United States Marine Corps

Command and Staff College

Marine Corps University
2076 South Street
Marine Corps Combat Development Center
Quantico Virginia 22134-5068

________________________________________________________________________
____________

MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

BRAZIL AND THE UNITED NATIONS

PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS IN THE 21st
CENTURY
SUBMITED IN PARIAL FULLFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

LUDOVICO ALEXANDRE CUNHA VELLOSO

LCDR, Brazilian Marine Corps

AY: 2001-2002
________________________________________________
_______
Mentor:
Approved:_____________________________
Dr. John P. Cann, Ph. D.

Date:___________

Mentor:
Approved:_____________________________
Lt. Col. Dave Kelley, USMC

Date:___________
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13. ABSTRACT (MAXIMUM 200 WORDS): Having participated in 23 UN operations, Brazil has a great deal of experience in
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consequence of many latent conflicts spread throughout the globe, Brazil’s enhanced participation in UN operations,
f it does not contribute directly to gaining the objectives established in the current National Defense Policy, at a
minimum will help to maintain the prestige of the country as a distinguished contributor to UN peace efforts.
Moreover, as Brazil claims to be prepared to assume the inherent responsibilities of a permanent member of the
Security Council, it should adopt a foreign policy with a renewed posture that considers the employment of military
orce with more flexibility, particularly, when there is a consensus of the international community that supports the
cause. Furthermore, Brazil’s increased level of participation should not be limited to only peace operations involving
Latin-American and Portuguese speaking countries. The maintenance of a consistent and distinguished participation
will provide the country significant opportunities to improve professional abilities of its military, diplomats and other
civilian leaders, project the name of the country internationally and consolidate its national defense strategic
objectives. Ultimately, an increased participation will contribute to the achievement of a permanent seat in an
expanded UN Security Council.
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 LCDR Ludovico A C Velloso

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 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Title: Brazil and the UN Peacekeeping Operations in the 21st Century

Author: LCDR Ludovico Alexandre Cunha Velloso

Thesis: On one hand Brazil has actively participated in various UN Peacekeeping operations since
1956, on the other, the Brazilian Government believes that Peacekeeping operations are only part of
a broader context that comprises several peacekeeping and international security aspects. Brazil
considers the reform of the United Nations (UN) Security Council as essential. In this regard the
country defends the position that key developing countries, regarded as regional powers, should be
granted a permanent seat in the Security Council. During the 1990s, Brazil considered UN
peacekeeping operations as a venue to project the name of the country, and to leverage its
international support to reach a permanent seat in the Security Council. However its participation did
not bring the expected results. Brazil made a consistent, but modest contribution to UN
peacekeeping operations. In order to achieve the national objectives defined in its current foreign
policy, Brazil should adopt a policy of more active participations in future peace operations.

Discussion: This paper addresses the importance of peacekeeping operations for Brazil. It provides
an appreciation of its current Constitution, National Defense Strategy and Foreign Policy, to include
its pursuit of a distinguished role in the international community. Subsequently, it examines the
Brazilian participation in United Nations (UN) and Organization of American States (OAS)
peacekeeping operations from 1956 until present, in order to analyze the Brazilian contribution, and
identify the aspects of its foreign and domestic policies that affected the decision to participate. This
paper also assesses the country’s ability to keep up to date with the changing nature of peacekeeping
operations and improve its participation. Despite Brazil’s large economic potential and regional
political importance, its participation in these operations has been modest. Constitutional constraints
and a bureaucratic decision-making process continue to limit Brazil’s contribution to peacekeeping
operations. Finally, this paper addresses the global importance of peacekeeping operations and
discusses the consequences for Brazil’s foreign policy, in order to identify the posture Brazil should
adopt, with respect to participating in future peace operations and achieving its national defense
objectives.

Conclusion(s) or Recommendation(s): Having participated in 23 UN operations, Brazil has a great

deal of experience in a wide variety of peacekeeping operations. Given the remaining relevance of
peacekeeping operations as a consequence of many latent conflicts spread throughout the globe,
Brazil’s enhanced participation in UN operations, if it does not contribute directly to gaining the
objectives established in the current National Defense Policy, at a minimum will help to maintain the
prestige of the country as a distinguished contributor to UN peace efforts. Moreover, as Brazil
claims to be prepared to assume the inherent responsibilities of a permanent member of the Security
Council, it should adopt a foreign policy with a renewed posture that considers the employment of
military force with more flexibility, particularly, when there is a consensus of the international
community that supports the cause. Furthermore, Brazil’s increased level of participation should not
be limited to only peace operations involving Latin-American and Portuguese speaking countries.
The maintenance of a consistent and distinguished participation will provide the country significant
opportunities to improve professional abilities of its military, diplomats and other civilian leaders,
project the name of the country internationally and consolidate its national defense strategic
objectives. Ultimately, an increased participation will contribute to the achievement of a permanent
seat in an expanded UN Security Council.
 LCDR Ludovico A C Velloso

CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES………………………………………………………………………………….v

Chapter

1. BRAZIL AND THE PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS….…………………………………1

2. UNDERSTANDING BRAZILIAN NATIONAL DEFENSE AND FOREIGN POLICIES...4

3. BRAZILIAN PARTICIPATION IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS:

AN OVERVIEW…………………………………………………………………………….13

4. WHY PEACEKEEPING REMAINS ESSENTIAL…………………………………………47

Bibliography……..………………………………………………………………………………….51
 LCDR Ludovico A C Velloso

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure

1. Brazil in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations

2. Military personnel assigned by Brazil to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in the

period 1989-1999

3. Brazilian Officers in Command Billets of UN Operations

4. Brazilian Officers in Staff Billets in the UN Headquarters and in the Department of

Peacekeeping Operations

5. Civilian Election Experts who have participated in UN Peacekeeping Operations

 LCDR Ludovico A C Velloso

CHAPTER 1

BRAZIL AND THE PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

The strengthening of the United Nations can be achieved by a General Assembly

more active and better regarded, and by a Security Council more representative,
whose composition can not reflect anymore an arrangement set by the winners of
a conflict that ended more than fifty years ago.1
Fernando Henrique Cardoso
President of Brazil

According to the powers that the United Nations Charter gives to the Security Council in

regard to international security issues, this institution has authorized the employment of

military force in peace operations, which until the late1980s has performed in few fields,

usually overseeing truces and cease-fire agreements.

After the end of the Cold War, these operations grew in quantity and diversified.

From this point on, the UN Peace Operations would transcend the classic role of

providing an interposition force and would include inspection of military facilities and

demobilization of former combatants, disarmament missions, mine clearance tasks, aid to

refugees and internal migrants, organization and oversight of national elections and State

Administration aid to include law and order enforcement.

Brazil has participated actively in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations

since 1956, when the country contributed one Infantry Battalion to the UNEF I, and

overall it has participated in twenty-five peace operations. During the 1990s, the country

1
 LCDR Ludovico A C Velloso

took part in missions in Angola, Mozambique, South Africa, Liberia, Uganda, El

Salvador, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Cyprus, Croatia, Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina,

Cambodia and East Timor.

Nevertheless, the Brazilian Government believes that Peacekeeping Operations

should be considered in a broader context, in which the causes of the necessity of the

mission could be addressed. Because of that, it also states that the United Nations will not

succeed in dealing with high-cost Peacekeeping operations, if it does not also address the

issues that made this kind of operation necessary. The necessity of force employment is

not considered as a crucial impeding factor to the Brazilian participation in Peace

Operations. As a firm position, the Government states that Brazilian participation will be

guided by the missions that can be considered under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, in

which the parties involved in the conflict consent to the mission, and the principles of

impartiality and non-violence are observed.

Brazil defends the principle that the legitimate employment of force is related

to the right of self-defense, or in case of humanitarian emergency aid, to forcible entry or

the usage of more coercitive means.

My intent with this paper is to analyze the Brazilian participation in

Peacekeeping Operations in relation to its Foreign Policy and National Defense Strategy,

and to develop conclusions on the role that the country could play in future scenarios, and

on its potential contribution to the United Nations efforts towards International Security

and Peace.

1
Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Brazilian President in his speech during the 56th UNITED NATIONS GENERAL
ASSEMBLY.

2
 LCDR Ludovico A C Velloso

My thesis is that Brazil can and should contribute more actively in regard to

United Nations efforts towards International Security without relinquishing the principles

that have been guiding its foreign policy throughout the last 50 years, and assume a more

distinguished participation, particularly in Peacekeeping Operations.

In order to prove my thesis statement, I will begin by providing an overview of

the Brazilian National Defense Strategy and how it is guided by the Constitution and

related to the country’s foreign policy. Afterwards, I will briefly sketch the Brazilian

approach in peacekeeping operations and the relevance of its participation in projecting

the name of the country. Following this, I will address the major deficiencies in the

planning, deployment and employment processes in order to identify potential fields in

which the country can give distinguished contributions to improve the United Nations

peacekeeping operations. Finally, I will address the issue of the Security Council, the

remaining relevance of peacekeeping operations and the consequences for the Brazilian

foreign policy in the 21st century.

3
 LCDR Ludovico A C Velloso

CHAPTER 2

UNDERSTANDING BRAZILIAN NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY

AND FOREIGN POLICY

Brazil’s foreign policy has been guided by solid principles throughout the last 50 years.

These principles are similar to those included in the United Nations Charter, and are

explicitly included in the Article 4 of its current constitution. 2 These principles are:

a. National independence

b. Prevalence of human rights

c. Self-determination of the Peoples

d. Non-intervention

e. Equality among nation-states

f. Peace defense

g. Pacific solution for conflicts

h. Repudiation of terrorism and racism

i. Cooperation among nation-states towards the progress of mankind, and

j. Concession of political asylum.

