. Ownership is thus the pivotal question.
ISABELO APA, MANUEL APA and LEONILO JACALAN, Since this is the question in the civil case, the proceedings in
vs. HON. RUMOLDO R. FERNANDEZ, HON. CELSO V. the criminal case must in the meantime be suspended.
ESPINOSA, and SPS. FELIXBERTO TIGOL, JR. and
ROSITA TAGHOY TIGOL (G.R. No. 112381. March 20,
1995)

FACTS: This is a special civil action of certiorari to set aside MEYNARDO L. BELTRAN vs. PEOPLE OF THE
orders of respondent Judge Rumoldo R. Fernandez of the PHILIPPINES, and HON. JUDGE FLORENTINO TUAZON,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 54, at Lapu-Lapu City, denying JR (G.R. No. 137567. June 20, 2000)
petitioners’ oral motion for the suspension of their arraignment
in Criminal Case No. 012489, entitled: “People of the FACTS: Petitioner Meynardo Beltran and wife Charmaine E.
Philippines v. Isabelo Apa, Manuel Apa and Leonilo Jacalan,” Felix were married on June 16, 1973 at the Immaculate
as well as their motion for reconsideration. Criminal Case No. Concepcion Parish Church in Cubao, Quezon City. On
012489 is a prosecution for violation of P.D. 772 otherwise February 7, 1997, after twenty-four years of marriage and four
known as the Anti-Squatting Law. Petitioners moved for the children, petitioner filed a petition for nullity of marriage on the
suspension of their arraignment on the ground that there was ground of psychological incapacity. In her Answer to the said
a prejudicial question pending resolution in another case petition, petitioner’s wife Charmaine Felix alleged that it was
being tried in Branch 27 of the same court. The case, docketed petitioner who abandoned the conjugal home and lived with a
as Civil Case No. 2247-L and entitled “Anselmo Taghoy and certain woman named Milagros Salting. Charmaine
Vicente Apa versus Felixberto Tigol, Jr. and Rosita T. Tigol, et subsequently filed a criminal complaint for concubinage under
al.,” concerns the ownership of Lot No. 3635-B.1 In that case, Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code against petitioner and
petitioners seek a declaration of the nullity of TCT No. 13250 his paramour before the City Prosecutor’s Office of Makati
of Rosita T. Tigol and the partition of the lot in question among who, in a Resolution dated September 16, 1997, found
them and private respondent Rosita T. Tigol as heirs of probable cause and ordered the filing of an Information
Filomeno and Rita Taghoy. The case had been filed in 1990 against them. On March 20, 1998, petitioner, in order to
by petitioners, three years before May 27, 1993 when the forestall the issuance of a warrant for his arrest, filed a Motion
criminal case for squatting was filed against them. On August to Defer Proceedings Including the Issuance of the Warrant of
25, 1993, the trial court denied the petitioners’ motion and Arrest in the criminal case. Petitioner argued that the
proceeded with their arraignment. On September 2, 1993, pendency of the civil case for declaration of nullity of his
petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but their motion marriage posed a prejudicial question to the determination of
was denied by the court in its order dated September 21, the criminal case. Judge Alden Vasquez Cervantes denied the
1993. foregoing motion in the Order7 dated August 31, 1998.
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the said Order of
denial was likewise denied in an Order dated December 9,
ISSUE: whether the question of ownership of Lot No. 3635-B, 1998.
which was pending in Civil Case No. 2247-L, is a prejudicial
question justifying suspension of the proceedings in the
criminal case against petitioners. ISSUE: Is the pendency of his petition for declaration of nullity
of his marriage based on psychological incapacity under
Article 36 of the Family Code a prejudicial question that should
HELD: A prejudicial question is a question which is based on merit the suspension of the criminal case for concubinage fied
a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately against him?
connected with it that its resolution is determinative of the guilt
or innocence of the accused. To justify suspension of the
criminal action, it must appear not only that the civil case HELD: No. The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial
involves facts intimately related to those upon which the question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It has two
criminal prosecution is based but also that the decision of the essential elements: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar
issue or issues raised in the civil case would be decisive of the or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action;
guilt or innocence of the accused. In the criminal case, the and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not
question is whether petitioners occupied a piece of land not the criminal action may proceed. The pendency of the case
belonging to them but to private respondent and against the for declaration of nullity of petitioner’s marriage is not a
latter’s will. Now the ownership of the land in question, known prejudicial question to the concubinage case. For a civil case
as Lot 3635-B of the Opon cadastre covered by TCT No. to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause
