G.R. No.

121917 July 31, 1996

ROBIN CARIÑO PADILLA, accused-appellant,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellees.

RESOLUTION

FRANCISCO, J.:p

On appellant Robin C. Padilla's application for bail.

In an information filed before the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, appellant was
charged with violation of P.D. No. 1866 for illegal possession of firearms punishable by
reclusion temporal maximum to reclusion perpetua. 1 Pending trial, appellant was
released on bail. Thereafter, appellant was convicted as charged and meted an
indeterminate penalty of 17 years 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal to 21 years
of reclusion perpetua. He appealed to public respondent Court of Appeals, but judgment
was rendered affirming his conviction. Respondent court cancelled his bailbond and
ordered his arrest for confinement at the New Bilibid Prison. Appellant filed a motion for
reconsideration but was denied. Dissatisfied, appellant is now before us by way of a
petition for review on certiorari with an application for bail praying, among others, to be
allowed to post bail for his temporary liberty. In his subsequent pleading, 1 appellant
moved for the separate resolution of his bail application.

The threshold issue is whether or not appellant is entitled to bail.

Bail is either a matter of right, or of discretion. It is a matter of right when the offense
charged is not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. 2 On the
other hand, upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, bail becomes a matter of discretion. 3
Similarly, if the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6) years but not
more than twenty (20) years then bail is a matter of discretion, except when any of the
enumerated circumstances 4 under paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present then
bail shall be denied. But when the accused is charged with a capital offense, or an
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and evidence of guilt
strong, bail shall be denied, 5 as it is neither a matter of right nor of discretion. If the
evidence, however, is not strong bail becomes a matter of
right. 6

In People v. Nitcha 7, the Court, reiterating established jurisprudence, there said:

. . . if an accused who is charged with a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua is

convicted by the trial court and sentenced to suffer such a penalty, bail is neither a matter
of right on the part of the accused nor of discretion on the part of the court. In such a
 situation, the court would not have only determined that the evidence of guilt is strong —
which would have been sufficient to deny bail even before conviction — it would have
likewise ruled that the accused's guilt has been proven beyond reasonable doubt. Bail
must not then be granted to the accused during the pendency of his appeal from the
judgment of conviction. Construing Section 3, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, as amended, this Court, in the en banc Resolution of 15 October 1991 in
People v. Ricardo Cortez, ruled that:

Pursuant to the aforecited provision, an accused who is charged with a

capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua, shall no
longer be entitled to bail as a matter of right even if he appeals the case
to this Court since his conviction clearly imports that the evidence of his
guilt of the offense charged is strong. 8

In this case, appellant was convicted of a crime punishable by reclusion

perpetua. Applying the aforequoted rule, we find appellant not entitled to bail as
his conviction clearly imports that the evidence of his guilt is strong. And contrary
to appellant's asseveration, a summary hearing for his bail application for the
sole purpose of determining whether or not evidence is strong is unnecessary.
Indeed, the extensive trial before the lower court and the appeal before
respondent court are more than sufficient in accomplishing the purpose for which
a summary hearing for bail application is designed.

Rule 114, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, moreover, is clear.

Thus:

Sec. 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life

imprisonment, not bailable. — No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, when evidence of guilt is strong,
shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.

Administrative Circular No. 2-92, in addition, applies in this case. The circular
unequivocably provides that when an accused is charged with a capital offense
or an offense which under the law at the time of its commission and at the time of
the application for bail is punishable by reclusion perpetua and is out on bail and
after trial is convicted by the trial court of the offense charged, his bond shall be
cancelled and the accused shall be placed in confinement pending resolution of
his appeal. Appellant's application must, perforce, fail as he is no longer entitled
to bail.

Be that as it may, we are not unwilling to accommodate his request for an X-ray and
Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) at St. Luke's Hospital as follow-up examinations for
his 1994 slipped-disc operation. It has been said that while justice is the first virtue of
the court, yet admittedly, humanity is the second. Hence, petitioner's request for the
badly needed X-ray and MRI examinations for which the New Bilibid Prison Hospital is
inadequately equipped, as certified to by its Chief Officer, deserves attention. We recall
that way back in 1946, we allowed in Dela Rama v. People's Court, 9 a precedent on
which appellant now anchors his application, a prisoner to be released on bail when his
continued detention would be injurious to his health. This trend, however, has changed
with the development of times. Besides, appellant's situation is not akin to Dela Rama's
factual milieu. While appellant now shall be denied bail, nevertheless, we cannot be
indifferent to his medical needs. And by granting appellant's request, the Court is merely
performing its supervisory powers over detainees to safeguard, among others, their
proper accommodation and health pursuant to Section 25 of Rule 114 of the Rules of
Court, as amended.

ACCORDINGLY, the cancellation of appellant's bailbond by public respondent court is

AFFIRMED and the instant application for bail is DENIED for lack of merit. Appellant's
request for an X-ray and MRI examinations at St. Luke's Hospital is GRANTED which
should be conducted at the first opportune time to be arranged by the Director of the
New Bilibid Prison with the responsible officers of the hospital, provided that appellant
shall be at all times subject to the security conditions imposed by the prison's director.
The responsibility for the enforcement of the subject request, as well as the security of
the appellant, devolves upon the Director of the New Bilibid Prison. Upon termination of
the medical examinations, appellant shall be recommitted to prison without delay. As
much as possible, any unnecessary publicity should be avoided.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Melo and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 P.D. 1866, Section 1.

1 Urgent Motion, Rollo, p. 261-270.

2 Rule 114, Section 4.

3 Rule 114, Section 5.

xxx xxx xxx

(a) That the accused is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the
crime aggravated by the circumstances of reiteration;

(b) That the accused is found to have previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded
sentence, or has violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification.

(c) That the accused committed the offense while on probation, parole, or under conditional
pardon;

(d) That the circumstances of the accused or his case indicate the probability of flight if released
on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that during the pendency of the appeal, the accused may commit
another crime.

5 Rule 114, Section 7.

6 People v. Donato, 198 SCRA 130, 145.

7 240 SCRA 283.

8 Id., at p. 295.

9 77 Phil. 461.