Despite the fact that this constitution is relatively new, these principles have

been setting the patterns for Brazilian participations in United Nations efforts for peace.

4
 LCDR Ludovico A C Velloso

Another important aspect is that the linkage between these principles and the content of

Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter, in step with its national objectives, has been

the main guide to the decision-making process, particularly which of sending troops to

integrate international Peacekeeping forces.

In order to achieve its national objectives, the Brazilian government established

in 1996 its current National Defense Policy, which sets the Brazilian National Defense

Objectives and the Strategic Orientation to conduct this policy. 3 This Document, the first

in Brazilian history, was prepared by a team of diplomats and military officers, and

constitutes a presidential directive. 4 The National Defense Objectives are the following:

a. Guarantee sovereignty while preserving the Nation’s territory integrity

b. Guarantee the rule of law and democratic institutions

c. Maintain the Nation’s cohesion and unity

d. Protect individuals, goods and resources that are Brazilian or under

Brazilian jurisdiction

e. Achieve and maintain Brazilian interests abroad

f. Give Brazil a significant role in international affairs and a greater role in

the international decision-making process, and

g. Contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security.

The strategic orientation of its Defense Policy is centered in an active

diplomacy in the pursuit of peace, and its defensive dissuasive strategic posture can be

summarized in the followed premises:

2
Art 4º Principles of International Relations, Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil. 27st Edition 2001, p. 3.
3
Art 2º Brazilian National Objectives, Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil. 27st Edition 2001, p. 3.
4
Braga, Carlos C. V.Military Integration in The Southern Cone: a Natural Consenquence of The MERCOSUR.
Command and Staff College. USA, Quantico, VA 2000. p. 22.

5
 LCDR Ludovico A C Velloso

- Boundaries and limits lawfully defined and internationally

recognized

- Close relation with neighbor states and with the international

community based on mutual trust and respect

- Rejection of the war of conquest, and

- Search for a pacific solution of controversies and the use of force

only in self-defense.

Despite the fact that previous constitutions have not mentioned its National

Objectives and the principles that command its foreign policy, the former participations

in United Nation peacekeeping operations indicate that the decision-making process had

usually assessed these principles as a general guidance to send troops, particularly that of

non-intervention, non-use of the force and impartiality.

On one hand the other important assessment lies in Chapter VI of the United

Nations 5 . As a major consideration, Brazil has normally considered the possibility of

sending troops overseas in any case in which the parties involved in the conflict consent

to the use of international military forces. On the other hand, it is not clearly defined in

the text of Chapter VI, as for example in the Articles 33 and 34, that the employment of

an international military force could be considered as a legitimate effort to support

negotiations and peaceful conflict resolution.

As the Brazilian diplomat Paulo R. C. T. da Fontoura points out, in the

practice of the United Nations, the establishment of missions of observation and

Peacekeeping operations is not explicitly based on the disposals of its charter.

Nevertheless, the members of the United Nations came to a consensus that it would not

6
 LCDR Ludovico A C Velloso

be mandatory to search for an arrangement that matches perfectly the content of the

charter, if this solution did not contradict any other article of the charter or any related

international law or rule. This is called the Implicit Powers Doctrine and was recognized

in the decision of the United Nations International Justice Court in 1949 in a case of

claim for damage reparation. 6

Still today after 51 years, this is a subject that causes countless discussions,

and there is no approved definition in the General Assembly of peacekeeping operations.

According to Paulo C. T. da Fontoura, that is the reason for not considering peacekeeping

operations as one of the options for pacific solutions included in Article 33 of Chapter VI

– negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to

regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice. 7

But these considerations do not impede a country in participating with troops in

some United Nations Missions. From this experience, two factors emerge from UNEF I

in the Gaza Strip, and from UNAVEM III in Angola (See Figure 1in Chapter 3). The

lessons learned from these experiences seem to be considered as an important guidance

for the decisions regarding the employment of Brazilian troops; the former because it was

the first and most important Brazilian contribution of troops to the United Nations, and

the latter represented the return of a more active participation in the United Nations

efforts towards peace after the end of the Cold War.

In both cases, it is important to make a brief appreciation of the non-

intervention, impartiality and non-use of force principles. In his report of 9 October 1958

addressed to the General Assembly, Dag Hammarskjöld considered as one of the major

5
Chapter VI. United Nations Charter. San Francisco, USA 1945.
6
Da Fontoura, Paulo R. C. T. O Brasil e as Operações de Manutenção da Paz da ONU. 2000, p. 66

7
 LCDR Ludovico A C Velloso

lessons learned from the UNEF I that only the expression of contentment of the parties

assures the respect of the non-intervention in internal matters of the member-states,

considering the content of the Article 2, Paragraph 7 of the United Nations Charter. 8

In regard to non-intervention, the Suez crisis was an international dispute

between Israel and Egypt. This was an inter-state conflict, and both parties agreed that

there was a need for the establishment of an international force that would occupy the

contested zone and manage the cease-fire agreement, until a pacific solution to the

conflict could be reached. That was to be considered the classic role of peacekeeping

operations throughout the Cold War period.

After the Cold War, and with an increasing appearance of intra-states conflicts,

the Great Powers, particularly the United States, at this point released from the

containment strategy that guided its foreign policy during that period, started to influence

the United Nations decision-making process. It was especially assertive when democratic

principles, such as self-determination, freedom of religion, and humanitarian issues,

particularly when genocide issues were at stake. In these cases, the United Nations

resolutions were carried out by an ad hoc coalition headed by the United States. These

actions were aimed at intervention in internal affairs of the subject countries, and were

undertaken under Chapter VII authority.

The explicit use of force outside the self-defense of its military troops is one of

the major constraints to Brazilian participation in such ad hoc coalition forces. On the one

hand, those resolutions contradict directly the strategic orientation of its National Defense

Strategy, the search for a pacific solution to controversies and the use of force only in

7
Da Fontoura, Paulo R. C. T. O Brasil e as Operações de Manutenção da Paz da ONU. 2000, p. 67.
8
Da Fontoura, Paulo R. C. T. O Brasil e as Operações de Manutenção da Paz da ONU. 2000, p. 88.

8
 LCDR Ludovico A C Velloso

self-defense, and on the other, those resolutions can be considered compatible with the

principles of prevalence of human rights and self-determination of the peoples, set in the

Article 4 of the Brazilian Constitution. The non-use of force, as we can see, has been a

key factor in Brazilian decisions regarding contributions with troops in United Nations

Peace Operations.

Decisions to intervene in intra-state affairs, with the involvement of non-state

actors, contribute significantly to an increased risk of employment of force. Such actors

are likely to disobey a United Nations direction or international pressure, and the risk is

considered to be higher than that of inter-state conflicts. It is thus important to consider

the possibility of transforming a peacekeeping into a peace-enforcement operation during

9
the accomplishment of the mandated mission.

In that regard, the decision to send troops to Angola during the UNAVEM III, if

it did not represent a shift in the Brazilian commitment to the United Nations

Peacekeeping operations, it represented an important demonstration of the country’s

determination to improve its contribution to the United Nations and remain engaged with

the modern trends of international affairs. The increasing occurrence of intra and non-

state conflicts characterized by non-observation of human rights constitutes a serious

menace to peace.

In this particular case, despite the fact that factions of both UNITA and the

FNLA agreed with the intervention of the United Nations, that conflict could be

characterized as a dispute between one state actor, the FNLA, and one non-state actor,

UNITA, and thus either or both could violate the United Nations mandate. Such a

9
Da Fontoura, Paulo R. C. T. O Brasil e as Operações de Manutenção da Paz da ONU. 2000, p. 90.

9
 LCDR Ludovico A C Velloso

situation could have led to a use of force, or the retirement of the contingent and a

consequent review of the mandate or the resolution.

The Brazilian current National Defense Policy and foreign policy, as we can

see, is a product of sound international positions adopted by the country since the

creation of the United Nations and even before. The other aspect is that its current

constitution defines explicitly the principles that guide the foreign policy and the

country’s national objectives, which provide legitimacy and transparency to its

international affairs. Furthermore, the publication of an unclassified version of its

National Defense Strategy, with its clear objectives, augments the confidence that it

contributes to international peace and development.

Brazil appreciates and supports the United Nations efforts towards the

strengthening of peace. Regionally, in South America, the country has been able to

develop solid friendships that are essential factors in the tranquility in the region.

MERCOSUR, a regional organization embracing Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and

Uruguay, and the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries are important

organizations that have a major influence in Brazilian foreign policy. In addition Brazil

seeks an increased economic, political and military integration of the Latin American

countries with a view toward the formation of a Latin America community of nations.

The principles of non-intervention and non-use of force, as analyzed in this

chapter, and the Brazilian commitment to international organizations and the culturally

fraternal countries of Latin America and the Portuguese speaking nations have played a

major role in its decision to participate in the United Nations efforts towards peace. It was

10
 LCDR Ludovico A C Velloso

this national policy and philosophy that supported the case for the Brazilian commitment

in the East Timor.

In the beginning of this new century with its continuing challenges to the

achievement of peace, it is important to identify a proper direction for the pursuit of its

National Defense Objectives, particularly, those that maintain peace and international

security. To achieve this it is important to evaluate the Brazilian participation and the

impact of its contributions in the international community. It is also important to address

the priority for commitment in some regional operations, or those in cases of countries

with a cultural affinity to Brazil, and the capacity of the country to adapt to the evolution

of Peacekeeping operations in terms of military capability, nation-building, intra-state

affairs, non-state actors, and civilian affairs, such as, humanitarian aid and elections

monitoring.

