G.R. No. L-18753 March 26, 1965 Dr.

6, 1965 Dr. Rene Teotico because the latter was the physician who took care of the testatrix during her
last illness.
VICENTE B. TEOTICO, petitioner-appellant,
vs. After the parties had presented their evidence, the probate court rendered its decision on
ANA DEL VAL, ETC., oppositor-appellant. November 10, 1960, admitting the will to probate but declaring the disposition made in favor of
Dr. Rene Teotico void with the statement that the portion to be vacated by the annulment should
Antonio Gonzales for petitioner-appellant. pass to the testatrix's heirs by way of intestate succession.
J.C. Zulueta, G. D. David and N. J. Quisumbing for oppositor-appellant.
Petitioner Teotico, together with the universal heir Josefina Mortera, filed a motion for
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.: reconsideration of that part of the decision which declares the portion of the estate to be vacated
by the nullity of the legacy made to Dr. Rene Teotico as passing to the legal heirs, while the
oppositor filed also a motion for reconsideration of the portion of the judgment which decrees
Maria Mortera y Balsalobre Vda. de Aguirre died on July 14, 1955 in the City of Manila leaving the probate of the will. On his part, Dr. Rene Teotico requested leave to intervene and to file a
properties worth P600,000.00. She left a will written in Spanish which she executed at her motion for reconsideration with regard to that portion of the decision which nullified the legacy
residence at No. 2 Legarda St., Quiapo, Manila. She affixed her signature at the bottom of the made in his favor.
will and on the left margin of each and every page thereof in the presence of Pilar Borja, Pilar
C. Sanchez, and Modesto Formilleza, who in turn affixed their signatures below the attestation
clause and on the left margin of each and every page of the will in the presence of the testatrix The motions for reconsideration above adverted to having been denied, both petitioner and
and of each other. Said will was acknowledged before Notary Public Niceforo S. Agaton by the oppositor appealed from the decision, the former from that portion which nullifies the legacy in
testatrix and her witnesses. favor of Dr. Rene Teotico and declares the vacated portion as subject of succession in favor of
the legal heirs, and the latter from that portion which admits the will to probate. And in this
instance both petitioner and oppositor assign several errors which, stripped of non-essentials,
In said will the testatrix made the following preliminary statement: that she was possessed of may be boiled down to the following: (1) Has oppositor Ana del Val Chan the right to intervene
the full use of her mental faculties; that she was free from illegal pressure or influence of any in this proceeding?; (2) Has the will in question been duly admitted to probate?; (3) Did the
kind from the beneficiaries of the will and from any influence of fear or threat; that she freely probate court commit an error in passing on the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will
and spontaneously executed said will and that she had neither ascendants nor descendants of and in determining who should inherit the portion to be vacated by the nullification of the legacy
any kind such that she could freely dispose of all her estate. made in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico?

Among the many legacies and devises made in the will was one of P20,000.00 to Rene A. These issues will be discussed separately.
Teotico, married to the testatrix's niece named Josefina Mortera. To said spouses the testatrix
left the usufruct of her interest in the Calvo building, while the naked ownership thereof she left
in equal parts to her grandchildren who are the legitimate children of said spouses. The testatrix 1. It is a well-settled rule that in order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate
also instituted Josefina Mortera as her sole and universal heir to all the remainder of her proceeding he must have an interest in the estate, or in the will, or in the property to be affected
properties not otherwise disposed of in the will. by it either as executor or as a claimant of the estate (Ngo The Hua v. Chung Kiat Hua, et al.,
L-17091, September 30, 1963); and an interested party has been defined as one who would be
benefited by the estate such as an heir or one who has a claim against the estate like a creditor
On July 17, 1955, Vicente B. Teotico filed a petition for the probate of the will before the Court (Idem). On the other hand, in Saguinsin v. Lindayag, et al., L-17750, December 17, 1962, this
of First Instance of Manila which was set for hearing on September 3, 1955 after the requisite Court said:
publication and service to all parties concerned.
According to Section 2, Rule 80 of the Rules of Court, a petition for letters of
Ana del Val Chan, claiming to be an adopted child of Francisca Mortera, a deceased sister of administration must be filed by an "interested person." An interested party has been
the testatrix, as well as an acknowledged natural child of Jose Mortera, a deceased brother of defined in this connection as one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an
the same testatrix, filed on September 2, 1955 an opposition to the probate of the will alleging heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor (Intestate Estate of
the following grounds: (1) said will was not executed as required by law; (2) the testatrix was Julio Magbanwa 40 O.G. 1171). And it is well settled in this jurisdiction that in civil
physically and mentally incapable to execute the will at the time of its execution; and (3) the actions as well as special proceedings, the interest required in order that a person may
will was executed under duress, threat or influence of fear. be a party thereto must be material and direct, and not merely indirect or contingent
(Trillana vs. Crisostomo, G.R. No. L-3370, August 22, 1951; Rapinosa vs. Barrion,
Vicente B. Teotico, filed a motion to dismiss the opposition alleging that the oppositor had no 70 Phil. 311).
legal personality to intervene. The probate court, after due hearing, allowed the oppositor to
intervene as an adopted child of Francisca Mortera, and on June 17, 1959, the oppositor amended
her opposition by alleging, the additional ground that the will is inoperative as to the share of
The question now may be asked: Has oppositor any interest in any of the provisions of the will, reason of adoption. Neither are the children of the adopted considered as descendants
and, in the negative, would she acquire any right to the estate in the event that the will is denied of the adopter. The relationship created is exclusively between the adopter and the
probate? adopted, and does not extend to the relatives of either. (Tolentino, Civil Code of the
Philippines, Vol. 1, p. 652).
Under the terms of the will, oppositor has no right to intervene because she has no interest in
the estate either as heir, executor, or administrator, nor does she have any claim to any property Relationship by adoption is limited to adopter and adopted, and does not extend to
affected by the will, because it nowhere appears therein any provision designating her as heir, other members of the family of either; but the adopted is prohibited to marry the
legatee or devisee of any portion of the estate. She has also no interest in the will either as children of the adopter to avoid scandal. (An Outline of Philippine Civil Law by
administratrix or executrix. Neither has she any claim against any portion of the estate because Justice Jose B. L. Reyes and Ricardo C. Puno, Vol. 1, p. 313; See also Caguioa,
she is not a co-owner thereof, and while she previously had an interest in the Calvo building Comments and Cases on Civil Law 1955, Vol 1, pp. 312-313; Paras, Civil Code of
located in Escolta, she had already disposed of it long before the execution of the the Philippines, 1959 ed., Vol. 1, p. 515)
will.1äwphï1.ñët
It thus appears that the oppositor has no right to intervene either as testamentary or as legal heir
In the supposition that, the will is denied probate, would the oppositor acquire any interest in in this probate proceeding contrary to the ruling of the court a quo.
any portion of the estate left by the testatrix? She would acquire such right only if she were a
legal heir of the deceased, but she is not under our Civil Code. It is true that oppositor claims to 2. The next question to be determined is whether the will Exhibit A was duly admitted to
be an acknowledged natural child of Jose Mortera, a deceased brother of the deceased, and also probate. Oppositor claims that the same should not have been admitted not only because it was
an adopted daughter of Francisca Mortera, a deceased sister of the testatrix, but such claim not properly attested to but also because it was procured thru pressure and influence and the
cannot give her any comfort for, even if it be true, the law does not give her any right to succeed testatrix affixed her signature by mistake believing that it contained her true intent.
to the estate of the deceased sister of both Jose Mortera and Francisca Mortera. And this is so
because being an illegitimate child she is prohibited by law from succeeding to the legitimate
relatives of her natural father. Thus, Article 992 of our Civil Code provides: "An illegitimate The claim that the will was not properly attested to is contradicted by the evidence of record. In
child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father this respect it is fit that we state briefly the declarations of the instrumental witnesses.
or mother; ... ." And the philosophy behind this provision is well expressed in Grey v. Fabie, 68
Phil. 128, as follows: Pilar Borja testified that the testatrix was in perfect state of health at the time she executed the
will for she carried her conversation with her intelligently; that the testatrix signed immediately
Between the natural child and the legitimate relatives of the father or mother who above the attestation clause and on each and every page thereof at the left-hand margin in the
acknowledged it, the Code denies any right of succession. They cannot be called presence of the three instrumental witnesses and the notary public; that it was the testatrix herself
relatives and they have no right to inherit. Of course, there is a blood tie, but the law who asked her and the other witnesses to act as such; and that the testatrix was the first one to
does not recognize it. On this, article 943 is based upon the reality of the facts and sign and later she gave the will to the witnesses who read and signed it.
upon the presumption will of the interested parties; the natural child is disgracefully
looked down upon by the legitimate family; the legitimate family is, in turn, hated by Pilar G. Sanchez also testified that she knew the testatrix since 1945; that it was the testatrix
the natural child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the former and the herself who asked her to be a witness to the will; that the testatrix was the first one to sign and
resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the natural child she gave the will later to the witnesses to sign and afterwards she gave it to the notary public;
nothing but the product of sin, a palpable evidence of a blemish upon the family. Every that on the day of the execution of the will the testatrix was in the best of health.
relation is ordinarily broken in life; the law does no more than recognize this truth, by
avoiding further grounds of resentment. (7 Manresa, 3d., p. 110.) Modesto Formilleza also testified that he was asked by the testatrix to be one of the witnesses
to the will; that he read and understood the attestation clause before he signed the document,
The oppositor cannot also derive comfort from the fact that she is an adopted child of Francisca and all the witnesses spoke either in Spanish or in Tagalog. He finally said that the instrumental
Mortera because under our law the relationship established by adoption is limited solely to the witnesses and the testatrix signed the will at the same time and place and identified their
adopter and the adopted and does not extend to the relatives of the adopting parents or of the signatures.
adopted child except only as expressly provided for by law. Hence, no relationship is created
between the adopted and the collaterals of the adopting parents. As a consequence, the adopted This evidence which has not been successfully refuted proves conclusively that the will was
is an heir of the adopter but not of the relatives of the adopter. duly executed because it was signed by the testatrix and her instrumental witnesses and the
notary public in the manner provided for by law.
The relationship established by the adoption, however, is limited to the adopting
parent, and does not extend to his other relatives, except as expressly provided by law. The claim that the will was procured by improper pressure and influence is also belied by the
Thus, the adopted child cannot be considered as a relative of the ascendants and evidence. On this point the court a quo made the following observation:
collaterals of the adopting parents, nor of the legitimate children which they may have
after the adoption, except that the law imposes certain impediments to marriage by
 The circumstance that the testatrix was then living under the same roof with Dr. Rene governing the interested parties, and must be punctually complied with in so far as it
Teotico is no proof adequate in law to sustain the conclusion that there was improper is not contrary to the law or to public morals. (Montañano v. Suesa, 14 Phil. 676, 679-
pressure and undue influence. Nor is the alleged fact of isolation of the testatrix from 680)
the oppositor and her witnesses, for their supposed failure to see personally the
testatrix, attributable to the vehemence of Dr. Rene Teotico, to exclude visitors, took To establish conclusively as against everyone, and once for all, the facts that a will
place years after the execution of the will on May 17, 1951. Although those fact may was executed with the formalities required by law and that the testator was in a
have some weight to support the theory of the oppositor, yet they must perforce yield condition to make a will, is the only purpose of the proceedings under the new code
to the weightier fact that nothing could have prevented the testatrix, had she really for the probate of a will. (Sec. 625.) The judgment in such proceedings determines
wanted to from subsequently revoking her 1951 will if it did not in fact reflect and and can determine nothing more. In them the court has no power to pass upon the
express her own testamentary dispositions. For, as testified to by the oppositor and validity of any provisions made in the will. It can not decide, for example, that a
her witnesses, the testatrix was often seen at the Escolta, in Quiapo and Sta. Cruz, certain legacy is void and another one is valid. (Castañeda v. Alemany, 3 Phil. 426,
Manila, walking and accompanied by no one. In fact, on different occasions, each of 428)
them was able to talk with her.
Pursuant to the foregoing precedents the pronouncement made by the court a quo declaring
We have examined the evidence on the matter and we are fully in accord with the foregoing invalid the legacy made to Dr. Rene Teotico in the will Exhibit A must be set aside as having
observation. Moreover, the mere claim that Josefina Mortera and her husband Rene Teotico had been made in excess of its jurisdiction. Another reason why said pronouncement should be set
the opportunity to exert pressure on the testatrix simply because she lived in their house several aside is that the legatee was not given an opportunity to defend the validity of the legacy for he
years prior to the execution of the will and that she was old and suffering from hypertension in was not allowed to intervene in this proceeding. As a corollary, the other pronouncements
that she was virtually isolated from her friends for several years prior to her death is insufficient touching on the disposition of the estate in favor of some relatives of the deceased should also
to disprove what the instrumental witnesses had testified that the testatrix freely and voluntarily be set aside for the same reason.
and with full consciousness of the solemnity of the occasion executed the will under
consideration. The exercise of improper pressure and undue influence must be supported by
substantial evidence and must be of a kind that would overpower and subjugate the mind of the WHEREFORE, with the exception of that portion of the decision which declares that the will
testatrix as to destroy her free agency and make her express the will of another rather than her in question has been duly executed and admitted the same to probate, the rest of the decision is
own (Coso v. Deza, 42 0. G. 596). The burden is on the person challenging the will that such hereby set aside. This case is ordered remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings. No
influence was exerted at the time of its execution, a matter which here was not done, for the pronouncement as to costs.
evidence presented not only is insufficient but was disproved by the testimony of the
instrumental witnesses.

