I. INTRODUCTION BATAS PAMBANSA Blg.

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Article VIII (Sections 1 and 5) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution AN ACT REORGANIZING THE JUDICIARY, APPROPRIATING FUNDS
THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
ARTICLE VIII
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT PRELIMINARY CHAPTER

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Section 1. Title. – This Act shall be known as "The Judiciary
Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Reorganization Act of 1980."

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle Section 2. Scope. – The reorganization herein provided shall
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable include the Court of Appeals, the Court of First Instance, the
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been Circuit Criminal Courts, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of Courts, the Courts of Agrarian Relations, the City Courts, the
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Municipal Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Courts.
Government.
CHAPTER I
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: COURT OF APPEALS

(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, Section 3. Organization. – There is hereby created a Court of
other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for Appeals which consists of a Presiding Justice and fifty Associate
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas Justice who shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines.
corpus. The Presiding Justice shall be so designated in his appointment,
and the Associate Justice shall have precedence according to the
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or dates of their respective appointments, or when the
certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final appointments of two or more of them shall bear the same date,
judgments and orders of lower courts in: according to the order in which their appointments were issued
by the President. Any member who is reappointed to the Court
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, after rendering service in any other position in the government
international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, shall retain the precedence to which he was entitled under his
proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in original appointment, and his service in the Court shall, for all
question. intents and purposes, be considered as continuous and
uninterrupted. (as amended by Exec. Order No. 33,, July 28,
(b) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, 1986.)
or toll, or any penalty imposed in relation thereto.
Section 4. Exercise of powers and functions. – The Court Appeals
(c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue. shall exercise its powers, functions, and duties, through seventeen
(17) divisions, each composed of three (3) members. The Court
(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion may sit en banc only for the purpose of exercising administrative,
perpetua or higher. ceremonial, or other non-adjudicatory functions. (as amended by
Exec. Order No. 33,.)
(e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.
Section 5. Succession to Office of Presiding Justice. – In case of a
(3) Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as vacancy in the absence of inability to perform the powers,
public interest may require. Such temporary assignment shall not functions, and duties of his office, the associate Justice who is first
exceed six months without the consent of the judge concerned. in precedence shall perform his powers, functions, and duties
until such disability is removed, or another Presiding Justice is
(4) Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage appointed and has qualified.
of justice.
Section 6. Who presides over session of a division. – If the
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement Presiding Justice is present in any session of a division of the
of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all Court, he shall preside. In his absence, the Associate Justice
courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, attending such session who has precedence shall preside.
and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall
provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy Section 7. Qualifications. – The Presiding Justice and the Associate
disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same Justice shall have the same qualifications as those provided in
grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive Constitution for Justice of the Supreme Court.
rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial
bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Section 8. Grouping of Divisions. – (Expressly repealed by Section
Court. 4, Exec. Order No. 33, July 28, 1986.)

(6) Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in Section 9. Jurisdiction. – The Court of Appeals shall Exercise:
accordance with the Civil Service Law.
Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 1. Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition,
certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or
7691
processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction;
2. Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of Section 13. Creation of Regional Trial Courts. – There are hereby
judgements of Regional Trial Courts; and created thirteen (13) Regional Trial Courts, one for each of the
following judicial regions:
3. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgements,
resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi- The First Judicial Region, consisting of the provinces of Abra,
judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commission, Benguet, Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, La Union, Mountain Province,
including the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Social and Pangasinan, and cities of Baguio, Dagupan, Laog and San
Security Commission, the Employees Compensation Commission Carlos;
and the Civil Service Commission, Except those falling within the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with The Second Judicial Region, consisting of the provinces of Batanes,
the Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under Cagayan, Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao, Nueva Viscaya, and Quirino;
Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions of this
Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and The Third Judicial Region, consisting of the provinces of Bataan,
subparagraph 4 of the fourth paragraph od Section 17 of the Bulacan (except the municipality of valenzuela), Nueva Ecija,
Judiciary Act of 1948. Pampanga, Tarlac, and Zambales, and the cities of Angeles,
Cabanatuan, Olongapo, Palayan and San Jose;
The court of Appeals shall have the power to try cases and
conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts The National Capital Judicial Region, consisting of the cities of
necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its Manila, Quezon, Pasay, Caloocan and Mandaluyong, and the
original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant municipalities of Navotas, Malabon, San Juan, Makati, Pasig,
and conduct new trials or Appeals must be continuous and must Pateros, Taguig, Marikina, Parañaque, Las Piñas, Muntinlupa, and
be completed within three (3) months, unless extended by the Valenzuela;
Chief Justice. (as amended by R.A. No. 7902.)
The Fourth Judicial Region, consisting of the provinces of
Section 10. Place of holding sessions. – The Court of Appeals shall Batangas, Cavite, Laguna, Marinduque, Mindoro Occidental,
have its permanent station in the City of Manila. Whenever Mindoro Oriental, Palawan, Quezon, Rizal (except the cities and
demanded by public interest, the Supreme Court, upon its own municipalities embraced within the National Capital Judicial
initiative or upon recommendation of the Presiding Justice, may Region0, Romblon, and Aurora, and the cities of Batangas, Cavite,
authorize a division of the Court to hold sessions outside Manila, Lipa, Lucena, Puerto Princessa, San Pablo, Tagaytay, and Trece
periodically, or for such periods and at such places as the Martires;
Supreme Court may determine, for the purpose of hearing and
deciding cases. The Fifth Judicial Region, consisting of the provinces of Albay,
Camarines Sur, Camarines Norte, Catanduanes, Masbate, and
Section 11. Quorum – A majority of the actual members of the Sorsogon, and the cities of Legaspi, Naga and Iriga;
Court shall constitute a quorum for its session en banc. Three
members shall constitute a quorum for the session of a division. The Sixth Judicial Region, consisting of the provinces of Aklan,
The unanimous vote of the three members of a division shall be Antique, Capiz, Iloilo, La Calota, Roxas, San Carlos, and Silay, and
necessary for the pronouncement of a decision of final resolution, the subprovince of Guimaras;
which shall be reached in consultation before the writing of the
opinion by any members of the division. In the event that the The Seventh Judicial Region, consisting of the provinces of Bohol,
three members do not reach a unanimous vote, the Presiding Cebu, Negros Oriental, and Siquijor, and the cities of Bais,
Justice shall request the Raffle Committee of the Court for the Canlaon, Cebu, Danao, Dumaguete, Lapu-lapu, Mandaue,
designation of two additional Justice to sit temporarily with them, Tagbilaran, and Toledo,
forming a special division of five members and the concurrence of
a majority of such division shall be necessary for the The Eighth Judicial Region, consisting of the provinces or Eastern
pronouncement of a decision or final resolution. The designation Samar, Leyte, Northern, Samar, Southern Leyte, Ormoc, and
of such additional Justice shall be made strictly by raffle. Tacloban:

A month for reconsideration of its decision or final resolution shall The Ninth Judicial Region, consisting of the provinces of Basilan,
be resolved by the Court within ninety (90) days from the time it Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga del Sur, and the cities of Dapitan,
is submitted for resolution, and no second motion for Dipolog, Pagadian, and Zamboanga;
reconsideration from the same party shall be entertainment. (as
amended by Exec. Order No. 33, July 28, 1986.) The Tenth Judicial Region, consisting of the provinces of Agusan
del Norte, Agusan del Sur, Bukidnon, Camiguin, Misamis
Section 12. Internal Rules. – The court en banc is authorized to Occidental, Misamis Oriental, and Surigao del Norte, and the cities
promulgate rules or orders governing the constitution of the of Butuan, Cagayan de Oro, Gingoog, Ozamis, Oroquieta, Surigao,
divisions and the assignment of Appellate Justices thereto, the and Tangub;
distribution of cases, and other matters pertaining to the
operations of the Court of its divisions. Copies of such rules and The Eleventh Judicial Region, consistingnof the provinces of Davao
orders shall be furnished by the Supreme Court, which rules and del Norte, Davao Oriental, Davao del Sur, South Cotabato, and
orders shall be effective fifteen (15) days after receipt thereof, Surigao del Sur, and the cities of Davao, and General Santos; and
unless directed otherwise by the Supreme Court.
The Twelfth Judicial Region, consisting of the provinces of Lanao
CHAPTER II del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, North Cotabato, and
REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS Sultan Kudarat, and the cities of Cotabato, Iligan, and Marawi.
 Four branches (Branches XXVII to XXX) for the province of Nueva
In case of transfer or redistribution of the provinces, Vizcaya, Branches XXVII to XXIX with seats at Bayombong, and
subprovinces, cities or municipalities comprising the regions Branch XXX at Bambang;
established by law of purposes of the administrative field
organization of the various departments and agencies of the Two branches (Branches XXXI and XXXII) for the province of
government, the composition of the judicial regions herein Quirino, with seats at Cabarroguis.
constituted shall be deemed modified accordingly.
(c) Seventy-five Regional Trial judges shall be commissioned for
Section 14. Regional Trial Courts. the Third Judicial Region. There shall be:

(a) Fifty-seven Regional Trial Judges shall be commissioned for the Five branches (Branches I to V) for the province of Bataan,
First Judicial Region. There shall be. Branches I to III with seats at Balanga, Branch IV at Mariveles, and
Branch V at Dinalupihan;
Two branches (Branches III ans II) for the province of Abra, with
seats at Bangued; Seventeen branches (Branches VI to XXII) for the province of
Bulacan (except the municipality of Valuenzuela), with seats at
Eight branches (Branches III to X) for the province of Benguet and Malolos;
the city of Baguio, Branches III to VII with seats at Baguio City, and
Branches VIII to X at La Trinidad; Eighteen branches (Branches XXIII to XL) for the province of Nueva
Ecija and the cities of Cabanatuan, San Jose and Palayan, Branches
Nine branches (Branches XI to XIX) for the province of Ilocos Norte XXIII to XXX with seats at Cabanatuan City, Branches XXXI to XXXIII
and the city of Laoag, Branches XI to XVI with seats at Laoag City, at Guimba, Branches XXXIV to XXXVI at Gapan, Branch XXXVII at
Branches XVII and XVIII at Batac, and Branch XIX at Bangui; Sto. Domingo, Branches XXXVIII and XXXIX at San Jose, and Branch
XL at Palayan.
Six branches (Braches XX to XXV) for the province of Ilocos Sur,
Branches XX and XXI with seats at Vigan, Branch XXII at Narvacan, Twenty-two branches (Branches XLI to LXII) for the province of
Branch XXIII at Candon, Branch XXIV at Cabugao, and Branch XXV Pampanga and the city of Angeles, Branches XLI to XLVIII with
at Tagudin; seats at San Fernando, Branches XLIX to LIII at Guagua, Branches
LIV and LV at Macabebe, and Branches LVI to LXII at Angeles City;
Nine branches (Branches XXVI to XXXIV) for the province of La
Union, Branches XXVI to XXX with seats at San Fernando, Six branches (Branches LXIII to LXVIII) for the province of Tarlac,
Branches XXXI and XXXII at Agoo, Branch XXXIII at Bauang, and Branches LXVI at Capas, Branch LXVII at Paniqui, and Branch LXVIII
Branch XXXIV at Balaoan; at Camiling; and

Two branches (Branches XXXV and XXXVI) for the province of Seven branches (Branches LXIX to LXXV) for the province of
Mountain province, with seats at Bontoc; and Zambales and the city of Olongapo, Branches LXIX to LXXI with
seats at Iba and Branches LXXII to LXXV at Olongapo City
Twenty-one branches (Branches XXXVII to LVII) for the province of
Pangasinan and the citie sof dagupan and san Carlos, Branches (d) One hundred seventy-two (172) Regional Trial Judges shall be
XXXVII to XXXIX with seats at Lingayen, Branches XL to XLIV at commissioned for the National Capital Judicial Region. There shall
dagupan, Branches XLV to XLIX at Urdaneta, Branch L at Villasis, be:
Branches LI and LII at Tayug, Branch LIII at Rosalaes, Branches LIV
and LV at Alaminos, and Branch LVI and LVII at san Carlos. Fifty-five branches (Branches 1 to 55) for the City of Manila, wit
seats thereat;
(b) Thirty-two Regional Trial Judges shall be commissioned for the
Second Judicial region. There shall be: Thirty-two branches (Branches 76 to 107) for Quezon City, with
seats thereat;
Twelve branches (Branches I to XII) for the province of Cagayan,
Branches I to V with seats at Tuguegarao, Branches VI to X at Twelve branches (Branches 108 to 119) for Pasay City, with seats
Aparri, Branch XI at Tuao, and Branch XII at Sanchez Mira; thereat;

One branch (Branch XIII) for the province of Batanes, with seat at Twelve branches (Branches 120 to 131) for Caloocan City, with
Basco; seats thereat;

Two branches (Branches XIV and XV) for the province of Ifugao, Fifty-eight branches (Branches 56 to 74 and 132 to 170) for the
Branch XIV with seat at Lagawe, and Branch XV at Potia; Municipalities of Navotas, Malabon, San Juan, Madaluyong,
Makati, Pasig, Pateros, Taguig, Marikina, Parañaque, Las Piñas,
Nine branches (Branches XVI to XXIV) for the province of Isabela, and Muntinlupa; Branches 67 to 71 and 151 to 168 at Pasig; and
Branches XVI to XVIII with seats at Ilagan, Branches XIX and XX at Branches 72 to 74, 169 and 170 at Malabon; and
cauayan, Branch XXI at Santiago, Branch XXII at Cabagan, Branch
XXIII at Roxas, and Branch XXIV at Echague; Three branches (Branches 75, 171 and 172) for the municipality of
Valenzuela, with seats thereat. (As amended by EO No. 33, July
Two branches (Branches XXV and XXVI) for the province of 30, 1986.)
kalinga-Apayao, Branch XXV with seat at Tabuk, and Branch XXVI
at Luna; (e) Eihty-two Regional Trial Judges shall be commissioned for the
Fourth Judicial Region. There shall be:
Fourteen branches (Branches I to XIV) for the province of Two branches (Branches XLII and XLII) for the province of
Batangas and the cities of Lipa and Batangas, Branches I to VI with Catanduanes, with seats at Virac;
seats at Batangas City, Branch V at Lemery, Branches VI to VIII at
Tanuan, Branches IX to XI at Balayan, Branches XII and XIII at Lipa, Seven branches (Branches XLIV to L) for the province of Masbate,
and Branch XIV at Nasugbu; Branches XLIV to XLVIII with seats at Masbate, Branch XLIX at
Cataingan, and Branch L at San Jacinto; and
Nine branches (Branches XV to XXIII) for the province of Cavite
and the cities of Cavite, Tagaytay and Trece Matires, Branch XV Five branches (Branches LI to LV) for the province of Sorsogon,
with seat at Naic, Branches XVII at Cavite City, Branch XVIII at Branches LI to LIII with seats at Sorsogon, Branch LVI at Gubat,
Tagayatay City, Branch XIX at Bacoor, Branches XX to XXII at Imus, and Branch LV at Irosin.
and Branch XXIII at Trece Martires;
(g) Sixty-three Regional Trial Judges shall be commissioned for the
Fourteen branches (Branches XXIV to XXXVII) for the province of Sixth Judicial Region. There shall be:
Laguna and the city of San Pablo, Branches XXVIII at Sta. Cruz,
Branches XXIX to XXXII at San Pable City, Branch XXXIII at Siniloan, Nine branches (Branches I to IX) for the province of Aklan, with
and Branches XXXIV to XXXVI at Calamba; seats at Kalibo;

One branch (Branch XXXVIII) for the province of Marinduque, with Four branches (Branches X to XIII) for the province of Antique,
seat at Boac; Branches X to XII with seats at San Jose, and Branch XIII and
Culasi;
Five branches (Branches XXXIX to XLIII) for the province of
Mindoro Oriental, Branches XXXIX to XL with seats at Calapan, Eighr branches (Branches XIV to XXI) for the province of Capiz and
Branches XLI and XLII at Pinamalayan, and Branch XLII at Roxas; the city of Roxas, Branches XIV to XIX with seats at Roxas City and
Branches XX and XXI at Mambusao;
Three branches (Branches XLVII to XLVI) for the province of
Mindoro Occidental, Branch XLIV with seat at Mamburao, and Eighteen branches (Branches XXII to XXXIX) for the province of
Branches XLV and XLVI at San Jose; Iloilo, the subprovince of Guimaras, and the city of Iloilo, with
seats at Iloilo City; and
Six branches (Branches XLVII to LII) for the province of Palawan
and the city of Puerto Princesa, with seats at Puerto Princesa City; Twenty-four branches (Branches XL to LXIII) for the province of
Negros Occidental, and the cities of Bacolod,Bago, Cadiz, La
Thirteen branches (Branches LIII to LXV) for the province of Carlota, San Carlos and Silay, Branch XL with seat at Silay City,
Quezon and the city of Lucena, Branches LIII to LX with seats at Branches XLI to LIV at Bacolod City, Branches LV and LVI at
Lucena City, Branches LXI and LXII at Gumaca, Branch LXIII at Himamaylan, Branches LVII to LIX at Kabankalan, Branch LXII at
Calauag, Branch LXIV at Mauban, and Branch LXV at Infanta; Bago City, and Branch LXII at La Carlota City.

One branchj(Branch LXVI) for the province of Aurora, with seat at (h) Forty-six Regional Trial Judges shall be commissioned for the
Baler; Seventh Judicial Region. There shall be:

Fourteen branches (Branches LXVII to LXXX) for the province of Four branches (Branches I to IV) for the province of Bohol and the
Rizal except the cities and municipalities embraced within the city of Tagbilaran, with seats at Tagbilaran City;
National Capital Judicial Region, Branches LXVII to LXX with seats
at Binangonan, Branches LXXI to LXXIV at Antipolo, Branches LXXV Twenty-five branches (Branches V to XXIX) for the province of
to LXXVII at San Mateo, and Branches LXXVIII to LXXX at Morong; Cebu and the cities of Cebu, Danao, Lapu-Lapu, Mandaue and
and Toledo, Branches V to XXIV with seats at Cebu City, Branch XXV at
Danao City, Branch XXVI at Argao, Branch XXVII at Lapu-Lapu City,
Two branches (Branches LXXXI and LXXXII) for the province of Branch XXVIII at Mandaue City, and Branch XXIX at Toledo City;
Romblon, Branch LXXXI with seat at Romblon, and Branch LXXXII
at Odiongan. Sixteen branches (Branches XXX to XLV) for the province of
Negros Oriental and the cities of Dumaguete, Bais and Canlaon,
(f) Fifty-five Regional Trial Judges shall be commissioned for the Branches XXX to XLIV with seats at Dumaguete City, and Branch
Fifth Judicial Region. There shall be: XLV at Bais City; and

Eighteen branches (Branches I to XVIII) for the province of Albay One branch (Branch XLVI) for the province of Siquijor, with seat at
and the city of Legaspi, Branches I to X with seats at Legaspi City, Larena.
Branches XI to XIV at Ligao, and Branches XV to XVIII at Tabaco;
(i) Thirty-three Regional Trial Judges shall be commissioned for
Nineteen branches (Branches XIX to XXXVII) for the province of the Eighth Judicial Region. There shall be:
Camarines Sur and the cities of Naga and Iriga, Branches XIX to
XXVIII with seats at Naga City, Branch XXIX at Libmanan, Branch Five branches (Branches I to V) for the province of Eastern Samar,
XXX at Tigaon, Braches XXXI to XXXIII at Pili, and Branches XXXIV Branches I and II with seats at Borongan, Branch III at Guiuan,
to XXXVII at Iriga City; Branch IV at Dolores, and Branch V at Oras;

Four branches (Branches XXXVIII to XLII) for the province of Thirteen branches (Branches VI to XVIII) for the province of Leyte,
Camarines Norte, with seat at Daet; the sub-province of Biliran, and the cities of Ormoc and Tacloban,
Branches VI and IX with seats at Tacloban City, Branch X at One branch (Branch XXVIII) for the province of Camiguin, with
Abuyog, Branch XI at Calubian, Branch XII at Ormoc City, Branch seat at Mambajao; and
XIII at Carigara, Branch XIV at Baybay, Branch XV at Burauen,
Branch XVI at Naval, Branch XVII at Palompon, and Branch XVIII at Four branches (Branches XXIX to XXXII) for the province of Surigao
Hilongos; del Norte and the City of Surigao, Branches XXIX and XXX with
seats at Surigao City, Branch XXXI at Dapa, and Branch XXXII at
Five branches (Branches XIX to XXIII) for the province of Northern Dinagat, Dinagat Island.
Samar, Branches XIX and XX with seats at Catarman, Branches XXI
and XXII at Laoang, and Branch XXIII at Allen; (l) Twenty-nine Regional Trial Judges shall be commissioned for
the Eleventh Judicial Region. There shall be
Three branches (Branches XXIV to XXVI) for the province of
Southern Leyte, Branches XXIV and XXV with seats at Maasin, and Four branches (Branches I to IV) for the province of Davao del
Branch XXVI at San Juan; and Norte, Branches I and II with seats at Tagum, Branch III at
Nabunturan, and Branch IV at Panabo;
Seven branches (Branches XXVII to XXXIII) for the province of
Samar and the city of Calbayog, Branches XXVII to XXIX with seats Three branches (Branches V to VII) for the province of Davao
at Catbalogan, Branch XXX at Basey, Branches XXXI and XXXII at Oriental, Branches V and VI with seats at Mati and Branch VII at
Calbayog City, and Branch XXXIII at Calbiga. Banganga;

(j) Twenty-four Regional Trial Judges shall be commissioned for Fourteen branches (Branches VIII to XXI) for the province of Davao
the Ninth Judicial Region. There shall be: del Sur and the city of Davao, Branches VIII to XVII with seats at
Davao City, Branches XVIII and XIX at Digos, Branch XX at Malinta,
Two branches (Branches I and II) for the province of Basilan, with and Branch XXI a Bansalan;
seats at Isabela;
Five Branches (Branches XXII to XXVI) for the province of South
Two branches (Branches III and IV) for the province of Sulu, Cotabato and the city of General Santos, Branches XXII and XXIII
Branch III with seat at Jolo, and Branch IV at Parang; with seats at General Santos City, Branches XXIV and XXV at
Koronadal, and Branch XXVI at Surallah; and
One branch (Branch V) for the province of Tawi-Tawi, with seat at
Bongao; Three branches (Branches XXVII to XXIX) for the province of
Surigao del Sur, Branch XXVII with seat at Tandag, Branch XXVIII at
Six branches (Branches VI to XI) for the province of Zamboanga Lianga, and Branch XXIX at Bislig.
del Norte, and the cities of Dipolog and Dapitan, Branches VI to X
seats at Dipolog City, and Branch XI at Sindangan; and (m) Twenty Regional Trial Judges shall be commissioned for the
Twelfth Judicial Region. There shall be:
Thirteen branches (Branches XII to XXIV) for the province of
Zamboanga del Sur and the cities of Pagadian and Zamboanga Seven branches (Branches I to VII) for the province of Lanao del
Branches XII to XVII with seats at Zamboanga City, Branches, XVIII Norte and the city of Iligan, Branches I to VI with seats at Iligan
to XXII at Pagadian City, Branch XXIII at Molave, and Branch XXIV City, and Branch VII at Tubod;
at Ipil.
Five branches (Branches VIII to XII) for the province of Lanao del
(k) Thirty-two Regional Trial Judges shall be commissioned for the Sur and the city of Marawi, Branches VIII to X with seats at
Tenth Judicial Region. There shall be: Marawi City, and Branches XI and XII at Malabang;

Five branches (Branches I to V) for the province of Agusan del Three branches (Branches XIII to XV) for the province of
Norte and the city of Butuan, with seats at Butuan City; Maguindanao and the city of Cotabato, Branches XIII and XIV with
seats at Cotabato City, and Branch XV at Maganoy;
Two branches (Branches VI and VII) for the province of Agusan del
Sur, Branches VI with seat at Prosperidad and Branch VII with seat Three branches (Branches XVI to XVIII) for the province of North
at Bayugan; Cotabato, Branch XVI with seat at Kabacan, Branch XVII at
Kidapawan, and Branch XVIII at Missayap; and
Four branches (Branches VIII to XI) for the province of Bukidnon,
Branches VIII to X with seats at Malaybalay and Branch XI at Two branches (Branches XIX and XX) for the province of Sultan
Manalo Fortich; Kudarat, Branch XIX, with seat at Isulan, and Branch XX at
Tacurong.
Five branches (Branches XII to XI) for the province of Misamis
Occidental and the cities of Oroquieta, Ozamis, and Tangub, Section 15. Qualifications. – No persons shall be appointed
Branches XII to XIV with seats at Oroquieta City, Branch XV at Regional Trial Judge unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Ozamis City, and Branch XVI at Tangub City; Philippines, at least thirty-five years of age, and for at least ten
years, has been engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines
Eleven branches (Branches XVII to XXVII) for the province of or has held a public office in the Philippines requiring admission to
Misamis Oriental and the cities of Cagayan de Oro and Gingoog, the practice of law as an indispensable requisite.
Branches XVII to XXV with seats at Cagayan de Oro City, Branch
XXVI at Medina, and Branch XXVII at Gingoog City; Section 16. Time and duration of sessions. – The time and
duration of daily sessions of the Regional Trial Courts shall be
determined by the Supreme Court: Provided, however, That all
motions, except those requiring immediate action, shall be heard (6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court,
in the afternoon of every Friday, unless it falls on a holiday, in tribunal, person or body exercising jurisdiction or any court,
which case, the hearing shall be held on the afternoon of the next tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
succeeding business day: Provided, further, That the Supreme functions;
Court may, for good reasons, fix a different motion day in
specified areas (7) In all civil actions and special proceedings falling within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of a Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Section 17. Appointment and assignment of Regional Trial Judges. Court and of the Courts of Agrarian Relations as now provided by
– Every Regional Trial Judge shall be appointed to a region which law; and
shall be his permanent station, and his appointment shall state
the branch of the court and the seat thereof to which he shall be (8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest,
originally assigned. However, the Supreme Court may assign damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses,
temporarily a Regional Trial Judge to another region as public and costs or the value of the property in controversy exceeds One
interest may require, provided that such temporary assignment hundred thousand pesos (100,000.00) or, in such other
shall not last longer than six (6) months without the consent of abovementioned items exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos
the Regional Trial Judge concerned. (200,000.00). (as amended by R.A. No. 7691*)

A Regional Trial Judge may be assigned by the Supreme Court to Section 20. Jurisdiction in criminal cases. – Regional Trial Courts
any branch or city or municipality within the same region as public shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all criminal cases not
interest may require, and such assignment shall not be deemed within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body,
an assignment to another station within the meaning of this except those now falling under the exclusive and concurrent
section. jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan which shall hereafter be
exclusively taken cognizance of by the latter.
Section 18. Authority to define territory appurtenant to each
branch. – The Supreme Court shall define the territory over which Section 21. Original jurisdiction in other cases. – Regional Trial
a branch of the Regional Trial Court shall exercise its authority. Courts shall exercise original jurisdiction:
The territory thus defined shall be deemed to be the territorial
area of the branch concerned for purposes of determining the (1) In the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus,
venue of all suits, proceedings or actions, whether civil or quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction which may be
criminal, as well as determining the Metropolitan Trial Courts, enforced in any part of their respective regions; and
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts over the
said branch may exercise appellate jurisdiction. The power herein (2) In actions affecting ambassadors and other public ministers
granted shall be exercised with a view to making the courts and consuls.
readily accessible to the people of the different parts of the region
and making the attendance of litigants and witnesses as Section 22. Appellate jurisdiction. – Regional Trial Courts shall
inexpensive as possible. exercise appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
Section 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. – Regional Trial Courts shall Circuit Trial Courts in their respective territorial jurisdictions. Such
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction: cases shall be decided on the basis of the entire record of the
proceedings had in the court of origin and such memoranda
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is and/or briefs as may be submitted by the parties or required by
incapable of pecuniary estimation; the Regional Trial Courts. The decision of the Regional Trial Courts
in such cases shall be appealable by petition for review to the
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of,
real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of Court of Appeals which may give it due course only when the
the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos petition shows prima facie that the lower court has committed an
(P20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such the error of fact or law that will warrant a reversal or modification of
value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (50,000.00) except actions for the decision or judgment sought to be reviewed.
forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings,
original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon Metropolitan Section 23. Special jurisdiction to try special cases. – The Supreme
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Court may designate certain branches of the Regional Trial Courts
Courts; to handle exclusively criminal cases, juvenile and domestic
relations cases, agrarian cases, urban land reform cases which do
(3) In all actions in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction where he not fall under the jurisdiction of quasi-judicial bodies and
demand or claim exceeds One hundred thousand pesos agencies, and/or such other special cases as the Supreme Court
(P100,000.00) or , in Metro Manila, where such demand or claim may determine in the interest of a speedy and efficient
exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos (200,000.00); administration of justice.

(4) In all matters of probate, both testate and intestate, where the Section 24. Special Rules of Procedure. – Whenever a Regional
gross value of the estate exceeds One hundred thousand pesos Trial Court takes cognizance of juvenile and domestic relation
(P100,000.00) or, in probate matters in Metro Manila, where such cases and/or agrarian cases, the special rules of procedure
gross value exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos (200,000.00); applicable under present laws to such cases shall continue to be
applied, unless subsequently amended by law or by rules of court
(5) In all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital promulgated by the Supreme Court.
relations;
CHAPTER III
METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS, AND One branch (Branch LXXX) for Muntinlupa with seat thereat;
MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS
Two branches (Branches LXXXI and LXXXII) for Valenzuela with
Section 25. Establishment of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal seats thereat;
Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. – There shall be
created a Metropolitan Trial Court in each metropolitan area Section 28. Other Metropolitan Trial Courts. – The Supreme Court
established by law, a Municipal Trial Court in each of the other shall constitute Metropolitan Trial Courts in such other
cities or municipalities, and a Municipal Circuit Trial Court in each metropolitan areas as may be established by law whose territorial
circuit comprising such cities and/or municipalities as are grouped jurisdiction shall be co-extensive with the cities and municipalities
together pursuant to law. comprising the metropolitan area.

Section 26. Qualifications. – No person shall be appointed judge of Every Metropolitan Trial Judge shall be appointed to a
a Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, or Municipal metropolitan area which shall be his permanent station and his
Circuit Trial Court unless he is a natural-born citizen of the appointment shall state branch of the court and the seat thereof
Philippines, at least 30 years of age, and, for at least five years, to which he shall be originally assigned. A Metropolitan Trial
has been engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines, or has Judge may be assigned by the Supreme Court to any branch
held a public office in the Philippines requiring admission to the within said metropolitan area as the interest of justice may
practice of law as an indispensable requisite. require, and such assignment shall not be deemed an assignment
to another station within the meaning of this section.
Section 27. Metropolitan Trial Courts of the National Capital
Region. – There shall be a Metropolitan Trial Court in the National Section 29. Municipal Trial Courts in cities. – In every city which
Capital Region, to be known as the Metropolitan Trial Court of does not form part of a metropolitan area, there shall be a
Metro Manila, which shall be composed of eighty-two (82) Municipal Trial Court with one branch, except as hereunder
branches. There shall be: provided:

Thirty branches (Branches I to XXX) for the city of Manila with Two branches for Laoag City;
seats thereat;
Four branches for Baguio City;
Thirteen branches (Branches XXXI to XLIII) for Quezon City with
seats thereat; Three branches for Dagupan City;

Five branches (Branches XLIV to XLVIII) for Pasay City with seats Five branches for Olongapo City;
thereat;
Three branches for Cabanatuan City;
Five branches (Branches XLIX to LIII) for Caloocan City with seats
thereat; Two branches for San Jose City;

One branch (Branch LIV) for Navotas with seat thereat; Three branches for Angeles City;

Two branches (Branches LV and LVI) for Malabon with seats Two branches for Cavite City;
thereat;
Two branches for Batangas City;
Two branches (Branches LVII and LVIII) for San Juan with seats
thereat; Two branches for Lucena City;

Two branches (Branches LIX and LX) for Mandaluyong with seats Three branches for Naga City;
thereat;
Two branches for Iriga City;
Seven branches (Branches LXI and LXVII) for Makati with seats
thereat; Three branches for Legaspi City;

Five branches (Branches LXVIII to LXXII) for Pasig with seats Two branches for Roxas City;
thereat;
Four branches for Iloilo City;
One branch (Branch LXXIII) for Pateros with seat thereat;
Seven branches for Bacolod City;
One branch (Branch LXXIV) for Taguig with seat thereat;
Two branches for Dumaguete City;
Two branches (Branches LXXV and LXXVI) for Marikina with seats
thereat; Two branches for Tacloban City;

Two branches (Branches LXXVII and LXXVIII) for Parañaque with Eight branches for Cebu City;
seats thereat;
Three branches for Mandaue City;
One branch (Branch LXXIX) for Las Piñas with seat thereat;
Two branches for Tagbilaran City;
 Every Municipal Circuit Trial Judge shall be appointed to a
Two branches for Surigao City; municipal circuit which shall be his official station.

