IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

AT GREENEVILLE

KEVIN PARSONS

Plaintiff
v.

EDWARD TESTER, 2:19-cv-225

JOSHUA PETERS,
THOMAS BROWN,
JOSHUA FERGUSON,
EVAN MARTIN,
RAYMOND MINK,
BRADLEY SEXTON,
RYAN ROSIER,

and

JOHNSON COUNTY, TENNESSEE

Defendants
______________________________________________________________________________

COMPLAINT
______________________________________________________________________________

The Plaintiff, Kevin Parsons, hereby brings suit against the Defendants as follows:

PARTIES

1) During the events described herein, Plaintiff KEVIN PARSONS, was a citizen of

Johnson County, Tennessee. He also was (and still is) the Mayor of its county seat, Mountain

City.

2) Defendant EDWARD ("EDDIE") TESTER is the Sheriff of Johnson County. He is

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 being sued individually.

3) During the events described, Defendants JOSHUA PETERS, THOMAS ("T.J.")

BROWN, JOSHUA FERGUSON, EVAN MARTIN, RAYMOND ("R.J.") MINK, and

BRADLEY SEXTON were Sheriff's deputies of Johnson County. They are being sued

individually.

4) Defendant RYAN ROSIER is an officer with the Tennessee Wildlife Resources

Agency who routinely works alongside the Johnson County Sheriff's Department for traffic stops

and other events.

5) Defendant JOHNSON COUNTY, TENNESSEE is a political subdivision of the

state of Tennessee. It is named as a Defendant.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

6) On December 22, 2018, Mayor KEVIN PARSONS was traveling and minding his

own business within Johnson County, Tennessee when Sergeant JOSHUA PETERS pulled him

over.

7) Prior to this traffic stop, Sergeant PETERS could see that there was a passenger in

the car with PARSONS. However, he could not see who the passenger was.

8) The official justification for this traffic stop was that PARSONS was speeding.

9) In reality, the deputy never even measured the car's speed.

10) Instead, he just stopped the car because he wanted to check the driver license of

the passenger.

11) Stopping vehicles at random in order to check driver licenses is actually a

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 common pastime and standard practice of the Johnson County Sheriff's Department.

12) At the beginning of this particular stop, Plaintiff PARSONS was ready to provide

his own driver's license. However, it was never even requested. The deputy already knew who he

was, anyway, since he was the Mayor of Mountain City.

13) In fact, the deputy pulled him over because he recognized him as the Mayor of

Mountain City.

14) Instead of asking for information about the driver, PETERS just demanded the

driver's license of the passenger.

15) In response, the passenger declined to provide any driver's license.

16) Likewise, PARSONS declined to identify his passenger.

17) Sergeant PETERS demanded that this driver identify his passenger.

18) PARSONS still declined. He told the deputy that the government did not have any

right to a passenger's information.

19) He then asked if they were free to leave, but the deputy said they were not free,

until he could identify all occupants of the vehicle.

20) After being denied the freedom to leave, PARSONS phoned the Sheriff himself.

He asked Sheriff EDDIE TESTER the legal question at issue: Is a driver required to identify his

passenger?

21) Sheriff TESTER is a final policymaker for JOHNSON COUNTY, TENNESSEE.

22) At this point, Sheriff TESTER answered that no, the driver was not required to

identify his passenger.

23) Therefore, PARSONS asked if the Sheriff could please educate his deputy on this

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 legal issue.

24) Sheriff TESTER then spoke to the deputy by phone. After doing so, the Sheriff

drove to the scene personally.

25) Instead of setting the deputy straight, though, Sheriff TESTER quickly joined in.

He continued to seize the driver and the passenger, and he demanded that PARSONS identify his

passenger.

26) Even after the Sheriff arrived, PARSONS still refused to identify his passenger.

27) Altogether, no steps were taken during this "traffic stop" to prosecute any traffic

violations.

28) For example, the officer(s) never attempted to examine any insurance paperwork.

29) No one attempted to examine the license of the driver.

30) No one called in a warrants check on the driver.

31) No one ever started writing a traffic ticket.

32) Eventually, the officers revealed to PARSONS that there was a warrant out for his

brother-in-law, for unpaid child support. They clarified that they were wondering if the passenger

might be this brother-in-law.

