People of the Philippines v. Hon. Enrique B. Inting Case Digest [G.R. No.
88919
July 25, 1990]
FACTS:
Mrs. Editha Barba filed a letter-complaint against OIC-Mayor Dominador Regalado of Tanjay,
Negros Oriental with the COMELEC for allegedly transferring her, a permanent Nursing
Attendant, Grade I, in the office of the Municipal Mayor to a very remote barangay and without
obtaining prior permission or clearance from COMELEC as required by law.
After a preliminary investigation of Barba’s complaint, Atty. Lituanas found a prima facie case.
Hence, on September 26, 1988, he filed with the respondent trial court a criminal case for violation
of section 261, Par. (h), Omnibus Election Code against the OIC-Mayor. In an Order dated
September 30, 1988, the respondent court issued a warrant of arrest against the accused OIC
Mayor.
However, in an order dated October 3, 1988 and before the accused could be arrested, the trial
court set aside its September 30, 1988 order on the ground that Atty. Lituanas is not authorized to
determine probable cause pursuant to Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The trial court
later on quashed the information. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whiter or not a preliminary investigation conducted by a Provincial Election Supervisor involving
election offenses have to be coursed through the Provincial Prosecutor, before the Regional Trial
Court may take cognizance of the investigation and determine whether or not probable cause
exists?
Held:
The 1987 Constitution empowers the COMELEC to conduct preliminary investigations in cases
involving election offenses for the purpose of helping the Judge determine probable cause and for
filing an information in court. This power is exclusive with COMELEC. The evident constitutional
intendment in bestowing this power to the COMELEC is to insure the free, orderly and honest
conduct of elections, failure of which would result in the frustration of the true will of the people
and make a mere idle ceremony of the sacred right and duty of every qualified citizen to vote. To
divest the COMELEC of the authority to investigate and prosecute offenses committed by public
officials in relation to their office would thus seriously impair its effectiveness in achieving this
clear constitutional mandate. Bearing these principles in mind, it is apparent that the respondent
trial court misconstrued the constitutional provision when it quashed the information filed by the
Provincial Election Supervisor.
People vs. Delgado
G.R. Nos. 93419-32 September 18, 1990
FACTS:
Atty. Lauron E. Quilatan, Election Registrar of Toledo City filed a complaint against private
respondents for alleged violation of the Omnibus Election Code. The COMELEC directed Atty.
Manuel Oyson, Jr., Provincial Election Supervisor of Cebu, to conduct the preliminary
investigation of the case. Atty. Oyson submitted a report finding a prima facie case and
recommending the filing of information against each of the private respondents for violation of
Section 261 (y) (2) and (5) of the Omnibus Election Code. The COMELEC en banc resolved to
file the information against the private respondents as recommended.
Fifteen information were filed against each of private respondents in the RTC of Toledo City. In
three separate manifestations the Regional Election Director of Region VII was designated by the
COMELEC to handle the prosecution with the authority to assign another COMELEC prosecutor.
Private respondents filed motions for reconsiderations and the suspension of the warrant of arrest
with the respondent court on the ground that no preliminary investigation was conducted.
Respondent court issued an order directing the COMELEC to conduct a reinvestigation of said
cases and to submit the report within 10 days after termination. The Toledo City INP was directed
to hold in abeyance the service of the warrants of arrest until the submission of the reinvestigation
report.
The COMELEC Prosecutor filed a motion for reconsideration and opposition to the motion for
reinvestigation alleging therein that it is only the Supreme Court that may review the decisions,
orders, rulings and resolutions of the COMELEC but it was denied.
On the other hand, the private respondents contend that since the cases were filed in court by the
COMELEC as a public prosecutor, and not in the exercise of its power to decide election contests,
the trial court has authority to order a reinvestigation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not RTC has the authority to order reinvestigation of the actions of the COMELEC in
the investigation and prosecution of election offenses filed in its court?
