SIX CARPENTER’S CASE

The Six Carpenters Case [1572] EngR 452

Trespass – Stolen goods

Facts

Six carpenters (S) were served with wine and bread at a tavern which they paid for. S requested more
wine and bread afterwards, of which they were served, by this time they refused to pay. John Vaux (J)
brought an action of trespass against Thomas Newman and the five other carpenters.

Issue

The issue in question in the present case was whether the non-payment by S made the entry into the
tavern tortious and therefore trespass.

Held

There was no trespass. When an entry, authority, or licence, is given to any one by the law, and he
abuses it, he shall be a trespasser ab initio, however it will not be trespass where the entry or authority
is given by the party and abused. Chic Fashions (West Wales) v. Jones [1968] 2 QB 299 doubts the
ratio in the instant case that if a man abuses an authority given by law, he becomes a trespasser ab
initio, due to the effect this would have on the ability of constables to execute search warrants. Chic
Fashions claims that the law has been gradually altered since the instant case to give greater
protection to constables. In that case it was held that a constable who enters private property by
virtue of a search warrant is entitled to seize not only goods reasonably believed to be covered by the
warrant but also any other goods which he honestly and reasonably believes to have been stolen.
Limitation of Trepass ab intio

1) It is applicable only where the entry is authorised by law.

 2) It is applicable only in the case of mis feasense or not for non feasance.
3) It is not applicable where entry can be justified on other ground
4) It is less applicable in present time.

Definition of Six Carpenters’ Case

((1610), 8 Coke, 146 a). Six carpenters entered a tavern and were served with wine
for which they paid. They were afterwards., at their request, served with bread and
more wine which they refused to pay for. Trespass was brought against the six
carpenters and the only point in the case was whether the non-payment made the
entry into the tavern tortious. Held, that (1) if a man abuse an authority given by
the law, he becomes a trespasser ab initio ; but (2) where the authority is given by
the party and abused, there he is not a trespasser ab initio ; but he must be
punished for his abuse ; (3) that mere non-feasance (or not doing) cannot make
the party who has the licence by Jaw a trespasser ab initio. Therefore the six
carpenters were not trespassers ab initio.

Six Carpenters Case (1610) 1 SMLC 134

Six carpenters entered a tavern asked for wine and paid for it. After wards they asked a second
supply, but refuse to pay for it. Held that mere non payment was a nonfeasance which was not
sufficient to render them trespasser ab initio.

Conditions:

1. Authority abused must be given by the law not by an individual.

2. The abuse must amount to a positive wrongful act.

3. Stealing something from a common inn.

Search Results
Featured snippet from the web
Trespass ab initio. — If a person enters on the land of another under an authority given him by law,
and, while there, abuses the authority ... trespasser ab initio there must be a wrongful act committed;
a mere nonfeasance is not enough.

Trespass ab initio is a form of trespass. The term trespass refers to an act of intrusion into
another person’s property. Ab initio is a Latin term meaning, “from the beginning.” A person is
said to have committed trespass ab initio, when s/he has abused the authority granted by law to
enter a property or land.

Trespass ab initio is a doctrine developed by early common law. Accordingly, a person who
enters a land in exercise of his/her duty authorized by law is said to have comitted trespass to
land, or property when s/he abuses the power conferred upon him/her by causing damage to the
property. The person will be held liable not only for his/her misconduct but also for the lawful
entry into the land. Thus, in a trespass ab initio claim, the lawful entry will be considered as
trespass, because the privilege is abused and harm is caused to another person’s legal interest.

Conditions constituting trespass ab initio are:

1. the authority abused must be an authority granted by law and not by an individual[i];
2. there must be some positive act of misconduct, and not a mere omission or neglect of duty[ii]
A person authorized by law will be held liable for the tortuous act, if s/he has misused the
privilege to enter another person’s legally protected property[iii]. Trespass ab initio occurs when
any unnecessary or unreasonable act which is caused deliberately to harm another person’s
interest. Also it occurs when the authorized person fails to take reasonable care to prevent an
unreasonable harm to the legally protected interest of another[iv].

