Go Chico vs Martinez

Facts:

It appears from the record that on June 2, 1919, J. J. Go Chioco made

a loan of P40,000 to Ortiga Hermanos, and to that effect a promissory note,
Exhibit 2, was executed, wherein Ortiga Hermanos, Chan Lin Cun , and E.
Martinez promised to pay, jointly and severally, said sum within three months
from the above mentioned date. On the same day, Ortiga Hermanos, together
with Chan Lin Cun and E. Martinez, signed another promissory note for the
amount of P1,800 payable within three months from said date, and on the
same date Ortiga Hermanos, through their manager, E. Martinez, delivered to
J. J. Go Chioco check, Exhibit 1, drawn against the Bank of the Philippine
Islands for the amount of P1,800, which was cashed by said J. J. Go Chioco.
When the note became due and the makers could not pay it, the same
was cancelled and another note, Exhibit 3, was executed in the sum of
P40,000 for the period of three months, which was signed, as the former, by
the defendants, Ortiga Hermanos, Chan Lin Cun, and E. Martinez. On the
same date another note was delivered by the same debtors in favor of J. J.
Go Chioco for the sum of P1,800 as well as a check, payable to order, Exhibit
2-B, drawn against the Bank of the Philippine Islands and signed by Ortiga
Hermanos. Said check for the sum of P1,800 was cashed by the plaintiff, J. J.
Go Chioco.
When the second note became due the makers failed to pat it, and, for
that reason, the note was cancelled and Exhibit 4 executed and signed by the
same parties. On the same date, that is, on December 2, 1919, Ortiga
Hermanos delivered to J. J. Go Chioco the note, Exhibit 4-A, for the sum of
P1,800 as well as the check, Exhibit 3-B, drawn against the Bank of the
Philippine Islands for the same amount which was cashed by J. J. Go Chioco.
On March 2, 1920, when the last mentioned note became due, the
defendants also failed to pay the same and for that reason the note was again
cancelled and another note executed and signed by the same parties, making
it appear that it should be paid within one month and for that reason the other
note, signed by the debtors, was for P600 only, as well as the amount of the
given by Ortiga Hermanos, on March 1, 1920, drawn against the Philippine
national Bank, which was cashed by J. J. Go Chioco.
On April 2, 1920, the date upon which the last mentioned note should
have been paid, the defendants also failed to satisfy it and for this reason the
note was again novated, stipulating that the period would be for three months.
On the same date the three debtors delivered their note, Exhibit 6-A, for the
amount of P1,800.
 The debtor also failed to satisfy this debt within the period stipulated
and, consequently, the note was novated and on July the 2d, Exhibit 7 was
signed by Ortiga Hermanos, Chan Cun and E. Martinez, which is another note
for a period delivered another note for the amount of P1,800 to J. J. Go
Chioco, payable within three months and on the following day, July 3, 1920,
Ortiga Hermanos delivered to J. J. Go Chioco Exhibit 6-A against the Bank of
the Philippine Islands for the same amount of P1,800.
Again, the note was not paid at maturity and for that reason the same
was novated on October 2, 1920, and signed by Ortiga Hermanos, Chan Lin
Cun and E. Martinez, and on the same date Ortiga Hermanos delivered to J.
J. Go Chioco another promissory note for P1,800 and a check against the
China Banking Corporation for the same amount. When the last mentioned
promissory note Exhibit A was again executed and signed by Ortiga
Hermanos, Chan Lin Cun and E. Martinez in the sum of P40,000, in favor of J.
J. Go Chioco payable within three months from date.

(1) That the plaintiff made a loan to the defendant, Ortiga Hermanos, of
the sum Of P40,000, and that interest at the rate of 18 per cent per
annum has been paid; (2) that the defendant paid the plaintiff, as
interest on said amount, including the payments in April and July,
1921, to wit P2,253.50 (P3.50 for stamps), from December 2, 1919,
the total sum of P1,500 as attorney's fees, constitutes the prayer of
the defendant's complaint; (3) that the defendant Ortiga Hermanos
paid the plaintiff, on two different occasions, on account of said loan
of P40,000, the amount of P25,000 which was set out in his
counterclaim; and (4) that according to the complaint filed by J. J.
Go Chioco of the sum of P40,000 loaned there still remains a
balance of P15,000 to be paid.
Issue: (1)Whether or not the defendant has paid the plaintiff a usurious rate of
interest, namely, 18 per cent per annum upon the promissory note for the
amount of P40,000; (2) whether or not the debtor who has paid a usurious rate
of interest can recover the amount paid on account of the principal as well as
the usurious interest paid, together with attorney's fees and costs; and (3)
whether or not the usurious creditor has a right to recover his capital loaned to
and not paid by the debtor.

Ruling:
Making into consideration the plain language of section 7 of Act No. 2655
and giving to it its true meaning, the rule should be, that the usurious contract is
avoided and that the lender cannot be permitted to maintain an action in the
courts to enforce his usurious contract. Such natural construction of the law will
be for the best interests of the entire Philippines.
In accordance with section 285 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the
agreement to pay interest, reduced to writing in the promissory notes for
P1,800, is considered as containing all those terms stipulated by the parties,
and therefore there can be, between the parties and their representatives or
successors in interest, no evidence of the terms of the agreement other than
the contents of the writing , except in the following cases:
(1) Where a mistake of imperfection of the writing, or its failure to
express the true intent and agreement of the parties, is put in issue by the
pleadings;
(2) Where the validity of the agreement is the fact in dispute.
As far as the record goes, said promissory notes of P1,800 were not put
in issue during the trial nor is there any discussion as to their validity. Said
notes recite a specific obligation and its language is not subject to ambiguity.
J. J. Go Chioco cannot, therefore, change, by his mere testimony, the terms
of said notes in the sense that part of the amount therein stated was collected
as penalty.
Moreover, the fact that the interest in question was collected quarterly
and in advance, with the exception of one case wherein the interest was
collected for one month, shows, in our opinion, that the transaction was for the
collection of interest, since you cannot charge or collect anything in advance
as penalty for failure to fulfill an obligation which was not yet enforceable.

