Villanueva vs IAC not inherit said lot from him and therefore had nothing of the land to

bequeath by will of otherwise to Consolacion.

Villanueva vs. IAC Article 158 of the Civil Code says that improvements, whether for utility
GR No. 67582, October 29, 1987 or adornment made on the separate property of the spouses through
advancements from the partnership or through the industry of either spouse
FACTS: belong to the conjugal partnership, and buildings constructed at the expense
of the partnership during the marriage on land belonging to one of the
Modesto Aranas, husband of Victoria, inherited a land from his spouses also pertain to the partnership, but the value of the land shall be
father. Dorothea and Teodoro, Modesto’s illegitimate children, borrowed reimbursed to the spouse who owns the same.
money from private respondent Jesus Bernas, mortgaging as collateral their There was no proof presented by Villanueva. Such proof is needed at the
father’s property. In the loan agreement, Aranas described themselves as time of the making or construction of the improvements and the source of
the absolute co-owners. Dorothea and Teodoro failed to pay the loan the funds used thereof in order to determine the character of the
resulting to extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage in 1977 and thereafter improvements as belonging to the conjugal partnership or to one spouse
Bernas acquired the land as the highest bidder. Aftewards, the Aranases separately. What is certain is that the land on which the improvements
executed a deed of extrajudicial partition in 1978, in which they adjudicated stand was the exclusive property of Modesto and that where the property is
the same land unto themselves in equal share pro-indiviso. Bernas then registered in the name of one spouse only and there is no showing of when
consolidated his ownership over the lot when the mortgagors failed to precisely the property was acquired, the presumption is that is belongs
redeem it withn the reglementary period, and had the title in the name of exclusively to said spouse. It is not therefore possible to declare the
Modesto cancelled and another TCT issued in his name. improvements to be conjugal in character.
In 1978, petitioner Consolacion Villanueva and Raymundo Aranas filed a Furthermore, Bernas’ mode of acquisition of ownership over the property
complaint against respondents spouses Jesus and Remedios Bernas, for the appears in all respect to be regular, untainted by any defect
cancellation of the TCT under the name of the Bernases, and they be whatsoever. Bernas must therefore be deemed to have acquired
declared co-owners of the land. Petitioner alleged that spouses Modesto indefeasible and clear title to the lot which cannot be defeated or negated
and Victoria in 1987 and 1958 executed 2 separate wills: first bequeathing by claims subsequently arising and of which he had no knowledge or
to Consolacion and Raymundo and to Dorothea and Teodoro, in equal means of knowing prior to their assertion and ventilation.
shares pro diviso, all of said Victoria’s shares from the conjugal partnership
property; and second Modesto’s interests in his conjugal partnership with
Victoria as well as his separate properties bequeathed to Dorothea and
Teodoro. Trial court dismissed the complaint, declaring herein
respondents as the legal owners of the disputed property. IAC likewise
affirmed the lower court’s decision.
ISSUE: WON Villanueva had a right over the land and the improvements
thereon made by Victoria who rendered the lot as conjugal property. JOCSON v. COURT OF APPEALS
February 16, 1989 (G.R. No. L-55322)

HELD:
FACTS:
The land was not a conjugal partnership property of Victoria and Emilio Jocon and Alejandra Jocson were husband and wife. The wife died first
Modesto. It was Modesto’s exclusive property since he inherited it from intestate then the husband followed. Moises and Agustina are their children. Ernesto
his parents. Moreover, since Victoria died ahead of Modesto, Victoria did Vasquesz is the husband of Agustina.
 status of Emilio Jocson. In other words, the import from the certificates of title is that
The present controversy concerns the validity of three (3) documents executed by Emilio Jocson is the owner of the properties, the same having been registered in his
Emilio Jocson during his lifetime. These documents purportedly conveyed, by sale, to name alone, and that he is married to Alejandra Poblete.
Agustina Jocson-Vasquez what apparently covers almost all of his properties,
including his one-third (1/3) share in the estate of his wife. Petitioner Moises Jocson
assails these documents and prays that they be declared null and void and the
properties subject matter therein be partitioned between him and Agustina as the only
heirs of their deceased parents.

Petitioner claimed that the properties mentioned in Exhibits 3 and 4 are the
unliquidated conjugal properties of Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete which the
former, therefore, cannot validly sell. They say it is conjugal properties of Emilio
Jocson and Alejandra Poblete, because they were registered in the name of “Emilio
Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete”.

ISSUE: WON the property registered under the name of “Emilio Jocson, married to
Alejandra Poblete” is conjugal property or exclusive property.

HELD:
Exclusive. Article 60 of the CC proveides that All property of the marriage is
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains
exclusively to the husband or to the wife. The party who invokes this presumption
must first prove that the property in controversy was acquired during the marriage. In
other words, proof of acquisition during the coverture is a condition sine qua non for
the operation of the presumption in favor of conjugal ownership.

It is thus clear that before Moises Jocson may validly invoke the presumption under
Article 160 he must first present proof that the disputed properties were acquired
during the marriage of Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete. The certificates of title,
however, upon which petitioner rests his claim is insufficient. The fact that the
properties were registered in the name of “Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra BELCODERO vs CA
Poblete” is no proof that the properties were acquired during the spouses’ coverture. GR No 89667, Oct 20,1993
Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two different acts. It is well settled that
registration does not confer title but merely confirms one already existing (See Torela
vs. Torela, supra). It may be that the properties under dispute were acquired by Emilio FACTS:
Jocson when he was still a bachelor but were registered only after his marriage to
Alejandra Poblete, which explains why he was described in the certificates of title as
married to the latter.
This case involves the question of ownership over a piece of
property acquired by a husband living with a paramour and after
having deserted his lawful wife and children.
Contrary to petitioner’s position, the certificates of title show, on their face, that the
properties were exclusively Emilio Jocson’s, the registered owner. This is so because
the words “married to’ preceding “Alejandra Poblete’ are merely descriptive of the civil
Alayo Bosing married Juliana Oday in 1927 and had 3 children. partnership of Alayo and his legitimate wife Juliana. Under both
In 1946, he abandoned them and lived with Josefa Rivera whom the new Civil Code (Article 116) and the old Civil Code (Article
he acknowleged as a common-law wife Josefa Bosing. They had 1407), “all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the
one child, Josephine Bosing, now Josephine Belcodero. conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains
exclusively to the husband or to the wife.” This presumption has
not been convincingly rebutted.
He married Josefa Bosing in 1958 while still married to Juliana.

