Issue 78, 3rd Quarter 2015

An Interview with
Martin E. Dempsey
21st-Century SOF
American Land Power in Korea
 Joint Force Quarterly
Founded in 1993  •  Vol. 78, 3rd Quarter 2015
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GEN Martin E. Dempsey, USA, Publisher

MajGen Frederick M. Padilla, USMC, President, NDU
Editor in Chief
Col William T. Eliason, USAF (Ret.), Ph.D.

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Advisory Committee
COL Michael S. Bell, USA (Ret.), Ph.D./College of International
Security Affairs; Maj Gen Brian T. Bishop, USAF/Air War College;
LTG Robert B. Brown, USA/U.S. Army Command and General Staff
College; BG Guy T. Cosentino, USA/National War College;
Col J. William DeMarco, USAF/Air Command and Staff College;
Col Keil Gentry, USMC/Marine Corps War College; Lt Gen David L.
Goldfein, USAF/The Joint Staff; BGen Thomas A. Gorry, USMC/
Dwight D. Eisenhower School for National Security and Resource
Strategy; Col Steven J. Grass, USMC/Marine Corps Command and
Staff College; RADM P. Gardner Howe III/U.S. Naval War College;
MG William E. Rapp, USA/U.S. Army War College; RADM John W.
Smith, Jr., USN/Joint Forces Staff College;
LtGen Thomas D. Waldhauser, USMC/The Joint Staff

Editorial Board
Richard K. Betts/Columbia University;
Stephen D. Chiabotti/School of Advanced Air and Space Studies;
Eliot A. Cohen/The Johns Hopkins University;
COL Joseph J. Collins, USA (Ret.)/National War College;
Mark J. Conversino/Air War College;
Thomas P. Ehrhard/Office of the Secretary of Defense;
Aaron L. Friedberg/Princeton University;
Col Thomas C. Greenwood, USMC (Ret.)/Office of the Secretary
of Defense; Douglas N. Hime/Naval War College;
Mark H. Jacobsen/Marine Corps Command and Staff College;
Col Jerome M. Lynes, USMC (Ret.)/The Joint Staff;
Kathleen Mahoney-Norris/Air Command and Staff College;
Thomas L. McNaugher/Georgetown University;
Col Mark Pizzo, USMC (Ret.)/National War College;
James A. Schear/Office of the Secretary of Defense;
LtGen Bernard E. Trainor, USMC (Ret.)

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Cover 2 images (top to bottom): U.S. Soldier assigned to Bravo Company,

1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Calvary
Division, provides security outside enemy compound during Decisive Action
Rotation 15-05 at National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California (U.S. Army/
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In this Issue Issue 78, 3rd Quarter 2015
About the Cover
Lieutenant Colonel Christine Mau,
33rd Operations Group deputy
commander—notably first woman
Dialogue fighter pilot accepted into F-35
program—completes initial F-35A
2 From the Chairman

JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY

Lightning II training flight at Eglin
Air Force Base, Florida, on May
Forum 5, 2015 (U.S. Air Force/Marleah
Robertson)
14 Executive Summary

ISSUE SEVENTY-EIGHT, 3 RD QUARTER 2015

An Interview with
16 Islamic Radicalization in Kenya Martin E. Dempsey
21st-Century SOF

By William R. Patterson American Land Power in Korea

24 The Arctic Domain:

A Narrow Niche for Joint
Special Operations Forces
By Kevin D. Stringer Features 127 Meeting China Halfway
75 Detangling the Web: Reviewed by Christopher Nelson
32 Rapid Regeneration of A Screenshot of U.S.
Irregular Warfare Capacity Government Cyber Activity
By Stephen Watts, J. Michael By G. Alexander Crowther Joint Doctrine
Polich, and Derek Eaton and Shaheen Ghori 129 Three Approaches to Center
of Gravity Analysis: The Islamic
84 One Size Does Not Fit
JPME Today State of Iraq and the Levant
All: The Multifaceted
40 Quo Vadis? The Education By Daniel J. Smith, Kelley
Nature of Cyber Statecraft Jeter, and Odin Westgaard
of Senior Military Officers By Andrea Little Limbago
By Charles D. Allen 136 Joint Doctrine Update
91 Understanding the Indications
44 Vertical and Horizontal Respect: and Warning Efforts of
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126 The Modern Mercenary
Reviewed by T.X. Hammes 3rd Quarter, July 2015
ISSN 1070-0692
 U.S. Marine Corps M-198 155mm Howitzer gun crew
of 4th Battalion, 14th Marines, Mike Battery, Gun 4,
at Camp Fallujah engage enemy targets November
2004 (U.S. Marine Corps/Samantha L. Jones)

From the Chairman

An Interview with Martin E. Dempsey
n January 7, 2015, Dr. R.D. Joseph J. Collins: Can you tell us how Chiefs of Staff? That is an impressive set

O Hooker, Jr., Director of

Research and Strategic Support
at the National Defense University
your views on the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan have evolved over your
assignments as division commander,
of perspectives on these wars.

General Martin E. Dempsey: I’d like to

(NDU), and Dr. Joseph J. Collins, Multi-National Security Transition start with a vignette. I arrived in Iraq late
Director of the Center for Complex Command–Iraq [MNSTC-I] com- June 2003 and took command of the 1st
Operations in the Institute for mander, acting U.S. Central Command Armored Division. I had watched devel-
National Strategic Studies, interviewed commander, U.S. Army Training and opments from Riyadh, where I was the
General Dempsey at NDU. Giorgio Doctrine commander, Chief of Staff of program manager of the Saudi Arabian
Rajao and Joanna E. Seich transcribed the Army, and Chairman of the Joint National Guard. There, I was being
the interview. fed a pretty steady diet from my Saudi

2  Dialogue / From the Chairman JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015

interlocutors about what was going well
and what was not. I was also getting fed a
heavy diet of Sunni Islam, obviously, and
so I, like Bing Crosby, went on the road
to Baghdad.
When I got to Baghdad, there was
a sense of constant transition almost
to the point of turmoil. For instance,
I arrived just after Lieutenant General
Dave McKiernan pulled out the CFLCC
[Coalition Forces Land Component
Command]. If you remember the
CFLCC story, he was told, I wasn’t
in the room, but I was led to believe
LTG McKiernan was told by Secretary
[Donald] Rumsfeld to take as much risk
going out as coming in, which sounds
like something Secretary Rumsfeld would
have said. So CFLCC had literally taken
this command and control architecture,
unplugged it, and went back to Kuwait
in the process of redeploying. V Corps, as
you recall, was left behind with General
[Ricardo] “Rick” Sanchez. And my sense
was that V Corps was little suited as a
command and control headquarters,
understaffed and under-resourced, funda-
mentally a tactical headquarters.
My sense was that we were a bit
adrift frankly, at least in Baghdad. I
can’t speak to what was happening in General Dempsey (DOD)
Mosul, Ramadi, or Diyala Province. But
in Baghdad, there was a bit of almost mission, how would you articulate the That was in 2003. Since then, I have
discovery learning, about what it means intent?” And he replied, “Look, you’re realized in a conflict that either creates
to have gone from this exquisite ma- going to have to take this armored divi- or inherits a failed state—in a conflict
neuver across the desert from Kuwait to sion, you’re going to have to adapt it so where the issues are historical as opposed
Baghdad, to now being fundamentally that it can provide stability operations ca- to topical, in a conflict where religion is a
responsible for the safety of a city of 7 pability. . . . I don’t have to tell you how factor—you separate yourself from your
million people, 75 square miles with a to do that.” But he added, “That’s job adversaries by innovation, not necessar-
river running through it, and with deep number 1: how do you take this organi- ily by size and technology. The rate of
ethnic and religious tensions. zation that you have and tailor it in order innovation and adaptation is likely to be
I was trying to learn as quickly as to provide a safe and secure environment the most important quality of a military
possible what the mission was going to in Baghdad?” I replied, “That’s a pretty campaign, not the things we normally
be because it was, quite frankly, unclear. heavy lift, a safe and secure environment focus on, such as Force Management
The Iraqi army had been disbanded and in Baghdad.” He also asked, “How long Level [FML]. It seems like a recent thing
de-Ba’athification had occurred. General do you think we have here?” I knew with this administration, but we have
David Petraeus at this time famously exactly what he [was thinking] because been debating FML from the very start
asked, “How does this thing end?” It was he’s an Arabist; he’d been a scholar and with Secretary Rumsfeld. We debated and
a fair question. an Arabic speaker. And I knew that he negotiated resources before we debated
General John Abizaid came to see was asking whether the United States had and negotiated objectives. That’s my ob-
me around the time I took command, a shelf-life here, or was this something servation of my time between 2003 and
and I had a candid conversation with we could consider doing in perpetuity, if the end of the Iraq War. You might place
him about my initial observations, and I necessary. From my experiences in Saudi this observation on the negative side of
asked him as CENTCOM [U.S. Central Arabia, I answered, “Three years.” He the ledger, debating resources rather than
Command] commander: “What is my stated, “I think you’re right.” objectives, but when objectives change,

JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015 Dempsey 3

 logistical, command and control—we
had built there.
Moreover, we probably retained a
little too much control for a little bit too
long. We probably didn’t make our rela-
tionship with former Iraqi Prime Minister
[Nouri] al-Maliki as transactional and
conditional as it should have been. As a
result, we began, toward the end of the
campaign, to be talking past one another.
So that’s kind of the front end and the
back end.
On the MNSTC-I side, which is right
in the middle for me from 2005 to 2007,
I know some of your questions relate to a
particular one: Can we actually build and
develop indigenous forces to take control
of their own country? Here is where I
find myself today on this question. If
we take ownership in every sense of the
word, which we did in the early days both
in Iraq and Afghanistan, and then try to
begin to build an indigenous force in an
institutional design to control it—that is
to say not only tactical-level fighters but
also the logistics architecture, intelligence
architecture, school systems, and the
ministries—that’s far more difficult than
making the indigenous force own it from
the beginning with our enabling it.
So you might ask, what would you do
Sheik Abdullah Sami Obeidi, a Sunni Arab tribal leader, signs declaration of support for Sons of Iraq
program as U.S. Army Colonel David Paschel, commander of 1st Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain differently. First of all, I would have abso-
Division, looks on in Al Noor, Iraq, March 9, 2008 (DOD/Samuel Bendet) lutely not disbanded the Iraqi army, and I
would have absolutely not de-Ba’athified.
we should simply recognize this and great adaptations to all of the battlefield We lost all of the bureaucrats who knew
adapt accordingly. Sometimes changing functions, whether fires and maneuver how to run the country. And I would
objectives is portrayed as mission failure, or command and control, and we began have, in a transactional and conditional
when in fact in a protracted campaign the to describe it as mission command. We way, made it clear how we would help
likelihood of renegotiating objectives is decentralized, we began to empower the the Iraqis regain control of their own
100 percent. edge, and we began to develop the lead- country, put it back on its feet. But there
On the positive side we were able ers who could work, seize, and execute would have been no doubt from the start
to adapt. One could argue some were initiatives. We began to improve intelli- that it would be their responsibility and
late to need, but the changes we made gence functions and logistics. We learned not ours.
in intelligence gathering, assessment a lot about contractors on the battlefield, The enduring lesson about MNSTC-I
analysis, exploitation, and dissemination some good and some bad. But we made a is this: The art of campaigning and
were important. When I visited a com- lot of incredible adjustments over time. building a foreign military is establishing
bat outpost on the Pakistani border in Let me finish by going back to the ownership and managing that from the
2008 as the CENTCOM commander, somewhat negative side. Architectures start. If you take too much ownership
Captain McChrystal, Stan’s [Stanley in organizations begin to develop a too soon, it is almost impossible to give
McChrystal’s] nephew, was in com- momentum of their own, and it be- it back.
mand. The captain had more access to comes difficult to disassemble them.
national technical means and all kinds The architectures themselves become R.D. Hooker, Jr.: I interviewed
of intelligence in 2008 than I did as self-fulfilling. I didn’t think we were a Combined Security Transition
division commander in 2003, and that’s ever going to get out of Baghdad with Command–Afghanistan deputy com-
not hyperbole. So we did make a lot of all of the architecture—intelligence, mander who believes that we tried too

4  Dialogue / From the Chairman JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015

hard in both Iraq and Afghanistan to security forces in Diyala Province, differ- development in a secure environment, or
make those militaries like our own. Do ent than the way the [U.S.] Marines were whether we should invest mightily into
you agree or disagree? developing security forces in Al Anbar. transitioning state-owned enterprises
Even in our own Service we had different into private-owned enterprises. I can
General Dempsey: I have thought about approaches, a different way of partnering. remember really serious, important, and
that a lot. Early on that was indeed a Now is that a strength or a weakness? constructive debates about that dichot-
valid criticism. I remember going to Initially it was a weakness because we omy. It was a false dichotomy, but it was
visit Bernard Kerik, who was the senior were a little inconsistent. I think over presented as a dichotomy nonetheless.
Coalition Provincial Authority [CPA] time, however, we were able to harmo- First, I would advise future leaders
police trainer. Kerik was passionate about nize that. that friction and disagreement in deci-
not wanting the military involved in I remember visiting a country—I sionmaking is not a negative. Frankly, you
the training and only wanted occasional won’t mention which country but it should embrace friction. What I found
support with resupply as we conducted wasn’t ours—and I went to its training was, and I can’t put a percentage on it,
patrols in Baghdad, thus assuring the center for the Iraqi security forces, and but in general the person at the table with
police stations were getting what they the trainers had a [significant amount of] the most persuasive argument tends to
needed. He was training them to be beat instruction on drill and ceremonies. You prevail in those environments.
cops, traffic circle cops, training them in see, the Iraqis loved to march—I mean Let me segue to an important factor.
law enforcement techniques. Then they they loved to march. But it wasn’t doing There is an article, I don’t know who
graduated, went out into the streets of them much good to keep them alive. But wrote it, but it was written in 2013,
Baghdad, and were slaughtered. because they loved to march so much, and it focuses on the uncanny ability of
Kerik left and the next guy that and they were well behaved when march- military and political leaders or elected
came in—I can’t remember his name—I ing, this particular partner was spending a officials to talk past each other. In the
went to him and said, “Look, this can’t lot of time teaching them how to march. military culture, as you know, we spend
be a competition, but I’m telling you decades learning how to do campaign
the police you are producing are not Hooker: Many sources, including the planning, and we start with a well-stated
going to stand and fight this insurgency recent RAND study by Linda Robinson, and clear objective. Then we build a
because they’re underarmed, they don’t have discussed the tension between campaign to achieve that objective, with
have protection around their stations, civilian decisionmakers and their military intermediate objectives and milestones
[and] they’re getting slaughtered in the advisors in making wartime decisions, along the way. Then we come up with
streets.” So we forged a partnership. particularly in the formation of objectives three courses of action: high risk, me-
[Years later] I came back as commander and the development of strategic options. dium risk, and low risk. We pick the
of MNSTC-I. The next guy who came What has been your experience, and what middle-risk option and execute. If you are
in was actually open-minded about is your advice to pass on to successors? an elected official, the likelihood of your
having the police effort subordinated to conceiving a well-crafted and well-de-
MNSTC-I. It was on my watch that we General Dempsey: I think the system is fined objective at the beginning is almost
gained oversight not only of the army but actually designed to create that friction zero. Rather, as an elected official, your
also of the police, and we were able to in decisionmaking. Our entire system first instinct is to seek to understand what
harmonize the efforts. But to your point, is built on the premise that we require options you have.
there’s no question that early on we were friction to move [forward]. Physics So militarily I know I’ve got it, I
trying to create these forces in our image. even says that. You have to have friction have a nuclear option, but let’s just park
I don’t regret that actually because we before the wheels on a car make contact that for a moment. What other options
probably had to see if that was possible with the road and propel it forward. do I have in this magnificent toolbox
before we adapted. So our system is designed to create a called the U.S. military? What tools do I
We also had coalition partners that certain amount of friction, and it suc- have that I can apply pressure with, that
would take sectors of Iraq. The boon and ceeds. There are always [institutional] I can manage escalation with, and that I
bane of a coalition, as you know, is that it equities, or the objectives as articu- can integrate with the other instruments
is a coalition—so everyone gets a voice. lated by the Department of State and of national power? Elected officials are
The boon is they’re there, and you get USAID [U.S. Agency for International hardwired to ask for options first and
26, 28, or 45 flags. But there’s no doubt Development]. One of the debates in then reverse-engineer objectives. And
in my mind, I can give you chapter and Iraq early on was which comes first, eco- the military is hard-wired to do exactly
verse, that the way the British were de- nomic development or security. It was a the opposite.
veloping the security forces in Basra was chicken-and-egg argument. Those were Now what do we do about that sit-
different than the Poles were developing heated debates about whether we should uation? Nothing frankly. But that is the
security forces, and it was different than lock down the country and then kind of environment that we live and work in. I
the way the [U.S.] Army was developing loosen the reins on it and do economic learned that pretty early on. I learned it

JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015 Dempsey 5

by reading [Bob Woodward’s] Obama’s General Dempsey: To thread that, or commander was that the surge ought
Wars [Simon & Schuster, 2011]. I read to link that back to the question about to be carried out by the Iraqis. It is de-
it not to get inside information on the the RAND study and whether friction batable whether they could have pulled
intrigue or the kiss-and-tell aspect, but is a negative or a positive, the way that it off, but we had two separate 3-star
I wanted to try and understand why Multi-National Force–Iraq [MNF-I] was commands in Iraq for that purpose. The
Woodward was able to find the seam constructed was [that it would be led decision was taken to dial down on our
between the advice that was given to the by] a strategic 4-star—[General] George efforts, and I saluted, and we executed.
President and his willingness to accept Casey at the time, later David Petraeus— Did it work? It did actually; it knocked
that advice. And it came down to what and two 3-stars. The two 3-stars were the level of violence down, and the surge
I just described: it wasn’t articulated the Multi-National Corps–Iraq [MNC-I] gave decision space for the Iraqi gov-
that way in the book, but that’s what commander, and me as the MNSTC-I ernment, but it failed to take advantage
I drew from the book. When you read commander. Both 3-stars had equal of that space. One might make the case
a book, the author wants you to take access and equal voice to the strategic that they failed to take advantage because
what you want to take from it, and not command. MNC-I measured his success we had sent the message that if they get
necessarily what he is trying to give you. on levels of violence, but the MNSTC-I into trouble, we will rescue them. And
But I’ve decided that we’re just hard- commander measured his success on the I believe that, too; if you’re trying to
wired differently. Knowing that, I think development of the Iraqi security forces. restore stability to a failed state, do you
it’s incumbent on us to work inside that When the question of the surge came up, do it or do they do it? And the surge sent
culture and not to rebel against it. [This the advice of the MNC-I commander, a signal that if something really went
is a factor] in my relationship with the not surprisingly, was that in order to drive badly, we would take control of it, and
President, in my relationship with the down violence, he needed five brigades. then we would give them another chance.
JCS [Joint Chiefs of Staff], and it informs (By the way, I may be off by a couple. The other way to do it would have been
my relationship with the COCOMs Initially it was only two brigades, then violent; it would have taken longer. I’m
[combatant commands] as I try to man- eventually it went to five brigades.) And not suggesting I was right and they were
age demand and supply. It has been quite my advice was that we probably should wrong, but I think I was there to give
helpful to me. knock violence down, but let’s be careful exactly that advice. And I gave it.
Getting back to the question, my ad- on how we do it because we could give The other way of considering the
vice to my successors is get to know how the Iraqis the idea that every time vio- surge as the right course of action is to
our government functions. Don’t come lence spikes, we would rush in and retake look at the transactional and conditional
to Washington thinking you’re going to control of things. We could be actually nature of relationships, especially in that
get Washington to conform to your be- setting back the development of the Iraqi part of the world. What actually made the
liefs because that is generally never going security forces. Or, stated in another way, surge work? Again, this is debatable, but
to happen. You have to have a moral I said, “Look, we have two options here, in my judgment, what made the surge
compass, but you have to understand the General Casey. You can double down on work was less about the introduction of
way people in this city make decisions. [U.S.] activities and you will probably additional U.S. forces and more about
Also, you must understand that most big knock the violence down pretty quickly, the fact that we co-opted the Sunni tribes
decisions are made in conjunction with or you can double down on the devel- by paying them and arming them on
budget cycles, not in conjunction with opment of the Iraqi security forces. In the promise that the Iraqi government
current events. If you want to change other words, embed at greater numbers, would absorb them into their security
something in our system of government, enable at greater numbers, but actually forces. Well, okay. It didn’t happen. And
you change it in the budget. Can you make them responsible for pushing the because it didn’t happen, the loyalty of
do things in between budgets cycles? surge and bringing the spike in violence the Sunni tribes went to us and not to
Of course you can; we built in a certain down. And my advice is the latter: we the Iraqi government. Once we took the
amount of flux, but big changes are have said that our exit strategy here runs other decision to stop paying them and
[usually] made in budget cycles, and that through the Iraqi security forces. So if stop supporting them, and they didn’t
includes big changes in campaigns. you want my advice as the MNSTC-I have a safety net in the Iraqi govern-
commander, I think we ought to double ment, I think we are where we are today
Collins: If we could just follow up on down on the Iraqis and not double down somewhat as a result of that. But that’s
that. You talked about the surge process on ourselves.” controversial.
in Afghanistan, and of course there was That is exactly how the conversation I do think the structure of MNF-I
a surge process in Iraq. Any reflections went. Somehow along the way I’ve was designed so that the strategic com-
on things that you have in your own been painted with the brush of being mand would get advice on both sides of
personal knowledge or that you’ve anti-surge. I was never anti-surge. My the equation, which is how much should
learned from those particular cases in question was simply who was going to we do and how much should they do. It
terms of decisionmaking? surge. And my advice as the MNSTC-I was my responsibility to argue for what

