FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 76031. March 2, 1994.]

MIGUEL SEMIRA , petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and

BUENAVENTURA AN , respondents.

DECISION

BELLOSILLO , J : p

Juana Gutierrez owned a parcel of land, later designated as Lot 4221, situated in
Sto. Niño, Taysan, Batangas which she sold to private respondent Buenaventura An for
P850.00 by means of a "Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng Lupa" executed on 4 January 1961. 1
Aside from the estimated area of 822.5 square meters appearing in the deed of sale, the
following boundaries of the lot are also stated: on the north, by Taysan-Lobo-Sto. Niño-
Pinagbayanan and Sto. Niño-Dagatan Road (Junction or Intersection road); on the east, by
Sto. Niño-Pinagbayanan Road and Juana Gutierrez; on the south, by Sto. Niño School site;
and, on the west, by Sto. Niño-Dagatan Road.
Thereafter, private respondent entered the premises observing thereby the
boundaries of the property and not the area given. 2
Subsequently, he acquired two (2) other parcels of land, Lot 4215 with an area of
8,606-square meters located on the east of Lot 4221 from the spouses Pascual Hornilla
and Gliceria Ilao on 30 June 1964, and another lot with an area of 11,000-square meters
from Santiago Asi. Pascual Hornilla is the son of Juana Gutierrez. prcd

On 18 October 1972, private respondent sold Lot 4221 to his nephew, Cipriano
Ramirez, and spouse by means of another "Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng Lupa" for P2,500.00, 3
where the lot was described with the same area and boundaries mentioned in the 4
January 1961 "Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng Lupa" with the exception of the boundary on the
east; which was changed from "Juana Gutierrez" to "Buenaventura An" to re ect the
acquisition by private respondent of the adjoining Lot 4215.
Like his uncle before him, Cipriano Ramirez occupied the lot by observing the
boundaries stated in the document of sale. Subsequently, he applied for a new tax
declaration to replace the one in the name of his uncle but was denied in view of an
existing mortgage executed by Buenaventura An in favor of the Taysan Rural Bank, which
was only settled in 1979.
On 12 March 1979, Cipriano Ramirez sold the lot to petitioner Miguel Semira for
P20,000.00. However, the area stated in the "Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng Lupa" 4 was 2,200
square meters and not 822.5 appearing in the previous document. As delimited by its
boundaries, the lot is actually much bigger than 822.5 square meters. This was con rmed
by the Taysan Cadastral Mapping Survey conducted in 1974 where it is de nitely stated
that the area of Lot 4221 is 2,200 square meters; hence, the reason for the change. prcd

On 17 March 1979, Miguel Semira entered the very same premises previously
occupied by Ramirez and began the construction of a new rice-mill. However, on 18 April
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 1979, a complaint for forcible entry was led against him by private respondent in the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Taysan-Lobo. 5The latter claimed that the area of Lot 4221
was 822.5 square meters only and that the excess of 1,377 square meters forcibly
occupied by petitioner formed part of Lot 4215 which he acquired from the Hornillas in
1964.
Petitioner admits having entered the disputed portion on 17 March 1979, but denies
having illegally done so. In his answer, petitioner claims ownership over the property by
invoking the 1979 deed of sale in his favor by Cipriano Ramirez.
Meanwhile, during the pendency of the case, private respondent applied for and was
issued Original Certi cate of Title No. P-12694 over the lots he purchased from the
Hornillas and that from Santiago Asi with a combined area of 19,606 square meters.
However, the title was issued for 2 hectares, 8 ares and 33 centares or 20,833 square
meters. No explanation was given for the difference. cdll