3. The question of whether the probate court could determine the intrinsic validity of the
provisions of a will has been decided by this Court in a long line of decisions among which the
following may be cited:

Opposition to the intrinsic validity or legality of the provisions of the will cannot be
entertained in Probate proceeding because its only purpose is merely to determine if
the will has been executed in accordance with the requirements of the law." (Palacios
v. Palacios, 58 0. G. 220)

... The authentication of a will decides no other questions than such as touch upon the
capacity of the testator and the compliance with those requisites or solemnities which
the law prescribes for the validity of wills. It does not determine nor even by
implication prejudge the validity or efficiency of the provisions, these may be
impugned as being vicious or null, notwithstanding its authentication. The questions
relating to these points remain entirely unaffected, and may be raised even after the
will has been authenticated. ...

From the fact that the legalization of a will does not validate the provisions therein
contained, it does not follow that such provision lack the efficiency, or fail to produce
the effects which the law recognizes when they are not impugned by anyone. In the
matter of wills it is a fundamental doctrine that the will of the testator is the law
G.R. No. L-37365 November 29, 1977 herein Engracio Manese (Exhibit 1-Manese) and her father Geronimo
Almanza.
GAUDENCIO BICOMONG, et al., plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
GERONIMO ALMANZA, et al., defendant. FLORENTINO CARTENA, defendant-
appellant. The subject matter of the complaint in Civil Case No. SP-265 concerns the one-half undivided
share of Maura Bagsic in the following described five (5) parcels of land which she inherited
Antonio E. Lacsam & Cesar A. Azucena, Jr. for appellant. from her deceased mother, Silvestra Glorioso, to wit:

Ricardo A. Fabros, Jr. for appellees. A. A parcel of land in Bo. San Ignacio, City of San Pablo, planted with 38
fruit bearing coconut trees, with an area of 1,077, sq. m. Bounded on the N.
by German Garingan; on the E. by Juan Aliagas; on the S. by Bernardino
Alina; and on the W. by Feliciana Glorioso Covered by Tax No. 12713 for
the year 1948 in the name of Silvestra Glorioso, now Tax No. 31232,
GUERRERO, J.: assessed at P170.00 in the name of defendant Geronimo Almanza;

This is an appeal certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals 1 in accordance with the B. A parcel of land, also situated in Bo. San Ignacio, City of San Pablo,
provisions of Sec. 17, paragraph (4) of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, since the only planted with fruit bearing coconut trees, with an area of 9,455 sq. m.
issue raised is the correct application of the law and jurisprudence on the matter which is purely Bounded on the N. by Paulino Gajuco; on the E. by Felisa Gavino and
a legal question. German Garigan; on the S. by Esteban Calayag; and on the W. by Laureano
Ambion, Covered by Tax No. 12714 for the year 1948 in the name of
The following findings of fact by the Court of First Instance of Laguna and San Pablo City in defendant Geronimo Almanza;
Civil Case No. SP-265, and adopted by the Court of Appeals, show that:
C. A parcel of land situated in same Bo. San Ignacio, City of San Pablo,
Simeon Bagsic was married to Sisenanda Barcenas on June 8, 1859 (Exh. planted with 376 fruit bearing coconut trees and having an area of 11,739
"D") Of this marriage there were born three children namely: Perpetua sq. m. Bounded on the N. by Jacinto Alvero, Anacleto Glorioso and
Bagsic (Exhibit G), Igmedia Bagsic (Exhibit F), and Ignacio Bagsic Bernardino Alma; on the E. by Bernardino Alma; on the S. by Rosendo
(Exhibit H). Sisenanda Barcenas died ahead of her husband Simeon Bagsic. Banaad, Jacinto Alvero and Casayan River; and on the W. by Anacleto
Glorioso Covered by Tax No. 12715 for the year 1948 in the name of
On June 3, 1885, Simeon Bagsic remarried Silvestra Glorioso (Exhibit "E"). Silvestra Glorioso, now Tax No. 31234, assessed at P2,720.00 in the name
Of this second marriage were born two children, Felipa Bagsic (Exhibit J) of defendant Geronimo Almanza;
and Maura Bagsic (Exhibit I). Simeon Bagsic died sometime in 1901.
Silvestra Glorioso also died. D. A residential lot, situated at P. Alcantara Street, Int., City of San Pablo,
with an area of 153, sq. m. Bounded on the N. by heirs of Pedro Calampiano;
Ignacio Bagsic died on April 18, 1939 (Exhibit C) leaving the plaintiff on the E. by Petronilo Cartago; on the S. by Ignacio Yerro; and on the W.
Francisca Bagsic as his only heir. Igmedia Bagsic also died on August 19, by Melecio Cabrera. Covered by Tax No. 17653 for the year 1948 in the
1944 (Exhibit B) survived by the plaintiffs Dionisio Tolentino, Maria name of Silvestra Glorioso, now Tax No. 21452, assessed at P610.00 in the
Tolentino and Petra Tolentino. name of Cristeta Almanza; and

Perpetua Bagsic died on July 1, 1945 (Exhibit A). Surviving her are her E. A parcel of coconut land, situated at Bo. Buenavista, Candelaria, Quezon,
heirs, the plaintiffs Gaudencio Bicomong, Felicidad Bicomong, Salome planted with 300 coconut trees fruit bearing. Area - 24,990 sq. m. Bounded
Bicomong, and Gervacio Bicomong. on the N. (Ilaya) by heirs of Pedro de Gala on the E. by Julian Garcia; on
the S. (Ibaba) by Julian Garcia, and on the W. by Taguan River. Covered by
Tax No. 21452, assessed at P910.00.
Of the children of the second marriage, Maura Bagsic died also on April 14,
1952 leaving no heir as her husband died ahead of her. Felipa Bagsic, the
other daughter of the second Geronimo Almanza and her daughter Cristeta
Almanza. But five (5) months before the present suit was filed or on July
23, 1959, Cristeta Almanza died leaving behind her husband, the defendant
Three sets of plaintiffs filed the complaint on December 1, 1959, namely: (a) the Bicomongs, Bagsic died on April 14, 1952, Felipa succeeded to Maura's estate. In support thereof, he cites
children of Perpetua Bagsic; (b) the Tolentinos, children of Igmedia Bagsic; and (c) Francisco Art. 1004 of the New Civil Code which provides that "should the only survivors be brothers and
Bagsic, daughter of Ignacio Bagsic, in the Court of First Instance of Laguna and San Pablo City sisters of the full blood, they shall inherit in equal shares," and he concludes with the rule that
against the defendants Geronimo Almanza and Engracio Menese for the recovery of their lawful the relatives nearest in degree excludes the more distant ones. (Art. 962, New Civil Code)
shares in the properties left by Maura Bagsic.
On the other hand, plaintiffs-appellees claim that the date of death of Felipa Bagsic was not
After the death of Maura Bagsic, the above-described properties passed on to Cristela Almanza raised as an issue in the trial court. It was even the subject of stipulation of the parties as clearly
who took charge of the administration of the same. Thereupon, the plaintiffs approached her shown in the transcript of the stenographic notes that Felipa Bagsic died on May 9. 1945. 3
and requested for the partition of their aunt's properties. However, they were prevailed upon by
Cristeta Almanza not to divide the properties yet as the expenses for the last illness and burial The Court of Appeals ruled that the facts of the case have been duly established in the trial court
of Maura Bagsic had not yet been paid. Having agreed to defer the partition of the same, the and that the only issue left for determination is a purely legal question involving the correct
plaintiffs brought out the subject again sometime in 1959 only. This time Cristeta Almanza application of the law and jurisprudence on the matter, hence the appellate court certified this
acceded to the request as the debts, accordingly, had already been paid. Unfortunately, she died case to Us.
without the division of the properties having been effected, thereby leaving the possession and
administration of the same to the defendants.
We hold that the provisions of Art. 975, 1006 and 1008 of the New Civil Code are applicable to
the admitted facts of the case at bar. These Articles provide:
After trial, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
Art. 975. When children of one or more brothers or sisters of tile deceased
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs who survive, they shall inherit from the latter by representation, if they survive
are hereby declared to be entitled to ten twenty-fourth (10/24) share on the with their uncles or aunts. But if they alone survive, they shall inherit in
five parcels of land in dispute. The defendant Engracio Manese and the heirs equal portions."
of the deceased Geronimo Almanza, who are represented in the instant case
by the administrator Florentino Cartena, are hereby required to pay the
plaintiffs from July 23, 1959 the sum of P625.00 per annum until the ten- Art. 1006. Should brothers and sisters of the full blood survive together with
twenty fourth (10/24) share on the five parcels of land are delivered to the brothers and sisters of the half blood, the former shall be entitled to a share
plaintiffs, with legal interest from the time this decision shall have become double that of the latter.
final.
Art. 1008. Children of brothers and sisters of the half blood shall succeed
With costs against the defendants. per capita or per stirpes, in accordance with the rules laid down for brothers
and sisters of the full blood.
SO ORDERED.
In the absence of defendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, Article
1003 of the New Civil Code provides that collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate
City of San Pablo, September 21, 1962. of the deceased. It appearing that Maura Bagsic died intestate without an issue, and her husband
and all her ascendants had died ahead of her, she is succeeded by the surviving collateral
7 relatives, namely the daughter of her sister of full blood and the ten (10) children of her brother
and two (2) sisters of half blood in accordance with the provision of Art. 975 of the New Civil
From the aforesaid decision of the trial court, Florentino Cartena, the substitute defendant for Code.
Geronimo Almanza, appealed to the Court of Appeals. The other defendant, Engracio Manese,
did not appeal and execution was issued with respect to the parcels of land in his possession, By virtue of said provision, the aforementioned nephews and nieces are entitled to inherit in
that is, those described under Letters D and E in the complaint. Hence, the subject matter of the their own right. In Abellana-Bacayo vs. Ferraris-Borromeo, L-19382, August 31, I965, 14
case on appeal was limited to the one-half undivided portion of only three of the five parcels of SCRA 986, this Court held that "nephews and nieces alone do not inherit by right of
land described under letters A, B and C in the complaint which defendant Cartena admitted to representation (that is per stirpes) unless concurring with brothers or sisters of the deceased."
be only in his possession. 2
Under the same provision, Art. 975, which makes no qualification as to whether the nephews or
On appeal, defendant-appellant Cartena contends that the provisions of Arts. 995, 1006 and nieces are on the maternal or paternal line and without preference as to whether their relationship
1008 of the New Civil Code, applied by the trial court in allowing plaintiffs-appellees to succeed to the deceased is by whole or half blood, the sole niece of whole blood of the deceased does
to the properties left by Maura Bagsic were not the applicable provisions. He asserts that in the not exclude the ten nephews and n of half blood. The only difference in their right of succession
course of the trial of the case in the lower court, plaintiffs requested defendants to admit that is provided in Art. 1008, NCC in relation to Article 1006 of the New Civil Code (supra), which
Felipa Bagsic, the sole sister of full blood of Maura Bagsic, died on May 9. 1955. Since Maura provisions, in effect, entitle the sole niece of full blood to a share double that of the nephews
and nieces of half blood. Such distinction between whole and half blood relationships with the
deceased has been recognized in Dionisia Padura, et al. vs. Melanie Baldovino, et al., No. L-
11960, December 27, 1958, 104 Phil. 1065 (unreported) and in Alviar vs. Alviar, No. L-22402,
June 30, 1969, 28 SCRA 610).