6  Dialogue / From the Chairman JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015

they should do. I made the case, and the broader in conflicts with nonstate actors work for a squad. If you want me to do
decision went the other way. History will because decisions are temporal in a way. X, here is what I think I need to do. If
decide if this was correct. If I am right about the need to adapt you think I need to do it for less, then I
more frequently, then the last thing we am going to do less. My military advice
Collins: The other question was the want to do is flop in there with 150,000 is what you can accomplish with a squad,
Afghanistan surge. You touched on that [personnel], 12 mega-forward operating what can you accomplish with a battalion,
with your mention of [Woodward’s] bases, [and then] begin to funnel in TGI what can you accomplish with a brigade,
Obama’s Wars. In crafting options for Friday’s and Baskin-Robbins. and we will not ask a brigade to do a di-
those situations, should the most senior When I look back, conflict against vision’s worth of work. That is it, and we
military people address all the options, or nonstate actors does not lend itself to have had some success in discussions that
only the options they think are the ones industrial-strength solutions. And I’m are built on that principle.
that are going to work? not sure exactly what I would have done
differently, but I would have been far Hooker: Historians are going to wrestle
General Dempsey: The one thing that more expeditionary, far more austere, with whether the outcomes of the Iraq
has to be clear: every option in military and far more attuned to the need to and Afghanistan campaigns were funda-
doctrine has to be suitable, feasible, [innovate and adapt] than negotiating mentally ascribable to the military effort
and acceptable. I could never conceive the Force Management Levels. For or civilian effort. There is a narrative that
of a circumstance where I would either example, in Afghanistan we did surge, asserts the military was asked in both
recommend or, if asked, support an and that one ultimately may have had conflicts, at least once we got into the
option that I didn’t find to be feasible, a better effect than the one in Iraq, but counterinsurgency game, to secure the
acceptable, and suitable. But with that even in conducting that surge, we surged population, and it did that fairly well.
said, in particular because of what I’ve traditionally with BCTs [Brigade Combat The military was able to build up large
said earlier, I want to make sure this is Teams]. We took BCTs and surged for numbers of host nation military units that
not lost because I have been giving a 12 consecutive cycles. By so doing, the took over the transition. But the failure
lot of thought to this. In the use of the industrial machine began to crank, and of the campaign was the inability of the
military instrument of power against state we started to build big FOBs [forward host-nations, both in terms of the capac-
actors, we differentiate ourselves by size operating bases]—and big FOBs increase ity and in terms of rule of law, to carry
and technology. We are bigger, badder, demand, demand increases requirement their loads. That was the vulnerability we
our tanks shoot further, penetrate more for money, et cetera. There is probably a were never able to overcome. Do you see
deeply, and can operate at night in a way way to redefine surge, but we looked at it it that way?
that our adversary cannot. So we over- through the lens of Force Management
match with size and technology in state Levels. I wasn’t in the system at the time. General Dempsey: Remember earlier
conflict. Training, good leadership, and I was the TRADOC commander, but the when I said that in conflict against non-
[a] better logistics system—all of these President was told: “Look, it’s 40,000 or state actors in failed states or failing states,
are important. nothing; 40,000 or let’s get out.” That I have come to believe that support needs
When you talk about conflict against is how it was portrayed. Is that right, to be transactional and conditional. I
nonstate actors, and that is really what we though, is that really true, 40,000 or let’s believe that because, generally speaking,
are talking about here, we were fighting get out? in these failing and failed states the issues
an insurgency on behalf of a government. So we have to be a little less dogmatic are societal—they are not political issues.
We were fighting an insurgency on be- in conflict against nonstate actors than Sometimes they begin as political issues,
half of Iraq and an insurgency on behalf we are in conflict with state actors. When or they’ll start as representational—for
of Afghanistan, simultaneously trying we are in conflict with a state actor, it instance, the fruit vendor in Tunisia
to restore their abilities to govern. In tends to be more existential, it tends to self-immolating because the government
that kind of conflict, the use of military be a little clearer on how you differentiate wanted to tax his fruit stand. It starts
[forces] against nonstate actors, I think yourself, and therefore I think the op- political, but it goes pretty quickly to
size and technology matter, but what tions become a little crisper. I don’t find sectarian issues, to religion, and ethnicity
matters more is the rate at which we the options to be that crisp in this kind because these are historic impulses that
innovate. The rate of innovation becomes of conflict, and therefore we have to be have been suppressed for generations. In
a better predictor of success than the more thoughtful and more open to nego- those environments, it’s absolutely pre-
Force Management Level, for example. tiating them, remembering that we have dictable that the “victor and vanquished”
Size matters, but the rate at which we can to have a moral compass. mentality will quickly come forward.
innovate, adapt, and respond to changes And by the way, I have one tenet Those who have been suppressed will
in the environment matters more. that I generally rely on in making rec- see themselves as victors, and they will
In that context, this is where I an- ommendations in places like Iraq and come and vanquish those oppressing
swer your question. The options are far Afghanistan, and here it is: A squad’s them, and I think whether we are asked

JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015 Dempsey 7

to conduct military operations in Iraq, General Dempsey: The Intelligence This is in the spirit of learning lessons
Afghanistan, Libya, Syria, [or] Nigeria, Community was slow in adapting to and not throwing stones. It took a while
that “victor-vanquished” instinct is the what really mattered in the environ- for the Intelligence Community to adapt
dominant societal instinct. If I’m right ments we found ourselves in. Back to to help us—that is to say the tactical
about this, then there can be no uncon- the difference in state actors and non- commander to understand the environ-
ditional support, in my opinion, because state actors: if I’m right about the fact ments—but there was progress. Now the
unconditional support will simply rein- that you differentiate yourself in a state question is whether can we sustain it. Or
force the “victor-vanquished” paradigm conflict by size and technology, then is the institution likely to forget that the
as it emerges. the intelligence architecture is going to understanding of culture, religion, and
So let’s fast-forward to Iraq today. build itself in such a way to determine economics of a local society is import-
Some people are saying, “Why aren’t you where capabilities are placing you at a ant? I hope not, and with all the chiefs
doing more, and sooner?” Our support disadvantage. In an environment with we seem to be committed to making
needs to remain as support and not own- nonstate actors, where it is all about sure that we don’t forget those lessons,
ership. Furthermore, support needs to innovation, then you have to understand but often the institution will. It is like a
be conditional. If the Iraqi government the factors that would cause you to need rubber band; you stretch it and then you
does not meet its commitments to create to innovate, and they largely reside in let it go, and it will go back to its normal
a more inclusive political environment societal factors. You try to drive the in- form or shape. I’m afraid some of that
and to address some of the grievances of surgency or the terrorist group from the might occur, if we are not careful.
the Sunni and Kurd populations, then population. Mike [Flynn] was right; we My successor will face state and non-
nothing we do will last. It will be painting could list the deck of cards or the wiring state challenges in about equal measures.
over rust. We have eight lines of effort, diagram of any number of organizations One thing Jim Baker [Principal Deputy
two of which are military, and generally and networks in Iraq and Afghanistan, Director, Strategic Plans and Policy, J5]
the military lines of effort leap out in but if we were to ask a commander on helped me think through [is] the mean-
front—and I do mean leap. That is who the ground in Afghanistan to tell us ing of the reemergence of Russia. I was
we are, right? If it is worth doing, it is something about this particular tribe feeling kind of constrained by Russia, and
worth overdoing. The military lines of ef- in this particular valley and who are its the President asked me, “Can I meet my
fort will always be achieved. And that can affiliates, that was often discovery learn- [North Atlantic Treaty Organization]
be detrimental to the other lines of effort. ing. Every time we had to RIP [relief in Article 5 responsibilities?” And I replied,
I don’t know if that answers your ques- place] out a unit, it was discovery learn- “Mr. President, that is a great question,
tion, but it is why I believe now that the ing again, so we fell into a bit of the 12 so let me get back to you.” I was feeling
use of the military instrument of power in 1-year campaigns instead of one 12-year uncomfortable about the ability of our
issues of nonstate actors and failed states campaign. Mike’s article actually helped forces to use forward basing because in
needs to be far more conditional and a lot with that, and we had done some the last 10 years the Russians have devel-
transactional than anything we do with things with TRADOC, with the HTTs oped some capabilities that actually could
state actors. [Human Terrain Teams], not without coerce and constrain us.
One more thing: [U.S. interests must controversy by the way. Jim pointed out that the world
lead.] The tragedy of human suffering My TRADOC G2, a guy named looked similar to that of the early years of
and the situation in Syria is awful, but Maxie McFarland, who passed away my career. And there was truth in that.
I will also tell you the use of the U.S. recently, was instrumental in develop- During the first 15 years of my career,
military instrument of power without ing and fielding the HTTs. It was his 1974 to 1989, Russia was a near-peer
consideration of what I just described brainchild to reach out to academia, to competitor, not just nuclear but also con-
can actually create more harm and even anthropology, to form these teams and ventionally. We were constrained, and our
further suffering, I think. to offer them to BCTs. We would try to military planning took into account the
keep them there so the HTT would stay fact that we were constrained in military
Collins: We have also had some grand in the last 6 months of a brigade, and operations by a near-peer competitor.
failures in intelligence, in particular in the first 6 months of a new brigade, so We didn’t like it, but we learned how to
the war in Iraq. One criticism, that in there was continuity. And they paid big deal with it. The next 20 years, 1989 to
particular of General Michael Flynn, is dividends. We got this, and it was con- 2009, had no constraints. So most of the
that we are here fighting among people troversial still, because of the notion that officer corps today lived in a world where
and we do not know much about them, we were perverting science, using sci- they were unconstrained. No one could
and intelligence is not focused on that ence to the detriment of culture rather prevent them from doing anything they
problem. How do you see intelligence than to the benefit of it. But it was ad- wanted to do. But guess what? We are
functioning and its level of proficiency dressing the question you asked: how do back to what is probably normal, I think,
both operationally and strategically in you learn about the environment? And in the course of recent events—that is, to
Iraq and Afghanistan? that is one answer. where you have near-peer competitors in

8  Dialogue / From the Chairman JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015

 F/A-18C Hornet assigned to
“Blue Diamonds” of Strike Fighter
Squadron VFA-146 launches from
USS Ronald Reagan to conduct
close-air support missions in June
2011 as part of Operation Enduring
Freedom (U.S. Navy/Alexander Tidd)

certain domains, and then you have to to contribute to foreign relations strategy can’t develop a relationship of trust and
account for this in military planning. as a statutory advisor of the National credibility—credibility first and trust sec-
So my successor will have to deal Security Council. In my early days, we ond, because trust is earned—then you
with the reality of state actors who can would go around the room, and the won’t be successful in contributing to our
now coerce and constrain us, as well as staff would be talking about something national security strategy.
nonstate actors. So, to your point, I don’t I didn’t want to talk about. Pick a topic.
think the pendulum will swing entirely Whatever it was, as it came around the Collins: You come down almost exactly
back to Russia or China as peer compet- room for me, I would say, “I am here at the same point JFK did after the Bay of
itors, but I think the institution will have as your military advisor; that is not a Pigs. He wrote instructions to the Joint
to adapt to have aspects of both in them. military issue.” And the President would Chiefs that said very much what you just
say, “Yes, but you are here, and I want said in the last 2 or 3 minutes. We have
Hooker: How should future senior officers your view on this strategic issue that has had a number of issues having to do with
who are combatant commanders or the national security implications.” detainees’ enhanced interrogation. Some
Chairman view their role in the highest If you are going to understand how of those shoes have not dropped yet for
councils of government? Are they there decisions are made in our government, the Department of Defense, military
to provide the best military advice only, or you must build relationships, and if commissions, and so forth. Were these
are they there, as Clausewitz noted, to be you’re going to build relationships, you problems inevitable, or did we get off on
both the statesman and general? have to demonstrate a certain gravitas. the wrong foot? If 10 years from now we
You’ve got to be able to have a con- have another situation akin to the situa-
General Dempsey: When you become a versation about grand strategy, not just tions in Afghanistan and Iraq, what would
senior military leader, you have multiple military strategy. If I had to give advice you tell your successor about the lessons
responsibilities, one of which is to give to my successors about job number one and how we did it in these two cases?
the best military advice possible, and in terms of being influential inside deci-
another is to help the force. But there is sionmaking boardrooms, it would be that General Dempsey: The detention opera-
a third one, too. I have the responsibility relationships matter most of all. If you tions have to be included in any campaign

JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015 Dempsey 9

 B-1B Lancer aircraft drop six GBU-38 munitions onto insurgent
torture house and prison in Northern Zambraniyah, Iraq, March 2008
(U.S. Air Force/Andy Dunaway)

plan that includes the use of military force aspirations than the reality, was that [we assumptions were flawed. So yes, we got
because we can’t ever put a young man or would] go into Iraq and we would be off on the wrong foot, but we also hadn’t
woman in the position where there’s no welcomed because we would be seen as done detainee operations since 1991.
possibility of detention. The alternative is liberators, and we could take as much But if you remember in 1991, the 96
capture and release, or kill not capture. risk getting out as we took getting in. Hour War, I can remember as part of VII
I think this is what happened in these One of the risks we took going in was Corps accumulating large numbers of
conflicts regarding detention operations. that we went in with fewer forces than Iraqi soldiers surrendering, and we pulled
You know what they say about campaign the commander thought he needed to them down into Saudi Arabia into tem-
assumptions: if the assumptions are flawed accomplish the task. Fewer forces mean porary camps. But I think we repatriated
or invalid, the campaign has to be adapted. fewer capabilities. We didn’t have the them within weeks, not months. And so
That’s why you make assumptions about number of MPs [military police] that we if you go back to the time before when
campaigns. So one of the assumptions probably needed to account for detention we did detainee operations, you have to
I think we made, again I was in Riyadh operations because we didn’t think that go all the way back to Vietnam, so there
when all this was being developed, but we’d be detaining enemy personnel. Or if was a lot of rust on that function. If there
I think one of the campaign assump- we were detaining, we would be turning is a lesson here, it’s the lesson that comes
tions, probably driven more by political them over to I don’t know whom, but the to us instinctively, which is to address the

10  Dialogue / From the Chairman JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015

worst-case scenario. We always do that, is the title of his book [Why We Lost: A with Gates, [Leon] Panetta, [Chuck]
but we’re talked out of it sometimes, and General’s Inside Account of the Iraq and Hagel, and [Ash] Carter. First of all, I
I think in the case of detainee operations Afghanistan Wars (Houghton Mifflin don’t think I’ve changed who I am to
in future conflict, we shouldn’t allow our- Harcourt, 2014)]. And senior military adapt to them, but I have adapted the
selves to get talked out of that function. leaders bear much of the responsibility. way I interact with them and that’s prob-
He suggests that we should have left ably an important distinction. I’ll give
Collins: Are enhanced interrogation Afghanistan and Iraq somewhere within you some examples.
techniques a bigger issue for the Central the first 6 months. Would such a thing Secretary Gates was a voracious
Intelligence Agency or the Department have been possible? reader and a very close reader. You could
of Defense? give him a read-ahead document and
General Dempsey: No, that’s not who you could expect that when you engage
General Dempsey: Our issue was an we are as a nation. I wish things were with him, he would have some close and
initial lack of doctrine. Then we had that simple. Imagine being able to just crisp questions. He let the written word
the terrible incident in Abu Ghraib, and go in and crush that which you can find, inform him, and so when you engaged
then the Army republished its doctrine declare that you’ve accomplished your with him one on one or in a meeting, it
and from that point forward, we had no task, and care nothing about what you tended to start at a higher level.
further problems. leave in your wake and withdraw. But Secretary Panetta was a man of
So linking it back to your last question, that’s not the American way of war, not uncanny instinct. Even before reading
the key here is to continue to refresh our to sound too much like Russell Weigley something or discussing it, he had been
doctrine in order to manage the functional [Distinguished University Professor of around so long and had had so many ex-
area. As we shrink the force, we have to History at Temple University and noted periences inside of government—whether
be careful not to eliminate that capability. military historian], but that’s not the in the White House as Chief of Staff,
A lesson of this conflict will be that lead- American way of war. The American way in Congress, or as the Director of the
ers need to be involved. Again, I was in of war tends to be that—out of a sense CIA—that he learned less by reading and
Baghdad, and the only thing I controlled in of not only obligation and responsibility more by interacting. He also believed
Abu Ghraib was external security, but I’m to protect, although that is not really deeply in relationships. So if you were
pretty sure I’m correct in saying that we doctrine, but also compassion—we able to forge a relationship with him and
just turned it over to the MPs to manage assist those who have been defeated to you gained his trust, it made the interac-
without proper oversight. So leadership reestablish themselves in a more moder- tions extraordinarily collegial.
matters whether you’re talking about ate and inclusive way. As far as whether So going from one to the other—un-
combat operations, detention operations, we made mistakes, I take no exception derstanding that the written word was
or intelligence operations. Remember, I to that, but I consider it more about important—I focused a lot on, especially
described that scenario in June 2003 when learning than about negligence. And I when I was at CENTCOM, I wrote my
we actually didn’t settle in on a definition think as we learned, we changed. Now to own weekly reports, organized them and
of the enemy, an organizational principle Bolger’s point about whether we stayed selected [the precise] words, and I man-
to design against it, and a campaign that there too long, 6 months certainly was aged the length of report in a way that
acknowledged that this was going to take not possible. If he would have said in the I knew would match Secretary Gates’s
some time. Even in August 2003 we were book that we should have had an idea way of learning. With Secretary Panetta,
talking about the possibility of being home as to how long we were willing to make I’m not sure; I may have given him
by Christmas. So we didn’t grasp the fact this commitment from the start and that maybe three documents in 18 months or
that this was going to be a protracted should have informed our thinking about in 2 years. In any case, he probably knew
campaign until October. So think about the how to organize the campaign, I accept what I was writing before I wrote it, and
time between March and October—that’s that, but 6 months is absurd. what he really wanted was to engage me
6 months. So there’s a 6-month period of on it. So we had a very close relationship
indecision there, and that’s where some of Hooker: Can you compare your ex- built mostly around the time we spent in
these bad habits, worse than bad habits, perience working for three different his office.
this misconduct began to manifest itself. Secretaries of Defense? Do you have any Secretary Hagel also comes from
There was a list of enhanced interrogation thoughts on varying styles of civil-military a background of long government
techniques, but Abu Ghraib was clearly not negotiations from one to the other? service, whether it was as President
a problem of enhanced interrogation—it of the USO, Deputy Director of the
was misconduct. General Dempsey: All very different. VA [Veteran’s Administration], an
As Chief of Staff of the Army and at academic at Georgetown University,
Collins: General [Daniel P.] Bolger CENTCOM, I had the opportunity to the Senate, and Secretary of Defense.
states clearly that the wars in Iraq and work with Secretary [Robert] Gates. So He has […] a greater instinct not for
Afghanistan have been lost. In fact, that really I’ve had some close relationships detail but for the theory of the case. He

JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015 Dempsey 11

likes to understand not only the tactical General Dempsey: If you mean by “beyond have any other options to deal with this
question, but also how that question the pale” large-scale intervention against insurgent threat.
fits into a broader frame. If Secretary nonstate actors or insurgents and failing I would like to tell you that large-scale
Panetta was the quintessential extrovert, states, let me use Iraq as an example. intervention during insurgencies will be
Secretary Hagel was kind of the quint- Today, I’m at bat for the third time in a thing of the past, but we have to retain
essential introvert. That doesn’t mean Iraq. I was literally in Iraq sitting on what the capability. That’s why we’ve estab-
he’s without humor. He’s pleasant, we later called Route Tampa in the after- lished building partner capacity as a core
he’s engaging, he’s compassionate, and math of the 96 Hour War, blocking that competence of the entire force, not just
extraordinarily connected to soldiers. major highway that runs from Kuwait special operators. Security force assistance
Not only soldiers [but also] the lower to Baghdad. I sat there for a couple of as part of theater campaign plans is prom-
ranking enlisted [of all the Services] months. You remember the debate about inent in the Phase 0 side of operations,
expressed their deep disappointment whether we should have pursued the but I don’t think we should size the force
that he’s leaving. Somehow he actually Republican Guard and end the event to counterinsurgency; we should size the
found a way to make a connection with right then and there, or whether we force for treaty obligations against state
the sergeants, petty officers, Airmen, and should have settled for the narrowly de- actors and then retain enough slack in the
ensigns that was quite remarkable. He is fined objectives in the [United Nations] system so that we can ensure readiness.
one of them. He doesn’t care for detail, Security Council resolutions and so forth. We’re getting ready to enter a huge
and he doesn’t care for big groups, The 96 Hour War accomplished the debate about the correct balance of
whereas with Panetta, you couldn’t put objectives, and as a result, we ended up forward stationing, rotational deploy-
enough people in the room for him leaving for the first time in the central ments, and readiness of standing forces.
because he could just own it, honestly. region a large force that was there both Right now, the model we have produces
He was a remarkable facilitator of huge as a deterrent and a reassurance for our readiness and deploys contingent upon
audiences. Secretary Hagel was much allies. Prior to 1991, we had a perma- combatant commander demand signals.
more comfortable with smaller groups. nent naval base in Bahrain, but I don’t That’s especially true in the Air Force, the
He also likes to read, and so he’s kind of think we had a permanent land base (we Navy somewhat, pretty much true in the
a hybrid of Gates and Panetta. Secretary may have had access to some air bases). Marine Corps, and except for a handful
Hagel is a one-on-one guy. He does We weren’t in Qatar and we weren’t in of brigades, pretty much true in the
his best thinking, his best work, and his [the United Arab Emirates]. One might Army. So we have everything distributed
best interaction one on one. So back to argue that although the Gulf War looks globally, but if there were some major
the question. I think I’m still the same to have been a lot cleaner, it did result in contingency or if there were something
person I was 3 years ago, but I’m a little a requirement to place a pretty signifi- that would surprise us that would exceed
savvier. I’ve adapted the way I interact cant footprint there that has put a strain the capacity of a particular COCOM to
with these leaders based on the way they on the force ever since. deal with it, the only place to get forces
learn, and you have to figure that out. Then we go from 2003 to 2011, and and readiness would be from some
I think we’ve wrung that out as much other COCOM. There’s almost nothing
Collins: In our crowdsourcing of stra- as we can, but here’s what I think is stationed in CONUS [the continental
tegic lessons of the wars, a number of different this time when we talk about United States] that is unused capability
folks are saying that when we look back our reentry into Iraq. I think we’ve got it or readiness, so we’ve got to go back and
through history on a grand scale, foreign about right, which is to say, we’ve made address that.
expeditionary forces in counterinsurgency it clear that we will support and enable, Prior to 1991, we were a lot big-
operations are successful only in rare cir- that we’ll keep the eight lines of effort ger—781,000 in the Army alone. We
cumstances. The British were successful apace, even if some of them will get a would have a fraction of the force
in Malaya, but then again the British were little ahead of each other on occasion. forward deployed, and we would have
the government, so there was no sanc- But we’re not going to take ownership these big Reforger exercises, for ex-
tuary. The United States was successful of Iraq again. And I think that we can ample. The forces would be stationed
in the Philippines in 1902, but again it accomplish this task with a light footprint mostly inside CONUS, and the idea was
was the government, and again there was and the use of some of our key enablers, that these forces would be at various
no sanctuary. But other than those two but we’ve got to have resolve and cour- degrees of readiness, but more or less
cases, many experts claim that this cannot age. If the government of Iraq proves to ready in CONUS for deployment into
be done. We have now been involved in be incapable or unwilling, we’ve got to contingency operations and the forward
Iraq, Afghanistan, and Vietnam. How be willing to dial it back. In other words, presence part of it wasn’t the priority. The
should your successors think about this in it has to be conditional; it just can’t be priority was the readiness part of it.
the future? Is this the sort of mission we unconditional in this kind of environment Since 1991, the paradigm’s reversed.
have to still prepare for, or is this some- because we have other options to deal The priority now is forward presence to
thing that is beyond the pale? with the terrorist threat, but Iraq doesn’t include rotational presence, thereafter