The case was initially dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 6The municipal court of
Taysan-Lobo ruled that since the issue of prior physical possession could not be resolved
without rst deciding on the ownership, dismissal was proper since forcible entry cases
involve the sole issue of prior physical possession. However, upon motion, and in view of
the passage of B.P. Blg. 129, which took effect 14 August 1981, providing that "
[m]etropolitan trial courts, and municipal trial courts, and municipal circuit trial courts,
without distinction, may try cases of forcible entry and detainer even if the question of
ownership is raised in the pleadings and possession could not be resolved without
deciding the ownership," 7 the trial court modi ed its earlier resolution and adjudged
petitioner the rightful and lawful owner and possessor of the area in question and cannot
therefore be ejected therefrom. 8
Private respondent appealed to the Regional Trial Court which reversed the
Municipal Circuit Trial court, ruling that it was not necessary to delve on the issue of
ownership since the question of prior physical possession could be resolved
independently, and that since petitioner admitted having possessed the disputed area on
12 March 1979 while the possession of private respondent began way back in 1964, the
latter clearly had prior possession. 9 Since petitioner did not speci cally deny the
allegation of forcible deprivation of property in his Answer, the averment in that regard was
deemed admitted under Sec. 1, Rule 9, of the Rules of Court. 1 0 As a nal word, the RTC
held that "no matter how righteous defendant's claim of ownership over the property may
be, he has not the right to take the law into his own hands by forcibly depriving plaintiff of
his prior actual possession of the property." 1 1
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, but without success. 1 2 In its Decision
of 22 April 1986, respondent appellate court dismissed the petition for review and
affirmed the RTC decision in toto. 1 3
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred: (1) in upholding this ejectment
from the disputed area despite the absence of clear and indubitable proof that private
respondent had prior physical possession and that he was deprived of the same by force,
intimidation, strategy or stealth; and, (2) in not holding that the question of ownership is so
necessarily involved that it would be impossible to decide the question of bare possession
without first setting that of ownership. 1 4
We agree with the position of petitioner and sustain the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
in holding that in the case at bench the issue of possession cannot be decide
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 independently of the question of ownership. Hence, we reverse the Court of Appeals as
well as the Regional Trial Court. LLphil

In his complaint in the MCTC, private respondent claims constructive possession of

the disputed portion since 30 June 1964 when he bought the same as part of Lot 4215 of
the Hornilla spouses. Likewise, petitioner bases his occupancy of the disputed portion on
the 1979 sale of Lot 4221 in his favor, which he contends is separate and distinct from Lot
4215 of private respondent. Clearly, the question of who has prior possession hinges on
the question of who the real owner of the disputed portion is. And the latter, in turn,
depends on whether such portion is part of Lot 4215 of private respondent or of Lot 4221
of petitioner. prLL

It is not disputed that Lot 4221 of petitioner was once owned by private respondent;
that the latter sold the same to his nephew, Cipriano Ramirez, in 1972 for the lump sum of
P2,500.00; that the "Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng Lupa" incorporated both the estimated area
and the de nite boundaries of the land; and, that private respondent's nephew in turn sold
the lot to petitioner in 1979 with the very same boundaries mentioned in the deed of sale
executed in his favor by his uncle Buenaventura An.
Petitioner claims that owns the entire 2,200 square meters since it is the size of Lot
4221 following its established boundaries. On the other hand, private respondent insists
that he only sold 822.5 square meters, hence, his nephew could not have transferred a
bigger area to petitioner.
We sustain petitioner as did the Municipal Circuit Trial Court. We have repeatedly
ruled that where land is sold for a lump sum and not so much per unit of measure or
number, the boundaries of the land stated in the contract determine the effects and scope
of the sale, not the area thereof. 1 5 Hence, the vendors are obligated to deliver all the land
included within the boundaries, regardless of whether the real area should be greater or
smaller than that recited in the deed. This is particularly true where the area is described as
"humigit kumulang," that is, more or less. 1 6 These conclusions are drawn from Art. 1542
of the Civil code which states —
In the sale of real estate, made for a lump sum and not at the rate of a
certain sum for a unit of measure or number, there shall be no increase or
decrease of the price, although there be a greater or less area or number than that
stated in the contract. LexLib

The same rule shall be applied when two or more immovables are sold for
a single price; but if, besides mentioning the boundaries, which is indispensable in
every conveyance of real estate, its area or number should be designated in the
contract, the vendor shall be bound to deliver all that is included within said
boundaries, even when it exceeds the area or number speci ed in the contract ;
and, should he not be able to do so, he shall suffer a reduction in the price, in
proportion to what is lacking in the area or number, unless the contract is
rescinded because the vendee does not accede to the failure to deliver what has
been stipulated. LLphil

Hence, when private respondent Buenaventura An sold Lot 4221 to his nephew
Cipriano Ramirez by means of a "Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng Lupa" which incorporated both
the area and the de nite boundaries of the lot, the former transferred not merely the 822.5
square meters stated in their document of sale but the entire area circumscribed within its
boundaries.