The contention of the appellant that Maura Bagsic should be succeeded by Felipa Bagsic, her
sister of full blood, to the exclusion of the nephews and nieces of half blood citing Art. 1004,
NCC is unmeritorious and erroneous for it is based on an erroneous factual assumption, that is,
that Felipa Bagsic died in 1955, which as indicated here before, is not true as she died on May
9, 1945, thus she predeceased her sister Maura Bagsic.

We find the judgment of the trial court to be in consonance with law and jurisprudence.

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment of the trial court is hereby affirmed. No costs.

Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Muñoz Palma, Martin and Fernandez, JJ., concur.
G.R. Nos. 89224-25 January 23, 1992 In his decision dated September 30, 1986, 4 Judge Jose S. Sañez dismissed Civil Case No. 1030,
holding that the defendants, being the legitimate heirs of Teodoro and Isabel as established by
MAURICIO SAYSON, ROSARIO SAYSON-MALONDA, BASILISA SAYSON-LIRIO, the aforementioned evidence, excluded the plaintiffs from sharing in their estate.
REMEDIOS SAYSON-REYES and JUANA C. BAUTISTA, petitioners,
vs. Both cases were appealed to the Court of Appeals, where they were consolidated. In its own
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, DELIA SAYSON, assisted by her husband, decision dated February 28, 1989, 5 the respondent court disposed as follows:
CIRILO CEDO, JR., EDMUNDO SAYSON AND DORIBEL SAYSON, respondents.
WHEREFORE, in Civil Case No. 1030 (CA-G.R. No. 11541), the appealed
decision is hereby AFFIRMED. In Civil case No. 1042 (CA-G.R. No.
12364), the appealed decision is MODIFIED in that Delia and Edmundo
CRUZ, J.: Sayson are disqualified from inheriting from the estate of the deceased
spouses Eleno and Rafaela Sayson, but is affirmed in all other respects.
At issue in this case is the status of the private respondents and their capacity to inherit from
their alleged parents and grandparents. The petitioners deny them that right, asserting if for SO ORDERED.
themselves to the exclusion of all others.
That judgment is now before us in this petition for review by certiorari. Reversal of the
The relevant genealogical facts are as follows. respondent court is sought on the ground that it disregarded the evidence of the petitioners and
misapplied the pertinent law and jurisprudence when it declared the private respondents as the
exclusive heirs of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson.
Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot five children, namely, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, Remedios
and Teodoro. Eleno died on November 10, 1952, and Rafaela on May 15, 1976. Teodoro, who
had married Isabel Bautista, died on March 23, 1972. His wife died nine years later, on March The contention of the petitioners is that Delia and Edmundo were not legally adopted because
26, 1981. Their properties were left in the possession of Delia, Edmundo, and Doribel, all Doribel had already been born on February 27, 1967, when the decree of adoption was issued
surnamed Sayson, who claim to be their children. on March 9, 1967. The birth of Doribel disqualified her parents from adopting. The pertinent
provision is Article 335 of the Civil Code, naming among those who cannot adopt "(1) Those
who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or natural children by legal
On April 25, 1983, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, and Remedios, together with Juana C. Bautista, fiction."
Isabel's mother, filed a complaint for partition and accounting of the intestate estate of Teodoro
and Isabel Sayson. It was docketed as Civil Case No. 1030 in Branch 13 of the Regional Trial
Court of Albay. The action was resisted by Delia, Edmundo and Doribel Sayson, who alleged Curiously enough, the petitioners also argue that Doribel herself is not the legitimate daughter
successional rights to the disputed estate as the decedents' lawful descendants. of Teodoro and Isabel but was in fact born to one Edita Abila, who manifested in a petition for
guardianship of the child that she was her natural mother. 6
On July 11, 1983, Delia, Edmundo and Doribel filed their own complaint, this time for the
accounting and partition of the intestate estate of Eleno and Rafaela Sayson, against the couple's The inconsistency of this position is immediately apparent. The petitioners seek to annul the
four surviving children. This was docketed as Civil Case No. 1042 in the Regional Trial Court adoption of Delia and Edmundo on the ground that Teodoro and Isabel already had a legitimate
of Albay, Branch 12. The complainants asserted the defense they raised in Civil Case No. 1030, daughter at the time but in the same breath try to demolish this argument by denying that Doribel
to wit, that Delia and Edmundo were the adopted children and Doribel was the legitimate was born to the couple.
daughter of Teodoro and Isabel. As such, they were entitled to inherit Teodoro's share in his
parents' estate by right of representation. On top of this, there is the vital question of timeliness. It is too late now to challenge the decree
of adoption, years after it became final and executory. That was way back in 1967. 7 Assuming
Both cases were decided in favor of the herein private respondents on the basis of practically the the petitioners were proper parties, what they should have done was seasonably appeal the
the same evidence. decree of adoption, pointing to the birth of Doribel that disqualified Teodoro and Isabel from
adopting Delia and Edmundo. They did not. In fact, they should have done this earlier, before
the decree of adoption was issued. They did not, although Mauricio claimed he had personal
Judge Rafael P. Santelices declared in his decision dated May 26, knowledge of such birth.
1986, 1 that Delia and Edmundo were the legally adopted children of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson
by virtue of the decree of adoption dated March 9, 1967. 2 Doribel was their legitimate daughter
as evidenced by her birth certificate dated February 27, 1967. 3 Consequently, the three children As the respondent court correctly observed:
were entitled to inherit from Eleno and Rafaela by right of representation.
When Doribel was born on February 27, 1967, or about TEN (10) days
before the issuance of the Order of Adoption, the petitioners could have
 notified the court about the fact of birth of DORIBEL and perhaps withdrew On the question of Doribel's legitimacy, we hold that the findings of the trial courts as affirmed
the petition or perhaps petitioners could have filed a petition for the by the respondent court must be sustained. Doribel's birth certificate is a formidable piece of
revocation or rescission of the adoption (although the birth of a child is not evidence. It is one of the prescribed means of recognition under Article 265 of the Civil Code
one of those provided by law for the revocation or rescission of an and Article 172 of the Family Code. It is true, as the petitioners stress, that the birth certificate
adoption). The court is of the considered opinion that the adoption of the offers only prima facie evidence 9 of filiation and may be refuted by contrary evidence.
plaintiffs DELIA and EDMUNDO SAYSON is valid, outstanding and However, such evidence is lacking in the case at bar.
binding to the present, the same not having been revoked or rescinded.
Mauricio's testimony that he was present when Doribel was born to Edita Abila was
Not having any information of Doribel's birth to Teodoro and Isabel Sayson, the trial judge understandbly suspect, coming as it did from an interested party. The affidavit of
cannot be faulted for granting the petition for adoption on the finding inter alia that the adopting Abila 10 denying her earlier statement in the petition for the guardianship of Doribel is of course
parents were not disqualified. hearsay, let alone the fact that it was never offered in evidence in the lower courts. Even without
it, however, the birth certificate must be upheld in line with Legaspi v. Court of
A no less important argument against the petitioners is that their challenge to the validity of the Appeals, 11 where we ruled that "the evidentiary nature of public documents must be sustained
adoption cannot be made collaterally, as in their action for partition, but in a direct proceeding in the absence of strong, complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity."
frontally addressing the issue.
Another reason why the petitioners' challenge must fail is the impropriety of the present
The settled rule is that a finding that the requisite jurisdictional facts exists, proceedings for that purpose. Doribel's legitimacy cannot be questioned in a complaint for
whether erroneous or not, cannot be questioned in a collateral proceeding, partition and accounting but in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party.
for a presumption arises in such cases where the validity of the judgment is
thus attacked that the necessary jurisdictional facts were proven [Freeman The presumption of legitimacy in the Civil Code . . . does not have this
on Judgments, Vol. I, Sec. 350, pp. 719-720]. (Emphasis supplied.) purely evidential character. It serves a more fundamental purpose. It
actually fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock, and that civil
In the case of Santos v. Aranzanso, 8 this Court declared: status cannot be attacked collaterally. The legitimacy of the child can be
impugned only in a direct action brought for that purpose, by the proper
parties, and within the period limited by law.
Anent this point, the rulings are summed up in 2 American Jurisprudence,
2nd Series, Adoption, Sec. 75, p. 922, thus:
The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or as a
collateral issue in another action for a different purpose. . . . 12 (Emphasis
An adoption order implies the finding of the necessary supplied.)
facts and the burden of proof is on the party attacking
it; it cannot be considered void merely because the fact
needed to show statutory compliance is obscure. While In consequence of the above observations, we hold that Doribel, as the legitimate daughter of
a judicial determination of some particular fact, such as Teodoro and Isabel Sayson, and Delia and Edmundo, as their adopted children, are the exclusive
the abandonment of his next of kin to the adoption, may heirs to the intestate estate of the deceased couple, conformably to the following Article 979 of
be essential to the exercise of jurisdiction to enter the the Civil Code:
order of adoption, this does not make it essential to the
jurisdictional validity of the decree that the fact be Art. 979. Legitimate children and their descendants succeed the parents and
determined upon proper evidence, or necessarily in other ascendants, without distinction as to sex or age, and even if they
accordance with the truth; a mere error cannot affect the should come from different marriages.
jurisdiction, and the determination must stand until
reversed on appeal, and hence cannot be collaterally An adopted child succeeds to the property of the adopting parents in the
attacked. If this were not the rule, the status of adopted same manner as a legitimate child.
children would always be uncertain, since the evidence
might not be the same at all investigations, and might
be regarded with different effect by different tribunals, The philosophy underlying this article is that a person's love descends first to his children and
and the adoption might be held by one court to have grandchildren before it ascends to his parents and thereafter spreads among his collateral
been valid, while another court would hold it to have relatives. It is also supposed that one of his purposes in acquiring properties is to leave them
been of no avail. (Emphasis supplied.) eventually to his children as a token of his love for them and as a provision for their continued
care even after he is gone from this earth.
Coming now to the right of representation, we stress first the following pertinent provisions of
the Civil Code:

Art. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of

which the representative is raised to the place and the degree of the person
represented, and acquires the rights which the latter would have if he were
living or if he could have inherited.

Art. 971. The representative is called to the succession by the law and not
by the person represented. The representative does not succeed the person
represented but the one who the person represented would have succeeded.

Art. 981. Should children of the deceased and descendants of other children
who are dead, survive, the former shall inherit in their own right, and the
latter by right of representation.