12  Dialogue / From the Chairman JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015

security cooperation, Phase 0, Phase 1— the fact that we’re going to be in per- counterterrorism, if you look at the way
that’s the priority now. Phase 3, combat, sistent conflict. Of course, eventually that the State Department organizes itself
we’re taking risk, frankly, because we’ve fizzled as well. I don’t remember exactly and interacts with us, interacts with the
got much less than we probably should why that one fizzled, but it hasn’t actually combatant commanders, it is one group,
have in readiness in CONUS. been replaced. If we have indeed ended one country at a time. But it’s a com-
I’m not suggesting we’re going to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, what mon threat. We have not successfully
flip it again. Some would argue that we do we have? We still have Soldiers and helped our elected officials address this
should flip the paradigm back to where Sailors and Marines deploying in harm’s threat in its totality, and until we do and
we prioritize surge capacity and readi- way. If you’re a pilot flying over Iraq, the until we can actually find the right vo-
ness as the primary effort. I don’t think distinction between combat advising and cabulary, I think we will continue to be
we’ll do that, but I think you’ll see us try no boots on the ground is meaningless. effective at containing the threat and to
to rebalance it. We’ve had some success, but there’s the greatest extent possible and keeping
The part of the force that tends to be work to be done on acknowledging it from our shores, but we will not be ef-
forward is the part that is most capable and understanding what runs from fective at ultimately defeating the threat
of doing the kind of things you’re talking Western Pakistan to Nigeria: a group of until we capture the right framework,
about in terms of counterinsurgency, organizations that sometimes work with which is actually transregional, and until
counterterrorism, building partner ca- each other and sometimes operate inde- we capture the right vocabulary. That’s
pacity, and so forth. As we change the pendently, depending on their objectives, not to suggest, by the way, I think that
paradigm, we have to figure out a way to that are trying to take advantage of lack absolutely the wrong thing would be
make sure that the training that supports of governance almost everywhere, that to agree that it’s transregional and find
the new paradigm accounts for both ma- are playing to this victimization psychol- the right vocabulary, and then decide
neuver warfare and low-intensity conflict. ogy, and that use the tactics of terror. And that we’re going to invest enormous
I think my successor will probably have there is a fine line here: are these people military resources to stabilize all of
to refresh the military lexicon a bit. You terrorists, or are these people using the these countries and put them back on
said before that Bolger said, “We lost Iraq tactics of terror? What we’ve discussed, a firm footing for their future. Because
and Afghanistan.” This statement implies both inside the military and with the that won’t happen. They will allow us
we didn’t win in Iraq and Afghanistan. Yet administration and Congress, is that this to do that—you know many of them
one of my premises is that the definition threat [. . .] of violent extremist organi- will. We’ll be embraced initially, then
[of winning] is frequently redefined in zations—most of which also happen to disdained and attacked ultimately by the
[the current] environment. Saying cate- be radical Islamic organizations—we as very people that we think we’re helping.
gorically “win” or “lose” seems to be far a nation just haven’t had a conversation You asked a great question right at
less applicable to those kinds of conflicts about that. I’ve been accused of being the beginning of this interview about the
than it is in a high-intensity conflict with anti-Islam by some and pro-Islam by oth- future of counterinsurgency. Is it possible
a peer competitor that is trying either to ers. I guess in that sense I’m succeeding to build an indigenous force that will
take your territory or deny your freedom in managing the conversation. But the actually take control of its own destiny?
of movement. point is there are violent extremist organi- I don’t know. But I think that’s the path
zations that are using a religious ideology to addressing that challenge in the future.
Hooker: Is it a mistake to think in terms to brand themselves and to gain support In my judgment, the wrong answer is for
of war termination, or are we in the mid- from disenfranchised populations, both elected officials to ask me the question
dle of an ongoing conflict, maybe less Sunni and Shia. they often ask, which is, “What are we
than a war, but a conflict that is unlikely As long as this conflict persists, every [the U.S. military] going to do about
to end anytime soon and that we ought 10 years or so a new generation will be it?” I get that all the time: “What are you
to adapt to? sucked in. And until this cycle is bro- going to do about Syria?” Here’s my re-
ken—and that cycle is likely not to be sponse: “I’m going to try my best to find
General Dempsey: You remember back in broken exclusively and not even primarily a way to integrate the military instrument
the early part of the last decade the phrase with military force—the despair, lack of of power with the other instruments of
“the Long War.” That phrase attracted hope, lack of inclusive governance, and government and look for our diplomats
antibodies of all kinds […] fiscal antibod- grotesque economic disparity will con- to form coalitions and find a political path
ies, political antibodies, and intellectual tinue, and the U.S. military will be called that we can enable with the use of mili-
antibodies. Then George Casey kind upon to have a role in addressing it. tary power.” JFQ
of led the charge on use of the phrase How we define that role is to be
“persistent conflict.” And his view, if you determined. Right now, we’re defin-
don’t want to concede that this is actually ing it one country and one group at
a war in the strictest or loosest definition a time. In fact, if you look at the way
of the word, you should at least accept our country plans are written for the

JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015 Dempsey 13

General Dempsey on UH-60 Blackhawk
helicopter while flying over Kabul, February 2012
(DOD/D. Myles Cullen)

Executive Summary
very so often we find ourselves in he experienced both “in country” as of a nation’s wars and the place for the

E a place where we can take time

to assess where we are, where we
have been, and where we think we are
well as his interaction with his supe-
riors at different times over the past
decade and more. He also offers some
machines we build to fight them.
In our Forum section we bring you
a broad range of important security
going—and check it against where we important insights about civilian-mil- issues that will take you from the halls
think we should be ending up. This itary relationships that he knows from of the Pentagon to the Arctic. William
edition of JFQ offers two interviews firsthand experience. Consider this Patterson provides a timely review of
that are assessments of events past, a must-read for those who may find the rise of Islamic terrorism in Kenya,
present, and future. Both are of stories themselves in this “arena” at the top where hundreds have been killed and
not yet complete: one, the wars in of the executive branch. The second wounded in recent years due to various
Afghanistan and Iraq; the other, the interview is with Lieutenant General attacks by groups, including al-Shabaab.
production of the F-35 fighter aircraft. Christopher Bogdan, USAF, who is Returning JFQ author Kevin Stringer sees
The first of these interviews is with the Program Executive Officer for the Arctic as the place joint special oper-
the 18th Chairman of the Joint Chiefs the F-35. Lieutenant General Bogdan ations forces should focus on in the years
of Staff General Martin Dempsey on provides his views on where the F-35 ahead. Stephen Watts, J. Michael Polich,
his views about the wars in Iraq and is headed while addressing the “stories and Derek Eaton, graduates of the Joint
Afghanistan, the decisions that were of the past.” Both interviews will in Forces Staff College, discuss how the
made that shaped these wars, and many ways surprise you as well as let Department of Defense can focus its
their outcomes. General Dempsey you hear from the officers who are efforts to rapidly regenerate our irregular
provides a candid assessment of what best positioned to see the time horizon warfare capacity given the withdrawals of

14  Forum / Executive Summary JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015

major troop deployments from Iraq and
Afghanistan in recent years. F-35B Lightning II takes off from USS Wasp during routine daylight operations
A lineup of some of the most ex- (U.S. Marine Corps/Anne K. Henry)
perienced instructors from around the
military academic community fills our
roster in this issue’s JPME Today section.
The U.S. Army War College’s Charles
Allen discusses how his college goes
about educating senior military officers
in leadership and creative thinking. From
Newport and the Naval War College’s
Distance Education Department,
George H. Baker, Jr., and Jason E. Wallis
present an interesting take on ethical
decisionmaking that offers a useful new
tool for faculty and students alike. At
the U.S. Army Command and General
Staff College, Dale Eikmeier is uniquely
positioned to reflect on wargaming at the
operational and tactical levels of war.
In Commentary, as a well-known pro-
fessor of strategic leadership at the Naval
War College (and a fellow press director),
Carnes Lord offers his views on the rela-
tionship between military professionals
and civilian leadership.
Our Features section brings a range
of issues including cyber, ballistic mis-
sile defense, land power in Asia, and
North Atlantic Treaty Organization ready to respond through the efforts of and in many cases they do not align with
(NATO) training. G. Alexander NATO’s Joint Military Training Center their organizations’ points of view. JFQ
Crowther and Shaheen Ghori lead off in Germany. offers you that opportunity to say what
with a discussion concerning what U.S. The National War College’s Mark you think matters. Got a better view?
Government cyber activity looks like Clodfelter, one of the Nation’s leading Write it up and send it to us. We have
and how to interpret that view. Andrea scholars on strategy and the applica- thousands of people looking for you to
Little Limbago helps us think about tion of airpower, brings us back to have a say. That’s how the joint force will
how cyber statecraft works. Another Vietnam in this issue’s Recall article. remain the best in the world. Or at least
team from the Joint Forces Staff Our Joint Doctrine section contains that is how I see where we are going. JFQ
College, Thomas K. Hensley, Lloyd a thought-provoking piece on center
P. Caviness, Stephanie Vaughn, and of gravity analysis as it applies to the William T. Eliason
Christopher Morton, explains what is current fight against the Islamic State Editor in Chief
involved in providing adequate warn- of Iraq and the Levant, and includes
ing for our ballistic missile defenses. an updated list of recently revised joint
Land power in Asia has become an publications. We also present three book
important discussion item alongside reviews that we hope you will enjoy.
the more publicized Air-Sea Battle Whether you agree with what our
debate. Lieutenant General John “JD” authors and the generals we interviewed
Johnson and Bradley T. Gericke re- said, I want you to know that you can
mind us that land power is still central take a position on these and any other
to a successful outcome in any future issues. You should take a position. Argue
crisis on the Korean Peninsula. From with your teammates. Wrestle with what
NATO, John G. Norris and James K. is happening today and what is likely
Dunivan give us a much-needed look to happen tomorrow. Not everything
inside the Alliance’s efforts to keep we publish here should be taken at face
land forces trained, integrated, and value. These are the ideas of the authors

JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015 Eliason 15

 Garissa Market in Nairobi suburb Eastleigh (Dan Kori/Wikipedia)

Islamic Radicalization in Kenya

By William R. Patterson

n September 2013, an attack carried of Eastleigh, known for its large Somali threat to its national interests in Kenya

I out by the al Qaeda–affiliated terror-

ist group al-Shabaab on the Westgate
shopping mall in Nairobi, Kenya, drew
ex-patriot population. Four other
Somalis have been charged with helping
to plan the operation, two of whom had
specifically and in the Horn of Africa
more generally.
The first major terrorist attack to hit
renewed attention to the extremist Kenyan citizenship and identification Kenya occurred at the U.S. Embassy in
threat facing that country. At least four cards.1 This attack was only the latest in Nairobi on August 7, 1998. This attack
attackers left more than 65 people dead a string of terrorist incidents stretching was carried out with a truck bomb, kill-
after a multiday rampage. All four of back to the late 1990s. It should serve ing 214 people and injuring more than
the known assailants were Somalis who as a stark reminder to the United States 5,000. On November 22, 2002, another
had been living in the Nairobi suburb that terrorism remains a significant set of attacks included the detonation of
a truck bomb at an Israeli-owned resort
and the launching of missiles at an Israeli-
chartered aircraft leaving the airport in
Dr. William R. Patterson is a former Social Scientist with the Human Terrain System who served in Mombasa. Sixteen Israelis and Kenyans
Afghanistan and has been selected to be a Foreign Service Officer with the Department of State.
This article is a modified version that the author originally published while serving with the Human
were killed in the blast at the hotel,
Terrain System. though no one was killed in the attack on

16  Forum / Islamic Radicalization in Kenya JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015

the plane. Al Qaeda was responsible for hood of Eastleigh. Ethnically, Kenya’s authority within the Muslim community,
each of these attacks.2 Muslims are primarily Swahili or Somali, that authority came to be challenged
Since those early attacks, the gov- although there are also sizable Arab and during the 20th century and remains an
ernment of Kenya has become an Asian (predominantly Indian and Paki- area of contention between different
important strategic partner in the U.S. stani) groups.5 Muslim groups today.
Government’s counterterrorism efforts In addition to ethnic divisions among During the end of the 19th and
in the broader Horn of Africa region. Kenya’s Muslims, there are also key dif- beginning of the 20th centuries, the ter-
In October 2011, the Kenyan Defense ferences in the types of Islam practiced. ritories that make up Kenya today were
Forces launched an offensive against Scholar Bjørn Møller writes that the colonized by the British Empire. The
al-Shabaab called Operation Linda Nchi Kenyan Muslim community can be cate- interior of the country was chartered to
(OLN)—Swahili for “protect the na- gorized as follows: the Imperial British East Africa Company
tion”—in Somalia. While OLN enjoyed in 1888, became a formal protectorate in
•• a majority of indigenous Kenyan
the approval of most Kenyans, it also 1895, and a colony in 1920. The Muslim
Muslims belong to Sufi orders, espe-
prompted criticism from Kenyan Muslim coastal area remained a protectorate but
cially in rural areas
communities. was administered in the same fashion as
•• reformists, more conservative Isla-
In 2012, Kenya passed a tough an- was the colony, meaning there was little
mists, are another primary grouping,
titerrorism bill called the Prevention of practical difference.11
mainly in the cities and among Arabs
Terrorism Act 2012. Though the passage Administratively, the British catego-
•• a small sect called the Ahmadiya,
of this bill was not as controversial as rized people as either native or nonnative,
which was responsible for the first
some earlier iterations, it still elicited providing different privileges to each, with
translation of the Koran into Kiswa-
criticism from Kenyan human rights and nonnative receiving preferential treatment.
hili, probably numbers no more than
Muslim groups. In addition, riots blam- Swahilis did not fit easily into either of
a few thousand
ing the Kenyan police for the extrajudicial those categories. As Jeremy Prestholdt
•• mainstream Sunni Muslims, mainly
killing of al-Shabaab–linked Muslim points out, “most occupied the awkward
among Asians
Youth Center (MYC) cleric Aboud Rogo3 position of having neither a recognized
•• a small number of Shi’ites, also
and the growing activity of the MYC are African ‘tribal’ identity nor the higher
mainly among Asians.6
indicative of increased Islamic radicalism legal status of Non-Native. By the end of
in Kenya. This presents a substantial risk Muslims settled on Pate Island the colonial era, this nebulous position
of terrorism against the Kenyan gov- (part of the Lamu archipelago in Coast contributed to perceptions of Swahilis
ernment, Western targets in Kenya, and Province) as early as the 8th century. This as neither completely African nor, by
neighboring countries in the region. presence grew considerably during the extension, Kenyan.”12 The legacy of that
This article explores the development 12th century as trade increased in the division remains today as many contem-
of radicalization in Kenya in recent Indian Ocean in general and along the porary Kenyans continue to see Muslims
decades and the sociocultural and po- coast of East Africa in particular. The more as foreigners than as true Kenyans.
litical factors that have undergirded it. earliest Muslim settlers came primarily Another colonial practice that
Additionally, it highlights four general from what are now Oman, Yemen, and served to split Muslims from the larger
factors influencing the rising threat of Iran, establishing communities along the society was the introduction and spe-
Islamic radicalism in Kenya: institutional Somali coast, Lamu, Mombasa, Zanzibar, cial treatment of Christianity. Abdalla
weaknesses; increasingly acute grievances and other coastal areas of East Africa. Bujra explains that Christianity came
by the Muslim minority; the establish- As these settlers intermarried with each to predominate in Kenya, and Western
ment of Wahhabi and other extremist other and with local people, Swahili cul- culture generally developed preeminence
forms of Islam in Kenya, along with at- ture evolved over time. Islam became the through the school system and through
tendant jihadi ideology and propaganda; core of Swahili culture, but the culture was examples set by colonial officials and
and Kenya’s foreign and military policy, also influenced by many traditional aspects British settlers. Kenya’s Muslims became
particularly as it pertains to Somalia. of indigenous African religious beliefs.7 culturally isolated as the Christian Church
Lamu and Mombasa became the primary and Western educational system became
Islam in Kenya areas of Islamic learning and scholarship established in the rest of the country.13
Approximately 4.3 million Muslims in Kenya.8 Swahili culture and Islam Not only was Christianity privileged,
comprise a little more than 10 percent remained largely confined to the coastal but Islam was also denigrated. Bujra
of the overall Kenyan population and areas where trade flourished, though Islam notes that “through Church activities
about 30 percent of the coastal popula- eventually established a foothold in the and education, and later through the
tion.4 Large concentrations of Kenyan capital city of Nairobi as well.9 Among colonial education and media, both
Muslims live in Coast Province, North some of the settlers, particularly in Lamu, Church, Colonial Administration, and
East Province, and the capital city of were sayyids, descendants of the Prophet the European settler communities
Nairobi, particularly in the neighbor- Mohammad.10 Traditionally granted great propagated very strong anti-Arab and

JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015 Patterson 17

anti-Islamic misinformation and pro- for themselves in Kenya, many Muslims sayyid (also called masharifu), whose
paganda. Hence Swahili/Arab political traveled abroad to the Middle East, par- power base remained centered in Lamu.
influences essentially came to a halt in ticularly Saudi Arabia, for work. Authors Kresse explains that the conflict between
[Kenya].”14 This political disenfran- Esha Faki Mwinyihaji and Frederick O. Khasim and the masharifu
chisement has never been remedied and Wanyama note that:
remains a major grievance of Kenya’s centered on the social and religious status of
Muslims to this day. The employment sector was seen as closed to the masharifu, the descendants of Prophet
The political disenfranchisement many Muslims. As a result of the oil boom Muhammad. In popular perception the
of Kenya’s Muslims continued after in the 1970s and 1980s, many young masharifu, as holy persons with special
Kenya’s independence in 1963. The Muslims went to work as expatriates in blessings, fulfilled an important religious
Kenyan African National Union Saudi Arabia where the remuneration function of mediating between Muslim
(KANU) immediately came to power was good with the minimal education commoners and God, via the Prophet
and instituted one-party rule. KANU, they had. For almost two decades Saudi Muhammad, to whom they were said to
strongly linked to Christian ethnic Arabia and the Persian Gulf served as a be especially close. But Sheikh Muhammed
groups, was perceived as benefiting safe haven for some Kenyan Muslims to Khasim insisted, with reference to the
those groups disproportionately while work and progress economically.18 Qur’an, that they did not have any such
largely ignoring problems specific to special powers and, furthermore, it was up
Muslims.15 Due to their marginalization One of the impacts of greater ex- to each individual to establish a direct con-
in the political process and conse- posure to the Middle East—and Saudi tact to God through special prayers (dua),
quential lack of influence in Kenyan Arabia in particular—was the introduc- independently.23
politics, dissent grew among Muslims. tion of stricter interpretations of Islam
Immediately upon Kenyan indepen- by Kenyan Muslims returning home. Khasim distributed his teachings
dence, the Mwambao United Front This provoked a conflict between older through pamphlets and educational
movement emerged in Kenya’s coastal Swahili interpretations of Islam that books. This served to threaten the au-
communities calling for the autonomy of incorporated elements of indigenous thority of the masharifu and represented
the coastal strip of Kenya. This was seen African religions and practices imported an opening salvo in the dispute between
by some Kenyan Muslims as the only from the Middle East. This schism was Islam as traditionally practiced in Kenya
way to achieve a political system that also generated by Kenyan students who and stricter interpretations of Islam more
honored their religious beliefs.16 Today completed their studies in the Middle recently imported from the Middle East.
the Mombasa Republican Council has East. In so doing, they adopted stricter An illustrative case study of this rift
taken up this cause and has attracted religious practices, which they brought is provided by Susan Beckerleg in her
significant support. back with them to their communities.19 anthropological work in the coastal city
Other Swahilis attempted to use the According to Kai Kresse: of Watamu. A reformist movement called
more traditional political route by estab- Halali Sunna took root there, which
lishing the Islamic Party of Kenya (IPK) Proficient in Arabic, the graduates re- stood in opposition to the traditional
in 1992. However, explicitly religious turned with university degrees and the masharifu. The adherents of this move-
parties are illegal in Kenya, and the IPK reformist doctrines of their respective host ment followed a stricter form of Islam
was denied formal political participation. institutions, which were more radical and and criticized the power of the masharifu
The IPK complained that all existent combative in tone and content. They ap- as well as the indigenous elements that
Kenyan political parties are, if not in name plied these ideas to the East African context had long been established in their form
at least in fact, Christian oriented and led in their teachings and public speeches, thus of Islam. They also stressed participation
by Christians.17 The rejection of the IPK radicalizing reformist discourse and polar- in traditional Islamic observances such as
as a legitimate political party has been per- izing Islamic debate more and more.20 prayer and the duty to imitate the life of
ceived by many Muslims as another form Mohammed. The men grew their beards
of political alienation and as a deliberate An individual named Sheikh and wore traditional Islamic garb and the
suppression of Muslims’ ability to express Muhammed Khasim was especially influ- women also dressed more conservatively
their views through the political process. ential along the Swahili coast.21 Khasim than did the typical Muslim women of
In addition, many of Kenya’s Muslims was most active during the 1960s and Watamu. This sect was highly influenced
perceived themselves as being excluded 1970s and argued that traditional Swahili by the conservative Tabligh Islamic
from employment opportunities available Islam included impermissible bid’a (in- movement, which originated in India in
to other Kenyans. This was especially novation in religious matters) and shirk the early 20th century and which reached
the case as Kenyans from the interior (violating the principle of the unity of Watamu in 1990 by way of migrants.24
of the country began to buy property God) due to the influences of indigenous The adherents of this movement were
along the coast during the burgeoning religions.22 He sought to purify Kenyan also evangelical and worked vigorously to
tourist industry. Seeing little opportunity Islam and to eliminate the power of the spread their ideas.25

