G.R. No.
134986 March 17, 2000
CAMPO ASSETS CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
CLUB X. O. COMPANY, represented by CHAN YORK GUI (ALLAN), respondent.
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
Notably, the stipulation in question in the case of Viray vs. IAC does not give authority to the lessor
to use force in retaking possession of the leased premises. However, in the same case of Viray
vs. IAC the Court pointed out that there is considerable authority in American law upholding the
validity of stipulations authorizing the use of "all necessary force" or "reasonable force" in making re-
entry upon the expiration/termination of the lease, viz:
Although the authorities are not in entire accord, the better view seems to be, even in
jurisdictions adopting the view that the landlord cannot forcibly eject a tenant who wrongfully
holds without incurring civil liability, that nevertheless, where a lease provides that if the
tenants holds over after the expiration of his term, the landlord may enter and take
possession of the premises, using all necessary force to obtain the actual possession
thereof, and that such entry should not be regarded as a trespass, be sued for as such, or in
any wise be considered unlawful, the landlord may forcibly expel the tenant upon the
termination of the tenancy, using no more force than is necessary, and will not be liable to
the tenant therefor, such a condition in a lease being valid.
. . . although there is contrary authority, the rule supported by a substantial number of cases
is that despite the effect of forcible entry and detainer statutes, where a lease expressly
gives a landlord a right to use such reasonable force as is necessary in making re-entry and
dispossessing a tenant, when the landlord becomes entitled to possession because of the
termination of the term, the landlord can use force in making re-entry and dispossessing the
tenant.9
Again, it must be noted that the application of the provision is limited to situations where the term of
the lease has expired and the logic in allowing the lessor to dispossess the tenant who has
padlocked the premises to prevent re-entry by the owner despite the expiration of the term of the
lease cannot be assailed.
In the case at bar, we find that although Paragraph VI of the Memorandum of Agreement employs
the prefatory words "in case the premises shall be deserted or vacated before the expiration of the
Agreement", which would restrict the operation of the clause to situations wherein the premises are
in fact vacated already, and would therefore imply that the re-entry with the use of force if at all, is
against property only, the stipulation would not proscribe re-taking by use of force against persons
despite the fact that the premises are still in the actual possession of another, albeit under a
questioned right. Moreover, there is no requirement of notice before re-entry. Jurisprudence
supports the view that when parties to a contract expressly reserve an option to terminate or rescind
a contract upon the violation of a resolutory condition, notice of resolution must be given to the other
party when such right is exercised. 10 In Zulueta vs. Mariano 11 we ruled that resort to courts may be
necessary when the right involves the retaking of property which is not voluntarily surrendered by the
other party. The rationale for the ruling in Zulueta vs. Mariano is based on the thesis that no one
should take the law into his own hands. 12 In this sense, the stipulation is legally vulnerable.
Permitting the use of unqualified force to repossess the property and without condition of notice
upon the lessee is fraught with dangerous possibilities. We are inclined to agree with the Court of
Appeals that such a broad stipulation cannot be sanctioned for the reason that it would allow the
lessor/owner to take the law into his own hands, and undermine the philosophy behind the remedy
of forcible entry which is to prevent breach of the peace and criminal disorder 13 and to compel the
party out of possession to respect and resort to the law alone to obtain what he claims to be his. 14
