FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 194412, November 16, 2016

SAMSODEN PANGCATAN, Petitioner, v. ALEXANDRO "DODONG" MAGHUYOP AND

BELINDO BANKIAO, Respondents.

G.R. No. 194566, November 16, 2016

ALEXANDRO "DODONG" MAGHUYOP AND BELINDO

BANKIAO, Petitioners, v. SAMSODEN PANGCATAN, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

The issue is whether or not the Court of Appeals (CA) justifiably annulled and set aside
the judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RT) in favor of the plaintiff on the ground that
the RTC had not received evidence showing said party's being an indigent litigant
exempt from the payment of filing fees.

The Cases

G.R. No. 1944121 is the appeal brought by Samsoden Pangcatan, the plaintiff in Civil
Case No. 1888-02 entitled Samsoden Pangcatan v. Alexandra "Dodong" Maghuyop,
Belinda Bankiao, Engr. Arnulfo Garcia and Eldefonso Densing, to reverse and set aside
the decision promulgated on December 18, 2009,2 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA),
in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 01251-MIN, annulled and set aside the decision3 rendered on
February 9, 2007 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 8, in Marawi City on the
ground that the RTC had improperly allowed the filing of the suit on the basis of his
being an indigent litigant despite not having received evidence of his indigency
pursuant to the guidelines and standards set and defined by Section 21, Rule 3 and
Section 19, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court. The nullification of the decision of the RTC
notwithstanding, the CA remanded the case, and required the RTC to hear and resolve
the plaintiff's Ex Parte Motion for Leave to File Case as Pauper Litigant in accordance
with said guidelines and standards.

G.R. No. 1945664 is the appeal brought by the defendants in Civil Case No. 1888-02 to
reverse the remand of the case to the RTC pursuant to the same decision of December
18, 2009 promulgated in CA-G.R. CV No. 01251-MIN on the ground of such remand
being a deviation from the rulings of the Court to the effect that the courts would
acquire jurisdiction over cases only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fees.

Antecedents

Pangcatan commenced Civil Case No. 1888-02 in the RTC to recover various damages
he had suffered in April 2002 from the vehicular accident caused by the negligence of
the defendants. Defendants Alexandro "Dodong" Maghuyop and Belindo Bankiao, the
petitioners in G.R. No. 194568, were respectively the owner and driver of the
passenger van that Pangcatan had hired to transport himself and the goods he had
purchased in Pagadian City to his store in Margosatubig, Zamboanga del Sur. Based on
the police report on the vehicular accident,5 Bankiao had stopped his vehicle in the
middle of the right lane of the highway in order to call for more passengers when the
dump truck of defendant Engr. Arnulfo Garcia then driven by defendant Eldefonso
Densing suddenly bumped the rear of the van, causing Pangcatan to lose
consciousness. After Pangcatan regained consciousness in the hospital, he discovered
that his right leg had been fractured, and that he had lost all the goods he had bought
in Pagadian City.6

Pangcatan's complaint alleged that his estimated daily income before the accident was
P400.00/day; that because of his injury, he could never sell again or engage in any
other business; and that his medical bills and the costs of his surgical operation would
easily run up to P500,000.00.7 When he filed his complaint in September 2002,
Pangcatan also filed his Ex Parte Motion for Leave to File Case as Pauper Litigant, which
the RTC granted through its order of September 4, 2002 under the condition that the
filing fees would constitute a first lien on any favorable monetary judgment that he
would recover from the suit.

Instead of filing their answer, Maghuyop and Bankiao moved to dismiss the complaint
based on several grounds, namely: (1) that the venue was improperly laid; (2) that the
complaint stated no cause of action against them; (3) that the claim or demand had
been paid or otherwise extinguished; (4) that the plaintiff was estopped from filing the
case; (5) that the plaintiff did not comply with a condition precedent; and (6) that the
plaintiff, a well known businessman and resident of Margosatubig, Zamboanga del Sur,
was not an indigent litigant.8

On January 27, 2003, the RTC denied the motion to dismiss because the movants did
not substantiate the grounds of the motion on the day of the hearing thereof.9

Maghuyop and Bakiao did not file their answer subsequently, and were declared in
default as a consequence. Pangcatan then presented ex parte his evidence against
them. Later on, they submitted their Comment and Opposition to Plaintiff's Formal
Offer of Evidence with Motion to Strike Out All Pleadings filed by the Plaintiff,10 whereby
they maintained that Pangcatan was not an indigent litigant based on his offer of
documentary evidence and his pleadings, and that, as such, he was not entitled to the
services and representation of any lawyer from the Public Attorney's Office; that the
RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the case by virtue of the non-payment of the
required docket fees; and that the complaint should be expunged from the records.