18  Forum / Islamic Radicalization in Kenya JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015

 Much of the local impetus for this
reversion to a more conservative form
of Islam sprang from social changes
being imposed on the community
by outside pressures. As Watamu
became a popular tourist destination
for Westerners, the young people of
Watamu became increasingly exposed
to the use of alcohol and drugs; im-
modest dress at the beach, especially by
women; and other behaviors that con-
tradicted traditional Islamic precepts
and rules of behavior. The adoption of
a stricter interpretation of Islam was
one way to push back against these dis-
orienting cultural and social changes.26
This phenomenon was not limited to
Watamu and was in fact occurring in
Muslim communities in popular tourist
destinations throughout coastal Kenya
in particular.
This push for the adoption of a
more conservative “pure” form of Smoke rises above Westgate Mall in Nairobi, September 23, 2013 (Anne Knight/Wikipedia)
Islam, as opposed to the more tra-
ditional form of Islam influenced by Forces of Radicalization in the region. It is far easier to operate a cell
indigenous African religion, created a There are four main factors that have in Kenya than in any of the Horn coun-
space for the development of radicaliza- served to intensify the country’s vulner- tries.”30 Radical and terrorist groups require
tion in Kenya. The reform movement ability to radicalization and terrorism: resources to thrive. Infrastructure and some
can in retrospect be seen as a first step structural and institutional factors, degree of economic stability allow for ease
toward a more radicalized and militant grievances, foreign and military policy, of travel, faster communications, and access
form of Islam establishing roots in and jihadist ideology. to resources.
the country. The rift created between Structural and Institutional Factors. In terms of communications,
traditional and reform Islam became There are several structural and institu- Mwinyihaji and Wanyama point to the
more adversarial over time, especially as tional factors that make Kenya vulnerable Internet as being particularly important:
outside actors, most prominently from to radicalization:
the Middle East and South Asia, began Rapid internet diffusion has led to a
•• the relatively advanced economy and
to increasingly influence the movement. mushrooming of cyber-cafes charging users
infrastructure allows for freedom
Kresse writes that: less than a dollar per hour. These units have
of movement and an abundance of
become crucial sites of Kenyan Muslims’ en-
targets
Differences in practice and understanding gagement with the global Muslim ummah,
•• weak governance in key areas such as
of Islam, which were once tolerated, turned enhancing their knowledge of Islam through
security, criminal justice system, and
to spark off strong animosities, and the cyber-literacy, and networking within and
rule of law impede effective action
intellectual center of reformist ideology between (cyber)-communities with shared
against terrorist groups28
shifted from an internal to an external interests.31
•• geographical proximity to unstable
position, as a multitude of Islamic groups
states, particularly Somalia, in con-
from around the world have sought to in- Such communication is much more
junction with porous borders.29
crease their influence and support.27 difficult to achieve in a failed state such
Economy and Infrastructure. It seems as Somalia.
The trend toward radicalization catalyzed counterintuitive that a relatively robust The infrastructure also offers entic-
by the reform movement soon combined economy and infrastructural system—com- ing targets for terrorist groups. Airports,
with other forces and only grew stronger pared to neighboring countries—would hotels, resorts, restaurants, and night-
during the 1990s and 2000s. make Kenya vulnerable. But as Raymond clubs, as well as government buildings
Muhula puts it, “Kenya’s attractiveness to such as the U.S. Embassy, are easily
terrorists is exacerbated by the fact that it accessible to terrorists. Furthermore,
also boasts the best infrastructural facilities tourists themselves are possible targets

JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015 Patterson 19

either while they are in the country or marginalized. For most of this period the Ahmad Iman dissuaded Kenyan Muslims
during their transit to and from, as the KANU held power in a one-party system. from engaging in national politics, urging
2002 attacks on the Israeli hotel and However, even after Kenyan politics them instead to “Chinja” (cut), “Chonga”
charter plane demonstrate. became more democratic, the interests (peel) and “Fiyeka” (slash) the throats of
Weak Governance. Weak governance, of the Muslim minority have been largely the [Kenyan] infidels and “to hit back
especially in critical areas such as criminal ignored in political circles. and cause blasts [in Kenya]” similar to the
justice, border security, and the provision The government established an Kampala bombings.36
of essential services, also increases Kenya’s official Muslim organization—the
vulnerability to radicalism and terror. Supreme Council of Muslims of Kenya Alienation from legitimate political
Widespread corruption, unguarded (SUPKEM)—in 1973. It was the only institutions may continue to increase
borders, and ineffective security and organization authorized to represent the appeal of violent attacks.
police organizations allow terrorist or- all of Kenya’s Muslims, and SUPKEM Discrimination and Lack of
ganizations freedom of movement, the leaders were closely allied with the polit- Opportunity. Lack of opportunity, in
establishment of safe havens, and the abil- ical establishment.34 Being a tool of the some cases as the result of discriminatory
ity to coordinate logistical needs.32 government, however, many Muslims policies, contributes to widely held griev-
A weak criminal justice system can viewed it more as a way to control them ances in coastal Muslim communities.
also result in impunity for terrorists. than to meet their unique interests. The Fathima Badurdeen argues:
When suspects are caught, they are organization was not seen as useful for
frequently able to evade justice through expressing any political ideas, opinions, or The root cause of youth radicalization in
bribery or as a result of sheer incompe- needs that were not already acceptable to Coast stems from the region’s desperate
tence in the system. This weakness not the government. economic, social, and political conditions.
only allows terror suspects to unjustly The situation has marginally improved Ineffective decentralization of development
go free but also fosters police abuses since the end of one-party rule. There plans and governance issues since indepen-
due to their inability to use the legal are now several national-level Muslim dence form the backbone of this situation,
system successfully. entities with some degree of indepen- which is taken advantage of by an infra-
Geography. Kenya’s close proximity dent political influence. These include, structure of social networks or religious and
to unstable states (Somalia, Uganda, among others, the National Muslim political groups that provide communities
South Sudan, and Ethiopia), along with Leaders Forum, Majlis Ulamaa Kenya, with what the government does not and are
its inability to protect its borders, are Kenya Council of Imams and Ulamaas, in some instances extremist.37
other risk factors. This is especially true and Council of Imams and Preachers
of Somalia and even more so in the af- of Kenya.35 These are primarily interest Unemployment is rife in the Muslim
termath of Operation Linda Nchi. The groups and councils, however, and do population. North East Province, Nairobi,
al-Shabaab terrorist group in Somalia not wield any direct power or authority. and Coast Province, all three with high
sends adherents back and forth across the While they give the Muslim community Muslim populations, had the highest
border.33 Additionally, Kenya’s proximity an outlet to express itself, they have not levels of unemployment in the country
to the Arabian Peninsula, Egypt, and the led to sufficient representation within as of 2005–2006,38 as well as the highest
Middle East more broadly has allowed for government itself or to remedies for the rates of youth unemployment in 2008.39
the steady penetration of jihadist ideol- unique problems and interests of Kenya’s Furthermore, economic development in
ogies as travel between Kenya and these Muslim communities. the tourism industry, particularly in Coast
areas is relatively easy. Without political power, Muslims Province, has generally advanced without
Grievances. Kenyan Muslims have sev- have not been able to advocate success- input from the local Muslim population
eral grievances, many of which have their fully for the needs of their communities and has also largely excluded them from its
roots in colonial history. The structural and have largely been left behind in terms benefits. Fatima Azmiya Badurdeen writes,
and institutional vulnerabilities discussed of economic and educational opportuni- “The government’s attitude toward and
above exacerbate these grievances: ties. Lacking a legitimate political path to plans for the coastal communities have led
address grievances, some Muslims turn citizens in Coast to feel that their resources
•• lack of representation in politics
to religious extremism to affect change. are being used for the benefit of others.”40
•• discrimination and lack of economic,
A report prepared by the United Nations She provides the example of a port devel-
educational, and other opportunities
Monitoring Group responsible for East opment project in Lamu. Locals believed
•• heavy-handedness and human rights
Africa noted that: that the project was being forced on them
abuses by the police and antiterror-
and complained that they have had little
ism legislation and tactics.
During a 13 September 2010 lecture, input regarding decisionmaking. This lack
Political Representation. Since Kenya’s addressing [Muslim Youth Center, an of local representation is typical of the
independence from Britain in 1963, the offshoot of al-Shabaab] combatants and types of interactions that have led to high
country’s Muslims have been politically other Swahili-speaking fighters in Somalia, levels of resentment.

20  Forum / Islamic Radicalization in Kenya JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015

 Disparities in educational opportuni- in Mombasa in 2002 brought terrorism was reintroduced in 2006, only to be
ties have also been a problem, and with to the forefront in Kenya. The United defeated again.
less access to government-run schools, States pressured the government to enact In October 2012, the Prevention
many Muslim families have turned to various legislation and policies to fight of Terrorism Act was passed. This law
madrassas and to foreign education. terrorism in Kenya to prevent the coun- prescribes stiff punishments for people
According to the International Crisis try’s use as a base for al Qaeda or other engaged in terrorist attacks, planning,
Group (ICG), since the late 1970s radical groups. However, some of these recruiting, or other activities. It also al-
Kenya’s madrassas have been domi- efforts have had the unintended conse- lows terrorism suspects to be extradited
nated by wealthy Wahhabi charities and quence of further radicalizing elements of to other countries for prosecution. Most
foundations. Madrassas at the primary the population. Since the terrorist attacks of the issues that Muslims objected to
and secondary level have been prevalent in 2002, some Kenyan Muslims have in earlier versions of the bill have been
throughout urban areas for decades and complained of being unfairly targeted ameliorated through amendments and
have frequently focused on teaching and of being the victims of human rights this version garnered some support in the
Arabic and Wahhabi theology. In fact, abuses, including arbitrary arrest and tor- Muslim community.47 Other Muslims con-
religious inculcation rather than an em- ture during interrogations.44 tinue to complain about the bill, however,
ployable education has often been the Muslim human rights groups oper- again arguing that it is aimed at them.48
primary aim of these institutions. The ating in Kenya document government It is important to view these legisla-
brightest of the students would then be abuse. Al-Amin Kimathi, chair of the tive initiatives and alleged human rights
granted scholarships to Wahhabi-oriented Muslim Human Rights Forum, claimed abuses in the context of social separation
universities in Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, or in media accounts that at least seven that has historically existed between
other Middle Eastern countries.41 Muslims, most with alleged ties to al- Muslims and the government. Jeremy
Finally, many Kenyan Muslims also Shabaab, disappeared in 2013. He also Prestholdt points out that “counterter-
say they are discriminated against by the surmised that inefficiencies within the rorism has alienated Muslim communities
government overall. They complain of criminal justice system had hampered legal who for nearly three decades have voiced
being treated as foreigners, about the investigations and caused security officers feelings of economic and political mar-
inability to get documents such as IDs to act outside of the law. According to ginalization.”49 These counterterrorism
and passports, and harassment of citizens Kimathi, “They [police] reach a point actions, or the perceptions that they
from Arab countries coming to Kenya.42 where they get frustrated by the law and have created, have had the unintended
This has been particularly difficult since the court process and they have realized consequence of exacerbating preexisting
the strict enforcement of passport regu- that the only way to deal with these people grievances and social cleavages. They
lations implemented in 2001. After the is to ‘disappear’ them.”45 have deepened an attitude of mistrust and
terrorist attacks of 9/11, the United Additionally, various legislative ini- have possibly had the opposite of their
States pressured the Kenyan government tiatives, particularly the Suppression of desired effect by further radicalizing ag-
to more scrupulously examine the pass- Terrorism Bill first introduced in 2002, grieved segments of the population. The
ports of citizens of Asian or Arab descent. have been viewed by many Kenyan International Crisis Group argues that
In response, the government has required Muslims as specifically targeting them. while the threat posed by groups such
that to obtain a new passport or renew a The bill was drafted with little or no input as al-Shabaab is real, overreaction and
previously held one, citizens of Asian or from the Muslim community, and it was human rights abuses by police and other
Arab ancestry, including Swahilis, must criticized for having an overly broad security actors may be counterproductive.
present their grandfather’s birth certif- definition of terrorism, extensive police The group warns that “reckless police
icate—a requirement that few Kenyans powers to detain people, and providing action has become a deepening concern
of any group can comply with. Many the minister for internal security with the and could radicalize Kenyan Somalis,
Kenyan Muslims consider the enforce- power to label any group as a terrorist as well as Muslims in general. Kenya
ment of these restrictive passport laws to organization. The most controversial urgently needs to reform its internal secu-
be openly discriminatory against them aspect, however, was the power granted rity services; what is presently on display
“at the behest of the United States.”43 to police to arrest any person “who, in is an incoherent system that weakens
As seen below, many grievances held by a public place wears an item of clothing national security.”50
Kenyan Muslims stem from such coun- . . . in such a way or in such circum- Kenya has taken several steps to
terterrorism efforts. stances as to arouse suspicion that he strengthen terrorism legislation, investigate
Counterterrorism and Human is a member or supporter of a declared terrorist organizations operating in Kenya,
Rights Abuses. The bombing of the U.S. terrorist organization.”46 Muslims feared and arrest suspected terrorist operatives.
Embassy in Nairobi in 1998, the attacks that this would allow members of their These steps are crucial to inhibiting the
on New York City and the Pentagon community to be targeted merely be- ability of terrorist groups to operate there.
in 2001, and the attacks against an cause of their appearance. Due to these They may backfire, however, if they are
Israeli-owned hotel and charter plane complaints, the bill was withdrawn. It viewed as targeting the entire Muslim

JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015 Patterson 21

community or as relying on draconian Foreign and Military Policies. government and heightened their sense of
tactics contrary to human rights. The unin- Kenyan foreign and military policies victimization.56
tended second-order effects of these efforts anger many Kenyan Muslims and More recently, Operation Linda Nchi
may be to increase radicalization and re- serve as a powerful ideological tool for has led to protests and outright violence
ceptivity to the messages being propagated radicalization. They complain that the in Kenya. In October 2011, the Kenyan
by terrorist groups. Closer engagement government’s relationships with the Defense Forces joined Somali, Ethiopian,
between government representatives and United States and Israel are too close and and French troops in an operation to
Muslim leaders over pending legislation, that Kenya’s multiple military interven- drive al Qaeda–affiliate al-Shabaab from
even-handed application of the law, and tions in Somalia targeted Muslims at the Somalia. That intervention led to a back-
thorough investigations of alleged human behest of the United States. The Islamic lash of attacks in Kenya itself. More than
rights violations may ameliorate some of Liberation Army of the People of Kenya, 20 attacks linked to al-Shabaab have been
these effects. for example, used Kenya’s close ties with conducted in Kenya since the operation
Jihadist Ideology. Jihadist organiza- the United States and Israel as justifica- began. Most of these attacks have tar-
tions in Kenya use a variety of ideological tion for the attack on the U.S. Embassy geted nightclubs, bars, and churches.57
tools and radical Islamic teachings to in Nairobi in 1998. After the attack they The ICG warned at the time that:
galvanize the Muslim population there released the following statement:
toward violence. The grievances, cultural Views within the ethnic Somali and wider
ties, and influx of jihadist philosophy The Americans humiliate our people, they Muslim community regarding the war are
through the increase of madrassas in occupy the Arabian peninsula, they extract mixed but predominately critical. . . . The
Kenya have served to legitimate and our riches, they impose a blockade and, notion that the war is popular within the
spread radical ideology. Ethnic heritage besides, they support the Jews of Israel, our Muslim community is wishful thinking,
is also an important factor. A report worse [sic] enemies, who occupy the Al-Aqsa and has the potential to exacerbate already
prepared for the Combating Terrorism mosque. . . . The attack was justified be- worrying radicalization in the country is
Center at West Point notes that “Many cause the government of Kenya recognized very real.58
residents of Mombasa, Malindi, and that the Americans had used the country’s
Lamu [all in Coast Province] hold stron- territory to fight against its Moslem neigh- This turned out to be prescient.
ger ties with the Arabian Peninsula than bors, in particular Somalia. Besides, Kenya Several historical and current factors
with Kenya’s own interior.”51 Raymond cooperated with Israel. In this country one have recently combined to increase the
Muhula also argues that ethnic ties make finds the most anti-Islamic Jewish centers potential of terrorist activity in Kenya.
some of Kenya’s Muslims particularly in all East Africa. It is from Kenya that Structural and institutional weaknesses,
receptive to jihadist ideology emanating the Americans supported the separatist historical grievances, the influx of radical
from the Middle East and other parts of war in Southern Sudan, pursued by John ideology, and military intervention in
the world.52 Garang’s fighters.55 Somalia have galvanized extremists and
As noted earlier, over the past several increased the likelihood of terrorist acts in
decades there has been a reformist move- Intervention in Somalia has been a Kenya. Kenyan counterterrorism efforts
ment that has sought to “purify” Islam of particularly strong catalyst for radicalism will continue, but attention should be
the indigenous elements that it has accrued among some Muslims in Kenya. In 2006, paid to their unintended second-order
from traditional African religious practices. for example, the Kenyan government al- effects, as well as the historical and social
This movement led to the establishment lowed the United States to use its territory context of these activities, so that nega-
of a more conservative—and eventually to support Ethiopian military operations tive effects can be ameliorated.
radical—form of Islam in Kenya. Radical against Somalia. The government also Islam is on a track of increasing radical-
jihadist ideology has been increasingly cooperated with U.S. efforts to track al ization in the country and groups linked
disseminated through mosques, madrassas, Qaeda operatives among the resultant ref- to al Qaeda and al-Shabaab pose a signif-
and community development initiatives53 ugees, and Kenyan security forces arrested icant and growing threat to Kenya and
as well as through the radical publication at least 150 people from various countries. to Western persons and interests in that
Al-Misbah, which is published by the MYC At least 90 of those arrested were later sent country. Recognition of the threat and its
and The Weekly Muslim News Update. Both to Somalia and Ethiopia. The government underlying causes is necessary for redress-
of these publications have used Koranic denied that any of the deported refugees ing those causes and reducing the threat
teachings to foment jihad and have criti- were Kenyan citizens, but Raila Odinga, level posed by radical Islamic groups. JFQ
cized the Kenyan government over a variety an opposition candidate for the presi-
of issues including economic disparities dency, released the names of 19 Kenyan
and discrimination, arbitrary arrests, and Muslims who he claimed were deported. Notes
Kenya’s military relationship with the This incident inflamed tensions with the
United States.54 Muslim community in Kenya and aroused
1
Lateef Mungin, “Hearing Starts, Ad-
journed for 4 Suspects in Kenya Mall Attack,”
their deep-seated distrust toward the

22  Forum / Islamic Radicalization in Kenya JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015

CNN.com, January 14, 2014, available at Terrorism Center, July 2007), 47, available at 51
Watts, Shapiro, and Brown, 51.
<www.cnn.com/2014/01/15/world/africa/ <www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/al-qaidas-misadven- 52
Muhula, 47.
kenya-mall-trial/>. tures-in-the-horn-of-africa>. 53
Badurdeen, 56.
2
Johnnie Carson, “Kenya: The Struggle 29
Ibid., 50 54
Mwinyihaji and Wanyama, 107.
against Terrorism,” in Battling Terrorism in the 30
Raymond Muhula, “Kenya and the 55
Quoted in Haynes, 499.
Horn of Africa, ed. Robert I. Rotberg (Cam- Global War on Terrorism: Searching for a New 56
Bachmann and Hönke, 108–109.
bridge, MA: World Peace Foundation, 2005), Role in a New War,” in Africa and the War on 57
ICG, “The Kenyan Military Intervention
180–181. Terrorism, ed. John Davis (Burlington, VT: in Somalia,” 8.
3
Tom Odula, “Aboud Rogo, Kenya Ashgate, 2007), 47. 58
Ibid., 14.
Muslim Cleric, Shot Dead,” Associated Press, 31
Mwinyihaji and Wanyama, 105.
September 17, 2012. 32
William Rosenau, “Al-Qaida Recruitment
4
Jodi Vittori, Kristin Bremer, and Pasquale Trends in Kenya and Tanzania,” Studies in
Vittori, “Islam in Tanzania and Kenya: Ally Conflict and Terrorism 28 (2005), 1.
or Threat in the War on Terror?” Studies in 33
International Crisis Group (ICG),
Conflict and Terrorism 32, no. 12 (December “Kenyan Somali Islamist Radicalisation,” Africa
2009), 1084. Briefing No. 85, January 25, 2012, 1.
5
Bjørn Møller, “Political Islam in Kenya,” 34
Vittori, Bremer, and Vittori, 1083.
DIIS Working Paper No. 2006/22, Danish 35
Mwinyihaji and Wanyama, 104.
Institute for International Studies, 2006, 11. 36
United Nations Security Council,
6
Ibid. S/2011/433, “Report of the Monitoring
7
Abdalla Bujra, “Islam in Eastern Africa: Group on Somalia and Eritrea Pursuant to
Historical Legacy and Contemporary Challeng- Security Council Resolution 1916 (2010),”
es,” Development Policy Management Forum, 144, available at <www.un.org/ga/search/
August 2002, 6. view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2011/433>.
8
Ibid., 7. 37
Fatima Azmiya Badurdeen, “Youth
9
Ibid., 11. Radicalization in the Coast Province of Kenya,”
10
B.G. Martin, “Islam in Lamu,” review of Africa Peace and Conflict Journal 5, no. 1
The Sacred Meadows: A Structural Analysis of (2012), 54.
Religious Symbolism in an East African Town, 38
World Bank, “Kenya—Poverty and
by Abdul Hamid M. el-Zein, Journal of African Inequality Assessment: Executive Summary
History 17, no. 3 (1976), 453. and Synthesis Report,” 2009, available at
11
Møller. <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/
12
Jeremy Prestholdt, “Kenya, the United handle/10986/3081>.
States, and Counterterrorism,” Africa Today 39
World Bank, “Kenya Poverty and
57, no. 4 (Summer 2011), 6. Inequality Assessment: Volume I: Synthesis
13
Bujra, 11–12. Report,” Poverty Reduction and Economic
14
Ibid., 8. Management Unit, Africa Region, Report No.
15
Jeffrey Haynes, “Islam and Democracy 44190-KE, June 2008.
in East Africa,” Democratization 13, no. 3, 40
Badurdeen, 54–55.
(September 2012), 497. 41
ICG, “Kenyan Somali Islamist Radicali-
16
Esha Faki Mwinyihaji and Frederick O. sation,” 11.
Wanyama, “The Media, Terrorism, and Political 42
Bujra, 16.
Mobilization of Muslims in Kenya,” The Politics 43
Prestholdt, 9.
and Religion Journal—Serbian Edition, no. 1 44
Jeremy Lind and Jude Howell, “Count-
(2011), 103. er-terrorism and the Politics of Aid: Civil
17
Vittori, Bremer, and Vittori, 1083. Society Responses in Kenya,” Development and
18
Mwinyihaji and Wanyama, 106. Change 42, no. 2 (2010), 342.
19
Kai Kresse, “Swahili Enlightenment? East 45
Clar Ni Chonghaile, “Kenyan Muslims
African Reformist Discourse at the Turning Fear the Worst Over Proposals to Boost Police
Point: The Example of Sheikh Muhammad Powers,” Guardian, September 27, 2012.
Kasim Mazrui,” Journal of Religion in Africa 46
Jan Bachmann and Jana Hönke, “‘Peace
33, no. 3 (2003), 281. and Security’ as Counterterrorism? The Politi-
20
Ibid., 282. cal Effects of Liberal Interventions in Kenya,”
21
Ibid., 285. African Affairs 109, no. 434 (2009), 108.
22
Ibid., 286. 47
Standard on Sunday Team, “Kibaki Signs
23
Ibid., 283. Historic Anti-terrorism Bill,” Standard Digital
24
Susan Beckerleg, “‘Brown Sugar’ or News, October 14, 2012, available at <www.
Friday Prayers: Youth Choices and Community standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000068354/
Building in Coastal Kenya,” African Affairs 94, kibaki-signs-historic-anti-terrorism-bill>.
no. 374 (January 1995), 32. 48
Wambui Ndonga, “Kenya: Kibaki Assents
25
Ibid., 33. to Prevention of Terrorism Act,” AllAfrica.
26
Ibid., 37. com, October 13, 2012.
27
Kresse, 280. 49
Prestholdt, 5.
28
Clint Watts, Jacob Shapiro, and Vaid 50
ICG, “The Kenyan Military Intervention
Brown, Al-Qaida’s (Mis)Adventures in the in Somalia,” Africa Report No. 184, February
Horn of Africa (West Point, NY: Combating 15, 2012, 8.

JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015 Patterson 23

Secretary Kerry listens as Arctic Council Chairman Leona Aglukkaq of Canada relinquishes council chairmanship to the United States during meeting of
its eight member nations and seven Permanent Representatives, April 2015 (State Department)

The Arctic Domain

A Narrow Niche for Joint Special
Operations Forces
By Kevin D. Stringer

lobal climate change has cata- ities, ranging from resource extraction maritime and air, can play a narrow but

G pulted the Arctic into the center

of geopolitics, as melting Arctic
ice transforms the region from one
and trade to national defense.2 With
the thawing of the ice, and Russia’s
expanding strategic interests in the
significant role in the areas of special re-
connaissance (SR) and related sovereignty
assertion and platform seizure missions to
of primarily scientific interest into a polar region, the Arctic takes on pro- support polar national security objectives.
maelstrom of competing commercial, found importance for the international SOF are ideally suited to this harsh and
national security, and environmen- security of a number of North Atlantic complex environment given their exper-
tal concerns.1 Security in the Arctic Treaty Organization (NATO) and tise, training, and resilience, which are
encompasses a broad spectrum of activ- neutral Nordic states. Even if the recent not found in conventional military forces
reduction in Arctic ice is only a cyclical or law enforcement organizations. This
phenomenon, it still poses defense chal- article illustrates the growing relevance of
lenges in the present for these nations.3 the Arctic domain, examines Russia’s ex-
Dr. Kevin D. Stringer is an Adjunct Faculty While coast guard and naval forces panding national interest in polar matters,
Member at the Joint Special Operations
University and a Lieutenant Colonel in the U.S.
will have primacy for this domain, special and shows the potential role of SOF for
Army Reserve. operations forces (SOF), principally several niche missions in this increasingly

24  Forum / The Arctic Domain: A Niche for Joint SOF JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015
relevant region. Danish and Finnish activity raise concerns of competing routes, with the security interests of
examples are highlighted to illustrate that Arctic sovereignty claims: increased Arctic nations closely related to their
the United States, in partnership with the commercial shipping through the Arctic; territorial boundaries and exclusive eco-
other Arctic NATO and neutral nations, aggressive oil, gas, and mineral explora- nomic zones (EEZ). Since commercial
should focus on customizing an appro- tion; threats to endangered Arctic species; objectives are often seen as potentially
priate SOF segment to perform specified and expanding military operations in the conflicting rather than shared, a “zone of
tasks, given future uncertainties in this region that could lead to conflict.9 peace” in the sense of an Arctic security
unique ecosystem. The primary catalyst for greater community has not yet developed.17 This
Arctic activity in the wake of the receding situation is exacerbated by the geography
Climate Change, Resources, ice cap is the potential economic value of the Arctic as a semi-enclosed sea en-
and Territorial Disputes inherent in the region. For energy re- circled by littoral states, since extensions
The Arctic covers more than one-sixth sources, Science magazine indicated that of continental shelves and delimitations
of the Earth’s total land mass plus the 30 percent of the world’s undiscovered of maritime boundaries invariably lead
Arctic Ocean.4 The geopolitical signif- natural gas and 13 percent of its undis- to overlapping sovereignty claims, which
icance of the Arctic Ocean increases covered oil might be found north of the can cause interstate friction.18 This is
because of growing shortages of Arctic Circle.10 A 2008 U.S. Geological not a new phenomenon, though. The
land-based raw materials, its expected Survey appraisal of undiscovered oil and Canadian archipelago, for example, has
resource wealth, new conveyor and gas north of the Arctic Circle reinforced been investigated, mapped, and claimed
transport technologies, and progressive this view with the assertion that the by different nations in the past.19 Overall,
climatic amelioration.5 According to the “extensive Arctic continental shelves the combination of melting Arctic sea ice,
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate may constitute the geographically largest potential polar riches, and conflicting ter-
Change, the Arctic warms nearly twice unexplored prospective area for petro- ritorial claims creates the conditions for
as fast as the rest of the world. Along leum remaining on Earth.”11 While more heightened interstate tensions among all
with rising temperatures, the Arctic research is needed to define the resource the players. This state of affairs is further
has experienced a dramatic decrease potential accurately, the Arctic stands magnified by increased, yet unpredict-
in the annual extent of sea ice. This out as one of the most promising energy able, Russian actions in the region.
decline in sea ice coverage is particularly venues in the world.12 Furthermore,
pronounced in September.6 Estimates the Arctic is an important commercial A Russian Threat?
show that approximately 41 percent of fishing ground, especially for the largest The Arctic is vital to Russia’s relevance
the permanent Arctic ice has completely populations (salmon, cod, and coalfish).13 in world affairs. In addition to possess-
disappeared, “and every year a further Beyond natural resources, professional ing the longest Arctic coastline, Russia
million square miles or so vanishes, tourism, particularly polar cruises, will encompasses at least half of the Arctic
shrinking the ice cap to around half of become more attractive as the ice melts.14 in terms of area, population, and prob-
the size it covered in the mid-twentieth Finally, new maritime routes from Asia to ably mineral wealth.20 As such, with its
century.”7 In fact, the U.S. Navy’s the Atlantic will create opportunities to geographical location and the length
“Arctic Roadmap” predicts ice-free save vast fuel costs for the shipping indus- of its northern coastline, Russia is a key
conditions for a portion of the Arctic by try. Use of the Northwest Passage over regional player, and its future geopo-
the summer of 2030.8 These spectacular North America could shorten transport litical and economic power in interna-
changes in the Arctic environment will routes between Asia and the U.S. East tional matters is directly linked to its
have a range of economic, political, and Coast by 5,000 miles. The Northern Sea potential exploitation of valuable Arctic
security consequences. Route over Eurasia is also important be- resources.21 Moreover, the Arctic has
Arctic climate change makes the cause it shortens shipping routes between always played a significant role for the
region the subject of growing inter- northern Europe and northeast Asia by Russian military, particularly its navy.22
national attention. The melting of the 40 percent compared with the existing Consequently, Russia has a stake in
ice cap has led to speculation that new routes through the Suez or Panama ca- essentially all contentious Arctic issues:
economic opportunities are opening in nals, and takes thousands of miles off sea delimitation of territory; ownership and
a region that has been frozen for cen- routes around Africa or Latin America.15 management of economic resources,
turies. Beyond commercial conjecture, Obviously, the Arctic emerges as an particularly natural resource deposits;
the diminishment of Arctic sea ice has increasingly attractive market for invest- and the prevention of conflict between
led to increased human activities in the ment and trade, based largely on the the military forces of the Arctic coastal
Arctic and has heightened interest in, and opening of new Arctic sea lines and the states, all of which are improving, to
concerns about, the region’s future. The access they provide.16 Considering the one degree or another, their Arctic-ori-
Arctic Ocean seabed is rich in mineral re- aforementioned commercial opportu- ented defense capabilities.23
sources, most notably natural gas and oil. nities, Arctic politics center increasingly Russia’s North is one of the country’s
However, forecasts of greater economic on access to natural resources and sailing richest areas. Its value derives from the

JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015 Stringer 25

vast quantities of precious raw materials Russian power is its Northern Fleet. zero-sum orientation dominates recent
to be found there including oil, gas, gold, While dramatically reduced from its Cold Russian strategy.36 Such policy statements,
diamonds, nickel, copper, platinum, iron, War size, the Russian Northern Fleet is combined with a series of Russian ac-
and timber. While the northern region the largest of the five Russian fleets and tions such as the resumption of strategic
of Russia is home to less than 10 percent is the single most substantial combat bomber flights over the Arctic, cyber
of the population, its contribution to na- naval force permanently deployed in the attacks on Estonia, the Russo-Georgian
tional revenue is about one-fifth of overall marine Arctic.29 Apart from the Russian War of 2008, the 2014 annexation of
gross domestic product. Approximately Northern Fleet, not a single Arctic state the Crimea, and Russian support for
60 percent of raw materials exports come deploys combat naval forces in the marine the insurgency in Eastern Ukraine, all
from the north of the country. Estimates Arctic, although the coast guards of these contribute to growing uneasiness over
show that 90 percent of Russia’s gas and states do patrol the area. Furthermore, future Russian intentions in the Arctic
60 percent of its oil can be found in the Arctic state ability to redeploy naval region. Among the Arctic neutral states,
polar region. The total value of these forces from other areas of operations is for instance, Sweden notes an increasing
mineral resources in Russia’s North ex- either limited or nonexistent since none regional instability and the likelihood of
ceeds $22.4 trillion according to Western of the other polar nations has warships crises in both the Baltic Sea and Arctic
estimates. By comparison, the total value designed for operation in the extreme regions, which require an overall re-
of U.S. mineral resources is $8 trillion.24 Arctic conditions.30 evaluation of Swedish defense policy.37
For Russia, the melting sea ice in According to Russian national Similarly, rising Russian activities in the
the Arctic creates huge opportunities security documents, Moscow plans to es- Kola Peninsula and the increasing stra-
regarding accessing the oil and gas fields tablish special Arctic military formations tegic importance of the Barents Sea are
located within its EEZ. Of all the great to “protect the county’s national interests forcing Finland to carefully reevaluate its
powers, Russia will benefit most from and to guarantee military security in dif- defense of adjacent Lapland.38 This over-
Arctic changes.25 As such, Moscow is ferent military and political situations.”31 all security situation leads to a discussion
keen to capitalize on natural resource de- To guard critical lines of transportation of the role of SOF in this austere but
velopment and shipping in the region by such as the NSR and to secure northern potentially volatile environment.
exploiting areas such as the Barents Sea, borders, then–Russian Defense Minister
540 kilometers off the coast of the Kola Anatoliy Serdyukov in July 2011 an- The SOF Niche
Peninsula and home to one of the world’s nounced plans to create two special army There is debate about the future of
biggest proven offshore gas fields.26 Yet brigades to be based in the Arctic cities security developments in the Arctic.
such exploitation will hinge on its ability of Murmansk and Arkhangelsk. This Some observers postulate a remili-
to project elements of national military concept derived from Russian studies tarization of the Arctic and the occur-
power into the region. of specialist Arctic troops in Finland, rence of “armed clashes” in the region
Militarily, Russia’s ambitions remain Norway, and Sweden.32 sooner rather than later. Others state
lofty, and contrary to the 1990s, the po- This rising role of the Arctic in that both the logic of this argument
litical willingness and money to increase Russian security policy and Moscow’s and the evidence supporting it are
defense spending now exist. This increase preparation to defend its rights to natu- flimsy, arguing that there is no reason
in military activity in the Arctic, and ral assets with force if needed has been to expect that matters relating to
Russia’s assertiveness and increasingly accentuated by official government military security will rise to the top of
confrontational rhetoric in foreign policy statements.33 For example, in a national the Arctic agenda soon.39 While some
issues, are most probably only the begin- security document released in May 2009, have argued that terrorism and hijack-
ning of a more visible Russian presence the Kremlin stated that “in a competition ing may constitute security concerns
in the region.27 Russia seeks to project its for resources, it can’t be ruled out that in the region, others maintain that
sovereign authority through improved military force could be used for resolving such threats are chimerical, given the
border control to provide safety and secu- problems.”34 The Russian government challenges of distance and geography
rity, especially in the Northern Sea Route reinforced this view with the statement and the difficulty of navigating in a
(NSR), and to maintain credible forces to that “although it deplores the notion polar environment.40 Even if a direct
secure critical infrastructures. Russia also of an arms race in the high north and military conflict may be unlikely, ten-
strives to maintain, develop, and project does not foresee a conflict there, it in- sions with Russia may still precipitate
a convincing military force—primarily tends to protect its Arctic interests.”35 some level of U.S. and NATO engage-
naval, aerial, and missile assets—in the Of greater concern, however, are the ment in the Arctic, and SOF, with
region to be able to react in various po- security perspectives and military doctrine their unique capabilities and small
litico-military scenarios as well as to deter underlying Russia’s military buildup and footprint, may be the deterrent and
the expansion of unwanted foreign mili- modernization in the Arctic. While the surveillance force of choice.
tary presence into the (Russian) Arctic.28 strategic thinking of the Russian political In the harsh polar ecosystem, the
The primary maritime instrument of elite is not monolithic, a “defense-driven” military becomes the tool of national

26  Forum / The Arctic Domain: A Niche for Joint SOF JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015
 Attack submarine USS New Mexico surfaces at Ice
Camp Nautilus in Arctic Ocean during Ice Exercise 2014
(DOD/Joshua Davies)

policy almost by default. The Arctic is While the first decade of the 21st next few years, we’re going to have to
a complex environment, and a report century has seen an enormous increase sort of return to those roots.”45 Similarly,
by the Arctic Institute noted that “the in the use of U.S. and NATO SOF for then–Major General Brad Webb, com-
armed forces, beyond their responsibility the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, mander of U.S. Special Operations
for handling all contingencies, are also SOF focus has skewed to direct-action Command Europe, affirmed, “while
the only agencies with both the requisite operations. These operations are defined Africa may be the challenge for this gen-
monitoring instruments and the physical as short-duration strikes and other small- eration the Arctic will be the challenge for
capabilities to operate in such a vast and scale offensive actions that are conducted the next.”46 For the Arctic, the tasks of
inhospitable region.”41 A further concern in hostile, denied, or diplomatically sen- special reconnaissance, sovereignty opera-
is that the Arctic is an environment of sitive environments, and which employ tions, and platform seizure missions come
extreme operational challenges, even for specialized military capabilities to seize, to the forefront for SOF employment.
armed forces with longstanding Arctic destroy, capture, exploit, recover, or
experience.42 These problems range from damage designated targets.44 The most Special Reconnaissance and
limited communications due to mag- visible of such activities was the elimi- Sovereignty Assertion
netic and solar phenomena that reduce nation of Osama bin Laden in the May Considering Arctic climate dynamics
radio signals to environmental degrada- 2011 raid on his compound in Pakistan. and increased human activity on polar
tion of personnel, weapons systems, and This emphasis on direct action has come air, land, and sea routes, the assertion
navigation equipment. Considering the at a price, however, causing SOF units to of sovereignty and the need for “on the
nature of SOF, with their recruitment of neglect a number of other useful mission surface” situational awareness takes on
more experienced personnel, a rigorous sets. The commander of the Colorado- strategic significance. This requirement
selection process, high resilience, and based U.S. Special Operations Command is compounded by key challenges that
extensive training to achieve proficiency North, Rear Admiral Kerry Metz, stated include shortfalls in ice and weather
in applicable mission sets, these elite that over the past decade of war in the reporting and forecasting and limita-
units offer the innovative, low-cost, Middle East, “we’ve gotten out of [the tions in command, control, commu-
and small-footprint approach needed to habit of doing] the routine work up in nications, computers, intelligence,
achieve nuanced national security objec- the Arctic area. SOF as an entity has not surveillance, and reconnaissance due to
tives in a challenging region.43 focused on that area, and I think over the lack of assets and harsh environmental

JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015 Stringer 27

conditions.47 Yet politically, sovereign Although the Danish armed forces Arctic nations for SOF SR and sover-
presence and domain awareness are currently undertake important tasks in eignty operation missions.56 For U.S.
essential prerequisites for Arctic national the Arctic, including enforcement of SOF, the SR and sovereignty missions
security. For example, Norwegian sovereignty, Denmark’s military posture would be best placed with selected U.S.
Defense Minister Ine Eriksen Søreide there will inevitably have to adjust to Marine Corps Forces Special Operations
stated that she did not want to remili- take on new roles and capabilities, such Command long-range reconnaissance
tarize the [Arctic] border, but “at the as wider ranging patrol and domain units, trained in Arctic conditions and
same time we do have, and want to awareness missions within Greenland, using Danish and Finnish SOF expertise
have, situational awareness for our own a desirable territory rich in both oil for extreme polar operations.
country and the alliance.”48 Similarly, and precious metals.52 The launch
since 2006, Canadian Prime Minister of the Danish Defense Force (DDF) Platform Seizure Missions
Stephen Harper has placed enormous Greenland-headquartered Joint Arctic Under the designation of counterterror-
emphasis on “exercising sovereignty Command in October 2012 initiated ism tasks, hostage rescue and recovery
over Canada’s North . . . our number plans to expand training and deployment operations are normally sensitive crisis
one Arctic foreign policy priority.”49 of special operations forces to reinforce missions in response to terrorist threats
While these objectives can be partially Denmark’s sovereignty over its Arctic and incidents. Adapted to the Arctic—
attained with satellite, ship, and aerial territories, which extend to 1.6 million and given the low probability of terrorist
platforms, a comprehensive knowledge square miles.53 The Arctic command activity there considering the distances
of the Arctic physical environment can organization took over responsibility for involved, Arctic geography, and the
be achieved only by an actual human the SOF Arctic defense unit known as the overall polar environment—these mis-
presence on the ground. Sirius Patrol, which has spearheaded the sions are more likely to involve the pro-
Hence, with increased activity in and DDF’s long-range reconnaissance patrols tection of Arctic weather stations, mili-
over Arctic waters, a military’s knowl- in Greenland since 1941, often operating tary bases, petroleum infrastructure such
edge base will need to be improved in temperatures as low as -67°F, while as oil rigs, pipelines, terminals, and refin-
significantly concerning the evolving overseeing sovereignty enforcement in eries, and even ships in the region from
operational environment in the Arctic the remote reaches of Greenland. These adversarial state, criminal, or environ-
(including newly accessible uncharted multiple, two-man teams with dogs oper- mental protester activity.57 Such action
waterways), as will the military’s ability ate for long periods over 160,000 square is likely to involve the retaking of an
to conduct search and rescue, disaster kilometers of Arctic terrain to provide occupied installation, offshore platform,
response and relief, and environmental real-time presence, reporting, and surveil- or cruise ship, potentially with nonle-
security operations, among other essential lance to assert Danish sovereignty over thal means. In Denmark, for example,
missions, within the Arctic region. In its polar realm. Many of the DDF’s core more resources will be directed at the
this context, building a greater capacity SOF, past and present, have sharpened army’s and navy’s main SOF units, the
for maritime domain awareness (MDA) their survival and reconnaissance skills on Hunter (Jægerkorpset) and Frogman (Frø-
looms as an especially critical requirement Sirius missions.54 mandskorpset) corps, for this purpose.
and obligation for forces assigned to the In addition to Denmark, Finland Both units, which have been extensively
Arctic.50 One option to achieve MDA has significant experience in operating deployed in Afghanistan, are spending
is through the conducting of “on the in hard winter conditions and is well more hours on mission-specific training
surface” SR missions by SOF elements. placed to offer cold climate training and that requires honing the skills necessary
Special reconnaissance entails reconnais- exercises to its international partners.55 to deal with a broad range of tasks, from
sance and surveillance actions normally This hard-won experience is not present assaulting enemy ships and using stealth
conducted in a clandestine or covert within many other Arctic countries, par- to restoring control and sovereignty over
manner to collect or verify information ticularly in the United States. Operations Danish fixed oil and gas installations
of strategic or operational significance, in the Arctic require special cold-weather in the Arctic, by air or sea.58 For the
employing military capabilities not gear, tactics, techniques, procedures, United States, Navy SEALs already have
normally found in conventional forces. and especially training for the armed this capability in their core mission and
SR may include collecting information forces. Finland’s airmobile special need only to attain Arctic proficiency for
on human activities or securing data on forces training center in Utti (Utin this contingent polar operation. Again,
the meteorological, hydrographic, or Jääkärirykmentti) specializes in perform- leveraging Arctic-capable partner-nation
geographic characteristics of a particular ing in severe Arctic conditions, with the SOF expertise and linking this role to the
area.51 For the Arctic, Denmark provides ability to operate even when the outside previously discussed SR task would be
an excellent model for the use of SOF in temperature is as low as -40°F. This the most effective method for exercising
SR and sovereignty operation roles, with training in operating in cold climate sur- this competence.
Finland offering additional considerations roundings is a tangible resource Finland Both the SR and platform seizure
for this mission. could offer to other NATO or neutral tasks will require air SOF units in

28  Forum / The Arctic Domain: A Niche for Joint SOF JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015
 U.S. Navy Arctic Submarine laboratory
technician takes break from preparing
submarine surfacing site near Ice Camp
Nautilus in Arctic Ocean during Ice Exercise
2014 (DOD/Joshua Davies)

JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015 Stringer 29

 Two F-15C Eagles return to simulated air combat portion
of Arctic Challenge exercise over Norway, helping boost
interoperability among NATO, the United States, United
Kingdom, and members of Nordic Defense Cooperation
(U.S. Air Force/Christopher Mesnard)

support. Possible units of action for this their ability to train selected crews to and polar military presence make its
assignment are U.S. Air Force Special specialize in Arctic air and survival as well intentions unclear, and thus a key player
Operations, MC-130P aircraft squad- as their overall organizational linkage to watch in Arctic affairs.60 As the ice
rons, and related CV-22 tiltrotor units, to SOF maritime units performing the recedes and maritime passages open,
coupled with selected SOF parares- other SR, sovereignty, and platform sei- the potential for territorial conflict and
cuemen and combat rescue officers zure missions in the polar environment. state-on-state confrontations could
from the special tactics squadrons. By While direct military conflict may be increase. Hence, this is an ideal niche
locating such assets at Thule Air Base in unlikely in the Arctic, the uncertainty situation for low-profile, small-footprint
Greenland and Joint Base Elmendorf- about the direction in which develop- maritime and air SOF teams to monitor
Richardson in Alaska, selected air SOF ments in the region will unfold and, as a the region and provide presence, strate-
units could provide air coverage and result, the uncertainty about the precise gic reconnaissance, and surveillance for
support for most of the North American nature of the challenges and threats de- sovereignty purposes, as well as platform
Arctic and Northwest Passage. Although riving from those developments, justify seizure or recovery capacity in readiness.
the Air Force has assets in its conven- the increased attention of the interna- For the United States, these Arctic
tional Service with similar profiles and tional community toward the Arctic.59 missions require a mix of specialized
equipment, air SOF may be better suited Simultaneously, Russia’s bellicose actions maritime and air SOF that can leverage
for a niche Arctic mission because of in other regions, overall martial rhetoric, the Arctic expertise and capabilities of