Brazil regards peacekeeping operations as being of utmost relevance.

Internally, its armed forces have been involved in the development and improvement of

doctrine. Its regular training exercises include peace operations scenarios, and several

efforts to improve the military education and preparedness to this sort of military activity

is under way.

With regard to the United Nations, despite the fact that Brazil does not now

have a representative in DPKO, it continues to participate in the organizational efforts to

improve its rapid response capacity, updating its registers in the database and joining

other member states in discussion meetings and conferences, particularly about the UN

RAPID DEPLOYABLE HEADQUARTERS.

11
 LCDR Ludovico A C Velloso

Brazil considers the Security Council reform a vital point. The government

supports the idea that the number and composition of its members must be reviewed in a

more comprehensive context to include the role of promoting economic and social

development, in relation to human rights and basic liberties. Brazil also stresses that it is

relevant to promote a predictable and stable environment for international trade and

investment.

The country’s participation in peacekeeping operations has been a result of

combined efforts from several agencies of the federal government, of the states, and of

the Congress whose role is to approve the assignment of troops and financial resources.

Although the majority of the population and government representatives regard

peacekeeping operations as of great importance to project the name of the country, it has

not achieved a consensus yet. However, there has been a perception that a distinguished

contribution to UN peacekeeping would contribute to and influence the process of the

country being invited to join the Security Council when it is ultimately expanded.

12
 LCDR Ludovico A C Velloso

CHAPTER 3

BRAZILIAN PARTICIPATION IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS: AN

OVERVIEW

The Brazilian participation in Peace Keeping Operations started even before the creation

of the United Nations. Under the authority of the League of Nations during the interwar

period, the government assigned a naval officer to participate in a commission that was to

administer the region around Leticia, a city near the boundary of Colombia and Peru on

the Amazon River, from June 1933 to May 1934. Simultaneous to the military

contribution, which would later be called peacekeeping operations, Brazil contributed

actively in overseeing and mediating the peace agreement between Colombia and Peru.

After the Creation of the United Nations, Brazil has participated in

Peacekeeping Operations since 1956. The purpose of this Chapter is to make an analysis

of these participations in relation to the following aspects:

- The participation in military and civilian missions with mention of its

historical antecedents

- The contribution of the inter-ministerial working-group set in May 1993

13
 LCDR Ludovico A C Velloso

- The legal and budgetary aspects that affect the assignment of military and

civilian personnel to UN operations

- The Brazilian contribution to the improvement of the Fast Reaction Capacity

of the UN

- The initiatives to improve the capacity of certain African countries in

peacekeeping operations

- The assignment of military personnel to the UN Department of Peacekeeping

Operations (DPKO)

- The participation in Command and Staff positions in peacekeeping missions

- The participation in activities related to the process of peace agreement

consolidation

- The public affairs issues, and

- The policy adopted by the Brazilian Government in the United Nations and

other fora.

THE PARTICIPATION IN MISSIONS

Brazilian participation in the United Nations peace operations can be divided

into two periods: the first from 1957 and 1967, when Brazil participated in six UN

operations with particular distinction to the UNEF I in Sinai and in the Gaza Strip, and

the second during the period from 1989 to the present, in which the country diversified its

contributions to perform broader missions requiring a higher command and control,

logistic and other specific capabilities, such as disarmament missions and election

14
 LCDR Ludovico A C Velloso

supervision. During this period, the participation in the UNAVEM III, in Angola can be

highlighted. 10

Personnel Summary of
Mission and Area
Military Policemen Civilians Total Contribution
One Infantry
Battalion composed
of approximately
600 personnel from
January 1957 until
June 1967.
UNEF I The Command of
6,300 0 0 6,300
(Gaza Strip) the Mission was
given to the country
on 2 occasions:
from Jan 1964 to
Aug 1964 and from
January 1965 to
January 1966.
Transport Aircraft
and Helicopter
ONUC pilots and some
179 0 0 179
(Congo) ground troops from
July 1960 to June
1964.
Personnel
transferred from the
UNEF I to the
UNSF
2 0 0 2 advanced party of
(Western Iran)
the UNSF from
August 1962 until
September 1962
Staff of the
DOMREP Secretary-General
(Dominican 1 0 0 1 Office in that
Republic) Country from May
1965 until October

10
Da Fontoura, Paulo R. C. T. O Brasil e as Operações de Manutenção da Paz da ONU. 2000, p. 203.

15
 LCDR Ludovico A C Velloso

1966.
Military Observers
of the cease-fire
UNIPOM
10 0 0 10 agreement from
(India and Pakistan)
September 1965
until March 1966.

Personnel Summary of
Mission and Area
Military Policemen Civilians Total Contribution
The Brazilian
ambassador was a
representative of
the Secretary-
General in Cyprus
from September
UNFICYP 1964 to January
20 0 1 21
(Cyprus) 1967. Actively the
military
participation
occurred only when
2 officers joined the
Argentine Battalion
in 1995.
Military Observers
from January 1989
until May 1995 and
an Army Medical
Detachment from
UNAVEM I
16 0 0 16 1990 on. Brazil
(Angola)
exercised the
command over the
Military Observers
during the entire
mission mandate.
Military Observers
ONUCA
34 0 0 34 from April 1990
(Central America)
until January 1992
Military Observers
UNAVEM II and Policemen
77 39 4 120
(Angola) from May 1991
until February

16
 LCDR Ludovico A C Velloso

1995, the end of the

mandate. One
Military Medical
Team with 14
personnel, and in
1992 with 4
election monitors.

Personnel Summary of
Mission and Area
Military Policemen Civilians Total Contribution
Military Observers
and policemen from
June 1991 until
April 1995.
ONUSAL
63 16 5 84 Military Medical
(El Salvador)
Team in April-May
1992, and 5
election monitors in
1994.
Military Observers
and policemen from
January 1993 until
December 1994. 1
Army Rifle
ONUMOZ
218 66 16 300 Company of 170
(Mozambique)
men from June to
December 1994.
15 election
monitors and 1
election judge.
Military Observers
and a Military
UNOMUR
13 0 0 13 Medical Unit from
(Uganda/Ruanda)
August 1993 until
September 1994.
Military Observers
UNPROFOR
and policemen from
(former 90 23 0 113
August 1992 until
Yugoslavia)
December 1995.
UNTAC 19 election
0 0 19 19
(Cambodia) monitors

17
 LCDR Ludovico A C Velloso

Allowed UN to
employ UNAVEM
UNOMIL
3 0 0 3 military observers
(Liberia)
from September to
November 1993.

Personnel Summary of
Mission and Area
Military Policemen Civilians Total Contribution
Liaison Officers
and policemen as
observers from
October 1994 until
today. To the PKO,
18 military
observers,
MINUGUA
39 37 0 76 including the
(Guatemala)
Executive Officer
to supervise the
facilities and the
demobilization of
the guerrilla from
February until May
1997.
12 election
UNOMOSA 0 0 12 12 monitors in April
1994.
One Infantry
Battalion with 800
personnel, one
Combat Engineer
UNAVEM III Company with 200
4174 48 0 4222
(Angola) personnel, Military
Medical Units and
Military Observers
from August 1995
until July 1997.

18
 LCDR Ludovico A C Velloso

Military Observers
UNCRO and policemen from
2 1 0 3
(Crotia) May 1995 until
December 1996.

UNPREPDEP Military Observes

5 0 0 5
(Macedonia) since 1995

Military Observers
UNTAES and policemen from
9 2 0 11
(Slovenia) May 1995 until
December 1996.
UNMOP
Military Observers
(Prevlaka 5 0 0 5 since 1996
Peninsula)

Personnel Summary of
Mission and Area
Military Policemen Civilians Total Contribution
Total numbers of
Brazilian
Total 11,302 289 76 11,667 participation in UN
operations since
1956
Figure 1- Resume of Brazil in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations 11

In both periods, Brazil also participated in peace operations not under the

authority of the United Nations. During the first period, it is relevant to mention the

Brazilian contribution to the Inter-American Peace Force that was assigned to the

Dominican Republic between 1965 and 1966. This deployment was authorized by the

Organization of the American States in its resolution of 5th June 1965.

Of the 23,450 personnel involved, most were from the United States; however,

1,450 composed this force from Brazil and 440 from other member states. The OAS

established a unified command to coordinate the activities of the various assigned forces.

Two Brazilian Army Flag Officers exercised general command: General Hugo Panasco

Alvim from the beginning until January 1966, and General Álvaro Alves da Silva from

11
Da Fontoura, Paulo R. C. T. O Brasil e as Operações de Manutenção da Paz da ONU. 2000, p. 201 to 203.

19
 LCDR Ludovico A C Velloso

January 1966 until its dissolution. After having contributed to the reestablishment of

democracy through the conduct of national elections on 1 January 1966, the Brazilian

contingent was repatriated after the J Balaguer’s occupation of the Presidency in 1 July

196612 .

BRAZIL IN THE MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS AUTHORIZED BY THE

UNITED NATIONS

Brazil has not traditionally participated in multinational forces authorized by the

United Nations Security Council. According to note 150, included in the Table 6, the

Getúlio Vargas government, despite significant international pressures exercised by the

United States, declined the formal request of the United Nations Secretary General asking

for the assignment of troops to participate in the Korean War. The Brazilian participation

was limited to the donation of products up to CR $ 50 million13 .