The RTC denied the Motion to Strike Out All Pleadings filed by the Plaintiff  through the
order of August 22, 2006.11

It is noted that the RTC dismissed the complaint against Engr. Garcia and Densing
because they had entered into a compromise with Pangcatan.12

Judgment of the RTC

On February 9, 2007, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of Pangcatan and against
Maghuyop and Bankiao,13 disposing thusly:
Defendants Alexandro Maghuyop and Belindo Bankiao are ordered to pay the plaintiff
(Pangcatan) jointly and severally the following amounts:

1) P50,000.00 as medical expenses incurred from April to August 2002;

2) P34,465.00 for the cost of the lost goods;

3) the unrealized profit of P400.00 a day counting from April 5, 2002 up to the present;

4) P10,000.00 as transportation expenses incurred;

5) P200,000.00 as moral damages;

6) P100,000.00 as exemplary damages; and

7) To pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.

Decision of the CA

Maghuyop and Bankiao appealed, contending that the RTC erred in acquiring
jurisdiction over the claim of Pangcatan; and that the RTC further erred in rendering
judgment in favor of Pangcatan and against them.

As stated, on December 18, 2009, the CA promulgated the now assailed decision,14viz.:

ACCORDINGLY, the appealed decision in Civil Case No. 1888-02 before the Marawi City
RTC, Branch 8, is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the RTC  a
quo which is ordered to hear the plaintiff-appellee's Ex-Parte Motion for Leave to File
Case as Pauper Litigant, applying Rule 3, Section 21 of the Rules of Court to determine
whether plaintiff-appellee can qualify as an indigent litigant; and, after which to decide
the case on the merits with dispatch.

SO ORDERED.

Hence, the appeals now under consideration.

Issues

Pangcatan submits that the CA erred because he was exempt from the payment of
docket fees by virtue of his being a client of the Public Attorney's Office (PAO), the
exemption being pursuant to Republic Act No. 9406 and OCA Circular No. 121-
2007,15 under which the clients of the PAO were exempt from the payment of docket
and other fees incidental to the filing of actions in court, whether as original or
appellate proceedings. He argues that OCA Circular No. 121-2007 revoked OCA Circular
No. 67-2007;16 that his having passed the indigency test of the PAO entitled him to the
exemption; that although Republic Act No. 9406 was not yet enacted at the time of the
filing of his complaint in the RTC, the manner of a PAO client establishing his indigency
was procedural in nature, and, therefore, Republic Act No. 9406 retroactively applied to
him; and that the order of the CA remanding his case to the RTC for determination of
his indigency was not only contrary to law but also impractical.

On their part, Maghuyop and Bankiao mainly contend that Pangcatan was not a indigent
litigant because his estimated daily earnings had amounted to P400.00; that he had
been considered as a pauper litigant by the PAO without complying with the
requirements of Section 19, Rule 141 of the  Rules of Court, like the submission of the
affidavit stating: (1) that his gross income and that of his immediate family did not
exceed an amount double the monthly minimum wage of an employee; and (2) that he
did not own real property with a fair market value of more than P300,000.00, as stated
in the appended current tax declaration; that such affidavit of the indigent client was
required to be corroborated by the affidavit of a disinterested person attesting to the
truth of the former, but such corroborating affidavit he also did not submit; and that
the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the case because Pangcatan did not pay
docket fees.

Did the CA err in setting aside the judgment of the RTC, and in remanding the case to
the RTC for the determination of whether or not Pangcatan was exempt from the
payment of filing and docket fees as an indigent litigant?

Ruling of the Court

The petition for review in G.R. No. 194412 is granted, but the petition for review in G.R.
No. 194566 is denied.