People v. ConcepcionG.R. No. 19190 (November 29, 1922)

FACTS:D e f e n d a n t a u t h o r i z e d a n e x t e n s i o n o f c r e d i t i n f a v o r
o f C o n c e p c i o n , a c o - partnership. Defendant’s wife was a director of this
co-partnership. Defendant was found guilty ofviolating Sec. 35 of Act No. 2747 which says
that “The National Bank shall not, directly or indirectly, grantloans to any of the members of
the Board of Directors of the bank nor to agents of the branch banks.” ThisSection was in effect
in 1919 but was repealed in Act No. 2938 approved on January 30, 1921

.ISSUE:W/N Defendant can be convicted of violating Sections of Act No. 2747, which were
repealed by ActNo. 2938.

HELD:In the interpretation and construction, the primary rule is to ascertain and give effect
to the intention ofthe Legislature. Section 49 in relation to Sec. 25 of Act No. 2747 provides a
punishment for any person whoshall violate any provisions of the Act. Defendant contends
that the repeal of these Sections by Act No.2938 has served to take away basis for
criminal prosecution. The Court holds that where an act ofthe Legislature which
penalizes an offense repeals a former act which penalized the same offense, suchrepeal does
 not have the effect of thereafter depriving the Courts of jurisdiction to try, convict
andsentence offenders charged with violations of the old law

Krivenko v. Register of Deeds G.R. No. L-630. November 15, 1947

Facts: Alexander Krivenko, an alien, bought a residential lot from Magdalena Estate Inc. in
December 1941. The registration was interrupted by the war. In May 1945, he sought to accomplish
the said registration but was denied by the Register of Deeds of Manila on the grounds that he is a
foreigner and he cannot acquire a land in this jurisdiction. Krivenko brought the case to the CFI of
Manila. The CFI ruled that he cannot own a land, being an alien. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not an alien may own private lands in the Philippines.

Held: No.

Ratio: Sec. 1, Art 13 of the Constitution talks about the conservation and utilization of natural
resources. The said provision embraces all lands of any kind of the public domain. Its purpose is to
establish a permanent and fundamental policy for the conservation and utilization of all natural
resources of the nation. Although it mentions agricultural, timber, and mineral lands, the court held
that in determining whether a parcel of land is agricultural, the test is not only whether it is actually
agricultural, but also its susceptibility to cultivation for agricultural purposes. Hence, “public
agricultural land” was construed as referring to those lands that were not timber or mineral.
Therefore, it includes residential lands.

StatCon maxim: If the only issue is a constitutional question which is unavoidable, the court should
confront the question and decide the case on the merits.

Krivenko v. Register of Deeds

STATUTE: In Sec.1 , Art. XIII of 1935 Constitution - “public agricultural lands shall not be alienated” except in
favor of Filipinos, SAME as Sec. 5 “no private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned.”
Both have same meaning being based on same policy of nationalization and having same subject.

Meaning of word qualified by purpose of statute

 Purpose may indicate whether to give word, phrase, ordinary, technical, commercial restricted or expansive meaning.
 In construing, court adopts interpretation that accords best with the manifest purpose of statute; even disregard
technical or legal meaning in favor of construction which will effectuate intent or purpose.

Word or phrase construed in relation to other provisions

 General rule: word, phrase, provision, should not be construed in isolation but must be interpreted in relation to other
provisions of the law.
 This is a VARIATION of the rule that, statute should be construed as a whole, and each of its provision must be given
effect.
People vs Tamani GR L-22160-61
FACTS: Tamani was convicted of murder andattempted murder by the lower court
onFebruary 14, 1963. Upon receipt of a copy ofthis orde r, his counsel subsequently
fi le d a motion for reconsideration on March 1, 1963,which was denied. The lower court sent
a copyo f t h e o r d e r o f d e n i a l t o t h e c o u n s e l b y registered mail on July 13,
1963 through thecounsel’s wife. Counsel filed his appeal only onSeptember 10, 1963, forty-
eight days from July2 4 t h , w h ic h i s t he r e g le m e n t a ry f i f t e e n - da y period for appeal.
Appellees contend that thecase should be dismissed on the ground thatt h e a p p e a l w a s
f o r t y - e i g h t d a y s l a t e . T h e y invoked Sec. 6, Rule 122 of the Rules of Courtw h i c h s t a t e s
t h a t a n a p p e a l m u s t b e t a k e n within fifteen (15) days from the promulgation ornotice of the
judgment or order appealed from.ISSUE: Whether the fifteen-day period shouldcommence
from the date of promulgationof the decision.R U L I N G : Y e s . U s i n g t h e r u l e o f
r e d d e n d o singula singulis, the word “promulgation” shouldbe construed as referring to
“judgment”, while“notice” should be construed as referring to“order”.Tamani’s appeal
is therefore 58 days late, not47, as Appellees contend; he only had a dayleft from the
receipt of his wife of the notice onJuly 13. Nonetheless, the court decided to actu p o n t h e
a p p e a l a t h a n d “ t o o b v i a t e a n y possible miscarriage of justice”.