After decades under the Fernando Henrique Cardoso administration, in 1996

Brazil was consulted by the United Nations over the country’s possibility of providing a

contingent to the multinational force to Zaire, currently the Republican of Congo, to

provide humanitarian assistance to refugees and internally dislocated populace who were

trapped in a civil war. Although, the initial response was positive, and indeed the armed

12
Ibid., p. 204
13
Da Fontoura, Paulo R. C. T. O Brasil e as Operações de Manutenção da Paz da ONU. 2000, p. 205

20
 LCDR Ludovico A C Velloso

forces and the Brazilian International Relations Ministry had appreciated the engagement

options, the force was not mobilized because the situation evolved into a peaceful

settlement.

On 6 September 1999, the population of East Timor territory in Indonesia was

submitted to a popular referendum which purpose was to define the political future of its

people. This referendum intended to define whether East Timor would continue under

Indonesian rule or would be independent. The overwhelming majority of 98.5 percent

decided in favor of independence. Of this number 78.5 percent favored complete

independence, the others being favorable of autonomy.

Right after the announcement of the popular referendum results, the security

situation within the territory deteriorated rapidly, turning the population into internal

refugees and generating an immediate need for humanitarian aid. The Indonesian militias

had launched a series of furious attacks against the East Timor population. While the data

on the number of the people killed remains unknown, estimates for the dislocated, who

were forced to abandon their homes, were 300,000 persons in a population of 850,000.

Facing this situation, the United Nations Security Council, under Chapter VII of the

United Nations Charter, and with the acquiescence of the Indonesian government,

approved the resolution 1264 of 1999 authorizing the member states to compose a

multinational force to intervene in East Timor. This resolution allowed the use of

necessary means to accomplish the mandate of the mission to restore order and protect

the population14 .

In the case of a multinational force, it is essential to underline that the

participating country must provide all the conditions and resources to sustain their

21
 LCDR Ludovico A C Velloso

contingents during the mission. Among the requirements for sustainment are those factors

that affect the decision-making process, such as the availability of modern assets for

logistics and communication support, the capacity to provide the force proper resources

for healthy and transportation, the capability to provide rapidly deployable and properly

trained forces and inherent legal issues.

The Brazilian participation with armed forces was limited to the cession of an

Army Military Police Detachment and an Army field grade officer in support of the

multinational force and its staff. However, the importance of this decision is that it was

the first time that Brazil was integrating with a force authorized but not commanded the

by United Nations, in the accomplishment of a mandate elaborated under Chapter VII.

The acquiescence of Djakarta did give the mission an intervention character by

acknowledging that it had lost control of the situation. The Brazilian government decision

represented an important advance in the country position towards East Timor

independence and the support of the UN peace operations.

Overall Brazil does not have a significant experience in multinational forces

mainly because of the effect of financial and legal aspects i. Over the last 55 years Brazil

has faced the possibility of contributing to a multinational force on three occasions. The

first was during the Korean War in 1951. The second was in 1996 during the Congo civil

war crisis. The third was in East Timor, when Brazil decided to participate with a small

contingent from the Army.

THE PEACE OPERATIONS INTERMINISTERIAL WORKING-GROUP

14
Da Fontoura, Paulo R. C. T. O Brasil e as Operações de Manutenção da Paz da ONU. 2000, p. 206

22
 LCDR Ludovico A C Velloso

There was a lack of an organization to supervise, coordinate and to remain

current with the international evolution of peacekeeping operations within the Federal

Government until 1992. With an increasing number of Brazilian military personnel

participating in these kinds of operations in Angola, Central America and the former

Yugoslavia between 1989 and 1992, the Itamaraty thus took the initiative and

coordinated the establishment of a working group called Grupo de Trabalho

Interministerial (GTI) to examine and propose actions to achieve the following

objectives:

1. To increase the Brazilian influence in the United Nations departments that

deal with Peacekeeping operations by assigning personnel to work in the United

Nations Secretariat

2. To improve the coordination between the Armed Forces, the Ministry of

Justice, the Supreme Electoral Court and the Itamaraty to make the assignment

of Military Officers, Police Officers and Electoral Experts more agile and

efficient

3. To update the current legislation that regulates the decisions over sending

armed military contingents and non-armed military observers overseas

4. To take advantage of any opportunity to establish bilateral cooperation

during the of implementation process in an effort to achieve enduring peace, and

5. To evaluate the wider aspects that could influence the creation of elite

peace operation units in the armed forces, specially trained and equipped to be

employed under United Nations request 15 .

15
Da Fontoura, Paulo R. C. T. O Brasil e as Operações de Manutenção da Paz da ONU. 2000, p. 208

23
 LCDR Ludovico A C Velloso

As a result of the work of this group, a series of modifications and attempts to

increase and improve the Brazilian contributions to the United Nations Peacekeeping

efforts were put into practice and will be discussed on the following sections of this

chapter.

THE ASSIGNMENT OF MILITARY PERSONNEL

The actions proposed by the Inter-ministerial Working Group have led the

armed forces to incorporate definitively, as a regular mission, the assignment of military

personnel to United Nations peacekeeping operations. These personnel may be employed

either as observers, or as troops, or as staff officers. The other important policy change is

that the UN-related troop assignment was made the responsibility of the joint staff, which

replaced the Army ministry, and from that point on it became a joint activity16 .

This institutional change improved the Brazilian contribution of military

observers to the UN peacekeeping missions, particularly from 1993. From 1994 Brazil

recommenced its UN contribution with troops that reflected an improvement in the

preparedness and in the reaction time needed to respond to international situations. This

improvement was a clear result of the new military and foreign relation ministries

internal decision-making and coordination procedures. The implementation of specific

structures within these organizations helped to facilitate the whole process of assignment

and preparation of personnel to the missions 17 .

Military Personnel per Service

Mission
Total
16
In 1993, Brazil did not have an integrated Ministry of Defense, the Defense issues were dealed by four ministries:
the ministry of the Army, the ministry of the Navy, the ministry of the Air Force and the ministry of Armed Forces
Major Staff, that took care of specific joint issues. Only in 1999 that the Brazilian Govermenment extinguished the four
ministries and established an integrated ministry of Defense.
17
Da Fontoura, Paulo R. C. T. O Brasil e as Operações de Manutenção da Paz da ONU. 2000, p. 210

24
 LCDR Ludovico A C Velloso

Army Navy Air Force

ONUCA 29 5 0 34
ONUSAL 48 3 12 63
ONUMOZ 207 9 2 218
UNOMUR 7 3 3 13
UNPROFOR, UNMOP, UNTAES, UNPREDEP 47 29 36 112
UNOMIL 3 0 0 3
MINUGUA 36 0 3 39
UNAVEM I, II, III and MONUA 3577 654 22 4253
UNIFCYP 20 0 0 20
UNAMET 4 3 0 7
TOTAL 3978 706 78 4762
Figure 2- Military personnel assigned by Brazil to United Nations Peacekeeping
Operations in the period 1989-1999

As a consequence of the recommendations of the Inter-ministerial Working

Group and from the analysis of DPKO reports, some initiatives to improve training and

preparation of personnel and units were put into practice within the Army and the Navy.

The Army has implemented a course that consists of a 3-week program for volunteers to

work as military observers or as staff officers. These personnel attend classes in

computers, English language, UN administrative and operational procedures and special

purpose briefings over the situation and characteristics of the nation in which they will

perform the mission. This experience has proved of significant value, and the Army has

also used computers to implement a non-resident program with a notable success 18 .

In terms of the mobilization and preparation of troop contingents, the Army has

made efforts to assign troops from every region of the country in order to spread the

doctrine and the lessons from the previous participations. This practice has permitted a

simultaneous preparation throughout the Army, increasing the preparedness of its

personnel. However, the time to prepare the troops ranges between 60 and 90 days after

the congressional approval of the necessary supplementary credits. These credits allow

25
 LCDR Ludovico A C Velloso

the assembly of materiel and commencement of the requisite administrative procedures

and specific training.

Time of mobilization was improved with the creation of the Rapid Action

Battalions as part of the modernization program of the service. Another important aspect

of the personnel selection is that no conscript can be assigned to UN missions, only

professional soldiers 19 .

In the Navy, the Força de Fuzileiros da Esquadra (FFE), the Brazilian

equivalent to the United States Fleet Marine Force, is responsible for training and

equipping troops, staff members and military observers. Despite the fact that these

Marines and Sailors are not specifically trained to these sort of operations, the marine

units of the FFE have long been conducting training in the specific actions typical to

peacekeeping operations, such as, urban and rural patrols and facility security. The Navy

also contributes military observers and helps with the transportation of personnel and

materiel. Nevertheless, the time of mobilization is the same as that of the Army.

The Air Force contribution in terms of military personnel has been limited to

observers and staff officers, although it has also been contributing significantly to the

sustainment of the forces in the field, and the transportation of personnel, equipment and

supply items 20 .

Before the need to improve the logistic support and integrate contingents from

the two senior services, the Army and the Navy, the former ministry of the Joint Staff

determined the establishment of a support unit to each mission involving armed troop

18
Da Fontoura, Paulo R. C. T. O Brasil e as Operações de Manutenção da Paz da ONU. 2000, p. 210
19
Rapid Action Battalion. In Portuguese, “Batalhão de Pronto-emprego” . This Army chose some units throughout the
country and established a special program of equipping and training in order to transform these units in rapid
deployable battalions to improve time-response and preparedness of the service.