Two branches for Butuan City; The Supreme Court shall determine the city or municipality where
the Municipal Circuit Trial Court shall hold sessions.
Five branches for Cagayan de Oro City;
Section 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Seven branches for Davao City; Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in criminal cases. –
Except in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of
Three branches for General Santos City; Regional Trial Courts and of the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Two branches for Oroquieta City; Courts shall exercise:

Three branches for Ozamis City; (1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations of city or
municipal ordinances committed within their respective territorial
Two branches for Dipolog City; jurisdiction; and

Four branches for Zamboanga City; (2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with
imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the
Two branches for Pagadian City; and amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or
other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such
Two branches for Iligan City. offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature,
value, or amount thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses
Section 30. Municipal Trial Courts. – In each of the municipalities involving damage to property through criminal negligence they
that are not comprised within a metropolitan area and a shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof. (as amended by
municipal circuit there shall be a Municipal Trial Court which shall R.A, No. 7691)
have one branch, except as hereunder provided:
Section 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Two branches for San Fernando, La Union; Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in civil cases. –
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
Four branches for Tuguegarao; Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:

Three branches for Lallo, and two branches for Aparri, both of (1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and probate
Cagayan; proceedings, testate and intestate, including the grant of
provisional remedies in proper cases, where the value of the
Two branches for Santiago, Isabela; personal property, estate, or amount of the demand does not
exceed One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in Metro
Two branches each for Malolos, Meycauayan and Bulacan, all of Manila where such personal property, estate, or amount of the
Bulacan Province; demand does not exceed Two hundred thousand pesos
(P200,000.00) exclusive of interest damages of whatever kind,
Four branches for San Fernando and two branches for Guagua, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs, the amount of
both of Pampanga; which must be specifically alleged: Provided, That where there are
several claims or causes of action between the same or different
Two branches for Tarlac, Tarlac; parties, embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the
demand shall be the totality of the claims in all the causes of
Two branches for San Pedro, Laguna; and action, irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of
the same or different transactions;
Two branches each for Antipolo and Binangonan, both in Rizal.
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and
Section 31. Municipal Circuit Trial Court. – There shall be a unlawful detainer: Provided, That when, in such cases, the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court in each area defined as a municipal defendant raises the question of ownership in his pleadings and
circuit, comprising one or more cities and/or one or more the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding
municipalities. The municipalities comprising municipal circuits as the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved
organized under Administrative Order No. 33, issued on June 13, only to determine the issue of possession.
1978 by the Supreme Court pursuant to Presidential Decree No.
537, are hereby constituted as municipal circuits for purposes of (3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve
the establishment of the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, and the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein
appointment thereto of Municipal Circuit Trial Judges: Provided, where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does
however, That the Supreme Court may, as the interests of justice not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil
may require, further reorganize the said courts taking into actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not
account workload, geographical location, and such other factors exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest,
as will contribute to a rational allocation thereof, pursuant to the damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 537 which shall be and costs: Provided, That value of such property shall be
applicable insofar as they are not inconsistent with this Act. determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots. (as
amended by R.A. No. 7691)
Section 34. Delegated jurisdiction in cadastral and land accordance with the procedure now prescribed by law for appeals
registration cases. – Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial to the Court of First Instance, by the provisions of this Act, and by
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts may be assigned by the such rules as the Supreme Court may hereafter prescribe.
Supreme Court to hear and determine cadastral or land
registration cases covering lots where there is no controversy or (2) All processes issued by the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
opposition, or contested lots the where the value of which does Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, in cases
not exceed One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00), such falling within their jurisdiction, may be served anywhere in the
value to be ascertained by the affidavit of the claimant or by Philippines without the necessity of certification by the Judge of
agreement of the respective claimants if there are more than one, the Regional Trial Court.
or from the corresponding tax declaration of the real property.
Their decisions in these cases shall be appealable in the same CHAPTER IV
manner as decisions of the Regional Trial Courts. (as amended by GENERAL PROVISIONS
R.A. No. 7691)
Section 39. Appeals. – The period for appeal from final orders,
Section 35. Special jurisdiction in certain cases. – In the absence of resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any court in all
all the Regional Trial Judges in a province or city, any Metropolitan cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the
Trial Judge, Municipal Trial Judge, Municipal Circuit Trial Judge final order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed
may hear and decide petitions for a writ of habeas corpus or from: Provided however, That in habeas corpus cases, the period
applications for bail in criminal cases in the province or city where for appeal shall be forty-eight (48) hours from the notice of the
the absent Regional Trial Judges sit. judgment appealed from.

Section 36. Summary procedures in special cases. – In No record on appeal shall be required to take an appeal. In lieu
Metropolitan Trial Courts and Municipal Trial Courts with at least thereof, the entire record shall be transmitted with all the pages
two branches, the Supreme Court may designate one or more prominently numbered consecutively, together with an index of
branches thereof to try exclusively forcible entry and unlawful the contents thereof.
detainer cases, those involving violations of traffic laws, rules and
regulations, violations of the rental law, and such other cases This section shall not apply in appeals in special proceedings and
requiring summary disposition as the Supreme Court may in other cases wherein multiple appeals are allowed under
determine. The Supreme Court shall adopt special rules or applicable provisions of the Rules of Court.
procedures applicable to such cases in order to achieve an
expeditious and inexpensive determination thereof without Section 40. Form of decision in appealed cases. – Every decision of
regard to technical rules. Such simplified procedures may provide final resolution of a court in appealed cases shall clearly and
that affidavits and counter-affidavits may be admitted in lieu of distinctly state the findings of fact and the conclusions of law on
oral testimony and that the periods for filing pleadings shall be which it is based, which may be contained in the decision or final
non-extendible. resolution itself, or adopted by reference from those set forth in
the decision, order, or resolution appealed from.
Section 37. Preliminary investigation. – Judges of Metropolitan
Trial Courts, except those in the National Capital Region, of Section 41. Salaries. – Intermediate Appellate Justices, Regional
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall Trial Judges, Metropolitan Trial Judges, Municipal Trial Judges,
have authority to conduct preliminary investigation of crimes and Municipal Circuit Trial Judges shall receive such compensation
alleged to have been committed within their respective territorial and allowances as may be authorized by the President along the
jurisdictions which are cognizable by the Regional Trial Courts. guidelines set forth in Letter of Implementation No. 93 pursuant
to Presidential Decree No. 985, as amended by Presidential
The preliminary investigation shall be conducted in accordance Decree No. 1597.
with the procedure prescribed in Section 1, paragraphs (a), (b),
(c), and (d), of Presidential Decree No. 911: Provided, however, Section 42. Longevity pay. – A monthly longevity pay equivalent to
That if after the preliminary investigation the Judge finds a prima 5% of the monthly basic pay shall be paid to the Justices and
facie case, he shall forward the records of the case to the Judges of the courts herein created for each five years of
Provincial/City Fiscal for the filing of the corresponding continuous, efficient, and meritorious service rendered in the
information with the proper court. judiciary; Provided, That in no case shall the total salary of each
Justice or Judge concerned, after this longevity pay is added,
No warrant of arrest shall be issued by the Judge in connection exceed the salary of the Justice or Judge next in rank.
with any criminal complaint filed with him for preliminary
investigation, unless after an examination in writing and under Section 43. Staffing pattern. – The Supreme Court shall submit to
oath or affirmation of the complainant and his witnesses, he finds the President, within thirty (30) days from the date of the
that a probable cause exists. effectivity of this Act, a staffing pattern for all courts constituted
pursuant to this Act which shall be the basis of the implementing
Any warrant of arrest issued in accordance herewith may be order to be issued by the President in accordance with the
served anywhere in the Philippines. immediately succeeding section.

Section 38. Judgments and processes. – Section 44. Transitory provisions. – The provisions of this Act shall
be immediately carried out in accordance with an Executive Order
(1) All judgments determining the merits of cases shall be in to be issued by the President. The Court of Appeals, the Courts of
writing, stating clearly the facts and the law on which they were First Instance, the Circuit Criminal Courts, the Juvenile and
based, signed by the Judge and filed with the Clerk of Court. Such Domestic Relations Courts, the Courts of Agrarian Relations, the
judgment shall be appealable to the Regional Trial Courts in City Courts, the Municipal Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Courts
shall continue to function as presently constituted and organized, executive judge of the appropriate Regional Trial Court shall
until the completion of the reorganization provided in this Act as define the administrative procedure of transferring the cases
declared by the President. Upon such declaration, the said courts affected by the redefinition of jurisdiction to the Metropolitan
shall be deemed automatically abolished and the incumbents Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Court, and Municipal Circuit Trial
thereof shall cease to hold office. The cases pending in the old Court."
Courts shall be transferred to the appropriate Courts constituted
pursuant to this Act, together with the pertinent functions, *Criminal cases falling within the jurisdiction of Family Courts
records, equipment, property and the necessary personnel. (established by the Family Courts Act of 1997 [R.A. No. 8369])
have been transferred from Metropolitan trial Courts, Municipal
The applicable appropriations shall likewise be transferred to the Trial Courts,
appropriate courts constituted pursuant to this Act, to be
augmented as may be necessary from the funds for organizational Municipal trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts and
changes as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 80. Said funding shall Municipal Circuit Trial Courts to Regional trial Courts under A.M.
thereafter be included in the annual General Appropriations Act. No. 99-1-13-SC effective March 1, 1999.

Section 45. Shari'a Courts. – Shari'a Courts to be constituted as

provided for in Presidential Decree No. 1083, otherwise known as Republic Act No. 7902 (Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Court of
the "Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines," shall be Appeals)
included in the funding appropriations so provided in this Act.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
Section 46. Gratuity of judges and personnel separated from
Philippines in Congress assembled:
office. – All members of the judiciary and subordinate employees
who shall be separated from office by reason of the
Section 1. Sec. 9 of Batas Pambansa BIg. 129, as amended, known
reorganization authorized herein, shall be granted a gratuity at a
as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, is hereby further
rate equivalent to one month's salary for every year of continuous
amended to read as follows:cralaw
service rendered in any branch of the government or equivalent
"SEC. 9. Jurisdiction. - The Court of Appeals shall exercise:
nearest fraction thereof favorable to them on the basis of the
highest salary received: Provided, That such member of the
"(1) Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition,
judiciary or employee shall have the option to retire under the
certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo warranto, and auxilliary writs
Judiciary Retirement Law or general retirement law, if he has met
or processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction;
or satisfied the requirements therefor.
"(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of
Section 47. Repealing clause. – The provisions of Republic Act No.
judgments of Regional Trial Courts; and
296, otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended,
of Republic Act No. 5179 as amended, of the Rules of Court, and
"(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments,
of all other statutes, letters of instructions and general order or
decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of the Regional Trial
parts thereof, inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are
Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or
hereby repealed or accordingly modified.
commissions, including the Securities and Exchange Commission,
the Social Security Commission, the Employees'Compensation
Section 48. Date of Effectivity. – This Act shall take effect
Commission and the Civil Service Commission, except those
immediately.
falling within the appelate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in
accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the
Approved: August 14, 1981
Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the
provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third
paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of
Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
Footnotes
"The Court of Appeals shall have the power to try cases and
*Other provisions of the Act:
conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts
necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its
"Section. 5. After five(5) years from the effectivity of this Act, the
original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant
jurisdictional amounts mentioned in Sec. 19(3), (4), and (8); and
and conduct new trials or further proceedings. Trials or hearings
Sec. 33(1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 as amended by this Act,
in the Court of Appeals must be continuous and must be
shall be adjusted to Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00).
completed within three (3) months unless extended by the Chief
five (5) years thereafter, such jurisdictional amounts shall be
Justice."
adjusted further to Three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00):
Sec. 2. All provisions of laws and rules inconsistent with the
Provided, however, That in the case of Metro Manila, the
provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or amended
abovementioned jurisdictional amounts shall be adjusted after
accordingly.
five (5) years from the effectivity of this Act of Four hundred
thousand pesos (P400,000.00).
Sec. 3. This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following
its publication in a newspaper of general circulation.
Section. 7. The provisions of this Act shall apply to all civil cases
Approved:
that have not yet reached the pre-trial stage. However, by
agreement of all the parties, civil cases cognizable by municipal
(SGD.) EDGARDO J. ANGARA
and metropolitan courts by the provisions of this Act may be
President of the Senate
transferred from the Regional Trial Courts to the latter. The
(SGD.) JOSE DE VENECIA, JR. "(5) In all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital
Speaker of the House of Representatives relations;cralaw

This Act which is a consolidation of House Bill No. 10452 and "(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court,
Senate Bill No. 1495 was finally passed by the House of tribunal, person or body exercising jurisdiction of any court,
Representatives and the Senate on February 16,1995 and tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
February 20,1995, respectively. functions;cralaw

(SGD.) EDGARDO E. TUMANGAN "(7) In all civil actions and special proceedings falling within the
Secretary of the Senate exclusive original jurisdiction of a Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court and of the Court of Agrarian Relations as now provided by
(SGD.) CAMILO L. SABIO law; and
Secretary General
House of Representatives "(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest,
damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses,
Approved: February 23, 1995 and costs or the value of the property in controversy exceeds One
hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in such other cases in
(SGD.) FIDEL V. RAMOS Metro Manila, where the demand exclusive of the
President ofthe Philippines abovementioned items exceeds Two Hundred thousand pesos
(P200,000.00)."
Republic Act No. 7691 (Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Lower
Courts) Sec. 2. Sec. 32 of the same law is hereby amended to read as
follows:
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7691
March 25, 1994 "Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Criminal Cases. –
AN ACT EXPANDING THE JURISDICTION OF THE METROPOLITAN Except in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of
TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS, AND MUNICIPAL Regional Trial Courts and of the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan
CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE BATAS Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
PAMBANSA, BLG. 129, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE "JUDICIARY Courts shall exercise:
REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1980"
"(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations of city or
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the municipal ordinances committed within their respective territorial
Philippines in Congress assembled: jurisdiction; and

Section 1. Sec. 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known "(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable
as the "Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980", is hereby amended with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the
to read as follows: amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or
other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such
"Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. – Regional Trial Courts shall offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction. or amount thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses involving
damage to property through criminal negligence, they shall have
"(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is exclusive original jurisdiction thereof."
incapable of pecuniary estimation;cralaw
Sec. 3. Sec. 33 of the same law is hereby amended to read as
"(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, follows:
real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of
the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos "Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
(P20,000,00) or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. –
value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except actions Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal "(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and probate
Circuit Trial Courts;cralaw proceedings, testate and intestate, including the grant of
provisional remedies in proper cases, where the value of the
"(3) In all actions in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction where the personal property, estate, or amount of the demand does not
demand or claim exceeds One hundred thousand pesos exceed One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in Metro
(P100,000.00) or, in Metro Manila, where such demand or claim Manila where such personal property, estate, or amount of the
exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00);cralaw demand does not exceed Two hundred thousand pesos
(P200,000.00), exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind,
"(4) In all matters of probate, both testate and intestate, where attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs, the amount of
the gross value of the estate exceeds One hundred thousand which must be specifically alleged: Provided, That interest,
pesos (P100,000.00) or, in probate matters in Metro Manila, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses,
where such gross value exceeds Two Hundred thousand pesos and costs shall be included in the determination of the filing fees:
(P200,000.00);cralaw Provided, further, That where there are several claims or causes
of actions between the same or different parties, embodied in the Sec. 8. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days following its
same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality publication in the Official Gazette or in two (2) national
of the claims in all the causes of action, irrespective of whether newspapers of general circulation.
the causes of action arose out of the same or different
transactions;cralaw Supreme Court Circular No. 09-94

"(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 09-94 June 14, 1994
unlawful detainer: Provided, That when, in such cases, the
defendant raises the questions of ownership in his pleadings and TO: THE COURT OF APPEALS, SANDIGANBAYAN, REGIONAL TRIAL
the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding COURT, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, METROPOLITAN TRIAL
the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL
only to determine the issue of possession; and COURT, ALL MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNMENT PROSECUTION
SERVICE AND ALL MEMBERS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE
"(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve PHILIPPINES
title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein
where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does SUBJECT: GUIDELINES IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF REPUBLIC
not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil ACT NO. 7691. ENTITLED "AN ACT EXPANDING THE JURISDICTION
actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL
exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, COURTS AND MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT
damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses TRIAL COURTS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE BATAS PAMBANSA
and costs: Provided, That in cases of land not declared for BLG. 129, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE 'JUDICIARY
taxation purposes, the value of such property shall be determined REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1980."
by the assessed value of the adjacent lots."
For the guidance of the bench and the Bar, the following
Sec. 4. Sec. 34 of the same law is hereby amended to read as guidelines are to be followed in the implementation of Republic
follows: Act No. 7691, entitled "An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
"Sec. 34. Delegated Jurisdiction in Cadastral and Land Registration Circuit Trial Courts, Amending for the Purpose Batas Pambansa
Cases. – Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Blg. 129, Otherwise Known as the 'Judiciary Reorganization Act of
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts may be assigned by the Supreme 1980":
Court to hear and determine cadastral or land registration cases
covering lots where there is no controversy or opposition, or 1. The new jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts, Metropolitan
contested lots where the value of which does not exceed One Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00), such value to be Courts in civil and original cases, and in cadastral and land
ascertained by the affidavit of the claimant or by agreement of registration cases, under Section 19, 32, 33 and 34 of B.P. Blg.
the respective claimants if there are more than one, or from the 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691. Was effective on April 15,
corresponding tax declaration of the real property. Their decisions 1994, fifteen (15) days after the publication in the Malaya and in
in these cases shall be appealable in the same manner as the Times Journal on March 30, 1994, pursuant to Section 8 of the
decisions of the Regional Trial Courts."chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary R.A. No. 7691.

Sec. 5. After five (5) years from the effectivity of this Act, the 2. The exclusion of the term "damages of whatever kind" in
jurisdictional amounts mentioned in Sec. 19(3), (4), and (8); and determining the jurisdictional amount under Section 19 (8) and
Sec. 33(1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 as amended by this Act, Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691,
shall be adjusted to Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00). applies to cases where the damages are merely incidental to or a
Five (5) years thereafter, such jurisdictional amounts shall be consequence of the main cause of action. However, in cases
adjusted further to Three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00): where the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one
Provided, however, That in the case of Metro Manila, the of the causes of action, the amount of such claim shall be
abovementioned jurisdictional amounts shall be adjusted after considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court.
five (5) years from the effectivity of this Act to Four hundred
thousand pesos (P400,000.00).chanrobles virtualaw library 3. The criminal jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Trial Courts under Section
Sec. 6. All laws, decrees, and orders inconsistent with the 32 (2) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, has been
provisions of this Act shall be considered amended or modified increased to cover offenses punishable with imprisonment not
accordingly.chanrobles virtualaw library exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of the fine. As a
consequence, the Regional Trial Courts have no more original
Sec. 7. The provisions of this Act shall apply to all civil cases that jurisdiction over offenses committed by public officers and
have not yet reached the pre-trial stage. However, by agreement employees in relation to their office, where the offense is
of all the parties, civil cases cognizable by municipal and punishable by more than four (4) years and two (2) months up to
metropolitan courts by the provisions of this Act may be six (6) years.
transferred from the Regional Trial Courts to the latter. The
executive judge of the appropriate Regional Trial Courts shall 4. The provisions of Section 32 (2) of B.P. 129 as amended by R.A.
define the administrative procedure of transferring the cases No. 7691, apply only to offenses punishable by imprisonment or
affected by the redefinition of jurisdiction to the Metropolitan fine, or both, in which cases the amount of the fine is disregarded
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial in determining the jurisdiction of the court. However, in cases
Courts.chanrobles virtualaw library where the only penalty provided by law is a fine, the amount
thereof shall determine the jurisdiction of the court in accordance
with the original provisions of Section 32 (2) of B.P. Blg. 129 which 1 Under Section 19 (3) of R.A. No. 7691, the Regional Trail Courts
fixed original exclusive jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction. "In all actions in
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts admiralty and maritime jurisdiction where the demand or claim
over offenses punishable with a fine of not more than four exceeds One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or in Metro
thousand pesos. If the amount of the fine exceeds four thousand Manila, where such demand or claim exceeds Two hundred
pesos, the Regional Trial Court shall have jurisdiction, including thousand pesos (P200,000.00)."
offenses committed by public officers and employees in relation
to their office, where the amount of the fine does not exceed six 2 Under Section 19 (4) of R.A. No. 7691, the Regional Trail Courts
thousand pesos. shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction. "In all matters of
probate, both testate and intestate, where the gross value of the
However, this rule does not apply to offenses involving damage to estate exceeds One hundred thousand pesos (P1000,000.00) or,
property through criminal negligence which are under the in probate matters in Metro Manila, where such gross value
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00)."
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts,
irrespective of the amount of the imposable fine. 3 Under Section 19 (8) of R.A. No. 7691, the Regional Trail Courts
Manila, June 14, 1994. shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction. "In all other cases in
(Sgd.) ANDRES R. NARVASA which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever
Chief Justice kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value of
the property in controversy exceeds One hundred thousand pesos
Supreme Court Circular No. 21-99 (P100,000.00) or, in such other cases in Metro Manila, where the
demand, exclusive of the abovementioned items, exceeds Two
CIRCULAR NO. 21-99 April 15, 1999 hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00)."

TO: ALL JUDGES OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS, THE 4 Under Section 33 (1) of R.A. No. 7691, the Metropolitan Trial
METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS IN Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, the Municipal Trial
CITIES, THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS AND THE MUNICIPAL Courts and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise
CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS. "Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and probate
proceedings, testate and intestate including the grant of
SUBJECT: EFFECTIVITY OF PROVISIONS OF SECTION 5 REPUBLIC provisional remedies in proper cases, where the value of the
ACT NO. 7691 FURTHER INCREASING THE JURISDICTIONAL personal property, estate or amount of the demand does not
AMOUNTS PRESCRIBED BY CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF BATAS exceed One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in Metro
PAMBANSA BLG. 129, AS AMENDED. Manila where such personal property, estate, or amount of the
demand does not exceed Two hundred thousand pesos
The provisions of Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7961 prescribe (P200,000.00), exclusive of interest, damages or whatever kind,
that "After five years (5) from the effectivity of this Act, the attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs, the amount of
jurisdictional amounts mentioned in Sec. 19(3), 1 (4), 2 and (8), 3 which must be specifically alleged: Provided, That interest,
and Sec. 33(1), 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 as amended by this damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses,
Act, shall be adjusted to Two hundred thousand pesos and costs shall be included in the determination of the filing fees:
(P200,000.00). Five (5) years thereafter, such jurisdictional Provided, further, That where there are several claims or causes
amounts shall be adjusted further to Three hundred thousand of action between the same or different parties embodied in the
pesos (P300,000.00): Provided, However, That in the case of same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality
Metro Manila, the abovementioned jurisdictional amounts shall of the claims in all the causes of action, irrespective of whatever
be adjusted after five (5) years from the effectivity of this Act to the cause of action arose out of the same or different
Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00)." transactions."

Section 8 of the same law states that "This Act shall take effect 5 Section 31 prescribes that "Year" shall be understood to be
fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Official Gazette or twelve calendar months; "month" of thirty days, unless it refers to
in two (2) national newspaper of general circulation." a specific calendar month in which case it shall be computed
according to the number of days the specific month contains;
Republic Act No. 7691 was published simultaneously in the 30 "day" to a day of twenty four hours; and night from sunset to
March 1994 issues of the Philippine Journal and Malaya. The law sunrise.
took effect on 15 April 1994.
Republic Act No. 8369
Considering the provisions of Section 31, 5 Chapter 8, Book I of
the 1987 Administrative Code, Section 5 of R.A. No. 7691 took Tenth Congress
effect on 20 March 1999.
Republic Act No. 8369 October 28, 1997
For information and guidance. AN ACT ESTABLISHING FAMILY COURTS, GRANTING THEM
EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OVER CHILD AND FAMILY
(Sgd.) ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO CASES, AMENDING BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG 129,AS AMENDED,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS ACT OF 1980, APPROPRIATING FUNDS
Court Administrator THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Footnotes Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the

Philippines in Congress assembled:
Section 1. Title. - This Act shall be known as the "Family Courts Act relations of husband and wife or those living together under
of 1997". different status and agreements, and petitions for dissolution of
conjugal partnership of gains;
Section 2. Statement of National Policies. - The State shall protect
the rights and promote the welfare of children in keeping with the e) Petitions for support and/or acknowledgment;
mandate of the Constitution and the precepts of the United
Nations Convention on the rights of the Child. The State shall f) Summary judicial proceedings brought under the provisions of
provide a system of adjudication for youthful offenders which Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the "Family Code of
takes into account their peculiar circumstances. the Philippines";

The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect g) Petitions for declaration of status of children as abandoned,
and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social dependent o neglected children, petitions for voluntary or
institution. The courts shall preserve the solidarity of the family, involuntary commitment of children; the suspension, termination,
provide procedures for the reconciliation of spouses and the or restoration of parental authority and other cases cognizable
amicable settlement of family controversy. under Presidential Decree No. 603, Executive Order No. 56,
(Series of 1986), and other related laws;
Section 3. Establishment of Family Courts. - There shall be
established a Family Court in every province and city in the h) Petitions for the constitution of the family home;
country. In case where the city is the capital of the province, the
Family Court shall be established in the municipality which has the i) Cases against minors cognizable under the Dangerous Drugs Act,
highest population. as AMENDED;

Section 4. Qualification and Training of Family Court Judges. - Sec. j) Violations of Republic Act No. 7610, otherwise known as the
15 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended, is hereby further "Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation
amended to read as follows: and Discrimination Act," as amended by Republic Act No. 7658;
and
"Sec. 15. (a) Qualification. - No person shall be appointed Regional
Trial Judge or Presiding Judge of the Family Court unless he is a k) Cases of domestic violence against:
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, at least thirty-five (35)
years of age, and, for at least ten (10) years, has been engaged in 1) Women - which are acts of gender based violence that results,
the practice of law in the Philippines or has held a public office in or are likely to result in physical, sexual or psychological harm or
the Philippines requiring admission to the practice of law as suffering to women; and other forms of physical abuse such as
indispensable requisite. battering or threats and coercion which violate a woman's
personhood, integrity and freedom movement; and
"(b) Training of Family Court Judges. - The Presiding Judge, as well
as the court personnel of the Family Courts, shall undergo training 2) Children - which include the commission of all forms of abuse,
and must have the experience and demonstrated ability in dealing neglect, cruelty, exploitation, violence, and discrimination and all
with child and family cases. other conditions prejudicial to their development.

"The Supreme Court shall provide a continuing education program If an act constitutes a criminal offense, the accused or batterer
on child and family laws, procedure and other related disciplines shall be subject to criminal proceedings and the corresponding
to judges and personnel of such courts." penalties.

Section 5. Jurisdiction offamily Courts. - The Family Courts shall If any question involving any of the above matters should arise as
have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the an incident in any case pending in the regular courts, said incident
following cases: shall be determined in that court.

a) Criminal cases where one or more of the accused is below Section 6. Use of Income. - All Family Courts shall be allowed the
eighteen (18) years of age but not less than nine (9) years of age use of ten per cent (10%) of their income derived from filing and
but not less than nine (9) years of age or where one or more of other court fees under Rule 141 of the Rules of Court for research
the victims is a minor at the time of the commission of the and other operating expenses including capital outlay: Provided,
offense: Provided, That if the minor is found guilty, the court shall That this benefit shall likewise be enjoyed by all courts of justice.
promulgate sentence and ascertain any civil liability which the
accused may have incurred. The Supreme Court shall promulgate the necessary guidelines to
effectively implement the provisions of this Sec.
The sentence, however, shall be suspended without need of
application pursuant to Ptesidential Decree No. 603, otherwise Section 7. Special Provisional Remedies. - In cases of violence
known as the "Child and Youth Welfare Code"; among immediate family members living in the same domicile or
household, the Family Court may issue a restraining order against
b) Petitions for guardianship, custody of children, habeas corpus the accused of defendant upon verified application by the
in relation to the latter; complainant or the victim for relief from abuse.

c) Petitions for adoption of children and the revocation thereof; The court may order the temporary custody of children in all civil
actions for their custody. The court may also order support
d) Complaints for annulment of marriage, declaration of nullity of pendente lite, including deduction from the salary and use of
marriage and those relating to marital status and property conjugal home and other properties in all civil actions for support.
Section 8. Supervision of Youth Detention Homes. - The judge of Section 14. Appeals. - Decisions and orders of the court shall be
the Family Court shall have direct control and supervision of the appealed in the same manner and subject to the same conditions
youth detention home which the local government unit shall as appeals from the ordinary Regional Trial Courts.
establish to separate the youth offenders from adult criminals:
Provided, however, That alternatives to detention and Section 15. Appropriations. - The amount necessary to carry out
institutional care shall be made available to the accused including the provisions of this Act shall be included in the General
counseling, recognizance, bail, community continuum, or Appropriations Act of the year following in its enactment into law
diversions from the justice system: Provided, further, That the and thereafter.
human rights of the accused are fully respected in a manner
appropriate to their well-being. Section 16. Implementing Rules and Regulations. - The Supreme
Court, in coordination with the DSWD, shall formulate the
Section 9. Social Services and Counseling Division. - Under the necessary rules and regulations for the effective implementation
guidance ofthe Department of Social Welfare and Development of the social aspects of this Act.
(DSWD), a Social Services and Counseling Division (SSCD) shall be
established in each judicial region as the Supreme Court shall Section 17. Transitory Provisions. - Pending the establishment of
deem necessary based on the number of juvenile and family cases such Family Courts, the Supreme Court shall designate from
existing in such jurisdiction. It shall provide appropriate social among the branches ofthe Regional Trial Court at least one Family
services to all juvenile and family cases filed with the court and Court in each of the cities of Manila, Quezon, Pasay, Caloocan,
recommend the proper social action. It shall also develop Makati, Pasig, Mandaluyong, Muntinlupa, Laoag, Baguio,
programs, formulate uniform policies and procedures, and Santiago, Dagupan, Olongapo, Cabanatuan, San Jose, Angeles,
provide technical supervision and monitoring of all SSCD in Cavite, Batangas, Lucena, Naga, Iriga, Legazpi, Roxas, Iloilo,
coordination with the judge. Bacolod, Dumaguete, Tacloban, Cebu, Mandaue, Tagbilaran,
Surigao, Butuan, Cagayan de Oro, Davao, General Santos,
Section 10. Social Services and Counseling Division Staff. - The Oroquieta, Ozamis, Dipolog, Zamboanga, Pagadian, Iligan, and in
SSCD shall have a staff composed of qualified social workers and such other places as the Supreme Court may deem necessary.
other personnel with academic preparation in behavioral sciences
to carry out the duties'of conducting intake assessment, social Additional cases other than those provided in Sec. 5 may be
case studies, casework and counseling, and othersocial services assigned to the Family Courts when their dockets permit:
that may be needed in connection with cases filed with the court: Provided, That such additional cases shall not be heard on the
Provided, however, That in adoption cases and in petitions for same day family cases are heard.
declaration of abandonment, the case studies may be prepared by
social workers of duly licensed child caring or child placement In areas where there are no Family Courts, the cases referred to in
agencies, or the DSWD. When warranted, the division shall Sec. 5 of this Act shall be adjudicated by the Regional Trial Court.
recommend that the court avail itself of consultative services of
psychiatrists, psychologists, and other qualified specialists Section 18. Separability Clause. - In case any provision of this Act
presently employed in other departments of the government in is declared unconstitutional, the other provisions shall remain in
connection with its cases. effect.

The position of Social Work Adviser shall be created under the Section 19. Repealing Clause. - All other laws, decrees, executive
Office of the Court Administrator, who shall monitor and orders, rules or regulations inconsistent herewith are hereby
supervise the SSCD ofthe Regional Trial Court. repealed, amended or modified accordingly.

Section 11. Alternative Social Services. - In accordance with Sec. Section 20. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days
17 of this Act, in areas where no Family Court has been after its publication in at least two (2) national newspapers of
established or no Regional Trial Court was designated by the general circulation.
Supreme Court due to the limited number of cases, the DSWD
shall designate and assign qualified, trained, and DSWD Approved October 28, 1997.
accredited social workers of the local government units to handle
juvenile and family cases filed in the designated Regional Trial
Court of the place. Supreme Court Circular No. 11-99, in relation to R.A. No. 8369

Section 12. Privacy and Confidentiality of Proceedings. - All CIRCULAR NO. 11-99 February 23, 1999
hearings and conciliation of the child and family cases shall be
treated in a manner consistent with the promotion of the child's TO: THE JUDGES AND CLERKS OF COURTS OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL
and the family's dignity and worth, and shall respect their privacy COURTS, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL
at all stages of the proceedings. Records of the cases shall be COURTS IN CITIES, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS AND MUNICIPAL
dealt with utmost confidentiality and the identity of parties shall CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS
not be divulged unless necessary and with authority of the judge.
SUBJECT: TRANSFER TO THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS OF CASES
Section 13. Special Rules of Procedure. - The Supreme Court shall FALLING WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE FAMILY COURTS
promulgate special rules of procedure for the transfer of cases to FROM THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL
the new courts during the transition period and for the disposition COURT IN CITIES, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS AND MUNICIPAL
of family cases with the best interests of the child and the CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS
protection of the family as primary consideration taking into
account the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.
For the information and guidance of all concerned, quoted province or city has a single sala, judges of the Municipal Trial
hereunder is the resolution of the Court En Banc dated February Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial
9, 1999 in A.M. No. 99-1-13-SC — Re: Transfer to Regional Trial Courts within the administrative area of the said Regional Trial
Courts of cases falling within the jurisdiction of the family courts Court shall forward the listed cases, together with the
from the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in corresponding records, to the Regional Trial Court within five (5)
Cities, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. days from the completion of the inventory, except the cases
which have already been submitted for decision as of the
WHEREAS, Section 32 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, effectivity of this Resolution.
as amended by Republic Act No. 7691, provides, on the one hand,
that the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Sec. 3. Transfer of cases in provinces or cities with multiple sala
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Trial Courts shall exercise Regional Trial Court. — Where the Regional Trial Court of the
exclusive original jurisdiction over, among others, "all offenses province or city has two (2) or more branches, judges of the
punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts within
imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability the administrative area of the said Regional Trial Court shall
arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of submit the listed cases, together with the corresponding records,
kind, nature, value or amount thereof . . . except the cases which have already been submitted for decision
as of the effectivity of this Resolution, to the Executive Judge of
WHEREAS, on the other hand, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 8369, the Regional Trial Court. The said Executive Judge shall then effect
otherwise known as the Family Courts Act of 1997, provides that the distribution of the listed cases to the branch or branches of
the Family Courts shall have original jurisdiction to hear and the Regional Trial Court designated to handle juvenile and
decide the following cases, regardless of the penalty imposable by domestic relations cases and cases involving youthful offenders.
law:
(a) In case only one (1) branch of the Regional Trial Court has been
a) Criminal cases where one or more of the accused is below designated to handle juvenile and domestic relations cases and
eighteen (18) years of age but not less than nine (9) years of age, cases involving youthful offenders, the Executive Judge shall cause
or one or more of the victims is a minor at the time of the the transfer of the listed cases to the Regional Trial Court branch
commission of the offense. so designated immediately after receipt of the records.

xxx xxx xxx (b) In cases (2) or more branches of the Regional Court have been
designated to handle the aforementioned cases, the Executive
h) Cases against minors cognizable under the Dangerous Act, as Judge shall, within ten (10) days from receipt of the records,
amended; [and] conduct the raffle, with notice to the parties, and distribute the
cases, together with the records to the Regional Trial Court
i) Violations of Republic Act No. 7610, otherwise known as the branches involved.
"Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation
and Discrimination Act," as amended by Republic Act No. 7658. (c) In provinces or cities with multiple-sala Regional Trial Court but
no branch or branches thereof have been designated to handle
WHEREAS, pending the constitution and organization of the juvenile and domestic relations cases or cases involving youthful
Family Courts and the designation of branches of the Regional offenders, the Executive Judge shall conduct the appropriate
Trial Courts as Family Courts in accordance with Section 17 raffle and distribute the said cases, together with the records, to
(Transitory Provisions) of R.A. No. 8369, there is need to provide the branches of the Regional Trial Court within ten (10) days from
guidelines in the hearing and determination of criminal cases receipt of such records.
falling within the jurisdiction of Family Courts which have
heretofore been filed with first level courts. Sec. 4. Resolution of and decision on cases already submitted for
decision. — Cases which have already been submitted for decision
NOW, THEREFORE, the Court has RESOLVED, as it hereby resolves, before the effectivity of this Resolution in Metropolitan Trial
that all criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Family Courts Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts and
filed with the first level courts shall be transferred to the Regional Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in which they have been filed and
Trial Courts which shall take cognizance thereof as follows: heard shall be resolved by such courts, as the case may be.

Sec. 1. Inventory of cases. — All judges of Metropolitan Trial Sec. 5. Publication and effectivity. — This Resolution shall take
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts and effect on 1 March 1999 and shall be published in two (2)
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall cause (1) the taking of an newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines before 15
inventory within ten (10) days from receipt of a copy of this February 1999.
issuance of all criminal cases falling within the jurisdiction of the
Family Courts filed with their respective courts; and (2) the Promulgated this 9th day of February, 1999.
preparation of the appropriate inventory list. The list shall indicate
the case number and the status of each case — whether for pre- February 23, 1999.
trial, trial or submitted for decision. A copy of the list shall be Republic Act No. 9285 (CIAC), Sections 35 and 39
submitted to the Court Management Office (Attention: The Chief,
Statistical Reports Division) of the Office of the Court CHAPTER 6 - ARBITRATION OF CONSTRUCTION DISPUTES
Administrator.