30  Forum / The Arctic Domain: A Niche for Joint SOF JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015
benchmark-setting partner nations such
16
Charles M. Perry and Bobby Anderson, 38
Virtanen, 45, 5.
New Strategic Dynamics in the Arctic Re- 39
Oran Young, “Arctic Politics in an Era of
as Denmark and Finland, and operate in gion: Implications for National Security and Global Change,” Brown Journal of World Af-
a unique joint special operations environ- International Collaboration (Washington, DC: fairs 19, no. 1 (Fall/Winter 2012), 165–178,
ment. JFQ Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, February specifically 169.
2012), 28. 40
“The Arctic: Special Report,” The Econo-
17
Kristian Atland, “Russia and Its Neigh- mist, June 16, 2012, 10.
bors: Military Power, Security Politics, and 41
O’Rourke, 59; and Ebinger and Zambe-
Notes Interstate Relations in the Post-Cold War takis, 1218.
Arctic,”Arctic Review on Law and Politics 1 42
Zysk, “Evolving Arctic,” 109.
1
Charles K. Ebinger and Evie Zambetakis,
(February 2010), 295. 43
Arctic Strategy, 7.
“The Geopolitics of Arctic Melt,” International 18
Ebinger and Zambetakis, 1227; and 44
Joint Publication (JP) 3-05, Special Oper-
Affairs 85, no. 6 (November 2009), 1215–
Claudia Cinelli, “The Law of the Sea and the ations (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff,
1232, specifically 1215.
Arctic Ocean,” Arctic Review on Law and Poli- April 18, 2011), II-5–II-6.
2
Arctic Strategy (Washington, DC: Depart-
tics 2, no. 1 (2011), 4–24. 45
Paul McLeary, “U.S. Special Ops Com-
ment of Defense, November 2013), 2. 19
Ingenfeld, 258. manders: We Need ISR in Africa, Comms in
3
Luke Coffey, “The Future of U.S. Bases in 20
Zysk, “Evolving Arctic,” 97; “The Arctic: Arctic,” Defense News, May 20, 2014, available
Europe—A View from America,” Baltic Securi-
Special Report,” The Economist, June 16, 2012, at <www.defensenews.com/article/20140520/
ty & Defence Review 15, no. 2 (2013), 135.
11; and Barbora Padrtova, “Russian Approach DEFREG02/305200052/US-Special-Ops-
4
Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the
Towards the Arctic Region,” in Panorama of Commanders-We-Need-ISR-Africa-Comms-
Arctic 2011–2020 (Copenhagen: Ministry of
Global Security Environment 2012, ed. M. Ma- Arctic>.
Foreign Affairs, August 2011), 9.
jer, R. Ondrejcsak, and V. Tarasovic (Bratisla- 46
Ibid.
5
See Eva Ingenfeld, “Just in Case Policy
va: Centre for European and North Atlantic 47
O’Rourke, 66.
in the Arctic,” Arctic 63, no. 2 (June 2010),
Affairs, 2012), 339–350. 48
Julian E. Barnes, “Cold War Echoes Un-
257–259. 21
Virtanen. der the Arctic Ice,” Wall Street Journal, March
6
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 22
Padrtova. 24, 2014, available at <http://online.wsj.com/
Change (IPCC) Working Group 1 Contribu- 23
Perry and Anderson, 50. news/articles/SB10001424052702304679404
tion to the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report, 24
Valery P. Pilyavsky, “Russian Geopolit- 579461630946609454>; and O’Rourke, 64.
June 7, 2013, 12–33.
ical and Economic Interest,” Friedrich Ebert 49
Government of Canada, “Statement on
7
Roger Howard, The Arctic Gold Rush: The
Stiftung Briefing Paper, March 2011; and Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy: Exercising
New Race for Tomorrow’s Natural Resources
Padrtova, 341. Sovereignty and Promoting Canada’s Northern
(New York: Continuum, 2009), 8. 25
Virtanen. Strategy Abroad,” August 2010, available at
8
David Titley and Courtney St. John, “Arc- 26
Atland, 280; and O’Rourke, 54. <www.international.gc.ca/polar-polaire/assets/
tic Security Considerations and the U.S. Navy’s 27
See Katatzyna Bozena Zysk, Russian Mil- pdfs/ CAFP_booklet-PECA_livret-eng.pdf>.
Roadmap for the Arctic,” Naval War College
itary Power and the Arctic (Brussels: EU-Russia 50
Perry and Anderson, 172.
Review 63, no. 2 (Spring 2010), 36.
Centre, October 2008); and Virtanen. 51
JP 3-05.
9
Andrei Zagorski, “The Arctic: A New 28
Mikkola Kaplya and Harri Juha, “The 52
Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the
Geopolitical Pivot?” Russia Direct Monthly
Global Arctic: The Growing Arctic Interests Arctic 2011–2020, 13; and Perry and Anderson,
Memo, no. 5 (December 2013), 2; and Ronald
of Russia, China, the United States and the 71.
O’Rourke, Changes in the Arctic: Background
European Union,” The Finnish Institute of In- 53
Gerard O’Dwyer, “Denmark Boosts Re-
and Issues for Congress, R41153 (Washington,
ternational Affairs Briefing Paper 133, August sources for the Arctic,” Defense News, October
DC: Congressional Research Service, April
2013, 4; and Padrtova, 347. 8, 2013.
2014), 1. 29
Zagorski, 6; and Virtanen. 54
Ibid.; Kingdom of Denmark Strategy
10
Donald L. Gautier et al., “Assessment 30
Zagorski, 6. for the Arctic 2011–2020, 21; Mia Ben-
of Undiscovered Oil and Gas in the Arctic,” 31
Strategia natsional’noi bezopasnosti nett, “Denmark’s Strategy for the Arctic,”
Science 324, no. 5931 (2009), 1175–1179.
Rossiiskoi Federatsii do 2020 goda, 2009, Sovet Foreign Policy Association, November 14,
11
U.S. Geological Survey Fact Sheet 2008-
Bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii, available at 2011, available at <http://foreignpolicy-
3049, “Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal:
<www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/1/99.html>; blogs.com/2011/11/14/denmarks-strate-
Estimates of Undiscovered Oil and Gas North
and Osnovy gosudarstvennoi politiki Rossiiskoi gy-for-the-arctic/>; and “Greenland by Dog
of the Arctic Circle,” available at <http://pubs.
Federatsii v Arktike na period do 2020 goda i Sledge: The Sirius Patrol in Numbers,” BBC
usgs.gov/fs/2008/3049/>.
dalneishuiu perspektivu, September 2008, Sovet News, November 30, 2011, available at <www.
12
See Kataryna Zysk, “The Evolving Arctic
Bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii, available at bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-15940985>.
Security Environment: An Assessment,” in
<www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/15/98.html>. 55
Finland’s Strategy for the Arctic Region
Russia in the Arctic, ed. Stephen Blank (Carl- 32
“Russia Plans Arctic Army Brigades,” 2013 (Helsinki: Prime Minister’s Office, August
isle, PA: U.S. Army War College, July 2011),
BBC News, July 1, 2011, available at <www. 2013), 14.
91–138.
bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-13997324>; 56
Virtanen, 93.
13
Ingenfeld, 258.
and Padrtova, 345. 57
JP 3-05, xi; and Atland, 279–298, specif-
14
Vesa Virtanen, The Arctic in World 33
Virtanen. ically 284.
Politics. The United States, Russia, and China in 34
Roger Howard, “Russia’s New Front 58
O’Dwyer.
the Arctic—Implications for Finland (Bos-
Line,” Survival 52, no. 2 (April–May 2010), 59
Zysk, “Evolving Arctic,” 117.
ton: Weatherhead Center for International
141–155. 60
Atland, 280.
Affairs, Harvard University, 2013), available at 35
O’Rourke, 62; and Virtanen, 45.
<http://projects.iq.harvard.edu/files/fellows/ 36
Perry and Anderson, 64.
files/virtanen.pdf>. 37
Justyna Gotkowski, “Swedish Security in
15
Ibid.; and Ebinger and Zambetakis,
Crisis,” Centre for Eastern Studies, February
1221.
13, 2013.

JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015 Stringer 31

U.S. Central Command–directed, irregular warfare–themed exercise
Eager Lion with U.S. Marines and Jordanian military focuses on
missions U.S. forces and coalition partners might perform during global
contingency operations (DOD/Richard Blumenstein)

Rapid Regeneration of Irregular

Warfare Capacity
By Stephen Watts, J. Michael Polich, and Derek Eaton

here is widespread agreement istan”—that is, another large-scale, to pursue forcible regime change in

T among the public and in the

foreign and defense communities
that the United States should avoid
long-term, and high-cost stability oper-
ation. President Barack Obama’s reluc-
tance to put “boots on the ground” in
the developing world “should have his
head examined,” but the sentiment is
widespread.1
“another Iraq” or “another Afghan- Iraq is but the most recent example of Worse than having to fight another
this reaction against the high costs and Iraq or another Afghanistan, however,
questionable outcomes of the conflicts would be if the United States were yet
Stephen Watts is a Political Scientist at the in those two countries. Former Defense again unprepared for such a contin-
RAND Corporation. J. Michael Polich is a Senior Secretary Robert Gates may have been gency—as occurred when it divested
Behavioral Scientist at the RAND Corporation.
Derek Eaton is an Associate Political Scientist at
particularly blunt when he declared itself of counterinsurgency capabilities
the RAND Corporation. that anyone advising a future President after the policy community united against

32  Forum / Regeneration of Irregular Warfare Capacity JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015
“another Vietnam.” This article considers insurgencies typically last many years, deployed 25,000 or more forces have
the challenge of maintaining readiness for intervening forces have considerable done so for only 5 years on average, and
large-scale irregular warfare (IW) contin- time to adapt to the operational theme rarely—if ever—for more than 8 years.
gencies when the national mood has so and environment.4 In contrast, conven- Even these numbers, however,
decisively turned against such operations. tional contingencies may conclude in probably overstate the amount of time
The need to hedge against such a victory or defeat in mere weeks. If one a democratic power such as the United
contingency is recognized in both the cannot pay the price necessary to be States has to adapt to the requirements
2012 Defense Strategic Guidance and prepared for every kind of conflict, it is of IW. For instance, although the United
the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review better to be prepared for conventional States deployed large numbers of forces
(QDR). Whereas both documents are contingencies and, if necessary, adapt in South Vietnam from 1965 to 1972,
widely interpreted as rejecting large-scale over time to irregular warfare rather it was searching for a way out after the
counterinsurgency and stability opera- than vice versa. Second, IW is typi- Tet Offensive in January–February
tions, they actually provide more nuanced cally fought by small units on a highly 1968—a mere 3 years after escalating its
guidance. Although U.S. forces will not decentralized battlefield—a much easier involvement. Similarly, the United States
be sized to conduct such operations, task militarily than coordinating fire intervened on a large scale in Iraq from
the QDR insists that “we will preserve and maneuver across large numbers of 2003 to 2011, but by 2007—less than
the expertise gained during the past ten higher echelon formations. The skeptics 4 years after its invasion—the United
years of counterinsurgency and stability of IW investments maintain it is easier States had committed to either win
operations [and] protect the ability to to adapt from more complex military the war through the so-called surge or
regenerate capabilities that might be tasks to less complex ones than it is to withdraw. And the United States is not
needed to meet future demands.”2 It is go in the other direction.5 Again, such alone in this respect. In the case of the
less clear what this guidance means in an argument suggests that the bulk of large-scale French counterinsurgency in
practice. To sketch the outlines of such an investments should be made in conven- Algeria (1954–1962), many observers
“adaptability hedge,”3 we first review the tional warfighting capabilities. Finally, argue the war became unwinnable for
history of large-scale IW operations to skeptics of IW contend that counter- France as a result of its widespread use
determine the timelines that intervening insurgency and stability operations of torture in the Battle of Algiers, which
forces have historically needed to adapt have historically been “wars of choice” ended in 1957—3 years after the esca-
to such contingencies, how quickly they fought by the United States in less lation of French involvement. Similarly,
have adapted in practice, and the costs of strategically vital regions of the world. India completely withdrew its forces from
slow adaptation. Second, we examine the These skeptics maintain that if fiscal aus- large-scale counterinsurgency operations
sorts of ground forces that are typically terity imposes the need for U.S. Armed in Sri Lanka within 3 years (1987–1990),
required for such operations and—using Forces to accept a higher degree of risk and Israel withdrew the bulk of its
simple metrics—estimate the amount of than usual, this risk is best assumed in forces from Lebanon in less than 2 years
time required to regenerate them. Based less-vital IW capabilities. (1982–1983).
on this analysis, we suggest which capa- While defensible, each of these In short, there appears to be a small
bilities could be regenerated relatively arguments overstates its case and mini- window of time before an intervening
quickly for large-scale IW contingencies mizes the extent of the risk the United democracy such as the United States
as the need arises and which would be States would incur by failing to invest in reaches a “culminating point” by which it
priorities to keep in the ground force standing IW capabilities or the ability to must be on a clear path to an acceptable
structure due to the long lag times asso- regenerate them quickly. outcome or face strong domestic political
ciated with rebuilding these capabilities How Long Do Militaries Have to pressures to withdraw.
once they are lost. Finally, we briefly Adapt to IW? The answer to this ques- How Long Does It Take to Adapt to
review the pipeline for regenerating IW tion in any particular case obviously the Requirements of IW? There is no way
capabilities and how to ensure the pipe- depends on circumstances. But history to measure exactly what “good enough”
line could function rapidly if needed. provides an approximate answer that adaptation looks like and how long it has
can be used for force planning. While taken across a range of contingencies.
The Imperative of Rapid insurgencies typically last for more than Instead, an examination of a single case—
Adaptation for Large-Scale IW 10 years (15 years, more recently), for- the U.S. experience in Operation Iraqi
Even if they accept that the United eign militaries usually intervene in them Freedom (OIF)—is helpful to illustrate
States might at some point get drawn for much shorter periods of time—at how long it took U.S. forces to adapt in a
into another such contingency, many least when they are deployed in large recent war.
observers are skeptical of making sizable numbers by democracies. Looking at There is some debate about what
investments in standing capabilities for the best-known cases of expeditionary constituted sufficient adaptation in
large-scale IW. These skeptics generally counterinsurgency by democratic inter- Iraq and how long it took. A few ob-
make three arguments. First, because veners, we see that democracies that have servers—mostly counterinsurgency

JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015 Watts, Polich, and Eaton  33

skeptics—argue that U.S. forces adapted Table. Commonly Identified Adaptation Failures in the Early Years of
within the first year of their deployment Operation Iraqi Freedom
in theater.6 Others, however, point to Lethal Operations Civil-Military Operations and Foreign Internal Defense (FID)
General Stanley McChrystal’s memo- Nonlethal Enablers
randum of November 2009 outlining Over-emphasis on offensive Failure of strategic planning Failure to prioritize FID for first
counterinsurgency guidance for forces in operations, inadequately
Failure to ensure full-spectrum
year, then failure to develop
discriminate use of firepower realistic expectations
Afghanistan as evidence that substantial training
portions of the force still had not mas- Concentration of forces rather
Leaders inexperienced with
Failure to plan for FID mission
than dispersion in COPs
tered critical aspects of IW. coordinating multiple LOOs Failure to widely embed
But a review of the literature suggests Lack of cultural awareness and across civil, military spheres advisors with host nation
sensitivity forces
that these observers are outliers. Most Inadequate numbers of
sources agree that U.S. forces required Failure to propagate new, full- trained, experienced personnel Inadequate numbers of
spectrum doctrine for civil functions, including personnel
3½ to 4 years to adapt at least reasonably reconstruction, IO
well to the exigencies of OIF. There is Failure to ensure appropriate Poor training for advisors
kinetic training Intelligence capabilities
widespread acknowledgment that the inadequate in personnel levels, Inappropriate personnel chosen
U.S. military was initially ill-prepared for training, and organization as advisors (inappropriate
background/experience and/or
the insurgency it encountered in Iraq poor quality)
despite the efforts of individuals to do the
best they could with what they had under
extraordinarily trying circumstances. A (at best) to adapt to the requirements detected such dynamics in the U.S. “at-
survey by Colonel William Hix and Kalev of large-scale irregular warfare abroad tritional” strategy in Vietnam as well as in
Sepp reportedly found that only one-fifth before they come under extraordinary Iraq and Afghanistan. While counterin-
of units demonstrated counterinsurgency political pressure to draw down their surgents can still potentially obtain their
proficiency in August 2005.7 On the presence. But the United States recently objectives in the end even if they perform
basis of detailed examination of multiple required between 3½ and 4 years to poorly in the early days of a conflict, the
units, one of the best empirical studies adapt at least reasonably well to these price is likely to be much steeper.11
of adaptation in OIF found that many of sorts of contingencies.10 In other words, Nor is IW likely to be confined to
the key breakthroughs occurred in 2006 the United States was ill-adapted to peripheral regions of little strategic signif-
and early 2007.8 A Joint Staff–sponsored the requirements of IW for—at a min- icance to the United States as contended
retrospective on Iraq and Afghanistan imum—approximately two-thirds to by skeptics of significant investments
concluded that: four-fifths of the time that it has typically in maintaining the ability to quickly
had to fight such wars on a large scale. regenerate large-scale IW capabilities.
operations during the first half of the de- What Are the Consequences of Being Many observers of conflict trends believe
cade [through 2006] were often marked Poorly Adapted to the Requirements of that irregular and conventional warfare
by numerous missteps and challenges as the IW? Slow adaptation entails one of two are likely to blend in so-called hybrid
U.S. government and military applied a costs: either worse outcomes, or higher conflicts.12 In looking to potential future
strategy and force suited for a different costs paid to obtain the same outcome. conflicts, most of the ones that appear
threat and environment. Operations in The former has been framed in terms of to be both relatively more likely to occur
the second half of the decade often featured a so-called golden hour, the early period and most significant in their impact in-
successful adaptation to overcome these in an intervention during which popular volve likely hybrid threats—contingencies
challenges.9 expectations are set and insurgents can such as state collapse and loose nuclear
begin to organize. Once formed, popular materials in North Korea or a future nu-
Three problems of adaptation in the expectations can become highly resistant clear-armed Iran. IW does not represent
early years of OIF stand out from these to change, making it extremely difficult a set of lesser strategic concerns for the
various studies: insufficiently discriminate for counterinsurgents to gain popular United States—“wars of choice” that can
use of force, inadequate nonlethal en- backing after a poor start. Moreover, be easily avoided. To the contrary, IW is
ablers to conduct effective civil-military insurgents are at their most vulnerable a likely element of many or most of the
and intelligence operations, and insuffi- when they first start to organize, making highest-risk scenarios the United States
cient (and often inappropriate) resources it critical that counterinsurgents are ef- currently faces.
devoted to the advisory (foreign internal fective in this early stage. Once violence
defense) function. These problems are and instability spread, they provide Rapid Adaptation to
summarized in table 1. opportunities for additional latent con- Large-Scale IW
The math is both clear and trou- flicts to turn violent and for hatreds and Building readiness for future IW contin-
bling. On average, countries such as suspicions to harden, leading to an inten- gencies is not fundamentally different
the United States have only 5 years sification of the conflict. Observers have from building readiness for other types

34  Forum / Regeneration of Irregular Warfare Capacity JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015
Survival evasion resistance and escape specialist and rescue squadron flight engineer Airmen conduct combat survival training near Osan Air Base, South
Korea, during 2012 Pacific Thunder exercise (DOD/Sara Csurilla)

of war. As in all readiness debates, pol- relatively quickly are candidates to be can be adapted, with mockups of foreign
icymakers face tradeoffs among cost, regenerated on demand. Once we know villages built and role-players hired on a
military effectiveness, and time.13 In this which capabilities need to be kept as contract basis, in relatively short order.
era of fiscal constraints, policymakers forces in being, and what infrastructure Such adaptations are necessary, and the
are seeking to limit costs by reducing is necessary to maintain a pipeline to following section will detail some of the
military readiness for large-scale IW regenerate other forms of IW capacity, infrastructure necessary to ensure they
contingencies, while still paying for the we can determine (at least roughly) are executed rapidly. But for IW, the long
necessary infrastructure to regenerate the price tag associated with the 2014 pole in the tent is typically human capi-
such capabilities quickly if needed. QDR’s pledge to “preserve the expertise tal—the development of military leaders
This approach is reasonable in prin- gained during the past ten years of coun- who can rely on the education and expe-
ciple. In practice, it requires answering terinsurgency and stability operations rience they have gained over many years
difficult questions: How quickly can [and] protect the ability to regenerate (or even decades) to adapt to a complex
such capabilities be regenerated? Can capabilities that might be needed to environment. Such leaders cannot be re-
they be regenerated quickly enough, meet future demands.” generated quickly if decisionmakers have
given the relatively short timelines for Estimating Requirements for guessed incorrectly about the nature of
IW adaptation discussed in the previous Capabilities in Being. Once the need for future contingencies.14
section? Capabilities in high demand adaptation is recognized, it can occur in What types of leaders are most
for IW that can only be built or achieve many domains relatively quickly. Training in demand? Studies have found that
adequate readiness over long periods and doctrine, for instance, can be ori- several types of units were particularly
of time are candidates to be retained as ented toward the specific circumstances stressed by IW requirements in Iraq
forces in being. Capabilities required for of new irregular contingencies within as and Afghanistan: combat arms, rotary
IW that can be built or achieve readiness little as a few months. Similarly, facilities aviation, military intelligence (especially

JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015 Watts, Polich, and Eaton  35

Airmen of 22nd special tactics squadron jump from MC-130H Combat Talon II during Emerald Warrior, DOD’s only irregular warfare exercise (U.S. Air Force/
Marleah Miller)

assets related to human intelligence), personnel in quartermaster companies or not practical unless decisionmakers are
military police (particularly law enforce- light- and medium-truck companies pos- willing to accept dramatic declines in
ment), explosive ordnance disposal sess approximately 3 years of service on quality, no matter how large the pipeline
(EOD), and special operations forces average. In contrast, many of the enablers for regeneration.
(SOF).15 Nor are these demands unique in high demand for IW contingencies Capabilities that are in high demand
to Iraq and Afghanistan; many of these possess personnel with considerably more for IW and have lengthy development
same types of units were in high demand experience. Personnel in interrogation times are high-priority candidates to
in a variety of other IW campaigns, both battalions, law and order detachments, be retained in disproportionately large
counterinsurgency (in Vietnam) and tactical military information support op- numbers if the Department of Defense
other forms of stability operations (for erations detachments, civil affairs teams, (DOD) makes a commitment to quickly
instance, in Bosnia and Kosovo). and EOD companies all possess between regain critical IW proficiencies and ca-
Unfortunately, many of the types 5 and 7 years of service on average—ap- pacity. These capabilities include aviation,
of units in highest demand for IW are proximately twice that of the logistical certain types of military intelligence,
rank-heavy formations filled with per- support units discussed above and sub- law enforcement, EOD, and SOF. They
sonnel with many years of experience stantially higher than the experience in could be retained as formed units, or
in their fields. For example, personnel a BCT. Moreover, the average years of their leadership could be retained in
comprising a Brigade Combat Team service in these units is approximately as disproportionately large numbers in a
(BCT) possess approximately 4 years long as the United States ever remains “grade over-structure” or cadre that
of service on average. Many enablers, committed on a large scale to IW contin- would serve as the basis for regenerating
such as transportation or administrative gencies. Regenerating these capabilities fully formed units in times of need.16
units, require far less experience; the on demand, in other words, is probably Regardless of how these capabilities are