RULING:
It is clear that aside from the adjudicatory or quasi-judicial power of the COMELEC to decide
election contests and administrative questions, it is also vested the power of a public prosecutor
with the exclusive authority to conduct the preliminary investigation and the prosecution of
election offenses punishable under the Code before a competent court. Thus, when the
COMELEC, through its duly authorized law officer, conducts the preliminary investigation of an
election offense and upon a prima facie finding of a probable cause, files the information in the
proper court, said court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case. Consequently, all the
subsequent disposition of said case must be subject to the approval of the court. The COMELEC
cannot conduct a re-investigation of the case without the authority of the court or unless so ordered
by the court.
The records of the preliminary investigation required to be produced by the court must be
submitted by the COMELEC. The trial court may rely on the resolution of the COMELEC to file
the information, by the same token that it may rely on the certification made by the prosecutor who
conducted the preliminary investigation, in the issuance of the warrant of arrest. Nevertheless, the
court may require that the record of the preliminary investigation be submitted to it to satisfy itself
that there is probable cause which will warrant the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
The refusal of the COMELEC or its agents to comply with the order of the trial court requiring
them to conduct a reinvestigation in this case and to submit to the court the record of the
preliminary investigation on the ground that only this Court may review its actions is certainly
untenable.
People vs. Basilla
G.R. Nos. 83938-40 November 6, 1989
FACTS:
Complaints for violations of Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code (BP Blg. 881) were filed with the
Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Masbate by Jolly Fernandez, then Officer-in-Charge of the Office of the
Governor against the spouses Jaime and Adoracion Tayong vote-buying, Ladislao Bataliran against
Salvacion Colambot for vote buying and PC/Sgt Arturo Rebaya against Melchor Yanson for carrying of
deadly weapon.
The Provincial Fiscal filed three separate criminal complaints against the three accused but respondent
Judge Henry Basilla motu proprio dismissed it on the ground that the complainant filed the complaint with
the fiscal and not with the COMELEC and the COMELEC did not investigate the case which violates Sec.
2(6) of Art. IX (C) which states that The Commission on Election shall “ investigate and, when appropriate
prosecute cases of violation of election laws, including acts or omissions, constituting election frauds
offenses, malpractices."
The private complainants alleged that the act of Respondent Judge dismissing the three criminal
information constitute grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction since the COMELEC has
authority to deputize the chief state prosecutors, provincial and city fiscals and their assistants, under
Sections 2 (4) and (8 ), Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution, and that the COMELEC did deputize such
prosecution officers to conduct preliminary investigation of complaints for alleged violation of election laws
and to institute criminal information thereof.
On the other hand, private respondents contend that the deputation by the COMELEC of the prosecuting
arms of the Government would be warranted only before the elections and only to ensure tree, honest,
orderly, peaceful and credible elections, that is, to perform the peace-keeping functions of policemen, lack
substance.
The Respondent Judge denied the Motion for Reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC has the authority to deputize the regular prosecution arms of the
Government for the investigation and prosecution of election offenses?
RULING:
We note that while Section 265 of the Code vests "exclusive power" to conduct preliminary investigation of
election offenses and to prosecute the same upon the COMELEC, it at the same time authorizes the
COMELEC to avail itself of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the Government. Section 2 of Article
IX-C of the 1 987 Constitution clearly envisage that the COMELEC would not be compelled to carry out all
its functions directly and by itself alone.
