G.R. No.

167571 November 25, 2008

LUIS PANAGUITON, JR., petitioner

Ponente: Tinga, J.

FACTS:

Rodrigo Cawili (Cawili) borrowed various sums of money amounting to P1,979,459.00 from Panaguiton
and in turn together with his associate Tongson, jointly issued in favor of petitioner three (3) checks
(bearing both of their signatures) in payment of the said loans. Upon presentment for payment on 18
March 1993, the checks were dishonored, either for insufficiency of funds or by the closure of the account.
Petitioner made formal demands to pay the amounts of the checks upon Cawili on 23 May 1995 and upon
Tongson on 26 June 1995, but to no avail. Panaguiton then filed a complaint for violation of BP 22 against
Tongson and Cawili, however during the preliminary investigation, the prosecutor found probable cause
only against Cawili. Panaguiton appealed the said decision to the DOJ which directed the case for re-
investigation.

However, Assistant City Prosecutor Sampaga (ACP Sampaga) dismissed the complaint against Tongson. In
her resolution, ACP Sampaga held that the case had already prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326, as
amended, which provides that violations penalized by B.P. Blg. 22 shall prescribe after four (4) years.

In this case, the four (4)-year period started on the date the checks were dishonored, or on 20 January
1993 and 18 March 1993. The filing of the complaint before the Quezon City Prosecutor on 24 August
1995 did not interrupt the running of the prescriptive period, as the law contemplates judicial, and not
administrative proceedings. Thus, considering that from 1993 to 1998, more than four (4) years had
already elapsed and no information had as yet been filed against Tongson, the alleged violation of B.P.
Blg. 22 imputed to him had already prescribed. Moreover, ACP Sampaga stated that the order of the Chief
State Prosecutor to refer the matter to the NBI could no longer be sanctioned under Section 3, Rule 112
of the Rules of Criminal Procedure because the initiative should come from petitioner himself and not the
investigating prosecutor. Finally, ACP Sampaga found that Tongson had no dealings with petitioner.

Petitioner appealed to the DOJ. But the DOJ, through Undersecretary Manuel A.J. Teehankee, dismissed
the same, stating that the offense had already prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the DOJ resolution. This time through then Undersecretary
Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez, ruled in his favor and declared that the offense had not prescribed and that
the filing of the complaint with the prosecutor's office interrupted the running of the prescriptive period
citing Ingco v. Sandiganbayan.
However, the DOJ, presumably acting on a motion for reconsideration filed by Tongson, ruled that the
subject offense had already prescribed and ordered "the withdrawal of the three (3) informations for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22" against Tongson.

In justifying its sudden turnabout, the DOJ explained that Act No. 3326 applies to violations of special acts
that do not provide for a prescriptive period for the offenses thereunder. Since B.P. Blg. 22, as a special
act, does not provide for the prescription of the offense it defines and punishes, Act No. 3326 applies to
it, and not Art. 90 of the Revised Penal Code which governs the prescription of offenses penalized
thereunder.23 The DOJ also cited the case of Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr. wherein the Supreme Court ruled that
the proceedings referred to in Act No. 3326, as amended, are judicial proceedings, and not the one before
the prosecutor's office.

Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals assailing the 9 August 2004
resolution of the DOJ. The petition was dismissed by the Court of Appeals in view of petitioner's failure to
attach a proper verification and certification of non-forum shopping. Hence the case.

Issue: W/N the case has already prescribed under Act No. 3326. (No)

Ruling: The petition is meritorious.

Ratio:

Petitioner assails the DOJ's reliance on Zaldivia v. Reyes, a case involving the violation of a municipal
ordinance, in declaring that the prescriptive period is tolled only upon filing of the information in court.
According to petitioner, what is applicable in this case is Ingco v. Sandiganbayan, wherein this Court ruled
that the filing of the complaint with the fiscal's office for preliminary investigation suspends the running
of the prescriptive period. Petitioner also notes that the Ingco case similarly involved the violation of a
special law, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
petitioner notes.37 He argues that sustaining the DOJ's and the Court of Appeals' pronouncements would
result in grave injustice to him since the delays in the present case were clearly beyond his control.38

There is no question that Act No. 3326, appropriately entitled An Act to Establish Prescription for
Violations of Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin, is the
law applicable to offenses under special laws which do not provide their own prescriptive periods. The
pertinent provisions read:

Section 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such
acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules: (a) x x x; (b) after four years for
 those punished by imprisonment for more than one month, but less than two years; (c)
xxx

Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of
the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the
institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.