It cannot be seriously contended that, simply because the

Alayo purchased a land on installment basis in 1949 and in his
property was titled in the name of Josefa at Alayo’s request, she
deed he named Josefa Bosing as his wife and transferred the lot
should thereby be deemed to be its owner. The property
in her name. Final deed executed in 1959.
unquestionably was acquired by Alayo and it was just
transferred to Josefa.
Alayo died in March 1967. In 1970 , Josefa and Josephine
executed a document of extra judicial partition and sale of the
lot, which was described as conjugal property. Josefa’s share
went to Josephine for P10,000, so Josephine Belcodero had full
ownership. Notice was published.

In October 1980, Juliana (real widow) and 3 children filed for

reconveyance of property. Trial Court and CA ruled in favor of
Juliana.

ISSUE:
EMBRADO and TORREGIANI v. COURT OF APPEALS

Whether or not said property registered under the name of the

common-law wife is not an exclusive property but a conjugal June 27, 1994 (233 SCRA 335)
property of Alayo and his legitimate wife Juliana.
FACTS:
HELD:

Yes. The property remained as belonging to the conjugal

Lucia Embrado, who was already married to petitioner Oreste overcome by the terms of the Venta Definitiva which contains a
Torregiani, bought LOT NO. 564 in her name alone. The document positive assertion of exclusive ownership, which was duly supported
provided that even though the deed was prepared and signed on 2 July by the testimony of Matias Carpitanos, one of the original sellers of the
1946, the effects of the document would retroact to the 15th day of lot.\
April 1941, the date the lot and its improvements were actually sold to
Lucia C. Embrado. Embrado sold the lot described as her own
paraphernal property tp her adopted daughter, Eda Jimenez. Eda sold However, it is a fact that there is a construction in 1958 of a
the lot to tohers. Torregianis instituted in the Court of First Instance, residential/commercial building on said lot a part of which was leased
now Regional Trial Court, of Zamboanga del Norte an action for to third persons and another part serving as the conjugal dwelling.
declaration of nullity of contract, annulment of sales, reconveyance Although there is no evidence on the source of funds used, it is
and damages alleging that he did not consent to the sale, which consent presumed to be conjugal funds.
was necessary because Lot 564 was conjugal property.
The second paragraph of Art. 158 of the Civil Code provides that
ISSUE: WON the property is exclusive of Embrado or conjugal
“[b]uildings constructed, at the expense of the partnership, during the
property.
marriage on land belonging to one of the spouses, also pertain to the
partnership, but the value of the land shall be reimbursed to the spouse
HELD: who owns the same.” Under this article, the land becomes conjugal
upon the construction of the building without awaiting reimbursement
before or at the liquidation of the partnership upon the concurrence of
The court agrees with respondent court that Lot 564 was originally the two conditions, to wit: (a) the construction of the building at the
paraphernal property of Lucia, we cannot adopt its conclusion that expense of the partnership; and, (b) the ownership of the land by one
because Lucia and the original owners agreed in 1941 for its purchase of the spouses. The conditions have been fully met in the case at
and sale, ownership was already acquired by Lucia at that moment. bench. Thus, even if Lot 564 was originally the paraphernal property
Under Art. 1496 of the Civil Code, “ownership of the thing sold is of Lucia as evident from the “Venta Definitiva”, the same became
acquired by the vendee from the moment it is delivered to him in any conjugal upon the construction of the residential/commercial building
of the ways specified in articles 1497 to 1501, or in any other manner in 1958.
signifying an agreement that the possession is transferred from the
vendor to the vendee,” and under Art. 1498, “(w)hen the sale is made
through a public instrument, the execution thereof shall be equivalent
to the delivery of the thing which is the object of the contract, if from
the deed the contrary does not appear or cannot clearly be inferred.”
Mariano v. Court of Appeals
In the case at bar, the Venta Definitiva over Lot 564 in favor of Lucia
Embrado was executed by the Carpitanoses on 2 July 1946 when her G.R. No. 51283, 7 June 1989
marriage to petitioner Oreste Torregiani was already subsisting.
Although ownership was acquired during the marriage and hence FACTS:
presumed conjugal, the presumption of conjugality was successfully
The proceedings at bar concern (1) an attempt by a married man to Neither shall the fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed upon them be
prevent execution against conjugal property of a judgment rendered charged to the partnership.
against his wife, for obligations incurred by the latter while engaged in a
business that had admittedly redounded to the benefit of the family, and However, the payment of personal debts contracted by either spouse
(2) the interference by a court with the proceedings on execution of a co- before the marriage, that of fines and indemnities imposed upon them, as
equal or coordinate court. Both acts being proscribed by law, correction is well as the support of illegitimate children of either spouse, may be
called for and will hereby be effected. The proceedings originated from a enforced against the partnership assets after the responsibilities
suit filed by Esther Sanchez against Lourdes Mariano in the Court of First enumerated in the preceding Article have been covered, if the spouse
Instance at Caloocan City, for recovery of the value of ladies’ readymade who is bound should have no exclusive property or if it should be
dresses allegedly purchased by and delivered to the latter. insufficient; but at the time of the liquidation of the partnership, such
spouse shall be charged for what has been paid for the purpose above-
Daniel Sanchez, Esther’s husband, now made his move. He filed a mentioned.
complaint for annulment of the execution in the Court of First Instance at
Quezon City in his capacity as administrator of the conjugal partnership.
He alleged that the conjugal assets could not validly be made to answer
for obligations exclusively contracted by his wife, and that, moreover,
some of the personal property levied on, such as household appliances
and utensils necessarily used in the conjugal dwelling, were exempt from
execution.

ISSUE:

WON the claim that property levied on in execution of a judgment is not

property of the judgment debtor, Daniel Sanchez’s wife, but of the
conjugal partnership of the Sanchez Spouses.