The contention of private respondents that the deputation by the COMELEC of the prosecuting arms of the
Government would be warranted only before the elections and only to ensure tree, honest, orderly, peaceful
and credible elections, that is, to perform the peace-keeping functions of policemen, lack substance. There
is nothing in Section 2 (4) of Article IX-C of the Constitution which requires such a pinched niggardly
interpretation of the authority of the COMELEC to appoint as its deputies, officials or employees of other
agencies and instrumentalities of the government. The prompt investigation and prosecution and
disposition of election offenses constitute an indispensable part of the task of securing free, orderly, honest,
peaceful and credible elections. The investigation and prosecution of election offenses are, in an important
sense, more important than the maintenance of physical order in election precinct. 'without the assistance
of provincial and city fiscals and their assistants and staff members, and of the state prosecutors of the
Department of Justice, the prompt and fair investigation and prosecution of election offenses committed
before or in the course of nationwide elections would simply not be possible, unless, perhaps, the
COMELEC had a bureaucracy many times larger than what it actually has. Moreover, the prosecution
officers designated by the COMELEC become deputies or agents of the COMELEC and pro tanto subject
to the authority, control and supervision of the COMELEC in respect of the particular functions covered by
such deputation. The acts of such deputies within the lawful scope of their delegated authority are, in legal
contemplation, the acts of the COMELEC itself. The only limitation the Constitution itself places upon the
COMELEC’s authority over its deputies relates to the enforcement of such authority through administrative
sanctions.
The Petition for Review on certiorari is hereby GRANTED.
Comelec vs. Silva
G.R. No. 129417 February 10, 1998
FACTS:
The COMELEC charged private respondents Erasto Tanciongco and Norma Castillo with violations of
Sec.27 of R.A. No. 6646, together with Zenon Uy, in twelve separate informations filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Bataan for tampering the certificates of canvass by increasing the votes received of senatorial
candidate Juan Ponce Enrile in certain municipalities of Bataan in the May 8, 1995 elections. The twelve
cases were presided over by respondent Judges, Honorable Lorenzo R. Silva Jr. and Honorable Benjamin
T. Vianzon.
Tanciongco and Castillo filed a joint "Omnibus Motion for Examination of Evidence to Determine the
Existence of Probable Cause; Suspension of Issuance of Warrant of Arrest; and Dismissal of the Cases."
Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito Zuño, who had been designated by the Commission on Elections to
prosecute the cases, filed a comment joining in private respondents' request. Complainant, Aquilino Q.
Pimentel,Jr. did not object to the dismissal of the cases.
Respondent Judges Silva and Vianzon summarily dismissed the cases against private respondents. It also
denied the Notice of Appeal filed by the COMELEC on the ground that the prosecutor, whom the
COMELEC had deputized to prosecute the cases, had earlier taken a contrary stand against the COMELEC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Respondent Judges is correct in denying the Notice of Appeal filed by the COMELEC?
RULING:
The authority to decide whether or not to appeal the dismissal belongs to the COMELEC. Art. IX-C, Sec.
2(6) of the Constitution expressly vests in it the power and function to "investigate and, where appropriate,
prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds,
offenses, and malpractices.
In effect the 1987 Constitution mandates the COMELEC not only to investigate but also to prosecute cases
of violation of election laws. This means that the COMELEC is empowered to conduct preliminary
investigations in cases involving election offenses for the purpose of helping the Judge determine probable
cause and for filing information in court. This power is exclusive with COMELEC.
Prosecutors designated by the COMELEC to prosecute the cases act as its deputies. They derive their
authority from it and not from their offices. It was beyond the power of Chief State Prosecutor Zuño to
oppose the appeal of the COMELEC and leave to the trial courts the determination of probable cause for
the filing of the cases and, if it found none, to dismissed it. Those cases were filed by the COMELEC after
appropriate preliminary investigation. If the Chief State Prosecutor thought there was no probable cause for
proceeding against private respondents, he should have discussed the matter with the COMELEC and
awaited its instruction. If he disagreed with the COMELEC's findings, he should have sought permission
to withdraw from the cases but he could not leave the determination of probable cause to the courts and
agree in advance to the dismissal of the cases should the courts find no probable cause for proceeding with
the trial of the accused. It was, therefore, grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent judges to
rely on the manifestation of Chief State Prosecutor Zuño as basis for denying due course to the notices of
appeal filed by the COMELEC.