26
 LCDR Ludovico A C Velloso

contingents called Grupo de Apoio do Estado Maior das Forças Armadas (GRAPEMFA).

Two of these groups were established, one to support the UNAVEM III in Angola and

another to support the UNOMOZ in Mozambique. The Ministry of Foreign Relations did

not play a formal role in formation of these groups; however, it was invited to participate

on an informal basis. This interaction permitted the establishment of adequate

coordination between ministries and services, fostering the mutual confidence essential to

situations involving the country’s prestige and the risk of human lives.

The cost of sending and maintaining troops for a protracted period is another

important issue that deserves to be carefully analyzed. The contingents of UNOMOZ and

UNAVEM III accounted for a cost of R$ 236,647,332, or approximately US $

100,000,000.00. The personnel expenses accounted for almost 38 percent of the total

cost, R$ 102,086,435. Nevertheless, this aspect can be rationalized by the fact that had

these troops stayed in the country, they would have consumed almost the same amount in

regular training. Furthermore, the expenses in materiel particularly were made to acquire

equipment or hire services from national companies. Considering the amount of

resources usually allocated to the military budget that in 1998, for example, was US $ 13,

8 billion, this cost can be considered affordable. 21

It is also important to note that the contribution to the UN peacekeeping

operations is mandatory for all the member states according to Chapter 1 of the United

Nations Charter. In the case of an inadequate contribution, the specified country will

have to reimburse other member states. Until 1999, Brazil had been reimbursed in US $

20
Da Fontoura, Paulo R. C. T. O Brasil e as Operações de Manutenção da Paz da ONU. 2000, p. 212
21
Da Fontoura, Paulo R. C. T. O Brasil e as Operações de Manutenção da Paz da ONU. 2000., p. 214 and Braga,
Carlos C. V. Military Integration in The Southern Cone: A Natural Consequence of MERCOSUR. 2000, P. 19

27
 LCDR Ludovico A C Velloso

36,000,000, and some other reimbursements are pending because of the delinquency of

the UN.

Besides the measures to improve the training and preparation of forces, other

important actions were taken in order to defend the Brazilian interests in the context of

the missions in which the country was contributing troops, particularly the assignment of

personnel to be employed in key functions within the staff in the field and within the

Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO).22

Although the majority of the measures implemented somehow helped to

improve the country contribution to the United Nations peacekeeping efforts, it is

relevant to address the issue of mobilization, particularly the congressional approval of

credits. While the assignment of military observers is absorbed by the regular budget of

the armed forces, the deployment and employment of troops need congressional approval
23
for extra credits, a process that normally requires ninety days . Considering that the

time for preparation of the force accounts for additional 60 to 90 days the overall time to

have the contingent operating in the field can reach up to 180 days.

BRAZILIAN PARTICIPATION IN COMMAND BILLETS IN UN

PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

The inter-ministerial working-group stressed the need for Brazil to have officers

assigned to command billets in the UN peacekeeping operations as an effective way to

safeguard the troops assigned to those missions, as well as a means to provide the

assigned officers with a broader professional experience and motivate the officers dealing

22
Da Fontoura, Paulo R. C. T. O Brasil e as Operações de Manutenção da Paz da ONU. 2000.., p. 215
23
Ibid., p. 213

28
 LCDR Ludovico A C Velloso

with these challenges. However, the Brazilian experience, throughout its more than 50

years duration, reveals that the selection process to key billets is a cloudy mixture of

political criteria, of the size of the troop contributions, of the mood of the Secretariat, of

particular aspects of the conflict, and of the sensitivities of the neighboring countries and

of the country invited to cede the flag officer. 24

Moreover, as a usual procedure, the DPKO tries to assign the billets in

proportion to the quantity of troops and personnel assigned by the contributing countries.

On one hand, in Angola, Brazil offered 43 officers to compose the staff and work in the

regional commands. However, only a small part of them occupied key billets, despite the

fact that Brazil and India were the two greatest contributors of troops. On the other, in

Guatemala, in Mozambique, and in the former Yugoslavia, where in each case the

contributions of the participating countries were far less expressive, the Army supplied

one field grade officer to be the executive officer of the MINUGUA and two flag officers

to command the military observers in UNOMOZ and in UNPROFOR.

MISSION NAME AND RANK BILLET PERIOD

General-de-Divisão Carlos Paiva Chaves Commandant of the JAN/AGO
UNEF I
(Flag Officer O-8) UN Force 1964
General-de-Divisão Syseno Sarmento Commandant of the JAN1965/
UNEF I
(Flag Officer O-8) UN Force JAN1966
General-de-Brigada Péricles Ferreira Commandant of the JAN1989/
UNAVEM I
Gomes (Flag Officer O-7) Military Observers MAY1991
General-de-Brigada Péricles Ferreira Commandant of the MAY1991/
UNAVEM II
Gomes (Flag Officer O-7) Military Observers SEP1991
General-de-Divisão Lélio Gomçalves Commandant of the FEB1993/
UNOMOZ
Rodrigues da Silva (Flag Officer O-8) Military Component FEB1994
General-de-Brigada Newton Bonuma Commandant of the NOV1994/
UNPROFOR
(Flag Officer O-7) Military Observers NOV1995
Capitão-de-Mar-e-Guerra Carlos Eduardo Commandant of the JUL1996/
UNAVEM III
Brandão (Field Grade Officer O-6) Military Observers JUL 1997
UNAVEM III Capitão-de-Mar-e-Guerra Carlos Ribeiro Commandant of the AGO1997/

24
Da Fontoura, Paulo R. C. T. O Brasil e as Operações de Manutenção da Paz da ONU. 2000, p. 216

29
 LCDR Ludovico A C Velloso

da Silva (Field Grade Officer O-6) Military Observers JUL1998

Deputy of the FEB/MAY
MINUGUA Coronel Adriano Pereira Junior
Military Observers 1997
Figure 3- Brazilian Officers in Command Billets of UN Operations 25

Although the Brazilian capacity to influence the selection process is limited, it is

relevant that the country makes a continuing effort with the Secretary General to have its

officers assigned to the staffs and assigned to the higher billets of the regional commands

in each mission that employs Brazilian personnel. According to the former ministries of

the Joint Staff (EMFA) and of the Army, this was one of the most significant lessons

learned from the Brazilian participations in Mozambique and in Angola. 26

THE PARTICIPATION IN THE UN DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING

OPERATIONS (DPKO)

As a result of a long effort and the successful contribution of troops to the

UNOMOZ and UNAVEM III, Brazil was formally invited to join the Department of

Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in 1994. The participation of Brazilian in the DPKO

was of great importance to the country, as it had worked hard to be accepted. It also

opened Brazilian access to key information regarding the organization of the missions of

observation and peacekeeping operations and the bureaucratic procedures of

reimbursement and indemnities. On June 1998, Brazil became the 5th largest contributor

with 7 officers joining the DPKO, only surpassed by 4 countries, the United States with

11, France with 10, Italy with 9, and United Kingdom with 8. Figure 4 shows these

assignments through February 1999.

25
Da Fontoura, Paulo R. C. T. O Brasil e as Operações de Manutenção da Paz da ONU. 2000, p. 215
26
Ibid., p. 217

30
 LCDR Ludovico A C Velloso

NAME SERVICE BILLET AND SECTION PERIOD

Logistic Officer of the
JUN/1994
Operational Logist Section in
Major Robert R. Baptista Army to
the Field Administration and
JUN/1996
Logistic Division (FALD)
Engineering Officer of the MAY/1995
Major João A. A. da Costa Air Force Engineering Section in the to
FALD APR/1997
Engineering Officer of the APR/1997
Major Marcelo E. C. Rodrigues Army Engineering Section in the to
FALD FEB/1999
Navy Logistic Officer of the MAY/1996
Capitão-de-Fragata (O-5)
(Marine Operational Logist Section in toFEB
Paulo C. D. Teixeira
Corps) the FALD 1998
Medical Support Officer of the MAY/1997
Major Gregório Feldman Air Force Medical Support Unity in the to Feb
Planning Division 1999
Claims Officer of the MAY/1996
Tenente-Coronel (O-5)
Army Administration Unit in the to
José da F. M. Leal
FALD DEC/1998

NAME SERVICE BILLET AND SECTION PERIOD

Assistant Claims Officer of MAY/1996
Suboficial (E-7) Navy the Administration Unit in the to
FALD DEC/1998
Information Analyst of the
MAY/1996
Tenente-Coronel (O-5) Support and Financial
Air Force to
José S. C. do Nascimento Management Service in the
FEB/1998
FALD
Military Personnel Policy
NOV/1996
Capitão-de-Fragata (O-5) Officer of the Under
Navy to
Afrânio de P. M. Júnior Secretary-General Personnel
NOV/1998
Administration Office
Information Systems Officer
NOV/1996
Capitão-de-Corveta (O-4) of the Policy and Analysis
Navy to
Maria de A. Oliveira Unit in the Under
NOV/1998
Secretary-General Office
Logistic Officer of the JUN/1998
Capitão-de-Corveta (O-4)
Navy Operational Logist Section in to
Tomás de A. T. Botelho
the FALD FEB/1999
Figure 4- Brazilian Officers in Staff Billets in the UN Headquarters and in the DPKO 27

27
Da Fontoura, Paulo R. C. T. O Brasil e as Operações de Manutenção da Paz da ONU. 2000, p. 218

31
 LCDR Ludovico A C Velloso

The UN suspended this free assignment of officers to work in the DPKO in

February 1999, because their tours were limited to 2 years. After that short period, the

expertise was lost. Considering the high level of specialty required to fill the billets in the

DPKO, the UN decided to hire retired officers or officers that had left active duty to gain

a more permanent reservoir of skill. In 1998, Brazil submitted candidates selected from

within the armed services; however, with this new policy no one is being considered.

