Case #12.
The conveyances were onerous donations as the properties were given
to the petitioner in exchange for his obligation to take care of the donee for the
rest of his life and provide for his burial. Hence, it was not covered by the rule in
Article 749 of the Civil Code requiring donations of real properties to be effected
through a public instrument.
DANGUILAN v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
G.R. No. 69970, November 28, 1988
FACTS:
1. The respondent filed a complaint against the petitioner in the then Court of
First Instance of Cagayan for recovery of a farm lot and a residential lot.
She claimed that she had purchased from Domingo Melad the land now
being unlawfully withheld by the defendant. In his answer, the petitioner
denied the allegation and averred that he was the owner of the said lots
of which he had been in open, continuous and adverse possession, having
acquired them from Domingo Melad. The case was dismissed for failure to
prosecute but was refilled.
2. Danguilan presented three other witnesses to corroborate his statements
and to prove that he had been living in the land since his marriage to Isidra
and had remained in possession thereof after Domingo Melad's death. Two
of said witnesses declared that neither the plaintiff nor her mother lived in
the land with Domingo Melad.
3. The trial court ruled based mainly on the issue of possession. Weighing the
evidence presented by the parties, the judge held that the defendant was
more believable and that the plaintiff's evidence was "unpersuasive and
unconvincing." It was held that the plaintiff's own declaration that she
moved out of the property and left it in the possession of the defendant
was contradictory to her claim of ownership. She was also inconsistent
when she testified first that the defendant was her tenant and later in
rebuttal that he was her administrator. The decision concluded that where
there was doubt as to the ownership of the property, the presumption was
in favor of the one actually occupying the same, which in this case was the
defendant.
4. The appellate court merely affirmed the factual findings of the trial court
except for an irrelevant modification, and it was only toward the end that
it went to and resolved what it considered the lone decisive issues.
ISSUE:
WON there was a valid donation.
HELD:
NO. The donation being of real property, it is void for not complying with
the requirements given by law. Donation of real property should be in a public
instrument. In this case, it wasn’t.
The Supreme Court ruled, considering the language of the two instruments,
that Domingo Melad did intend to donate the properties to the petitioner, as the
private respondent contends. We do not think, however, that the donee was
moved by pure liberality. While truly donations, the conveyances were onerous
donations as the properties were given to the petitioner in exchange for his
obligation to take care of the donee for the rest of his life and provide for his burial.
The case at bar comes squarely under the doctrine laid down in Manalo v. De
Mesa where the Court held:
There can be no doubt that the donation in question was made for
a valuable consideration, since the donors made it conditional upon the
donees' bearing the expenses that might be occasioned by the death and
burial of the donor Placida Manalo, a condition and obligation which the
donee Gregorio de Mesa carried out in his own behalf and for his wife
Leoncia Manalo; therefore, in order to determine whether or not said
donation is valid and effective it should be sufficient to demonstrate that,
as a contract, it embraces the conditions the law requires and is valid and
effective, although not recorded in a public instrument.
The deed of sale was allegedly executed when the respondent was only
three years old and the consideration was supposedly paid by her mother, Maria
Yedan from her earnings as a wage worker in a factory. This was itself a suspicious
circumstance, one may well wonder why the transfer was not made to the
mother herself, who was after all the one paying for the lands. The sale was made
out in favor of Apolonia Melad although she had been using the surname Yedan
her mother's surname, before that instrument was signed and in fact even after
she got married. The averment was also made that the contract was simulated
and prepared after Domingo Melad's death. It was also alleged that even after
the supposed execution of the said contract, the respondent considered
Domingo Melad the owner of the properties and that she had never occupied
the same.