Sarmiento vs. Comelec
G. R. No. 105628 August 6, 1992
FACTS:
The special civil actions for certiorari hereby jointly resolved, filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seek
to set aside the Resolutions of respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in the following Special
Cases (SPC): 1) G.R. No. 105628 — SPC No. 92-266 granting the appeal from the ruling of the Municipal
Board of Canvassers of Virac, Catanduanes which ordered the exclusion from the canvass of one (1)
election return; 2) G.R. No. 105725 — SPC No. 92-323 reversing the ruling of the City Board of Canvassers
of Iriga City which ordered the exclusion from the canvass of six (6) election returns and in UND No. 92-
243 ordering the said Board of Canvassers to include in the canvass the election returns involved therein;
3) G.R. No. 105727 — SPC No. 92-288 dismissing the appeal of petitioner from the ruling of the Provincial
Board of Canvassers of Catanduanes which ordered the inclusion in the canvass the certificate of canvass
for the municipality of Virac, excluding the returns from 48 precincts; 4) G.R. No. 105730 — SPC No. 92-
315 affirming the ruling of the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte which
dismissed petitioner's opposition to the composition of the said Municipal Board of Canvassers; 5) G.R. No.
105771 — SPC No. 92-271 affirming the ruling of the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Cabusao,
Camarines Sur which, among others, rejected petitioner's objection to certain election returns; 6) G.R. No.
105778 — SPC No. 92-039 dismissing said case for non-compliance with Section 20 of R.A. No. 7166; 7)
G.R. No. 105797 — SPC No. 92-153 affirming the rulings of the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Davao
Oriental which rejected petitioner's objections to the canvass of some certificates of canvass; 8) G.R. No.
105919 — SPC No. 92-293 dismissing petitioner's appeal from the ruling of the Municipal Board of
Canvassers of Upi Nuro, Maguindanao; 9) G.R. No. 105977 — SPC No. 92-087 denying the amended pre-
proclamation petition, which is an appeal from the rulings of the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Ternate,
Cavite, and denying a subsequent motion to resolve the issues raised in said amended petition.
Petitioners question the resolutions for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion for violating
Section 3, subdivision C, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution which provides that: “The Commission on
Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite
disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be
heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by
the Commission en banc.”
ISSUE:
Whether or not the resolutions issued by the COMELEC violate Section 3(C), Article IX of the 1987
Constitution?
RULING:
Article IX Section 3(C) of the 1987 Constitution provides that election cases including pre-proclamation
controversies and all such cases must first be heard and decided by a Division of the Commission. The
Commission, sitting en banc, does not have the authority to hear and decide the same at the first instance.
The COMELEC en banc acted without jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, when it resolved the
appeals of petitioners in the abovementioned Special Cases without first referring them to any of its
Divisions. Said resolutions are, therefore, null and void and must be set aside. Consequently, the appeals
are deemed pending before the Commission for proper referral to a Division.
Accordingly, the instant petitions are DISMISSED without prejudice to the filing by petitioners of regular
election protests. If the winning candidates for the positions involved in the Special Cases subject of these
petitions have already been proclaimed, the running of the period to file the protests shall be deemed
suspended by the pendency of such cases before the COMELEC and of these petitions before this Court.
Reyes vs. RTC of Oriental Mindoro
G.R. No. 108886 May 5, 1995
FACTS:
Petitioner Aquiles Reyes and private respondent Adolfo Comia were candidates for the position
of member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro. Private respondent moved for
the exclusion of certain election returns, on the ground of serious irregularity in counting in favor
of petitioner considering that there was another candidate bearing the same surname. The
petitioner was proclaimed as the eighth winning candidate without resolving the petition and took
his oath of office.
Private respondent filed an election protest before the trial court alleging that a vital mistake had
been committed by the Board of Canvassers in the computation of the total number of votes
garnered by petitioner.
The motion to dismiss filed by Petitioner was denied by the Trial Court. The Municipal Board of
Canvassers admitted that it had made a mistake in crediting private respondent with only 858
votes when he was entitled to 915 votes in the Statement of Votes. The trial court annulled the
proclamation of petitioner and declared private respondent as the eighth winning candidate.