33) At the same time that the officers revealed their suspicion, Sergeant PETERS

threatened to charge PARSONS with a felony if he did not identify the passenger, if it turned out

that the passenger was indeed the brother-in-law.

34) Upon being told of the suspicion, and upon hearing the threat of a felony charge,

PARSONS acknowledged that the passenger was indeed his brother-in-law.

35) PETERS and TESTER then arrested the passenger. PARSONS himself was

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 released, without ever being cited for anything.

36) Unfortunately, Sheriff TESTER had taken office in September 2018, and

unbeknownst to PARSONS, during the election season he had made a special promise to his

campaign supporters: Once elected Sheriff, he would indict the Mayor of Mountain City.

37) Around the same time that Sheriff TESTER took office, he had knowingly

employed a former employee of the Mountain City Police Department.

38) Namely, "T.J." BROWN had formerly worked for the Mountain City Police

Department, under Mayor PARSONS. But when the City Council declined to authorize funding

for a new drug dog during the fall of 2018, he became disgruntled, accused Mayor PARSONS of

trafficking drugs, and quit the force.

39) In response to these unsubstantiated allegations of drug trafficking, on September

10, 2018, PARSONS had filed a complaint against this officer for slander. He had specifically

delivered a copy to the officer's new employer — the Sheriff.

40) Sheriff TESTER had ignored the allegation of misconduct against BROWN, and

had nonetheless hired, retained, and declined to discipline the new deputy.

41) Two days after that complaint, BROWN had harassed the Plaintiff's daughter at

the local high school. In the parking lot, he had run his uncertified drug dog around her vehicle.

After doing so, he pretended that this dog had sniffed drugs inside the car. Then he interrogated

the girl about these supposed drugs. The interrogation only ended after the assistant principal

ordered him off the premises.

42) The Johnson County Sheriff's Department has three drug dogs. None of them are

certified as being reliable.

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 43) Still, JOHNSON COUNTY routinely uses these dogs to search people's cars.

44) Getting back to the "traffic stop" in question (December 22, 2018), two weeks

went by following this stop, without further incident.

45) But on January 08, 2019, Deputy PETERS swore out an arrest warrant against

PARSONS for his conduct during the stop. The alleged crime was that PARSONS had failed to

identify his passenger, and/or had supposedly told the officers, "I don't know," when asked who

his passenger was.

46) In reality, PARSONS never even said "I don't know," at least not in reference to

the passenger's identity. Instead, he just declined to reveal the passenger's name.

47) The affidavit of complaint also claimed that PARSONS already knew (prior to the

stop) that his brother-in-law had an outstanding warrant.

48) This allegation was false or misleading because PARSONS had actually been

informed about the outstanding warrant (by PETERS) roughly seven months prior. That is, he

had known about it once in the past, but the information was completely stale. And during the

stop, PARSONS had no reason to suspect that the warrant was still outstanding.

49) As listed on the affidavit of complaint, the criminal charge for PARSONS was

simply called "Obstruction of Justice." Other than this name, the affidavit merely cited Tenn.

Code Ann. § 39-16-602 — a statute which contains more than one chargeable crime.

50) "Obstruction of Justice" is not even the name of any offense in Tennessee. The

charge was simply listed that way in order to smear the Mayor.

51) Although the Mayor was no flight risk on this misdemeanor charge, PETERS

specifically chose to take out an arrest warrant, instead of a criminal summons. He did so using a

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 state-law procedure whereby the judicial commissioner had no option but to issue a summons.

See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-6-215(a)(1).

52) Regardless, the judicial commissioner in question also had a policy, which he has

admitted, of always approving every warrant presented to him by any law enforcement officer.

He does not actually judge whether probable cause exists.

53) Further, this judicial commissioner has never, in thirty years, taken a single hour

of continuing legal education, even though ten hours of CLE have been required by statute,

yearly, since 2010. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-1-111(f).

54) Nonetheless, JOHNSON COUNTY has continued employing this defective

judicial commissioner for decades, paying him out of the county budget.