Sec. 2. Transfer of cases in provinces or cities with only a single SEC. 35. Coverage of the Law. - Construction disputes which fall
sala Regional Trial Court. — Where the Regional Trial Court of the within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Construction
Industry Arbitration Commission (the "Commission") shall include quorum. In the absence of the Chairperson, the most senior
those between or among parties to, or who are otherwise bound Commissioner shall act as presiding officer of the meeting.
by, an arbitration agreement, directly or by reference whether
such parties are project owner, contractor, subcontractor, 4.6. The Commission may, for purposes of efficiency, delegate any
quantity surveyor, bondsman or issuer of an insurance policy in a of its functions to any department of office of the Commission, an
construction project. individual Commissioner or staff member of the Commission
except its review or appellate authority and its power to adopt,
The Commission shall continue to exercise original and exclusive alter and supplement any rule or regulation.
jurisdiction over construction disputes although the arbitration is
"commercial" pursuant to Section 21 of this Act. The commission may review upon its own initiative or upon the
petition of any interested party any action of any department or
SEC. 39. Court to Dismiss Case Involving a Construction Dispute. - office, individual Commissioner, or staff member of the
A regional trial court which a construction dispute is filed shall, Commission.
upon becoming aware, not later than the pretrial conference, that
the parties had entered into an arbitration to be conducted by the Section 5. Powers and Functions of the Commission.– 5.1. The
CIAC, unless both parties, assisted by their respective counsel, commission shall act with transparency and shall have the powers
shall submit to the regional trial court a written agreement and functions provided by this code, Presidential Decree No. 902-
exclusive for the Court, rather than the CIAC, to resolve the A, the Corporation Code, the Investment Houses law, the
dispute. Financing Company Act and other existing laws. Pursuant thereto
the Commission shall have, among others, the following powers
Republic Act No. 8799 (Section , par.2, Chapter 2) and functions:

CHAPTER II (a) Have jurisdiction and supervision over all corporations,

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION partnership or associations who are the grantees of primary
franchises and/or a license or a permit issued by the Government;
Section 4. Administrative Agency. – 4.1. This Code shall be
administered by the Security and Exchange Commission (b) Formulate policies and recommendations on issues concerning
(hereinafter referred to as the "Commission") as a Collegial body, the securities market, advise Congress and other government
composed of a chairperson and (4) Commissioners, appointed by agencies on all aspect of the securities market and propose
the President for a term of (7) seven years each and who shall legislation and amendments thereto;
serves as such until their successor shall have been appointed and
qualified. A Commissioner appointed to fill a vacancy occurring (c) Approve, reject, suspend, revoke or require amendments to
prior to the expiration of the term for which his/her predecessor registration statements, and registration and licensing
was appointed, shall serve only for the unexpired portion of their applications;
terms under Presidential Decree No. 902-A. Unless the context
indicates otherwise, the term "Commissioner" includes the (d) Regulate, investigate or supervise the activities of persons to
Chairperson. ensure compliance;

4.2. The Commissioners must be natural-born citizens of the (e) Supervise, monitor, suspend or take over the activities of
Philippines, at least forty (40) years of age for the Chairperson and exchanges, clearing agencies and other SROs;
at least thirty-five (35) years of age for the Commissioners, of
good moral character, or unquestionable integrity, of known (f) Impose sanctions for the violation of laws and rules,
probity and patriotism, and with recognized competence in social regulations and orders, and issued pursuant thereto;
and economic disciplines: Provided, That the majority of
Commissioners, including the Chairperson, shall be members of (g) Prepare, approve, amend or repeal rules, regulations and
the Philippine Bar. orders, and issue opinions and provide guidance on and supervise
compliance with such rules, regulation and orders;
4.3. The chairperson is chief executive officer of the Commission.
The Chairperson shall execute and administer the policies, (h) Enlist the aid and support of and/or deputized any and all
decisions, orders and resolutions approved by the Commission enforcement agencies of the Government, civil or military as well
and shall have the general executive direction and supervision of as any private institution, corporation, firm, association or person
the work and operation of the Commission and it’s members, in the implementation of its powers and function under its Code;
bodies, boards, offices, personnel and all its administrative
business. (i) Issue cease and desist orders to prevent fraud or injury to the
investing public;
4.4. The salary of the Chairperson and the Commissioners shall be
fixed by the President of the Philippines based on the objective (j) Punish for the contempt of the Commission, both direct and
classification system, at a sum comparable to the members of the indirect, in accordance with the pertinent provisions of and
Monetary Board and commensurate importance and penalties prescribed by the Rules of Court;
responsibilities attached to the position.
(k) Compel the officers of any registered corporation or
4.5. The Commission shall hold meetings at least once a week for association to call meetings of stockholders or members thereof
the conduct of business or as often as may be necessary upon the under its supervision;
call of the Chairperson or upon the request of (3) Commissioners.
The notice of the meeting shall be given to all Commissioners and (l) Issue subpoena duces tecum and summon witnesses to appear
the presence of three (3) Commissioners shall constitute a in any proceedings of the Commission and in appropriate cases,
order the examination, search and seizure of all documents,
papers, files and records, tax returns and books of accounts of any
entity or person under investigation as may be necessary for the
proper disposition of the cases before it, subject to the provisions
of existing laws;

(m) Suspend, or revoke, after proper notice and hearing the

franchise or certificate of registration of corporations, partnership
or associations, upon any of the grounds provided by law; and

(n) Exercise such other powers as may be provided by law as well

as those which may be implied from, or which are necessary or
incidental to the carrying out of, the express powers granted the
Commission to achieve the objectives and purposes of these laws.

5.2. The Commission’s jurisdiction over all cases enumerated

under section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A is hereby
transferred to the Courts of general jurisdiction or the appropriate
Regional Trial Court: Provided, That the Supreme Court in the
exercise of its authority may designate the Regional Trial Court
branches that shall exercise jurisdiction over the cases. The
Commission shall retain jurisdiction over pending cases involving
intra-corporate disputes submitted for final resolution which
should be resolved within one (1) year from the enactment of this
Code. The Commission shall retain jurisdiction over pending
suspension of payment/rehabilitation cases filed as of 30 June
2000 until finally disposed.
G.R. No. 175723 February 4, 2014 Petitioners then filed a special civil action for certiorari with the
CA assailing the July 9, 2004 and October 15, 2004 Orders of the
THE CITY OF MANILA, represented by MAYOR JOSE L. ATIENZA, RTC.6
JR., and MS. LIBERTY M. TOLEDO, in her capacity as the City
Treasurer of Manila, Petitioners, In its Resolution promulgated on April 6, 2006, the CA dismissed
vs. petitioners' petition for certiorari holding that it has no
HON. CARIDAD H. GRECIA-CUERDO, in her capacity as Presiding jurisdiction over the said petition. The CA ruled that since
Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 112, Pasay City; SM appellate jurisdiction over private respondents' complaint for tax
MART, INC.; SM PRIME HOLDINGS, INC.; STAR APPLIANCES refund, which was filed with the RTC, is vested in the Court of Tax
CENTER; SUPERVALUE, INC.; ACE HARDWARE PHILIPPINES, INC.; Appeals (CTA), pursuant to its expanded jurisdiction under
WATSON PERSONAL CARE STORES, PHILS., INC.; JOLLIMART Republic Act No. 9282 (RA 9282), it follows that a petition for
PHILS., CORP.; SURPLUS MARKETING CORPORATION and certiorari seeking nullification of an interlocutory order issued in
SIGNATURE LINES, Respondents. the said case should, likewise, be filed with the CTA.

DECISION Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration,7 but the CA denied

it in its Resolution dated November 29, 2006.
PERALTA, J.:
Hence, the present petition raising the following issues:
Before the Court is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the I- Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in
Resolutions1 dated April 6, 2006 and November 29, 2006 of the dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction.
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 87948.
II- Whether or not the Honorable Regional Trial Court gravely
The antecedents of the case, as summarized by the CA, are as abuse[d] its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
follows: in enjoining by issuing a Writ of Injunction the petitioners, their
agents and/or authorized representatives from implementing
The record shows that petitioner City of Manila, through its Section 21 of the Revised Revenue Code of Manila, as amended,
treasurer, petitioner Liberty Toledo, assessed taxes for the taxable against private respondents.
period from January to December 2002 against private
respondents SM Mart, Inc., SM Prime Holdings, Inc., Star III- Whether or not the Honorable Regional Trial Court gravely
Appliances Center, Supervalue, Inc., Ace Hardware Philippines, abuse[d] its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
Inc., Watsons Personal Care Stores Phils., Inc., Jollimart Philippines in issuing the Writ of Injunction despite failure of private
Corp., Surplus Marketing Corp. and Signature Lines. In addition to respondents to make a written claim for tax credit or refund with
the taxes purportedly due from private respondents pursuant to the City Treasurer of Manila.
Section 14, 15, 16, 17 of the Revised Revenue Code of Manila
(RRCM), said assessment covered the local business taxes IV- Whether or not the Honorable Regional Trial Court gravely
petitioners were authorized to collect under Section 21 of the abuse[d] its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
same Code. Because payment of the taxes assessed was a considering that under Section 21 of the Manila Revenue Code, as
precondition for the issuance of their business permits, private amended, they are mere collecting agents of the City
respondents were constrained to pay the ₱19,316,458.77 Government.
assessment under protest.
V- Whether or not the Honorable Regional Trial Court gravely
On January 24, 2004, private respondents filed [with the Regional abuse[d] its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
Trial Court of Pasay City] the complaint denominated as one for in issuing the Writ of Injunction because petitioner City of Manila
"Refund or Recovery of Illegally and/or Erroneously-Collected and its constituents would result to greater damage and prejudice
Local Business Tax, Prohibition with Prayer to Issue TRO and Writ thereof. (sic)8
of Preliminary Injunction"
Without first resolving the above issues, this Court finds that the
which was docketed as Civil Case No. 04-0019-CFM before public instant petition should be denied for being moot and academic.
respondent's sala [at Branch 112]. In the amended complaint they
filed on February 16, 2004, private respondents alleged that, in Upon perusal of the original records of the instant case, this Court
relation to Section 21 thereof, Sections 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 and discovered that a Decision9 in the main case had already been
20 of the RRCM were violative of the limitations and guidelines rendered by the RTC on August 13, 2007, the dispositive portion
under Section 143 (h) of Republic Act. No. 7160 [Local of which reads as follows:
Government Code] on double taxation. They further averred that
petitioner city's Ordinance No. 8011 which amended pertinent WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court hereby renders
portions of the RRCM had already been declared to be illegal and JUDGMENT in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant to
unconstitutional by the Department of Justice.2 grant a tax refund or credit for taxes paid pursuant to Section 21
of the Revenue Code of the City of Manila as amended for the
In its Order3 dated July 9, 2004, the RTC granted private year 2002 in the following amounts:
respondents' application for a writ of preliminary injunction.
To plaintiff SM Mart, Inc. - P 11,462,525.02
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration4 but the RTC To plaintiff SM Prime Holdings, Inc. -
denied it in its Order5 dated October 15, 2004. 3,118,104.63
To plaintiff Star Appliances Center -
2,152,316.54
To plaintiff Supervalue, Inc. - 1,362,750.34 was filed within the reglementary period within which to file a
To plaintiff Ace Hardware Phils., Inc. - petition for review on certiorari; (2) when errors of judgment are
419,689.04 averred; and (3) when there is sufficient reason to justify the
To plaintiff Watsons Personal Care Health - relaxation of the rules.18 Considering that the present petition
231,453.62 was filed within the 15-day reglementary period for filing a
Stores Phils., Inc. petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, that an error of
To plaintiff Jollimart Phils., Corp. - 140,908.54 judgment is averred, and because of the significance of the issue
To plaintiff Surplus Marketing Corp. - on jurisdiction, the Court deems it proper and justified to relax
220,204.70 the rules and, thus, treat the instant petition for certiorari as a
To plaintiff Signature Mktg. Corp. - 94,906.34 petition for review on certiorari.
TOTAL: - P 19,316,458.77
Defendants are further enjoined from collecting taxes under Having disposed of the procedural aspect, we now turn to the
Section 21, Revenue Code of Manila from herein plaintiff. central issue in this case. The basic question posed before this
Court is whether or not the CTA has jurisdiction over a special civil
SO ORDERED.10 action for certiorari assailing an interlocutory order issued by the
RTC in a local tax case.
The parties did not inform the Court but based on the records, the
above Decision had already become final and executory per the This Court rules in the affirmative.
Certificate of Finality11 issued by the same trial court on October
20, 2008. In fact, a Writ of Execution12 was issued by the RTC on On June 16, 1954, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 1125 (RA
November 25, 2009. In view of the foregoing, it clearly appears 1125) creating the CTA and giving to the said court jurisdiction
that the issues raised in the present petition, which merely over the following:
involve the incident on the preliminary injunction issued by the
RTC, have already become moot and academic considering that (1) Decisions of the Collector of Internal Revenue in cases
the trial court, in its decision on the merits in the main case, has involving disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes,
already ruled in favor of respondents and that the same decision fees or other charges, penalties imposed in relation thereto, or
is now final and executory. Well entrenched is the rule that where other matters arising under the National Internal Revenue Code
the issues have become moot and academic, there is no or other law or part of law administered by the Bureau of Internal
justiciable controversy, thereby rendering the resolution of the Revenue;
same of no practical use or value.13
(2) Decisions of the Commissioner of Customs in cases involving
In any case, the Court finds it necessary to resolve the issue on liability for customs duties, fees or other money charges; seizure,
jurisdiction raised by petitioners owing to its significance and for detention or release of property affected fines, forfeitures or
future guidance of both bench and bar. It is a settled principle other penalties imposed in relation thereto; or other matters
that courts will decide a question otherwise moot and academic if arising under the Customs Law or other law or part of law
it is capable of repetition, yet evading review.14 administered by the Bureau of Customs; and

However, before proceeding, to resolve the question on (3) Decisions of provincial or City Boards of Assessment Appeals in
jurisdiction, the Court deems it proper to likewise address a cases involving the assessment and taxation of real property or
procedural error which petitioners committed. other matters arising under the Assessment Law, including rules
and regulations relative thereto.
Petitioners availed of the wrong remedy when they filed the
instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules On March 30, 2004, the Legislature passed into law Republic Act
of Court in assailing the Resolutions of the CA which dismissed No. 9282 (RA 9282) amending RA 1125 by expanding the
their petition filed with the said court and their motion for jurisdiction of the CTA, enlarging its membership and elevating its
reconsideration of such dismissal. There is no dispute that the rank to the level of a collegiate court with special jurisdiction.
assailed Resolutions of the CA are in the nature of a final order as Pertinent portions of the amendatory act provides thus:
they disposed of the petition completely. It is settled that in cases
where an assailed judgment or order is considered final, the Sec. 7. Jurisdiction. - The CTA shall exercise:
remedy of the aggrieved party is appeal. Hence, in the instant
case, petitioner should have filed a petition for review on a. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal, as herein
certiorari under Rule 45, which is a continuation of the appellate provided:
process over the original case.15
1. Decisions of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in cases
Petitioners should be reminded of the equally-settled rule that a involving disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes,
special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is an original or fees or other charges, penalties in relation thereto, or other
independent action based on grave abuse of discretion amounting matters arising under the National Internal Revenue or other laws
to lack or excess of jurisdiction and it will lie only if there is no administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue;
appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.16 As such, it cannot be a substitute for a 2. Inaction by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in cases
lost appeal.17 involving disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes,
fees or other charges, penalties in relations thereto, or other
Nonetheless, in accordance with the liberal spirit pervading the matters arising under the National Internal Revenue Code or
Rules of Court and in the interest of substantial justice, this Court other laws administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue,
has, before, treated a petition for certiorari as a petition for where the National Internal Revenue Code provides a specific
review on certiorari, particularly (1) if the petition for certiorari
period of action, in which case the inaction shall be deemed a
denial; c. Jurisdiction over tax collection cases as herein provided:

3. Decisions, orders or resolutions of the Regional Trial Courts in 1. Exclusive original jurisdiction in tax collection cases involving
local tax cases originally decided or resolved by them in the final and executory assessments for taxes, fees, charges and
exercise of their original or appellate jurisdiction; penalties: Provides, however, that collection cases where the
principal amount of taxes and fees, exclusive of charges and
4. Decisions of the Commissioner of Customs in cases involving penalties, claimed is less than One million pesos (₱1,000,000.00)
liability for customs duties, fees or other money charges, seizure, shall be tried by the proper Municipal Trial Court, Metropolitan
detention or release of property affected, fines, forfeitures or Trial Court and Regional Trial Court.
other penalties in relation thereto, or other matters arising under
the Customs Law or other laws administered by the Bureau of 2. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction in tax collection cases:
Customs;
a. Over appeals from the judgments, resolutions or orders of the
5. Decisions of the Central Board of Assessment Appeals in the Regional Trial Courts in tax collection cases originally decided by
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction over cases involving the them, in their respective territorial jurisdiction.
assessment and taxation of real property originally decided by the
provincial or city board of assessment appeals; b. Over petitions for review of the judgments, resolutions or
orders of the Regional Trial Courts in the Exercise of their
6. Decisions of the Secretary of Finance on customs cases elevated appellate jurisdiction over tax collection cases originally decided
to him automatically for review from decisions of the by the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Commissioner of Customs which are adverse to the Government Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, in their respective jurisdiction.19
under Section 2315 of the Tariff and Customs Code;
A perusal of the above provisions would show that, while it is
7. Decisions of the Secretary of Trade and Industry, in the case of clearly stated that the CTA has exclusive appellate jurisdiction
nonagricultural product, commodity or article, and the Secretary over decisions, orders or resolutions of the RTCs in local tax cases
of Agriculture in the case of agricultural product, commodity or originally decided or resolved by them in the exercise of their
article, involving dumping and countervailing duties under Section original or appellate jurisdiction, there is no categorical statement
301 and 302, respectively, of the Tariff and Customs Code, and under RA 1125 as well as the amendatory RA 9282, which
safeguard measures under Republic Act No. 8800, where either provides that th e CTA has jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari
party may appeal the decision to impose or not to impose said assailing interlocutory orders issued by the RTC in local tax cases
duties. filed before it.

b. Jurisdiction over cases involving criminal offenses as herein The prevailing doctrine is that the authority to issue writs of
provided: certiorari involves the exercise of original jurisdiction which must
be expressly conferred by the Constitution or by law and cannot
1. Exclusive original jurisdiction over all criminal offenses arising be implied from the mere existence of appellate jurisdiction.20
from violations of the National Internal Revenue Code or Tariff Thus, in the cases of Pimentel v. COMELEC,21 Garcia v. De
and Customs Code and other laws administered by the Bureau of Jesus,22 Veloria v. COMELEC,23 Department of Agrarian Reform
Internal Revenue or the Bureau of Customs: Provided, however, Adjudication Board v. Lubrica,24 and Garcia v. Sandiganbayan,25
That offenses or felonies mentioned in this paragraph where the this Court has ruled against the jurisdiction of courts or tribunals
principal amount of taxes and fees, exclusive of charges and over petitions for certiorari on the ground that there is no law
penalties, claimed is less than One million pesos (₱1,000,000.00) which expressly gives these tribunals such power.26 It must be
or where there is no specified amount claimed shall be tried by observed, however, that with the exception of Garcia v.
the regular Courts and the jurisdiction of the CTA shall be Sandiganbayan,27 these rulings pertain not to regular courts but
appellate. Any provision of law or the Rules of Court to the to tribunals exercising quasi-judicial powers. With respect to the
contrary notwithstanding, the criminal action and the Sandiganbayan, Republic Act No. 824928 now provides that the
corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability for taxes special criminal court has exclusive original jurisdiction over
and penalties shall at all times be simultaneously instituted with, petitions for the issuance of the writs of mandamus, prohibition,
and jointly determined in the same proceeding by the CTA, the certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary writs
filing of the criminal action being deemed to necessarily carry with and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
it the filing of the civil action, and no right to reserve the filing of
such civil action separately from the criminal action will be In the same manner, Section 5 (1), Article VIII of the 1987
recognized. Constitution grants power to the Supreme Court, in the exercise
of its original jurisdiction, to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition
2. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction in criminal offenses: and mandamus. With respect to the Court of Appeals, Section 9
(1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (BP 129) gives the appellate court,
a. Over appeals from the judgments, resolutions or orders of the also in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, the power to issue,
Regional Trial Courts in tax cases originally decided by them, in among others, a writ of certiorari,whether or not in aid of its
their respected territorial jurisdiction. appellate jurisdiction. As to Regional Trial Courts, the power to
issue a writ of certiorari, in the exercise of their original
b. Over petitions for review of the judgments, resolutions or jurisdiction, is provided under Section 21 of BP 129.
orders of the Regional Trial Courts in the exercise of their
appellate jurisdiction over tax cases originally decided by the The foregoing notwithstanding, while there is no express grant of
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal such power, with respect to the CTA, Section 1, Article VIII of the
Circuit Trial Courts in their respective jurisdiction. 1987 Constitution provides, nonetheless, that judicial power shall
be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may Stated differently, it would be somewhat incongruent with the
be established by law and that judicial power includes the duty of pronounced judicial abhorrence to split jurisdiction to conclude
the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights that the intention of the law is to divide the authority over a local
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine tax case filed with the RTC by giving to the CA or this Court
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari against interlocutory
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any orders of the RTC but giving to the CTA the jurisdiction over the
branch or instrumentality of the Government. appeal from the decision of the trial court in the same case. It is
more in consonance with logic and legal soundness to conclude
On the strength of the above constitutional provisions, it can be that the grant of appellate jurisdiction to the CTA over tax cases
fairly interpreted that the power of the CTA includes that of filed in and decided by the RTC carries with it the power to issue a
determining whether or not there has been grave abuse of writ of certiorari when necessary in aid of such appellate
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part jurisdiction. The supervisory power or jurisdiction of the CTA to
of the RTC in issuing an interlocutory order in cases falling within issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction should
the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the tax court. It, thus, co-exist with, and be a complement to, its appellate jurisdiction to
follows that the CTA, by constitutional mandate, is vested with review, by appeal, the final orders and decisions of the RTC, in
jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari in these cases. order to have complete supervision over the acts of the latter.36

Indeed, in order for any appellate court to effectively exercise its A grant of appellate jurisdiction implies that there is included in it
appellate jurisdiction, it must have the authority to issue, among the power necessary to exercise it effectively, to make all orders
others, a writ of certiorari. In transferring exclusive jurisdiction that will preserve the subject of the action, and to give effect to
over appealed tax cases to the CTA, it can reasonably be assumed the final determination of the appeal. It carries with it the power
that the law intended to transfer also such power as is deemed to protect that jurisdiction and to make the decisions of the court
necessary, if not indispensable, in aid of such appellate thereunder effective. The court, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction,
jurisdiction. There is no perceivable reason why the transfer has authority to control all auxiliary and incidental matters
should only be considered as partial, not total. necessary to the efficient and proper exercise of that
jurisdiction.1âwphi1 For this purpose, it may, when necessary,
Consistent with the above pronouncement, this Court has held as prohibit or restrain the performance of any act which might
early as the case of J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Jaramillo, et al.29 interfere with the proper exercise of its rightful jurisdiction in
that "if a case may be appealed to a particular court or judicial cases pending before it.37
tribunal or body, then said court or judicial tribunal or body has
jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writ of certiorari, in aid of Lastly, it would not be amiss to point out that a court which is
its appellate jurisdiction."30 This principle was affirmed in De endowed with a particular jurisdiction should have powers which
Jesus v. Court of Appeals,31 where the Court stated that "a court are necessary to enable it to act effectively within such
may issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction if jurisdiction. These should be regarded as powers which are
said court has jurisdiction to review, by appeal or writ of error, inherent in its jurisdiction and the court must possess them in
the final orders or decisions of the lower court."32 The rulings in order to enforce its rules of practice and to suppress any abuses
J.M. Tuason and De Jesus were reiterated in the more recent of its process and to defeat any attempted thwarting of such
cases of Galang, Jr. v. Geronimo33 and Bulilis v. Nuez.34 process.

Furthermore, Section 6, Rule 135 of the present Rules of Court In this regard, Section 1 of RA 9282 states that the CTA shall be of
provides that when by law, jurisdiction is conferred on a court or the same level as the CA and shall possess all the inherent powers
judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other means of a court of justice.
necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such court or
officer. Indeed, courts possess certain inherent powers which may be said
to be implied from a general grant of jurisdiction, in addition to
If this Court were to sustain petitioners' contention that those expressly conferred on them. These inherent powers are
jurisdiction over their certiorari petition lies with the CA, this such powers as are necessary for the ordinary and efficient
Court would be confirming the exercise by two judicial bodies, the exercise of jurisdiction; or are essential to the existence, dignity
CA and the CTA, of jurisdiction over basically the same subject and functions of the courts, as well as to the due administration of
matter – precisely the split-jurisdiction situation which is justice; or are directly appropriate, convenient and suitable to the
anathema to the orderly administration of justice.35 The Court execution of their granted powers; and include the power to
cannot accept that such was the legislative motive, especially maintain the court's jurisdiction and render it effective in behalf
considering that the law expressly confers on the CTA, the of the litigants.38
tribunal with the specialized competence over tax and tariff
matters, the role of judicial review over local tax cases without Thus, this Court has held that "while a court may be expressly
mention of any other court that may exercise such power. Thus, granted the incidental powers necessary to effectuate its
the Court agrees with the ruling of the CA that since appellate jurisdiction, a grant of jurisdiction, in the absence of prohibitive
jurisdiction over private respondents' complaint for tax refund is legislation, implies the necessary and usual incidental powers
vested in the CTA, it follows that a petition for certiorari seeking essential to effectuate it, and, subject to existing laws and
nullification of an interlocutory order issued in the said case constitutional provisions, every regularly constituted court has
should, likewise, be filed with the same court. To rule otherwise power to do all things that are reasonably necessary for the
would lead to an absurd situation where one court decides an administration of justice within the scope of its jurisdiction and
appeal in the main case while another court rules on an incident for the enforcement of its judgments and mandates."39 Hence,
in the very same case. demands, matters or questions ancillary or incidental to, or
growing out of, the main action, and coming within the above
principles, may be taken cognizance of by the court and
determined, since such jurisdiction is in aid of its authority over * No part.
the principal matter, even though the court may thus be called on
to consider and decide matters which, as original causes of action, 1 Penned by Associate Justice Rebecca de Guia-Salvador, with
would not be within its cognizance.40 Associate Justices Ruben T. Reyes (now a retired member of this
Court) and Aurora Santiago-Lagman, concurring; Annexes "A" and
Based on the foregoing disquisitions, it can be reasonably "B," rollo, pp. 43-48; 49-51.
concluded that the authority of the CTA to take cognizance of
petitions for certiorari questioning interlocutory orders issued by 2 Rollo, p. 44. (Italics and emphasis in the original; citations
the RTC in a local tax case is included in the powers granted by the omitted)
Constitution as well as inherent in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction. 3 Records, vol. II, pp. 476-480.

Finally, it would bear to point out that this Court is not 4 Id. at 481-490.
abandoning the rule that, insofar as quasi-judicial tribunals are
concerned, the authority to issue writs of certiorari must still be 5 Id. at 513.
expressly conferred by the Constitution or by law and cannot be
implied from the mere existence of their appellate jurisdiction. 6 CA rollo, pp. 2-31.
This doctrine remains as it applies only to quasi-judicial bodies.
7 Id. at 321-326.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
8 Rollo, p. 20. (Emphasis in the original)
SO ORDERED.
9 Records, vol. II, pp. 761-762.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice 10 Id. at 762. (Emphasis in the original)

WE CONCUR: 11 Id. at 822.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO 12 Id. at 837.

Chief Justice
13 Garcia v. COMELEC, 328 Phil. 288, 292 (1996).
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. 14 Caneland Sugar Corporation v. Alon, G.R. No. 142896,
Associate Justice September 12, 2007, 533 SCRA 28, 33.
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice ARTURO D. BRION 15 Republic of the Philippines, represented by Abusama M. Alid,
Associate Justice Officer-in-Charge, Department of Agriculture-Regional Field Unit
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN XII (DA-RFU-XII) v. Abdulwahab A. Bayao, et al., G. R . No. 179492,
Associate Justice No part June 5, 2013.
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO*
Associate Justice 16 Mendez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 174937, June 13, 2012,
ROBERTO A. ABAD 672 SCRA 200, 207.
Associate Justice MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice 17 Id.
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA 18 Tagle v. Equitable PCI Bank, G.R. No. 172299, April 22, 2008,
Associate Justice 552 SCRA 424, 444, citing Oaminal v. Castillo, 459 Phil. 542, 556
BIENVENIDO L. REYES (2003); Republic v. Court of Appeals, 379 Phil. 92, 98 (2000);
Associate Justice ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE Delsan Transport Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil. 1066,
Associate Justice 1075 (1997); Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank v. Court of
MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN Appeals, 389 Phil. 644, 655 (2000).
Associate Justice
19 Emphasis supplied.
CERTIFICATION
20 Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board v. Lubrica,
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify 497 Phil. 313, 322 (2005); Veloria v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 94771,
that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in July 29, 1992, 211 SCRA 907, 915.
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court. 21 189 Phil. 581 (1980).

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO 22 G.R. Nos. 88158 and 97108-09, March 4, 1992, 206 SCRA 779.
Chief Justice
23 Supra note 20.

Footnotes 24 Supra note 20.

25 G..R. No. 114135, October 7, 1994, 237 SCRA 552.

26 Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board v. Lubrica,

supra note 20; Veloria v. COMELEC, supra note 20; Garcia v.
Sandiganbayan, id. at 563-564; Garcia v. De Jesus, supra note 22,
at 787-788; Pimentel v. COMELEC, supra note 21, at 587.

27 Supra note 25.

28 An Act Further Defining the Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan,

Amending for the Purpose Presidential Decree No. 1606, As
Amended, Providing Funds Therefor, And for Other Purposes.

29 118 Phil. 1022 (1963).

30 J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Jaramillo, et al., supra, at 1026.

31 G.R. No. 101630, August 24, 1992, 212 SCRA 823.

32 De Jesus v. Court of Appeals, supra, at 827-828.

33 G.R. No. 192793, February 22, 2011, 643 SCRA 631, 635-636.

34 G.R. No. 195953, August 9, 2011, 655 SCRA 241, 246-247.

35 Southern Cross Cement Corporation v. Philippine Cement

Manufacturers Corp., 478 Phil. 85, 125 (2004).

36 Breslin v. Luzon Stevedoring Company, 84 Phil. 618, 623

(1949).

37 4 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error, §5, p. 536; 2 Am Jur, Appeal and
Error, §9, 850.

38 Santiago v. Vasquez, G.R. Nos. 99289-90, January 27, 1993, 217

SCRA 633, 648.

39 Treasurer-Assessor v. University of the Philippines, 148 Phil.

526, 539 (1971); Amalgamated Laborers' Association v. Court of
Industrial Relations, 131 Phil. 374, 380 (1968); Philippine Airlines
Employees' Association v. Philippine Airlines, Inc. 120 Phil. 383,
390 (1964). (Citations omitted).