Petitioner filed a notice of appeal to the COMELEC and the petition for mandamus and
prohibition to the CA to compel the Sangguniang Bayan to recognize him as the duly proclaimed
member. The CA dismissed the petition because of petitioner's pending appeal in the COMELEC.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but his motion was denied. The appellate court's
decision became final and executory. On the other hand, the COMELEC dismissed petitioner's
appeal on the ground that he had failed to pay the appeal fee within the prescribed period.
Petitioner contends that both the trial court and the COMELEC's First Division committed a grave
abuse of discretion, first by assuming jurisdiction over the election contest filed by private
respondent despite the fact that the case was filed more than ten days after petitioner's
proclamation, and second by dismissing petitioner's appeal from the decision of the trial court for
late payment of the appeal fee.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the filing of the motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc may be
dispensed of by the petitioner?
RULING:
The motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc is required for the filing of a petition
for certiorari as provided by Article IX(C), Section 2. Petitioner contention that this requirement
may be dispensed with because the only question raised in his petition is a question of law is not
correct. The questions raised by petitioner involve the interpretation of constitutional and statutory
provisions in light of the facts of this case. The questions tendered are, therefore, not pure
questions of law.
All election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies, must be decided by the COMELEC
in division. Should a party be dissatisfied with the decision, he may file a motion for
reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc. It is, therefore, the decision, order or ruling of the
COMELEC en banc that, in accordance with Art. IX (A) Section 7 may be brought to the Supreme
Court on certiorari.
Telecommunications and Broadcaster vs. Comelec |
TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND BROADCAST ATTORNEYS OF THE PHILIPPINES,
INC. and GMA NETWORK, INC. vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 132922 April 21, 1998
FACTS:
Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. and GMA
Network, Inc. challenge the validity of Section 92 of BP 881 on the ground (1) that it takes property
without due process of law and without just compensation; (2) that it denies radio and television
broadcast companies the equal protection of the laws; and (3) that it is in excess of the power given
to the COMELEC to supervise or regulate the operation of media of communication or information
during the period of election.
Petitioner GMA Network claims that it suffered losses in providing COMELEC Time in the 1992
presidential election and the 1995 senatorial election and that it stands to suffer even more should
it be required to do so again this year. Petitioners contend that Section 92 of BP 881 violates the
due process clause and the eminent domain provision of the Constitution by taking air time from
radio and television broadcasting stations without payment of just compensation claiming that the
primary source of revenue of the radio and television stations is the sale of air time to advertisers.
Petitioners claim that Section 92 is an invalid amendment of R.A. No. 7252 which granted GMA
Network, Inc. a franchise for the operation of radio and television broadcasting stations. They
argue that although Section 5 of R.A. No. 7252 gives the government the power to temporarily use
and operate the stations of petitioner GMA Network or to authorize such use and operation, the
exercise of this right must be compensated. Petitioners also complain that B.P. 881, Section 92
singles out radio and television stations to provide free air time.
Finally, it is argued that the power to supervise or regulate given to the COMELEC under Art. IX-
C, Section 92 of the Constitution does not include the power to prohibit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the power to supervise or regulate given to the COMELEC under Art. IX-C,
Section 92 of the Constitution includes the power to prohibit?
RULING:
Article IX-C, Section 4 of the Constitution authorized the COMELEC to supervise or regulate the
use by media of information of their franchises or permits, while what Congress prohibits is the
sale or donation of print space or air time for political ads. In other words, the object of supervision
or regulation is different from the object of the prohibition. It is another fallacy for petitioners to
contend that the power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit. This may have force if
the object of the power were the same.
The prohibition in Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646 is only half of the regulatory provision in the
statute. The other half is the mandate to the COMELEC to procure print space and air time for
allocation to candidates. Instead of leaving candidates to advertise freely in the mass media, the
law provides for allocation, by the COMELEC of print space and air time to give all candidates
equal time and space for the purpose of ensuring "free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible
elections.
