In Re Appointments of Hon. Mateo Valenzuela and Hon.

Placido Vallarta
A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC, November 9, 1998

Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes

Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Referred to the Court en banc are the

appointments signed by the President dated March
30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo Valenzuela and Hon. Placido
Vallarta as judges of the RTC of Bago City and
Cabanatuan City, respectively. These appointments
appear prima facie, at least, to be expressly
prohibited by Sec. 15, Art. VII of the Constitution.
The said constitutional provision prohibits the
President from making any appointments two
months immediately before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of his term, except
temporary appointments to executive positions when
continued vacancies therein will prejudice public
service or endanger public safety.

Issue: Whether or not, during the period of the

ban on appointments imposed by Sec. 15, Art. VII of
the Constitution, the President is nonetheless
required to fill vacancies in the judiciary, in view of
Secs. 4 (1) and 9 of Art. VIII
Held: During the period stated in Sec. 15, Art.
VII of the Constitution “two months immediately
before the next presidential elections and up to the
end of his term” the President is neither required to
make appointments to the courts nor allowed to do
so; and that Secs. 4(1) and 9 of Art. VIII simply
mean that the President is required to fill vacancies
in the courts within the time frames provided therein
unless prohibited by Sec. 15 of Art. VII. This
prohibition on appointments comes into effect once
every 6 years.

The appointments of Valenzuela and Vallarta were

unquestionably made during the period of the ban.
They come within the operation of the prohibition
relating to appointments. While the filling of
vacancies in the judiciary is undoubtedly in the
public interest, there is no showing in this case of
any compelling reason to justify the making of the
appointments during the period of the ban

Estrada vs. Desierto G.R. No. 146710-15, March 2, 2001 Estrada vs.
Arroyo G.R. No. 146738, March 2, 2001

Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes

Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: In the May 11, 1998 elections,

petitioner Joseph Estrada was elected President
while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was
elected Vice-President. From the beginning of his
term, however, petitioner was plagued by problems
that slowly eroded his popularity. On October 4,
2000, Ilocos Sur Governor Chavit Singson, a
longtime friend of the petitioner, accused the
petitioner, his family and friends of receiving millions
of pesos from jueteng lords. The expose’
immediately ignited reactions of rage. On November
13, 2000, House Speaker Villar transmitted the
Articles of Impeachment signed by 115
representatives or more than 1/3 of all the members
of the House of Representatives to the Senate. On
November 20, 2000, the Senate formally opened the
impeachment trial of the petitioner. On January 16,
2001, by a vote of 11-10, the senator-judges ruled
against the opening of the second envelope which
allegedly contained evidence showing that petitioner
held P3.3 billion in a secret bank account under the
name “Jose Velarde.” The ruling was met by a
spontaneous outburst of anger that hit the streets of
the metropolis. Thereafter, the Armed Forces and
the PNP withdrew their support to the Estrada
government. Some Cabinet secretaries,
undersecretaries, assistant secretaries and bureau
chiefs resigned from their posts.

On January 20, 2001, at about 12 noon, Chief

Justice Davide administered the oath to respondent
Arroyo as President of the Philippines. On the same
day, petitioner issued a press statement that he was
leaving Malacanang Palace for the sake of peace and
in order to begin the healing process of the nation.
It also appeared that on the same day, he signed a
letter stating that he was transmitting a declaration
that he was unable to exercise the powers and
duties of his office and that by operation of law and
the Constitution, the Vice-President shall be the
Acting President. A copy of the letter was sent to
Speaker Fuentebella and Senate President Pimentel
on the same day.

After his fall from the power, the petitioner’s legal

problems appeared in clusters. Several cases
previously filed against him in the Office of the
Ombudsman were set in motion.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not the petitioner resigned as
President
(2) Whether or not the petitioner is only temporarily
unable to act as President

Held: Petitioner denies he resigned as President

or that he suffers from a permanent disability.
Resignation is a factual question. In order to have a
valid resignation, there must be an intent to resign
and the intent must be coupled by acts of
relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is not
governed by any formal requirement as to form. It
can be oral. It can be written. It can be express. It
can be implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it
must be given legal effect. In the cases at bar, the
facts show that petitioner did not write any formal
letter of resignation before leaving Malacanang
Palace. Consequently, whether or not petitioner
resigned has to be determined from his acts and
omissions before, during and after Jan. 20, 2001 or
by the totality of prior, contemporaneous and
posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a
material relevance on the issue. The Court had an
authoritative window on the state of mind of the
petitioner provided by the diary of Executive Sec.
Angara serialized in the Phil. Daily Inquirer. During
the first stage of negotiation between Estrada and
the opposition, the topic was already about a
peaceful and orderly transfer of power. The
resignation of the petitioner was implied. During the
second round of negotiation, the resignation of the
petitioner was again treated as a given fact. The
only unsettled points at that time were the
measures to be undertaken by the parties during
and after the transition period. The Court held that
the resignation of the petitioner cannot be doubted.
It was confirmed by his leaving Malacanang. In the
press release containing his final statement, (1) he
acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as
President of the Republic, but with the reservation
about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving
the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake
of peace and in order to begin the healing process of
the nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace
due to any kind of inability and that he was going to
reassume the presidency as soon as the disability
disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to the
people for the opportunity to serve them; (4) he
assured that he will not shirk from any future
challenge that may come ahead in the same service
of the country; and (5) he called on his supporters
to join him in the promotion of a constructive
national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.

The Court also tackled the contention of the

petitioner that he is merely temporarily unable to
perform the powers and duties of the presidency,
and hence is a President on leave. The inability
claim is contained in the Jan. 20, 2001 letter of
petitioner sent to Senate Pres. Pimentel and
Speaker Fuentebella. Despite said letter, the House
of Representatives passed a resolution supporting
the assumption into office by Arroyo as President.
The Senate also passed a resolution confirming the
nomination of Guingona as Vice-President. Both
houses of Congress have recognized respondent
Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that
recognition is the premise that the inability of
petitioner Estrada is no longer temporary. Congress
has clearly rejected petitioner’s claim of inability.
The Court cannot pass upon petitioner’s claim of
inability to discharge the powers and duties of the
presidency. The question is political in nature and
addressed solely to Congress by constitutional fiat.
It is a political issue which cannot be decided by the
Court without transgressing the principle of
separation of powers.