40 Id.
G.R. No. 181416 November 11, 2013 x x x;

MEDICAL PLAZA MAKATI CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION, 8. As a consequence, plaintiff was not allowed to file his
Petitioner, certificate of candidacy as director. Being considered a
vs. delinquent, plaintiff was also barred from exercising his right to
ROBERT H. CULLEN, Respondent. vote in the election of new members of the Board of Directors x x
x;
DECISION
9. x x x Again, prior to the said election date, x x x counsel for the
PERALTA, J.: defendant [MPMCC] sent a demand letter to plaintiff, anent the
said delinquency, explaining that the said unpaid amount is a
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the carry-over from the obligation of defendant Meridien. x x x;
Rules of Court assailing the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision1 dated
July 10, 2007 and Resolution2 dated January 25, 2008 in CA-G.R. 10. Verification with the defendant [MPMCC] resulted to the
CV No. 86614. The assailed decision reversed and set aside the issuance of a certification stating that Condominium Unit 1201
September 9, 2005 Order3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of has an outstanding unpaid obligation in the total amount of
Makati, Branch 58 in Civil Case No. 03-1018; while the assailed ₱145,567.42 as of November 30, 2002, which again, was
resolution denied the separate motions for reconsideration filed attributed by defendant [MPMCC] to defendant Meridien. x x x;
by petitioner Medical Plaza Makati Condominium Corporation
(MPMCC) and Meridien Land Holding, Inc. (MLHI). 11. Due to the seriousness of the matter, and the feeling that
defendant Meridien made false representations considering that
The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows: it fully warranted to plaintiff that condominium unit 1201 is free
and clear from all liens and encumbrances, the matter was
Respondent Robert H. Cullen purchased from MLHI condominium referred to counsel, who accordingly sent a letter to defendant
Unit No. 1201 of the Medical Plaza Makati covered by Meridien, to demand for the payment of said unpaid association
Condominium Certificate of Title No. 45808 of the Register of dues and other assessments imposed on the condominium unit
Deeds of Makati. Said title was later cancelled and Condominium and being claimed by defendant [MPMCC]. x x x;
Certificate of Title No. 64218 was issued in the name of
respondent. 12. x x x defendant Meridien claimed however, that the obligation
does not exist considering that the matter was already settled and
On September 19, 2002, petitioner, through its corporate paid by defendant Meridien to defendant [MPMCC]. x x x;
secretary, Dr. Jose Giovanni E. Dimayuga, demanded from
respondent payment for alleged unpaid association dues and 13. Plaintiff thus caused to be sent a letter to defendant [MPMCC]
assessments amounting to ₱145,567.42. Respondent disputed x x x. The said letter x x x sought an explanation on the fact that,
this demand claiming that he had been religiously paying his dues as per the letter of defendant Meridien, the delinquency of unit
shown by the fact that he was previously elected president and 1201 was already fully paid and settled, contrary to the claim of
director of petitioner.4 Petitioner, on the other hand, claimed defendant [MPMCC]. x x x;
that respondent’s obligation was a carry-over of that of MLHI.5
Consequently, respondent was prevented from exercising his right 14. Despite receipt of said letter on April 24, 2003, and to date
to vote and be voted for during the 2002 election of petitioner’s however, no explanation was given by defendant [MPMCC], to
Board of Directors.6 Respondent thus clarified from MLHI the the damage and prejudice of plaintiff who is again obviously being
veracity of petitioner’s claim, but MLHI allegedly claimed that the barred from voting/participating in the election of members of
same had already been settled.7 This prompted respondent to the board of directors for the year 2003;
demand from petitioner an explanation why he was considered a
delinquent payer despite the settlement of the obligation. 15. Clearly, defendant [MPMCC] acted maliciously by insisting that
Petitioner failed to make such explanation. Hence, the Complaint plaintiff is a delinquent member when in fact, defendant Meridien
for Damages8 filed by respondent against petitioner and MLHI, had already paid the said delinquency, if any. The branding of
the pertinent portions of which read: plaintiff as delinquent member was willfully and deceitfully
employed so as to prevent plaintiff from exercising his right to
xxxx vote or be voted as director of the condominium corporation; 16.
Defendant [MPMCC]’s ominous silence when confronted with
6. Thereafter, plaintiff occupied the said condominium unit no. claim of payment made by defendant Meridien is tantamount to
1201 and religiously paid all the corresponding monthly admission that indeed, plaintiff is not really a delinquent member;
contributions/association dues and other assessments imposed
on the same. For the years 2000 and 2001, plaintiff served as 17. Accordingly, as a direct and proximate result of the said acts of
President and Director of the Medical Plaza Makati Condominium defendant [MPMCC], plaintiff experienced/suffered from mental
Corporation; anguish, moral shock, and serious anxiety. Plaintiff, being a doctor
of medicine and respected in the community further suffered
7. Nonetheless, on September 19, 2002, plaintiff was from social humiliation and besmirched reputation thereby
shocked/surprised to receive a letter from the incumbent warranting the grant of moral damages in the amount of
Corporate Secretary of the defendant Medical Plaza Makati, ₱500,000.00 and for which defendant [MPMCC] should be held
demanding payment of alleged unpaid association dues and liable;
assessments arising from plaintiff’s condominium unit no. 1201.
The said letter further stressed that plaintiff is considered a 18. By way of example or correction for the public good, and as a
delinquent member of the defendant Medical Plaza Makati. stern warning to all similarly situated, defendant [MPMCC] should
be ordered to pay plaintiff exemplary damages in the amount of THE COURT A QUO HAS DECIDED THE INSTANT CASE IN A WAY
₱200,000.00; NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS
OF THE SUPREME COURT WHEN IT TOOK COGNIZANCE OF THE
19. As a consequence, and so as to protect his rights and interests, APPEAL WHILE RAISING ONLY PURE QUESTIONS OF LAW.17
plaintiff was constrained to hire the services of counsel, for an
acceptance fee of ₱100,000.00 plus ₱2,500.00 per every court The petition is meritorious.
hearing attended by counsel;
It is a settled rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is
20. In the event that the claim of defendant [MPMCC] turned out determined by the allegations in the complaint. It is not affected
to be true, however, the herein defendant Meridien should be by the pleas or the theories set up by the defendant in an answer
held liable instead, by ordering the same to pay the said or a motion to dismiss. Otherwise, jurisdiction would become
delinquency of condominium unit 1201 in the amount of dependent almost entirely upon the whims of the defendant.18
₱145,567.42 as of November 30, 2002 as well as the above Also illuminating is the Court’s pronouncement in Go v.
damages, considering that the non-payment thereof would be the Distinction Properties Development and Construction, Inc.:19
proximate cause of the damages suffered by plaintiff;9
Basic as a hornbook principle is that jurisdiction over the subject
Petitioner and MLHI filed their separate motions to dismiss the matter of a case is conferred by law and determined by the
complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.10 MLHI claims allegations in the complaint which comprise a concise statement
that it is the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff’s cause of action.
which is vested with the exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide The nature of an action, as well as which court or body has
the case. Petitioner, on the other hand, raises the following jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the allegations
specific grounds for the dismissal of the complaint: (1) estoppel as contained in the complaint of the plaintiff, irrespective of whether
respondent himself approved the assessment when he was the or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the
president; (2) lack of jurisdiction as the case involves an intra- claims asserted therein. The averments in the complaint and the
corporate controversy; (3) prematurity for failure of respondent character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted. Once
to exhaust all intra-corporate remedies; and (4) the case is already vested by the allegations in the complaint, jurisdiction also
moot and academic, the obligation having been settled between remains vested irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is
petitioner and MLHI.11 entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted
therein. x x x20
On September 9, 2005, the RTC rendered a Decision granting
petitioner’s and MLHI’s motions to dismiss and, consequently, Based on the allegations made by respondent in his complaint,
dismissing respondent’s complaint. does the controversy involve intra-corporate issues as would fall
within the jurisdiction of the RTC sitting as a special commercial
The trial court agreed with MLHI that the action for specific court or an ordinary action for damages within the jurisdiction of
performance filed by respondent clearly falls within the exclusive regular courts?
jurisdiction of the HLURB.12 As to petitioner, the court held that
the complaint states no cause of action, considering that In determining whether a dispute constitutes an intra-corporate
respondent’s obligation had already been settled by MLHI. It, controversy, the Court uses two tests, namely, the relationship
likewise, ruled that the issues raised are intra-corporate between test and the nature of the controversy test.21
the corporation and member.13
An intra-corporate controversy is one which pertains to any of the
On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the trial court’s decision following relationships: (1) between the corporation, partnership
and remanded the case to the RTC for further proceedings. or association and the public; (2) between the corporation,
Contrary to the RTC conclusion, the CA held that the controversy partnership or association and the State insofar as its franchise,
is an ordinary civil action for damages which falls within the permit or license to operate is concerned; (3) between the
jurisdiction of regular courts.14 It explained that the case hinged corporation, partnership or association and its stockholders,
on petitioner’s refusal to confirm MLHI’s claim that the subject partners, members or officers; and (4) among the stockholders,
obligation had already been settled as early as 1998 causing partners or associates themselves.22 Thus, under the relationship
damage to respondent.15 Petitioner’s and MLHI’s motions for test, the existence of any of the above intra-corporate relations
reconsideration had also been denied.16 makes the case intra-corporate.23

Aggrieved, petitioner comes before the Court based on the Under the nature of the controversy test, "the controversy must
following grounds: not only be rooted in the existence of an intra-corporate
relationship, but must as well pertain to the enforcement of the
I. parties’ correlative rights and obligations under the Corporation
Code and the internal and intra-corporate regulatory rules of the
THE COURT A QUO HAS DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE, corporation."24 In other words, jurisdiction should be determined
NOT THERETOFORE DETERMINED BY THE SUPREME COURT, OR by considering both the relationship of the parties as well as the
HAS DECIDED IT IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH nature of the question involved.25
THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT WHEN IT
DECLARED THE INSTANT CASE AN ORDINARY ACTION FOR Applying the two tests, we find and so hold that the case involves
DAMAGES INSTEAD OF AN INTRA-CORPORATE CONTROVERSY intra-corporate controversy. It obviously arose from the intra-
COGNIZABLE BY A SPECIAL COMMERCIAL COURT. corporate relations between the parties, and the questions
involved pertain to their rights and obligations under the
II. Corporation Code and matters relating to the regulation of the
corporation.26
 To be sure, this action partakes of the nature of an intra-
Admittedly, petitioner is a condominium corporation duly corporate controversy, the jurisdiction over which pertains to the
organized and existing under Philippine laws, charged with the SEC. Pursuant to Section 5.2 of Republic Act No. 8799, otherwise
management of the Medical Plaza Makati. Respondent, on the known as the Securities Regulation Code, the jurisdiction of the
other hand, is the registered owner of Unit No. 1201 and is thus a SEC over all cases enumerated under Section 5 of Presidential
stockholder/member of the condominium corporation. Clearly, Decree No. 902-A has been transferred to RTCs designated by this
there is an intra-corporate relationship between the corporation Court as Special Commercial Courts.30 While the CA may be
and a stockholder/member. correct that the RTC has jurisdiction, the case should have been
filed not with the regular court but with the branch of the RTC
The nature of the action is determined by the body rather than designated as a special commercial court. Considering that the
the title of the complaint.1âwphi1 Though denominated as an RTC of Makati City, Branch 58 was not designated as a special
action for damages, an examination of the allegations made by commercial court, it was not vested with jurisdiction over cases
respondent in his complaint shows that the case principally dwells previously cognizable by the SEC.31 The CA, therefore, gravely
on the propriety of the assessment made by petitioner against erred in remanding the case to the RTC for further proceedings.
respondent as well as the validity of petitioner’s act in preventing
respondent from participating in the election of the corporation’s Indeed, Republic Act (RA) No. 9904, or the Magna Carta for
Board of Directors. Respondent contested the alleged unpaid Homeowners and Homeowners’ Associations, approved on
dues and assessments demanded by petitioner. January 7, 2010 and became effective on July 10, 2010, empowers
the HLURB to hear and decide inter-association and/or intra-
The issue is not novel. The nature of an action involving any association controversies or conflicts concerning homeowners’
dispute as to the validity of the assessment of association dues associations. However, we cannot apply the same in the present
has been settled by the Court in Chateau de Baie Condominium case as it involves a controversy between a condominium unit
Corporation v. Moreno.27 In that case, respondents therein filed a owner and a condominium corporation. While the term
complaint for intra-corporate dispute against the petitioner association as defined in the law covers homeowners’
therein to question how it calculated the dues assessed against associations of other residential real property which is broad
them, and to ask an accounting of association dues. Petitioner, enough to cover a condominium corporation, it does not seem to
however, moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground of be the legislative intent. A thorough review of the deliberations of
lack of jurisdiction alleging that since the complaint was against the bicameral conference committee would show that the
the owner/developer of a condominium whose condominium lawmakers did not intend to extend the coverage of the law to
project was registered with and licensed by the HLURB, the latter such kind of association. We quote hereunder the pertinent
has the exclusive jurisdiction. In sustaining the denial of the portion of the Bicameral Conference Committee’s deliberation, to
motion to dismiss, the Court held that the dispute as to the wit:
validity of the assessments is purely an intra-corporate matter
between petitioner and respondent and is thus within the THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ZUBIRI). Let’s go back, Mr. Chair, very
exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC sitting as a special commercial quickly on homeowners.
court. More so in this case as respondent repeatedly questioned
his characterization as a delinquent member and, consequently, THE ACTING CHAIRMAN (REP. ZIALCITA). Ang sa akin lang, I think
petitioner’s decision to bar him from exercising his rights to vote our views are similar, Your Honor, Senator Zubiri, the entry of the
and be voted for. These issues are clearly corporate and the condominium units might just complicate the whole matters. So
demand for damages is just incidental. Being corporate in nature, we’d like to put it on record that we’re very much concerned
the issues should be threshed out before the RTC sitting as a about the plight of the Condominium Unit Homeowners’
special commercial court. The issues on damages can still be Association. But this could very well be addressed on a separate
resolved in the same special commercial court just like a regular bill that I’m willing to co-sponsor with the distinguished Senator
RTC which is still competent to tackle civil law issues incidental to Zubiri, to address in the Condominium Act of the Philippines,
intra-corporate disputes filed before it.28 rather than address it here because it might just create a red
herring into the entire thing and it will just complicate matters,
Moreover, Presidential Decree No. 902-A enumerates the cases hindi ba?
over which the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
exercises exclusive jurisdiction: THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ZUBIRI). I also agree with you although I
sympathize with them---although we sympathize with them and
xxxx we feel that many times their rights have been also violated by
abusive condominium corporations. However, there are certain
b) Controversies arising out of intra-corporate or partnership things that we have to reconcile. There are certain issues that we
relations, between and among stockholders, members or have to reconcile with this version.
associates; between any or all of them and the corporation,
partnership or association of which they are stockholders, In the Condominium Code, for example, they just raised a very
members, or associates, respectively; and between such peculiar situation under the Condominium Code --- Condominium
corporation, partnership or association and the State insofar as it Corporation Act. It’s five years the proxy, whereas here, it’s three
concerns their individual franchise or right to exist as such entity; years. So there would already be violation or there will be already
and a problem with their version and our version. Sino ang matutupad
doon? Will it be our version or their version?
c) Controversies in the election or appointment of directors,
trustees, officers, or managers of such corporations, partnerships, So I agree that has to be studied further. And because they have a
or associations.29 law pertaining to the condominium housing units, I personally feel
that it would complicate matters if we include them. Although I
agree that they should be looked after and their problems be THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ZUBIRI). xxx And so, what is their final
looked into. decision on the definition of homeowners?

Probably we can ask our staff, Your Honor, to come up already THE ACTING CHAIRMAN (REP. ZIALCITA).
with the bill although we have no more time. Hopefully we can
tackle this again on the 15th Congress. But I agree with the We stick to the original, Mr. Chairman. We’ll just open up a whole
sentiments and the inputs of the Honorable Chair of the House can of worms and a whole new ball game will come into play.
panel. Besides, I am not authorized, neither are you, by our counterparts
to include the condominium owners.
May we ask our resource persons to also probably give
comments? THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ZUBIRI).

Atty. Dayrit. Basically that is correct. We are not authorized by the Senate nor
– because we have discussed this lengthily on the floor, actually,
MR. DAYRIT. several months on the floor. And we don’t have the authority as
well for other Bicam members to add a provision to include a
Yes I agree with you. There are many, I think, practices in their separate entity that has already their legal or their established
provisions in the Condominium Law that may be conflicting with Republic Act tackling on that particular issue. But we just like to
this version of ours. put on record, we sympathize with the plight of our friends in the
condominium associations and we will just guarantee them that
For instance, in the case of, let’s say, the condominium, the so- we will work on an amendment to the Condominium Corporation
called common areas and/or maybe so called open spaces that Code. So with that – we skipped, that is correct, we have to go
they may have, especially common areas, they are usually owned back to homeowners’ association definition, Your Honor, because
by the condominium corporation. Unlike a subdivision where the we had skipped it altogether. So just quickly going back to Page 7
open spaces and/or the common areas are not necessarily owned because there are amendments to the definition of homeowners.
by the association. Because sometimes --- generally these are If it is alright with the House Panel, adopt the opening phrase of
donated to the municipality or to the city. And it is only when the Subsection 7 of the Senate version as opening phrase of
city or municipality gives the approval or the conformity that this Subsection 10 of the reconciled version.
is donated to the homeowners’ association. But generally, under
PD [Presidential Decree] 957, it’s donated. In the Condominium x x x x33
Corporation, hindi. Lahat ng mga open spaces and common areas
like corridors, the function rooms and everything, are owned by To be sure, RA 4726 or the Condominium Act was enacted to
the corporation. So that’s one main issue that can be conflicting. specifically govern a condominium. Said law sanctions the
creation of the condominium corporation which is especially
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ZUBIRI). I’ll just ask for a one-minute formed for the purpose of holding title to the common area, in
suspension so we can talk. which the holders of separate interests shall automatically be
members or shareholders, to the exclusion of others, in
THE ACTING CHAIRMAN (REP. ZIALCITA). Unless you want to put a proportion to the appurtenant interest of their respective units.34
catchall phrase like what we did in the Senior Citizen’s Act. The rights and obligations of the condominium unit owners and
Something like, to the extent --- paano ba iyon? To the extent that the condominium corporation are set forth in the above Act.
it is practicable and applicable, the rights and benefits of the
homeowners, are hereby extended to the --- mayroon kaming Clearly, condominium corporations are not covered by the
ginamit na phrase eh...to the extent that it be practicable and amendment. Thus, the intra-corporate dispute between
applicable to the unit homeoweners, is hereby extended, petitioner and respondent is still within the jurisdiction of the RTC
something like that. It’s a catchall phrase. But then again, it might sitting as a special commercial court and not the HLURB. The
create a... doctrine laid down by the Court in Chateau de Baie Condominium
Corporation v. Moreno35 which in turn cited Wack Wack
MR. JALANDONI. It will become complicated. There will be a lot of Condominium Corporation, et al v. CA36 is still a good law.
conflict of laws between the two laws.
WHEREFORE, we hereby GRANT the petition and REVERSE the
THE ACTING CHAIRMAN (REP. ZIALCITA). Kaya nga eh. At saka, I Court of Appeals Decision dated July 10, 2007 and Resolution
don’t know. I think the --- mayroon naman silang protection sa dated January 25, 2008 in CA-G.R. CV No. 86614. The Complaint
ano eh, di ba? Buyers decree doon sa Condominium Act. I’m sure before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 58, which is
there are provisions there eh. Huwag na lang, huwag na lang. not a special commercial court, docketed as Civil Case No. 03-
1018 is ordered DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction. Let the case be
MR. JALANDONI. Mr. Chairman, I think it would be best if your REMANDED to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
previous comments that you’d be supporting an Makati City for re-raffle purposes among the designated special
amendment.1âwphi1 I think that would be --- Well, that would be commercial courts.
the best course of action with all due respect.
SO ORDERED.
THE ACTING CHAIRMAN (REP. ZIALCITA). Yeah. Okay. Thank you.
So iyon na lang final proposal naming ‘yung catchall phrase, "With DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
respect to the..."32 Associate Justice

xxxx WE CONCUR:
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. 16 Id. at 76-78.
Associate Justice
Chairperson 17 Id. at 49-50.

ROBERTO A. ABAD 18 Eristingcol v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 167702, March 20,
Associate Justice JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA 2009, 582 SCRA 139, 156, citing Sta. Clara Homeowners’
Associate Justice Association v. Sps. Gaston, 425 Phil. 221 (2002).
MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN
Associate Justice 19 G.R. No. 194024, April 25, 2012, 671 SCRA 461.

ATTESTATION 20 Go v. Distinction Properties Development and Construction,

Inc.,supra, at 471-472. (Emphasis and underscoring in the
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been original.)
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division. 21 Reyes v. Regional Trial Court of Makati, Br. 142, G.R. No.
165744, August 11, 2008, 561 SCRA 593, 609-610.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice 22 Go v. Distinction Properties Development and Construction,
Chairperson, Third Division Inc., supra note 19, at 479-480;

CERTIFICATION Strategic Alliance Development Corporation v. Star Infrastructure

Development Corporation, G.R. No. 187872, November 17, 2010,
Pursuant to Section I 3 Article VIII of the Constitution and the 635 SCRA 380, 391.
Division Chairperson s Attestation I certify that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the 23 Reyes v. Regional Trial Court of Makati, Br. 142, supra note 21,
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s at 610.
Division.
24 Strategic Alliance Development Corporation v. Star
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO Infrastructure Development Corporation, supra note 22, at 391;
Chief Justice Reyes v. Regional Trial Court of Makati, Br. 142, supra note 21, at
611.

Footnotes 25 Reyes v. Regional Trial Court of Makati, Br. 142, supra note 21,
at 611.
1 Penned by Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., with Associate
Justices Vicente S. E. Veloso and Marlene Gonzales-Sison, 26 Aguirre II v. FQB+7, Inc., G.R. No. 170770, January 9, 2013, 688
concurring; rollo, pp. 79-85. SCRA 242, 261.

2 Id. at 76-78. 27 G.R. No. 186271, February 23, 2011, 644 SCRA 288, 297.

3 Penned by Presiding Judge Eugene C. Paras; id. at 86-88. 28 Strategic Alliance Development Corporation v. Star
Infrastructure Development Corporation, supra note 22, at 398.
4 Rollo, p. 80.
29 Reyes v. Regional Trial Court of Makati, Br. 142, supra note 21,
5 Id. at 604-605.

6 Id. 30 Strategic Alliance Development Corporation v. Star

Infrastructure Development Corporation, supra note 22, at 396.
7 Id. at 81.
31 Calleja v. Panday, 518 Phil. 801, 813 (2006).
8 Id. at 89-96.
32 Bicameral Conference Committee on the Disagreeing
9 Id. at 91-94. Provisions of SBN 3106 and HBN 50, September 30, 2009, pp. 90-
94.
10 Id. at 86.
33 Id. at 101-102.
11 Id. at 97.
34 Yamane v. BA Lepanto Condominium Corporation, 510 Phil.
12 Id. at 87. 750, 772 (2005).

13 Id. 35 G.R. No. 186271, February 23, 2011, 644 SCRA 288.

14 Id. at 83. 36 G.R. No. 78490, November 23, 1992, 215 SCRA 850.

15 Id. at 84.
G.R. No. 90503 September 27, 1990 5.1. The respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion and acted
without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the complaint before
NESTOR SANDOVAL, petitioner, him notwithstanding that exclusive and original jurisdiction over
vs. the subject-matter thereof is vested with the Housing and Land
HON. DOROTEO CAÑEBA, Presiding Judge, RTC, Manila, Branch Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) pursuant to PD 957.
20, DEPUTY SHERIFF OF MANILA (RTC, Manila, Branch 20), and
ESTATE DEVELOPERS & INVESTORS CORPORATION, respondents. 5.2. The respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion and acted
without jurisdiction in refusing to vacate his judgment rendered
Arnold V. Guerrero & Associates for petitioner. without jurisdiction and in issuing a writ of execution to
implement his abovesaid void judgment. 2
Lino M. Patajo for private respondent.
The petition is impressed with merit.

GANCAYCO, J.: Under Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 957 the National
Housing Authority (NHA) was given the exclusive jurisdiction to
The issue in this petition is whether or not the ordinary courts hear and decide certain cases as follows:
have jurisdiction over the collection of unpaid installments
regarding a subdivision lot. SEC.1. In the exercise of its function to regulate the real estate
trade and business and in addition to its powers provided for in
On August 20, 1987 private respondent filed a complaint in the Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority shall
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila for the collection of unpaid have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the
installments regarding a subdivision lot, pursuant to a promissory following nature:
note, plus interest. On January 29, 1988 the trial court rendered a
decision. A. Unsound real estate business practices:

It appears that petitioner was declared in default so much so that B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by
after receiving the evidence of private respondent, the trial court subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the project
rendered its decision on January 19,1988, the dispositive portion owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman;and
of which reads as follows:
C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and
WHEREFORE, on the allegations and the prayer of the complaint statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lot or
and the evidence adduced in support therefor, judgment is condominium unit against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or
hereby rendered, ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff the salesman. (Emphasis supplied.)
following:
The language of this section, particularly, the second portion
1. The sum of P73,867.42 plus interest and other charges thereof, leaves no room for doubt that exclusive jurisdiction over
commencing from January 1, 1988 until fully paid; the case between the petitioner and private respondent is vested
not on the RTC but on the NHA. The NHA was re-named Human
2. Such sum which shall not be less than P2,000.00 or 25% of the Settlements Regulatory Commission and thereafter it was re-
amount of delinquency whichever is greater, as and for attorney's named as the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). 3
fees.
Undeniably the sum of money sought to be collected by private
3. Costs against the defendant. respondent from petitioner represented unpaid installments of a
subdivision lot which the petitioner purchased. Petitioner alleges
4. SO ORDERED. 1 that he suspended payments thereof because of the failure of the
developer to develop the subdivision pursuant to their
On September 28, 1988 the trial court issued an order directing agreement.
the issuance of a writ of execution to enforce its decision that had
become final and executory. In Antipolo Realty Corporation vs. National Housing Authority, 4
the suit which was filed with the NHA, likewise involved non-
On September 30, 1988 petitioner filed a motion to vacate payment of installments over a subdivision lot, wherein this Court
judgment and to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the held that the NHA has exclusive authority to hear and decide the
lower court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter and that case.
its decision is null and void. A motion for reconsideration of the
writ of execution was also filed by petitioner. An opposition to In Solid Homes, Inc. vs. Teresita Payawal, 5 this Court ruled that
both motions was filed by private respondent to which a reply upon the issuance of Presidential Decree No. 957, the trial court
was filed by petitioner. may no longer assume jurisdiction over the cases enumerated in
Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 397. We even stated therein
On February 17, 1989 the trial court denied the motion to vacate that the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board has the authority
the judgment on the ground that it is now beyond the jurisdiction to award damages in the exercise of this exclusive power
of the Court to do so. It directed the issuance of a writ of conferred upon it by Presidential Decree No. 1344.
execution anew.
In Estate Developers and Investors Corporation vs. Antonio Sarte
Hence the herein petition wherein it is alleged that the trial court and Erlinda Sarte, G.R. No. 93646, which is a case substantially
committed a grave abuse of discretion as follows: similar to the instant case, in a resolution of August 13, 1990 this
Court upheld the exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB over the
collection suit.

Considering that the trial court has no jurisdiction under the

circumstances obtaining in this case, the decision it rendered is
null and void ab initio. It is as if no decision was rendered by the
trial court at all.

When as in this case the attention of the trial court is drawn to its
lack of competence and authority to act on the case, certainly the
trial court has a duty to vacate the judgment by declaring the
same to be null and void ab initio.

This is as it should be. Inasmuch as the questioned judgment is

null and void, it is, as above observed, as if no decision had been
rendered by the trial court. It cannot become final and exucutory,
much less can it be enforced by a writ of execution.

The trial court, rather than reiterating the issuance of a writ of

execution in this case, which it did, should have recalled and
cancelled the writ of execution of the judgment.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The questioned decision of

the trial court dated January 29, 1988 is hereby declared null and
void for lack of jurisdiction. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa (Chairman), Cruz, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ.,

concur.

Footnotes

1 Page 35, Rollo.

2 Page 7, Rollo.

3 Executive Order No. 648, February 7, 1981 and Executive Order

No. 90, December 17, 1976.

4 153 SCRA 399 (1987).

5 G.R. No. 84811, August 29, 1989.

G.R. No. 97381 November 5, 1992
When petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid
BENIGNO V. MAGPALE, JR., petitioner, Decision was denied in the DOTC's Order of February 20, 1989, he
vs. appealed to the Merit System and Protection Board (MSPB) of
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and ROGELIO A. DAYAN, in his respondent Civil Service Commission.
capacity as the General Manager of the Philippine Ports Authority,
respondents. On February 5, 1990, the MSPB rendered a Decision reversing the
Decision of the DOTC. The pertinent portion of the MSPB's
Decision reads:
MELO, J.:
After a careful review of the record of the case, this Board found
Before Us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing Resolution the appeal meritorious. Respondent cannot be held liable for
No. 90-962 dated October 19, 1990 of respondent Civil Service Gross Negligence for his alleged failure to account for several
Commission (CSC). Said CSC resolution set aside and modified the properties and for failure to liquidate the cash advances he
decision dated February 5, 1990 of the Merit System Protection received as there was no showing that he has been specifically
Board in MSPB Case No. 449, which ordered the immediate required to do so either by law or regulation. The mere detail of
reinstatement in the service of herein petitioner Benigno V. respondent to PPA-Manila, in the absence of an order requiring
Magpale, Jr., without loss of seniority rights and with payment of him to turn over and account for the funds and property received
back salaries and other emoluments to which he is entitled under for his office at PMU-Tacloban will not necessarily obligate him to
the law. make accounting for the same.

The record shows that petitioner started his career in government Moreover, Section 105, Chapter 5 of Presidential Decree 1445,
as an employee in the Presidential Assistance on Community otherwise known as "The Government Auditing Code of the
Development in 1960. Fifteen years later, or in 1975, he Philippines" measured the liability of an officer accountable for
transferred to the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) as Arrastre government property only to the money value of said property.
Superintendent. He was promoted to the position of Port Though respondent is the person primarily liable for these funds
Manager in 1977 of the Port Management Unit (PMU), General and property, he holds this liability jointly with the person who
Santos City. Then he was reassigned, in the same year to PPA- has the actual possession thereof and who has the immediate
PMU, Tacloban City where he likewise discharged the functions of responsibility for the safekeeping.
Port Manager. On December 1, 1982, the PPA General Manager
designated Atty. William A. Enriquez as officer-in-charge of PPA- As to the charge relative to respondent's frequent unauthorized
PMU, Tacloban City effective December 6, 1982. On January 6, absences had been sufficiently and convincingly explained, due to
1983, petitioner was ordered to immediately report to the which the Board found him not at all guilty of the offense charged
Assistant General Manager (AGM) for Operation, PPA, Manila, (sic).
Petitioner reported at PPA Manila on the same date and
performed the duties and functions assigned to him. IN VIEW THEREOF, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed.
Respondent-Appellant Magpale should immediately by reinstated
In an Internal Control Department Report dated March 5, 1984, in the service without loss of seniority rights and with payment of
the PMU-Tacloban Inventory Committee and the Commission on back salaries and other emoluments to which he is entitled under
Audit (COA) stated that petitioner failed to account for equipment the law. (pp. 31-32, Rollo.)
of PPA value at P65,542.25 and to liquidate cash advances
amounting to P130,069.61. He was found also to have incurred On March 1, 1990, PPA, through its General Manager, herein
unauthorized absences from May 25, 1984 to July 23, 1984. respondent Rogelio A Dayan, filed an appeal with the Civil Service
Field Office-PPA, and the latter office indorsed the appeal to
On July 23, 1984, or nineteen months after he began reporting in respondent CSC in a letter dated March 5, 1990.
Manila, a formal charge for Dishonesty, Pursuit of Private Business
without permission as required by Civil Service Rules and On March 5, 1990, petitioner requested the Secretary of the DOTC
Regulations, Frequent and Unauthorized Absences and Neglect of to direct the PPA to implement the MSPB decision as it has
Duty was filed against petitioner. Based on said charges he was become final and executory. Said request was reiterated in
ordered preventively suspended and has been out of service since another letter also dated March 5, 1990 by petitioner to OIC
then. Wilfredo M. Trinidad of the Office of the Assistant Secretary for
Administration and Legal Affairs, DOTC.
For almost four years the case remained unacted upon. The
formal investigation and hearing resumed on September 18, 1987. On March 13, 1990, petitioner filed with the MSPB a Motion for
Implementation of the MSPB decision. This was opposed by the
On January 18, 1989 a Decision was rendered by the Secretary of PPA through its General Manager.
the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC),
through its Administrative Action Board, finding petitioner guilty On April 27, 1990 petitioner filed with respondent CSC his
of Gross Negligence on two counts: (a) for his failure to account comment to the appeal of the PPA contending that he is not an
for the forty-four (44) assorted units of equipment, among them a accountable officer and is under no obligation to account for the
Sony Betamax and a TV Camera, and (b) for failing to render the property and equipment; that said property and equipment were
required liquidation of his cash advances amounting to not received by him as custodian and he should not be held liable
P44,877.00 for a period of four years. Petitioner was also found for the loss of the same; that the said property and equipment
guilty of frequent and unauthorized absences. Accordingly, he was were place in PPA-PMU Tacloban City which the herein petitioner
meted the penalty of dismissal from the service with the left on October 8, 1982 and since then had lost control over them.
corresponding accessory penalties. Moreover, petitioner averred that as to the unliquidated cash
advances of P44,877.00, the same had long been liquidated. penalty of suspension for one (1) year shall be imposed against
Finally, petitioner claimed that his failure to secure the clearance respondent. This shall be without prejudice to any criminal or civil
for any possible property or financial obligation in PMU-Tacloban proceeding that PPA or COA may institute against respondent.
was due to the urgency of his transfer to PPA-Manila and the Accordingly, the Decision and Order of MSBP dated February 5,
absence of any order or demand to secure the clearance. 1990 and May 29, 1990, respectively, are hereby set aside. (pp.
27-28, Rollo.)
On May 29, 1990, the MSPB issued an Order for the immediate
implementation of its February 5, 1990 Decision ruling that: Hence, the present recourse.

Records further show that a copy of this Board's decision was The petition alleges that respondent CSC, in issuing its Resolution
received by the Office of the Honorable Secretary, that No. 90-962, gravely abused its discretion because:
Department, thru Mr. Frankie Tampus on February 6, 1990.
Records finally show that as of March 5, 1990, no motion for 1. The law did not authorize an appeal by the government from an
reconsideration of this Board's aforementioned decision has ever adverse decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSBP);
been filed as evidenced by the certification of even date issued
and signed by Director Adelaida C. Montero of the Office for 2. Respondent PPA General Manager did not have the right or
Central Personnel Records, this Commission. Hence, said decision legal personality to appeal from the MSPB decision;
has long become final and executory. (p. 34, Rollo.)
3. Assuming that the appeal was available to respondent DAYAN,
On June 28, 1990, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the appeal the same was filed out time after the MSPB decision had long
of PPA claiming that: become final and executory. (pp. 6-7, Petition; pp. 7-8, Rollo.)