Even though candidates are being rejected at the moment, Brazil considers their

assignment to DPKO vital. Even the alternative of assigning retired officers or officers

who are not on active duty is considered essential, as it is important to occupy these

billets, as such assignments are key in having access to privileged information regarding

the mobilization of forces and organization of UN missions. This last point is important

in that a Brazilian representative can participate more actively in discussions and the

conceptual development of force employment to the benefit of his country. 28

PARTICIPATION IN ELECTIONS MONITORING ACTIVITIES

The Inter-ministerial Working Group verified that Brazil was able to participate

in Elections Monitoring Operations in every type of electoral operation performed by the

United Nations. Until the year of 2000, the country had contributed to 5 peacekeeping

operations and only one civil mission that included election monitoring. This one mission

has been Brazil’s most important civilian contribution. Figure 5 details this activity.

UNOMOZ UNAME
UNAVEM II UNTAC UNOSAL UNOMSA
T
4 19 5 12 16 19
28
Da Fontoura, Paulo R. C. T. O Brasil e as Operações de Manutenção da Paz da ONU. 2000, p. 219

32
 LCDR Ludovico A C Velloso

TOTAL 75
Figure 5- Civilians Election Experts who have participated in UN Peacekeeping

Operations 29

In 1993, as recommended by the Inter-ministerial Working Group, the Superior

Electoral Court selected 69 voluntary experts from the states and from the Federal

District, and their names were included in the data-base of the Elections Assistance

Division of the United Nations. Besides the civilians from the Ministry of Justice,

diplomats from the Itamaraty also worked in support of these activities as government

observers.

The Brazilian participation in these activities has been diversified, and the

country has accumulated significant experience with its system of mobilization of

electoral experts not only to UN missions, but also missions carried out by the OAS and

other multilateral and regional organizations.

With regard to foreign policy, participation of diplomats working together with

military and electoral experts has contributed to a better domestic visibility of the

overseas activities, especially because of the assignment of representatives from all the

states. Overall and as a consequence of good results achieved internationally and

domestically, it is of great importance that the country pursues a foreign policy towards a

permanent commitment in order to contribute even more effectively to UN efforts in the

electoral field and to continue to update the data-base of the Elections Assistance

Division of the United Nations 30 .

THE ISSUES OF THE BRAZILIAN LEGISLATION

29
Da Fontoura, Paulo R. C. T. O Brasil e as Operações de Manutenção da Paz da ONU. 2000, p. 225

33
 LCDR Ludovico A C Velloso

Efforts of the Executive to influence the congress over the necessity to update

and modernize the legislation that regulates the employment of troops overseas in

peacetime has produced little. The current federal law 2,953 dates from 17 November

1956 and is in need of revision. Moreover, there is still no legislation to regulate the

employment of military observers.

The law project that resulted from the recommendations of the Inter-ministerial

Working Group tried to update the current legislation in 1993. The Government sent to

congress draft legislation on December 27; nevertheless, the experience accumulated in

Angola and Mozambique revealed that it was inadequate and the project was withdrawn

from the congress.

In 1999, constitutional amendment number 23 dated September 9 created the

Ministry of Defense and extinguished the former three services ministries and the joint

staff ministry. It addressed expressly the role of the Defense regarding peacekeeping

operations. It should be responsible for preparing, mobilizing and providing forces to UN

peacekeeping operations, while the ministry of foreign relations would provide an

interface with the UN and would advise the President with regard to choosing the best

scenarios in which the country could participate. These roles were perfectly in

accordance with the National Defense Policy, established by the President in 1996.

However, the congress considers that this document does not address fundamental issues.

Among other issues, there are procedures needed to hire companies to provide services or

materiel and equipment and to allocate resources in the Defense budget to meet the needs

of this type of operations.

30
Da Fontoura, Paulo R. C. T. O Brasil e as Operações de Manutenção da Paz da ONU. 2000, p. 225

34
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Moreover, within the Executive branch there is no consensus over the inclusion

of a rubric in the Military budget to attend the specific expenses in UN peacekeeping

operations. The economic advisors within the Executive consider a formal appreciation

by the Congress as essential to alter the composition of the Budget, which move would

meet one suggestion made by Boutros-Ghali in his Agenda for Peace to shift the

responsibility from the Foreign Relations Ministries to the Defense Ministries. According

to him, this would presumably highlight international peacekeeping as a central security

mission in the post-Cold War period and could provide much larger resources than

typically exist in the Foreign Relation Ministries 31 . In the specific case of Brazil, it would

also contribute to better meeting the roles set in the National Defense Policy.

Every time that the country has had the opportunity to contribute with troops in

United Nations peacekeeping operations, the issue has had to pass two times in the

congress. First, the Executive has needed to obtain the acquiescence to send a contingent

overseas and second, to approve additional credits to meet the financial needs of the

mission. As a result, the overall delay in this process could reach up to 180 days.

It is highly recommended that the Executive and the Legislative establish a co-

responsibility system, because of the diplomatic sensitivity of the matter and the need to

respond with supplementary budget credits, both of which could improve the country’s

response to the UN requests. This system would also allow a more effective channel of

information between the branches, improving the transparency of the decisions, an aspect

31
Roper, J., Nishiara, M., Otunnu, O. A., and Schoettle, E. C. B. Keeping the Peace in The Post-Cold War Era:
Strengthening Multilateral Peacekeeping. The Trilateral Commission, Paris, New York and Tokyo, 1993, Chapter III.

35
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highly valorized by the Congress, particularly with regard to press coverage of the events

in the field 32 .

THE PARTICIPATION IN THE UN EFFORTS TOWARDS THE ACHIEVMENT

OF A RAPID REACTION CAPABILITY

A most important aspect of the Brazilian government effort at responding to UN

needs is that of its opposition to the establishment of a permanent or even semi-

permanent force under the operational control of the United Nations, particularly in the

way it was proposed in the Peace Agenda elaborated by the former Secretary-General

Boutros-Ghali in 1992. The major concerns of the country in this regard are threefold.

The first is budgetary implications. The second is the issue of command and command

relationships, and the third is the existence of a potential risk of manipulation by the great

powers, particularly the permanent members of the Security Council 33 . Despite these

challenges to Brazilian sovereignty, the government intends to support the UN efforts to

reduce the time between the issue of the Security Resolution setting the mission and the

deployment of the forces.

This paper now addresses other suggestions to improve the United Nations

response. It is important to assess the Brazilian participation in the Stand-by

Arrangements System and in the informal group of the Friends of the Rapid Deployment

Mission. Finally, it is vital to analyze the Brazilian contribution to the establishment of a

United Nations Rapid Deployable Brigade.

32
Da Fontoura, Paulo R. C. T. O Brasil e as Operações de Manutenção da Paz da ONU. 2000, p. 239 and 240.
33
Da Fontoura, Paulo R. C. T. O Brasil e as Operações de Manutenção da Paz da ONU. 2000, p. 240.

36
 LCDR Ludovico A C Velloso

THE PARTICIPATION IN THE STAND-BY-ARRANGEMENTS SYSTEM

Despite former invitations in 1991, Brazilian participation in the UN Stand-by

Arrangements System was regarded more seriously only after the establishment of the

Inter-ministerial Working Group in 1993. As a consequence of this change in posture, the

Army and the Navy had to identify the forces that would be available for these

operations. However, the need of Congressional approval both for deployment and

financial resources were incompatible with the mobilization time proposed by the DPKO,

which was up to 7 days, up to 14 days and up to 30 days, depending on the size of the

force and scenario. This incompatibility had left the initial efforts inconclusive. In 1994,

the government put the project on hold pending reconciliation between congressional

approval times and UN notice.

It was not until 1997, when the DPKO reviewed the mobilization time

requirements – up to 30 days, from 30 to 60 days, up to 90 days and more than 90 days –

that the matter gained a renewed life. These times could be considered feasible and

compatible with Brazilian government requirements, since they would now allow the

time usually needed by the Congress to approve and make available the proper resources.

At the same time the Army was implementing its Rapid Action Battalion, a force that

would soon qualify to be introduced into the data-base of the DPKO.

On July, 1998, the armed services commited? to the Itamaraty the forces

available to support the UN Stand-by Arrangements System. Mainly, these forces were

comprised of one Marine Corps Infantry Battalion, one Army Infantry Battalion, a

Combat Engineer Company, a medical detachment, and 27 officers from the Navy,

37
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Marine Corps and the Army to support the Rapid Deployable Mission Headquarters and

the Staff of the Mission Command.

Despite the relaxation in the mobilization times, there were lingering concerns

about the legislative and the budgetary issues. However, these obstacles did not impede

the country to making progress and overcoming issues, such as, information

unavailability, readiness, logistics and training improvements within the armed forces. In

the budgetary field, the government needs to study the possibility of establishing

cotangential credits in the budget, and in the legal field the Congress and the Executive

should contemplate signing a Memorandum on an Ad Referendum basis. This

memorandum would give the Executive prior authorization to commit forces as proposed

in 1998. Occasional adjustments could be further carried out by the Congress as a result

of negotiations with the UN. Moreover, this would allow the reliable insertion of

Brazilian forces in the DPKO data-base. 34

PROPOSALS TO IMPROVE THE RAPID DEPLOYMENT OUTSIDE THE UN

Different methods have been developed to improve the Rapid Deployable

System by various countries, mainly European and North-American States, with lesser or

greater degrees of success. Among those, the Rapid Deployable Brigade (SHIRBRIG),

the Iberia-American Peace Force and the “Força Lusófona de Paz” are of special interest

for the Brazilian Government because of the priorities in its foreign policy of

strengthening its ties with other Latin-American and Portuguese speaking countries.