RULING:

In the case at bar, the husband of the judgment debtor cannot be

deemed a “stranger” to the case prosecuted and adjudged against his
wife. In any case, whether by intervention in the court issuing the writ, or
by separate action, it is unavailing for either Esther Sanchez or her
husband, Daniel, to seek preclusion of the enforcement of the writ of
possession against their conjugal assets. For it being established, as
aforestated, that Esther had engaged in business with her husband’s
consent, and the income derived therefrom had been expended, in part at
least, for the support of her family, the liability of the conjugal assets to
respond for the wife’s obligations in the premises cannot be disputed.
Ayala Investments vs CA
Ayala Investments vs CA
GR No. 118305, February 12, 1998
Art. 122. The payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or
the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the
conjugal properties partnership except insofar as they redounded to the
FACTS:
benefit of the family.
Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained P50,300,000.00 loan from as a surety is certainly not an exercise of an industry or profession, it is not
petitioner Ayala Investment and Development Corporation embarking in a business. Hence, the conjugal partnership should not be
(AIDC). Respondent Alfredo Ching, EVP of PBM, executed security made liable for the surety agreement which was clearly for the benefit of
agreements on December 1980 and March 1981 making him jointly and PBM.
severally answerable with PBM’s indebtedness to AIDC. PBM failed to
pay the loan hence filing of complaint against PBM and Ching. The RTC The court did not support the contention of the petitioner that a benefit for
rendered judgment ordering PBM and Ching to jointly and severally pay the family may have resulted when the guarantee was in favor of Ching’s
AIDC the principal amount with interests. Pending the appeal of the employment (prolonged tenure, appreciation of shares of stocks, prestige
judgment, RTC issued writ of execution. Thereafter, Magsajo, appointed enhanced) since the benefits contemplated in Art. 161 of the Civil Code
deputy sheriff, caused the issuance and service upon respondent spouses of must be one directly resulting from the loan. It must not be a mere by
the notice of sheriff sale on 3 of their conjugal properties on May product or a spin off of the loan itself.
1982. Respondent spouses filed injunction against petitioners on the
ground that subject loan did not redound to the benefit of the said conjugal
partnership. CA issued a TRP enjoining lower court from enforcing its
order paving way for the scheduled auction sale of respondent spouses
conjugal properties. A certificate of sale was issued to AIDC, being the
only bidder and was registered on July 1982.

ISSUE: Whether or not the debts and obligations contracted by the

husband alone is considered “for the benefit of the conjugal partnership”
and is it chargeable.

HELD:

The loan procured from AIDC was for the advancement and benefit of
PBM and not for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of
Ching. Furthermore, AIDC failed to prove that Ching contracted the debt
for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains. PBM has a personality
distinct and separate from the family of Ching despite the fact that they
happened to be stockholders of said corporate entity. Clearly, the debt was
a corporate debt and right of recourse to Ching as surety is only to the extent
of his corporate stockholdings.

Based from the foregoing jurisprudential rulings of the court, “if the money Spouses ANTONIO and LUZVIMINDA GUIANG, petitioners,
or services are given to another person or entity, and the husband acted only vs.
as a surety or guarantor, that contract cannot, by itself, alone be categorized COURT OF APPEALS and GILDA COPUZ, respondents.
as falling within the context of obligations for the benefit of the conjugal G.R. No. 125172 June 26, 1998
PANGANIBAN, J.:
partnership”. The contract of loan or services is clearly for the benefit of
the principal debtor and not for the surety or his family. Ching only signed
as a surety for the loan contracted with AIDC in behalf of PBM. Signing
Facts: It properly falls within the ambit of Article 124 of the Family Code, which
Gilda Corpuz and Judie Corpuz were legally married spouses and blessed was correctly applied by the lower court:
with three children.
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership
The Corpuz couple, with plaintiff-wife Gilda Corpuz as vendee, bought a property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the
lot located in South Cotabato. Later, they sold one-half portion of their lot husband’s decision shall prevail, subject recourse to the court by the wife
to spouses Guiang. The latter had since then occupied the one-half portion for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date
and built their house thereon. They were, thus adjoining neighbors of the of the contract implementing such decision.
Corpuzes. In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to
participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other
spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not
Gilda left for Manila trying to look for work abroad and her departure was include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the
with the consent of her husband, but was not able to go abroad though. authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the
She stayed for sometime in Manila. After his wife’s departure for Manila, absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall
defendant Judie seldom went home to the conjugal dwelling. be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer
on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be
Sometime in 1990, Harriet Corpuz learned that her father intended to sell perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse
the remaining one-half portion including their house, of their home lot to or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both
defendants Guiangs. She wrote a letter to her mother informing her. She offerors. (165a)
replied that she was objecting to the sale. Harriet, however, did not inform The respondent’s consent to the contract of sale of their conjugal property
her father about this; but instead gave the letter to Mrs. Luzviminda Guiang was totally absent. To constitute a valid contract, the Civil Code requires
so that she would advise her father. the concurrence of the following elements: (1) cause, (2) object, and (3)
consent, the last element being indubitably absent in the case at bar.

However, over the objection of private respondent Gilda, her husband sold
to the petitioners-spouses Antonio and Luzviminda Guiang one half of their In the case at bar, the absence of the consent of one renders the entire
conjugal property, consisting of their residence and the lot on which it sale null and void, including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining
stood. Upon her return to Cotabato, respondent gathered her children and to the husband who contracted the sale.
went back to the subject property. Petitioners filed a complaint for
trespassing. Later, there was an amicable settlement between the parties.
Feeling that she had the shorer end of the bargain, respondent filed an
Amended Complaint against her husband and petitioners. The said
Complaint sought the declaration of a certain deed of sale, which involved
the conjugal property of private respondent and her husband, null and void.

Issue:
Partosa-Jo vs CA
Whether or not the contract without the consent of wife was void. Partosa-Jo vs CA
GR 82606, December 18, 1992

Held:
Yes, the said contract which was without the consent of the wife was void.
FACTS:
The petitioner, Prima Partosa-Jo, is the legal wife of Jose Jo, herein
private respondent. The latter admitted to have cohabited with 3 women
and fathered 15 children. Prima filed a complaint against the husband for
judicial separation of conjugal property in addition to an earlier action for
support which was consolidated. RTC decision was a definite disposition
of the complaint for support but none of that for the judicial separation of
conjugal property. Jose elevated the decision to CA which affirmed
rulings of the trial court. The complaint on the separation of property was
dismissed for lack of cause of action on the ground that separation by
agreement was not covered in Art. 178 of the Civil Code. Prima
contested that the agreement between her and Jose was for her to
temporarily live with her parents during the initial period of her
pregnancy and for him to visit and support her. They never agreed to be
separated permanently. She even returned to him but the latter refused to
accept her.

ISSUE: WON there is abandonment on the part of Jose Jo to warrant

judicial separation of conjugal property.

HELD:

SC is in the position that respondent court should have made the necessary
modification instead of dismissing the case filed. For abandonment to
exist, there must be an absolute cessation of marital relations, duties and
rights, with the intention of perpetual separation. The fact that Jo did not
accept her demonstrates that he had no intention of resuming their conjugal
relationship. From 1968 until 1988, Jose refused to provide financial
support to Prima. Hence, the physical separation of the parties, coupled
with the refusal by the private respondent to give support to the petitioner,
sufficed to constitute abandonment as a ground for the judicial separation
of their conjugal property.

