People vs Intod

FACTS

In the morning of February 4, 1979, Sulpicio Intod, Jorge Pangasian, Santos Tubio and Avelino
Daligdig went to Salvador Mandaya’s house in Katugasan, Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental and
asked him to go with them to the house of Bernardina Palangpangan. Thereafter, Mandaya and
Intod, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig had a meeting with Aniceto Dumalagan. He told Mandaya
that he wanted Palangpangan to be killed because of a land dispute between them and that
Mandaya should accompany the four (4) men, otherwise, he would also be killed.

At about 10:00 o’clock in the evening of the game day, Petitioner, Mandaya, Pangasian, Tubio
and Daligdig, all armed with firearms, arrived at Palangpangan’s house in Katugasan, Lopez
Jaena, Misamis Occidental. At the instance of his companions, Mandaya pointed the location of
Palangpangan’s bedroom. Thereafter, Petitioner, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig fired at said
room. It turned out, however, that Palangpangan was in another City and her home was then
occupied by her son-in-law and his family. No one was in the room when the accused fired the
shots. No one was hit by the gun fire.

Petitioner and his companions were positively identified by witnesses. One witness testified that
before the five men left the premises, they shouted: "We will kill you (the witness) and
especially Bernardina Palangpangan and we will come back if you were not injured."

After trial, the Regional Trial Court convicted Intod of attempted murder. The Court of Appeals
affirmed in toto the trial court’s decision. Hence this petition.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law
library
RULING

This petition questions the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), as affirmed by the Court
of Appeals, holding that Petitioner was guilty of attempted murder. Petitioner seeks from this
Court a modification of the judgment by holding him liable only for an impossible crime, citing
Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code which provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Petitioner contends that, Palangpangan’s absence from her room on the night he and his
companions riddled it with bullets made the crime inherently impossible.

On the other hand, Respondent argues that the crime was not impossible. Instead, the facts were
sufficient to constitute an attempt and to convict Intod for attempted murder. Respondent alleged
that there was intent. Further, in its Comment to the Petition, respondent pointed out
that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

. . . The crime of murder was not consummated, not because of the inherent impossibility of its
accomplishment (Art. 4(2), Revised Penal Code), but due to a cause or accident other than
petitioner’s and his co-accused’s own spontaneous desistance (Art. 3., ibid.) Palangpangan did
not sleep at her house at that time. Had it not been for this fact, the crime is possible, not
impossible. 3
Article 4, paragraph 2 is an innovation 4 of the Revised Penal Code. This seeks to remedy the
void in the Old Penal Code where:
. . . it was necessary that the execution of the act has been commenced, that the person
conceiving the idea should have set about doing the deed, employing appropriate means in order
that his intent might become a reality, and finally, that the result or end contemplated shall have
been physically possible. So long as these conditions were not present, the law and the courts did
not hold him criminally liable.
This legal doctrine left social interests entirely unprotected. The Revised Penal Code, recognizes
in the offender his formidability, and now penalizes an act which was it not aimed at something
quite impossible or carried out with means which prove inadequate, would constitute a felony
against person or against property. The rationale of Article 4(2) is to punish such criminal
tendencies.

Under this article, the act performed by the offender cannot produce an offense against persons
or property because: (1) the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of
accomplishment; or (2) the means employed is either (a) inadequate or (b) ineffectual.

That the offense cannot be produced because the commission of the offense is inherently
impossible of accomplishment is the focus of this petition. To be impossible under this clause,
the act intended by the offender must be by its nature one impossible of accomplishment. There
must be either (1) legal impossibility, or (2) physical impossibility of accomplishing the intended
act 12 in order to qualify the act as an impossible crime.

Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to a
crime.Legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where (1) the motive, desire and
expectation is to perform an act in violation of the law; (2) there is intention to perform the
physical act, (3) there is a performance of the intended physical act; and (4) the consequence
resulting from the intended act does not amount to a crime.

On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the
actor or beyond his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime. One example is the
man who puts his hand in the coat pocket of another with the intention to steal the latter’s wallet
and finds the pocket empty.

The case at bar belongs to this category. Petitioner shoots the place where he thought his victim
would be, although in reality, the victim was not present in said place and thus, the petitioner
failed to accomplish his end.
Factual impossibility of the commission of the crime is not a defense. If the crime could have
been committed had the circumstances been as the defendant believed them to be, it is no
defense that in reality the crime was impossible of commission.

In our jurisdiction, impossible crimes are recognized. The impossibility of accomplishing the
criminal intent is not merely a defense, but an act penalized by itself. Furthermore, the phrase
"inherent impossibility" that is found in Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code makes no
distinction between factual or physical impossibility and legal impossibility. Ubi lex non
distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. Where the law does not distinguish, we ought not to
distinguish.

The factual situation in the case at bar presents physical impossibility which rendered the
intended crime impossible of accomplishment. And under Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Revised
Penal Code, such is sufficient to make the act an impossible crime.

To uphold the contention of respondent that the offense was Attempted Murder because the
absence of Palangpangan was a supervening cause independent of the actor’s will, will render
useless the provision in Article 4, which makes a person criminally liable for an act "which
would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its
accomplishment . . ." In that case, all circumstances which prevented the consummation of the
offense will be treated as an accident independent of the actor’s will which is an element of
attempted and frustrated felonies.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is hereby GRANTED, the decision of

SO ORDERED.

Feliciano, Regalado and Nocon, Jr., JJ., concur.