In some cases, a person can delegate his/her privilege to a third party to enter another person’s
land. In such case, the person delegating the privilege will be held liable for any abuse of power
by the third party[v]. Trespass ab intio also extends to harmful acts caused to chattels. However
a person who holds the privilege will not be held liable for harmful acts caused accidentally[vi].

Currently, a person who is found guilty of trespass ab initio is liable for punitive damages. This
rule came in effect after the tort law started recognizing punitive damage[vii].
 Phillips v Brooks Ltd
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Phillips v Brooks Ltd

Decided 1 May 1919

Citation(s) [1919] 2 KB 243

Court membership

Judge(s) sitting Horridge J

Keywords

Fraudulent misrepresentation, mistake about identity, third party rights

Phillips v Brooks Ltd [1919] 2 KB 243 is an English contract law case concerning mistake. It
held that a person is deemed to contract with the person in front of them unless they can
substantially prove that they instead intended to deal with someone else (see also Shogun
Finance Ltd v Hudson).

Contents

 1Facts
 2Judgment
 3See also
 4References
Phillips v Brooks Ltd (Contract)
Facts[edit]
On 15 April 1918, a man named North entered Phillip's jewellery shop and said, "I am Sir George
Bullough". He wrote a dud cheque for £3000 to pay for some pearls and a ring. He said he lived
in St. James's Square. Mr Phillips checked the phone directory and found there was someone
there by that name. Mr Phillips asked if he would like to take the jewellery with him and Mr North
said he would leave the pearls but take the ring 'for his wife's birthday tomorrow'. Mr North
then pawned the ring to Brooks Ltd for £350. When the false cheque was dishonoured, Phillips
sued Brooks Ltd to get the ring back.
Note that there are conflicting reports showing that Mr North identified himself after the ring was
sold, as Viscount Haldane said in Lake v Simmons, but others say that North identified himself
straight away.

Judgment[edit]
The earlier judgement of Cundy v Lindsay had established that contracts could be automatically
void for mistake to identity. Where this is the case, title does not pass to the fraudulent buyer,
and the third party loses out in the entirety. This principle is different where parties contract face
to face; Horridge J stated:

I have carefully considered the evidence of the plaintiff, and have come to the conclusion that, although he
“ believed the person to whom he was handing the ring was Sir George Bullough, he in fact contracted to sell
and deliver it to the person who came into his shop.[1] ”
This outcome can be explained by putting it as such: Mr Phillips hoped he was contracting with
Sir George Bullough, but in reality he agreed to contract with whoever came into his shop, taking
a risk that he was not who he said he was. It had the mere effect of making the contract voidable
for fraud, meaning that title passed to the rogue and subsequently to the third party buyer:

The following expressions used in the judgment of Horridge J seem to me to fit the facts in this case:
“ "The minds of the parties met and agreed upon all the terms of the sale, the thing sold, the price and time of payment,
the person selling and the person buying. The fact that the seller was induced to sell by fraud of the buyer made the
sale voidable, but not void. He could not have supposed that he was selling to any other person; his intention was to
sell to the person present, and identified by sight and hearing; it does not defeat the sale because the buyer assumed a
false name or practised any other deceit to induce the vendor to sell."

Facts

Phillips was a jeweller. The fraudster purchased a ring from the jeweller with a cheque
and signed his name “Sir George Bullough” and provided this person’s address.
Phillips knew of Bullough and knew he lived at the address, so allowed him to take
the ring before the cheque cleared. The purchaser subsequently turned out not to be
‘Sir George Bullough’. The fraudster then pledged the ring to a bona fide third party.

Issues
Whether Phillips could rely on mistake to identity to void the contract and seek
possession/ownership of the ring.

Held

It was found that whilst the fraudster had indeed fraudulently purchased the ring
there was no mistake as to identity due to the fact this contract was made face-to-
face. Whilst fraudulent statements were made, the identity of the fraudster could not
be considered ‘mistaken’. Importantly, a fraudulent contract is voidable (not void)
and permits property to pass to bona fide third-party meaning Brooks Ltd was the
legal owner of the ring.