1. Appeal of PPA was filed out of time and that the CSC has no In support of this first contention, petitioner invokes Paragraph
jurisdiction over it; 2(a). Section 16, Chapter 3, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of Executive
Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of
2. The PPA has not exhausted administrative remedies before 1987 which provides:
appealing to the higher body, the CSC;
Sec. 16. Offices in the Commission. — The Commission shall have
3. The MSPB decision has become final and therefore cannot be the following offices:
disturbed anymore.
xxx xxx xxx
(p. 22, Rollo.)
(2) The Merit Systems Protection Board composed of a Chairman
On October 19, 1990, respondent CSC rendered its now assailed and two (2) members shall have the following functions:
Resolution No. 90-962, the pertinent portion of which reads as
follows: (a) Hear and decide on appeal administrative cases involving
officials and employees of the Civil Service. Its decision shall be
The Commission thus holds respondent Magpale guilty of Gross final except those involving dismissal or separation from the
Neglect of Duty on two (2) counts for the forty-four (44) service which may be appealed to the Commission. (Emphasis
equipments (sic) under his charge and to render an accounting for supplied.)
cash advances amounting to P44,877.90. Accordingly, considering
two mitigating circumstances of length of service and first offense claiming that since the MSBP decision was for dismissal or
in favor of respondent, the commission hereby imposes a penalty separation from the service, but reinstatement without loss of
of suspension for a period of one (1) year against him. As he has seniority rights and with payment of back salaries, the said MSBP
been out of the service since 1984, the penalty is deemed served decision should be deemed final, immediately executory and
and he should now be reinstated to his former position. This is, unappealable.
however, without prejudice to any criminal or civil proceedings
that the agency concerned or the COA may institute as proper Petitioner next contends that assuming, for the sake of argument,
under the premises. that the decision of the MSBP was appealable, respondent Dayan,
even in his capacity as General Manager of the PPA, did not have
Finally, the decision of the MSPB exonerating the respondent the legal personality not the right to appeal the decision of the
Magpale for Gross Negligence is hereby reversed. Corollarily, the MSBP, citing Paragraph 1, Section 49, Chapter 7, Subtitle A, Title I,
order of payment of back salaries is hereby set aside. MSPB is Book V, of Executive Order No. 292 and the case of Paredes vs.
likewise reminded to be more circumspect on matters of this CSC, G.R. No. 88177, December 4, 1990, 192 SCRA 84.
nature, especially as the instant case involves accountability of
public funds and property. Assuming further that the MSBP decision was appealable and that
respondent Dayan had the legal personality to appeal the MSBP
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Commission decision, petitioner still contends that the appeal should not have
finds respondent Benigno V. Magpale, Jr., guilty of Gross Neglect been given due course by the respondent CSC because the appeal
of Duty on two (2) counts for failure to account for the forty-four was not filed with the proper disciplining office in accordance with
(44) equipments (sic) under his charge and to render an same Section 49 of Executive Order No. 292, which in this case,
accounting for cash advance amounting to P44,877.90. In view of should be the DOTC, not with the CSC Field Office at the PPA.
the attendant mitigating circumstances of length of service and
first offense in favor of respondents and the Neglect of Duty to On the merit of the petition, petitioner claims that assuming even
account for cash advance in the amount of P44,877.90 (second further that an appeal lies from the MSBP decision, that
count) be appreciated as an aggravating circumstances, the respondent Dayan had the legal personality or standing to
institute the appeal that it was filed with the proper office, still charge and to liquidate his cash advances, petitioner is guilty of
CSC Resolution 90-962 was rendered with grave abuse of Gross Neglect of Duty and should have been dismissed from the
discretion because petitioner cannot be suspended for alleged service if no mitigating circumstances were considered in his
failure to account for pieces of equipment and cash advances favor.
since this is not the neglect of duty contemplated by Section 36 of
Presidential Degree No. 807 or Section 46 of chapter in the Civil We gave due course to the petition and required the parties to
Service in Executive Order 292. At most, petitioner can be held file their respective memoranda. After considering the same and
liable for the money value of the equipment and advances as the pertinent laws and jurisprudence, We find that the petition
mandated by Section 105 of Presidential Decree No. 1445, the must be granted.
Government Auditing Code of the Philippines.
After Mendez vs. Civil Service Commission, (204 SCRA 965 [1991]),
For its part, respondent CSC maintains — the extent of the authority of respondent CSC to review the
decisions of the MSPB is now a settled matter.
First, that the finality of the MSPB decision in the disciplinary
cases as stated in Section 16, Paragraph 2(a), Book V of Executive The Court, in said case held:
Order No. 292, relied upon by petitioner, is modified by section
12, Paragraph 11, Book V, of the same Executive Order No. 292, It is axiomatic that the right to appeal is merely a statutory
which reads: privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in
accordance with the provisions of law. (Victorias Milling Co., Inc.
Sec. 12. Powers and Functions. — The Commission shall have the vs. Office of the Presidential Assistant for Legal Affairs, 153 SCRA
following powers and functions: 318).

xxx xxx xxx A cursory reading of P.D. 807, otherwise known as "The
Philippines Civil Service Law" shows that said law does not
(11) Hear and decide administrative case instituted by or bought contemplate a review of decisions exonerating officers or
directly or on appeal, including contested appointments, and employees from administrative charges.
review decisions and actions of its offices and of the agencies
attached to it. Section 37 paragraph (a) thereof, provides:

Furthermore, relevant provisions of Executive Order No 135 dated The Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative
February 25, 1987 amending Section 19(b) of Presidential Decree disciplinary cases involving the imposition of the penalty of
No. 807 and Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 1409 state, thus: suspension for more than thirty days, or fine in an amount
exceeding thirty day's salary, demotion in rank or salary or
WHEREAS, in the interest of justice, there is a need to confer upon transfer, removal or dismissal from office. . . . (Emphasis supplied)
the Civil Service Commission jurisdiction over appeal in contested (p. 7. Rollo)
or provisional appointments and to make its decision thereon, as
well as in administrative disciplinary cases final and reviewable by Said provisions must be read together with Section 39 paragraph
the Supreme Court. (a) of P.D. 805 which contemplates:

xxx xxx xxx Appeals, where allowable, shall be made by the party adversely
affected by the decision . . . (Emphasis supplied) (p. 104, Rollo)
Relationship with the Civil Service Commission. –– The
Commission shall hear and decide appeals from other decisions of The phrase "party adversely affective by the decision" refers to
the Board provided that the decisions of the Commission shall be the government employees against whom the administrative case
subject to review on certiorari upon receipt of the copy thereof by is filed for the purpose of disciplinary action which may take the
the aggrieved part. form of suspension, demotion in rank or salary, transfer, removal
or dismissal from office. In the instant case, Coloyan who filed the
Thus, respondent CSC argues that it is deemed not to have lost its appeal cannot be considered an aggrieved party because he is not
appellate jurisdiction over the decisions of the MSPB in the respondent of the administrative case below.
administrative disciplinary case.
Finally, pursuant to Section 37 paragraph (b) of P.D. 807, the city
Second, the case of Paredes vs. CSC is not applicable. Respondent mayor, as head of the city government, is empowered to enforce
Dayan appealed the MSPB decision not in his personal capacity judgment with finality on lesser penalties like suspension from
nor in pursuit in his private interest, but as head of PPA, being the work for one month and forfeiture of salary equivalent to one
general manager thereof. month against erring employees.

Third, the appeal was filed with the proper disciplining office By inference or implication, the remedy of appeal may be availed
because the decision appealed from was that of the MSPB, one of of only in a case where the respondent is found guilty of the
the offices in respondent CSC. Thus, respondent CSC was justified charges filed against him. But the respondent is exonerated of
in giving due course to PPA's notice of appeal filed with its (CSC) said charges, as in this case, there is no occasion on appeal. (pp.
Field Office at the PPA. 967-968)

Finally, petitioner's claim that he is liable only for the money value The above ruling is a reiteration of the earlier pronouncement in
of the property and cash advances and cannot be administratively Paredes vs. Civil Service Commission, (192 SCRA 84 [1990]) cited
charged for such infraction is untenable and a mockery of the civil by petitioner, where We said:
service law. For his failure to account for the property under his
Based on the above provisions of law, appeal to the Civil Service (b) fine in an amount exceeding thirty days salary; or
Commission in an administrative case is extended to the party
adversely affected by the decision, that is, the person or the c) demotion in rank or salary or transfer; or
respondent employee who has been meted out the penalty of
suspension for more than thirty days; or fine in an amount (d) removal or dismissal from office.
exceeding thirty days salary demotion in rank or salary or transfer,
removal or dismissal from office. The decision of the disciplining The February 5, 1990 decision of the MSPB did not involve
authority is even final and not appealable to the Civil Service dismissal or separation from office, rather, the decision
Commission in cases where the penalty imposed is suspension for exonerated petitioner and ordered him reinstated to his former
not more than thirty days or fine in an amount not exceeding position. Consequently, in the light of our pronouncements in the
thirty days salary. Appeal in cases allowed by law must be filed aforecited cases of Mendez v. Civil Service Commission and
within fifteen days from receipt of the decision. Paredes vs. Civil Service Commission, the MSPB decision was not a
proper subject of appeal to the CSC.
Here the MSPB after hearing and the submission of memoranda
exonerated private respondent Amor of all charges except for Settled is the rule that a tribunal, board, or officer exercising
habitual tardiness. The penalty was only a reprimand so that even judicial functions acts without jurisdiction if no authority has been
private respondent Amor, the party adversely affected by the conferred by law to hear and decide the case. (Acena v. Civil
decision, cannot even interpose an appeal to the Civil Service Service Commission, 193 SCRA 623 [1991]).
Commission.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Civil Service Commission is
As correctly ruled by respondent, petitioner Paredes the hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE and the decision of the Merit
complainant is not the part adversely affected by the decision so Systems Protection Board dated February 5, 1990 is hereby
that she has no legal personality to interpose an appeal to the REINSTATED.
Civil Service Commission. In an administrative case, the
complainant is a mere witness (Gonzalo vs. D. Roda, 64 SCRA 120). SO ORDERED.
Even if she is the Head of the Administrative Services Department
of the HSRC as a complaint she is merely a witness for the Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino,
government in an administrative case. No private interest is Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo and Campos, Jr.,
involved in an administrative case as the offense is committed JJ., concur.
against the government. (pp. 98-99)
Narvasa, C.J., and Medialdea, J., are on leave.
While it is true, as contended by respondent Civil Service
Commission that under Section 12 (par. 11), Chapter 3, Subtitle A,
Book V of Executive Order 292, the CSC does have the power to —

Hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or brought

before it directly or on appeal, including contested appointments,
and review decisions and actions of its offices and of the agencies
attached to it. . . .

the exercise of the power is qualified by and should be read

together with the other sections of the same sub-title and book of
Executive Order 292, particularly Section 49 which prescribes the
following requisites for the exercise of the power of appeal, to
wit:

(a) the decision must be appealable;

(b) the appeal must be made by the party adversely affected by

the decision;

(c) the appeal must be made within fifteen days from receipt of
the decision, unless a petition for the reconsideration is
seasonably filed; and

(d) the notice of appeal must be filed with the disciplining office,
which shall forward the records of the case, together with the
notice of appeal to the appellate authority within fifteen days
from filing of the notice of appeal, with its comments, if any.

Under Section 47 of the same Code, the CSC shall decide on

appeal all administrative disciplinary cases involving the
imposition of:

(a) a penalty of suspension for more than thirty days; or

G.R. No. L-24680 October 7, 1968 consisting of buildings of the total costs of P70,000.00. It is not
disputed that the lessee paid in full the monthly rent during the
JESUSA VDA. DE MURGA, plaintiff-appellee, ten- year period of the lease.
vs.
JUANITO CHAN, defendant-appellant. As early as July 23, 1958, before the expiration of the ten-year
period of the lease, there had been intercourse of
Jose Go and Fernando P. Blanco for plaintiff-appellee. communications between the lessor and the lessee for the
Abelardo A. Climaco, T. de los Reyes, Enrique A. Fernandez and renewal of the lease, but the parties failed to arrive at an
Ernani Cruz Paño for defendant-appellant. agreement; hence, this action by the lessor against the lessee.

ANGELES, J.: Thus, on July 23, 1958, the lessor informed the lessee of her
willingness to renew the lease for five years at a monthly rent of
In this appeal, two issues involving questions of law are posed for P700.00. (Exhibit B.) In his reply the lessee said:
resolution: First, whether or not the allegations in the complaint
constitute a cause of action for unlawful detainer, and confer ... Much as I am willing to consider the suggested increase of
jurisdiction over the case to the municipal court (now city court) rental, however, I would like to plead with you that due to very
of Zamboanga City, under the provisions of Rule 70 of the Rules of poor business at present, I may not be able to consider your
Court and decisions interpreting the same, when particularly indicated increase. (Exhibit C.)
considered in the light of the contexture of the pertinent letter of
demand to vacate the leased premises (Annex J of the Complaint), On August 1, 1958, the lessor advised the lessee that:
couched in the following wise:
Beginning February 1, 1959, ... the rental of my lots ... will be
Please be advised further that we reiterate our demand made to P700.00. (Exhibit D.)
you in our registered letter dated February 4, 1959 (to vacate the
leased premises) which was received by you on the 10th instant, On January 18, 1959, the lessee advised the lessor that she
unless you pay the amount of Six Hundred pesos (P600.00) or (lessor) should purchase the buildings constructed on the land in
Seven Hundred pesos (P700.00) as new rental per our letter of accordance with the stipulation in the contract of lease, and —
January 19, 1959, before the expiration of the 15-day period
granted you for vacating the same. ... In case you do not agree with the purchase of the aforesaid
buildings, I am willing to continue occupying the land and execute
and, Second, whether or not the lessor and the lessee had agreed a new contract of lease, but I am appealing to you to take into
upon an automatic renewal of the lease of the premises, under consideration the prevailing business conditions by reducing the
the stipulation in clause "7" of the corresponding contract of monthly rental to P400.00, ... (Exhibit L.)
lease, containing the following agreement:
On January 19, 1959, the lessor replied that —
7. — That upon the termination of the term of Ten (10) years
above expressed, the said Jesusa Vda. de Murga shall have the ... she rejects the option to purchase the buildings, ... and her
option to purchase the building or buildings belonging to and present last offer is: (a) Six hundred pesos (P600.00) rentals
constructed by the said Juanito Chan, and the price of said payable within the first fifteen days of every month, without
building or buildings shall be determined by three commissioners, contract; or (b) Seven hundred pesos (P700.00) rentals payable
two of whom shall be appointed by each of the parties, and the within the first fifteen days of every month, one year advanced
remainder commissioner shall be appointed by both. However, in rental, with a five-year contract. (Exhibit F.)
the event that the said Jesusa Vda. de Murga shall not exercise
the right granted her for any reason or cause, this contract of On January 20, 1959, the lessor informed the lessee that the
lease shall be automatically renewed but the period for said conditions stated in the latter's letter of January 18, 1959, were
renewal shall, however, be fixed and adjusted again by the not acceptable to her. (Exhibit G.)
parties. It is agreed further that in case of said renewal, the rental
shall also be adjusted by the parties depending on the business On January 21, 1959, the lessee advised the lessor that he (lessee)
condition which shall then at that time prevail. (Exhibit A.) cannot accept the conditions stated in her (lessor's) letters of
January 19 and 20, 1959 —
Jesusa Vda. de Murga was the owner of two parcels of land in the
City of Zamboanga, designated as lots 36 and 38 of the cadastral ... y, insists que Vd. compre mis casas enclavadas en los lotes
plan of the place, and covered by Transfer Certificates of Title objeto de arrendamiento. Y en caso de su negative seguire
Nos. 3237 and 3238, respectively. ocupando el solar bajo el pago de un alquiler mensual de
Quinientos pesos (P500.00) debido al negocio reinante en estos
On January 31, 1949, a contract of lease over said two lots was dias, tal como esta dispuesto en el contrato de arrendamiento
entered into by and between Jesusa Vda. de Murga as lessor, and firmado por Vd. y yo el dia 31 de Enero de 1949." (Exhibit H.)
Juanito Chan as lessee, the basic terms of which pertinent to the
present case are: The period of the lease was ten (10) years from On February 4, 1959, the lessor made demand on the lessee to
January 31, 1949; the lessee to pay a monthly rent of P500.00 vacate the premises —
within the first ten days of every month; with the consent of the
lessor, the lessee may introduce improvements on the land; and ... for the reason that the lease contract had expired on January
Clause "7" quoted hereinabove. (Exhibit A.) 31, 1959, ... and the lessor had waived the right to exercise the
option granted her under paragraph "7" of said contract, ...
Upon taking possession of the leased premises, with the consent (Exhibit I.)
of the lessor, the lessee introduced improvements on the land
On February 16, 1959, the lessee sent his check for P500.00 to the the sum of P1,200.00 from February 1, 1959, as monthly rental of
lessor in payment of the monthly rental corresponding to the the land, and P2,000.00 as attorney's fees.
month of February, 1959. (See Exhibit J.)
From the foregoing decision, the defendant interposed a direct
On February 19, 1959, the lessor returned to the lessee the check appeal to this Court. Therefore, only questions of law may be
which the latter had sent to the former, stating further in the considered in this appeal.
letter that she was demanding that the leased premises be
vacated, if he (lessor) would not agree to pay the new rental of Among the four errors assigned by the appellant in his brief, the
P600.00 or P700.00 a month beginning February 1, 1959, as first two pose the issue of lack of jurisdiction of the municipal
embodied in the letter, Exhibit J, hereinabove quoted. Court and of the lack of cause of action for unlawful detainer; the
remaining errors delving on questions of fact which, by reason of
Disregarding the written demand of the lessor, dated February 19, the nature of the appeal are, therefore, deemed admitted and
1959, Exhibit J, the lessee chose to remain in the possession of the may not be reviewed in this appeal.
leased premises and insisted that the contract of lease stipulated
an automatic renewal of the lease, and conformably thereto, he In relation to the issue of lack of jurisdiction of the municipal
has a right to continue occupying the premises; and as token of court over the case, it is to be noted that, after the lessor and the
his decision, he sent to the lessor his check for P500.00 in lessee had failed to agree on the renewal of the lease which
payment of the monthly rent corresponding to the month of terminated on January 31, 1959, the lessor, on February 19, 1959,
February 1959. The lessor was undoubtedly not satisfied with the sent the demand letter hereinabove quoted, Exhibit J. It was,
tendered amount of P500.00, because she had demanded then, as it is now, the contention of the lessee that such demand
P600.00 or P700.00, as new monthly rent as a condition for the is not that kind of demand contemplated in the Rules of Court as
renewal of the lease. And without any further definite demand on complying with the jurisdictional requirement — that demand to
the lessee to vacate the premises filed, on March 10, 1959, a vacate is indispensable in order to determine whether the
complaint of unlawful detainer in the municipal court of tenant's possession has become illegal. On this matter, the rulings
Zamboanga City against the lessee, Juanito Chan, to eject the in the following cases are pertinent and applicable:
latter from the leased premises. The facts alleged in the complaint
as cause of action, consisted in reproducing and reiterating the The notice giving lessee the alternative either to pay the increased
substance of the correspondence exchanged between lessor and rental or otherwise to vacate the land is not the demand
lessee, as narrated above, and claiming that the possession of the contemplated by the Rules of Court in unlawful detainer cases.
lessee of the premises had become illegal by his failure and When after such notice, the lessee elects to stay, he thereby
refusal to pay the increased new rental. For relief, the plaintiff merely assumes the new rental and cannot be ejected until he
prayed that the defendant be ordered to vacate the premises, and defaults in said obligation and necessary demand is first made.
"TO PAY THE NEW RENTS DEMANDED OF P600.00 or P700.00 (Manotok vs. Guinto, L-9540, April 30, 1957.)
FROM FEBRUARY 1, 1959 MONTHLY AS THE CASE MAY BE."
Attached to the complaint, as annexes thereto, were copies of the The lessor may, under Article 1569 of the Civil Code, judicially
letters exchanged between the lessor and the lessee, Exhibits B to disposses the lessee for default in the payment of the price
J. agreed upon. But where such default is based on the fact that the
rent sought to be collected is not that agreed upon, an action for
In his answer (as amended), the defendant admitting the ejectment cannot lie. (Belmonte vs. Martin, 42 Off. Gaz. No. 10,
genuineness and authenticity of the letters annexed to the 2146.)
complaint, but traversing some of the allegations therein, raised
the defenses of lack of jurisdiction of the court over the case, and In the case at bar, it clearly appears from the demand letter of
lack of cause of action for unlawful detainer. February 19, 1959, that the obligation to vacate the leased
premises would be dependent on the failure of the lessee to
After a trial, decision was rendered ordering the defendant to agree to the new rent demanded by the lessor. As the lessee,
vacate the premises, to pay the plaintiff the sum of P600.00 as however, was in the physical possession of the land by virtue of a
monthly rent from February 1, 1959, and P500.00 as attorney's prior contract of lease, and the demand was in the alternative
fees. imposing a new rental, even without taking into account the
efficacy of the stipulation for an automatic renewal of the lease,
The defendant appealed from the decision to the Court of First which shall be discussed hereafter, in the light of the ruling in
Instance of Zamboanga City. Before this Court, the defendant Belmonte vs. Martin, supra, without any subsequent definite
again raised the special defenses of lack of jurisdiction of the demand to vacate the premises, subject to no condition, the
municipal court and lack of cause of action for unlawful detainer. lessee did not incur in default which would give rise to a right on
Ruling on the issue of lack of jurisdiction, the court said: the part of the lessor to bring an action of unlawful detainer.

With reference to the contention of defendant that the municipal Delving on the second special defense to wit, that the allegations
court had no jurisdiction to try this case because the in the complaint do not constitute a cause of action of unlawful
interpretation, application and enforcement of the terms of the detainer, it is the contention of the lessee-appellant that clause
Lease Agreement is within the competence of a court higher than "7" of the contract of lease, quoted hereinabove, meant an
that of the municipal court, deserves hardly any discussion. express grant to the lessee to renew the lease at his option,
Suffice it to say that the jurisdiction of the municipal court is contrary to the claim of the lessor-appellee that there must be a
grounded on Section 88 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. prior mutual agreement of the parties. As we read clause "7", We
find that it envisioned the happening of two eventualities at the
After a trial, the Court of First Instance rendered judgment expiration of the lease on January 31, 1959 — either the lessor
ordering the defendant to vacate the premises, to pay the plaintiff may purchase the improvements constructed by the lessee on the
land, or in case the lessor fails, for any cause or reason, to
exercise the option to buy, the lease shall be deemed stipulation, obliges the promisor to fulfill his promise. (Legarda
automatically renewed. The evidence has established that the Koh vs. Ongsiako, 36 Phil. Rep. 185). Such a stipulation is
lessor had refused to buy the buildings on the land. The statement supported by the consideration which is at the basis of the
in said clause "7" that in case of renewal the duration of the lease contract of lease (16 R.C.L. pp. 883, 884) and obviously involves a
and the new rental to be paid shall be adjusted by the parties, is mutuality of benefit, or reciprocity, between the parties,
of no moment in the solution of the issue, whether or not the notwithstanding the right of election is conceded solely to the
facts alleged in the complaint constitute a cause of action of lessee. As a general rule, in construing provisions of this character,
unlawful detainer. The pleadings of the parties, and the annexes the tenant is favored, where there is any uncertainty, and not the
thereto, clearly show that the jugular vein of the controversy landlord, upon the principle that a grant should be taken most
hinges on the correct interpretation of clause "7" of the contract strongly against the grantor. (15 R.C.L. p. 884, 24 Cyc. 915.)
of lease, a matter outside the jurisdiction of the municipal court.
The lessor-appellee maintains that the lease had terminated on In the case of Legarda Koh vs. Ongsiaco, 36 Phil. 189-190, the
January 31, 1959, renewable only upon a new agreement of the contract of lease had this provision:
parties; on the other hand, the lessee-appellant contends that,
inasmuch as the controversy hinges on the interpretation of The term of the said contract shall be for one year, counting from
clause "7" of the contract, that is, whether or not said clause the 1st of December of the present year (1963) which term shall
contemplated an automatic renewal of the lease, the action was be extendible at the will of both parties.
not for unlawful detainer but one not capable of pecuniary
estimation and, therefore, beyond the competence of the Said the Supreme Court:
municipal court.
According to Article 1091 of the Civil Code, obligations arising
The contention of the lessee-appellant must be sustained. from contracts have legal force between the contracting parties
and must be fulfilled in accordance with their stipulation.
In Cruz vs. Alberto, 39 Phil. 991, the contract of lease had the Therefore, if the defendant bound himself to lease his properties
following provision: for the period of one year, which term should be extendible, it is
evident and strictly in accord with justice that the plaintiff-lessee
That the term of this contract of lease shall be six years from the has a right, at the termination of the first period of one year, to
date of the execution, and extendible for another six years agreed have the said contract of lease renewed in fulfillment of the
upon by both parties. stipulated extension of the term of the lease; otherwise, the
clause contained in the document Exhibit 1, that the lease at its
It was contended by the lessor that the lease cannot be extended termination would be extendible, would be worthless.
except upon mutual agreement. Ruling on the contention, the
Supreme Court said: The defendant-appellant is wrong in his contention that the
renewal or extension of the contract depended solely upon
We are of the opinion that the trial judge was entirely correct in himself, notwithstanding the stipulations contained in said
his interpretation of the contracts in question; and though it must contract, inasmuch as the renewal and continuation of the lease
be admitted that this interpretation renders the words "agreed could not be left wholly to the plaintiff's free will, without
upon by both parties" superfluous yet this does not involve any counting on the defendant's consent — a consent expressly
strain upon the meaning of the entire passage. If the granted in the promise that the term would be extended, which
interpretation which the appellant would have us adopt be true, term, although its duration was not fixed, should be understood
the entire clause relative to the extension of the term would be to be for another year, a period equal to and not greater than the
superfluous, for if the extension is only to be effective upon a new term of the lease.
agreement of the parties to be made at the expiration of the
original term, why should anything at all be said about an When a contract of lease provides that the term thereof is
extension? Parties who are free to make one contract of lease are extendible, the agreement is understood as being in favor of the
certainly free to make a new one when the old has expired lessee, and the latter is authorized to renew the contract and to
without being reminded of their faculty to do so by the insertion continue to occupy the leased property, after notifying the lessor
of a clause of this kind in the first lease. This would not only be to that effect. The lessor can withdraw from the said contract only
superfluous but nonsensical. The clause relative to the extension after having fulfilled his promise to grant the extension of time
of the lease should, if possible, be so interpreted as to give it stipulated therein, unless the lessee has failed to comply with or
some force. has violated the conditions of the contract. It is not necessary that
the extension be expressly conceded by the lessor because he
As we interpret the contracts before us, the parties meant to consented thereto in the original contract.
express the fact that they had already agreed that there might be
an extension of the lease and had agreed upon its duration, thus UPON THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, We declare that the
giving the defendant the right of election to take for a second municipal court (now city court) of Zamboanga City had no
term or to quit upon the expiration of the original term. The jurisdiction over the case; therefore, the appealed decision is set
clause in question has the same meaning as if the words "agreed aside and reversed, with costs against the plaintiff-appellee.
upon by both parties" had been omitted and the passage had
closed with a period after the word "years" in the first contract Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Sanchez, Castro,
and after "extension" in the third contract. Fernando and Capistrano, JJ., concur.
Dizon, J., took no part.
It has been held by this court that the word "extendible" standing Zaldivar, J., is on leave.
without qualification in a contract of lease, means that the term
of the lease may be extended and is equivalent to a promise to
extend, made by the lessor to the lessee, and, as unilateral
G.R. No. 180321 March 20, 2013 issued an Order6 denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss and
declared her in default. Thereafter, trial ensued.
EDITHA PADLAN, Petitioner,
vs. On July 1, 2005, the RTC rendered a Decision7 finding petitioner
ELENITA DINGLASAN and FELICISIMO DINGLASAN, Respondents. to be a buyer in good faith and, consequently, dismissed the
complaint.
DECISION
Not satisfied, respondents sought recourse before the CA,
PERALTA, J.: docketed as CA-G.R. No. CV No. 86983.

This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision1 On June 29, 2007, the CA rendered a Decision8 in favor of the
dated June 29, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV respondent. Consequently, the CA reversed and set aside the
No. 86983, and the Resolution2 dated October 23, 2007 denying Decision of the RTC and ordered the cancellation of the TCT issued
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.3 in the name of Lorna and the petitioner, and the revival of
respondents’ own title, to wit:
The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision dated July
Elenita Dinglasan (Elenita) was the registered owner of a parcel of
land designated as Lot No. 625 of the Limay Cadastre which is 1, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Third Judicial Region, Branch 4,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-105602, with Mariveles, Bataan (Stationed in Balanga, Bataan) in Civil Case No.
an aggregate area of 82,972 square meters. While on board a 438-ML is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
jeepney, Elenita’s mother, Lilia Baluyot (Lilia), had a conversation
with one Maura Passion (Maura) regarding the sale of the said The Transfer Certificate of Title No. 134932 issued in the name of
property. Believing that Maura was a real estate agent, Lilia Lorna Ong and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 137466 issued in
borrowed the owner’s copy of the TCT from Elenita and gave it to the name of defendant-appellee Editha Padlan are CANCELLED
Maura. Maura then subdivided the property into several lots from and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 134785 in the name of the
Lot No. 625-A to Lot No. 625-O, under the name of Elenita and her plaintiffs-appellants is REVIVED.
husband Felicisimo Dinglasan (Felicisimo).
SO ORDERED.9
Through a falsified deed of sale bearing the forged signature of
Elenita and her husband Felicisimo, Maura was able to sell the lots The CA found that petitioner purchased the property in bad faith
to different buyers. On April 26, 1990, Maura sold Lot No. 625-K from Lorna. The CA opined that although a purchaser is not
to one Lorna Ong (Lorna), who later caused the issuance of TCT expected to go beyond the title, based on the circumstances
No. 134932 for the subject property under her name. A few surrounding the sale, petitioner should have conducted further
months later, or sometime in August 1990, Lorna sold the lot to inquiry before buying the disputed property. The fact that Lorna
petitioner Editha Padlan for ₱4,000.00. Thus, TCT No. 134932 was bought a 5,000-square-meter property for only ₱4,000.00 and
cancelled and TCT No. 137466 was issued in the name of selling it after four months for the same amount should have put
petitioner. petitioner on guard. With the submission of the Judgment in
Criminal Case No. 4326 rendered by the RTC, Branch 2, Balanga,
After learning what had happened, respondents demanded Bataan, entitled People of the Philippines v. Maura Passion10 and
petitioner to surrender possession of Lot No. 625-K, but the latter the testimonies of respondents, the CA concluded that
refused. Respondents were then forced to file a case before the respondents sufficiently established that TCT No. 134932 issued in
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Balanga, Bataan for the Cancellation the name of Lorna and TCT No. 137466 issued in the name of
of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 137466, docketed as Civil Case petitioner were fraudulently issued and, therefore, null and void.
No. 438-ML. Summons was, thereafter, served to petitioner
through her mother, Anita Padlan. Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration.
Petitioner argued that not only did the complaint lacks merit, the
On December 13, 1999, respondents moved to declare petitioner lower court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter
in default and prayed that they be allowed to present evidence ex of the case and the person of the petitioner.
parte.4
On October 23, 2007, the CA issued a Resolution11 denying the
On January 17, 2000, petitioner, through counsel, filed an motion. The CA concluded that the rationale for the exception
Opposition to Declare Defendant in Default with Motion to made in the landmark case of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy12 was
Dismiss Case for Lack of Jurisdiction Over the Person of present in the case. It reasoned that when the RTC denied
Defendant.5 Petitioner claimed that the court did not acquire petitioner’s motion to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction,
jurisdiction over her, because the summons was not validly served petitioner neither moved for a reconsideration of the order nor
upon her person, but only by means of substituted service did she avail of any remedy provided by the Rules. Instead, she
through her mother. Petitioner maintained that she has long been kept silent and only became interested in the case again when the
residing in Japan after she married a Japanese national and only CA rendered a decision adverse to her claim.
comes to the Philippines for a brief vacation once every two
years. Hence, the petition assigning the following errors:

On April 5, 2001, Charlie Padlan, the brother of petitioner, I

testified that his sister is still in Japan and submitted a copy of
petitioner’s passport and an envelope of a letter that was WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT HAS JURISDICTION
allegedly sent by his sister. Nevertheless, on April 5, 2001, the RTC OVER THE PERSON OF THE PETITIONER.
 (2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of,
II real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of
the property involved exceeds Twenty Thousand Pesos
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT HAS JURISDICTION (₱20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such
OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE. value exceeds Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00), except actions
for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings,
III original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER IS A BUYER IN GOOD FAITH AND Circuit Trial Courts; x x x
FOR VALUE.13
Section 3 of RA 7691 expanded the exclusive original jurisdiction
Petitioner maintains that the case of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy finds of the first level courts, thus:
no application in the case at bar, since the said case is not on all
fours with the present case. Unlike in Tijam, wherein the Section 3. Section 33 of the same law BP Blg. 129 is hereby
petitioner therein actively participated in the proceedings, amended to read as follows:
petitioner herein asserts that she did not participate in any
proceedings before the RTC because she was declared in default. Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. –
Petitioner insists that summons was not validly served upon her, Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
considering that at the time summons was served, she was Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
residing in Japan. Petitioner contends that pursuant to Section 15,
Rule 14 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, when the defendant does xxxx
not reside in the Philippines and the subject of the action is
property within the Philippines of the defendant, service may be (3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve
effected out of the Philippines by personal service or by title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein
publication in a newspaper of general circulation. In this case, where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does
summons was served only by substituted service to her mother. not exceed Twenty Thousand Pesos (₱20,000.00) or, in civil
Hence, the court did not acquire jurisdiction over her person. actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not
exceed Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) exclusive of interest,
Also, petitioner posits that the court lacks jurisdiction of the damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses
subject matter, considering that from the complaint, it can be and costs: Provided, That in cases of land not declared for
inferred that the value of the property was only ₱4,000.00, which taxation purposes, the value of such property shall be determined
was the amount alleged by respondents that the property was by the assessed value of the adjacent lots.
sold to petitioner by Lorna.
Respondents filed their Complaint with the RTC; hence, before
Finally, petitioner stresses that she was a buyer in good faith. It proceeding any further with any other issues raised by the
was Maura who defrauded the respondents by selling the petitioner, it is essential to ascertain whether the RTC has
property to Lorna without their authority. jurisdiction over the subject matter of this case based on the
above-quoted provisions.
Respondents, on the other hand, argue that the CA was correct in
ruling in their favor. However, in order to determine which court has jurisdiction over
the action, an examination of the complaint is essential. Basic as a
The petition is meritorious. hornbook principle is that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a
case is conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the
Respondents filed the complaint in 1999, at the time Batas complaint which comprise a concise statement of the ultimate
Pambansa Blg. (BP) 129, the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of action. The nature of an
was already amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 7691, An Act action, as well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is
Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, determined based on the allegations contained in the complaint
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, of the plaintiff, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is
amending for the purpose BP Blg. 129.14 entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted
therein. The averments in the complaint and the character of the
Section 1 of RA 7691, amending BP Blg. 129, provides that the RTC relief sought are the ones to be consulted. Once vested by the
shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction on the following allegations in the complaint, jurisdiction also remains vested
actions: irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover
upon all or some of the claims asserted therein.15
Section 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise
known as the "Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980," is hereby What determines the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the
amended to read as follows: action pleaded as appearing from the allegations in the complaint.
The averments therein and the character of the relief sought are
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. – Regional Trial Courts shall the ones to be consulted.16
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
Respondents’ Complaint17 narrates that they are the duly
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is registered owners of Lot No. 625 of the Limay Cadastre which was
incapable of pecuniary estimation; covered by TCT No. T-105602. Without their knowledge and
consent, the land was divided into several lots under their names
through the fraudulent manipulations of Maura. One of the lots
was Lot 625-K, which was covered by TCT No. 134785. On April Consequently, the remaining issues raised by petitioner need not
26, 1990, Maura sold the subject lot to Lorna. By virtue of the be discussed further.
fictitious sale, TCT No. 134785 was cancelled and TCT No. 134932
was issued in the name of Lorna. Sometime in August 1990, Lorna WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court
sold the lot to petitioner for a consideration in the amount of of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86983, dated June 29, 2007, and its
₱4,000.00. TCT No. 134932 was later cancelled and TCT No. Resolution dated October 23, 2007, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
137466 was issued in the name of petitioner. Despite demands The Decision of the Regional Trial Court, dated July I, 2005, is
from the respondents, petitioner refused to surrender possession declared NULL and VOID. The complaint in Civil Case No. 438-ML
of the subject property. Respondents were thus constrained to is dismissed without prejudice.
engage the services of a lawyer and incur expenses for litigation.
Respondents prayed for the RTC (a) to declare TCT No. 137466 SO ORDERED.
null and to revive TCT No. T-105602 which was originally issued
and registered in the name of the respondents; and (b) to order DISDADO M. PERALTA
petitioner to pay attorney’s fees in the sum of ₱50,000.00 and Associate Justice
litigation expenses of ₱20,000.00, plus cost of suit.18
WE CONCUR:
An action "involving title to real property" means that the
plaintiff's cause of action is based on a claim that he owns such PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
property or that he has the legal rights to have exclusive control, Associate Justice
possession, enjoyment, or disposition of the same. Title is the Chairperson
"legal link between (1) a person who owns property and (2) the
property itself." "Title" is different from a "certificate of title" ROBERTO A. ABAD
which is the document of ownership under the Torrens system of Associate Justice JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
registration issued by the government through the Register of Associate Justice
Deeds. While title is the claim, right or interest in real property, a MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN
certificate of title is the evidence of such claim.19 Associate Justice

In the present controversy, before the relief prayed for by the ATTESTATION
respondents in their complaint can be granted, the issue of who
between the two contending parties has the valid title to the I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
subject lot must first be determined before a determination of reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
who between them is legally entitled to the certificate of title writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
covering the property in question.1âwphi1
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
From the Complaint, the case filed by respondent is not simply a Associate Justice
case for the cancellation of a particular certificate of title and the Chairperson, Third Division
revival of another. The determination of such issue merely follows
after a court of competent jurisdiction shall have first resolved the CERTIFICATION
matter of who between the conflicting parties is the lawful owner
of the subject property and ultimately entitled to its possession Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the
and enjoyment. The action is, therefore, about ascertaining which Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in
of these parties is the lawful owner of the subject lot, jurisdiction the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
over which is determined by the assessed value of such lot.20 case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's
Division.
In no uncertain terms, the Court has already held that a complaint
must allege the assessed value of the real property subject of the MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
complaint or the interest thereon to determine which court has Chief Justice
jurisdiction over the action.21 In the case at bar, the only basis of
valuation of the subject property is the value alleged in the
complaint that the lot was sold by Lorna to petitioner in the Footnotes
amount of ₱4,000.00. No tax declaration was even presented that
would show the valuation of the subject property. In fact, in one 1 Penned by Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando, with
of the hearings, respondents’ counsel informed the court that Associate Justices Rosalinda Asuncion- Vicente and Enrico A.
they will present the tax declaration of the property in the next Lanzanas, concurring; rollo, pp. 26-35.
hearing since they have not yet obtained a copy from the
Provincial Assessor’s Office.22 However, they did not present such 2 Id.at41-45.
copy.
3 Rollo, pp. 36-40.
To reiterate, where the ultimate objective of the plaintiffs is to
obtain title to real property, it should be filed in the proper court 4 Records, pp. 17-19.
having jurisdiction over the assessed value of the property subject
thereof.23 Since the amount alleged in the Complaint by 5 Id. at 20-22.
respondents for the disputed lot is only ₱4,000.00, the MTC and
not the RTC has jurisdiction over the action. Therefore, all 6 Id. at 85-87.
proceedings in the RTC are null and void.24
7 CA rollo, pp. 21-23.
8 Rollo, pp. 26-35.