Wherefore, the petition was granted and in favor of the petitioner and that
the court ordered the conjugal property of the spouses be divided between
them, share and share alike. The division will be implemented after the
determination of all the properties pertaining to the said conjugal
partnership including those that may have been illegally registered in the
SECURITY BANK AND TRUST COMPANY v. MAR TIERRA CORP, WILFRIDO
name of the persons. MARTINEZ, MIGUEL LACSON, and RICARDO LOPA
November 29, 2006 (508 SCRA 419)
FACTS: On the other hand, if the money or services are given to another person or entity and
Respondent Mar Tierra Corporation, through its president, Wilfrido C. Martinez, the husband acted only as a surety or guarantor, the transaction cannot by itself be
applied for a P12,000,000 credit accommodation with petitioner Security Bank and deemed an obligation for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. It is for the benefit of
Trust Company. Petitioner approved the application and entered into a credit line the principal debtor and not for the surety or his family.
agreement with respondent corporation. It was secured by an indemnity agreement
executed by individual respondents Wilfrido C. Martinez, Miguel J. Lacson and
Ricardo A. Lopa who bound themselves jointly and severally with respondent In the case at bar, the principal contract, the credit line agreement between petitioner
corporation for the payment of the loan. and respondent corporation, was solely for the benefit of the latter. The accessory
contract (the indemnity agreement) under which individual respondent Martinez
assumed the obligation of a surety for respondent corporation was similarly for the
Respondent corporation was not able to pay all its debt balance as it suffered latter’s benefit. Petitioner had the burden of proving that the conjugal partnership of
business reversals, eventually ceasing operations. Petitioner filed a complaint against the spouses Martinez benefited from the transaction. It failed to discharge that
respondent corp and individual respondents. burden.

RTC issued a writ of attachment on all real and personal properties of respondent
corporation and individual respondent Martinez including the conjugal house and lot
of the spouses but it found that it did not redound to the benefit of his family, hence, it
ordered the lifting of the attachment on the conjugal house and lot of the spouses
Martinez.

Petitioner appealed to CA. It affirmed RTC decision. Petitioned to SC.

ISSUE: WON the conjugal partnership may be held liable for an indemnity agreement
entered into by the husband to accommodate a third party

HELD:
No. SC upheld the CA. Under Article 161(1) of the Civil Code, the conjugal
partnership is liable for “all debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership.”

The court ruled in Luzon Surety Co., Inc. v. de Garcia that, in acting as a guarantor or
surety for another, the husband does not act for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership as the benefit is clearly intended for a third party.

In Ayala Investment and Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that,

if the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e., the direct recipient of
the money and services to be used in or for his own business or profession, the
transaction falls within the term “obligations for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership.” In other words, where the husband contracts an obligation on behalf of
the family business, there is a legal presumption that such obligation redounds to the
benefit of the conjugal partnership.
CASE DIGEST: RIVERA V. HEIRS OF ISSUE:
VILLANUEVA WON Angelina is an illegitimate child of the deceased Villanueva.
Published by bigboy on February 5, 2014 | Leave a response
RULING:
Rivera v. Heirs of Villanueva
G.R. No. 141501, July 21, 2006 No. The mere registration of a child in his or her
birth certificate as the child of the supposed parents is not a valid
FACTS: adoption, does not confer upon the child the status of an
adopted child and the legal rights of such child, and even
Petitioners are allegedly the half-brothers, the half-sister-in-law, amounts to simulation of the child’s birth or falsification of his or
and the children of a half-brother of the deceased Pacita her birth certificate, which is a public document. Furthermore, it
Gonzales. Respondents are heirs of Villanueva and are is well-settled that a record of birth is merely a prima face
represented by Melchor. The remaining evidence of the facts contained therein. It is not conclusive
respondents, AngelinaVillanueva and husband Victoriano de evidence of the truthfulness of the statements made there by the
Luna, are allegedly the daughter and the son-in-law, respectively, interested parties.Following the logic
of the late Villanueva. From 1927 until her death in 1980, of Benitez case, respondent Angelina and her co-defendants in
Gonzales cohabited with Villanueva without the benefit of SD-857 should have adduced evidence of her adoption, in view of
marriage because the latter was married to one Amanda Musngi the contents of her birth certificate. The records, however,
who died on April 20, 1963. In the course of are bereft of any such evidence. Under the circumstances, the
their cohabitation, they acquired several properties including the Court ruled that it was not sufficiently established that
properties contested in this case. Gonzales died on July 3, 1980 respondent Angelina was Gonzales’ biological daughter, nor even
without leaving a will. On August 8, 1980, Villanueva her adopted daughter. Thus, she cannot inherit from Gonzales.
and respondent Angelina executed a deed of extrajudicial Since she could not have validly participated in Gonzales’ estate,
partition with sale, that is, an extrajudicial settlement of the extrajudicial partition which she executed with Villanueva on
Gonzales’ estate comprising a number of the August 8, 1980 was invalid.
aforementioned properties. In this document, Villanueva, for the
amount of P30,000, conveyed his interests in the estate
to Angelina. Petitioners filed a case for partition of
Gonzales’ estate and annulment of titles and damages, with the
RTC. In dismissing the complaint, the RTC made two findings:
(1) Gonzales was never married to Villanueva and
(2) respondent Angelinawas her illegitimate child by Villanueva
and therefore her sole heir, to the exclusion of petitioners. The CA
ruled that respondent Angelina was the illegitimate daughter of
the decedent, based solely on her birth certificate.
 mental faculties, may assume sole powers of administration of the
conjugal property and dispose a parcel of land with improvements.

Uy vs CA HELD:
GR No. 109557, November 29, 2000
SC ruled in favor of Teodoro. The rule on summary proceedings does not
FACTS: apply to cases where the non-consenting spouse is incapacitated or
incompetent to give consent. In this case, trial court found that subject
Dr. Ernesto Jardelaza suffered stroke that rendered him comatose. Gilda, spouse was incompetent who was in a comatose condition and with a
wife of the latter, filed a petition in RTC Iloilo to be allowed as sole diagnosis of brain stem infract. Hence, the proper remedy is a judicial
administrator of their conjugal property and be authorized to sell the same guardianship proceeding under the Revised Rules of Court. The law
as her husband is physically incapacitated to discharge his functions. She provides that wife who assumes sole powers of administration has the
further contest that such illness of the husband necessitated expenses that same powers and duties as a guardian. Consequently, a spouse who
would require her to sell their property in Lot 4291 and its improvement desires to sell real property as administrator of the conjugal property,
to meet such necessities. RTC ruled in favor of Gilda contending that must observe the procedure for the sale of the ward’s estate required of
such decision is pursuant to Article 124 of FC and that the proceedings judicial guardians, and not the summary judicial proceedings under
thereon are governed by the rules on summary proceedings. FC. SC further held that such incapacity of the trial court to provide for
an opportunity to be heard is null and void on the ground of lack of due
The son of the spouses, Teodoro, filed a motion for reconsideration process.
contending that the petition made by her mother was essentially a petition
for guardianship of the person and properties of his father. As such it
cannot be prosecuted in accordance with the provisions on summary
proceedings instead it should follows the ruled governing special
proceedings in the Revised Rules of Court requiring procedural due
process particularly the need for notice and a hearing on the merits. He
further reiterated that Chapter 2 of the FC comes under the heading on
“Separation in Fact Between Husband and Wife” contemplating a
situation where both spouses are of disposing mind. Hence, he argued
that this should not be applied in their case.