There is no question that as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and thus the granddaughter of
Eleno and Rafaela, Doribel has a right to represent her deceased father in the distribution of the
intestate estate of her grandparents. Under Article 981, quoted above, she is entitled to the share
her father would have directly inherited had he survived, which shall be equal to the shares of
her grandparents' other children. 13

But a different conclusion must be reached in the case of Delia and Edmundo, to whom the
grandparents were total strangers. While it is true that the adopted child shall be deemed to be a
legitimate child and have the same right as the latter, these rights do not include the right of
representation. The relationship created by the adoption is between only the adopting parents
and the adopted child and does not extend to the blood relatives of either party. 14

In sum, we agree with the lower courts that Delia and Edmundo as the adopted children and
Doribel as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro Sayson and Isabel Bautista, are their exclusive
heirs and are under no obligation to share the estate of their parents with the petitioners. The
Court of Appeals was correct, however, in holding that only Doribel has the right of
representation in the inheritance of her grandparents' intestate estate, the other private
respondents being only the adoptive children of the deceased Teodoro.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against the petitioners.

Narvasa, C.J., Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-22469 October 23, 1978 article 785 of the Spanish Civil Code as prohibiting perpetual entails, and Rodriguez vs. Court
of Appeals, L-28734, March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 546.)
TOMAS CORPUS, plaintiff-appellant,
vs. From that order, Pedro Martinez, Juliana de Castro , Juanita Corpus (deceased) and the estate of
ADMINISTRATOR and/or EXECUTOR of the Estate of Teodoro R. Yangco, RAFAEL Luis R. Yangco aped to this Court (L-1476). Those appeals were dismissed in tills Court's
CORPUS, AMALIA CORPUS, JOSE A. V. CORPUS, RAMON L. CORPUS, ENRIQUE resolutions of October 10 and 31, 1947 after the legatees and the appellants entered into
J. CORPUS, S. W. STAGG, SOLEDAD ASPRER and CIPRIANO compromise agreements. In the compromise dated October 7, 1947 the legatees agreed to pay
NAVARRO, defendants-appellees. P35,000 to Pedro Martinez, the heirs of Pio V. Corpus, the heirs of Isabel Corpus and the heir
of Juanita Corpus. Herein appellant Tomas Corpus signed that compromise settlement as the
sole heir of Juanita Corpus. The estate of Luis R. Yangco entered into a similar compromise a
ment A the resolution dismissing the appeal became, final and executory on October 14 and
November 4, 1947, entries of judgment were made on those dates.
AQUINO, J.:
Pursuant to the compromise agreement, Tomas Corpus Signed a receipt dated October 24, 1947
Teodoro R. Yangco died in Manila on April 20, 1939 at the age of seventy-seven years. His will wherein he acknowledge that he received from the Yangco estate the sum of two thousand pesos
dated August 29, 1934 was probated in the Court of First Instance of Manila in Special (P2,000) "as settlement in full of my share of the compromise agreement as per understanding
Proceeding No. 54863. The decree of probate was affirmed in this Court's 1941 decision with Judge Roman Cruz, our attorney in this case" (Exh. D or 17).
in Corpus vs. Yangco, 73 Phil. 527. The complete text of the will is quoted in that decision.
On September 20, 1949, the legatees executed an agreement for the settlement and physical
Yangco had no forced heirs. At the time of his death, his nearest relatives were (1) his half partition of the Yangco estate. The probate court approved that agreement and noted that the
brother, Luis R. Yangco, (2) his half sister, Paz Yangco, the wife of Miguel Ossorio (3) Amalia 1945 project of partition was pro tanto modified. That did not set at rest the controvery over the
Corpus, Jose A. V. Corpus, and Ramon L. Corpus, the children of his half brother, Pablo Corpus, Yangco's estate.
and (4) Juana (Juanita) Corpus, the daughter of his half brother Jose Corpus. Juanita died in
October, 1944 at Palauig, Zambales.
On October 5, 1951, Tomas Corpus, as the sole heir of Juanita corpus, filed an action in the
Court of First Instance of Manila to recover her supposed share in Yangco intestate estate. He
Teodoro R. Yangco was the son of Luis Rafael Yangco and Ramona Arguelles, the widow of alleged in his complaint that the dispositions in his Yangcos will sing perpetual prohibitions
Tomas Corpus. Before her union with Luis Rafael Yangco, Ramona had begotten five children upon alienation rendered it void under article 785 of the old Civil Code and that the 1949
with Tomas Corpus, two of whom were the aforenamed Pablo Corpus and Jose Corpus. partition is invalid and, therefore, the decedent's estate should be distributed according to the
rules on intestacy.
Pursuant to the order of the probate court, a project of partition dated November 26, 1945 was
submitted by the administrator and the legatees named in the will. That project of partition was The trial court in its decision of July 2, 1956 dismissed the action on the grounds of res judicata
opposed by the estate of Luis R. Yangco whose counsel contended that an intestacy should be and laches. It held that the intrinsic validity of Yangco's will was passed upon in its order dated
declared Because the will does not contain an institution of heir. It was also opposed by Atty. December 26, 1946 in Special Proceeding No. 54863 approving the project of partition for the
Roman A. Cruz, who represented Juanita Corpus, Pedro Martinez and Juliana de Castro. Juanita testator's estate.
Corpus was already dead when Atty. Cruz appeared as her counsel.
Tomas Corpus appealed to the Court of Appeals which in its resolution dated January 23, 1964
Atty. Cruz alleged in his opposition that the proposed partion was not in conformity with the in CA-G. R. No. 18720-R certified the appeal to this Court because it involves real property
will because the testator intended that the estate. should be "conserved" and not physically valued at more than fifty thousand pesos (Sec. 17151 Judiciary Law before it was amended by
partitioned. Atty. Cruz prayed "que declare que el finado no dispuso en su testamento de sus Republic Act No. 2613).
bienes y negocios y que ha lugar a sucession intestado con respecio a los raismos y que same
un dia en esta causa para la recepcion de pruebas previa a la declaracion de quienes son los
herederos legales o abintestato del difunto." Appellant Corpus contends in this appeal that the trial court erred in holding (1) that Teodoro
R. Yangco was a natural child, (2) that his will had been duly legalized and (3) that plaintiff's
action is barred by res judicata and laches.
The Probate court in its order of December 26, 1946 approved the project of partition. It held
that in certain clauses of the will the testator intended to conserve his properties not in the sense
of disposing of them after his death but for the purpose of Preventing that "tales bienes fuesen In the disposition of this appeal it is not necessary to resolve whether Yangco's will had been
malgastados o desfilpar radios por los legatarios" and that if the testator intended a Perpetual duly legalized and whether the action of Tomas Corpus is barred by res judicata and laches. The
prohibition against alienation, that conch tion would be regarded "como no puesta o no appeal may be resolved by de whether Juanita Corpus, the mother of apt Tomas Corpus was a
existents". it concluded that "no hay motives legales o morales para que la sucession de Don legal heir of Yangco. Has Tomas Corpus a cause of action to recover his mother's supposed
Teodoro R. Yangco sea declarada intestada (See Barretto vs. Tuason, 50 Phil. 888, which cites intestate share in Yangco's estate?
To answer that question, it is necessary to ascertain Yangco's filiation The trial court found that Appellant Corpus concedes that if 'Teodoro R. Yangco was a natural child, he (Tomas Corpus)
Yangco "a su muerte tambien le sbrevivieron Luis y Paz appellidados Yangco, hermanos would have no legal personality to intervene in the distribution of Yangco's estate (p. 8,
naturales reconocidos por su padre natural Luis R. Yangco". The basis of the trial court's appellant's brief).
conclusion that Teodoro R. Yangco was an acknowledged natural child and not a legitimate
child was the statement in the will of his father, Luis Rafael Yangco, dated June 14, 1907, that The rule in article 943 is now found in article 992 of the Civil Code which provides that "an
Teodoro and his three other children were his acknowledged natural children. His exact words illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives
are: of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the
illegitimate child".
Primera. Declaro que tengo cuatro hijos naturales reconocidos,
Hamados Teodoro, Paz, Luisa y Luis, los cuales son mis unicos herederos That rule is based on the theory that the illegitimate child is disgracefully looked upon by the
forzosos (Exh. 1 in Testate Estate of Teodoro Yangco). legitimate family while the legitimate family is, in turn, hated by the illegitimate child.

That will was attested by Rafael del Pan Francisco Ortigas, Manuel Camus and Florencio The law does not recognize the blood tie and seeks to avod further grounds of resentment (7
Gonzales Diez Manresa, Codigo Civil, 7th Ed., pp. 185- 6).

Appellant Corpus assails the probative value of the will of Luis R. Yangco, Identified as Exhibit Under articles 944 and 945 of the Spanish Civil Code, "if an acknowledged natural or
1 herein, which he says is a mere copy of Exhibit 20, as found in the record on appeal in Special legitimated child should die without issue, either legitimate or acknowledged, the father or
Proceeding No. 54863. He contends that it should not prevail over the presumption of legitimacy mother who acknowledged such child shall succeed to its entire estate; and if both
found in section 69, Rule 123 of the old Rules of Court and over the statement of Samuel W. acknowledged it and are alive, they shall inherit from it share and share alike. In default of
Stagg in his biography of Teodoro R. Yangco, that Luis Rafael Yangco made a second marital natural ascendants, natural and legitimated children shall be succeeded by their natural brothers
venture with Victoria Obin implying that he had a first marital venture with Ramona Arguelles, and sisters in accordance with the rules established for legitimate brothers and sisters." Hence,
the mother of Teodoro. Teodoro R. Yangco's half brothers on the Corpus side, who were legitimate, had no right to
succeed to his estate under the rules of intestacy.
These contentions have no merit. The authenticity of the will of Luis Rafael Yangco, as
reproduced in Exhibit I herein and as copied from Exhibit 20 in the proceeding for the probate Following the rule in article 992, formerly article 943, it was held that the legitimate relatives
of Teodoro R. Yangco's wilt in incontestable. The said will is part of a public or official judicial of the mother cannot succeed her illegitimate child (Cacho vs. Udan L- 19996, April 30, 1965,
record. 13 SCRA 693. See De Guzman vs. Sevilla, 47 Phil. 991).