13250, is the issue in Civil Case 2247-L now pending in the suspension of the latter pending the final determination of
Branch 27 of the RTC at Lapu-Lapu City. The resolution, the civil case, it must appear not only that the said civil case
therefore, of this question would necessarily be determinative involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution
of petitioners’ criminal liability for squatting. would be based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or
issues raised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt or
The owner of a piece of land can be ejected only if for some innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.
reason, e.g., he has let his property to the plaintiff, he has
given up its temporary possession. But in the case at bar, no
In a case for concubinage, the accused, like the herein
petitioner need not present a final judgment declaring his HELD: In the present case, the complaint of the petitioners for
marriage void for he can adduce evidence in the criminal case Annulment of Extrajudicial Sale is a civil action and the
of the nullity of his marriage other than proof of a final respondent’s petition for the issuance of a writ of possession
judgment declaring his marriage void. With regard to of Lot No. 3-A, Block 1, Psd-07-021410, TCT No. 44668 is but
petitioner’s argument that he could be acquitted of the charge an incident in the land registration case and, therefore, no
of concubinage should his marriage be declared null and void, prejudicial question can arise from the existence of the two
suffice it to state that even a subsequent pronouncement that actions. The focal issue in Civil Case No. MAN-3454 was
his marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense. whether the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate
mortgage executed by the petitioners in favor of the
respondent bank and the sale of their property at public
auction for P2,403,770.73 are null and void, whereas, the
issue in LRC Case No. 3 was whether the respondent bank
SPOUSES ANTONIO S. PAHANG and LOLITA T. was entitled to the possession of the property after the
PAHANG vs. HON. AUGUSTINE A. VESTIL, DEPUTY statutory period for redemption had lapsed and title was
SHERIFF, Regional Trial Court-Branch 56 and issued.
METROPOLITAN BANK and TRUST COMPANY (G.R. No.
148595. July 12, 2004) It bears stressing that the proceedings in a petition and/or
motion for the issuance of a writ of possession, after the lapse
FACTS: On January 5, 1996, the petitioners, Spouses of the statutory period for redemption, is summary in nature.
Antonio and Lolita Pahang, received a short-term loan of The trial court is mandated to issue a writ of possession upon
P1,500,000.00 from Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company a finding of the lapse of the statutory period for redemption
payable on December 27, 1996. The loan was covered by without the redemptioner having redeemed the property. It
Non- Negotiable Promissory Note No. 1906013 and was, cannot be validly argued that the trial court abused its
likewise, secured by a real estate mortgage on a parcel of land discretion when it merely complied with its ministerial duty to
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 29607. As issue the said writ of possession.
the petitioners failed to pay the loan, the interest and the
penalties due thereon, the respondent foreclosed the real
estate mortgage extrajudicially. As a consequence, the
mortgaged property was sold at public auction on January 8,
1998 to the respondent bank as the highest bidder. On
December 29, 1998, the respondent wrote the petitioners that
the one-year redemption period of the property would expire
on January 27, 1999.5 Instead of redeeming the property, the
petitioners filed, on January 19, 1999, a complaint for
annulment of extrajudicial sale against the respondent bank
and the Sheriff in the Regional Trial Court of Cebu (Mandaue
City), Branch 56, docketed as Civil Case No. MAN-3454.
Therein, the petitioners alleged that the respondent bloated
their obligation of P1,500,000.00 to P2,403,770.73 by
including excessive past due interest, penalty charges,
attorney’s fees and sheriff’s expense.

After the expiration of the one-year redemption period, the

respondent consolidated its ownership over the foreclosed
property. The petitioners, citing the ruling of this Court in
Belisario v. The Intermediate Appellate Court, opposed the
petition on the ground that the core issue in their complaint in
Civil Case No. MAN-3454 constituted a prejudicial question,
which warranted a suspension of the proceedings before the
court. On March 28, 2000, the RTC of Mandaue City, Branch
56, rendered a decision in LRC Case No. 3 granting the
petition and ordering the issuance of a writ of possession in
favor of the respondent. Finding that the RTC did not act with
grave abuse of discretion in ordering the issuance of the writ
of possession, the CA rendered a decision on March 2, 2001,
dismissing the petition.

ISSUE: whether or not the complaint of the petitioners in Civil

Case No. MAN-3454 for annulment of extrajudicial sale is a
prejudicial question to the petition of the respondent bank for
the issuance of a writ of possession in LRC Case No. 3