During the pendency of the motion, Gilda sold the property to her
daughter and son in law. Upon the appeal by Teodoro, CA reversed the
decision of the lower court.

Valdes vs RTC
ISSUE: WON Gilda as the wife of a husband who suffered stroke, a 260 SCRA 221
cerebrovascular accident rendering him comatose, without motor and
FACTS:
Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971 and begotten Miguel Palang married his first wife Carlina in 1949. In 1972, Miguel returned to the
Philippines for good but did not choose to leave with his wife and daughter Herminia.
5 children. Valdez filed a petition in 1992 for a declaration of nullity of In July 1973, then 63 years old Miguel contracted his second marriage with 19 years
their marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code, which was old Erlinda Agapay.
granted hence, marriage is null and void on the ground of their mutual
psychological incapacity. Stella and Joaquin are placed under the custody In May 1973 or two months prior to their marriage Miguel and Erlinda jointly
of their mother while the other 3 siblings are free to choose which they purchased a parcel of agricultural land located at San Felipe, Binalonan, Pangasinan.
prefer. Upon the death of Miguel in 1981, Carlina and Herminia filed a case to recover the
ownership and possession of the Agricultural land in Pangasinan.

Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision regarding the ISSUE:
procedure for the liquidation of common property in “unions without
marriage”. During the hearing on the motion, the children filed a joint Whether or not the property acquired during the illicit cohabitation or subsequent void
affidavit expressing desire to stay with their father. marriage (Erlinda and Miguel) belongs to conjugal property of the first and valid
marriage (Carlina and Miguel).
ISSUE: Whether or not the property regime should be based on co-
ownership. RULING:

HELD: Yes. The provision of law applicable here is Article 148 of the Family Code providing
for cases of cohabitation when a man and woman who are not capacitated to marry
each other live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of
The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage, regardless of the cause marriage or under a void marriage. While Miguel and Erlinda contracted marriage,
thereof, the property relations of the parties are governed by the rules on said union was patently void because earlier marriage of Miguel and Carlina was still
subsisting and unaffected by the latter’s de facto separation.
co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie
presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who
Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their
did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be considered as actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in
having contributed thereto jointly if said party’s efforts consisted in the common in proportion to their respective contributions. It must be stressed that actual
care and maintenance of the family. contribution is required by this provision, in contrast to Article 147 which states that
efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and household, are regarded as
contributions to the acquisition of common property by one who has no salary or
income or work or industry. If the actual contribution of the party is not proved, there
will be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares.

Erlinda tried to establish by her testimony that she is engaged in the business of buy-
and-sell and had a sari-sari store but failed to persuade the SC that she actually
contributed money to buy the riceland. Since petitioner failed to prove that she
contributed money to the purchase price of the riceland, SC finds no basis to justify
her co-ownership with Miguel over the same.
Agapay v. Palang

G.R. No. 116668, 28 July 1997

Tumlos vs Fernandez
GR No. 137650, April 12, 2000
FACTS:
FACTS:
Mario and Lourdes Fernandez were plaintiffs in an action for ejectment
filed against Guillerma, Gina and Toto Tumlos. In the complaint, spouses SC rejected the claim that Guillerma and Mario were co-owners of the subject
Fernandez alleged that they are the absolute owners of an apartment property. The claim was not satisfactorily proven by Guillerma since there were
building that through their tolerance they allowed the Tumlos’ to occupy no other evidence presented to validate it except for the said affidavit. Even if
the allegations of having cohabited with Mario and that she bore him two
the apartment for the last 7 years without payment of any rent. It was
children were true, the claim of co-ownership still cannot be accepted. Mario is
agreed that Guillerma will pay 1,600 a month while the other defendants validly married with Lourdes hence Guillerma and Mario are not capacitated to
promised to pay 1,000 a month which was not complied with. Demand marry each other. The property relation governing their supposed cohabitation is
was made several times for the defendants to vacate the premises as they under Article 148 of the Family Code. Actual contribution is required by the
are in need of the property for the construction of a new building. said provision in contrast to Art 147 which states that efforts in the care and
maintenance of the family and household are regarded as contributions to the
Defendants appealed to RTC that Mario and Guillerma had an amorous acquisitions of common property by one who has no salary, income, work or
relationship and that they acquired the property in question as their love industry. Such is not included in Art 148. If actual contribution is not proven
nest. It was likewise alleged that they lived together in the said apartment then there can be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares.
building with their 2 children for about 10 years and that Gullerma
administered the property by collecting rentals from the lessees until she
discovered that Mario deceived her as to the annulment of their
marriage.

ISSUE: WON Guillerma is a co-owner of the said apartment under

Article 148.

Mallilin vs Castillo
GR No. 136803, June 16, 2000

FACTS:

Eustaquio Mallilin Jr. and Ma. Elvira Castillo were alleged to be both married and
HELD: with children but separated from their respective spouses and cohabited in 1979
while respective marriages still subsist. They established Superfreight Customs passed away under the care of Susan Yee who spent for his medical and
Brokerage Corporation during their union of which petitioner was the President and burial expenses. Both petitioner and respondent filed claims for monetary
Chairman and respondent as Vice President and Treasurer. They likewise acquired benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from various
real and personal properties which were registered solely in respondent’s name. Due government agencies. Nicdao was able to collect a total of P146,000.00 and
to irreconcilable conflict, the couple separated in 1992. Petitioner then demanded his Yee received a total of P21,000.00. Yee filed an action for collection of sum
share from respondent in the subject properties but the latter refused alleging that of money against Nicdao, contending that the marriage of the latter with
said properties had been registered solely in her name. Furthermore, respondent Santiago is void ab initio because their marriage was solemnized without
denied that she and petitioner lived as husband and wife because they were still the required marriage license. The trial court ruled in favor of Yee, ordering
legally married at the time of cohabitation. Nicdao to pay Yee half of acquired death benefits. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Petitioner filed complaint for partition of co-ownership shares while respondent filed
a motion for summary judgment. Trial court dismissed the former and granted the
latter. Issue:

ISSUE: WON petitioner can validly claim his share in the acquired properties Whether or not the marriage of Santiago Carino and Susan Nicdao is void
registered under the name of the respondent considering they both have subsisting for lack of marriage license.
relationship when they started living together.
Ruling:
HELD:
The Court ruled that trial court erred that parties who are not capacitated to marry
Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of
each other and were living together could not have owned properties in
Nicdao and Carino was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a
common. Under Article 148, if the parties are incapacitated to marry each other,
requisite of marriage and the absence thereof, subject to certain
properties acquired by them through their joint contribution, property or industry,
shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their contributions which, in the
exceptions, renders the marriage void ab initio. In the case at bar, the
absence of proof to the contrary, is presumed to be equal. Hence, there is co- marriage does not fall within any of those exceptions and a
ownership even though the couples in union are not capacitated to marry each marriage license therefore was indispensable to the validity of it. This fact
other. is certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila. Such
being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of Nicdao and Carino
Furthermore, when CA dismissed petitioner’s complaint for partition on grounds of has been sufficiently overcome and cannot stand. The marriage of Yee and
due process and equity, his right to prove ownership over the claimed properties was Carino is void ab initio as well for lack of judicial decree of nullity
denied. Such dismissal is unjustified since both ends may be served by simply of marriage of Carino and Nicdao at the time it was contracted. The
excluding from the action for partition the properties registered in the name of marriages are bigamous; under Article 148 of the Family Code,
Steelhouse Realty and Eloisa Castillo, not parties in the case. properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint contribution
shall belong to the co-ownership. The decision of the trial court and Court
of Appeals is affirmed.

SANTIAGO CARINO, petitioner vs. SUSAN CARINO, defendant

G.R. No. 132529. February 2, 2001

Facts:

During the lifetime of SP04 Santiago S. Carino, he contracted two

marriages, the first with Susan Nicdao Carino with whom he had two
offsprings (Sahlee and Sandee) and with Susan Yee Carino with whom he
had no children in their almost ten year cohabitation. In 1988, Santiago
 she specify the extent of her contribution. What appears in the record are receipts in
JACINTO SAGUID vs. CA, RTC, her name for the purchase of construction materials.

BRANCH 94, BOAC, MARINDUQUE While there is no question that both parties contributed in their joint account deposit,
and GINA S. REY there is, however, no sufficient proof of the exact amount of their respective shares
therein. Pursuant to Article 148 of the Family Code, in the absence of proof of extent
of the parties’ respective contribution, their share shall be presumed to be equal.
FACTS:
Seventeen-year old Gina S. Rey was married, but separated de facto from her
husband, when she met and cohabited with petitioner Jacinto Saguid In 1996, the
couple decided to separate and end up their 9-year cohabitation. private respondent
filed a complaint for Partition and Recovery of Personal Property with Receivership
against the petitioner. She prayed that she be declared the sole owner of these
personal properties and that the amount of P70,000.00, representing her contribution
to the construction of their house, be reimbursed to her.

ISSUE: WON there are actual contributions from the parties

HELD:
it is not disputed that Gina and Jacinto were not capacitated to marry each other
because the former was validly married to another man at the time of her cohabitation
with the latter. Their property regime therefore is governed by Article 148 of the
Family Code, which applies to bigamous marriages, adulterous relationships,
relationships in a state of concubinage, relationships where both man and woman are
married to other persons, and multiple alliances of the same married man. Under this
regime, “…only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions …” Proof of actual contribution is required.

Even if cohabitation commenced before family code, article 148 applies because this
provision was intended precisely to fill up the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code.
The fact that the controverted property was titled in the name of the parties to an
adulterous relationship is not sufficient proof of co-ownership absent evidence of
actual contribution in the acquisition of the property.

In the case at bar, the controversy centers on the house and personal properties of
the parties. Private respondent alleged in her complaint that she contributed
P70,000.00 for the completion of their house. However, nowhere in her testimony did
GAUDENCIO GUERRERO vs. RTC Mondequillo vs Breva
GR. No. 86355, May 31, 1990
OF ILOCOS NORTE, BR. XVI,
FACTS:
JUDGE LUIS B. BELLO, JR., The sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land located at Poblacion Malalag, Davao
PRESIDING, and PEDRO G. del Sur on July 1988, registered in the name of Jose Mondequillo and a parcel of
agricultural land located at Dalagbong Bulacan, Malalag, Davao de Sur also
registered in the latter’s name. A motion to quash was filed by the petitioner alleging
HERNANDO that the residential land is where the family home is built since 1969 prior the
commencement of this case and as such is exempt from execution, forced sale or
attachment under Article 152 and 153 except for liabilities mentioned in Article 155
FACTS: thereof, and that the judgment sought to be enforced against the family home is not
one of those enumerated. With regard to the agricultural land, it is alleged that it is
Guerrero and Pedro are brothers in law , their respective wives being sisters. Filed by still part of the public land and the transfer in his favor by the original possessor and
applicant who was a member of a cultural minority. The residential house in the
petitioner as an accion publicana against private respondent, this case assumed present case became a family home by operation of law under Article 153.

another dimension when it was dismissed by respondent Judge on the ground that ISSUE: WON the subject property is deemed to be a family home.

the parties being brother-in-law the complaint should have alleged that earnest efforts HELD:

were first exerted towards a compromise. The petitioner’s contention that it should be considered a family home from the time
it was occupied by petitioner and his family in 1969 is not well-taken. Under Article
162 of the Family Code, it provides that the provisions of this Chapter shall govern
existing family residences insofar as said provisions are applicable. It does not mean
ISSUE: WON brothers by affinity are considered members of the same family. that Article 152 and 153 shall have a retroactive effect such that all existing family
residences are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their
occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and are exempt from the
execution for payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Code. The
HELD: said article simply means that all existing family residences at the time of the
effectivity of the Family Code, are considered family homes and are prospectively
Considering that Art. 151 herein-quoted starts with the negative word “No”, the entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the FC. The debt and
liability which was the basis of the judgment was incurred prior the effectivity of the
requirement is mandatory 4 that the complaint or petition, which must be verified, Family Code. This does not fall under the exemptions from execution provided in
the FC.
should allege that earnest efforts towards a compromise have been made but that the
As to the agricultural land, trial court correctly ruled that the levy to be made shall be
same failed, so that “[i]f it is shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the case on whatever rights the petitioner may have on the land. Petition was dismissed.

must be dismissed.”