55) So after getting their "Obstruction of Justice" warrant from this defective judicial

commissioner, Deputies JOSHUA PETERS, T.J. BROWN, JOSHUA FERGUSON, EVAN

MARTIN, R.J. MINK, BRADLEY SEXTON, and Officer RYAN ROSIER all met together to

ambush PARSONS in the parking lot of City Hall.

56) Specifically, they wanted to make a public spectacle by arresting the Mayor, right

before a City Council meeting.

57) The officers were wearing full S.W.A.T. gear.

58) They arrested PARSONS just as he was arriving at City Hall to preside over a

meeting. They told him that he would not be attending the meeting.

59) The Sheriff did not personally show up to this spectacle, but upon information and

belief, he conspired with the other officers to do the deed.

60) During the arrest, the deputies would not tell PARSONS what he was being

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 arrested for, or show him the warrant.

61) By keeping things ambiguous, the officers thereby added to the mystery and the

public spectacle.

62) After PARSONS was handcuffed and locked in a police car, PETERS, BROWN,

FERGUSON, MARTIN, MINK, SEXTON, and ROSIER all searched his car.

63) There was no probable cause to think that any evidence was inside.

64) There was no warrant to search the car.

65) The car was searched either to look randomly for drugs, or else to give the

appearance of suspecting drugs.

66) After the officers had entered the car, they let one of their uncertified drug dogs

inside the car to look for drugs.

67) In the process, the beast tore into the inside of the Plaintiff's car, damaging his

property.

68) Ultimately, PARSONS spent hours in jail, before making bond.

69) Although the warrant read simply "Obstruction of Justice," at the preliminary

hearing, the criminal prosecutor would later clarify that the charge was Obstruction of Service of

Process. The crime is a Class B misdemeanor. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-16-602(c).

70) Over a year before this arrest, the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals had

already held that Obstruction of Service of Process only occurs if someone commits an "overt

act" to prevent service of such civil process. State v. Burgess, 532 S.W.3d 372, 391-392 (Tenn.

2017). Under this binding opinion, "mere concealment" of the person to be served was ruled

insufficient to charge an offense. Id.

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 71) No overt acts were charged here.

72) In light of the elements of the offense, and especially in light of the appellate court

opinion, the affidavit of complaint plainly did not charge any crime against PARSONS.

73) At the preliminary hearing, a special general sessions judge (imported from a

different county) reviewed the dashboard video, other evidence, and arguments of the parties.

Then he dismissed the charge for lack of probable cause. The dismissal happened on May 29,

2019.

74) All the violation(s) as charged in this complaint were committed intentionally,

maliciously, and/or recklessly, warranting the imposition of punitive damages.

75) At all times, these Defendants were acting under color of law, either as a

government entity (JOHNSON COUNTY) or as law enforcement officers (everyone else).

76) As a result of the wrongdoing charged herein, PARSONS has suffered

humiliation, loss of business income, and emotional distress.

CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

COUNT I
UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE
42 U.S.C. § 1983

(Tester, Peters, and Johnson County)

77) The other sections are incorporated by reference.

78) By stopping the Plaintiff on December 22, 2018 without probable cause, in order

to check the identity of his passenger, under color of law Defendants JOSHUA PETERS and

EDDIE TESTER violated the Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable

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 searches and seizures.

79) JOHNSON COUNTY is liable for this misconduct because the Sheriff, a final

policymaker, personally participated in it.

80) Further, JOHNSON COUNTY is also liable because the Johnson County Sheriff's

Department routinely carries out these unlawful stops as a matter of practice.

COUNT II
FALSE ARREST
42 U.S.C. § 1983

(All Defendants)

81) The other sections are incorporated by reference.

- 82) By arresting the Plaintiff on January 08, 2019, without probable cause and based

on a facially invalid warrant, under color of law Defendants JOSHUA PETERS, T.J. BROWN,

JOSHUA FERGUSON, EVAN MARTIN, R.J. MINK, BRADLEY SEXTON, and RYAN

ROSIER all violated the Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable

searches.

83) Sheriff EDDIE TESTER is also liable for the misconduct because he conspired

with PETERS and BROWN to arrest the Plaintiff. The conspiracy is evidenced by his own prior

statements pledging to indict the Plaintiff in the absence of probable cause, his ongoing

associations with Officer BROWN who had publicly slandered and harassed the Plaintiff, his

personal involvement in the illegal roadside encounter by PETERS that was the subject of this

warrant, and the two-week delay between that event and the criminal prosecution.