34
Da Fontoura, Paulo R. C. T. O Brasil e as Operações de Manutenção da Paz da ONU. 2000, p. 244.

38
 LCDR Ludovico A C Velloso

With regard to the SHIRBRIG, the main constraints to the Brazilian integration

are the legal and the budgetary issues already discussed. These impose a considerable

delay in the mobilization and preparation of forces. Considering the fact that until now

the country has not found a way to overcome these constraints, the government has never

shown any real intention in joining this force. The other two initiatives, restricted to a

smaller group of countries, were likewise not advanced.

During the II Defense Ministers Assembly of the Portuguese Official Language

African Countries in May 1999, Brazil and Portugal agreed in submit to the Portuguese

Speaking Countries Community a proposal for the creation of an Interstate Defense

Commission. Given the Government’s experience and those of the European countries

and of the United States in Africa, the true underlying intent of the proposed military

cooperation was aimed at preparing troops to integrate into UN peacekeeping forces

rather than to establish any long-term commitment to a multi-national force.

Furthermore, no African country has shown any real the intent to participate in

the Stand-by Arrangements System. In Latin-America, only four other countries agreed

to participate in this arrangement: Argentina, Bolivia, Guatemala and Uruguay.

Argentina, a strategic partner in the MERCOSUR, joined the SHIRBRIG, which clouds

the situation with respect to Brazil and raise further issues to consider with regard to

economic and military integration in the Southern cone and in Latin-America.

As a result, the only initiative that has gained maturity, particularly after 1994,

is the SHIRBRIG. The others are considered to be more a way to strengthen bilateral

military relations than an effective way to improve the rapid response capability for

United Nations Peacekeeping operations. Regarding these aspects and the legal and

39
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budgetary constraints, any significant improvement in a short term is not considered

feasible. 35

THE PARTICIPATION IN THE FRIENDS OF THE RAPID DEPLOYMENT

GROUP AND IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RAPID DEPLOYABLE

MISSION HEADQUARTERS

Brazil has participated in the informal group of Friends of Rapid Deployment,

and believes that the position of the group should be disseminated better, and that all

members contribute with equal weight. This position is adopted so that a small number of

states, particularly the NATO members, do not dominate the recommended proposals and

the courses of action. Brazil recognizes the utility of this group; however, it considers that

the appropriate forum for this matter is the UN Peacekeeping Operations Special

Committee.

The proposal most favored by Brazil and discussed in this forum is the

establishment of the Rapid Deployment Mission Headquarters (RDMHQ). After the

creation of the RDMHQ Unit in the DPKO in July 1996, the Secretariat consulted the

member states over the assignment of personnel to fill its billets. Today, the nucleus of

the Headquarters has been established; however, the DPKO intended to create an

intermediate support unit with up to 29 personnel in the DPKO and another 24 personnel

on stand-by in their home countries.

As opposed to the Stand-by Arrangements, the military personnel assigned to

the RDMHQ can be employed without further notice to their home country. This idea

does not contravene the Brazilian National Policy of impartiality and non-use of force.

35
Da Fontoura, Paulo R. C. T. O Brasil e as Operações de Manutenção da Paz da ONU. 2000, p. 247.

40
 LCDR Ludovico A C Velloso

This arrangement is reinforced by Brazilian participation in of the group of Rapid

Deployment Friends, which fosters discussion over vital matters, such as transportation

of troops and other logistics requirements. 36

IMPROVING THE AFRICAN CAPACITY IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

The former advisor of the Secretary-General, General Franklin Van Kappen,

suggested that Brazil should extend its participation in Africa to non-Portuguese speaking

countries. According to him, this could be an appropriate response to critiques from a

number of countries regarding Brazilian participation in lusophone UN peacekeeping

operations. The inference here is that Brazil is “the new Portugal”, an epithet with

adverse colonial connotations. Such a modification in policy tends also to prevent

adverse comparisons to other South-American countries, such as, Argentina and

Uruguay.

Besides the moral pressure, this proposal seems to have a clear intent of forcing

Brazil to augment its contribution with additional troops. Brazil’s principal commitment

is to the Portuguese Speaking Countries Community and Latin-America. Nevertheless, it

has authorized the United Nations to transfer military observers from the UNAVEM II in

Angola to the UNOMIL in Libya, has sent electoral experts to the UNOMSA in South-

Africa, and furnished military observers and a medical detachment to augment the

UNOMUR. 37

In terms of bilateral cooperation, Brazil has made contacts with the American

African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI), and the French Renforcement des Capacités

36
Da Fontoura, Paulo R. C. T. O Brasil e as Operações de Manutenção da Paz da ONU. 2000, p. 249
37
Da Fontoura, Paulo R. C. T. O Brasil e as Operações de Manutenção da Paz da ONU. 2000, p. 250

41
 LCDR Ludovico A C Velloso

Africaines de Maintien de la Paix (RECAMP) initiatives. The first result of these contacts

was the participation in two assemblies of the African Peacekeeping Support Group

(APSG) in New York. These meetings envisaged the conduct of infantry training. The

Brazilian Army was consulted and agreed to examine the possibilities for cooperation in

light of its financial constraints and the kind of training required. In regard to the latter,

the French government invited Brazil to participate in two exercises. The first occurred in

1998 in Senegal, and the other in 2000, in Gabon. In both exercises the country

participated only with observers. Although these invitations were important from the

stand-point of bilateral relationships and military interchange, they did not contribute

significantly to improve the Brazilian capability to conduct peacekeeping operations.

Despite the increasing need for emergency humanitarian assistance during the

recent conflicts on the African continent, the Brazilian government is currently incapable

of providing a significant contribution in this area, again because of operational and

budgetary constraints. Nevertheless, a plausible course of action could be the

establishment of agreements with selected countries on information sharing, engineering

missions, military personnel education, and on-job training. This political gesture would

highlight Brazilian commitment without a long-term or expensive commitment.

However, over time it could be positively interpreted and might prove to be an effective

commitment towards the improvement of the African countries in conducting

peacekeeping operations. 38

THE REPERCUSSION IN THE PRESS

38
Da Fontoura, Paulo R. C. T. O Brasil e as Operações de Manutenção da Paz da ONU. 2000, p. 252

42
 LCDR Ludovico A C Velloso

As the commitment of the Brazilian troops grew during the early 1990s, there

was an increasing need to give more transparency to the government decisions affecting

troops employed in Mozambique and Angola. Overall the media coverage focused on the

contribution of Brazilian troops to the happy notion of peace and international security.

The press did, however, address the complaints of low salaries by military personnel, and

the augmented pay of UN missions acting as a primary factor in attracting volunteers.

The Joint Staff Ministry (EMFA) was anxious to have the media visit military

facilities overseas and arranged a daily program in the Radiobrás, the official Brazilian

government radio station, to report on Brazilian troops in Angola and Mozambique.

In the majority of cases the response was very positive; however, in some

episodes, such as, the fatal wounding of a marine corporal who was killed in an ambush,

media coverage was sensational and gave a distorted and disproportional view of the

situation. As the media is a significant instrument in forming and manipulating opinion, it

must feel that immediate and precise information is being provided, particularly over any

adverse development.

The decision to contribute with troops is certainly a political one, and it is taken

with the inherent risks of participation in operations such as peacekeeping. However,

government decisions cannot be dictated by a possible negative public reaction at the

news of accidents or fatalities. The government needs to be pro-active and provide

substantial and timely information to the general public. Part of this anticipation should

be a policy of cooperation with all forms of media in influencing public opinion. The

publication of articles in specialized magazines is one way that could contribute

effectively to the government efforts.

43
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PARTICIPATION IN NATION REBUILDING OPERATIONS

Actions that are aimed at keeping peace need to be followed by or implemented

simultaneously with measures to consolidate peace. These measures seek to prevent the

reopening of hostilities, to aid in economic recovery, and to encourage a democratic

government.

The economic, political and social recovery can be achieved through a

reintegration of a population into sound business, government and social pursuits. To

achieve these purposes, there will be a considerable need for the generation of new jobs,

investments to rebuild the physical infrastructure, and the establishment of the rule of

law. It is also essential to reestablish means for the population to feed itself and make a

living free of NGOs and other sources of support. Brazil has given aid both by bilateral

and multilateral agreements to host nations. Among the contributions, the ministries of

foreign relations and the armed forces have provided support for the organization of

police forces, and mine removal activities.

Recently, the Army and the Marine Corps have been participating in a mission

conducted by the OAS to remove mines in Central America, the MARMINCA. This

mission is part of the Mine-clearing Assistance Program in Central America (PADCA),

created in 1991 upon a request of countries within that region. The Inter-American

Defense Joint-Staff (JID) coordinates the operational activities of the international

military teams that in June 1999 were composed of 28 personnel from Brazil, 4 from

Argentina, 5 from Colombia, 3 from El Salvador and 4 from Venezuela. Traditionally the

largest contingent to augment the MARMINCA is Brazilian and without onus to the

44
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organization or the host nation. The Brazilian Officers have performed tasks of mine

clearing in Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua.

Another important contribution is to the improvement of police services.