With the prohibition on media advertising by candidates themselves, the COMELEC Time and
COMELEC Space are about the only means through which candidates can advertise their
qualifications and programs of government more than merely depriving their qualifications and
programs of government. More than merely depriving candidates of time for their ads, the failure
of broadcast stations to provide air time unless paid by the government would clearly deprive the
people of their right to know. Art III, Section 7 of the Constitution provides that "the right of the
people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized," while Art. XII, Section 6
states that "the use of property bears a social function and the right to own, establish, and operate
economic enterprises is subject to the duty of the State to promote distributive justice and to
intervene when the common good so demands."
To affirm the validity of Section 92 of B.P. 881 is to hold public broadcasters to their obligation
to see to it that the variety and vigor of public debate on issues in an election is maintained. For
while broadcast media are not mere common carriers but entities with free speech rights, they are
also public trustees charged with the duty of ensuring that the people have access to the diversity
of views on political issues. This right of the people is paramount to the autonomy of broadcast
media. To affirm the validity of Section 92, therefore, is likewise to uphold the people's right to
information on matters of public concern. The use of property bears a social function and is subject
to the state's duty to intervene for the common good. Broadcast media can find their just and
highest reward in the fact that whatever altruistic service they may render in connection with the
holding of elections is for that common good.
Adiong vs. Comelec
BLO UMPAR ADIONG vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS.
G.R. No. 103956 March 31, 1992
FACTS:
On January 13, 1992, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2347. Petitioner Blo Umpar Adiong, a
senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections assails the COMELEC's Resolution insofar as it prohibits
the posting of decals and stickers in "mobile" places like cars and other moving vehicles. According to him
such prohibition violates Section 82 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 11(a) of Republic Act No.
6646. In addition, the petitioner believes that with the ban on radio, television and print political
advertisements, he, being a neophyte in the field of politics stands to suffer grave and irreparable injury
with this prohibition. The posting of decals and stickers on cars and other moving vehicles would be his
last medium to inform the electorate that he is a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections. Finally,
the petitioner states that as of the date of the petition he has not received any notice from any of the Election
Registrars in the entire country as to the location of the supposed "COMELEC Poster Areas."
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC may prohibit the posting of decals and stickers on mobile places, public or
private, and limit their location or publication to the authorized posting areas that it fixes?
RULING:
The COMELEC's prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places whether public or private
except in designated areas provided for by the COMELEC itself is null and void on constitutional grounds.
First, the prohibition unduly infringes on the citizen's fundamental right of free speech enshrined in the
Constitution (Sec. 4, Article III). There is no public interest substantial enough to warrant the kind of
restriction involved in this case. The posting of decals and stickers in mobile places like cars and other
moving vehicles does not endanger any substantial government interest. There is no clear public interest
threatened by such activity so as to justify the curtailment of the cherished citizen's right of free speech and
expression.
Second, the questioned prohibition premised on the statute and as couched in the resolution is void for
overbreadth. The restriction as to where the decals and stickers should be posted is so broad that it
encompasses even the citizen's private property, which in this case is a privately-owned vehicle. In
consequence of this prohibition, another cardinal rule prescribed by the Constitution would be violated.
Section 1, Article III of the Bill of Rights provides that no person shall be deprived of his property without
due process of law.
Third, the constitutional objective to give a rich candidate and a poor candidate equal opportunity to inform
the electorate as regards their candidacies, mandated by Article II, Section 26 and Article XIII, section 1 in
relation to Article IX (c) Section 4 of the Constitution, is not impaired by posting decals and stickers on
cars and other private vehicles. Compared to the paramount interest of the State in guaranteeing freedom
of expression, any financial considerations behind the regulation are of marginal significance.
In sum, the prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places whether public or private except
in the authorized areas designated by the COMELEC becomes censorship which cannot be justified by the
Constitution. There are many candidates whose names alone evoke qualifications, platforms, programs and
ideologies which the voter may accept or reject. When a person attaches a sticker with such a candidate's
name on his car bumper, he is expressing more than the name; he is espousing ideas.