On the other hand, the children of Ramona Arguelles and Tomas Corpus are presumed to be Where the testatrix, Rosario Table was the legitimate daughter of Jose Table the two
legitimate. A marriage is presumed to have taken place between Ramona and Tomas. Semper acknowledged natural children of her uncle, Ramon Table her father's brother, were held not to
praesumitur pro matrimonio. It is disputably presumption "That a man and a woman deporting be her legal heirs (Grey vs. Table 88 Phil. 128).
themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage"; "that a child
born in lawful wedlock, there being no divorce, absolute or from bed and board, is legitimate",
and "that things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary By reason of that same rule, the natural child cannot represent his natural father in the succession
habits of life" (Sec. 5[z], [bb] and cc Rule 131, Rules of Court). to the estate of the legitimate grandparent (Llorente vs. Rodriguez, 10 Phil. 585; Centeno vs.
Centeno, 52 Phil. 322; Allarde vs. Abaya, 57 Phil. 909).
Since Teodoro R. Yangco was an acknowledged natural child or was illegitimate and since
Juanita Corpus was the legitimate child of Jose Corpus, himself a legitimate child, we hold that The natural daughter cannot succeed to the estate of her deceased uncle, a legitimate brother of
appellant Tomas Corpus has no cause of action for the recovery of the supposed hereditary share her natural mother (Anuran vs. Aquino and Ortiz, 38 Phil. 29).
of his mother, Juanita Corpus, as a legal heir, in Yangco's estate. Juanita Corpus was not a legal
heir of Yangco because there is no reciprocal succession between legitimate and illegitimate WHEREFORE the lower court's judgment is affirmed. No costs.
relatives. The trial court did not err in dismissing the complaint of Tomas Corpus.
SO ORDERED.
Article 943 of the old Civil code provides that "el hijo natural y el legitimado no tienen derecho
a suceder abintestato a los hijos y parientes legitimos del padre o madre que to haya reconocido,
ni ellos al hijo natural ni al legitimado". Article 943 "prohibits all successory reciprocity mortis
causa between legitimate and illegitimate relatives" 16 Sanchez Roman, Civil Code, pp. 996-
997 cited in Director of Lands vs. Aguas, 63 Phil. 279, 287. See 16 Scaevola Codigo Civil, 4th
Ed., 455-6). ...
OLIVIA S. PASCUAL and HERMES S. PASCUAL, Petitioners, v. ESPERANZA C. subject to the limitation prescribed by Article 992 to the end that an illegitimate child has no
PASCUAL-BAUTISTA, MANUEL C. PASCUAL, JOSE C. PASCUAL, SUSANA C. right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother."
PASCUAL-BAUTISTA, ERLINDA C. PASCUAL, WENCESLAO C. PASCUAL, JR., (Amicus Curiae’s Opinion by former Justice Minister Ricardo C. Puno, p. 12). Diaz v.
INTESTATE ESTATE OF ELEUTERIO T. PASCUAL, AVELINO PASCUAL, Intermediate Appellate Court, 182 SCRA 427; pp. 431-432; [1990]).
ISOCELES PASCUAL, LEIDA PASCUAL-MARTINES, VIRGINIA PASCUAL-NER,
NONA PASCUAL-FERNANDO, OCTAVIO PASCUAL-FERNANDO, OCTAVIO 3. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; WHEN THE WORDS AND PHRASES OF THE
PASCUAL, GERANAIA PASCUAL-DUBERT, and THE HONORABLE PRESIDING STATUTE ARE CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL; RULE. — Verily, the interpretation of the
JUDGE MANUEL S. PADOLINA of Br. 162, RTC, Pasig, Metro Manila, Respondents. law desired by the petitioner may be more humane but it is also an elementary rule in statutory
construction that when the words and phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their
Joaquin P. Yuseco and Reynarte D. Hipolito, for Petitioners. meaning must be determined from the language employed and the statute must be taken to mean
exactly what it says. (Baranda v. Gustilo, 165 SCRA 758-759 [1988]). The courts may not
Cortes & Reyna Law Firm for Private Respondents. speculate as to the probable intent of the legislature apart from the words (Aparri v. CA, 127
SCRA 233 [1984]). When the law is clear, it is not susceptible of interpretation. It must be
applied regardless of who may be affected, even if the law may be harsh or onerous.
SYLLABUS (Nepumoceno, Et. Al. v. FC, 110 Phil. 42). And even granting that exceptions may be conceded,
the same as a general rule, should be strictly but reasonably construed; they extend only so far
as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general
1. CIVIL LAW; SUCCESSION; ORDER OF INTESTATE SUCCESSION; ILLEGITIMATE provisions rather than the exception. Thus, where a general rule is established by statute, the
CHILDREN; NO RIGHT TO INHERIT AB INTESTATO FROM LEGITIMATE CHILDREN court will not curtail the former nor add to the latter by implication (Samson v. C.A. 145 SCRA
AND RELATIVES OF THEIR PARENTS; DIAZ V. IAC (150 SCRA 645) CITED. — The 654 [1986]).
issue in the case at bar, had already been laid to rest in Diaz v. IAC, (150 SCRA 645) where this
Court ruled that: "Article 992 of the Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it
prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate DECISION
children and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a natural
tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purposes of Article 992. Between the
legitimate family and illegitimate family there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and PARAS, J.:
incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate
family; the family is in turn hated by the illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged
condition of the former, and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, This is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to reverse and set aside: (a) the decision
sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish of the Court of Appeals 1 dated April 29, 1988 in CA-G.R. SP. No. 14010 entitled "Olivia S.
broken in life the law does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of Pascual and Hermes S. Pascual v. Esperanza C. Pascual-Bautista, Manuel C. Pascual, Jose
resentment."cralaw virtua1aw library Pascual, Susana C. Pascual-Bautista, Erlinda C. Pascual, Wenceslao C. Pascual, Jr., Et. Al.",
which dismissed the petition and in effect affirmed the decision of the trial court and (b) the
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NO RIGHT TO REPRESENT THEIR PARENTS IN THE resolution dated July 14, 1988 denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.chanrobles
INHERITANCE OF A LEGITIMATE PARENT. — "Article 902, 98, and 990 clearly speaks virtual lawlibrary
of successional rights of illegitimate children, which rights are transmitted to their descendants
upon their death. The descendants (of these illegitimate children) who may inherit by virtue of The undisputed facts of the case are as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
the right of representation may be legitimate or illegitimate. In whatever manner, one should
not overlook the fact that the persons to be represented are themselves illegitimate. The three Petitioners Olivia and Hermes both surnamed Pascual are the acknowledged natural children of
named provisions are very clear on this matter. The right of representation is not available to the late Eligio Pascual, the latter being the full blood brother of the decedent Don Andres Pascual
illegitimate descendants of legitimate children in the inheritance of a legitimate grandparent. It (Rollo, petition, p. 17).
may be argued as done by petitioners, that the illegitimate descendant of a legitimate child is
entitled to represent by virtue of the provisions of Article 982, which provides that ‘the Don Andres Pascual died intestate on October 12, 1973 without any issue, legitimate,
grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of representation.’ Such a conclusion acknowledged natural, adopted or spurious children and was survived by the
is erroneous. It would allow intestate succession by an illegitimate child to the legitimate parent following:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
of his father or mother, a situation which would set at naught the provisions of Article 992.
Article 982 is inapplicable to the instant case because Article 982 prohibits absolutely a (a) Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, surviving spouse:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives
of the father or mother. It May not be amiss to state Article 982 is the general rule and Article (b) Children of Wenceslao Pascual, Sr., a brother of the full blood of the deceased, to
992 the exception. "The rules laid down in Article 982 that ‘grandchildren and other descendants wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
shall inherit by right of representation’ and in Article 902 that the rights of illegitimate children
. . . are transmitted upon their death to their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate are Esperanza C. Pascual-Bautista
 Silvestre M. Pascual
Manuel C. Pascual
Eleuterio M. Pascual
Jose C. Pascual
(Rollo, pp. 46-47)
Susana C. Pascual-Bautista
Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, the surviving spouse of the late Don Andres Pascual, filed with the
Erlinda C. Pascual Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 162 (CFI of Rizal, Br. XXIII), a Special Proceeding, Case
No. 7554, for administration of the intestate estate of her late husband (Rollo, p. 47).
Wenceslao C. Pascual, Jr.
On December 18, 1973, Adela Soldevilla de Pascual filed a Supplemental Petition to the Petition
(c) Children of Pedro Pascual, brother of the half blood of the deceased, to wit:chanrob1es for Letters of Administration, where she expressly stated that Olivia Pascual and Hermes
virtual 1aw library Pascual, are among the heirs of Don Andres Pascual (Rollo, pp. 99-101).

Avelino Pascual On February 27, 1974, again Adela Soldevilla de Pascual executed an affidavit, to the effect that
of her own knowledge, Eligio Pascual is the younger full blood brother of her late husband Don
Isoceles Pascual Andres Pascual, to belie the statement made by the oppositors, that they are not among the
known heirs of the deceased Don Andres Pascual (Rollo, p. 102).
Loida Pascual-Martinez
On October 16, 1985, all the above-mentioned heirs entered into a COMPROMISE
Virginia Pascual-Ner AGREEMENT, over the vehement objections of the herein petitioners Olivia S. Pascual and
Hermes S. Pascual, although Paragraph V of such compromise agreement provides, to
Nona Pascual-Fernando wit:chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

Octavio Pascual "This Compromise Agreement shall be without prejudice to the continuation of the above-
entitled proceedings until the final determination thereof by the court, or by another compromise
Geranaia Pascual-Dubert; agreement, as regards the claims of Olivia Pascual and Hermes Pascual as legal heirs of the
deceased, Don Andres Pascual." (Rollo, p. 108).
(d) Acknowledged natural children of Eligio Pascual, brother of the full blood of the deceased,
to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library The said Compromise Agreement had been entered into despite the Manifestation/Motion of the
petitioners Olivia Pascual and Hermes Pascual, manifesting their hereditary rights in the
Olivia S. Pascual intestate estate of Don Andres Pascual, their uncle (Rollo, pp. 111-112).

Hermes S. Pascual On September 30, 1987, petitioners filed their Motion to Reiterate Hereditary Rights (Rollo, pp.
113114) and the Memorandum in Support of Motion to reiterate Hereditary Rights (Rollo, pp.
(e) Intestate of Eleuterio T. Pascual, a brother of the half blood of the deceased and represented 116-130).
by the following:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
On December 18, 1987, the Regional Trial Court, presided over by Judge Manuel S. Padolina
Dominga M. Pascual issued an order, the dispositive portion of which reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

Mamerta P. Fugoso "WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court resolves as it is hereby resolved to Deny this
motion reiterating the hereditary rights of Olivia and Hermes Pascual" (Rollo, p. 136).
Abraham S. Sarmiento, III
On January 13, 1988, petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration (Rollo, pp. 515-526), and
Regina Sarmiento-Macaibay such motion was denied.

Eleuterio P. Sarmiento Petitioners appealed their case to the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. No. 14010 (Rollo,
p. 15).
Dominga P. San Diego
On April 29, 1988, the respondent Court of Appeals rendered its decision the dispositive part of
Nelia P. Marquez which reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Costs against the petitioners. petitioners herein cannot represent their father Eligio Pascual in the succession of the latter to
the intestate estate of the decedent Andres Pascual, full blood brother of their father.
"SO ORDERED." (Rollo, p. 38)
In their memorandum, petitioners insisted that Article 992 in the light of Articles 902 and 989
Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration of said decision and on July 14, 1988, the Court of the Civil Code allows them (Olivia and Hermes) to represent Eligio Pascual in the intestate
of Appeals issued its resolution denying the motion for reconsideration (Rollo, p. 42). estate of Don Andres Pascual.

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. On motion for reconsideration of the decision in Diaz v. IAC, this Court further elucidated the
successional rights of illegitimate children, which squarely answers the questions raised by the
After all the requirements had been filed, the case was given due course. petitioner on this point.

The main issue to be resolved in the case at bar is whether or not Article 992 of the Civil Code The Court held:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
of the Philippines, can be interpreted to exclude recognized natural children from the inheritance
of the deceased. "Article 902, 98, and 990 clearly speaks of successional rights of illegitimate children, which
rights are transmitted to their descendants upon their death. The descendants (of these
Petitioners contend that they do not fall squarely within the purview of Article 992 and of the illegitimate children) who may inherit by virtue of the right of representation may be legitimate
doctrine laid down in Diaz v. IAC (150 SCRA 645 [1987]) because being acknowledged natural or illegitimate. In whatever manner, one should not overlook the fact that the persons to be
children, their illegitimacy is not due to the subsistence of a prior marriage when such children represented are themselves illegitimate. The three named provisions are very clear on this
were under conception (Rollo, p. 418). matter. The right of representation is not available to illegitimate descendants of legitimate
children in the inheritance of a legitimate grandparent. It may be argued as done by petitioners,
Otherwise stated they say the term "illegitimate" children as provided in Article 992 must be that the illegitimate descendant of a legitimate child is entitled to represent by virtue of the
strictly construed to refer only to spurious children (Rollo, p. 419). provisions of Article 982, which provides that `the grandchildren and other descendants shall
inherit by right of representation.’ Such a conclusion is erroneous. It would allow intestate
On the other hand, private respondents maintain that herein petitioners are within the prohibition succession by an illegitimate child to the legitimate parent of his father or mother, a situation
of Article 992 of the Civil Code and the doctrine laid down in Diaz v. IAC is applicable to them. which would set at naught the provisions of Article 992. Article 982 is inapplicable to the instant
case because Article 982 prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate
The petition is devoid of merit. child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother. It May not be amiss to
state Article 982 is the general rule and Article 992 the exception.
Pertinent thereto, Article 992 of the Civil Code, provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The rules laid down in Article 982 that `grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by
"An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and right of representation’ and in Article 902 that the rights of illegitimate children . . . are
relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner transmitted upon their death to their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate are subject
from the illegitimate child."cralaw virtua1aw library to the limitation prescribed by Article 992 to the end that an illegitimate child has no right to
inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother." (Amicus
The issue in the case at bar, had already been laid to rest in Diaz v. IAC, supra, where this Court Curiae’s Opinion by former Justice Minister Ricardo C. Puno, p. 12). Diaz v. Intermediate
ruled that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph Appellate Court, 182 SCRA 427; pp. 431-432; [1990]).