The rule in this jurisdiction is that when an action is filed in court, the complaint must
be accompanied by the payment of the requisite docket and filing fees.17 Section 1, Rule
14118 of the Rules of Court expressly requires that upon the filing of the pleading or
other application that initiates an action or proceeding, the prescribed fees for such
action or proceeding shall be paid in full. If the complaint is filed but the prescribed fees
are not paid at the time of filing, the courts acquire jurisdiction only upon the full
payment of such fees within a reasonable time as the courts may grant, barring
prescription.19

Nonetheless, Section 11, Article III of the Constitution has guaranteed free access to
the courts, to wit:

Section 11. Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal
assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty.

This guarantee of free access to the courts is extended to litigants who may be indigent
by exempting them from the obligation to pay docket and filing fees. But not everyone
who claims to be indigent may demand free access to the courts. In Re: Query of Mr.
Roger C. Prioreschi Re Exemption from Legal and Filing Fees of the Good Shepherd
Foundation, Inc.,20 the Court has declared that the exemption may be extended only to
natural party litigants;21 the exemption may not be extended to juridical persons even if
they worked for indigent and underprivileged people because the Constitution has
explicitly premised the free access clause on a person's poverty, a condition that only a
natural person can suffer.22 To prevent the abuse of the exemption, therefore, the Court
has incorporated Section 21, Rule 3 and Section 19, Rule 141 in the Rules of Court in
order to set the guidelines implementing as well as regulating the exercise of the right
of free access to the courts. The procedure governing an application for authority to
litigate as an indigent party as provided under Section 21, Rule 3 and Section 19, Rule
141 of the Rules of Court have been synthesized in Algura v. The Local Government
Unit of the City of Naga.23

Algura  stipulates that when the application to litigate as an indigent litigant is filed, the
trial court shall scrutinize the affidavits and supporting documents submitted by the
applicant to determine if he complies with the income and property standards
prescribed in the present Section 19 of Rule 141—that his gross income and that of his
immediate family do not exceed an amount double the monthly minimum wage of an
employee; and that he does not own real property with a fair market value of more
than P300,000.00; that if the trial court finds that he meets the income and property
requirements, the authority to litigate as indigent litigant is automatically granted, and
the grant is a matter of right; that, however, if the trial court finds that one or both
requirements have not been met, it should then set a hearing to enable the applicant to
prove that he has "no money or property sufficient and available for food, shelter and
basic necessities for himself and his family;" that in that hearing, the adverse party
may adduce countervailing evidence to disprove the evidence presented by the
applicant; that, afterwards, the trial court will rule on the application depending on the
evidence adduced; that, in addition, Section 21 of Rule 3 provides that the adverse
party may later still contest the grant of such authority at any time before judgment is
rendered by the trial court, possibly based on newly discovered evidence not obtained
at the time the application was heard; that, if the trial court determines after hearing
that the party declared as an indigent is in fact a person with sufficient income or
property, the proper docket and other lawful fees shall be assessed and collected by the
clerk of court; and that if payment is not made within the time fixed by the trial court,
execution shall issue or the payment of the prescribed fees shall be made, without
prejudice to other sanctions that the trial court may impose.

The RTC allowed Pangcatan to litigate as an indigent party at the start of the case by
approving his  Ex Parte Motion for Leave to File Case as Pauper Litigant. The RTC
dismissed the objections interposed by Maghuyop and Bankiao in their motion to
dismiss, which included his not being an indigent litigant, because they did not
substantiate the grounds of their motion on the day of the hearing of the motion.24 On
appeal to the CA, Maghuyop and Bankiao reiterated their objection based on
Pangcatan's not being an indigent litigant, and submitted that the CA did not
consequently acquire jurisdiction over his claim against them.

As earlier mentioned, the CA promulgated its now assailed decision annulling and
setting aside the judgment of the RTC based on the non-payment of the filing fees
although it remanded the case for the purpose of receiving evidence from Pangcatan
upon which the RTC could determine if he was exempt therefrom as an indigent litigant,
or not. It opined as follows:

In the instant case, defendants-appellants maintain that plaintiff-appellee's ex

parte motion to litigate as an indigent is defective since it was not accompanied or
supported by the required affidavits executed by the latter attesting that he and his
immediate family do not earn the gross income of PhP3,000.00, and that they do not
own any real property with an assessed value of more than PhP300,000.00, and by a
disinterested person attesting to the truth of his affidavit.