Policemen from Brazil have contributed to the National Academy of Public Security

(ANSP), in which Brazilian policemen performed as instructors and advisors and also

contributed to the Central-American Police Superior Studies Institutes, both located in El

Salvador.

In Angola the Army has sent one doctor to teach in the Mine Counter-action

Technical School of Angola, and to contribute to the National Development Program of a

Mine-clearing Capacity, sponsored by the United Nations Office Project Services

(UNOPS).

Again in Angola the government attempted to establish a bilateral cooperation

with the proposed foundation of a Mission of Military Cooperation. This military mission

would comprise military personnel and material mobilized primarily from the Army. It

would consist of a liaison office, one combat engineering company, and one medical

team. The Itamaraty defined the purpose of the mission, and the financial resources

necessary to support the mission would be approximately 17 million dollars. 39 The

ratification of this mission is still dependent on the signing of the agreement between

Brazil and Angola and a subsequent congressional approval.

In Angola, the military participation in peace consolidation initiatives helps to

project a positive image of Brazil both in international circles and in Angola. While this

country is located in a region that receives a high priority in Brazilian foreign policy, its

outlook remains dim under the current government, despite the fact that it holds great

45
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potential with its vast natural resources. Taking advantage of its industrial, services and

technological capabilities, other potential fields of bilateral cooperation can be explored,

such as structuring of the education system and construction, particularly housing and

roads. 40

In other words, in light of Brazilian foreign policy, it is essential to sustain a

presence in order to demonstrate good faith toward the potential bilateral relationship.

Indeed, it is important to note that countries simply contributing with donations of

equipment and financial resources garner less appreciation and acknowledgment than

those contributing troops and personnel in the field. Brazilian experience indicates that a

people-to-people aspect of any program is important in making it understood and

appreciated by all concerned. A remaining question is raised as to what extent the

Itamaraty would be interested in focusing its bilateral relations on the military and police

field in the face of decreasing budgetary resources and increasing technical capabilities

requirements. 41

LESSONS FROM THE BRAZILIAN PARTICIPATION IN PEACEKEEPING

OPERATIONS

Brazil has kept an independent and consistent position without succumbing to

the oscillations in the postures of some western countries that until 1993 had considered

peacekeeping operations as a panacea for every conflict. After 1994, those countries

adopted an unwavering position regarding the creation of new missions and have

preferred to support the authorization of Chapter VII mandates for multinational forces,

39
Da Fontoura, Paulo R. C. T. O Brasil e as Operações de Manutenção da Paz da ONU. 2000, p. 258
40
Da Fontoura, Paulo R. C. T. O Brasil e as Operações de Manutenção da Paz da ONU. 2000, p. 259

46
 LCDR Ludovico A C Velloso

or depending on the case, for regional or sub-regional organisms, considered more

“efficient” by the United Nations. 42

On one hand Brazil does not support the policy adopted by some non-aligned

countries that are adamantly against new concepts and proposals to adjust or change the

methods employed. On the other, it does not concur with the developed countries that

seek to implement their interventionist policies. 43

It is clear to say that Brazil has a large and widely varied experience in

peacekeeping operations. However, there are still some fields in which the country needs

to improve effective practical measures in order to support its foreign policy and the

achievement of its strategic goals. There is little question about the know-how acquired in

participating in a broad and wide context in the last forty-five years, from military

observation and demilitarized zone patrolling to electoral monitoring. Nevertheless, some

essential capacities can be improved in order to contribute more effectively to the role of

the country in the future.

These opportunities for improvement include logistic capabilities to support

missions at long distances, command and control, inter-agency and joint planning and

conduct of operations, revised legislation, presence in the host nation after the end of the

mandate, enhanced peace consolidation process, and a review of its foreign policy to

consider the possibility of integrating ad hoc coalitions of multinational forces authorized

by the United Nations and the expansion of the priorities of commitment from being

mainly restricted to the Portuguese speaking countries and Latin America to other regions

of the planet.

41
Ibid., p. 259
42
Ibid., p. 264

47
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CHAPTER 4

WHY PEACEKEEPING REMAINS ESSENTIAL

As the character of threats has changed, many conflicts may seem remote to those not

immediately in the line of fire. Nevertheless, recent history has shown how quickly civil

wars between parties can destabilize neighboring countries and spread throughout entire

43
Da Fontoura, Paulo R. C. T. O Brasil e as Operações de Manutenção da Paz da ONU. 2000, p. 264

48
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regions. These conflicts often generate a series of other threats to international security,

such as illegal arms traffic, terrorism, drug traffic, refugee flows and damage to the

environment, whose repercussions can be felt far way from the initial conflict zone.

International cooperation is essential to deal with these global problems. UN

peacekeeping operations, with more than half a century of experience, are a feasible and

reliable tool. Its legitimacy and universality, although sometimes contested, can barely be

achieved by other arrangements. An organization with 189 member states is unique. It

provides peacekeeping forces with special credentials and a moral strength that no other

organization in the world can give. Today there are 15 UN peacekeeping missions spread

through 4 continents, employing 47,095 persons among civilians, police, and military

personnel from 87 countries. The projected cost of the current peacekeeping operations

for the period from 1 July 2001 to 30 June 2002 ranges from 2.7 to 3 billions of US

dollars. This considerable sum underlines the relevance of peacekeeping operations

today44 .

CONSEQUENCES FOR THE BRAZILIAN FOREIGN POLICY

The Brazilian enhanced participation during the 1990s did not provide the

expected returns. Despite the fact it helped to project the name of country, it did not

gather international recognition or support for the Brazilian claims over a Security

Council reform and a possible permanent seat. Nevertheless, the Inter-ministerial

working-group conclusions about the importance of United Nations peacekeeping

operations were correct, since the improved participation of the country in the mid 1990s

49
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contributed to various invitations to participate in other ongoing operations, as it

consolidated its prestige as a competent peacekeeper.

Given the remaining relevance of peacekeeping operations as a consequence of

many latent conflicts spread throughout the globe, Brazil’s enhanced participation in UN

operations, if it does not contribute directly to gaining the objectives established in the

current National Defense Policy, at a minimum will help to keep the prestige of the

country as a distinguished contributor to UN peace efforts. Moreover, as the country

claims to be prepared to assume the inherent responsibilities of a permanent member of

the Security Council, its current participations can be considered far too modest when

compared to the financial burden imposed on this select group alongside the economic

potential of the country that could reach up to US $ 80 million. Nowadays, Brazil is

contributing military and civilian personnel in only 3 UN peacekeeping operations,

totaling 80 persons 45 .

Participation in Peacekeeping operations provides relevant experiences and is a

valuable way to improve the professional abilities of any military force. The co-

habitation of forces of various countries in a common purpose provides a unique

environment that helps to improve the readiness and capabilities of an armed force to

integrate with multinational forces. It helps the development of doctrine and the

acquisition of important professional experience. It is also vital to mention that broader,

more active participation not restricted to peacekeeping operations can contribute

44
Aguilar, Sergio L. C. A Política Externa Brasileira e a Participação nas Missões de Paz. AND/Nº 790/ 2º QUAD.,
2001. p. 96 and United Nations Current Peacekeeping Operations 15 January 2002
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/cu_mission/body.htm
45
Roper, John, Nishihara, Masashi, Otunnu, Olara A., and Schoettle, Enid C. B. Keeping The Peace In The Post-Cold
War Era: Strenghtening Multilateral Peacekeeping . The Trilateral Commission, 1993. p. 18. and Aguilar, Sergio L. C.
A Política Externa Brasileira e a Participação nas Missões de Paz . AND/Nº 790/ 2º QUAD., 2001. p. 97

50
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significantly to project the name of the country internationally and help consolidate its

defense strategic goals.

Regarding military force employment principles, the country has shown

significant evolution in the recent years. Understanding that adamant restraints with

respect to peace-enforcing will contribute neither to the accomplishment of its national

objectives nor to the improvement of international peace and security. During its last

participation in the Security Council, the country joined a multinational coalition headed

by Australia carrying out a UN mission for the first time in history and gave support to

the NATO bombardments in Kosovo. These decisions revealed that Brazil intends to

keep up to date with the international trends 46 .

Brazil to date has had a consistent but modest commitment to peacekeeping

operations, particularly in light of its national wealth. It had initially seen such operations

as an avenue to a seat on the UN Security Council; however, as this route seems less and

less certain, Brazil has been reluctant to commit further resources, particularly in peace-

enforcement missions.

A renewed posture is vital particularly when there is a legitimate need of

humanitarian aid. In such a case failing to respond rapidly and adequately can seriously

compromise the international prestige of the country. In order to achieve improvement, it

is also essential that internally Brazil pursue an enhanced integration in the executive and

between the executive and the legislative, in order to provide the country with a response

capacity compatible with its economic potential.

When the mission includes the need for a restoration of a nation self-governing

ability, the capacity to contribute to rebuilding a nation’s infra-structure, and to conduct

51
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democratic elections are key to participate more actively in current UN operations. There

seems to be an endless demand for these activities. Regardless of the mandate scope, it is

also of fundamental importance that Brazil pursues an enhanced post-mission relationship

with the host country to strengthen friendship ties and also to take advantage of potential

bilateral and multi-lateral political, military, trade and business opportunities.

Although Brazil maintains a foreign policy that gives priorities to Latin-

American and Portuguese speaking countries, it intends, nevertheless, to maintain

adequate peacekeeping participation in order to remain current in its capabilities. Brazil

continues to hope that the political landscape will change and permit it to reap the

rewards of increased exposure with a more prominent stature internationally and

particularly with a permanent seat on a revised UN Security Council.

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