"Article 992 of the Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a Verily, the interpretation of the law desired by the petitioner may be more humane but it is also
succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives an elementary rule in statutory construction that when the words and phrases of the statute are
of the father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the language employed and the
not recognized by law for the purposes of Article 992. Between the legitimate family and statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says. (Baranda v. Gustilo, 165 SCRA 758-759
illegitimate family there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The [1988]). The courts may not speculate as to the probable intent of the legislature apart from the
illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; the family is in words (Aparri v. CA, 127 SCRA 233 [1984]). When the law is clear, it is not susceptible of
turn hated by the illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the former, interpretation. It must be applied regardless of who may be affected, even if the law may be
and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate harsh or onerous. (Nepumoceno, Et. Al. v. FC, 110 Phil. 42). And even granting that exceptions
child nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life the law does may be conceded, the same as a general rule, should be strictly but reasonably construed; they
no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of resentment."cralaw virtua1aw extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor
library of the general provisions rather than the exception. Thus, where a general rule is established by
statute, the court will not curtail the former nor add to the latter by implication (Samson v. C.A.
Eligio Pascual is a legitimate child but petitioners are his illegitimate children. 145 SCRA 654 [1986]).chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad

Applying the above doctrine to the case at bar, respondent IAC did not err in holding that Clearly the term "illegitimate" refers to both natural and spurious.
Finally under Article 176 of the Family Code, all illegitimate children are generally placed under
one category, which undoubtedly settles the issue as to whether or not acknowledged natural
children should be treated differently, in the negative.

It may be said that the law may be harsh but that is the law (DURA LEX SED LEX).

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the assailed
decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated April 29, 1988 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION (h) Dismissing defendants' counterclaim. 1

G.R. No. L-51263 February 28, 1983 From the record, it appears that Francisca Reyes who died intestate on July 12, 1942 was
survived by two (2) daughters, Maria and Silvestra Cailles and a grandson, Sotero Leonardo,
CRESENCIANO LEONARDO, petitioner, the son of her daughter, Pascuala Cailles who predeceased her. Sotero Leonardo died in 1944,
vs. while Silvestra Cailles died in 1949 without any issue.
COURT OF APPEALS, MARIA CAILLES, JAMES BRACEWELL and RURAL BANK
OF PARAÑAQUE, INC., respondents. On October 29, 1964, petitioner Cresenciano Leonardo, claiming to be the son of the late Sotero
Leonardo, filed a complaint for ownership of properties, sum of money and accounting in the
Porfirio C. David for petitioner. Court of First Instance of Rizal seeking judgment (1) to be declared one of the lawful heirs of
the deceased Francisca Reyes, entitled to one-half share in the estate of said deceased jointly
with defendant, private respondent herein, Maria Cailles, (2) to have the properties left by said
Marquez & Marquez for private respondent. Francisca Reyes, described in the complaint, partitioned between him and defendant Maria
Cailles, and (3) to have an accounting of all the income derived from said properties from the
time defendants took possession thereof until said accounting shall have been made, delivering
to him his share therein with legal interest.
DE CASTRO, J.:
Answering the complaint, private respondent Maria Cailles asserted exclusive ownership over
Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 43476- the subject properties and alleged that petitioner is an illegitimate child who cannot succeed by
R, promulgated on February 21, 1979, reversing the judgment of the Court of First Instance of right of representation. For his part, the other defendant, private respondent James Bracewell,
Rizal in favor of petitioner: claimed that said properties are now his by virtue of a valid and legal deed of sale which Maria
Cailles had subsequently executed in his favor. These properties were allegedly mortgaged to
respondent Rural Bank of Paranaque, Inc. sometime in September 1963.
(a) Declaring plaintiff Cresenciano Leonardo as the great grandson and heir
of deceased FRANCISCA REYES, entitled to one-half share in the estate
of said deceased, jointly with defendant Maria Cailles; After hearing on the merits, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner, the
dispositive portion of which was earlier quoted, finding the evidence of the private respondent
insufficient to prove ownership of the properties in suit.
(b) Declaring the properties, subject of this complaint, to be the properties
of the deceased FRANCISCA REYES and not of defendants Maria Cailles
and James Bracewen From said judgment, private respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals which, as already
stated, reversed the decision of the trial court, thereby dismissing petitioner's complaint,
reconsideration having been denied by the appellate court, this petition for review was filed of
(c) Declaring null and void any sale of these properties by defendant Maria the following assignment of errors:
Cailles in so far as the share of Cresenciano Leonardo are affected;
I
(d) Ordering the partition within 30 days from the finality of this decision,
of the properties subject of this litigation, between defendant Maria Cailles
and plaintiff Cresenciano Leonardo, share and share alike; RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PROPERTIES IN
QUESTION ARE THE EXCLUSIVE PROPERTIES OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS.
(e) Ordering defendants Maria Cailles and James Bracewell, within 30 days
from the finality of this decision, to render an accounting of the fruits of the
properties, and 30 days thereafter to pay to plaintiff Cresenciano Leonardo II
his one-half share thereof with interest of 6% per annum;
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER
(f) Ordering defendants Maria Cailles and James to pay jointly and severally HAS NOT ESTABLISHED HIS FILIATION.
plaintiff Cresenciano Leonardo the amount of P2,000.00 as attorney's fees;
III
(g) Ordering defendants to pay the costs; and
 RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER, properties which they bought in 1908 and 1917, are the same as the
AS THE GREAT GRANDSON OF FRANCISCA REYES, HAS NO properties sought by the plaintiff.
LEGAL RIGHT TO INHERIT BY REPRESENTATION.
Carefully going over the evidence, We believe that the trial judge
To begin with, the Court of Appeals found the subject properties to be the exclusive properties misinterpreted the evidence as to the identification of the lands in question.
of the private respondents.
To begin with, the deed of sale (Exh. '60') of 1908 clearly states that the
There being two properties in this case both will be discussed separately, as land sold to Maria Cailles is en la cane Desposorio in Las Pinas Rizal which
each has its own distinct factual setting. The first was bought in 1908 by was bounded by adjoining lands owned by persons living at the time,
Maria Cailles under a deed of sale (Exh. '60'), which describes it as follows: including the railroad track of the Manila Railroad Co. ('la via ferrea del
Railroad Co.')
. . . radicada en la calle Desposorio de este dicho
Municipio dentro de los limites y linderos siquientes: With the exception of the area which was not disclosed in the deed, the
Por la derecha a la entrada el solar de Teodorico Reyes description fits the land now being sought by the plaintiff, as this property
por la izquierda el solar de Maria Calesa (Cailles) arriba is also located in Desposorio St. and is bounded by the M.R.R. Co.
citada por la espalda la via ferrea del Railroad Co., y
la frente la dicha calle Desposorio With these natural boundaries, there is indeed an assurance that the property
described in the deed and in the tax declaration is one and the same property.
After declaring it in her name, Maria Cailles paid the realty taxes starting
from 1918 up to 1948. Thereafter as she and her son Narciso Bracewell, left The change of owners of the adjoining lands is immaterial since several
for Nueva Ecija, Francisca Reyes managed the property and paid the realty decades have already passed between the deed and the declaration and
tax of the land. However, for unexplained reasons, she paid and declared 'during that period, many changes of abode would likely have occurred.
the same in her own name. Because of this, plaintiff decided to run after this
property, erroneously thinking that as the great grandson of Francisca
Reyes, he had some proprietary right over the same. Besides, it is a fact that defendants have only one property in Desposorio
St. and they have paid the realty taxes of this property from May 29, 1914
up to May 28, 1948. Hence, there is no reason to doubt that this property is
The second parcel on the other hand, was purchased by Maria Cailles in the same, if not Identical to the property in Desposorio St. which is now
1917 under a deed of sale (Exh. '3') which describes the property as follows: being sought after by the plaintiff.

. . . una parcela de terreno destinado al beneficio de la With respect to the other parcel which Maria Cailles bought from
sal, que linda por Norte con la linea Ferrea y Salinar de Tranquilino Mateo in 1917, it is true that there is no similar boundaries to
Narciso Mayuga, por Este con los de Narciso Mayuga be relied upon. It is however undeniable that after declaring it in her name,
y Domingo Lozada, por Sur con los de Domingo Maria Cailles began paying the realty taxes thereon on July 24, 1917 until
Lozada y Fruto Silverio y por Oeste con el de Fruto 1948. (Reference to Exhibits omitted.)2
Silverio y Linea Ferrea de una extension superficial de
1229.00 metros cuadrados.
Petitioner takes issue with the appellate court on the above findings of fact, forgetting that since
the present petition is one for review on certiorari, only questions of law may be raised. It is a
After declaring it in her name, Maria Cailles likewise paid the realty tax in well-established rule laid down by this Court in numerous cases that findings of facts by the
1917 and continued paying the same up to 1948. Thereafter when she and Court of Appeals are, generally, final and conclusive upon this Court. The exceptions are: (1)
her son, Narciso Bracewell, established their residence in Nueva Ecija, when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation; (2) when the inference made
Francisco Reyes administered the property and like in the first case, is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4)
declared in 1949 the property in her own name. Thinking that the property when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; and (5) when the Court of Appeals,
is the property of Francisca Reyes, plaintiff filed the instant complaint, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same are contrary to the
claiming a portion thereof as the same allegedly represents the share of his submission of both appellant and appellee. 3 None of the above exceptions, however, exists in
father, the case at bar, hence, there is no reason to disturb the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals.

As earlier stated, the court a quo decided the case in favor of the plaintiff Anent the second assignment of error, the Court of Appeals made the following findings:
principally because defendants' evidence do not sufficiently show that the 2
 Going to the issue of filiation, plaintiff claims that he is the son of Sotero
Leonardo, the son of one of the daughters (Pascuala) of Francisca Reyes.
He further alleges that since Pascuala predeceased Francisca Reyes, and that
his father, Sotero, who subsequently died in 1944, survived Francisca
Reyes, plaintiff can consequently succeed to the estate of Francisca Reyes
by right of representation.

In support of his claim, plaintiff submitted in evidence his alleged birth

certificate showing that his father is Sotero Leonardo, married to Socorro
Timbol, his alleged mother.

Since his supposed right will either rise or fall on the proper evaluation of
this vital evidence, We have minutely scrutinized the same, looking for that
vital link connecting him to the family tree of the deceased Francisca Reyes.
However, this piece of evidence does not in any way lend credence to his
tale.

This is because the name of the child described in the birth certificate is not
that of the plaintiff but a certain 'Alfredo Leonardo' who was born on
September 13, 1938 to Sotero Leonardo and Socorro Timbol. Other than his
bare allegation, plaintiff did not submit any durable evidence showing that
the 'Alfredo Leonardo' mentioned in the birth certificate is no other than he
himself. Thus, even without taking time and space to go into further details,
We may safely conclude that plaintiff failed to prove his filiation which is
a fundamental requisite in this action where he is claiming to be an heir in
the inheritance in question. 4

That is likewise a factual finding which may not be disturbed in this petition for review in the
absence of a clear showing that said finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or that
there was a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the court making the finding of fact.