36  Forum / Regeneration of Irregular Warfare Capacity JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015
maintained, DOD needs to ensure that it Warfare Fusion Cell, for instance, closed operational themes as might be desirable.
gains appropriate experience operating in on October 1, 2014.17 There is ample Consequently, DOD should also monitor
real-world environments, ideally through precedent to anticipate further such cuts. IW proficiency by monitoring units’
security cooperation and similar activities. Service culture celebrates command performance at the Services’ premier
True proficiency in tasks conducted in functions and operational experience, exercises, such as the Army’s combat
“wars among the people” is simply too and the leadership is largely drawn from training centers and Marine Corps’
difficult to attain in the classroom or in the warfighting branches. If money and predeployment exercises. DOD should
artificial training environments. manpower allocations are tight, Service track data on the content of exercises
Maintaining a Pipeline to priorities are likely to favor deployable (goals, types of threats, operational envi-
Regenerate Other IW Capabilities. units and operational functions over insti- ronment, tactics executed and evaluated,
Clearly, the United States cannot afford tutions—like IW organizations—whose and so forth), performance of the trainee
to maintain all the capabilities it needs for product is less tangible and longer term. units,18 and percentage of leaders in key
large-scale IW in capacities sufficient to For example, the post–Cold War draw- positions—battalion commanders, S-3s,
meet the requirements of many plausible down resulted in sizable reductions in executive officers, company command-
scenarios. Particularly where regeneration Army institutions (particularly at the U.S. ers—who actually execute a premier
times are relatively rapid (for capabilities Army Training and Doctrine Command). exercise rotation emphasizing IW skills
that require relatively less expertise) or Similarly, when units were under pressure during their tenure in that position.
where the overall numbers of forces to deploy at full strength during the Assuming that the scale of current
involved make it impractical to maintain 1990s, the Army moved to increase man- operations declines as expected, fewer
a force optimized for IW (as is the case ning in operational units at the expense military leaders will have direct expe-
for combat arms other than SOF), the of manning in the its institutional base. rience in IW. As a result, professional
United States will need to regenerate Therefore, we should expect that lower education courses will represent a critical
capacity and proficiency for IW as quickly priorities are likely to be accorded to means through which IW knowledge and
as possible. doctrine writers, training developers, ex- skills will be inculcated in future cohorts
Three elements of the Services’ activ- perts in training/advising foreign forces, of officers and noncommissioned officers.
ities are especially important in providing and even experts at the combat training School curricula, however, are limited
a basis for regenerating IW capability centers. For these reasons, DOD should in the amount of student instructional
in the future: organizations, exercises, monitor the size of IW institutions and time available; each domain of expertise
and school curricula. To ensure that the the seniority of their staff to assess their must compete with others for curriculum
Services maintain their pipelines for re- well-being and capacity to contribute to hours (or “blocks of instruction”). How,
generating IW capabilities, DOD should preserving IW capabilities. then, could defense leadership monitor
ensure adequate funding and attention Just as the Services developed orga- the curriculum profile to gauge the ade-
for each of these elements. nizations to gain IW proficiency over quacy of IW focus? Previous studies have
Both the Army and Marine Corps the past decade, they also oriented their made a start by calculating occurrence of
created many organizations to develop training programs to the requirements of key words and phrases related to IW.19 A
proficiency for large-scale IW during the the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. With more complete monitoring effort would
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Army’s the withdrawal of most American troops establish goals and criteria for determin-
focal point for this area was the Army from both countries and the rebalancing ing which skills and knowledge are most
Irregular Warfare Fusion Cell, which of U.S. defense capabilities toward the important and then use small panels
helped to coordinate IW-related activities Asia-Pacific region, the Services are of knowledgeable veterans (preferably
among the U.S. Army Peacekeeping justifiably reorienting their training to at the O-4 or O-5 level, who have IW
and Stability Operations Institute, regain proficiency in conventional war- experience and some academic research
Asymmetric Warfare Group, Center fighting. Yet this reorientation does not training) to monitor and track the extent
for Army Lessons Learned, and U.S. mean the Services have abandoned IW. to which these skills are taught in profes-
Army Special Operations Command. In fact, both the Army and Marine Corps sional military education at all levels.
Similarly, the Marine Corps established have adopted scenarios based on hybrid DOD cannot afford to maintain the
the Center for Irregular Warfare, Security threats, and both plan to incorporate Services’ current levels of proficiency
Cooperation Group, and Center for these features into their major exercises. in IW, nor is it necessary to do so for
Advanced Operational Culture Learning. Steps have already been taken to test and the majority of U.S. forces. Outside of
These organizations that study and codify refine these concepts. the high-demand, long-development
IW operations formed DOD’s intellectual As with institutional budgets, how- time capabilities for IW discussed
foundation for preserving expertise. ever, training budgets are also coming above—capabilities such as aviation, law
In a period of fiscal constraint, these under pressure. Moreover, there are a enforcement, certain types of military
organizations’ budgets have already finite number of days in a year, making it intelligence, EOD, and SOF—the goal
come under pressure; the Army Irregular difficult to retain proficiency in as many should be rapid regeneration of IW

JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015 Watts, Polich, and Eaton  37

readiness should such a contingency contingencies and that depend on senior Capabilities,” World Politics Review, March 4,
2008.
require it. Maintaining organizations leaders—particularly certain capabilities 7
Cited in James A. Russell, Innovation,
dedicated to retaining U.S. intellectual in aviation, military intelligence, law Transformation, and War: Counterinsurgency
foundations for such warfare, continuing enforcement, EOD, and SOF—represent Operations in Anbar and Ninewa Provinces,
to require some degree of proficiency priority candidates for retention in larger Iraq, 2005–2007 (Stanford, CA: Stanford Uni-
in IW in the Services’ key exercises, and numbers as forces in being, either as versity Press, 2011), 5.
8
Ibid. See also Thomas R. Mockaitis, The
continuing to give substantial attention formed units or in a grade over-structure
Iraq War: Learning from the Past, Adapting
to IW topics in school curricula should all or leadership cadre. to the Present, and Planning for the Future
help to speed the regeneration process. Finally, DOD should closely monitor (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2007);
resources and readiness levels associated and Chad C. Serena, A Revolution in Military
Conclusion with the pipeline to regenerate IW pro- Adaptation: The U.S. Army in the Iraq War
(Washington, DC: Georgetown University
As much as all Americans may wish to ficiency between maneuver and other
Press, 2011).
avoid another Iraq or another Afghani- forces as needed. 9
Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis
stan, the country cannot afford to allow It should be Americans’ fervent hope (JCOA), Decade of War, Volume I: Enduring
its capabilities for large-scale irregular that such investments in rapid adaptation Lessons from the Past Decade of Operations
warfare to atrophy as it did when for large-scale irregular warfare prove (Washington, DC: JCOA, June 15, 2012).
10
The United States is not alone in this
decisionmakers insisted the United unnecessary. But hope, as they say, is not
regard. On other nations’ experience with
States would never again fight another a policy. As the 2014 QDR recognizes, slow adaptation, see Rod Thornton, “Getting
Vietnam. Although the United States hedging against such contingencies rep- It Wrong: The Crucial Mistakes Made in the
should certainly avoid such conflicts resents sound policy. Now it is time to Early Stages of the British Army’s Deployment
whenever possible, trends in violent ensure the resources follow to make good to Northern Ireland (August 1969 to March
1972),” Journal of Strategic Studies 30, no. 1
conflict toward hybrid wars suggest that on such policy commitments. JFQ
(2007), 73–107; and John Kiszely, “Learning
it would be prudent to invest in a hedge About Counterinsurgency,” RUSI Journal,
against the possibility of U.S. involve- December 2006, 16–21.
ment in another such war. Notes 11
Perhaps the single most commonly cited
Determining the precise composition source on poor adaptation to irregular warfare
1
Thom Shanker, “Warning Against Wars is Andrew Krepinevich’s study of the U.S.
of such a hedge or its pricetag is beyond
Like Iraq and Afghanistan,” New York Times, Army’s slow adaptation to the realities of the
the scope of this article. Instead, we have February 25, 2011. Vietnam War and its implications for outcomes;
emphasized four critical points about the 2
Quadrennial Defense Review 2014 (Wash- see Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., The Army and
broad outlines of such an IW hedge. ington, DC: Department of Defense [DOD], Vietnam (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Uni-
First, adaptation to irregular warfare March 2014), vii. versity Press, 1986). For a more recent similar
3
This article is adapted from a classified treatment of the slow adaptation of American
is a lengthy process and the United States
study conducted by the RAND Corporation for warfighting approaches to the context of
is unlikely to have much time to adapt to the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense Vietnam, see Lewis Sorley, A Better War: The
such conflicts before it comes under con- for Personnel and Readiness. See Stephen Watts Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of
siderable political pressure to demonstrate et al., Adaptable Ground Force Structure for Ir- America’s Last Years in Vietnam (San Diego:
tangible progress or draw down its forces. regular Warfare, RR-120-OSD (Santa Monica, Harcourt, Inc., 1999). For an examination of
CA: RAND Corporation, 2014). the costs of slow adaptation in Afghanistan,
Second, the costs of being poorly 4
On the contention that there is adequate see Daniel Marston, “Realizing the Extent of
adapted to IW are substantial. Poor adap- time to adapt to the requirements of irregular Our Errors and Forging the Road Ahead,”
tation significantly reduces the likelihood warfare (IW), see, for instance, Gian P. Gentile, in Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare, ed.
of achieving acceptable outcomes and “A Strategy of Tactics: Population-centric Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian (Long
raises the price of whatever success is real- COIN and the Army,” Parameters, Autumn Island City, NY: Osprey Publishing, 2008). On
2009, 5–6. “golden hours” generally and the costs of slow
ized. Moreover, we cannot be confident 5
When asked which of the possible future adaptation in Iraq specifically, see James Ste-
that poor readiness for IW represents challenges the Army should prepare for, the phenson, Losing the Golden Hour: An Insider’s
“acceptable risk” because IW contin- incoming head of the U.S. Army War College, View of Iraq’s Reconstruction (Washington, DC:
gencies are likely to occur only where Major General Tony Cucolo, stated, “You Potomac Books, Inc., 2007). On the broader
peripheral U.S. interests are engaged. To focus on the hardest one. . . . The hardest one military implications of the golden hour, see
is high-intensity combat operations. . . . [I]f Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., An Army at the
the contrary, many highly plausible and
we focus on ‘deter and defeat,’ I firmly believe Crossroads (Washington, DC: Center for Strate-
high-impact scenarios entail substantial we can do almost anything else.” Quoted in gic and Budgetary Assessments, 2008), 47–54.
IW elements. Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr., “Wake Up and Adapt, On insurgent organization and vulnerability, see
Third, the ability to adapt rapidly Incoming War College Chief Tells Army,” AOL Steven Metz, Learning from Iraq: Counterin-
to large-scale IW requires both main- Defense, April 3, 2012, available at <http:// surgency in American Strategy (Carlisle, PA:
defense.aol.com/2012/04/03/wake-up-and- U.S. Army War College, 2007); and Mark
taining certain capabilities in being and
adapt-incoming-war-college-chief-tells-army/?i- Irving Lichbach, The Rebel’s Dilemma (Ann
maintaining the pipeline to regenerate cid=related1)>. Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995).
other capabilities. Those capabilities 6
See Gian P. Gentile, “Misreading the 12
Proponents of this view include former
that are both in high demand for IW Surge Threatens U.S. Army’s Conventional Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, “A Bal-

38  Forum / Regeneration of Irregular Warfare Capacity JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015
Jordanian F-16 Fighting Falcon leads another Jordanian F-16, American F-16, and two Marine F-18s over training base in Northern Jordan as part of Eager
Lion exercise (U.S. Air National Guard/John P. Rohrer)

anced Strategy: Reprogramming the Pentagon Experienced and effective leaders are not grown 2014.
for a New Age,” Foreign Affairs 88, no. 1 (Jan- quickly.” See 2012 Army Strategic Planning 18
For a related evaluation effort, see Bryan
uary/February 2009), 3; Frank G. Hoffman, Guidance (Washington, DC: Headquarters W. Hallmark and James C. Crowley, Company
“Hybrid Warfare and Challenges,” Joint Force Department of the Army, April 19, 2012), 12. Performance at the National Training Center:
Quarterly 52 (1st Quarter 2009), 34–48; and 15
See Michael L. Hansen et al., Reshaping Battle Planning and Execution, MR-846-A
T.X. Hammes, The Sling and the Stone: On War the Army’s Active and Reserve Components, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation,
in the 21st Century (St. Paul, MN: Zenith Press, MG-961-OSD (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 1997).
2006). This view has since become embedded Corporation, 2011), 32–35; and Donald P. 19
Stephen J. Mariano, “Between the Pen
in a wide range of Defense Department doctri- Wright and Timothy R. Reese, On Point II: and the Sword: 40 Years of Individual and
nal publications. Transition to the New Campaign (Fort Leav- Institutional Attitudes Toward Small Wars,”
13
Richard K. Betts, Military Readiness: enworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, Harvard University, Weatherhead Center for
Concepts, Choices, Consequences (Washington, 2008). International Affairs, 2012 (PowerPoint brief-
DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1995). 16
See Watts et al. for more precise analysis ing summarizing a Ph.D. thesis in war studies
14
The 2012 Army Strategic Planning Guid- of historical IW utilization and the characteris- at the Royal Military College of Canada).
ance states, “The development of mid-grade of- tics of the priority capabilities for retention.
ficers and non-commissioned officers has been 17
Kevin Lilley, “Irregular Warfare Center
the historical limiting factor in expansibility. to Close Oct. 1,” Army Times, September 1,

JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015 Watts, Polich, and Eaton  39

 U.S. Naval War College student participates in National Security
Decision Making seminar (U.S. Navy/James E. Foehl)

Quo Vadis? The Education of

Senior Military Officers
By Charles D. Allen

his article considers approaches to mendation that USAWC faculty design in public departments and agencies,

T teaching senior military officers

at the U.S. Army War College
(USAWC). It reviews the results of
and implement a portfolio approach to
provide students with the opportunity
to demonstrate the benefits of senior-
including the Department of Defense
(DOD), at all levels of government.1
Arguably, the U.S. military plays a
several studies and surveys from the level education. substantial role in the public admin-
employers of our graduates and from istration of the will of the American
recent graduates themselves on how Introduction people. Accordingly, its educational
best to prepare for future assignments. Over the past decade, the U.S. military programs should prepare them for this
It examines the tensions between has encountered challenges and difficul- role. DOD consumes over 50 percent
theoretical and utilitarian education in ties in providing governmental services of the Nation’s discretionary budget
strategy and concludes with a recom- to indigenous populations. Lessons as it employs a uniformed and civilian
from post–World War II Europe and workforce of over 3 million people.
Japan should have informed recent Its military officers have significant
U.S. policy and operations in Iraq and responsibilities as public administrators.
Colonel Charles D. Allen, USA (Ret.), is Professor Afghanistan. Donald Kettl and James Given the vast responsibilities of this
of Leadership and Cultural Studies in the
Department of Command, Leadership, and
Fesler describe public administrators largest executive branch organization,
Management at the U.S. Army War College. as unelected public servants who work it is curious that military education

40  JPME Today / The Education of Senior Military Officers JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015
programs have been generally ignored the faculty (up from 20 seminars in 2011). that would argue distinctions without
in public administration literature.2 Each faculty team has leeway in the delivery differences. This contention caused us as
Like other U.S. public administra- of content and is responsible for achieving educators to revisit the assumptions of
tors, DOD officers both at home and lesson objectives for each session. adult learning or andragogy:9
abroad assume responsibilities in public As an educational institution,
•• Adults have the need to know why
security and law enforcement, in public USAWC should be the role model of
they are learning something.
works, and in emergency management a learning organization4 within DOD.
•• Adults learn through doing.
and services. Thus, DOD senior-level Organizational scholar Peter Senge as-
•• Adults are problem-solvers.
education should prepare its graduates, serts in The Fifth Discipline that a learning
•• Adults learn best when the subject is
among other things, to serve as effective organization is “continually expanding its
of immediate use.
public administrators. capacity to create its future.”5 The future
The U.S. Army War College is one we seek to create is one of relevancy to In a larger forum, the debate contin-
of DOD’s senior-level colleges and pro- the military members of our society who ued on what our approach should be—to
vides the capstone of joint professional are charged with protecting U.S. national provide a framework with an application
military education for U.S. military values and interests. Thus, we continu- of the concepts presented in each of the
officers. Mostly in their mid-40s and ally assess the design and delivery of the lessons or to present multiple frameworks
with more than 20 years of service, curriculum to provide graduates with so that students would have a broad
these military professionals are high the best possible preparation for future understanding of the topics. The battle
performers with extensive experience service. The faculty conducts an examina- lines seemed drawn superficially between
in leading and managing organizations. tion of each core course and individual faculty members with postgraduate
This formal professional development lessons therein—a crucial and often pain- educational experience and those with
opportunity provides them a foundation ful experience. My experiences in these traditional operational “field” or func-
for future high-level service. Each year “hot washes” or “after action reviews” tional experience within the military.
approximately 300 officers from across generated this article on the education of It would be convenient but wrong to
the Armed Forces participate in USAWC USAWC students. characterize the debate as “how to think”
seminars of the Resident Education versus “what to think.” The essential
Program (REP) throughout a 10-month The Stimulus question faced by all faculty is how to
opportunity to “confer on the three great At an end-of-course review with teaching teach “how to think” in the limited time
problems of national defense, military colleagues for the REP, I was the leader we have in seminar. The USAWC faculty
science, and responsible command.”3 The of a small group for a subset of lessons of represents a range of educational and
Distance Education Program engages our core course on Strategic Leadership. military experiences (it is a mix of civilian
over 700 students in two 2-year cohorts. What followed was a pointed discussion academics and predominantly military
Like the other senior Service colleges, on the faculty role in educating our Active-duty and retired officers). With
USAWC programs are designed to equip students for senior-leadership responsi- that in mind, our faculty members have
graduates with critical thinking skills that bilities. One faculty member argued that preferred teaching styles for delivering
facilitate analysis of strategic situations, our teaching philosophy should seek to our diverse curriculum.
enable them to provide sound assess- provide graduates with tools that can be
ments and advice to senior leaders, and applied in their assignments immediately Stakeholder Surveys
prepare them to manage complex na- following graduation. One teaching This is not a unique debate for us, or for
tional security organizations in the joint, method put forth in The Adult Learner educators writ large.10 Our institution
interagency, international, and multina- was the use of adult learning models as has explored this question through exter-
tional environment. the guiding process in seminars.6 The nal and internal studies to determine
The USAWC REP curriculum is other was based on Education for Judg- the needs of future military officers and
delivered by three academic departments: ment.7 The faculty member decried the study approaches to educating military
National Security and Strategy; Command, practice of providing students with mul- leaders for the 21st century.11 Recent
Leadership, and Management; and Military tiple frameworks and theoretical perspec- reviews of the USAWC curriculum
Strategy, Plans, and Operations. The curric- tives without first giving them tools to focused on educating strategic leaders
ulum currently consists of five core courses use in the “real world.” He asserted that and educating strategic thinking.12
followed by two terms of electives, along not allowing students the opportunity Each study addresses presenting specific
with special programs providing in-depth to apply the perspectives to case studies knowledge to develop competencies for
study of selected areas. Seminar cohorts was a waste of time given his perception near-term assignments—a pragmatic and
of 16 to 17 students are led by a three- to of theoretical discussions with limited or rational approach to meet the short-term
four-person faculty team. As of academic no application.8 With passion, the faculty needs of the officers and their gaining
year 2012–2013, there are 24 seminars member commented that such discus- organizations—as well as providing
with standardized lesson plans designed by sions could be purely academic exercises students with several tools that can be

JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015 Allen 41

 Nonetheless, some students and
faculty perceive the need to provide gradu-
ates with more specific ways to overcome
both the predictable and unpredictable
challenges of their next assignments. This
can be accomplished by providing them
with different frameworks or models that
explain organizational phenomenon (de-
scriptive) and also expose them to various
approaches to accomplish organizational
goals (prescriptive). If a tested theory
becomes widely accepted, the resulting
model is adopted to provide predicable
results. However, when we can only rely
on competing theories, each of which may
describe the organizational phenomena for
only certain conditions, then it becomes
imprudent to assume that a single frame-
work will suffice. Our recent graduates are
best positioned to validate this assertion.
Our USAWC students, by virtue of
their past successful performance and
high potential, have been selected to
serve in higher levels of the national
defense establishment. They have
Retired Ambassador Robert B. Zoellick, chairman of Goldman Sach’s International Advisors, speaks
to students, staff, and faculty during evening lecture at U.S. Naval War College, October 2014 (U.S. real-world experience within their or-
Navy/James E. Foehl) ganizations that they can bring to bear
on the issues that arise in their seminars.
useful in handling myriad situations. The when current doctrine is ineffective and As an institution, we must convey the
goal is to develop within our graduates then to develop new doctrine appropri- relevance and utility of the material we
the ability to create their own ways to ate to the circumstances at hand. For teach to our students who are archetypal
address the unforeseen circumstances in example, our contemporary military ex- adult learners.
any environment. periences in Afghanistan and Iraq led to Our military educational mission
Each study recommends that students the development of a counterinsurgency mirrors that of a public administration
receive a broad exposure to concepts that doctrine that diverged greatly from the educational program. For this kind of
enhance development of their adaptive previous doctrine that focused on large- education, Patricia Shields reminds us of
capacity—their ability to cope with a scale conventional operations. the tradition of classical pragmatism. She
wide range of conditions. The Office of Surveys of military leaders in opera- discusses the applicability of the “four
the Secretary of Defense study suggests tional and institutional positions have Ps”: practical, pluralism, participatory,
future military leaders need “an ap- considered this educational issue. U.S. and provisional.16 Our USAWC should
preciation for adaptability and flexibility. general officers reported that developing likewise be practical by demonstrating
. . . Officers have to be comfortable breadth of knowledge was more impor- the link between theories and our stu-
with thinking in terms of the art of the tant for USAWC graduates than having dents’ broad experiences. The diversity
possible. They must be able to take in depth of knowledge in specialized areas.14 of our constituents as well as the interde-
multiple points of view and different General officer respondents in 2012 pendence of policy and decisionmaking
perspectives.”13 However, some faculty indicated that USAWC graduates were systems reveals pluralism in the realm
members counter that students, as adult well prepared to understand how to oper- of national security. Developing a clear
learners, need a tangible framework that ate in the strategic environment, address understanding of the problem space and
can be applied to anticipated problems. and plan for the future while executing potential solutions requires the partici-
The use of frameworks is commonplace current missions, and deal with complex patory engagement of all members of
in Army culture. Prior to senior Service problems.15 External observers and em- the national security enterprise. Lastly,
schools, military education is based ployers of our graduates suggest that a adopted policies are rarely “best” perma-
on standardized curriculum delivered broad education with exposure to many nent solutions given the changing nature
uniformly. However, successful USAWC perspectives enhances their adaptability as of the environment. In our realm, all
graduates must be able to determine senior leaders. policies and practices are provisional.