The argument is well taken. Section 19 clearly states that the litigant shall execute the
required affidavits in order to support by sufficient evidence his indigent status. It
appears from the record that plaintiff-appellee was exempted from payment of legal
fees on account of his alleged poverty. Yet there is scant evidence of that. Samsoden
failed to meet the evidentiary requirements for prosecuting a motion to litigate as an
indigent party. What he has presented before the court a quo was only a Certification
from the Office of the Provincial Assessor's Office that he has no land holdings or real
properties. Quite clearly, the court a quo has erroneously allowed the suit in forma
pauperis without following the requirement of the Rules. But just because the court
below has so erred does not mean We should at once castigate plaintiff-appellee by
outrightly dismissing his complaint outright (sic) for non-payment of the docket fees.

Examining the pertinent rules, We note that while Rule 141, Section 19 lays down
specific standards, Rule 3, Section 21 does not clearly draw the parameters for
exemption from payment of fees in case of an indigent party. Knowing that litigants
may abuse the grant of authority, the trial court must use sound discretion and
scrutinize evidence strictly in granting exemptions in order to determine whether the
applicant has hurdled the precise standards under Rule 141. The trial court must also
guard against abuse and misuse of the privilege to litigate as an indigent litigant to
prevent the filing of exorbitant claims which would otherwise be regulated by a legal fee
requirement.

Thus, a remand of the case is warranted for the trial court to determine whether
plaintiff-appellee can be considered as an indigent litigant using the standards set in
Rule 3, Section 21. Plaintiff-appellee must produce affidavits and supporting documents
showing that he satisfies the twin requirements on gross monthly income and
ownership of real property under Rule 141. Otherwise, the trial court should call a
hearing as required by Rule 3, Section 21 to enable plaintiff-appellee to adduce
evidence to show that he does not have property and money sufficient and available for
food, shelter, and basic necessities for him and his family. In that hearing, the
defendants-appellants would have the right to also present evidence to refute the
allegations and evidence in support of the application of plaintiff-appellee to litigate as
an indigent litigant.

To recapitulate the rules on indigent litigants, if the applicant for exemption meets the
salary and property requirements under Section 19 of Rule 141, then the grant of his
application is mandatory. On the other hand, when the application does not satisfy one
or both requirements, then the application should not be denied outright; instead, the
court should apply the indigency test under Section 21 of Rule 3 and use its sound
discretion in determining the merits of the prayer for exemption.

The Constitution holds sacrosanct the access to justice by the impoverished. Without
doubt, the unhampered access to the justice system by the poor, the underprivileged,
and the marginalized is one of the most precious rights which must be shielded and
secured.
With the above discussion, the Court finds it unnecessary to delve on the second issue
raised.

ACCORDINGLY, the appealed decision in Civil Case No. 1888-02 before the Marawi City
RTC, Branch 8, is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the RTC  a
quo which is ordered to hear the plaintiff-appellee's Ex-Parte Motion for Leave to File
Case as Pauper Litigant, applying Rule 3, Section 21 of the Rules of Court to determine
whether plaintiff-appellee can qualify as an indigent litigant; and, after which, to decide
the case on the merits with dispatch.

SO ORDERED.25

Under the circumstances, the CA grossly erred in annulling and setting aside the
judgment of the RTC based solely on the non-payment of the filing fees. If the RTC had
incorrectly granted Pangcatan's Ex Parte Motion for Leave to File Case as Pauper
Litigant, the grant was not jurisdictional but an error of judgment on its part as the trial
court. It can hardly be disputed that the RTC apparently believed based on its
erroneous application of the aforementioned guidelines set by the Rules of Court that
Pangcatan was entitled to be exempted from the payment of the filing fees because his
daily income was P400.00.

It is true that the non-payment of the filing fees usually prevents the trial court from
acquiring jurisdiction over the claim stated in the complaint But for the CA to annul the
judgment rendered after trial based solely on such non-payment was not right and just
considering that the non-payment of the filing fees had not been entirely attributable to
the plaintiff alone. The trial court was more, if not exclusively, to blame for the
omission. For sure, all that Pangcatan had done was to apply for the exemption, leaving
to the RTC the decision whether or not to grant his application. Moreover, the CA
disregarded the fact that the RTC, through its order of September 4, 2002,26 had
granted his Ex Parte Motion for Leave to File Case as Pauper Litigant and had allowed
him to litigate as an indigent party subject to the condition that the legal fees would
constitute a first lien on the monetary judgment to be rendered after trial.