9 Id. at 34-35 (Emphasis in the original)

10 Records, pp. 151-160.

11 Rollo, pp. 41-45.

12 131 Phil. 556 (1968).

13 Rollo, pp. 16-17.

14 Effective April 15, 1994.

15 City of Dumaguete v. Philippine Ports Authority, G.R. No.

168973, August 24, 2011, 656 SCRA 102, 119.

16 Fort Bonifacio Development Corporation v. Domingo, G.R. No.

180765, February 27, 2009, 580 SCRA 397, 404.

17 Rollo, pp. 46-50.

18 Id. at 49.

19 Heirs of Generoso Sebe v. Heirs of Veronico Sevilla, G.R. No.

174497, October 12, 2009, 603 SCRA 395, 404-405.

20 Id. at 406.

21 Quinagoran v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 155179, August 24,

2007, 531 SCRA 104, 113.

22 Records, p. 128.

23 Huguete v. Embudo, 453 Phil. 170, 177 (2003).

24 Quinagoran v. Court of Appeals, supra note 21, at 115.

G.R. No. 155713 May 5, 2006 aside the MeTC decision. The RTC directed the parties to go back
to the Lupon Chairman or Punong Barangay for further
MILAGROS G. LUMBUAN,* Petitioner, proceedings and to comply strictly with the condition that should
vs. the parties fail to reach an amicable settlement, the entire
ALFREDO A. RONQUILLO, Respondent. records of the case will be remanded to MeTC of Manila, Branch
6, for it to decide the case anew.
DECISION
The respondent sought reconsideration but the RTC denied the
QUISUMBING, J.: motion in an Order dated March 15, 1999. Thus, he sought relief
from the Court of Appeals through a petition for review.10 On
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse and set April 12, 2002, the appellate court promulgated a decision,
aside the Decision1 dated April 12, 2002, of the Court of Appeals reversing the decision of the RTC and ordering the dismissal of the
in CA-G.R. SP No. 52436 and its Resolution2 dated October 14, ejectment case. The appellate court ruled that when a complaint
2002, denying the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. is prematurely instituted, as when the mandatory mediation and
conciliation in the barangay level had not been complied with, the
The salient facts, as found by the Court of Appeals,3 are as court should dismiss the case and not just remand the records to
follows: the court of origin so that the parties may go through the
prerequisite proceedings.
Petitioner Milagros G. Lumbuan is the registered owner of Lot 19-
A, Block 2844 with Transfer Certificate of Title No. 193264, The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was
located in Gagalangin, Tondo, Manila. On February 20, 1995, she denied by the appellate court. Hence, this present petition.
leased it to respondent Alfredo A. Ronquillo for a period of three
years with a monthly rental of P5,000. The parties also agreed In the meantime, while this petition was pending before this
that there will be a 10% annual increase in rent for the succeeding Court, the parties went through barangay conciliation
two years, i.e., 1996 and 1997,4 and the leased premises will be proceedings as directed by the RTC of Manila, Branch 38. Again,
used exclusively for the respondent’s fastfood business, unless they failed to arrive at an amicable settlement prompting the RTC
any other use is given, with the petitioner’s prior written to issue an Order11 remanding the case to the MeTC of Manila,
consent.5 Branch 6, where the proceedings took place anew. On April 25,
2000, the MeTC rendered a second decision, the dispositive
While the respondent at the start operated a fastfood business, portion of which reads:
he later used the premises as residence without the petitioner’s
prior written consent. He also failed to pay the 10% annual WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment on the merits is
increase in rent of P500/month starting 1996 and P1,000/month hereby rendered for the plaintiff as follows:
in 1997 to the present. Despite repeated verbal and written
demands, the respondent refused to pay the arrears and vacate 1. Ordering defendant and all persons claiming right of possession
the leased premises. under him to voluntarily vacate the property located at Lot 19-A
Block 2844, Gagalangin, Tondo, Manila and surrender possession
On November 15, 1997, the petitioner referred the matter to the thereof to the plaintiff;
Barangay Chairman’s office but the parties failed to arrive at a
settlement. The Barangay Chairman then issued a Certificate to 2. Ordering defendant to pay to plaintiff the amount of
File Action.6 P387,512.00 as actual damages in the form of unpaid rentals and
its agreed increase up to January 2000 and to pay the amount of
On December 8, 1997, the petitioner filed against the respondent P6,500.00 a month thereafter until the same is actually vacated;
an action for Unlawful Detainer, docketed as Civil Case No.
157922-CV. It was raffled to the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) 3. Ordering the defendant to pay to plaintiff the sum of
of Manila, Branch 6. On December 15, 1997, the respondent P10,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees plus cost of the suit.
received the summons and copy of the complaint. On December
24, 1997, he filed his Answer by mail. Before the MeTC could SO ORDERED.12
receive the respondent’s Answer, the petitioner filed a Motion for
Summary Judgment dated January 7, 1998.7 Acting upon this The respondent appealed the foregoing decision.1avvphil.net The
motion, the MeTC rendered a decision8 on January 15, 1998, case was raffled to RTC of Manila, Branch 22, and docketed as
ordering the respondent to vacate and surrender possession of Civil Case No. 00-98173. The RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner
the leased premises; to pay the petitioner the amount of P46,000 and dismissed the appeal. The respondent elevated the case to
as unpaid rentals with legal interest until fully paid; and to pay the the Court of Appeals, where it is now pending.
petitioner P5,000 as attorney’s fees plus cost of the suit.
The sole issue for our resolution is:
The respondent then filed a Manifestation calling the attention of
the MeTC to the fact that his Answer was filed on time and [WHETHER] THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
praying that the decision be set aside. The MeTC denied the DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT FOR THE ALLEGED FAILURE OF THE
prayer, ruling that the Manifestation was in the nature of a PARTIES TO COMPLY WITH THE MANDATORY MEDIATION AND
motion for reconsideration which is a prohibited pleading under CONCILIATION PROCEEDINGS IN THE BARANGAY LEVEL.13
the Rules on Summary Procedure.
With the parties’ subsequent meeting with the Lupon Chairman
Upon appeal, the case was raffled to the Regional Trial Court or Punong Barangay for further conciliation proceedings, the
(RTC) of Manila, Branch 38, and docketed as Civil Case No. 98- procedural defect was cured. Nevertheless, if only to clear any
87311. On July 8, 1998, the RTC rendered its decision9 setting
lingering doubt why the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the
complaint, we shall delve on the issue. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 52436 are
The petitioner alleges that the parties have gone through REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the decision of the Regional Trial
barangay conciliation proceedings to settle their dispute as shown Court of Manila, Branch 38, in Civil Case No. 98-87311 is
by the Certificate to File Action issued by the Lupon/Pangkat AFFIRMED.
Secretary and attested by the Lupon/Pangkat Chairman. The
respondent, on the other hand, contends that whether there was The Court of Appeals is ordered to proceed with the appeal in CA
defective compliance or no compliance at all with the required – G.R. No. 73453 and decide the case with dispatch.
conciliation, the case should have been dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
The primordial objective of the Katarungang Pambarangay
Rules,14 is to reduce the number of court litigations and prevent LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
the deterioration of the quality of justice which has been brought Associate Justice
about by the indiscriminate filing of cases in the courts. To attain
this objective, Section 412(a) of Republic Act No. 716015 requires WE CONCUR:
the parties to undergo a conciliation process before the Lupon
Chairman or the Pangkat as a precondition to filing a complaint in ANTONIO T. CARPIO
court,16 thus: Associate Justice CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Asscociate Justice
SECTION 412. Conciliation. – (a) Pre-condition to Filing of DANTE O. TINGA
Complaint in Court. – No complaint, petition, action, or Associate Justice
proceeding involving any matter within the authority of the lupon
shall be filed or instituted directly in court or any other PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
government office for adjudication, unless there has been a Associate Justice
confrontation between the parties before the lupon chairman or
the pangkat, and that no conciliation or settlement has been ATTESTATION
reached as certified by the lupon secretary or pangkat secretary
as attested to by the lupon or pangkat chairman…. I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
Here, the Lupon/Pangkat Chairman and Lupon/Pangkat Secretary writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
signed the Certificate to File Action stating that no settlement was
reached by the parties. While admittedly no pangkat was LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
constituted, it was not denied that the parties met at the office of Associate Justice
the Barangay Chairman for possible settlement. The efforts of the Chairperson
Barangay Chairman, however, proved futile as no agreement was
reached. Although no pangkat was formed, in our mind, there was CERTIFICATION
substantial compliance with the law. It is noteworthy that under
the aforequoted provision, the confrontation before the Lupon Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the
Chairman or the pangkat is sufficient compliance with the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in
precondition for filing the case in court.17 This is true the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
notwithstanding the mandate of Section 410(b) of the same law case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
that the Barangay Chairman shall constitute a pangkat if he fails in Division.
his mediation efforts. Section 410(b) should be construed
together with Section 412, as well as the circumstances obtaining ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
in and peculiar to the case. On this score, it is significant that the Chief Justice
Barangay Chairman or Punong Barangay is herself the Chairman
of the Lupon under the Local Government Code.18
Footnotes
Finally, this Court is aware that the resolution of the substantial
issues in this case is pending with the Court of Appeals. While * Also referred to as "Lambuan" in some parts of the records.
ordinarily, we would have determined the validity of the parties’
substantial claims since to await the appellate court’s decision will 1 Rollo, pp. 54-58. Penned by Associate Justice Hilarion L. Aquino,
only frustrate speedy justice and, in any event, would be a futile with Associate Justices Edgardo P. Cruz, and Amelita G. Tolentino
exercise, as in all probability the case would end up with this concurring.
Court, we find that we cannot do so in the instant case.
2 Id. at 60.
It must be underscored that supervening events have taken place
before the lower courts where the parties have been adequately 3 With editorial changes.
heard, and all the issues have been ventilated. Since the records
of those proceedings are with the Court of Appeals, it is in a 4 Rollo, pp. 35-36.
better position to fully adjudicate the rights of the parties. To rely
on the records before this Court would prevent us from rendering 5 Id. at 36.
a sound judgment in this case. Thus, we are left with no
alternative but to leave the matter of ruling on the merits to the 6 Id. at 38.
appellate court.
7 Id. at 87.

8 CA rollo, pp. 30-32.

9 Id. at 22-28.

10 Id. at 8-21.

11 Id. at 50.

12 Id. at 78.

13 Rollo, p. 118.

14 Codified in Sections 399 to 422, Chapter 7, Title One, Book III

and Section 515, Title One, Book IV of Republic Act No. 7160, shall
be known as the Pambarangay Law and these implementing rules
and regulations shall be known as the Katarungang Pambarangay
Rules.

15 Otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991.

16 Zamora v. Heirs of Carmen Izquierdo, G.R. No. 146195,

November 18, 2004, 443 SCRA 24, 31.

17 Diu v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115213, December 19, 1995,

251 SCRA 472, 479-480.

18 Id.; SECTION 399. Lupong Tagapamayapa. – (a) There is hereby

created in each barangay a lupong tagapamayapa, hereinafter
referred to as the lupon, composed of the punong barangay as
chairman….
G.R. No. 117970 July 28, 1998 Accused Tumbagahan, De los Santos, Cajilo and Fontamillas, with
the assistance of their lawyers Atty. Abelardo V. Calsado and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, Juanito Dimaano, pleaded not guilty when arraigned on February
15, 1988; 12 while Accused Cawaling, assisted by Counsel
vs. Jovencio Q. Mayor, entered a plea of not guilty on March 16,
1988. 13
ULYSSES M. CAWALING, ERNESTO TUMBAGAHAN, RICARDO DE
LOS SANTOS, and HILARIO CAJILO, accused-appellants. After due trial, 14 the court a quo 15 rendered its Decision dated
October 21, 1994, 16 the decretal portion of which reads:

PANGANIBAN, J.: WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused (1) ULYSSES M.
CAWALING, (2) ERNESTO TUMBAGAHAN, (3) RICARDO DELOS
It is axiomatic that once an accused-appellant admits killing the SANTOS, (4) HILARIO CAJILO, AND (5) ANDRES FONTAMILLAS
victim, he bears the burden of establishing the presence of any GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER under
circumstance like self-defense, performance of a lawful duty or, the Information, dated June 4, 1987, and sentences each of them
for that matter, double jeopardy, which may relieve him of to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with the accessory
responsibility, or which may mitigate his criminal liability.1 If he penalties of the law.
fails to discharge this burden, his conviction becomes inevitable.
In this Decision, we also reiterate the following doctrines: (1) the The accused, jointly and severally, are ORDERED to pay Nelson
regional trial court, not the Sandiganbayan, has jurisdiction over Elisan the sum of P6,000.00 as actual damages and the heirs of
informations for murder committed by public officers, including a the deceased Ronie Elisan the sums of P116,666.66 by way of lost
town mayor; (2) the assessment of trial courts on the credibility of earnings and P50,000.00 as indemnity for death, without
witnesses and their testimonies deserve great respect; (3) the subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the
equipoise rule cannot be invoked where the evidence of the costs.
prosecution is overwhelming; (4) alibi cannot be believed in the
face of credible testimony identifying the appellants; and (5) The bail bonds of all the accused are ORDERED CANCELLED and all
conspiracy may be proven by circumstantial evidence. said accused ORDERED immediately confined in jail.

The Case The slug (Exh. A); the .38 caliber revolver (with 3 empty shells and
3 live bullets) (Exh. G); and the slug of bullet (Exh. H) are
Before us is an appeal from the 34-page Decision 2 dated October confiscated in favor of the government.
21, 1994, promulgated by the Regional Trial Court of Romblon in
Criminal Case No. OD-269. Convicted of murder were former After the judgment has become final, the Officer-in-Charge, Office
Mayor Ulysses M. Cawaling and Policemen Ernesto Tumbagahan, of the Clerk of Court, this Court, is ordered to deliver and deposit
3 Ricardo De los Santos and Hilario Cajilo. the foregoing Exhibits A, F, G and H, inclusive, to the Provincial
Director, PNP, of the Province of Romblon properly receipted.
Prior to the institution of the criminal case against all the Thereafter, the receipt must be attached to the record of the case
appellants, an administrative case 4 had been filed before the and shall form part of the record.
National Police Commission, in which Policemen Ernesto
Tumbagahan, Ricardo De los Santos, Hilario Cajilo (three of herein The period of preventive imprisonment the accused had
appellants) and Andres Fontamillas were charged by Nelson Ilisan undergone shall be credited in their favor to its full extent
5 with the killing of his brother Ronie 6 Ilisan. On April 6, 1986, pursuant to Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
Adjudication Board No. 14 7 rendered its Decision which found
Tumbagahan, De los Santos, Cajilo and Fontamillas guilty of grave The case against co-accused ALEX BATUIGAS who is at large is
misconduct and ordered their dismissal from the service with ORDERED ARCHIVED pending his arrest. 17
prejudice. 8 On June 26, 1986, the Board issued a resolution, 9
dismissing the respondents' motion for reconsideration for lack of Hence, this appeal. 18
merit.
The Facts
Subsequently, on June 4, 1987, Second Assistant Provincial Fiscal
Alexander Mortel filed, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Version of the Prosecution
Odiongan, Romblon, 10 an Information for murder 11 against the
appellants and Andres Fontamillas. The accusatory portion reads: The trial court gives this summary of the facts as viewed by the
prosecution witnesses:
That on or about the 4th day of December 1982, at around 9:00
o'clock in the evening, in the Poblacion, [M]unicipality of San Jose, The killing occurred on December 4, 1982 at around 9:00 o'clock
[P]rovince of Romblon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of in the evening at the ricefield of Poblacion, San Jose, Romblon
this Honorable Court, the said accused, with intent to kill, when the bright moon was already above the sea at an angle of
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did about 45 degrees, or if it was daytime, it was about 9:00 o'clock in
then and there, by means of treachery and with evident the morning (Imelda Elisan Tumbagahon, on direct examination,
premeditation and taking advantage of their superior strenght tsn, Jan. 17, 1989, p. 5, and on cross examination, tsn, April 18,
[sic] willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot 1989, p. 22).
RONIE ILISAN, with the use of firearms, inflicting upon the latter
multiple mortal injuries in different parts of his body which were On December 4, 1982, about 8:00 o'clock or 8:30 o'clock in the
the direct and immediate cause of his death. evening, Vicente Elisan and his elder brother Ronie Elisan, the
victim, were drinking tuba at C & J-4 Kitchenette of co-accused
Andres Fontamillas in Poblacion, San Jose, Romblon. When they Exit of the gun shot wound from the right axilla, measuring 1/2 x
stood up to go home, Luz Venus, the wife of Diosdado Venus, told 1/2 inch with edges everted, one inch below the axilla and one
them not to go out because the accused were watching them inch below the level of the nipple.
outside about three (3) meters from the restaurant. Diosdado
Venus accompanied them upon their request and they went out 4. Back:
and walked towards home. About a hundred meters from the
restaurant, the six (6) accused, that is, Mayor Cawaling, the four Gun shot wound measuring 1/4 x 1/4 inch, along the vertebral
(4) policemen, namely, Hilario Cajilo, Andres Fontamillas, Ernesto column, right at the level of the 10th ribs with contussion [sic]
Tumbagahan and Ricardo delos Santos, and civilian Alex Batuigas, collar.
the mayor's brother-in-law, flashlighted them and Diosdado
Venus ran going back. The two (2) brothers also ran towards 5. Leg, Left:
home to the house of their elder sister Imelda Elisan
Tumbagahon. Co-accused Andres Fontamillas and Hilario Cajilo Gun shot wound measuring 1/4 x 1/4 anterior aspect upper third
blocked them on the gate of the fence of their sister's house. leg with contussion [sic] collar, with the exit 1/2 x 1/2 posterior
Ronie Elisan ran towards the ricefield. The accused were chasing aspect upper third leg, left. 20
them. Vicente Elisan saw his brother Ronie f[a]ll down on the
ricefield while he ran towards the bushes and la[y] on the ground. Based on the death certificate (Exhibit E) issued by Dr. Flores,
Ronie Elisan rose up by kneeling and raising his two (2) hands. All Ronie Ilisan died of "severe hemorrhage and gun shot wo[unds]."
the six (6) accused approached him with their flashlights and shot 21
him. Ronie fell down about twenty (20) meters from the bushes
where Vicente Elisan hid behind the coconut tree. Co-accused Version of the Defense
Cawaling said ["]you left him, he is already dead.["] Mayor
Cawaling was armed with .45 caliber, policemen Andres Appellant Cawaling, in his 47-page Brief, 22 presented his own
Fontamillas and Hilario Cajilo were both with armalites, Ernesto narration of the incident as follows:
Tumbagahan and Ricardo delos Santos were both with .38 caliber
and so with civilian Alex Batuigas. They left towards the house of At around 7:00 in the evening of December 4, 1982, Ulysses
Mayor Cawaling. After they were gone, Vicente Elisan ran towards Cawaling, then the mayor of the [M]unicipality of San Jose in the
the house of his older brother Nelson Elisan. Upon seeing him, [P]rovince of Romblon, arrived aboard a hired motorized boat
Vicente told Nelson that Ronie was already dead. Nelson said from Manila in the seashore of San Jose. From the seashore, he
nothing. While they were there, elder sister Imelda Elisan immediately proceeded to his home. At around 7:30 in the
Tumbagahon, who was crying came. She said: "Manong, patay ron evening, Cawaling went to the municipal hall to check on
si Ronie." (Brother, Ronie is already dead). Nelson said ["]do not administrative matters that piled up in the course of his trip to
be noisy; they might come back and kill all of us.["] Imelda Manila. He also went inside the police station (located inside the
stopped crying. municipal building) to be apprised of any developments, after
which he went out and joined Pfc. Tumbagahan and Pfc. Cajilo
After a while, brothers Nelson and Vicente Elisan went to the who were standing near the flagpole in front of the municipal
house of barangay captain Aldolfo Tumbagahon. The three (3) building. The three engaged in a conversation. Cawaling learned
went to the townhall and called the police but there was none that the two police officers were the ones assigned for
there. Going to the house of the Chief of Police Oscar Montero, patrol/alert for that night. The three of them went inside the INP
they were told by his wife that Commander Montero was in the office and there Cawaling informed the two policemen that he
house of Mayor Cawaling. They proceeded to the place where received information from reliable persons that certain persons
Ronie Elisan was shot. The cadaver was brought to the house of were plotting to kill him and a member of the town's police force.
Nelson Elisan. Vicente Elisan found an empty shell of a .45 caliber It is to be noted that this occurred at the height of the communist
about three (3) arm's length from the body of the victim. They insurgency and political violence in the countryside in the early
surrendered it to the Napolcom. 19 80's. Hence, such information was taken very seriously, having
been relayed by sources independent of each other.
Dr. Blandino C. Flores described the gunshot wounds of the victim
as follows: Cawaling, as town chief then empowered with supervisory
authority over the local police, accompanied Pfc. Tumbagahan
Gunshot Wounds: and Pfc. Cajilo in conducting patrol and surveillance operations
around the small municipality. He usually did this as routine since
1. Shoulder: Romblon was then plagued with political assassinations and
armed conflict. On their way to the seashore, they passed by C &
Gun shot wound 1/2 x 1/2 inch in diameter shoulder right 2 inches J-4 Kitchenette, and chanced upon Ronnie Ilisan and his brother
from the neck with contussion [sic] collar s[u]rrounding the Vicente Ilisan drinking liquor and discussing in very loud voices.
wound. They stopped right in the front of the restaurant and there they
heard Ronnie Ilisan state in a every loud voice that he will kill a
2. Right Axilla: person that night. Inside the restaurant, without the knowledge
then of Cawaling and the two police officers, witness Gil Palacio,
Gun shot wound 1/4 x 1/4 inch in diameter, 2 inches below the who was buying cigarettes and Luz Venus, the cook/server of the
right nipple with contussion [sic] collar s[u]rrounding the wound. restaurant, saw Ronnie Ilisan, very drunk, brandishing in the air a
.38 caliber Smith and Wesson revolver with a protruding screw.
3. Left Axilla:
Initially dismissing Ronnie Ilisan's statement as just another
hollow swagger of an intoxicated person ("salitang lasing"),
Cawaling and the two policemen proceeded on their way. After
the patrol, they returned to the municipal building and stationed perhaps the correct qualifying circumstance would be abuse of
themselves in front. At around 8:30 in the evening, Ronnie Elisan superiority. In these cases the attack was not sudden nor
passed by the municipal hall walking towards the direction of the unexpected and the element of surprise was lacking." (Id., I
house of Nelson Ilisan, another brother, and shouted the Aquino, pp. 423-424). In the instant case, we earlier ruled that the
challenge, "gawas ang maisog", meaning THOSE WHO ARE BRAVE, qualifying treachery should be considered as an exception to the
COME OUT. Cawaling and the two police officers again brushed general rule on treachery because it was not present at the
aside [the] challenge as just another foolish drunken revelry [o]n inception of the attack. The killing was not sudden nor
the part of Ronnie Ilisan, a well-known troublemaker in the small unexpected and the element of surprise was lacking. It is for this
municipality. reason that we hold that alevosia should be deemed absorbed or
included in abuse of superiority. Even assuming ex-gratia
A few moments later, after Ronie Ilisan had passed by, they argumenti that it should be the other way around, the situation
distinctly heard a gunshot and hysterical female voices shouting, will not be of help, penaltywise, to the accused. 24
"pulis, tabang" meaning POLICE! HELP! four times. Impelled by
the call of duty, Cawaling and the two policemen immediately ran The defenses raised by the appellants were dismissed and their
in the direction of the gunshot and the desperate female voices witnesses declared unworthy of belief for the following reasons:
until they reached the house of Nelson Ilisan in San Jose Street. At
this point, they saw Ronnie Ilisan holding a .38 caliber revolver. 1. It was highly improbable that Defense Witness Tesnado would
They also saw Vicente Ilisan, Francisco Tesnado, Fe Ilisan, the wife not tell his wife (Dory) and Bebelinia Ilisan Sacapaño about the
of Nelson and Delma Ilisan, the wife of Vicente, the latter two incident he had allegedly witnessed, more so when Sacapaño was
being the same persons who cried "pulis, tabang" four times. the victim's first cousin.
Cawaling then told Ronnie to surrender his gun but the latter
responded by pointing the gun at Cawaling and pulling the trigger. 2. The spot report prepared by Station Commander Oscar M.
Montero, the testimonies of Cajilo and Tumbagahan and the
At the precise moment that the gun fired, Cawaling warned the medical findings of Dr. Flores contradicted one another on the
two policemen to drop to the ground by shouting "dapa". following details: the caliber of the gun used in shooting the
Fortunately, Cawaling was not hit. Ronnie Ilisan then turned victim, the wounds inflicted and the whereabouts of Cawaling
around and ran towards the church. The two policemen gave during the shoot-out.
chase. Cawaling, still shaken and trembling after the mischance
was initially left behind but followed shortly. When Ronnie Ilisan 3. Cawaling and his men, armed with guns, could have
reached the church, he turned around and again fired at the immediately disarmed the victim at the initial encounter. The
pursuing Pfc. Cajilo. Fortunately, the gun misfired. When they court could not understand why the victim was able to fire his
finally reached the ricefield, Pfc. Cajilo fired two (2) warning shots gun, run, then stop and again fire his gun, without being caught.
in the air for Ronnie to surrender. Ronnie responded by firing
once again at Pfc. Tumbagahan but failed to hit the latter. At that 4. The positive identification made by the prosecution witnesses
instance, Pfc. Cajilo counter-fired at Ronnie Ilisan hitting him. Pfc. prevails over the alibi posed by De los Santos and Fontamillas, a
Tumbagahan also fired his weapon in the heat of exchange and defense that was not corroborated by any other witness.
also hit Ronnie Ilisan. As a result of the gunshot wounds, Ronnie
Ilisan later on succumbed. 5. The .38 caliber revolver, allegedly owned by the victim, was in
fact owned and used by Alex Batuigas.
Pfc. Tumbagahan picked up the gun still in the hand of the dead
Ronnie Ilisan and gave it to Pfc. Cajilo. The three, Cawaling, who 6. The defense presented a photo and a sketch to prove that
subsequently caught up with them after the incident, and the two Imelda Ilisan Tumabagahan had an obstructed view of the killing.
police officers, then proceeded to the police station located in the The trial court ruled that such evidence was misleading, because
municipal building to formally report the incident in their station the window, from where said witness allegedly saw the incident,
blotter. 23 was at the eastern side of her house, and thus afforded a clear
view of the incident, while the window referred to by the defense
The "Brief for All of the Accused-Appellants" filed by Atty. was at the southern portion.
Napoleon U. Galit and the "Brief for Appellants Ernesto
Tumbagahan and Hilario Cajilo" submitted by Atty. Joselito R. 7. The questioned testimonies of Dr. Flores, Nelson Ilisan and
Enriquez merely repeated the facts as narrated by the trial court. Provincial Prosecutor Pedro Victoriano, Jr., though not formally
offered as evidence, may be admitted because of the failure of
Ruling of the Trial Court the defense to object thereto at the time they were called to
testify.
Finding the prosecution witnesses and their testimonies credible,
the court a quo convicted the appellants. The killing was qualified 8. The defense failed to prove that the prosecution witnesses had
to murder because of the aggravating circumstances of abuse of any ill motive to testify falsely against the appellant.
superior strength and treachery. The trial court ruled that there
was a notorious inequality of forces between the victim and his 9. Appellants had a motive to kill the victim. Nelson Ilisan testified
assailants, as the latter were greater in number and armed with that his brother Ronie (the victim) had witnessed Bonifacio
guns. It further ruled that abuse of superior strength absorbed Buenaventura (a former chief commander of the San Jose Police
treachery, as it ratiocinated: Force) kill a certain Ruben Ventura. Cawaling, who was
Buenaventura's first cousin, wanted Ronie dead, because the
"Certain cases," an authority wrote, "involving the killing of latter had not followed his instruction to leave town to prevent
helpless victim by assailants superior to them in arms or numbers, him from testifying in said case.
or victims who were overpowered before being killed, were
decided on the theory that the killing was treacherous, when Assignment of Errors
 9 The lower court committed error in not dismissing the case for
The appellants, through their common counsel, Atty. Napoleon want of jurisdiction. 27
Galit, assign the following errors to the lower court:
Appellant Cawaling imputes these additional errors to the court a
1. The trial court gravely erred in sustaining prosecutor's theory of quo:
conspiracy and thus renders nugatory or has totally forgotten that
policemen when in actual call of duty normally operate in group 1. The trial court gravely erred in not acquitting herein accused-
but not necessarily in conspiracy. appellant, Ulysses M. Cawaling, considering that he had no part in
the killing and the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond
2. The trial court gravely erred in believing the theory of the reasonable doubt;
prosecution that accused-appellant Ulysses Cawaling was one of
the alleged co-conspirators in the killing of the deceased Ronnie 2. The trial court gravely erred in not finding the shooting incident
Elisan. a result of hot pursuit and shoot-out between the deceased
Ronnie Ilisan and the police officers in the performance of their
3. The trial court gravely erred in not believing the defense of duty and self-defense, and in sustaining the prosecution's
accused-appellant Ulysses Cawaling that he has nothing to do conspiracy theory;
with the shooting incident except to shout to arrest the accused[,]
which prompted his co-accused policemen to chase the accused 3. The trial court gravely erred in not acquitting Accused-
and sho[o]t him when he resisted, after he fired at Mayor Appellant Ulysses M. Cawaling considering that there was blatant
Cawaling. absence of due process in the proceedings tantamount to mistrial.
28
4. The trial court gravely erred in not giving weight to accused-
appellant policemen['s] testimonies which carry the presumption This Court's Ruling
of regularity.
We affirm the conviction of the appellants. In so ruling, we will
5. The trial court gravely erred in not acquitting all the accused- resolve the following issues: (1) jurisdiction of the trial court, (2)
appellants by applying "the equipoise rule" thereby resulting [i]n double jeopardy, (3) credibility of prosecution witnesses and their
reasonable doubts on the guilt. 25 testimonies, (4) self-defense, (5) performance of lawful duty, (6)
alibi, (7) conspiracy, (8) rule on equipoise, (9) qualifying
In their joint brief, 26 Appellants Tumbagahan and Cajilo cite circumstances, (10) damages and (11) attending circumstances as
these other errors: they affect the penalty.

1. The trial court gravely erred in relying on the theory of the We shall address the first two issues as important preliminary
prosecution that accused-appellants Ernesto Tumbagahan and questions and discuss the merits of the remaining ones, which we
Hilario Cajilo were alleged co-conspirators in the killing of the have culled from the errors cited by the appellants in their
victim, Ronie Ilisan. aforementioned briefs.

2. The trial court gravely erred in not believing the defense that First Issue:
herein accused-appellants merely did a lawful duty when the
shooting incident happened which led to the death of Ronnie Jurisdiction of the Trial Court
Ilisan.
Appellants Tumbagahan and Cajilo argue that the trial court erred
3. The trial court gravely erred in not acquitting herein accused- when it assumed jurisdiction over the criminal case. They insist
appellants by applying the equipoise rule, thereby resulting in that the Sandiganbayan, not the regular courts, had jurisdiction to
reasonable doubt on their guilt. try and hear the case against the appellants, as they were public
officers at the time of the killing which was allegedly committed
4. Prescinding from the foregoing, herein accused-appellants do by reason of or in relation to their office.
press and hold, that the lower court committed grave, serious and
reversible error in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of We do not agree.
treachery (alevosia).
The jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is determined by
5. The lower court committed grave, serious and reversible error the law in force at the time of the institution of the action. Once
in convicting both accused-appellants of murder, instead merely the court acquires jurisdiction, it may not be ousted from the case
of homicide, defined and penalized under the Revised Penal Code. by any subsequent events, such as a new legislation placing such
proceedings under the jurisdiction of another tribunal. The only
6. The lower court committed grave, serious and reversible error recognized exceptions to the rule, which find no application in the
in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of taking advantage of case at bar, arise when: (1) there is an express provision in the
superior strength. statute, or (2) the statute is clearly intended to apply to actions
pending before its enactment. 29
7. The consummated crime being merely homicide, the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender should be considered to The statutes pertinent to the issue are PD 1606, as amended; 30
lower the penalty of homicide. and PD 1850, as amended by PD 1952 and BP 129.