No. The court already ruled in Gayon v. Gayon 6 that the enumeration of “brothers PABLITO TANEO, JR., JOSE TANEO, NENA T. CATUBIG
and sisters” as members of the same family does not comprehend “sisters-in-law”
and HUSBAND, CILIA T. MORING and
 HUSBAND, petitioners, No. 5545, Cad. 237 was a private land, by virtue of a Sheriffs
vs. Sale on February 12, 1996.
COURT OF APPEALS and ABDON GILIG, respondents.
G.R. No. 108532 March 9, 1999 Private respondent averred that the subject land was originally
KAPUNAN, J.: owned by Lazaro Ba-a who sold the land to Pablo Taneo on
Facts: September 18, 1941, as evidenced by an Escritura de Venta.
Two (2) of petitioners’ properties were levied to satisfy the Despite it being a private land, Pablo Taneo filed an application
judgment amount of about P5,000.00: one was a parcel of land for free patent which was final only in 1979.
located in Barrio Igpit, Municipality of Opol, Misamis Oriental
with an area of about five (5) hectares, and the other was the
As counterclaim, private respondent alleged that since
family home also located at Igpit, Opol, Misamis Oriental.
petitioners are still in possession of the subject property, he has
been deprived of acts of ownership and possession and
On February 12, 1966, the subject properties were sold to the therefore, prayed for payment of rentals from February, 1968
private respondent as the highest bidder. However, the until possession has been restored to them.
petitioner failed to redeem the same, so a final deed of
conveyance was executed on February 9, 1968, definitely
In its decision of March 27, 1989, the RTC dismissed the
selling, transferring, and conveying said properties to the private
complaint.
respondent.

Issue:
The petitioner filed an action to declare the deed of conveyance
Whether or not Taneo’s family home is exempt from execution.
void and to quiet title over the land with a prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction. They agreed that the property was
acquired through free patent, therefore, it is inalienable and not Held:
subject to any encumbrance for the payment of debt, pursuant No, the trial court found that on March 7, 1964, Pablo Taneo
to Commonwealth Act No. 141. They further alleged that the constituted the house in question, erected on the land of
Sheriff’s Deed of Conveyance issued by Deputy Provincial Vacalares, as the family home. The instrument constituting the
Sheriff Jose Yasay in favour of the private respondent over the family home was registered only on January 24, 1966. The
subject property including their family home which was money judgment against Pablo Taneo was rendered on January
extrajudicially constituted. 24, 1964. Thus, at the time when the debt was incurred, the
family home was not yet constituted or even registered. The
petitioners’ alleged family home, as constituted by their father
Private respondent refuted the petitioner’s contentions alleging
is not exempt as it falls under the exception of Article 243 (2).
that he lawfully acquired the subject properties described as Lot
Ong vs Ong G.R. No. 153206 -He also argued that the real motive of Lucita and her family in filing the
complaint is to deprive him of his control and ownership over his conjugal
properties with Lucita.
Articles 56 & 57

-That the CA overlooked some facts of the case which warrant an exception
Ong Eng Kiam a.k.a. William Ong vs Lucita Ong
to the general rule that questions of fact cannot be the subject for
review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
G.R. No. 153206
-The CA erred in relying on the testimonies of Lucita her sister and their
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: parents’ doctor Dr. ElinZano since their testimonies are tainted with
relationship and fraud and since Lucita abandoned the family home she has
also given a ground for legal separation and therefore should NOT- be granted
FACTS: one pursuant to Art. 56 par. 4 of The family code – Where both parties have
given ground for legal separation

William Ong and Lucita Ong have been married for more than 20 years when
Lucita filed a complaint for Legal separation under Article 55 par. (1) of the ISSUE: WON Lucita Ong should be granted a decree on legal separation
Family Code.
HELD:
Lucita alleged that since their third year of marriage, her husband William
subjected her to physical violence like slapping, kicking and pulling her
hair and bang her head against the concrete wall.and been violent towards The claim that the real motive of Lucita in filing the case is for her family to take
their three children. He would scold them using his belt buckle to beat them. control of the conjugal properties is absurd. Lucita left because of her
One day after a violent quarrel wherein William hit Lucita on several different husband’s repeated physical violence and grossly abusive conduct. That the
parts of her body, pointed a gun at her and asked her to leave the house which physical violence and grossly abusive conduct were brought to bear upon
she did. Lucita have been duly established. He can derive no personal gain from
pushing for the financial interests of her family at the expense of her marriage
of 20 years and the companionship of her husband and children
Lucita’s statements about William’s abusive behavior were corroborated by her
sister Linda Lim. Dr. Vicente Elinzan whom Lucita consulted the day after she
left her conjugal home also testified about her injuries. The assessment of the trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses is given
great respect. Relationship alone is not enough to discredit and label a
witness’ testimony as biased and unworthy of credence. Witnesses Linda Lim
The trial court granted Lucitas petition for legal separation which and Dr. Elinzano gave detailed and straightforward testimonies the court finds
the CA affirmed that their testimonies are not tainted with bias.

William then filed this petition for review on certiorari The abandonment referred to by the Family Code is abandonment without
justifiable cause for more than one year. Lucita left William due to his abusive
conduct, such does not constitute abandonment contemplated in the said
-On the decision denying all of Lucita’s allegations and that he never inflicted provision
physical harm on her or their children.

PETITION DENIED: Lucita should be granted a decree of legal separation

 State in order to take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not
Pacete v. Carriaga fabricated.”

The above stated provision calling for the intervention of the state
G.R. No. L-53880, 17 March 1994
attorneys in case of uncontested proceedings for legal separation (and of
annulment of marriages, under Article 88) is to emphasize that marriage
FACTS: is more than a mere contract.
Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the Family Code, further
Concepcion Alanis filed a complaint on October 1979, for the Declaration mandates that an action for legal separation must “in no case be tried
of Nullity of Marriage between her erstwhile husband Enrico Pacete and before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the
one Clarita de la Concepcion, as well as for legal separation between her petition,” obviously in order to provide the parties a “cooling-off” period. In
and Pacete, accounting and separation of property. She averred in her this interim, the court should take steps toward getting the parties to
complaint that she was married to Pacete on April 1938 and they had a reconcile.
child named Consuelo; that Pacete subsequently contracted a second
marriage with Clarita de la Concepcion and that she learned of such The significance of the above substantive provisions of the law is further
marriage only on August 1979. Reconciliation between her and Pacete or underscored by the inclusion of a provision in Rule 18 of the Rules of
was impossible since he evidently preferred to continue living with Clarita. Court which provides that no defaults in actions for annulments of
marriage or for legal separation. Therefore, “if the defendant in an action
The defendants were each served with summons. They filed an for annulment of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court
extension within which to file an answer, which the court partly granted. shall order the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not
Due to unwanted misunderstanding, particularly in communication, the collusion between the parties exists, and if there is no collusion, to
defendants failed to file an answer on the date set by the court. intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is
Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a motion to declare the defendants in default, not fabricated.”
which the court forthwith granted. The court received plaintiffs’ evidence
during the hearings held on February 15, 20, 21, and 22, 1980. After trial,
the court rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiff on March 17, 1980.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying

petitioner’s motion for extension of time to file their answer, in declaring
petitioners in default and in rendering its decision on March 17, 1980
which decreed the legal separation of Pacete and Alanis and held to be
null and void the marriage of Pacete to Clarita.