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 The fact that the area turned out to be 2,200 square meters; instead of only 822.5
square meters, is of no moment and does not entitle private respondent to the difference
because the de nite object sold was Lot 4221 in its entirety and not just any unit of
measure or number. 1 7 That the sale resulted in a disadvantage to private respondent does
not confer on him any cause of action against petitioner. 1 8
Besides, we are hardly convinced that Buenaventura An entered into the sale
unaware that Lot 4221 actually had a much bigger area than it purported to be. Even as
early as the sale between him and his nephew, private respondent was already aware of
the difference between the stated area of Lot 4221 and its actual size. His nephew
Cipriano Ramirez testi ed, and private respondent did not dispute, that when asked why
the area of Lot 4221 stated in their deed of sale was much smaller than the actual size,
private respondent explained that it was to minimize taxes. 1 9 Private respondent likewise
did not deny that his nephew merely transferred to petitioner the very same area which he
himself had acquired and possessed in 1961 when he bought the same from Juana
Gutierrez, the original owner of the lot. LexLib

Considering the foregoing, it is not di cult to sustain petitioner over private

respondent when the latter failed even to prove prior possession in his favor. Absent such
element, it cannot be said that he was forcibly deprived of the disputed portion. Hence, his
action for forcible entry must fail.
It should be emphasized, however, that the case before us is merely an action of
forcible entry and that the issue of ownership was decided for the sole purpose of
resolving priority of possession. Hence, any pronouncement made affecting ownership of
the disputed portion is to be regarded merely as provisional, hence, does not bar nor
prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the land. 2 0
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of
Appeals) dated 22 April 1986 a rming that of the Regional Trial Court of 13 January 1984
in toto is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another one entered REINSTATING, AFFIRMING
and REITERATING the Decision of 4 May 1983 of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Taysan-Lobo, Batangas, with costs against private respondent Buenaventura An. LibLex

SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Davide, Jr., Quiason and Kapunan, JJ ., concur.

Footnotes
1. Exh. "I." Original Records, pp. 181-182.

2. See Decision dated 4 May 1983 penned by Acting Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge
Francisco D. Sulit, p. 10; Original Records, p. 482.

3. Exh. "C." Original Records, p. 184-A.

4. Exh. "A," id., p. 938.

5. Docketed as Civil Case No. 4-MCC-T.

6. Decision dated 4 October 1982 penned by Acting Municipal Circuit Trial Judge
Francisco D. Sulit; Rollo, pp. 52-62.

7. Sec. 33, par. (2).

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 8. Decision dated 4 May 1983, Original Records, pp. 842-854.
9. Decision dated 13 January 1984 was penned by Judge Gerano V. Catalan, Regional
Trial Court of Batangas, Branch VII, in Civil Case No. 2286; Original Records, pp. 892-
903.
10. Sec. 1. Allegations not specifically denied deemed admitted. — Material averments in
the complaint, other than those as to the amount of damage, shall be deemed admitted
when not specifically denied. . . .

11. Id., p. 10; Original Records, p. 901.

12. Docketed as AC-G.R. SP No. 03876, Semira v. Hon Catalan, et al.
13. Penned by Associate Justice Alfredo M. Lazaro, concurred in by Associate Justices
Juan A. Sison, Santiago M. Kapunan and Alfredo V. Cruz, Jr.; Rollo, pp. 124-131.
14. Petition, p. 11; Rollo, p. 19.

15. Pacia v. Lagman, 63 Phil. 361, 365 (1936), citing Loyola v. Bartolome, 39 Phil. 544;
Escudero v. Director of Lands, 44 Phil. 83; Government of the Philippine Islands v.
Abaja, 52 Phil. 261; Beltran v. Reyes, 55 Phil. 1004.
16. Sta. Ana v. Hernandez, 125 Phil. 61, 68 (1966), citing Goyena v. Tambunting, 1 Phil.
490; Teran v. Villanueva, 56 Phil. 677; Azarraga v. Gay, 52 Phil. 599; Mondragon v.
Santos, 87 Phil. 471.
17. See Ambrosio Padilla, Civil Code Annotated, Vol. V, 7th ed. (1987), pp. 272-273.

18. See Mata v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 87880, 7 April 1992, 207 SCRA 753, 759.
19. TSN, 30 April 1980, p. 48; Original Records, p. 497.

20. Sec. 7, Rule 70, Rules of Court; see Mendoza v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 81909, 5
September 1991; 201 SCRA 343, 354.

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