8. The lower court committed error in not considering double Sec. 4 of PD 1606 31 reads:
jeopardy.
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. — The Sandiganbayan shall exercise:
 In relation to the above, Section 4-a-2 of PD 1606, as amended by
(a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving: PD 1861, quoted earlier, lists two requisites that must concur
before the Sandiganbayan may exercise exclusive and original
xxx xxx xxx jurisdiction over a case: (a) the offense was committed by the
accused public officer in relation to his office; and (b) the penalty
(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional or
employees in relation to their office, including those employed in imprisonment for six (6) years, or higher than a fine of six
government-owned or controlled corporations, whether simple or thousand pesos (P6,000). 34 Sanchez vs. Demetriou 35 clarified
complexed with other crimes, where the penalty prescribed by that murder or homicide may be committed both by public
law is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) officers and by private citizens, and that public office is not a
years, or a fine of P6,000.00: PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that offenses constitutive element of said crime, viz.:
or felonies mentioned in this paragraph where the penalty
prescribed by law does not exceed prision correccional or The relation between the crime and the office contemplated by
imprisonment for six (6) years or a fine of P6,000.00 shall be tried the Constitution is, in our opinion, direct and not accidental. To
by the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, fall into the intent of the Constitution, the relation has to be such
Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court. that, in the legal sense, the offense cannot exist without the
office. In other words, the office must be a constituent element of
xxx xxx xxx the crime as defined in the statute, such as, for instance, the
crimes defined and punished in Chapter Two to Six, Title Seven, of
However, former President Ferdinand Marcos issued two the Revised Penal Code.
presidential decrees placing the members of the Integrated
National Police under the jurisdiction of courts-martial. Section 1 Public office is not the essence of murder. The taking of human
of PD 1952, 32 amending Section 1 of PD 1850, reads: life is either murder or homicide whether done by a private citizen
or public servant, and the penalty is the same except when the
Sec. 1. Court Martial Jurisdiction over Integrated National Police perpetrator, being a public functionary, took advantage of his
and Members of the Armed Forces. Any provision of law to the office, as alleged in this case, in which event the penalty is
contrary notwithstanding — (a) uniformed members of the increased.
Integrated National Police who commit any crime or offense
cognizable by the civil courts shall henceforth be exclusively tried But the use or abuse of office does not adhere to the crime as an
by courts-martial pursuant to and in accordance with element; and even as an aggravating circumstance, its materiality
Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended, otherwise known as arises, not from the allegations but on the proof, not from the fact
the Articles of War; (b) all persons subjects to military law under that the criminals are public officials but from the manner of the
Article 2 of the aforecited Articles of War who commit any crime commission of the crime.
or offense shall be exclusively tried by courts-martial or their case
disposed of under the said Articles of War; Provided, that, in Furthermore, the Information filed against the appellants contains
either of the aforementioned situations, the case shall be no allegation that appellants were public officers who committed
disposed of or tried by the proper civil or judicial authorities when the crime in relation to their office. The charge was for murder, a
court-martial jurisdiction over the offense has prescribed under felony punishable under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. As
Article 38 of Commonwealth Act Numbered 408, as amended, or clarified in Aguinaldo, et al. vs. Domagas, et al., 36 "[I]n the
court-martial jurisdiction over the person of the accused military absence of such essential allegation, and since the present case
or Integrated National Police personnel can no longer be does not involve charges of violation of R.A. No. 3019 (the Anti-
exercised by virtue of their separation from the active service Graft etc. Act), the Sandiganbayan does not have jurisdiction over
without jurisdiction having duly attached beforehand unless the present case. (Bartolome vs. People, 142 SCRA 459 [1986])
otherwise provided by law: Even before considering the penalty prescribed by law for the
offense charged, it is thus essential to determine whether that
PROVIDED FURTHER, THAT THE PRESIDENT MAY, IN THE INTEREST offense was committed or alleged to have been committed by the
OF JUSTICE, ORDER OR DIRECT, AT ANY TIME BEFORE public officers and employees in relation to their offices."
ARRAIGNMENT, THAT A PARTICULAR CASE BE TRIED BY THE
APPROPRIATE CIVIL COURT. Jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint or
information. 37 In the absence of any allegation that the offense
As used herein, the term uniformed members of the Integrated was committed in relation to the office of appellants or was
National Police shall refer to police officers, policemen, firemen, necessarily connected with the discharge of their functions, the
and jail guards. regional trial court, not the Sandiganbayan, has jurisdiction to
hear and decide the case. 38
On the other hand, the jurisdiction of regular courts over civil and
criminal cases was laid down in BP 129, the relevant portion of Second Issue:
which is quoted hereunder:
Double Jeopardy
Sec. 20. Jurisdiction in Criminal Cases. — Trial Courts shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the In seeking their acquittal, Appellants Tumbagahan and Cajilo also
exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body, except those invoke their right against double jeopardy. They argue that the
now falling under the exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction of the first jeopardy attached when a criminal case for murder was filed
Sandiganbayan which shall hereafter be exclusively taken before the Judge Advocate General's Office (JAGO), which was
cognizance of by the latter. 33 allegedly dismissed after several hearings had been conducted. 39
We are not persuaded.
There is double jeopardy when the following requisites are Q. In the evening of December 4, 1982, at about 8:00 or 8:30,
present: (1) a first jeopardy has attached prior to the second; (2) where were you?
the first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and (3) a second
jeopardy is for the same offense as that in the first. And the first A. I was inside the restaurant of Andres Fontamillas.
jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a
competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has xxx xxx xxx
been entered; and (e) when the accused was acquitted or
convicted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated Q. What were you doing there?
without his express consent. 40
A. I was drinking tuba.
For a better appreciation of appellants' argument, we must
consider PD 39 41 and its implementing rules, 42 which prescribe Q. When you were about to finish drinking tuba, what did you do?
the procedure before a military commission. A summary
preliminary investigation shall be conducted before trial for the A. I stood up preparing to go home.
purpose of determining whether there is prima facie evidence to
pursue trial before a military commission. The investigation report Q. Were you able to leave that restaurant actually?
shall contain a summary of the evidence, the acts constituting the
offense or offenses committed, and the findings and A. No, sir.
recommendations of the investigating officer. Thereafter, the
report shall be forwarded to the judge advocate general, who Q. Why?
shall determine for either the defense secretary or for the AFP
chief of staff whether the case shall be referred for trial to a A. Luz Venus told us not to go out when [I] stood up to go home.
military commission. 43 Where a prima facie case is found against
the accused, formal charges shall be signed by a commissioned Q. Do you know why you were advise[d] not to go out?
officer designated by the judge advocate general. 44 The accused
shall then be arraigned, during which the charge and specification A. Yes, sir.
shall be read and the accused shall enter his plea. 45 After
hearings, a record of the trial shall be forwarded to the AFP chief Q. Why?
of staff for proper action. 46
A. Because we were being watched by Mayor Cawaling, Andres
In the present case, the appellants have presented no sufficient Fontamillas, Hilario Cajilo and Alex Bat[ui]gas.
and conclusive evidence to show that they were charged,
arraigned and acquitted in a military commission, or that the case xxx xxx xxx
was dismissed therein without their consent. The defense merely
offered as evidence certain disposition forms 47 and a Q. When you were informed by Luz Venus that you should not go
letter, 48 dated March 8, 1983, recommending that the case out because Mayor Cawaling and the persons you mentioned
against Appellants Tumbagahan, Cajilo and De los Santos be were outside watching for you, what did you do?
dropped and considered closed. 49 No charge sheet and record of
arraignment and trial were presented to establish the first A. We did not go out.
jeopardy.
Q. Since you remained inside, what did you do?
As pointed out by the solicitor general, "appellants were never
arraigned, they never pleaded before the Judge Advocate A. I also viewed thru the window.
General's Office, there was no trial, and no judgment on the
merits had been rendered." 50 Q. Did you see them?

Third Issue: A. Yes, sir.

Credibility of Witnesses Q. How far were they from the restaurant?

As a general rule, the factual findings of trial courts deserve A. About three meters.
respect and are not disturbed on appeal, unless some facts or
circumstances of weight and substance have been overlooked, Q. What were they doing outside the restaurant?
misapprehended or misinterpreted, and would otherwise
materially affect the disposition of the case. 51 This rule, A. They were also viewing us.
however, does not apply when the judge who penned the
decision was not the same one who had heard the prosecution Q. For how long did they remain there viewing you?
witnesses testify, 52 as in the present case. Nonetheless, we have
carefully perused and considered the voluminous records of this A. Just a short time.
case, and we find no reason to alter the findings of the court a
quo in regard to the credibility of the prosecution witnesses and Q. And later on, do you know where did they go? [sic]
their testimonies.
A. No, sir. I went out from the restaurant and when I went out, I
Vicente Ilisan, the victim's brother, narrated before the trial court did not see them anymore.
the circumstances relevant to the crime:
Q. Before you went out of the restaurant, what did you do?
A. Diosdado Venus accompanied us. Q. What about Alex Batuigas, what did he do?

Q. Why did you ask Diosdado Venus to accompany you? A. He also followed helping chasing us. [sic]

A. Yes, sir. Because we were aware that we were being watched Q. What about the four policemen, what did they do?
from outside so we asked to be accompanied by Diosdado Venus.
A. The same. They were also chasing us.
Q. From the restaurant accompanied by Diosdado Venus, what
did you do? Q. About how far is that restaurant [from] the spot where you
were first lighted by the flashlight of the accused?
A. Towards home.
A. About one hundred meters.
Q. Were you able to reach home?
Q. Now, according to you, you ran towards the ricefield, what
A. No, sir. happened while you were running towards the ricefield?

Q. Why, what happened on the way? A. I saw my brother fell [sic] down.

A. Diosdado Venus ran going back because we were lighted by a Q. Fell down where?
flashlight.
A. On the ricefield.
Q. How many flashlight[s] were trimed [sic] to you?
Q. What about you, where were you when your brother fell down
A. Six. in the ricefield?

Q. Did you come to know who trimed [sic] the flashlight towards A. I ran towards the bushes.
you?
Q. What did you do upon reaching the bushes?
A. Yes, sir.
A. I la[y] on the ground with my belly touch[ing] on the ground
Q. Who were they? behind the coconut tree.

A. Mayor Cawaling, Andres Fontamillas, Hilario Cajilo, Ernesto Q. When your brother according to you had fallen on the ricefield,
Tumbagahan, Ricardo delos Santos and Alex Batuigas. what did he do thereafter?

Q. How were you able to recognize them when that was night A. He rose up, [raised] his hands and surrender[ed] to them.
time?
Q. In rising, what was his position?
A. Because the flashlight[s] were bright.
A. He was rising like this. (Witness demonstrating by kneeling
Q. When Diosdado Venus ran back to his restaurant, what did [and] raising his two hands).
your brother Ronie Elisan and you do?
Q. While Ronie Elisan was kneeling and raising both of his hands,
A. We also ran towards home. what happened?

Q. To whose house? A. Mayor Cawaling approached him together with the four
policemen and his brother-in-law and they shot him.
A. That of my older sister Imelda [E]lisan.
Q. Do you know what weapon[s] were used in shooting your
Q. Were you able to reach that house? brother?

A. No, sir. A. Yes, sir.

Q. Why, what happened when you ran away? Q. What weapon were used?

A. Andres Fontamillas and Hilario Cajilo were blocking us on the A. The weapon of Mayor Cawaling is .45 caliber and that of
gate of the fence of my sister's house. Andres Fontamillas and Hilario Cajilo were both armalite and that
of Ernesto Tumbagahan, Alex Batuigas and Ricardo delos Santos
Q. Since your way was blocked, where did Ronie Elisan go? were .38 caliber.

A. We ran towards the ricefield. Q. How were you able to identify their weapons?

Q. When you ran, what did Mayor Cawaling do? A. Because the flashlight[s] were bright.

A. They were chasing us.

Q. Now, what happened to your brother when he was fired upon to determine or prove important matters, such as whether Ronie
by the accused in this case? was drunk, if he fired a gun, how many and what caliber of guns
were used in shooting him; they did not, however, avail
A. He fell down. themselves of this opportunity. As public officers, appellants knew
that it was within their power to request or secure from the court,
Q. And how far is that spot where your elder brother had fallen or any other competent authority, an order for another autopsy
down to the spot where Diosdado Venus left you when he 61 or any such evidence as may affirm their innocence. Third,
returned to the restaurant? their conviction lies in the strong and convincing testimonial
evidence of the prosecution, not in the corroborative testimony of
A. To my estimate it is about 300 meters. Bebelinia Sacapaño.

Q. After your brother had fallen down, what did the accused do? Relying on the testimonies of Luz Venus and Gil Palacio, Appellant
Cawaling also pointed out that "[t]he power of observation of
A. Mayor Cawaling said, ["]you left him, he is already dead.["] alleged eyewitness Vicente was severely affected by his
intoxication. It may be inferred that an intoxicated person's
Q. Where did they go? sense[s] of sight and hearing and of touch are less acute than
those of a sober person and that his observation are inexact as to
A. They went towards the house of Mayor Cawaling. 53 what actually occurred." 62

Imelda Tumbagahan was at home feeding her child when she This argument is not persuasive. The evidence presented fails to
heard her brother Ronie shouting for help. After getting a show that Vicente was so intoxicated that night as to affect his
flashlight and looking through the window of her house, she saw powers of observation and retrospection. Defense Witness
Cawaling and Alex Batuigas chasing Ronie who was running Palacio merely saw the witness drinking tuba on the night of the
towards her house. Tumbagahan and De los Santos prevented killing. 63 Meanwhile the whole testimony of Luz on the matter
Ronie from entering the fence of her house, as a result of which, mainly reveals that Ronie was the person she was referring to as
her brother ran towards a rice field nearby. There, on bended drunk, as shown by this portion: 64
knees and with hands raised, Ronie was shot by Cawaling and his
men. 54 Q When Ronie and Vicente both surnamed Ilisan entered the C &
J-4 kitchenette what if any did you observe?
Nelson Ilisan also heard his younger brother Ronie shouting for
help while being chased by the group of Cawaling. As Cajilo and A I saw them so dr[u]nk (Nakita ko sila lasing na lasing).
Fontamillas blocked Ronie from entering the gate of Imelda's
house, the victim ran towards a rice field. Nelson stopped Q Who was lasing na lasing or so dr[u]nk?
Cawaling and asked, "Nong, basi guinalagas ninyo and acon hali?
(Nong, why do you chase my brother?)" But the mayor merely A Ronie Ilisan sir.
continued chasing Ronie. Thereafter, Nelson saw his brother, on
his knees with both hands raised, shot by appellants. 55 Granting that Vicente was drunk, the conviction of the appellants
is still inevitable in view of the positive declarations of Witnesses
The three aforementioned witnesses narrated in detail the assault Nelson and Imelda, who unequivocally identified appellants as
against their brother Ronie and positively identified the appellants perpetrators of the senseless killing of their brother Ronie.
as the perpetrators. The trial court cannot be faulted for relying
on their testimonies and accepting them as true, 56 especially Appellant Cawaling also questions the trial court's reliance on the
when the defense failed, to prove any ill motive on their part. 57 testimonies of Dr. Blandino Flores, 65 Nelson Ilisan 66 and
In addition, family members who have witnessed the killing of Prosecutor Pedro Victoriano, Jr., 67 for failure of the prosecution
their loved one usually strive to remember the faces of the to offer them as evidence. In People vs. Java, 68 this Court ruled
assailants. 58 Thus, the relationship per se of witnesses with the that the testimony of a witness, although not formally offered in
victim does not necessarily mean that the former are biased. On evidence, may still be admitted by the courts, if the other party
the contrary, it is precisely such relationship that would impel does not object to its presentation. The Court explained: "Section
them to seek justice and put the real culprit behind bars, rather 36 of [Rule 132] requires that an objection in the course of the
than impute the offense to the innocent. 59 oral examination of a witness should be made as soon as the
grounds therefor shall become reasonably apparent. Since no
Appellant Cawaling submits that the prosecution witnesses objection to the admissibility of evidence was made in the court
tampered with the evidence by cleaning the cadaver before an below, an objection raised for the first time on appeal will not be
autopsy could be done. "Such irregular washing of the cadaver by considered." In the present case, a cursory reading of the
a close relative of the deceased, who is educated and who stenographic notes reveals that the counsel for the appellants did
presumably knew perfectly well the need to preserve it in its not raise any objection when said witnesses testified on the
original state for the medico-legal examination[,] is highly matters now being impugned. Moreover, they repeatedly cross-
suspicious. It points to the fact that the relatives of the deceased examined the witnesses, which shows that they had waived their
wanted to hide, or erase something that would bolster and assist objections to the said testimonies of such witnesses.
the defense (that is, state of drunkenness, powder burns or lack
thereof, indicating the firing of a weapon or the proximity of the Lastly, Appellant Mayor Cawaling questions the motive of
weapon used on the deceased, etc.)." 60 Prosecutor Pedro Victoriano Jr. This contention is likewise bereft
of merit. Unlike judges who are mandated to display cold
Such contention is unavailing. First, Bebelinia Sacapaño merely neutrality in hearing cases, 69 prosecutors are not required to
cleaned the cadaver and made no further examination. Second, divest themselves of their personal convictions and refrain from
appellants had an opportunity to have the body examined again exhibiting partiality. In this case, there is reasonable ground for
Prosecutor Victoriano to believe that an offense has been and not on the weakness of that of the prosecution; for even if
committed and that the accused was probably guilty thereof. 70 the latter evidence were weak, it could not be disbelieved after
Under the circumstance, it is his sworn duty to see that justice is the accused has admitted the
served. 71 Thus, "[h]e may prosecute with earnestness and vigor killing. 78 Thus, appellants must establish with clear and
— indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, convincing evidence that the killing was justified, and that they
he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to incurred no criminal liability therefor. 79 They failed to do so, and
refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful their conviction thus becomes inevitable. 80
conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a
just one." 72 Further, Fifth Issue:

Under the prevailing criminal procedure, the fiscal's sphere of Lawful Performance of Duties
action is quite extensive, for he has very direct and active
intervention in the trial, assuming as the Government's Appellants contend that the killing of Ronie resulted from the
representative the defense of society, which has been disturbed lawful performance of their duties as police officers. However,
by the crime, and taking public action as though he were the such justifying circumstance may be invoked only after the
injured party, for the purpose of securing the offender's defense successfully proves that (1) the accused acted in the
punishment, whenever the crime has been proved and the guilt of performance of a duty, and (2) the injury or offense committed is
the accused as the undoubted perpetrator thereof established. 73 the necessary consequence of the due performance or lawful
exercise of such duty. 81 These two requisites are wanting in this
Fourth Issue: case.

Self-Defense The appellants, except Mayor Cawaling, were men in uniform who
happened to be on duty when they killed Ronie. The victim was
To escape criminal liability, the appellants also invoke the nor committing any offense at the time. Killing the victim under
justifying circumstances of self-defense and lawful performance of the circumstances of this case cannot in any wise be considered a
duty. 74 Allegedly, Ronie was firing his gun and shouting. "Guwa valid performance of a lawful duty by men who had sworn to
ang maisog! (Come out who is brave!)." Then the mayor and the maintain peace and order and to protect the lives of the people.
policemen arrived at the scene to pacify him. Ronie fired at them, As aptly held in People vs. De la Cruz, 82 "Performance of duties
which forced them to chase him and return fire. does not include murder." That Ronie was a troublemaker in their
town is not an excuse; as the Court declared in the same case of
We find this scenario bereft of plausibility. People vs. De la Cruz, "Murder is never justified, regardless of the
victim."
Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is a condition sine
qua non for the successful invocation of self-defense. 75 As Sixth Issue:
factually found by the trial court, unlawful aggression did not start
with the victim, but rather with the appellants. Cawaling and his Alibi
men proceeded to the C & J-4 Kitchenette and waited for Ronie to
come out. When the victim did, they chased and shot him without We likewise brush aside the defenses of alibi and denial raised by
giving him any opportunity to defend himself. Appellant De los Santos. Prosecution witnesses positively
identified him and Fontamillas as part of the group which chased
Granting arguendo the veracity of the defense's factual version, it and shot Ronie Ilisan. It is elementary that alibi and denial are
is important to note that appellants admitted that Ronie was outweighed by positive identification that is categorical,
running away from them when they chased and shot him. Thus, consistent and untainted by any ill motive on the part of the
unlawful aggression — assuming it was initially present — had eyewitness testifying on the matter. Alibi and denial, if not
ceased, and the appellants no longer had any right to pursue the substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and
offender. Basic is the rule that when unlawful aggression ceases, self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law. 83
the defender no longer has the right to kill or even wound the
former aggressor. Upon the cessation of the unlawful aggression In fact, De los Santos failed to establish with clear and convincing
and the danger or risk to life and limb, there should be a evidence that it was physically impossible for him to have been at
corresponding cessation of hostilities on the part of the person the scene of the crime during its commission. 84 The evidence he
defending himself. 76 had presented demonstrated only that, at the time, he was
sleeping in his house, which was near the locus criminis.

Alibi is always considered with suspicion and received with

Furthermore, the means employed to ward off the attack was caution, not only because it is inherently weak and unreliable, but
unreasonably excessive. Being armed, the appellants could have also because it is easily fabricated and concocted. 85 It is
easily ordered the victim to surrender. Even the first shot at his therefore incumbent upon the appellant to prove that he was at
shoulder would have been sufficient to immobilize him, yet they another place when the felony was committed, and that it was
fired a succession of shots at him while he was in no position to physically impossibie for him to have been at the scene of the
put up a defense. crime at the time it was committed. 86 This he failed to prove.

Jurisprudence teaches that when an accused admits having Seventh Issue:

committed the crime but invokes self-defense to escape criminal
liability, the burden of proof is reversed and shifted to him. He Conspiracy
must then prove the elements of self-defense. 77 It necessarily
follows that he must now rely on the strength of his own evidence
The trial court correctly appreciated the presence of conspiracy. We partly agree.
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to Treachery exists when the malefactors employ means and
commit it. Direct proof of conspiracy is rarely found, for criminals methods that tend directly and especially to insure their
do not write down their lawless plans and plots. The agreement to execution without risk to themselves arising from the defense
commit a crime, however, may be deduced from the mode and which the victims might make. The essence of treachery is the
manner of the commission of the offense or inferred from acts sudden and unexpected attack without the slightest provocation
that point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action, and on the part of the person attacked. 93 While we do not disregard
community of intent. 87 It does not matter who inflicted the the fact that the victim, together with his brother Vicente, was
mortal wound, as the act of one is the act of all, and each incurs able to run towards a rice field, we still believe that treachery
the same criminal liability. 88 We concur with the trial court's attended the killing.
elucidation:
In People vs. Landicho, 94 we ruled that treachery might still be
All of the accused chased the victim and his brother; four (4) of appreciated even when the victim was warned of danger to his
whom blocked their ways, first, to their elder brother Nelson person, for "what is decisive is that the execution of the attack
Elisan's house and, second, to their elder sister Imelda Elisan made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or to
Tumbagahon's house. Having changed course by proceeding to retaliate."
the ricefield in their desperate attempt to evade the accused, all
the six (6) armed accused continued their pursuit. Their victim, The appellants waited for Ronie to come out of the restaurant. All
having fallen on the rice paddy, and rising and kneeling on it with of them chased the victim and prevented him from seeking refuge
raised hands, all the said accused with their flashlights beamed on either in the house of his sister Imelda or that of his brother
their victim, in a united and concerted manner, shot him. After Nelson. All of them carried firearms and flashlights. They fired
Ronie Elisan had fallen down, co-accused Mayor Cawaling was their guns at the victim while he was on his knees with arms
even heard as saying "(Y)ou left [sic] him, he is already dead." . . . . raised, manifesting his intention not to fight back.
89
We cannot appreciate the aggravating circumstance of abuse of
Eighth Issue: superior strength, however, as we have consistently ruled that it
is deemed absorbed in treachery. 95
Equipoise Rule
We also affirm the finding of the trial court that the prosecution
We reject appellants' position that the equipoise rule should failed to prove the attending circumstance of evident
apply to this case. 90 In People vs. Lagnas, 91 the Court, through premeditation. To prove this aggravating circumstance, the
Mr. Justice Florenz D. Regalado, described this rule as follows: prosecution must show the following: (1) the time when the
offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly
Once again, albeit in effect a supportive and cumulative indicating that the offender clung to his determination; and (3) a
consideration in view of the preceding disquisition, the equipoise lapse of time, between the determination to commit the crime
rule finds application in this case, that is, if the inculpatory facts and the execution thereof, sufficient to allow the offender to
and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one reflect upon the consequences of his act. 96 Nothing in the
of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the records shows how and when the plan to kill was hatched, or how
other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill much time had elapsed before it was carried out.
the test of moral certainty, and is not sufficient to support a
conviction. Tenth Issue:

In this case, the inculpatory facts point to only one conclusion: Damages
appellants are guilty. As amplified in the discussion above, the
Court agrees with the trial court that the guilt of the appellants The trial court awarded the following: (a) P50,000.00, as civil
was proven beyond reasonable doubt. indemnity; (b) P6,000.00, as actual damages; and (c) P116,666.66,
for lost earnings. In computing the latter, the trial court used the
Ninth Issue: following formula:

Murder or Homicide? Total annual net income = 10% x total annual gross income

The Information alleges three qualifying circumstances: treachery, = .10 x P25,000.00

evident premeditation and taking advantage of superior strength.
If appreciated, any one of these will qualify the killing to murder. = P2,500.00.
However, Appellants Tumbagahan and Cajilo posit that there was
no treachery, reasoning that Ronie was not an unsuspecting xxx xxx xxx
victim, as he had been forewarned by Diosdado Venus of the
presence of the appellants inside the restaurant, and there had Loss of earning capacity of Ronie Elisan = 2/3 (90-20) x P2,500.00
been a chase prior to the killing. Further, they contend that abuse = P116,666.66. 97
of superior strength is deemed absorbed in treachery, and that
"the addition of abuse of superior strength to qualify the case to Consistent with jurisprudence, we affirm the ruling of the trial
murder is nothing more than mere repetition — a legal chicanery, court awarding the amount of P50,000 as civil indemnity to the
so to say. Similarly, where treachery is not proved, there can be heirs of the victim. 98
no abuse of superior strength, vice-versa." 92
We cannot do the same to the award of actual damages and lost
earnings, however. The award of actual damages has no basis, as SO ORDERED.
no receipts were presented to substantiate the expenses allegedly
incurred. An alleged pecuniary loss must be established by Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Vitug and Quisumbing, JJ. concur.
credible evidence before actual damages may be awarded. 99
Similarly erroneous is the award for loss of earning capacity, Footnotes
which should be computed as follows: 100
1 People vs. Bautista, 254 SCRA 621, 626, March. 12, 1996.
2/3 x [80 — age of victim at the time of death] x [reasonable
portion of the annual net income which would have been 2 Penned by Judge Placido C. Marquez; records, Vol. II, pp. 389-
received as support by heirs] 422.

As testified to by Nelson Ilisan, the deceased had been earning an 3 Sometimes spelled "Tumbagahon" in the TSN.
average of P100 daily or P3,000 monthly. 101 From this monthly
income must be deducted the reasonable amount of P1,000 4 With docket number 85-0419.
representing the living and other necessary expenses of the
deceased. Hence, the lost earnings of the deceased should be 5 Sometimes spelled "Elisan" in the records and the TSN.
computed as follows:
6 Sometimes spelled "Ronnie."
= 2/3 x [80 - 22] x [P24,000]
7 Composed of Amelia L. Cube as chairman; Artemio B. Cana,
= 2/3 x [58] x [P24,000] representative of the then Ministry of Justice; and Francisco A.
Bautista, representative of the Philippine Constabulary.
= 2[P1,392,000]
8 See Records of Exhibit, pp. 6-14.
3
9 Records, Vol. I, p. 73.
= P2,784,000
10 Presided by Judge Cezar R. Maravilla.
3
11 Rollo, p. 17.
= P928,000.
12 Records, Vol. I, p. 215.
Eleventh Issue:
13 Records, Vol. I, p. 241.
Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances
14 The trial court issued an Order dated October 28, 1994
Prior to the amendment of Section 248 of the Revised Penal Code, dismissing the case against Andres Fontamillas, when the latter
102 the imposable penalty for murder was reclusion temporal in died of congestive heart failure before final judgment could be
its maximum period to death. In their Brief, Appellants Cajilo and rendered. (See death certificate in records, Vol. II, p. 388.)
Tumbagahan argue for the imposition of the lower penalty of
reclusion temporal, contending that their filing of bail 15 Acting on the request of Nelson Ilisan to inhibit Judge Cezar R.
bonds/property bonds, before the order for their arrest was Maravilla from further hearing the case, this Court issued a
issued, should be treated as voluntary surrender. 103 Resolution dated September 13, 1990, designating Judge Placido
C. Marquez in lieu of Judge Maravilla. (See Records, Vol. I, p. 510.)
We cannot accept this contention. In the first place, it has no
factual basis. The warrant for the arrest of herein appellants was 16 Promulgated on October 28, 1994. (See Records, Vol. II, p.
issued on August 18, 1987, 104 but appellants' counsel filed the 423.)
Urgent Motion for Bail only thereafter, on September 2, 1987. 105
In the second place, appellants failed to prove the requisites for 17 Decision, pp. 33-34; rollo, pp. 87-88.
voluntary surrender, which are: (1) the offender has not been
actually arrested; (2) the offender surrenders himself to a person 18 The case was deemed submitted for resolution on December 2,
in authority or to the latter's agent; and (3) the surrender is 1996, when the Court received a copy of the Brief for Appellee.
voluntary. 106 The records reveal that a warrant of arrest was The filling of a reply brief was deemed waived, as none was filed
actually served on Tumbagahan and Cajilo 107 on September 2, within the reglementary period.
1987 and that they were in fact detained. 108
19 Decision, pp. 3-4; rollo, pp. 57-58.
In view of the absence of any other aggravating or mitigating
circumstance, the trial court correctly imposed reclusion 20 Records of Exhibit, p. 2.
perpetua.
21 Records of Exhibit, p. 4.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED and the assailed
Decision is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: (1) the 22 Rollo, pp. 318 et seq.
award of P6,000 as actual damages is DELETED, and (2) the award
for loss of earning capacity is INCREASED to P928,000. Costs 23 Brief for Appellant Cawaling, pp. 2-5; rollo, pp. 319-322.
against appellant.
24 Decision, p. 21; rollo, p. 75. 44 Ibid., Rule 4, par. a-2.

25 "Brief for all the Appellants," pp. 16-17; rollo, pp. 179-180. 45 Ibid., Rule 4, par. b-3-b.

26 Filed by their counsel, Joselito R. Enriquez; rollo, pp. 252-279. 46 Ibid., Rule 4, par. c-1.

27 Brief for Appellants Ernesto Tumbagahan and Hilario Cajilo, pp. 47 Exhibits 6, 7, 7-A, 8 and 8-A.
15-44; rollo, pp. 252-279.
48 Exhibit 6-A.
28 Brief for Appellant Ulysses Cawaling, signed by Atty. Daniel C.
Gutierrez, p. 10; rollo, p. 327. 49 The last form with a later date is merely a pretrial advice.

29 People vs. Velasco, 252 SCRA 135, 147, January 23, 1996. See 50 Brief for the Appellee, pp. 23-24; rollo, p. [456].
also Aruego, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 254 SCRA 711, 719-720,
March 13, 1996. 51 People vs. Cogonon, 262 SCRA 693, 704, October 4, 1996.

30 By PDs 1629,1860, and 1861, BP 129, and EOs 101 and 184. 52 People vs. Reyes, GR No. 91262, January 28, 1998.
Although inapplicable to this case because it was approved only
on February 5, 1997, RA 8249 limits the jurisdiction of the 53 TSN, March 16, 1988, pp. 7-14.
Sandiganbayan to public officers occupying positions
corresponding to salary grade 27 or higher and to police officers 54 TSN, January 17, 1989, pp. 3-59 and January 18, 1989, pp. 2-23.
occupying the position of provincial director and those holding
the rank of senior superintendent or higher. 55 TSN, August 28, 1989, pp. 26-41 and February 27, 1990, pp. 2-
47.
31 The original §4 of PD 1606 was amended by PDs 1860 and
1861. 56 See People vs. Monterey, 261 SCRA 357, 372, September 3,
1996 and People vs. Bongadillo, 234 SCRA 233, 243, July 20, 1994.
32 Re: "Amending Section One of Presidential Decree No. 1850,
entitled, "Providing for the Trial by Courts-Martial of Members of 57 People vs. Pano, 257 SCRA 274, 283, June 5, 1996 and People
the Integrated National Police and Further Defining the vs. Prado, 254 SCRA 531, 538, March 8, 1996.
Jurisdiction of Courts-Martial Over Members of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines."" 58 People vs. Ramos, 260 SCRA 402, 410, August 7, 1996.

33 BP 129. Corollary to § 33 thereof, the RTC shall have 59 People vs. Juan, 254 SCRA 478, 487, March 7, 1996 and People
jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment vs. Fabrigas, 261 SCRA 436, 446-447, September 5, 1996.
exceeding four years and two months or a fine of more than
P4,000 or both such fine and imprisonment. 60 Brief for Appellant Cawaling, p. 22; rollo, p. 338.

34 Natividad vs. Felix, 229 SCRA 680, 686-687, February 4, 1994. 61 PD 856 (Re: Code on Sanitation) states:

35 227 SCRA 627, 645, November 9, 1993, per Cruz, J., citing Sec. 95. Autopsy and Dissection of Remains — The autopsy and
Montilla vs. Hilario (90 Phil 49). dissection of remains are subject to the following requirements:

36 En Banc Resolution, GR No. 98452, September 26, 1991. xxx xxx xxx

37 Lim vs. Court of Appeals, 251 SCRA 408, 418, December 19, b. Autopsies shall be performed in the following cases:
1995.
1. Whenever required by special laws;
38 People vs. Magallanes, 249 SCRA 212, 222-223, October 11,
1995. 2. Upon orders of a competent court, a mayor and a provincial or
city fiscal;
39 Brief for Appellants Tumbagahan and Cajilo, pp. 43-44; rollo,
pp. 278-279. 3. Upon written request of police authorities;

40 Guerrevo vs. Court of Appeals, 257 SCRA 703, 712-713, June 4. Whenever the Solicitor General, provincial or city fiscal as
28, 1996 and People vs. Leviste, 255 SCRA 238, 249, March 28, authorized by existing laws, shall deem it necessary to disinter
1996. and take possession of remains for examination to determine the
cause of death; and
41 "Governing the Creation, Composition, Jurisdiction, Procedure,
and Other Matters Relevant to Military Tribunals." 5. Whenever the nearest kin shall request in writing the
authorities concerned to ascertain the cause of death.
42 "Governing the Creation, Composition, Jurisdiction, Procedure,
and Other [Matters Relevant to Military] Tribunals." 62 Brief for Appellant Cawaling, p. 15; rollo, p. 331.

43 Ibid., Rule 4, par. a-1. 63 TSN, June 14, 1993, p. 52.

64 Ibid, p. 23. 80 People vs. Baniel, GR No. 108492, July 15, 1997; People vs.
Viernes, 262 SCRA 641, 651, October 3, 1996; People vs.
65 TSN, August 28, 1989, pp. 1-26. Ganzagan, Jr., 247 SCRA 220, 233, August 11, 1995.

66 Ibid., pp. 26-41. 81 People vs. Pinto, Jr., 204 SCRA 9, 27, November 21, 1991.

67 TSN, March 27, 1990, pp. 2-29. 82 227 SCRA 278, 285, October 18, 1993, per Cruz, J.

68 227 SCRA 668, 679-680, November 10, 1993, per Nocon, J. See 83 People vs. Dinglasan, 267 SCRA 26, 43, January 28, 1997 and
also People vs. Cadocio, 228 SCRA 602, 609-610, December 17, People vs. Obzunar, 265 SCRA 547, 569, December 16, 1996.
1993.
84 People vs. Pareja, 265 SCRA 429, 440, December 9, 1996.
69 Paragraph 2, § 14, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
85 People vs. Castillo, 273 SCRA 22, 32-33, June 2, 1997.
70 See § 1, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.
86 People vs. Sancholes, 271 SCRA 527, 541, April 18, 1997.
71 Ibid., § 4, Rule 110.
87 People vs. Sequiño, 264 SCRA 79, 101-102, November 13, 1996
72 Suarez vs. Platon, 69 Phil 556, 564-565, February 7, 1940, per and People vs. Jubila, Jr., 252 SCRA 471, 480, January 29, 1996.
Laurel, J.
88 People vs. Salison, Jr., 253 SCRA 758, 770, February 20, 1996.
73 United States vs. Casipong and Hongoy, 20 Phil. 178, 181-182,
September 5, 1911, Torres, J. 89 Decision, pp. 17-18; rollo, pp. 71-72.