Referring to the third assignment of error, even if it is true that petitioner is the child of Sotero
Leonardo, still he cannot, by right of representation, claim a share of the estate left by the
deceased Francisca Reyes considering that, as found again by the Court of Appeals, he was born
outside wedlock as shown by the fact that when he was born on September 13, 1938, his alleged
putative father and mother were not yet married, and what is more, his alleged father's first
marriage was still subsisting. At most, petitioner would be an illegitimate child who has no right
to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father, like the deceased
Francisca Reyes. (Article 992, Civil Code of the Philippines.)

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals sought to be reviewed in this petition is
hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. L-66574. June 17, 1987.]
Felisa Jardin upon her Motion to Intervene in Sp. Proceedings Nos. B-4 and B-5, was allowed
ANSELMA DIAZ, guardian of VICTOR, RODRIGO, ANSELMINA and MIGUEL, all to intervene in the intestate estates of Pablo Santero and Pascual Santero by Order of the Court
surnamed SANTERO, Petitioners, and FELIXBERTA PACURSA, guardian of dated August 24, 1977.
FEDERICO SANTERO, Et Al., v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and
FELISA PAMUTI JARDIN, Respondents. Petitioner Anselma Diaz, as guardian of her minor children, filed her "Opposition and Motion
to Exclude Felisa Pamuti-Jardin dated March 13, 1980, from further taking part or intervening
Ambrosio Padilla, Mempin & Reyes Law Offices, for Petitioners. in the settlement of the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, as well as in the
intestate estate of Pascual Santero and Pablo Santero.
Pedro S. Sarino for respondent F.P. Jardin.
Felixberta Pacursa guardian for her minor children, filed thru counsel, her Manifestation of
March 14, 1980 adopting the Opposition and Motion to Exclude Felisa Pamuti, filed by Anselma
DECISION Diaz.

On May 20, 1980, Judge Ildefonso M. Bleza issued an order excluding Felisa Jardin "from
PARAS, J.: further taking part or intervening in the settlement of the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda.
de Santero, as well as in the intestate estates of Pascual Santero and Pablo Santero and declared
her to be, not an heir of the deceased Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero." 3
Private respondent filed a Petition dated January 23, 1976 with the Court of First Instance of
Cavite in Sp. Proc. Case No. B-21, "In The Matter of the Intestate Estate of the late Simona After her Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the trial court in its order dated November
Pamuti Vda. de Santero," praying among other things, that the corresponding letters of 1, 1980, Felisa P. Jardin filed her appeal to the Intermediate Appellate Court in CA-G.R. No.
Administration be issued in her favor and that she be appointed as special administratrix of the 69814-R. A decision 4 was rendered by the Intermediate Appellate Court on December 14, 1983
properties of the deceased Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero. (reversing the decision of the trial court) the dispositive portion of which reads —

It is undisputed: 1) that Felisa Pamuti Jardin is a niece of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero who "WHEREFORE, finding the Order appealed from not consistent with the facts and law
together with Felisa’s mother Juliana were the only legitimate children of the spouses Felipe applicable, the same is hereby set aside and another one entered sustaining the Orders of
Pamuti and Petronila Asuncion; 2) that Juliana married Simon Jardin and out of their union were December 1 and 9, 1976 declaring the petitioner as the sole heir of Simona Pamuti Vda. de
born Felisa Pamuti and another child who died during infancy; 3) that Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero and ordering oppositors-appellees not to interfere in the proceeding for the declaration
Santero is the widow of Pascual Santero and the mother of Pablo Santero; 4) that Pablo Santero of heirship in the estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero."cralaw virtua1aw library
was the only legitimate son of his parents Pascual Santero and Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero;
5) that Pascual Santero died in 1970; Pablo Santero in 1973 and Simona Santero in 1976; 6) that "Costs against the oppositors-appellees."cralaw virtua1aw library
Pablo Santero, at the time of his death was survived by his mother Simona Santero and his six
minor natural children to wit: four minor children with Anselma Diaz and two minor children The Motion for Reconsideration filed by oppositors-appellees (petitioners herein) was denied
with Felixberta Pacursa. by the same respondent court in its order dated February 17, 1984 hence, the present petition for
Review with the following:cralawnad
Judge Jose Raval in his Orders dated December 1, 1976 1 and December 9, 1976 2 declared
Felisa Pamuti Jardin as the sole legitimate heir of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.chanrobles ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
law library
I. The Decision erred in ignoring the right to intestate succession of petitioners grandchildren
Before the trial court, there were 4 interrelated cases filed to wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph Santero as direct descending line (Art. 978) and/or natural/ "illegitimate children" (Art. 988)
and prefering a niece, who is a collateral relative (Art. 1003);
"a) Sp. Proc. No. B-4 — is the Petition for the Letters of Administration of the Intestate Estate
of Pablo Santero; II. The Decision erred in denying the right of representation of the natural grandchildren Santero
to represent their father Pablo Santero in the succession to the intestate estate of their
"b) Sp. Proc. No. B-5 — is the Petition for the Letters of Administration of the Intestate Estate grandmother Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero (Art. 982);
of Pascual Santero;
III. The Decision erred in mistaking the intestate estate of the grandmother Simona Pamuti Vda.
"c) Sp. Proc. No. B-7 — is the Petition for Guardianship over the properties of an Incompetent de Santero as the estate of "legitimate child or relative" of Pablo Santero, her son and father of
Person, Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero; the petitioners’ grandchildren Santero;

"e) Sp. Proc. No. B-21 — is the Petition for Settlement of the Intestate Estate of Simona Pamuti IV. The Decision erred in ruling that petitioner-appellant Felisa P. Jardin who is a niece and
Vda. de Santero."cralaw virtua1aw library therefore a collateral relative of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero excludes the natural children
of her son Pablo Santero, who are her direct descendants and/or grand children; barrier provided for under Art. 992 of the New Civil Code.

V. The Decision erred in applying Art. 992, when Arts. 988, 989 and 990 are the applicable In answer to the erroneous contention of petitioners that Article 941 of the Spanish Civil Code
provisions of law on intestate succession; and is changed by Article 990 of the New Civil Code, We are reproducing herewith the Reflections
of the Illustrious Hon. Justice Jose B.L. Reyes which also finds full support from other civilists,
VI. The Decision erred in considering the orders of December 1 and December 9, 1976 which to wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
are provisional and interlocutory as final and executory.
"In the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 the right of representation was admitted only within the
The real issue in this case may be briefly stated as follows — who are the legal heirs of Simona legitimate family; so much so that Article 943 of that Code prescribed that an illegitimate child
Pamuti Vda. de Santero — her niece Felisa Pamuti Jardin or her grandchildren (the natural can not inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father and mother.
children of Pablo Santero)? The Civil Code of the Philippines apparently adhered to this principle since it reproduced Article
943 of the Spanish Code in its own Art. 992, but with fine inconsistency, in subsequent articles
The dispute at bar refers only to the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero and the (990, 995 and 998) our Code allows the hereditary portion of the illegitimate child to pass to his
issue here is whether oppositors-appellees (petitioners herein) as illegitimate children of Pablo own descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate. So that while Art, 992 prevents the
Santero could inherit from Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, by right of representation of their illegitimate issue of a legitimate child from representing him in the intestate succession of the
father Pablo Santero who is a legitimate child of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero. grandparent, the illegitimates of an illegitimate child can now do so. This difference being
indefensible and unwarranted, in the future revision of the Civil Code we shall have to make a
Now then what is the appropriate law on the matter? Petitioners contend in their pleadings that choice and decide either that the illegitimate issue enjoys in all cases the right of representation,
Art. 990 of the New Civil Code is the applicable law on the case. They contend that said in which case Art. 992 must be suppressed; or contrariwise maintain said article and modify
provision of the New Civil Code modifies the rule in Article 941 (Old Civil Code) and Articles 995 and 998. The first solution would be more in accord with an enlightened attitude
recognizes the right of representation (Art. 970) to descendants, whether legitimate or vis-a-vis illegitimate children. (Reflections on the Reform of Hereditary Succession, JOURNAL
illegitimate and that Art. 941, Spanish Civil Code denied illegitimate children the right to of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, First Quater, 1976, Volume 4, Number 1, pp. 40-41).
represent their deceased parents and inherit from their deceased grandparents, but that Rule was
expressly changed and/or amended by Art. 990 New Civil Code which expressly grants the It is therefore clear from Article 992 of the New Civil Code that the phrase "legitimate children
illegitimate children the right to represent their deceased father (Pablo Santero) in the estate of and relatives of his father or mother" includes Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero as the word
their grandmother (Simona Pamuti)" 5 "relative" includes all the kindred of the person spoken of. 7 The record shows that from the
commencement of this case the only parties who claimed to be the legitimate heirs of the late
Petitioners’ contention holds no water. Since the hereditary conflict refers solely to the intestate Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero are Felisa Pamuti Jardin and the six minor natural or illegitimate
estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, who is the legitimate mother of Pablo Santero, the children of Pablo Santero. Since petitioners herein are barred by the provisions of Article 992,
applicable law is the provision of Art. 992 of the Civil Code which reads as follows:chanrobles the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court did not commit any error in holding Felisa Pamuti-
virtual lawlibrary Jardin to be the sole legitimate heir to the intestate estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
ART. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children
and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same Lastly, petitioners claim that the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court erred in ruling that
manner from the illegitimate child. (943a). the Orders of the Court a quo dated December 1, 1976 and December 9, 1976 are final and
executory. Such contention is without merit. The Hon. Judge Jose Raval in his order dated
Pablo Santero is a legitimate child, he is not an illegitimate child. On the other hand, the December 1, 1976 held that the oppositors (petitioners herein) are not entitled to intervene and
oppositors (petitioners herein) are the illegitimate children of Pablo Santero. hence not allowed to intervene in the proceedings for the declaration of the heirship in the
intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero. Subsequently, Judge Jose Raval issued an
Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely order, dated December 9, 1976, which declared Felisa Pamuti-Jardin to be the sole legitimate
a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives heir of Simona Pamuti. The said Orders were never made the subjects of either a motion for
of the father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is reconsideration or a perfected appeal. Hence, said orders which long became final and executory
not recognized by law for the purposes of Art. 992. Between the legitimate family and the are already removed from the power of jurisdiction of the lower court to decide anew. The only
illegitimate family there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The power retained by the lower court, after a judgment has become final and executory is to order
illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; the family is in its execution. The respondent Court did not err therefore in ruling that the Order of the Court a
turn, hated by the illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the former, quo dated May 30, 1980 excluding Felisa Pamuti Jardin as intestate heir of the deceased Simona
and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate Pamuti Vda. de Santero "is clearly a total reversal of an Order which has become final and
child nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does executory, hence null and void."cralaw virtua1aw library
no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of resentment. 6
WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby DISMISSED, and the assailed decision is hereby
Thus, petitioners herein cannot represent their father Pablo Santero in the succession of the letter AFFIRMED.
to the intestate estate of his legitimate mother Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, because of the SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-66574 February 21, 1990 6) that Pablo Santero, at the time of his death was survived by his mother
Simona Santero and his six minor natural children to wit: four minor
ANSELMA DIAZ, guardian of VICTOR, RODRIGO, ANSELMINA and MIGUEL, all children with Anselma Diaz and two minor children with Felixberta
surnamed SANTERO, and FELIXBERTA PACURSA, guardian of FEDERICO Pacursa.
SANTERO, et al., petitioners, (pp. 1-2, Decision; pp. 190-191, Rollo)
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and FELISA PAMUTI JARDIN, respondents. Briefly stated, the real issue in the instant case is this — who are the legal heirs of Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero — her niece Felisa Pamuti-Jardin or her grandchildren (the natural
Ambrosio Padilla, Mempin & Reyes Law Offices for petitioners. children of Pablo Santero)?