At any rate, Pangcatan was represented from the start by the Public Attorney's Office
(PAO). The exemption of the clients of the PAO like him from the payment of the legal
fees was expressly declared by law for the first time in Republic Act No.
9406,27 particularly its amendment of Section 16-D of the  Administrative Code of 1987,
as follows:

Section 16-D. Exemption from Fees and Costs of the Suit.- The clients of the PAO
shall be exempt from payment of docket and other fees incidental to
instituting an action in court and other quasi-judicial bodies, as an original
proceeding or on appeal. The costs of the suit, attorney's fees and contingent fees
imposed upon the adversary of the PAO clients after a successful litigation shall be
deposited in the National Treasury as trust fund and shall be disbursed for special
allowances of authorized officials and lawyers of the PAO.

Such exemption by virtue of Republic Act No. 9406 was recognized by the Court
Administrator through OCA Circular No. 67-2007,28 but the clients of the PAO remained
required to submit relevant documentation to comply with the conditions prescribed by
Section 19, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court. Later on, the Court Administrator removed
the conditions prescribed under OCA Circular No. 67-2007 by issuing Circular No. 121-
2007.29 Since then until the present, all clients of the PAO have been exempt from the
payment of docket and other fees incidental to instituting an action in court whether as
an original proceeding or on appeal.

It is notable that the Court has pointed out in its ruling in  Re: Petition for Recognition
of the Exemption of the Government Service Insurance System from Payment of Legal
Fees30 that its acknowledgment of the exemption Bowed to the clients of the PAO
pursuant to Section 16D of the Administrative Code of 1987, as amended by Republic
Act No. 9406, was not an abdication of its rule-making power but simply its recognition
of the limits of that power; and that, in particular, such acknowledgment reflected a
keen awareness that, in the exercise of its rule-making power, it may not dilute or
defeat the right of access to justice of indigent litigants.

The exemption of clients of the PAO from the payment of the legal fees under Republic
Act No. 9406 and OCA Circular No. 121-2007 was not yet a matter of law at the time
Pangcatan initiated Civil Case No. 1888-02 on September 4, 2002. Yet, we cannot avoid
applying the exemption in his favor for purposes of this case. The remand to the RTC
for the purpose of determining the factual basis for the exemption would be
superfluous. To start with, the exemption, being a matter of procedure, can be
retrospectively applied to his case. It is fundamental wisdom, indeed, that procedural
laws do not come within the legal conception of a retroactive law, or the general rule
against the retroactive operation of statutes, and, as such, they may be given
retroactive effect on actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage.
Doing so will not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely
affected, inasmuch as there are no vested rights in rules of procedure.31 And, secondly,
if the ultimate objective to be served by all courts is the administration of justice, the
remand of the case after the trial by the RTC would be unreasonable and burdensome
on all the parties as well as on the trial court.

Instead, the judgment of the RTC in favor of Pangcatan and against Maghuyop and
Bankiao should be allowed to stand. This appeal to the Court by the latter, which also
delves into the merits of the judgment against them, should fail as to them for lack of
any arguable error committed by the trial court. The records contain no evidence
adduced by them considering that they had waived their evidence on any legitimate
defenses they might have raised due to their being declared in default for non-filing of
their answer.32 It would be futile to still defer the judgment rendered upon Pangcatan's
evidence in order to still hear them thereafter. A party in default - of which both of
them were - could lift the default only by filing a motion to set aside the default before
judgment is rendered.33 Their right to appeal the judgment by default notwithstanding,
their chances of reversing the adverse judgment are nil, for in the first place they had
no answer whereby they would have controverted the allegations of fact against them,
and, necessarily, they had no evidence with which to defeat the claim against them.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment rendered in favor of Pangcatan.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari  in G.R. No.