74 Art. 11 of the Revised Penal Code states: 90 Brief for Appellants Tumbagahan and Cajilo, p. 34; rollo, p. 269.

Art. 11. Justifying circumstances. — The following do not incur any 91 222 SCRA 745, 762, May 28, 1993. See also People vs.
criminal liability: Maongco, 230 SCRA 562, 572, March 1, 1994; People vs. Ramilla,
227 SCRA 583, 587, November 8, 1993; and People vs. Libag, 184
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided SCRA 707, 719, April 27, 1990.
that the following circumstances concur:
92 Brief for Appellants Tumbagahan and Cajilo, pp. 42; rollo, p.
First. Unlawful aggression. 277.

Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent 93 People vs. Cogonon, 262 SCRA 693, 704-705, October 4, 1996.
or repel it.
94 258 SCRA 1, 28 July 3, 1996, per Davide, J. See also People vs.
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person Babor, 262 SCRA 359, 366, September 24, 1996.
defending himself.
95 People vs. Broncano, 260 SCRA 724, 738, August 22, 1996;
xxx xxx xxx People vs. Torrefiel, 256 SCRA 369, 379, April 18, 1996; and
People vs. Patrolla, Jr., 254 SCRA 467, 476, March 7, 1996.
5. Any person who acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful
exercise of a right or office." 96 People vs. Magsomhol, 252 SCRA 187, 200-201, January 24,
1996 and People vs. Compendio, Jr., 258 SCRA 254, 264, July 5,
75 People vs. Balamban, 264 SCRA 619, 631, November 21, 1996; 1996.
People vs. De Gracia, 264 SCRA 200, 207, November 14, 1996;
and, People vs. Deopante, 263 SCRA 691, 706, October 30, 1996. 97 Decision, p. 30; rollo, p. 84.

76 People vs. Babor, 262 SCRA 359, 365, September 24, 1996, See 98 People vs. Trilles, 254 SCRA 633, 643, March 12, 1996 and
also People vs. Capoquian, 236 SCRA 655, September 22, 1994. People vs. Dones, 254 SCRA 696, 710, March 13, 1996.

77 See § 1, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court. 99 People vs. Sol, 272 SCRA 392, 407, May 7, 1997.

78 People vs. Vallador, 257 SCRA 515, 524, June 20, 1996. See also 100 People vs. Villamor, GR No. 111313-14, January 16, 1998.
People vs. Tampon, 258 SCRA 115, 124, July 5, 1996; People vs. People vs. Marollano, GR No. 105004, July 24, 1997.
Nuestro, 240 SCRA 221, 227, January 18, 1995;
101 TSN, August 29, 1989, p. 14-15.
79 People vs. Balamban, 264 SCRA 619, 630, November 21, 1996;
People vs. Patotoy, 261 SCRA 37, 42-43, August 26, 1996; People 102 § 6 of RA 7659, which took effect only on December 31, 1993,
vs. Morin, 241 SCRA 709, 714, February 24, 1995; People vs. amended § 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
Adonis, 240 SCRA 773, 776, January 31, 1995; People vs. Daquipil,
240 SCRA 314, 329, January 20, 1995. 103 Brief for Appellants Tumbagahan and Cajilo, p. 43; rollo, p.
278.

104 Records, Vol. I, p. 44.

G.R. No. 146195 November 18, 2004 The following day, Anita Punzalan sent Avelina a letter4 informing
her that the lease is being terminated and demanding that
AVELINA ZAMORA, EMERITA ZAMORA-NICOL, SONNY NICOL, petitioners vacate the premises within 30 days from notice.
TERESA ZAMORA-UMALI, CLARENCE UMALI, ROBERTO ZAMORA,
ROLANDO ZAMORA, MARY ANN ZAMORA, MICHELLE ZAMORA Despite several barangay conciliation sessions, the parties failed
and RODRIGO ZAMORA, petitioners, to settle their dispute amicably. Hence, the Barangay Chairman
vs. issued a Certification to File Action dated September 14, 1997.5
HEIRS of CARMEN IZQUIERDO, represented by their attorney-in-
fact, ANITA F. PUNZALAN, respondents. Consequently, on October 2, 1997, respondents, represented by
Anita Punzalan, filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC),
Branch 49, Caloocan City, a complaint for unlawful detainer and
DECISION damages against petitioners, docketed as Civil Case No. 23702.6
Forthwith, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss7 the complaint on
the ground that the controversy was not referred to the barangay
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.: for conciliation. First, they alleged that the barangay Certification
to File Action "is fatally defective" because it pertains to another
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the dispute, i.e., the refusal by respondents' attorney-in-fact to give
Decision2 of the Court of Appeals dated September 12, 2000 and her written consent to petitioners' request for installation of
its Resolution dated December 1, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 54541, water facilities in the premises. And, second, when the parties
entitled "Avelina Zamora, et al., petitioners, versus Heirs of failed to reach an amicable settlement before the Lupong
Carmen Izquierdo, represented by the executrix, Anita F. Tagapamayapa, the Punong Barangay (as Lupon Chairman), did
Punzalan, respondents." not constitute the Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo before whom
mediation or arbitration proceedings should have been
The records show that sometime in 1973, Carmen Izquierdo and conducted, in violation of Section 410(b), Chapter 7 (Katarungang
Pablo Zamora entered into a verbal stipulation whereby the Pambarangay), Title One, Book III of Republic Act No. 71608
former leased to the latter one of her apartment units located at (otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991), which
117-B General Luna Street, Caloocan City. They agreed on the reads:
following: the rental is P3,000.00 per month; the leased premises
is only for residence; and only a single family is allowed to occupy "SECTION 410. Procedure for Amicable Settlement.–
it.
(a) x x x
After the death of Carmen (lessor) in 1996 her attorney-in-fact,
Anita Punzalan, representing the heirs, herein respondents, (b) Mediation by lupon chairman – Upon receipt of the complaint,
prepared a new contract of lease wherein the rental was the lupon chairman9 shall, within the next working day, summon
increased from P3,000.00 to P3,600.00 per month.3 However, the respondent(s), with notice to the complainant(s) for them and
petitioners refused to sign it. their witnesses to appear before him for a mediation of their
conflicting interests. If he fails in his mediation effort within
In January 1997, Pablo (lessee) died. His wife, Avelina Zamora, and fifteen (15) days from the first meeting of the parties before him,
their children (two of whom have their own families), herein he shall forthwith set a date for the constitution of the pangkat in
petitioners, continued to reside in the apartment unit. However, accordance with the provisions of this Chapter." (Underscoring
they refused to pay the increased rental and persisted in supplied)
operating a photocopying business in the same apartment.
Respondents opposed the motion to dismiss,10 the same being
Meanwhile, petitioner Avelina Zamora applied with the prohibited under Section 19 of the 1991 Revised Rule on
Metropolitan Waterworks & Sewerage System (MWSS) for a Summary Procedure. They prayed that judgment be rendered as
water line installation in the premises. Since a written consent may be warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint, pursuant
from the owner is required for such installation, she requested to Section 611 of the same Rule.
respondents' attorney-in-fact to issue it. However, the latter
declined because petitioners refused to pay the new rental rate On July 9, 1998, the MTC issued an Order12 denying petitioners'
and violated the restrictions on the use of the premises by using a motion to dismiss and considering the case submitted for decision
portion thereof for photocopying business and allowing three in view of their failure to file their answer to the complaint.
families to reside therein.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration,13 contending that
This prompted petitioner Avelina Zamora to file with the Office of a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of failure to
the Punong Barangay of Barangay 16, Sona 2, District I, Lungsod refer the complaint to the Lupon for conciliation is allowed under
ng Caloocan, a complaint against Anita Punzalan (respondents' Section 19 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure,
attorney-in-fact), docketed as "Usaping Bgy. Blg. 1-27-97, Ukol sa: which partly provides:
Hindi Pagbibigay ng Pahintulot sa Pagpapakabit ng Tubig."
"SEC. 19. Prohibited pleadings and motions. – The following
On August 24, 1997, during the barangay conciliation proceedings, pleadings, motions, or petitions shall not be allowed in the cases
petitioner Avelina Zamora declared that she refused to sign the covered by this Rule:
new lease contract because she is not agreeable with the
conditions specified therein. (a) Motion to dismiss the complaint or to quash the complaint or
information except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter, or failure to comply with the preceding section
[referring to Section 18 on referral of the complaint to the Lupon In the case at bar, the Punong Barangay, as Chairman of the
for conciliation]; Lupong Tagapamayapa, conducted conciliation proceedings to
resolve the dispute between the parties herein. Contrary to
x x x." petitioners' contention, the complaint does not only allege, as a
cause of action, the refusal of respondents' attorney-in-fact to
On August 26, 1998, the MTC rendered a Judgment14 in favor of give her consent to the installation of water facilities in the
respondents and against petitioners, the dispositive portion of premises, but also petitioners' violation of the terms of the lease,
which reads: specifically their use of a portion therein for their photocopying
business and their failure to pay the increased rental. As correctly
"WHEREFORE, Judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the found by the RTC:
plaintiff and against the defendants, ordering defendants and all
persons claiming right under them: "The records show that confrontations before the barangay
chairman were held on January 26, 1997, February 9, 1997,
1) To vacate the leased premises located at No. 117-B General February 23, 1997, February 28, 1997, July 27, 1997, August 3,
Luna Street, Caloocan City and to surrender possession thereof to 1997, August 10, 1997, August 17, 1997 and August 24, 1997
the plaintiff; wherein not only the issue of water installation was discussed but
also the terms of the lease and the proposed execution of a
2) To pay the amount of three thousand six hundred (P3,600.00) written contract relative thereto. It appears, however, that no
pesos per month starting January, 1997 until the premises being settlement was reached despite a total of nine meetings at the
occupied by them is finally vacated and possession thereof is barangay level.
restored to the plaintiff;
It is of no moment that the complaint was initially made by
3) To pay plaintiff the sum of five thousand (P5,000.00) pesos as defendant-appellant Avelina Zamora because herein plaintiff-
and for attorney's fees; and appellee was given by the Sangguniang Barangay the authority to
bring her grievance to the Court for resolution. While it is true
4) To pay the costs of this suit. that the Sertifikasyon dated September 14, 1997 is entitled 'Ukol
Sa Hindi Pagbibigay Ng Pahintulot Sa Pagpapakabit Ng Tubig', this
SO ORDERED." title must not prevail over the actual issues discussed in the
proceedings.
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 125, Caloocan
City, rendered its Decision15 dated February 15, 1999 affirming Hence, to require another confrontation at the barangay level as a
the MTC Judgment. Subsequently, it denied petitioners' motion sine qua non for the filing of the instant case would not serve any
for reconsideration.16 useful purpose anymore since no new issues would be raised
therein and the parties have proven so many times in the past
Petitioners then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for that they cannot get to settle their differences amicably."20
review, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 54541. On September 12,
2000, it rendered a Decision17 affirming the RTC Decision. We cannot sustain petitioners' contention that the Lupon
conciliation alone, without the proceeding before the Pangkat ng
Thereafter, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but was Tagapagkasundo, contravenes the law on Katarungang
denied by the Appellate Court in its Resolution dated December 1, Pambarangay. Section 412(a) of R.A. No. 7160, quoted earlier,
2000.18 clearly provides that, as a precondition to filing a complaint in
court, the parties shall go through the conciliation process either
Hence, the instant petition. before the Lupon Chairman (as what happened in the present
case), or the Pangkat.
I
Moreover, in Diu vs. Court of Appeals,21 we held that
The primordial objective of Presidential Decree No. 1508 (the "notwithstanding the mandate in Section 410(b) of R.A. No. 7160
Katarungang Pambarangay Law), now included under R.A. No. that the Barangay Chairman shall constitute a Pangkat if he fails in
7160 (the Local Government Code of 1991), is to reduce the his mediation efforts," the same "Section 410(b) should be
number of court litigations and prevent the deterioration of the construed together with Section 412(a) of the same law (quoted
quality of justice which has been brought about by the earlier), as well as the circumstances obtaining in and peculiar to
indiscriminate filing of cases in the courts.19 To attain this the case." Here, while the Pangkat was not constituted, however,
objective, Section 412(a) of R.A. No. 7160 requires the parties to the parties met nine (9) times at the Office of the Barangay
undergo a conciliation process before the Lupon Chairman or the Chairman for conciliation wherein not only the issue of water
Pangkat as a precondition to filing a complaint in court, thus: installation was discussed but also petitioners' violation of the
lease contract. It is thus manifest that there was substantial
"SECTION 412. Conciliation. – (a) Pre-condition to Filing of compliance with the law which does not require strict adherence
Complaint in Court.– No complaint, petition, action, or proceeding thereto.22
involving any matter within the authority of the lupon shall be
filed or instituted directly in court or any other government office II
for adjudication, unless there has been a confrontation between
the parties before the lupon chairman or the pangkat, and that no We hold that petitioners' motion to dismiss the complaint for
conciliation or settlement has been reached as certified by the unlawful detainer is proscribed by Section 19(a) of the 1991
lupon or pangkat secretary and attested to by the lupon or Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, quoted earlier. Section
pangkat chairman x x x." (Underscoring supplied) 19(a) permits the filing of such pleading only when the ground for
dismissal of the complaint is anchored on lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter, or failure by the complainant to refer the from service of summons], the court, motu proprio, or on motion
subject matter of his/her complaint "to the Lupon for conciliation" of the plaintiff, shall render judgment as may be warranted by the
prior to its filing with the court. This is clear from the provisions of facts alleged in the complaint and limited to what is prayed for
Section 18 of the same Rule, which reads: therein: Provided, however, That the court may in its discretion
reduce the amount of damages and attorney's fees claimed for
"SEC. 18. Referral to Lupon. – Cases requiring referral to the being excessive or otherwise unconscionable. This is without
Lupon for conciliation under the provisions of Presidential Decree prejudice to the applicability of Section 4, Rule 18 of the Rules of
No. 1508 where there is no showing of compliance with such Court, if there are two or more defendants."
requirement, shall be dismissed without prejudice, and may be
revived only after such requirement shall have been complied 12 Annex "C", Petition, Rollo at 53-54.
with. This provision shall not apply to criminal cases where the
accused was arrested without a warrant." (Underscoring supplied) 13 Annex "D", id. at 55-57.

As discussed earlier, the case was referred to the Lupon Chairman 14 Annex "E", id. at 58-61.
for conciliation. Obviously, petitioners' motion to dismiss, even if
allowed, is bereft of merit. 15 Annex "H", id. at 79-83.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and 16 Annex "I", id. at 84.
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 54541
sustaining the Decision of the RTC which upheld the MTC 17 Annex "J", id. at 85-93.
Judgment is AFFIRMED.
18 Annex "L", id. at 98.
Costs against petitioners.
19 Galuba vs. Laureta, No. L-71091, January 29, 1988, 157 SCRA
SO ORDERED. 627, 634.

Panganiban, (Chairman), Carpio-Morales, and Garcia, JJ., concur. 20 RTC Decision, Rollo at 81-82.

Corona, J., on leave. 21 G.R. No. 115213, December 19, 1995, 251 SCRA 472.

22 Id.
Footnotes

1 Filed under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as

amended.

2 Penned by Associate Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria and concurred

in by Justice Bernardo P. Abesamis and Justice Alicia L. Santos
(both retired).

3 Annexes "A" and "C", Petition, Rollo at 38, 53.

4 Rollo at 43.

5 Id. at 42. The barangay certification was signed by Barangay

Secretary Flordeliza Fernandez, Punong Barangay Jose R. Galgana
and Lupong Tagapamayapa Efren Simangan.

6 Annex "A", Petition, Rollo at 36-41.

7 Annex "B", id. at 44-47.

8 This law took effect on January 1, 1992. The law on barangay

conciliation was originally governed by Presidential Decree No.
1508 (enacted on June 11, 1978) which was repealed by
codification in the Local Government Code of 1991.

9 Under Section 399 (a) of R.A. 7160, the Punong Barangay is

designated as the Lupon Chairman.

10 Annex "B-1", Petition, Rollo at 48-52.

11 Section 6 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure provides:

"SEC. 6. Effect of failure to answer. – Should the defendant fail to

answer the complaint within the period above provided [10 days
1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure (Section 1, par. A) 4. Contract of Sale; or
REVISED RULES ON SUMMARY PROCEDURE 5. Contract of Mortgage;
RESOLUTION OF THE COURT EN BANC DATED OCTOBER 15, 1991 (b) For damages arising from any of the following:
PROVIDING FOR THE REVISED RULE ON SUMMARY PROCEDURE 1. Fault or negligence;
FOR METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS IN 2. Quasi-contract; or
CITIES, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL 3. Contract;
COURTS. (c) The enforcement of a barangay amicable settlement or an
arbitration
award involving a money claim covered by this Rule pursuant to
Pursuant to Section 36 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 Sec. 417
(B.P Blg. 129) and to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive
determination of the cases referred to herein, the Court Resolved Presidential Decree 1606, as amended (Section 4)
to promulgate the following Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Section 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction
over:
I.
Applicability (a) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise,
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and Republic
Section 1. Scope. — This rule shall govern the summary Act No. 1379;
procedure in the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial
Courts in Cities, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal (b) Crimes committed by public officers and employees including
Circuit Trial Courts in the following cases falling within their those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations,
jurisdiction:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary embraced in Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, whether simple
or complexed with other crimes; and

A. Civil Cases:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary (c) Other crimes or offenses committed by public officers or

employees, including those employed in government-owned or
controlled corporations, in relation to their office.
(1) All cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer, irrespective
of the amount of damages or unpaid rentals sought to be The jurisdiction herein conferred shall be original and exclusive if
recovered. Where attorney's fees are awarded, the same shall not the offense charged is punishable by a penalty higher than prision
exceed twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00). correccional, or its equivalent, except as herein provided; in other
(2) All other civil cases, except probate proceedings, where the offenses, it shall be concurrent with the regular courts.
total amount of the plaintiff's claim does not exceed ten thousand
pesos (P10,000.00), exclusive of interest and costs. In case private individuals are charged as co-principals,
accomplices or accessories with the public officers or employees
RULE OF PROCEDURE FOR SMALL CLAIMS CASES including those employed in government-owned or controlled
AS AMENDED1 corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers
and employees.
SEC. 2. Scope.—This Rule shall govern the procedure in actions
before the Where an accused is tried for any of the above offenses and the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, evidence is insufficient to establish the offense charged, he may
Municipal Trial Courts and nevertheless be convicted and sentenced for the offense proved,
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts for payment of money where the included in that which is charged.
value of the claim does
not exceed One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) exclusive Any provision of law or the Rules of Court to the contrary
of interest and costs. notwithstanding, the criminal action and the corresponding civil
action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense
SEC. 4. Applicability.—The Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal charged shall at all times be simultaneously instituted with, and
Trial Courts in jointly determined in the same proceeding by, the Sandiganbayan,
Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts the filing of the criminal action being deemed to necessarily carry
shall apply this Rule in with it the filing of the civil action, and no right to reserve the
all actions which are: (a) purely civil in nature where the claim or filing of such action shall be recognized; Provided, however, that,
relief prayed for by the in cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan,
plaintiff is solely for payment or reimbursement of sum of money, where the civil action had therefore been filed separately with a
and (b) the civil aspect regular court but judgment therein has not yet been rendered and
of criminal actions, either filed before the institution of the the criminal case is hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan, said
criminal action, or reserved civil action shall be transferred to the Sandiganbayan for
upon the filing of the criminal action in court, pursuant to Rule consolidation and joint determination with the criminal action,
111 of the Revised Rules otherwise, the criminal action may no longer be filed with the
Of Criminal Procedure. Sandiganbayan, its exclusive jurisdiction over the same
These claims or demands may be: notwithstanding, but may be filed and prosecuted only in the
(a) For money owed under any of the following: regular courts of competent jurisdiction; Provided, further, that,
1. Contract of Lease; in cases within the concurrent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
2. Contract of Loan; and the regular courts, where either the criminal or civil action is
3. Contract of Services; first filed with the regular courts, the corresponding civil or
criminal action, as the case may be, shall only be filed with the
regular courts of competent jurisdiction. (e) The list of appointed members shall be posted in three (3)
conspicuous places in the barangay for the entire duration of their
Excepted from the foregoing provisions, during martial law, are term of office; and
criminal cases against officers and members of the armed forces
in the active service. (f) In barangays where majority of the inhabitants are members of
indigenous cultural communities, local systems of settling
Presidential Decree 1083 disputes through their councils of datus or elders shall be
recognized without prejudice to the applicable provisions of this
A DECREE TO ORDAIN AND PROMULGATE A CODE RECOGNIZING Code.
THE SYSTEM OF FILIPINO MUSLIM LAWS, CODIFYING MUSLIM
PERSONAL LAWS, AND PROVIDING FOR ITS ADMINISTRATION SECTION 400. Oath and Term of Office. – Upon appointment, each
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES lupon member shall take an oath of office before the punong
barangay. He shall hold office until a new lupon is constituted on
ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 14-93. the third year following his appointment unless sooner
ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 14-93 terminated by resignation, transfer of residence or place of work,
or withdrawal of appointment by the punong barangay with the
TO: ALL REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS, METROPOLITAN TRIAL concurrence of the majority of all the members of the lupon.
COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT
TRIAL COURTS SECTION 401. Vacancies. – Should a vacancy occur in the lupon for
SUBJECT: GUIDELINES ON THE KATARUNGANG PAMBARANGAY any cause, the punong barangay shall immediately appoint a
CONCILIATION PROCEDURE TO PREVENT CIRCUMVENTION OF qualified person who shall hold office only for the unexpired
THE REVISED KATARUNGANG PAMBARANGAY LAW [SECTIONS portion of the term.
399-422, CHAPTER VII, TITLE I, BOOK III, R. A. 7160, OTHERWISE
KNOWN AS THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991]. SECTION 402. Functions of the Lupon. – The lupon shall:

The Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law under R. A. 7160, (a) Exercise administrative supervision over the conciliation panels
otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, provided herein;
effective on January 1, 1992 and which repealed P. D. 1508,
introduced substantial changes not only in the authority granted (b) Meet regularly once a month to provide a forum for exchange
to the Lupong Tagapamayapa but also in the procedure to be of ideas among its members and the public on matters relevant to
observed in the settlement of disputes within the authority of the the amicable settlement of disputes, and to enable various
Lupon. conciliation panel members to share with one another their
observations and experiences in effecting speedy resolution of
Reublic Act No. 7160 (Section 399 to 422, Book III, Title I, Chapter disputes; and
7)
(c) Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and
CHAPTER VII functions as may be prescribed by law or ordinance.

Katarungang Pambarangay SECTION 403. Secretary of the Lupon. – The barangay secretary
shall concurrently serve as the secretary of the lupon. He shall
SECTION 399. Lupong Tagapamayapa. – (a) There is hereby record the results of mediation proceedings before the punong
created in each barangay a lupong tagapamayapa, hereinafter barangay and shall submit a report thereon to the proper city or
referred to as the lupon, composed of the punong barangay, as municipal courts. He shall also receive and keep the records of
chairman and ten (10) to twenty (20) members. The lupon shall be proceedings submitted to him by the various conciliation panels.
constituted every three (3) years in the manner provided herein.
SECTION 404. Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo. – (a) There shall be
(b) Any person actually residing or working in the barangay, not constituted for each dispute brought before the lupon a
otherwise expressly disqualified by law, and possessing integrity, conciliation panel to be known as the pangkat ng
impartiality, independence of mind, sense of fairness, and tagapagkasundo, hereinafter referred to as the pangkat,
reputation for probity, may be appointed a member of the lupon. consisting of three (3) members who shall be chosen by the
parties to the dispute from the list of members of the lupon.
(c) A notice to constitute the lupon, which shall include the names
of proposed members who have expressed their willingness to Should the parties fail to agree on the pangkat membership, the
serve, shall be prepared by the punong barangay within the first same shall be determined by lots drawn by the lupon chairman.
fifteen (15) days from the start of his term of office. Such notice
shall be posted in three (3) conspicuous places in the barangay (b) The three (3) members constituting the pangkat shall elect
continuously for a period of not less than three (3) weeks; from among themselves the chairman and the secretary. The
secretary shall prepare the minutes of the pangkat proceedings
(d) The punong barangay, taking into consideration any and submit a copy duly attested to by the chairman to the lupon
opposition to the proposed appointment or any secretary and to the proper city or municipal court. He shall issue
recommendations for appointment as may have been made and cause to be served notices to the parties concerned.
within the period of posting, shall within ten (10) days thereafter,
appoint as members those whom he determines to be suitable The lupon secretary shall issue certified true copies of any public
therefor. Appointments shall be in writing, signed by the punong record in his custody that is not by law otherwise declared
barangay, and attested to by the barangay secretary. confidential.
SECTION 405. Vacancies in the Pangkat. – Any vacancy in the SECTION 409. Venue. – (a) Disputes between persons actually
pangkat shall be chosen by the parties to the dispute from among residing in the same barangay shall be brought for amicable
the other lupon members. Should the parties fail to agree on a settlement before the lupon of said barangay.
common choice, the vacancy shall be filled by lot to be drawn by
the lupon chairman. (b) Those involving actual residents of different barangays within
the same city or municipality shall be brought in the barangay
SECTION 406. Character of Office and Service of Lupon Members. where the respondent or any of the respondents actually resides,
– (a) The lupon members, while in the performance of their at the election of the complainant.
official duties or on the occasion thereof, shall be deemed as
persons in authority, as defined in the Revised Penal Code. (c) All disputes involving real property or any interest therein shall
be brought in the barangay where the real property or the larger
(b) The lupon or pangkat members shall serve without portion thereof is situated.
compensation, except as provided for in Section 393 and without
prejudice to incentives as provided for in this section and in Book (d) Those arising at the workplace where the contending parties
IV of this Code. The Department of the Interior and Local are employed or at the institution where such parties are enrolled
Government shall provide for a system of granting economic or for study, shall be brought in the barangay where such workplace
other incentives to the lupon or pangkat members who or institution is located.
adequately demonstrate the ability to judiciously and
expeditiously resolve cases referred to them. While in the Objections to venue shall be raised in the mediation proceedings
performance of their duties, the lupon or pangkat members, before the punong barangay; otherwise, the same shall be
whether in public or private employment, shall be deemed to be deemed waived. Any legal question which may confront the
on official time, and shall not suffer from any diminution in punong barangay in resolving objections to venue herein referred
compensation or allowance from said employment by reason to may be submitted to the Secretary of Justice or his duly
thereof. designated representative, whose ruling thereon shall be binding.

SECTION 407. Legal Advice on Matters Involving Questions of Law. SECTION 410. Procedure for Amicable Settlement. – (a) Who may
– The provincial, city legal officer or prosecutor or the municipal initiate proceeding – Upon payment of the appropriate filing fee,
legal officer shall render legal advice on matters involving any individual who has a cause of action against another
questions of law to the punong barangay or any lupon or pangkat individual involving any matter within the authority of the lupon
member whenever necessary in the exercise of his functions in may complain, orally or in writing, to the lupon chairman of the
the administration of the katarungang pambarangay. barangay.

SECTION 408. Subject Matter for Amicable Settlement; Exception (b) Mediation by lupon chairman – Upon receipt of the complaint,
Thereto. – The lupon of each barangay shall have authority to the lupon chairman shall, within the next working day, summon
bring together the parties actually residing in the same city or the respondent(s), with notice to the complainant(s) for them and
municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes except: their witnesses to appear before him for a mediation of their
conflicting interests. If he fails in his mediation effort within
(a) Where one party is the government, or any subdivision or fifteen (15) days from the first meeting of the parties before him,
instrumentality thereof; he shall forthwith set a date for the constitution of the pangkat in
accordance with the provisions of this Chapter.
(b) Where one party is a public officer or employee, and the
dispute relates to the performance of his official functions; (c) Suspension of prescriptive period of offenses – While the
dispute is under mediation, conciliation, or arbitration, the
(c) Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding one (1) year prescriptive periods for offenses and cause of action under
or a fine exceeding Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00); existing laws shall be interrupted upon filing of the complaint with
the punong barangay. The prescriptive periods shall resume upon
(d) Offenses where there is no private offended party; receipt by the complainant of the complaint or the certificate of
repudiation or of the certification to file action issued by the
(e) Where the dispute involves real properties located in different lupon or pangkat secretary: Provided, however, That such
cities or municipalities unless the parties thereto agree to submit interruption shall not exceed sixty (60) days from the filing of the
their differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate lupon; complaint with the punong barangay.

(f) Disputes involving parties who actually reside in barangays of (d) Issuance of summons; hearing; grounds for disqualification –
different cities or municipalities, except where such barangay The pangkat shall convene not later than three (3) days from its
units adjoin each other and the parties thereto agree to submit constitution, on the day and hour set by the lupon chairman, to
their differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate lupon; hear both parties and their witnesses, simplify issues, and explore
all possibilities for amicable settlement. For this purpose, the
(g) Such other classes of disputes which the President may pangkat may issue summons for the personal appearance of
determine in the interest of justice or upon the recommendation parties and witnesses before it. In the event that a party moves to
of the Secretary of Justice. disqualify any member of the pangkat by reason of relationship,
bias, interest, or any other similar grounds discovered after the
The court in which non-criminal cases not falling within the constitution of the pangkat, the matter shall be resolved by the
authority of the lupon under this Code are filed may, at any time affirmative vote of the majority of the pangkat whose decision
before trial, motu proprio refer the case to the lupon concerned shall be final. Should disqualification be decided upon, the
for amicable settlement. resulting vacancy shall be filled as herein provided for.
e) Period to arrive at a settlement – The pangkat shall arrive at a SECTION 415. Appearance of Parties in Person. – In all
settlement or resolution of the dispute within fifteen (15) days katarungang pambarangay proceedings, the parties must appear
from the day it convenes in accordance with this section. This in person without the assistance of counsel or representative,
period shall, at the discretion of the pangkat, be extendible for except for minors and incompetents who may be assisted by their
another period which shall not exceed fifteen (15) days, except in next-of-kin who are not lawyers.
clearly meritorious cases.
SECTION 416. Effect of Amicable Settlement and Arbitration
SECTION 411. Form of Settlement. – All amicable settlements shall Award. – The amicable settlement and arbitration award shall
be in writing, in a language or dialect known to the parties, signed have the force and effect of a final judgment of a court upon the
by them, and attested to by the lupon chairman or the pangkat expiration of ten (10) days from the date thereof, unless
chairman, as the case may be. When the parties to the dispute do repudiation of the settlement has been made or a petition to
not use the same language or dialect, the settlement shall be nullify the award has been filed before the proper city or
written in the language known to them. municipal court.

SECTION 412. Conciliation. – (a) Pre-condition to Filing of However, this provision shall not apply to court cases settled by
Complaint in Court. – No complaint, petition, action, or the lupon under the last paragraph of Section 408 of this Code, in
proceeding involving any matter within the authority of the lupon which case the compromise settlement agreed upon by the
shall be filed or instituted directly in court or any other parties before the lupon chairman or the pangkat chairman shall
government office for adjudication, unless there has been a be submitted to the court and upon approval thereof, have the
confrontation between the parties before the lupon chairman or force and effect of a judgment of said court.
the pangkat, and that no conciliation or settlement has been
reached as certified by the lupon secretary or pangkat secretary SECTION 417. Execution. – The amicable settlement or arbitration
as attested to by the lupon or pangkat chairman or unless the award may be enforced by execution by the lupon within six (6)
settlement has been repudiated by the parties thereto. months from the date of the settlement. After the lapse of such
time, the settlement may be enforced by action in the
(b) Where Parties May Go Directly to Court. – The parties may go appropriate city or municipal court.
directly to court in the following instances:
SECTION 418. Repudiation. – Any party to the dispute may, within
(1) Where the accused is under detention; ten (10) days from the date of the settlement, repudiate the same
by filing with the lupon chairman a statement to that effect sworn
(2) Where a person has otherwise been deprived of personal to before him, where the consent is vitiated by fraud, violence, or
liberty calling for habeas corpus proceedings; intimidation. Such repudiation shall be sufficient basis for the
issuance of the certification for filing a complaint as hereinabove
(3) Where actions are coupled with provisional remedies such as provided.
preliminary injunction, attachment, delivery of personal property
and support pendente lite; and SECTION 419. Transmittal of Settlement and Arbitration Award to
the Court. – The secretary of the lupon shall transmit the
(4) Where the action may otherwise be barred by the statute of settlement or the arbitration award to the appropriate city or
limitations. municipal court within five (5) days from the date of the award or
from the lapse of the ten-day period repudiating the settlement
(c) Conciliation Among Members of Indigenous Cultural and shall furnish copies thereof to each of the parties to the
Communities. – The customs and traditions of indigenous cultural settlement and the lupon chairman.
communities shall be applied in settling disputes between
members of the cultural communities. SECTION 420. Power to Administer Oaths. – The punong
barangay, as chairman of the lupong tagapamayapa, and the
SECTION 413. Arbitration. – (a) The parties may, at any stage of members of the pangkat are hereby authorized to administer
the proceedings, agree in writing that they shall abide by the oaths in connection with any matter relating to all proceedings in
arbitration award of the lupon chairman or the pangkat. Such the implementation of the katarungang pambarangay.
agreement to arbitrate may be repudiated within five (5) days
from the date thereof for the same grounds and in accordance SECTION 421. Administration; Rules and Regulations. – The city or
with the procedure hereinafter prescribed. The arbitration award municipal mayor, as the case may be, shall see to the efficient and
shall be made after the lapse of the period for repudiation and effective implementation and administration of the katarungang
within ten (10) days thereafter. pambarangay. The Secretary of Justice shall promulgate the rules
and regulations necessary to implement this Chapter.
(b) The arbitration award shall be in writing in a language or
dialect known to the parties. When the parties to the dispute do SECTION 422. Appropriations. – Such amount as may be necessary
not use the same language or dialect, the award shall be written for the effective implementation of the katarungang
in the language or dialect known to them. pambarangay shall be provided for in the annual budget of the
city or municipality concerned.
SECTION 414. Proceedings Open to the Public; Exception. – All
proceedings for settlement shall be public and informal: Provided,
however, That the lupon chairman or the pangkat chairman, as
the case may be, may motu proprio or upon request of a party,
exclude the public from the proceedings in the interest of privacy,
decency, or public morals.
Articles 19, 21, 26-28 and 1157 of the New Civil Code

CHAPTER 2
HUMAN RELATIONS (n)

Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due,
and observe honesty and good faith.
Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in
a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy
shall compensate the latter for the damage.

Art. 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy
and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons. The
following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a
criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages,
prevention and other relief:

(1) Prying into the privacy of another's residence:

(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations

of another;

(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends;

(4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his religious

beliefs, lowly station in life, place of birth, physical defect, or
other personal condition.

Art. 27. Any person suffering material or moral loss because a

public servant or employee refuses or neglects, without just
cause, to perform his official duty may file an action for damages
and other relief against he latter, without prejudice to any
disciplinary administrative action that may be taken.
Art. 28. Unfair competition in agricultural, commercial or
industrial enterprises or in labor through the use of force,
intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust, oppressive
or highhanded method shall give rise to a right of action by the
person who thereby suffers damage.

Art. 1157. Obligations arise from:

(1) Law;

(2) Contracts;

(3) Quasi-contracts;

(4) Acts or omissions punished by law; and

(5) Quasi-delicts. (1089a)