84) JOHNSON COUNTY is liable for this misconduct because the Sheriff, a final

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 policymaker, personally participated in it through the aforesaid conspiracy.

85) Further, JOHNSON COUNTY is also liable because it employs a defective

judicial commissioner who is neither competent, nor neutral and detached, all in deliberate

indifference to the rights of the criminally accused within Johnson County.

COUNT III
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION
42 U.S.C. § 1983

(Tester, Peters, and Johnson County)

86) The other sections are incorporated by reference.

87) Alternatively, by arresting the Plaintiff on January 08, 2019 based on a warrant

whose probable cause was procured through his own intentional or reckless falsehoods and

misleading statements, Defendant PETERS violated the Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment right to be

free from unreasonable seizures under color of law.

88) Sheriff TESTER is liable for the misconduct because he conspired with PETERS

and BROWN to arrest the Plaintiff. (See ¶ 83).

89) JOHNSON COUNTY is also liable for the misconduct because the Sheriff, a final

policymaker, participated in it through this conspiracy.

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 COUNT IV
RETALIATORY ARREST AND PROSECUTION
42 U.S.C. § 1983

(Tester, Peters, and Johnson County)

90) The other sections are incorporated by reference.

91) By arresting and prosecuting the Plaintiff on January 08, 2019 in retaliation for

invoking his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, and/or for freely telling the officers under

the First Amendment that they were behaving wrongly, under color of law Defendant PETERS

violated the Fifth and First Amendments.

92) Sheriff TESTER is also liable for the misconduct because he conspired with

PETERS and BROWN to arrest the Plaintiff. (See ¶ 83).

93) JOHNSON COUNTY is liable for this misconduct because the Sheriff, a final

policymaker, personally participated in it.

COUNT V
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION
TENNESSEE COMMON LAW

(Tester and Peters)

94) The other sections are incorporated by reference.

95) By maliciously instituting the legal proceeding against the Plaintiff without

probable cause, which was later dismissed involuntarily in the Plaintiff's favor, Defendant

PETERS committed the common-law tort of malicious prosecution.

96) Sheriff TESTER is also liable for the misconduct because he conspired with

PETERS and BROWN to arrest the Plaintiff. (See ¶ 83).

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 COUNT VI
UNREASONABLE SEARCH
42 U.S.C. § 1983

(All Defendants)

97) The other sections are incorporated by reference.

98) By searching the Plaintiff's car on January 08, 2019 without probable cause or any

other justification, Defendants PETERS, BROWN, FERGUSON, MARTIN, MINK, SEXTON,

and ROSIER all violated the Plaintiff's right under the Fourth Amendment to be free of unlawful

searches.

99) Sheriff TESTER is liable for the misconduct because he conspired with PETERS

and BROWN, and is therefore liable for all the results of the conspiracy. (See ¶ 83).

100) JOHNSON COUNTY is liable for the misconduct because the Sheriff, a final

policymaker, participated in it through this conspiracy.

101) JOHNSON COUNTY is also liable because it has a widespread practice of using

uncertified drug dogs to search people's cars illegally.

JURISDICTION

102) The federal Court has subject-matter jurisdiction because the civil rights claims

listed are based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal question, and the state-law claims are based on

the same facts and covered by the Court's supplemental jurisdiction.

103) This Court (in Tennessee) has personal jurisdiction because the Defendants are

either citizens of Tennessee, or else have sufficient contacts with Tennessee that traditional

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 notions of fair play allow for jurisdiction in this state.

104) Venue is proper in the Eastern District of Tennessee (Greeneville Division)

because the incidents happened in Johnson County, Tennessee.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Kevin Parsons asks for the following:

i) Nominal/compensatory damages of $750,000,

ii) Punitive damages above that amount,

iii) Reasonable attorney's fees, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, and

iv) Any futher relief that the Court deems appropriate.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Drew Justice

Drew Justice #29247
Attorney for the Plaintiff
1902 Cypress Drive
Murfreesboro, TN 37130
(615) 419-4994
drew@justicelawoffice.com

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