RULING:

The Civil Code provides that “no decree of legal separation shall be
promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment. In
case of non-appearance of the defendant, the court shall order the
prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not collusion between parties
exists. If there is collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the
 whatever remaining properties have been allocated to the deceased
spouse.

Macadangdang v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. L-49542,12 September 1980

FACTS:
Such dissolution and liquidation are necessary consequences of the
Respondent Filomena Gaviana Macadangdang and petitioner Antonio
final decree. Article 106 of the Civil Code, now Article 63 of the Family
Macadangdang were married in 1946 after having lived together for
Code provides the effects of the decree of legal separation. These
two years and had 6 children. They started a buy and sell business
legal effects ipso facto or automatically follows, as an inevitable
and sari-sari store in Davao City. Through hard work and good
incident of the judgment decreeing legal separation, for the purpose of
fortune, their business grew and expanded into merchandising,
determining the share of each spouse in the conjugal assets.
trucking, transportation, rice and corn mill business, abaca stripping,
real estate etc. Their relationship became complicated and both
indulged in extramarital relations. Married life became intolerable so
they separated in 1965 when private respondent left for Cebu for
good. When she returned in Davao in 1971, she learned of the illicit
affairs of her estranged husband. She then decided to take the initial
action. In April 1971, she instituted a complaint for legal separation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the death of a spouse after a final decree of legal

separation has effect on the legal separation.

RULING:

The death of a spouse after a final decree of legal separation has no

effect on the legal separation. When the decree itself is issued, the
finality of the separation is complete after the lapse of the period to
appeal the decision to a higher court even if the effects, such as the
liquidation of the property, have not yet been commenced nor
terminated.

The law clearly spells out the effect of a final decree of legal
separation on the conjugal property. Therefore, upon the liquidation
and distribution conformably with the effects of such final decree, the
law on intestate succession should take over the disposition of
Narag vs. Narag, 291 SCRA 451
Rule 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on
FACTS:
his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life,
Atty. Dominador Narag was alleged to have abandoned his family for his
behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
paramour who was once his student in tertiary level. The administrative
complaint of disbarment was filed by her wife, Mrs. Julieta Narag. Undoubtedly, the canons of law practice were violated.
Respondent filed motion to dismiss because allegedly the complainant
fabricated the story as well as the love letters while under extreme emotional ______________________________________________________
confusion arising from jealousy. The case took an unexpected turn when Atty. Dominador Narag failed to prove his innocence because he failed to
another complaint was filed, the wife as again the complainant but now refute the testimony given against him and it was proved that his actions
together with their seven children as co-signatories. After several hearings, were of public knowledge and brought disrepute and suffering to his wife
and children. Good moral character is a continuing qualification required of
the facts became clear, that the respondent indeed abandoned his family as
every member of the bar. Thus, when a lawyer fails to meet the exacting
against morals, based on testimonial evidences. In addition, the assailed standard of moral integrity, the Supreme Court may withdraw his or her
relationship bore two children. privilege to practice law. (Canons 1&7, Rule 7.03, Code of Ethics for
Lawyers) It is not only a condition precedent to the practice of law, but a
continuing qualification for all members. Hence when a lawyer is found
ISSUE: guilty of gross immoral conduct, he may be suspended or disbarred. Grossly
Whether or not respondent is guilty of gross immorality and for having immoral means it must be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act or so
violated and the Code of Ethics for Lawyers culpable for disbarment. unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under
such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense
of decency. As a lawyer, one must not only refrain from adulterous
HELD: relationships but must not behave in a way that scandalizes the public by
YES. Respondent disbarred. creating a belief that he is flouting those moral standards

RATIO:
The complainant was able to establish, by clear and convincing evidence,
that the respondent breached the high and exacting moral standards set for
the members of the law profession.

Good moral character is not only a condition precedent to the practice of law,
but a continuing qualification for all members of the bar.
CANON 7 — A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the
legal profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
 filed a case against petitioners belies such assertion. Clearly,
petitioners are guilty of actionable delay for having failed to process
the video tape. Considering that private respondents were about to
leave for the United States, they took care to inform petitioners that
they would just claim the tape upon their return two months later.
GO vs CA Thus, the erasure of the tape after the lapse of thirty days was
unjustified.
NANCY GO AND ALEX GO, petitioners, vs. THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS In this regard, Article 1170 of the Civil Code provides that “those who
in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence
G.R. No. 114791 May 29, 1997 or delay, and those who is any manner contravene the tenor thereof,
are liable for damages.”
FACTS: Private respondents, spouses Hermogenes and Jane Ong,
were married on June 7, 1981, in Dumaguete City. The video coverage In the instant case, petitioners and private respondents entered into a
of the wedding was provided by petitioners at a contract price of contract whereby, for a fee, the former undertook to cover the latter’s
P1,650.00. Three times thereafter, the newlyweds tried to claim the wedding and deliver to them a video copy of said event. For whatever
video tape of their wedding, which they planned to show to their reason, petitioners failed to provide private respondents with their tape.
relatives in the United States where they were to spend their Clearly, petitioners are guilty of contravening their obligation to said
honeymoon, and thrice they failed because the tape was apparently not private respondents and are thus liable for damages.
yet processed. The parties then agreed that the tape would be ready
upon private respondents’ return.

When private respondents came home from their honeymoon,

however, they found out that the tape had been erased by petitioners
and therefore, could no longer be delivered.

Furious at the loss of the tape which was supposed to be the only
record of their wedding, private respondents filed on September 23,
1981 a complaint for specific performance and damages against
petitioners, which was granted by the RTC and affirmed by the CA,
hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not Nancy and Alex Go should be held liable for
the damages sought

RULING: Yes. As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, it is

contrary to human nature for any newlywed couple to neglect to claim
the video coverage of their wedding; the fact that private respondents