194412, but DENIES the petition for review on certiorari  in GR. No.
194566; REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR.
CV No. 01251-MIN, and, accordingly, REINSTATES the decision rendered on February
9, 2007 by the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 1888-02, ordering the respondents
in GR. No. 194412, namely: Alexandra Maghuyop and Belindo Bakiao, liable jointly and
severally to pay petitioner Samsoden Pangcatan as follows: (1) P50,000.00 as medical
expenses; (2) P34,465.00 for the cost of the lost goods; (3) P10,000.00 as
transportation expenses; (4) P60,000.00 as temperate damages; (5) P50,000.00 moral
damages; (6) P20,000.00 as exemplary damages; (7) Interest at the legal rate of
6%  per annum on each of the foregoing amounts stated in items (1) to (6), inclusive,
from the finality of this decision until fully paid; and (8) Costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C.J., Leonardo-De Castro, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.

Caguioa,* J., on leave.

Endnotes:

*
 On leave.

1
Rollo (G.R. No. 194412), pp. 10-29.

2
 Id. at 68-76; and rollo (G.R. No. 194566), pp. 11-19; penned by Associate Justice
Edgardo A. Camello and concurred in by Associate Justice Edgardo T. Lloren and
Associate Justice Leoncia R. Dimagiba.

3
Rollo (G.R. No. 194412), pp. 41-47; penned by Judge Santos B. Adiong.

4
Rollo (G.R. No. 194566), pp. 4-8.

5
 RTC rollo, pp. 41-42.

6
Rollo (G.R. No. 194412), p. 69.

7
 Id.

8
 Id. at 70.

9
 Id.

10
 Id. at 71.

11
 Id. at 143.

12
 Id. at 70.

13
 Id.at 41-47

14
 Id. at 68-76; also, rollo (G.R. No. 194566), pp. 11-19.
15
Exemption of the Indigent Clients of the Public Attorney's Office (PAO) from the
Payment of Docket and Other Fees.

16
Exemption of the Indigent Clients of the Public Attorney's Office (PAO) from the
Payment of Docket and Other Fees.

17
  Ballatan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125683, March 2, 1999, 304 SCRA 34,
42; Tacay v. Regional Trial Court of Tagum, Davao del Norte, G.R. Nos. 88075-77,
December 20, 1989, 180 SCRA 433, 444; Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL) v.
Asuncion, G.R. Nos. 79937-38, February 13, 1989, 170 SCRA 274, 285; Manchester
Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, No. L-75919, May 7, 1987, 149 SCRA
562, 568-569.

18
 As revised by the Resolution dated February 17, 2000 issued in A.M. No. 00-2-01-SC
amending Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, effective March 1, 2000.

19
Tacay v. RTC of Tagum, Davao del Norte, supra note 17.

20
 A.M. No. 09-6-9-SC, August 19, 2009, 596 SCRA 401.

21
 Id. at 405.

22
 Id. at 405-406.

23
 G.R. No. 150135, October 30, 2006, 506 SCRA 81.

24
 Records, p. 62.

25
Rollo (G.R. No. 194412), pp. 73-76.

26
 Records, p. 21.

27
  An Act Reorganizing And Strengthening The Public Attorney's Office (PAO), Amending
For The Purpose Pertinent Provisions Of Executive Order No.292, Otherwise Known As
The "ADMINISTRATIVE Code Of 1987", As Amended, Granting Special Allowance To
PAO Officials And Lawyers, And Providing Funds Therefor. Approved on March 23, 2007.

28
  Exemption of the Indigent Clients of the Public Attorney's Office (PAO) from the
Payment of Docket and Other Fees, issued by Court Administrator Christopher O. Lock,
effective on July 12, 2007.

29
Exemption of the Indigent Clients of the Public Attorney's Office (PAO) from the
Payment of Docket and Other Fees, issued by Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepaño,
effective on December 11, 2007.

30
 A.M. No. 08-2-01-0, February 11, 2010; 612 SCRA 193, 210.

31
 See De los Santos v. Vda. de Mangubat, G.R. No. 149508, 10 October 2007, 535
SCRA 411, 423.
32
 See Section 3, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, which states:

Sec. 3. Default; declaration of. — If the defending party fails to answer within the time
allowed therefor, the court shall, upon motion of the claiming party with notice to the
defending party, and proof of such failure, declare the defending party in
default. Thereupon, the court shall proceed to render judgment granting the
claimant such relief as his pleading may warrant, unless the court in its
discretion requires the claimant to submit evidence. Such reception of
evidence may be delegated to the clerk of court. (1a, R18)

33
 Section 3(b), Rule 9 of the  Rules of Court.