The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty
person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not
constituting jeopardy.

We agree that Act. No. 3326 applies to offenses under B.P. Blg. 22. An offense under B.P. Blg. 22 merits
the penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but not more than one year or by a fine,
hence, under Act No. 3326, a violation of B.P. Blg. 22 prescribes in four (4) years from the commission of
the offense or, if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof. Nevertheless, we cannot
uphold the position that only the filing of a case in court can toll the running of the prescriptive period.

It must be pointed out that when Act No. 3326 was passed on 4 December 1926, preliminary investigation
of criminal offenses was conducted by justices of the peace, thus, the phraseology in the law, "institution
of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment," and the prevailing rule at the time was that
once a complaint is filed with the justice of the peace for preliminary investigation, the prescription of the
offense is halted.

The historical perspective on the application of Act No. 3326 is illuminating. Act No. 3226 was approved
on 4 December 1926 at a time when the function of conducting the preliminary investigation of criminal
offenses was vested in the justices of the peace. Thus, the prevailing rule at the time, as shown in the
cases of U.S. v. Lazada and People v. Joson, is that the prescription of the offense is tolled once a complaint
is filed with the justice of the peace for preliminary investigation inasmuch as the filing of the complaint
signifies the institution of the criminal proceedings against the accused. These cases were followed by our
declaration in People v. Parao and Parao that the first step taken in the investigation or examination of
offenses partakes the nature of a judicial proceeding which suspends the prescription of the offense.
Subsequently, in People v. Olarte, we held that the filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court, even
if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation, should, and does, interrupt the
period of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or
information is filed cannot try the case on the merits. In addition, even if the court where the complaint
or information is filed may only proceed to investigate the case, its actuations already represent the initial
step of the proceedings against the offender, and hence, the prescriptive period should be interrupted.

In Ingco v. Sandiganbayan and Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim, which involved violations of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019) and the Intellectual Property Code (R.A. No. 8293), which are
both special laws, the Court ruled that the prescriptive period is interrupted by the institution of
proceedings for preliminary investigation against the accused. In the more recent case of Securities and
Exchange Commission v. Interport Resources Corporation, et al., the Court ruled that the nature and
purpose of the investigation conducted by the Securities and Exchange Commission on violations of the
Revised Securities Act, another special law, is equivalent to the preliminary investigation conducted by
the DOJ in criminal cases, and thus effectively interrupts the prescriptive period.

The following disquisition in the Interport Resources case is instructive, thus:

While it may be observed that the term "judicial proceedings" in Sec. 2 of Act No. 3326 appears before
"investigation and punishment" in the old law, with the subsequent change in set-up whereby the
investigation of the charge for purposes of prosecution has become the exclusive function of the executive
branch, the term "proceedings" should now be understood either executive or judicial in character:
executive when it involves the investigation phase and judicial when it refers to the trial and judgment
stage. With this clarification, any kind of investigative proceeding instituted against the guilty person
which may ultimately lead to his prosecution should be sufficient to toll prescription.

Indeed, to rule otherwise would deprive the injured party the right to obtain vindication on account of
delays that are not under his control. A clear example would be this case, wherein petitioner filed his
complaint-affidavit on 24 August 1995, well within the four (4)-year prescriptive period. He likewise timely
filed his appeals and his motions for reconsideration on the dismissal of the charges against Tongson. He
went through the proper channels, within the prescribed periods. However, from the time petitioner filed
his complaint-affidavit with the Office of the City Prosecutor (24 August 1995) up to the time the DOJ
issued the assailed resolution, an aggregate period of nine (9) years had elapsed. Clearly, the delay was
beyond petitioner's control. After all, he had already initiated the active prosecution of the case as early
as 24 August 1995, only to suffer setbacks because of the DOJ's flip-flopping resolutions and its
misapplication of Act No. 3326. Aggrieved parties, especially those who do not sleep on their rights and
actively pursue their causes, should not be allowed to suffer unnecessarily further simply because of
circumstances beyond their control, like the accused's delaying tactics or the delay and inefficiency of the
investigating agencies.

We rule and so hold that the offense has not yet prescribed. Petitioner 's filing of his complaint-affidavit
before the Office of the City Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 signified the commencement of the
proceedings for the prosecution of the accused and thus effectively interrupted the prescriptive period
for the offenses they had been charged under B.P. Blg. 22. Moreover, since there is a definite finding of
probable cause, with the debunking of the claim of prescription there is no longer any impediment to the
filing of the information against petitioner.