Pedro S. Sarino for respondent Felisa Pamuti Jardin. The present controversy is confined solely to the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero. In connection therewith, We are tasked with determining anew whether petitioners as
illegitimate children of Pablo Santero could inherit from Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, by
RESOLUTION right of representation of their father Pablo Santero who is a legitimate child of Simona Pamuti
Vda. de Santero.

Petitioners claim that the amendment of Articles 941 and 943 of the old Civil Code (Civil Code
PARAS, J.: of Spain) by Articles 990 and 992 of the new Civil Code (Civil Code of the Philippines)
constitute a substantial and not merely a formal change, which grants illegitimate children
The decision of the Second Division of this Court in the case of Anselma Diaz, et al. vs. certain successional rights. We do not dispute the fact that the New Civil Code has given
Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., G.R. No. 6574, promulgated June 17, 1987 declaring Felisa illegitimate children successional rights, which rights were never before enjoyed by them under
Pamuti-Jardin to be the sole legitimate heir to the intestate estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. the Old Civil Code. They were during that time merely entitled to support. In fact, they are now
de Santero, and its Resolution of February 24, 1988 denying the Motion for Reconsideration considered as compulsory primary heirs under Article 887 of the new Civil Code (No. 5 in the
dated July 2, 1987, are being challenged in this Second Motion for Reconsideration dated July order of intestate succession). Again, We do not deny that fact. These are only some of the many
5, 1988. After the parties had filed their respective pleadings, the Court, in a resolution dated rights granted by the new Code to illegitimate children. But that is all. A careful evaluation of
October 27, 1988, resolved to grant the request of the petitioners for oral argument before the the New Civil Code provisions, especially Articles 902, 982, 989, and 990, claimed by
court en banc, and the case was set for hearing on November 17, 1988 to resolve the question: petitioners to have conferred illegitimate children the right to represent their parents in the
Does the term "relatives" in Article 992 of the New Civil Code which reads: inheritance of their legitimate grandparents, would in point of fact reveal that such right to this
time does not exist.

An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate

children or relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or Let Us take a closer look at the above-cited provisions.
relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child.
Art.902. The rights of illegitimate children set forth in the preceding articles
include the legitimate parents of the father or mother of the illegitimate children? Invited to are transmitted upon their death to their descendants, whether legitimate or
discuss as amici curiae during the hearing were the following: Justice Jose B.L. Reyes, former illegitimate.
Justice Minister Ricardo C. Puno, Dr. Arturo Tolentino, former Justice Eduardo Caguioa, and
Professor Ruben Balane. Art. 982. The grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right
of representation and if any one of them should have died, leaving several
The facts of the case, as synthesized in the assailed decision, are as follows: heirs, the portion pertaining to him shall be divided among the latter in equal
portions. (933)

It is undisputed: 1) that Felisa Pamuti Jardin is a niece of Simona Pamuti

Vda. de Santero who together with Felisa's mother Juliana were the only Art. 989. If, together with illegitimate children, there should survive
legitimate children of the spouses Felipe Pamuti and Petronila Asuncion; 2) descendants of another illegitimate child who is dead, the former shall
that Juliana married Simon Jardin and out of their union were born Felisa succeed in their own right and the latter by right of representation. (940a)
Pamuti and another child who died during infancy; 3) that Simona Pamuti
Vda. de Santero is the widow of Pascual Santero and the mother of Pablo Art. 990. The hereditary rights granted by the two preceding articles
Santero; 4) that Pablo Santero was the only legitimate son of his parents to illegitimate children shall be transmitted upon their death to their
Pascual Santero and Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero; 5) that Pascual descendants, who shall inherit by right of representation from their
Santero died in 1970; Pablo Santero in 1973 and Simona Santero in 1976; deceased grandparent. (941a) Emphasis supplied).
Articles 902, 989, and 990 clearly speak of successional rights of illegitimate children, which controversy. While the New Civil Code may have granted successional rights to illegitimate
rights are transmitted to their descendants upon their death. The descendants (of these children, those articles, however, in conjunction with Article 992, prohibit the right of
illegitimate children) who may inherit by virtue of the right of representation may be legitimate representation from being exercised where the person to be represented is a legitimate child.
or illegitimate. In whatever manner, one should not overlook the fact that the persons to be Needless to say, the determining factor is the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the person to be
represented are themselves illegitimate. The three named provisions are very clear on this represented. If the person to be represented is an illegitimate child, then his descendants, whether
matter. The right of representation is not available to illegitimate descendants legitimate or illegitimate, may represent him; however, if the person to be represented is
of legitimate children in the inheritance of a legitimate grandparent. It may be argued, as done legitimate, his illegitimate descendants cannot represent him because the law provides that only
by petitioners, that the illegitimate descendant of a legitimate child is entitled to represent by his legitimate descendants may exercise the right of representation by reason of the barrier
virtue of the provisions of Article 982, which provides that "the grandchildren and other imposed Article 992. In this wise, the commentaries of Manresa on the matter in issue, even
descendants shall inherit by right of representation." Such a conclusion is erroneous. It would though based on the old Civil Code, are still very much applicable to the New Civil Code
allow intestate succession by an illegitimate child to the legitimate parent of his father or mother, because the amendment, although substantial, did not consist of giving illegitimate children the
a situation which would set at naught the provisions of Article 992. Article 982 is inapplicable right to represent their natural parents (legitimate) in the intestate succession of their
to instant case because Article 992 prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the grandparents (legitimate). It is with the same line of reasoning that the three aforecited cases
illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother. It may not be may be said to be still applicable to the instant case.
amiss to state that Article 982 is the general rule and Article 992 the exception.
Equally important are the reflections of the Illustrious Hon. Justice Jose B.L. Reyes which also
"The rules laid down in Article 982 that 'grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by find support from other civilists. We quote:
right of representation and in Article 902 that the rights of illegitimate children ... are transmitted
upon their death to their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate are subject to the In the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 the right of representation was admitted
limitation prescribed by Article 992 to the end that an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab only within the legitimate family; so much so that Article 943 of that Code
intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother."' (Amicus Curiae's prescribed that an illegitimate child can not inherit ab intestato from the
Opinion by former Justice Minister Ricardo C. Puno, p. 12) legitimate children and relatives of his father and mother. The Civil Code
of the Philippines apparently adhered to this principle since it reproduced
"Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits Article 943 of the Spanish Code in its own Art. 992, but with fine
absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children inconsistency, in subsequent articles (990, 995 and 998) our Code allows
and relatives of the father or mother of said illegitimate child. They may have a natural tie of the hereditary portion of the illegitimate child to pass to his own
blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purpose of Article 992. Between the legitimate descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate. So that while Art. 992
family and the illegitimate family there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and prevents the illegitimate issue of a legitimate child from representing him
incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate in the intestate succession of the grandparent, the illegitimates of an
family; and the family is in turn, hated by the illegitimate child; the latter considers the illegitimate child can now do so. This difference being indefensible and
privileged condition of the former, and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, unwarranted, in the future revision of the Civil Code we shall have to make
in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a a choice and decide either that the illegitimate issue enjoys in all cases the
blemish broken in life; the law does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further right of representation, in which case Art. 992 must be suppressed; or
ground of resentment." (7 Manresa 110 cited in Grey v. Fable 40 OG (First S) No. 3, p. 196). contrariwise maintain said article and modify Articles 992 and 998. The first
solution would be more in accord with an enlightened attitude vis-a-vis
According to petitioners, the commentaries of Manresa as above- quoted are based on Articles illegitimate children. (Reflections on the Reform of hereditary
939 to 944 of the old Civil Code and are therefore inapplicable to the New Civil Code and to Succession, JOURNAL of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, First
the case at bar. Petitioners further argue that the consistent doctrine adopted by this Court in the Quartet 1976, Volume 4, Number 1, pp. 40-41). (p. 7, Decision; p. 196,
cases of Llorente vs. Rodriguez, et al., 10 Phil., 585; Centeno vs. Centeno, 52 Phil. 322, Rollo)
and Oyao vs. Oyao, 94 Phil. 204, cited by former Justice Minister Justice Puno, Justice Caguioa,
and Prof. Balane, which identically held that an illegitimate child has no right to succeed ab It is therefore clear from Article 992 of the New Civil Code that the phrase "legitimate children
intestato the legitimate father or mother of his natural parent (also a legitimate child himself is and relatives of his father or mother" includes Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero as the word
already abrogated by the amendments made by the Now Civil Code and thus cannot be made to "relative" is broad enough to comprehend all the kindred of the person spoken of. (Comment,
apply to the instant case. p. 139 Rollo citing p. 2862 Bouvier's Law Dictionary vol. 11, Third Revision, Eight Edition)
The record reveals that from the commencement of this case the only parties who claimed to be
Once more, We decline to agree with petitioner. We are fully aware of certain substantial the legitimate heirs of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero are Felisa Pamuti Jardin and the
changes in our law of succcession, but there is no change whatsoever with respect to the six minor natural or illegitimate children of Pablo Santero. Since petitioners herein are barred
provision of Article 992 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, by the said substantial change, Article by the provisions of Article 992, the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court did not commit
992, which was a reproduction •f Article 943 of the Civil Code of Spain, should have been any error in holding Felisa Pamuti Jardin to be the sole legitimate heir to the intestate estate of
suppressed or at least modified to clarify the matters which are now the subject of the present the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
It is Our shared view that the word "relatives" should be construed in its general
acceptation. Amicus curiae Prof. Ruben Balane has this to say:

The term relatives, although used many times in the Code, is not defined by
it. In accordance therefore with the canons of statutory interpretation, it
should be understood to have a general and inclusive scope, inasmuch as
the term is a general one. Generalia verba sunt generaliter
intelligenda. That the law does not make a distinction prevents us from
making one: Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguera debemus. Esrinche,
in his Diccionario de Legislacion y Jurisprudencia defines parientes as
"los que estan relacionados por los vinculos de la sangre, ya sea por
proceder unos de otros, como los descendientes y ascendientes, ya sea por
proceder de una misma raiz o tronco, como los colaterales. (cited in
Scaevola, op. cit., p. 457). (p. 377, Rollo)

According to Prof. Balane, to interpret the term relatives in Article 992 in a more restrictive
sense than it is used and intended is not warranted by any rule of interpretation. Besides, he
further states that when the law intends to use the term in a more restrictive sense, it qualifies
the term with the word collateral, as in Articles 1003 and 1009 of the New Civil Code.

Thus, the word "relatives" is a general term and when used in a statute it embraces not only
collateral relatives but also all the kindred of the person spoken of, unless the context indicates
that it was used in a more restrictive or limited sense — which as already discussed earlier, is
not so in the case at bar.

To recapitulate, We quote this:

The lines of this distinction between legitimates and illegitimates. which

goes back very far in legal history, have been softened but not erased by
present law. Our legislation has not gone so far as to place legitimate and
illegitimate children on exactly the same footing. Even the Family Code of
1987 (EO 209) has not abolished the gradation between legitimate and
illegitimate children (although it has done away with the sub-classification
of illegitimates into natural and 'spurious'). It would thus be correct to say
that illegitimate children have only those rights which are expressly or
clearly granted to them by law (vide Tolentino, Civil Code of the
Philippines, 1973 ed., vol. III, p. 291). (Amicus Curiae's Opinion by Prof.
Ruben Balane, p. 12).

In the light of the foregoing, We conclude that until Article 992 is suppressed or at least amended
to clarify the term "relatives" there is no other alternative but to apply the law literally. Thus,
We hereby reiterate the decision of June 17, 1987 and declare Felisa Pamuti-Jardin to be the
sole heir to the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, to the exclusion of petitioners.

WHEREFORE, the second Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED, and the assailed decision
is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.