42  JPME Today / The Education of Senior Military Officers JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015
 This reflection on USAWC education true framework and allow students to test
3
Elihu Root, “The Army War College,
Address at the Laying of the Cornerstone,
began with a forceful nudge by colleagues their understanding of its concepts and Washington, DC, February 21, 1903,” in
to examine how we should attempt to applications in a case study. Even then, The Military and Colonial Policy of the United
educate our USAWC students. I came to we faculty must encourage students to States, Addresses and Reports by Elihu Root,
realize that we are faced with several para- challenge even approved solutions. There ed. Robert Bacon and James B. Scott (Cam-
doxes: We must educate both broadly and will be other lessons where tried and true bridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1916),
121–129.
deeply. We must not only expose them to is not a viable approach and may even 4
Christopher Argyris and Donald Schön,
proven ways to address known challenges be counterproductive. These are better Organizational Learning: A Theory of Action
but also enhance their ability to adapt and addressed by working through multiple Perspective (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley,
create their own tools for new situations. perspectives. Faculty members who are 1978).
We must encourage students to share responsible for specific lessons must keep
5
Peter Senge, The Fifth Discipline: The
Art and Practice of the Learning Organization
their experiences while helping them view in mind the deliverability of the lessons by
(Boston, MA: Currency, 1990), 14.
situations through different lenses. Each the collective faculty and to the students. 6
Malcolm S. Knowles, Elwood F. Holton,
of these paradoxes presents a challenge The overarching goal is to provide our and Richard A. Swanson, The Adult Learner:
to our faculty, who want to fully equip graduates with the best possible prepara- The Definitive Classic in Adult Education and
our students for the future while enabling tion for future service to the Nation Human Resource Development, 6th ed. (San
Diego: Elsevier, 2005).
them to perform effectively in their next through this educational experience. 7
C. Roland Christensen, David A. Garvin,
assignment. One colleague called this Implicitly, this goal must be sought and Ann Sweet, eds., Education for Judgment:
“educating for certainty.” But we must at each of the DOD professional military The Artistry of Discussion Leadership (Boston:
acknowledge that we are unable to do education institutions, whereby its at- HBS Press, 1992).
that. The future provides both continuity tainment will support success of the joint
8
Louis B. Barnes, C. Roland Christensen,
and Abby J. Hansen, Teaching and the Case
and change. So our educational approach force. With the persistent challenges in
Method, 3rd ed. (Boston: Harvard Business
should account for both and prepare our the joint, interagency, international, and School Press, 1994).
students to operate in the strategic land- multinational environment, it is doubly 9
Knowles, Holton, and Swanson; Peter
scape they will encounter. important that the Armed Forces resist the Renner, The Art of Teaching Adults: How to Be-
A portfolio approach may be the pull of parochialism in the face of policy come an Exceptional Instructor and Facilitator,
10th ed. (Vancover: Training Associates, 2005).
most pragmatic way to meet our insti- and fiscal uncertainty. Successful graduates 10
Frans-Bauke van der Meer and Ar-
tutional goals. The portfolio curriculum of joint professional military education thur Ringeling, “An Education Strategy for
design and materials offers established programs will have learned “how to think” Practitioners in Public Administration Master’s
frameworks and theories combined and pragmatism in collaborative planning Programs,” Journal of Public Affairs Education
with opportunities to explore emerging and execution of operations to support 16, no. 1 (2010), 77–93.
11
“The Military Officer in 2030: Secretary
theoretical constructs. During a visit to national security interests.
of Defense 2003 Summer Study,” slide presen-
USAWC seminars, a noted journalist and These reflections are intended to tation (Newport, RI: Office of the Secretary of
military historian challenged our students prompt the public administration and Defense, 2003); and William T. Johnsen et al.,
to use their year as “an opportunity to leadership education communities to also “The Army War College: Educating Strategic
get bigger.” Through historical examina- reflect on how to assist the U.S. military Leaders in an Age of Uncertainty,” in The
Future of Military War Colleges, ed. Jeffrey D.
tions, he discerned that successful military in its functions and responsibilities. The
McCausland (Carlisle, PA: Dickinson College,
leaders had the uncanny abilities “to breadth and depth of research in these December 2005), 22–185.
accommodate other opinions” and “to fields offer knowledge and practical ap- 12
Harry R. Yarger and Charles D. Allen,
be open to other points of view.” These plications that can be useful in national Educating Strategic Leaders: Report of the Elec-
abilities help inform “bigger judgments” security matters. Further engagement and tive Program Review Working Group (Carlisle,
PA: U.S. Army War College, 2007); and Harry
that senior leaders have the responsibility collaboration—a conversation—between
R. Yarger, Educating Strategic Thinking in
and obligation to make. the public administration, leadership edu- JSOU (Washington, DC: Joint Special Opera-
I realized that we as faculty must also cation, and defense communities would tions University, 2007).
accept the challenge to get bigger and benefit all. JFQ 13
“The Military Officer in 2030: Secretary
move away from our own areas of com- of Defense 2003 Summer Study.”
14
2012 U.S. Army War College General
fort. We have to accept that we may not
Officer Survey (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War
always have the right answer to provide Notes College, 2012).
to our students to solve problems that 15
Ibid., 1.
have yet to materialize. In designing
1
Donald F. Kettl and James W. Fesler, The 16
David H. Brendel, Healing Psychiatry:
Politics Of The Administrative Process, 3rd ed. Bridging the Science/Humanism Divide (Cam-
courses and lessons, we should bridge the (New York: CQ Press, 2005). bridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006); and Patricia M.
gap between preparing students for their 2
Jeffery A. Weber and Johan Eliasson, eds., Shields, “Rediscovering the Taproot: Is Clas-
next assignment and preparing them for Handbook of Military Administration: Public sical Pragmatism the Route to Renew Public
their roles in an uncertain future. Some Administration and Public Policy (London: Adminstration?” Public Administration Review
lessons will lend themselves to a tried and CRC Press, 2007). (March/April 2008), 205–221.

JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015 Allen 43

Officer Candidate School instructor explains objective of teambuilding exercise including Marine Corps leadership traits, decisionmaking, and ethical
leadership to students from University of North Carolina, at Marine Corps Leadership Seminar, April 2013 (U.S. Marine Corps/Megan Angel)

Vertical and Horizontal Respect

A Two-Dimensional Framework for Ethical
Decisionmaking
By George H. Baker, Jr., and Jason E. Wallis

veryone wants to be a good Yet the newspapers are frequently filled The dictionary defines ethics as

E person; at least that tends to be

a fundamental assumption about
most of the people we work with in
with articles about officers, enlisted
members, and civilians falling from
grace. Why do so many people make
“an area of study that deals with ideas
about what is good and bad behavior: a
branch of philosophy dealing with what
the Department of Defense (DOD). bad choices? is morally right or wrong.”1 This article
proposes a simple two-dimensional
framework for ethical decisionmaking.
We kept it simple so it can be remem-
George H. Baker, Jr., is a Professor in the College of Distance Education at the U.S. Naval War College. bered. We believe this framework will
Master Chief Jason E. Wallis is the Director of the Navy Senior Enlisted Academy.

44  JPME Today / A Framework for Ethical Decisionmaking JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015
be helpful throughout the day-to-day posted speed limit. However, behavior choice and judgment.”12 Finally, Nucci
moments that sometimes challenge our today is often far more transparent than it concluded that “a person of good char-
professional ethics. was when Moulton first gave his speech. acter is someone who attends to the
Modern-day transparency warrants as- moral implications of actions and acts in
Vertical Respect and the sociating Moulton’s obedience to the accordance with what is moral in most
Choice Continuum unenforceable with what we call the red circumstances.”13 In other words, people
This first part of the framework has its zone. In the red zone we have choices. of good moral character have the habit of
roots in a 1924 speech given by Lord For example, we all should obey the making choices based on ethical values.
Moulton in Great Britain. John Fletcher posted speed limit, right? To summarize, the choice continuum
Moulton was the Minister of Muni- In his paper “Ethics in the U.S. considers three things: the individual, the
tions for Great Britain at the onset of Navy,” Rear Admiral Ted Carter de- situation, and the available choices. For
World War I.2 In what came to be titled scribed Moulton’s obedience to the DOD members, the heart of the choice
Law and Manners, Moulton talked unenforceable as “the sphere where continuum is in demonstrating vertical
about a continuum of choices ranging individuals must exercise discretion and respect—making choices that reflect the
from total freedom on one end to total judgment, making decisions when the values of DOD as embodied in the pro-
restriction on the other. (Moulton used only enforcer is themselves.”6 Carter fession of arms. If there is any use at all in
different terms, but the meaning is emphasized that decisionmaking in the the choice continuum, it is in its ability to
essentially the same.) red zone “relies upon an internalized highlight the red zone, where individuals
On the one hand, with total restric- sense of responsibility and an intrinsically- may be tempted to make choices based
tion the individual has no choice but to developed ethical core.”7 In other words, on personal interests at the expense of or-
comply. Think of this as externally im- the red zone represents where one’s true ganizational interests. After all, everyone
posed obedience. One image that comes character comes to light. Do we consis- wants to be good, but sometimes we can
to mind is a prisoner complying with the tently choose service above self? benefit from a little reminder.
orders of a prison guard. On the other We all make choices in the course of
hand, with total freedom there are no carrying out our duties. Some choices Theory to Practice: Life
rules. People are free to do as they please. are ethical and others are not. Rather in the Red Zone
In Moulton’s words, this realm “includes than emphasizing right and wrong, the The DOD Encyclopedia of Ethical
all those actions as to which we claim and Joint Ethics Regulation describes ethics as Failure is a readily available source of
enjoy complete freedom.”3 “standards by which one should act based cases involving red zone decisionmak-
Together, total restriction and total on values” and values as “core beliefs ing. Here, the Standards of Conduct
freedom represent the ends of a con- such as duty, honor, and integrity that Office publishes a selection of cases for
tinuum of choice. Yet Moulton’s speech motivate attitude and actions.”8 As one use in DOD ethics training. The Office
was not about the ends of the continuum might expect, the Joint Ethics Regulation cautions, “some cases are humorous,
but rather the gray area of decisionmaking is “applicable to all DOD employees, some sad, and all are real. Some will
that lies between. Moulton called this gray regardless of military or civilian grade.”9 anger you as a Federal employee and
area “obedience to the unenforceable.”4 The Joint Ethics Regulation goes on to some will anger you as an American
Said differently, if total restriction is the say that “not all values are ethical values taxpayer.”14 They all reflect individu-
realm of what we “must do,” then some- (integrity is; happiness is not).”10 The als making choices in a given situation
where beyond total restriction is the realm unspoken message is to subordinate where obedience to organizational rules
of what we “should do.” In Moulton’s personal interests to organizational (that is, vertical respect) was seemingly
words, obedience to the unenforceable interests (that is, service above self). unenforceable—at least to them.
“is the obedience of a man to that which Making choices that are consistent with Members who rise within the DOD
he cannot be forced to obey. He is the en- organizational values demonstrates verti- hierarchy accumulate both responsibility
forcer of the law upon himself.”5 Behavior cal respect. and authority. Authority brings with it
here is reflected in the old cliché, “it is People who consistently make good control of resources. The two examples
what we do when no one is looking.” ethical choices are said to be of good that follow from the Encyclopedia of
It is here that we take a slight depar- moral character. In his book Education in Ethical Failure illustrate bad choices by
ture from Moulton’s original concept. the Moral Domain, Larry Nucci defined individuals in the red zone:
The “choice continuum” relabels morality as “knowledge of right and
Moulton’s obedience to the unenforce- wrong. Conduct is moral if it involves Your Posters Are My Posters. An Army
able as obedience to the (seemingly) selection of particular courses of action officer was convicted both for making false
unenforceable. Furthermore, obedience that are deemed to be right.”11 Again, statements, including false statements in
to the (seemingly) unenforceable often the theme of choice takes center stage. his confidential financial disclosure report
carries a sense of what we “might get Nucci posited: “The central feature (failure to report an outside position and
away with”—for example, exceeding the of human morality is our capacity for the income from that position), and for

JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015 Baker and Wallis 45

Johns Hopkins University student tries to lower tensions during ethical decisionmaking field exercise at The Basic School (U.S. Marine Corps/
Emmanuel Ramos)

stealing government property. The employee colonel resigned from the military service Take, for example, the use of govern-
put in an order at the department print for the good of the service under other than ment vehicles. Many in DOD, including
shop, certifying that a series of posters honorable conditions.16 those in the lower ranks or grades, have
were for official business. The posters were access to government vehicles. The rules
actually for the employee’s side business. In the first case, the Army officer regarding the use of government ve-
Additionally, the employee purchased a abused his official position for personal hicles (including government-provided
conference table, for which his own business gain. Following the explanation of rental cars) can vary depending on
got a $400 credit toward a conference table ethical versus nonethical values from the whether one is at a permanent duty
of its own. The employee was sentenced to 2 Joint Ethics Regulation, we see that the station or on temporary duty (TDY).
years of probation, 6 months house arrest, Army officer chose personal happiness Generally, government vehicles are
a fine of $25,000, and was ordered to pay over integrity. In the second case, the for official use only. However, what
$1,600 in restitution.15 lieutenant colonel also chose personal constitutes “official” use can vary from
happiness over integrity by accepting one situation to the next. For example,
a gift while in an official capacity and using a government vehicle to make
Sampling of Gift Not Sufficient. A
failing to follow the rules for doing a burger run is permissible while on
lieutenant colonel committed dereliction
such. In each case, individuals had to TDY, but not so while at a permanent
of duty when, in violation of the Joint
choose between what they “should do” duty station.17 Thus, use of government
Ethics Regulation, he received a bottle of
and what they “might get away with.” vehicles is an area where government
Ballantine’s 30-year-old Scotch valued at
Unfortunately, they chose the latter. employees must be knowledgeable and
$400 and failed to report it and properly
One does not have to be senior to careful of the rules. Beyond the area of
dispose of it. In lieu of a court martial, the
make bad decisions in the red zone. government vehicles, many in DOD at

46  JPME Today / A Framework for Ethical Decisionmaking JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015
Johns Hopkins University student reasons with warlord of Centralian Revolution Army during ethical decisionmaking field exercise at The Basic
School (U.S. Marine Corps/Emmanuel Ramos)

all levels hold U.S. Government credit Although the choice continuum has Horizontal Respect and
cards, which carry their own list of dos value in promoting ethical decisionmak- Domain Theory
and don’ts. ing relative to organizational values, it If ethics is the philosophy of right and
As members of the government in has some significant limitations. It covers wrong behavior, then morals frequently
general and the DOD in particular, we only one dimension in decisionmaking— refers to what is “considered right and
hold a public office. We serve, and the respect amid an organizational hierarchy good by most people.”18 Good behavior
public trusts us to serve ethically. The red (that is, vertical respect). The choice is moral behavior, whereas bad behavior is
zone is called the red zone for a good continuum is focused on rules, not on immoral. Furthermore, moral issues often
reason: it represents a danger area where relationships. Although one might argue center on person-to-person behavior.
normally good people have the opportu- that “relationship to others” is already Domain theory in ethics considers the
nity to make bad choices. Bad choices in a part of the choice continuum, it is not social standards of right and wrong in how
the red zone jeopardize the public trust obvious. This is where the second dimen- we treat others. Dr. Larry Nucci begins his
enjoyed by all members of DOD. The sion of our proposed framework comes discussion of domain theory by drawing
choice continuum highlights the need to into play. Where “rules” and “choice” a distinction between morals and social
think clearly when making decisions in are the cornerstones of the choice con- conventions. Where ethics considers is-
the red zone. tinuum, “relationship to others” is the sues of right and wrong, “conventions are
Bystanders play a role in the red zone, foundation of domain theory. arbitrary because there are no inherent
too. Just as a single candle can light the interpersonal effects of the actions they
dark, sometimes all it takes is a single regulate.”19 Nucci provides the following
voice of reason to highlight the right example taken from an interview with a
choice—the right way ahead. child to illustrate his point:

JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015 Baker and Wallis 47

 Figure 1. The Choice Continuum

domain theory centers on horizontal re-

Figure 1. The ChoiceThe Choice Continuum
Continuum
spect (that is, respect for one another).
There are three domains in domain
Obedience to the
Total
(Seemingly)
Total theory. The first is the personal domain.
Restriction The Choice Continuum
Unenforceable
Freedom
As Nucci explains, this is the realm “of the
individual’s identified freedoms.”25 The
Obedience to the
personal domain consists of “one’s body
Total Total
Restriction (Seemingly)
Freedom and the claims to freedom of expression,
Unenforceable
The Red Zone communication, and association.”26 These
are the personal rights of people to be
individuals of their own designs, that is, to
be whom they choose to be.
The Red Zone However, claims to individual free-
dom incur shared moral obligations.
After all, exercising the freedom to be
ourselves assumes that others grant us
Figure 2. Domain Theory the freedom to do so. This give-and-
take relationship is what Nucci labeled
“moral reciprocity, mutual respect, and
cooperation.”27 He argues, “Moral
Figure 2. Domain TheoryDomain Theory discourse transforms individual claims
to freedom into mutually shared
Personal Domain Moral Domain moral obligations.”28 In simple terms,
• My body Domain Theory•• Fairness through the principle of reciprocity
• My expressions Mutual respect the personal domain begets the moral
• My associations • Concern for others
domain. Nucci labels the moral domain
Personal Domain Moral Domain as the sphere of interpersonal issues
• My body • Fairness “pertaining to justice, human welfare,
• My expressions Conventional Domain • Mutual respect
• My associations • All other rules of social • Concern for others and compassion.”29 In other words, the
behavior moral domain comprises the “principles
of fairness, mutual respect, and concern
Conventional Domain for the welfare of others.”30
• All other rules of social The third and final domain in do-
behavior
Moral Issue: Did you see what hap- former carry an implication of potential main theory is the conventional domain.
pened? Yes. They were playing and John harm to others. It consists of all other rules that stem
hit him too hard. Is that something you are Nucci further elaborates that moral from living in a society, that is, “the
supposed to do or not supposed to do? Not issues are matters concerned with “wel- agreed-upon uniformities in social be-
so hard to hurt. Is there a rule about that? fare and physical harm . . . psychological havior determined by the social system
Yes. What is the rule? You’re not to hit harm . . . fairness and rights . . . and in which they were formed.”31 These are
hard. What if there were no rule about hit- positive behaviors” toward others.21 He also the rules that are exemplified within
ting hard, would it be alright to do then? argues that moral issues are independent vertical respect.
No. Why not? Because he could get hurt of social norms. “Judgments of moral The conventional domain is vast and
and start to cry. issues are justified in terms of harm or its rules are numerous. And as Nucci
fairness that actions would cause, while cautions, those rules are often changing
Conventional Issue: Did you see what judgments of conventions are justified in and always relative to the society in which
just happened? Yes. They were noisy. Is terms of norms and the expectations of they were created. If the aforementioned
that something you are supposed to do or authority.”22 Nucci concludes that “the cases from DOD’s Encyclopedia of Ethical
not supposed to do? Not do. Is there a rule core of human morality is a concern for Failure were viewed through the lens of
about that? Yes. We have to be quiet. fairness and human welfare.”23 In other domain theory, they would fall within the
What if there were no rule, would it be al- words, domain theory has a powerful conventional domain.
right to do then? Yes. Why? Because there focus: social relationships—“the very Lastly, Nucci makes an important
is no rule.20 ability of people to get along with one point regarding the conventional domain.
another.”24 Said differently, where the Where rules may come and go within the
In sum, the primary difference between choice continuum centers on vertical conventional domain, the rules in the
moral and conventional issues is that the respect (or respect for the institution), personal and moral domains are few and

48  JPME Today / A Framework for Ethical Decisionmaking JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015
enduring, giving a sense of permanence test, when someone has to ‘take the lead’
Notes
to this part of domain theory. in life,”37 was moral leadership in action.
With this definition in mind, the issues 1
Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary
Horizontal Respect: of sexual assault and of integrating gay (2015).
Theory to Practice men and women into the military will be 2
John Fletcher Moulton, “Law and Man-
ners,” Atlantic Monthly, July 1924, 1–4.
One issue regarding horizontal respect solved only by people whose character 3
Ibid., 1.
gaining significant attention in today’s reflects moral leadership. 4
Ibid.
military is sexual assault. In a December To summarize, the strength of do- 5
Ibid.
2014 news conference, former Secretary main theory is its ability to highlight 6
Walter E. Carter, Jr., “Ethics in the U.S.
of Defense Chuck Hagel told reporters: horizontal respect—our ability to get Navy,” U.S. Naval War College, March 24,
along with each other. By accepting our 2014, 9.
7
Ibid.
Sexual assault threatens the lives and own personal freedoms, we incur an 8
Department of Defense (DOD), DOD
well-being of both the women and the obligation to allow others to also realize 5500.07-R, The Joint Ethics Regulation, includ-
men who serve our country in uniform. It their personal freedoms via the principle ing Changes 1–7, November 17, 2011, 118.
destroys the bonds of trust and confidence, of reciprocity. 9
Ibid., i.
which [are] at the heart of our military.
10
Ibid., 118.
11
Larry P. Nucci, Education in the Moral
Eradicating sexual assault from our ranks Framework Conclusion Domain (New York: Cambridge University
is not only essential to the long-term health Chapter 12 of the Joint Ethics Regula- Press, 2001), 4–5.
and readiness of the force, it is also about tion lists 10 ethical values all DOD 12
Ibid., 112.
honoring our highest commitments to employees should consider when car- 13
Ibid., 124.
protect our fellow Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, rying out their duties. The first four
14
Standards of Conduct Office, Encyclope-
dia of Ethical Failure (Washington, DC: DOD,
and Marines.32 deal with attaining vertical respect. October 2014), 3.
They are honesty, integrity, loyalty, and 15
Ibid., 70.
Similarly, the DOD 2014 accountability. The next five deal with 16
Ibid., 82.
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) horizontal respect. They are fairness, 17
DOD, Joint Travel Regulations, April 1,
states: “Eliminating sexual assault is one caring, respect (for others), promise- 2015, O-7.
18
Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary.
of the Department of Defense’s highest keeping, and responsible citizenship. 19
Nucci, 7.
priorities.”33 Using domain theory as a The final value listed, pursuit of excel- 20
Ibid., 8.
lens, we see that sexual assault is a viola- lence, charges DOD members to be 21
Ibid., 10.
tion of the moral domain, where mutual examples of excellence and to “strive 22
Ibid.
respect and concern for the victim’s well- beyond mediocrity.”38 This final attitu-
23
Ibid., 19.
24
Ibid.
being are superseded by the perpetrator’s dinal value is designed to maintain the 25
Ibid., 73.
selfish desires. In simple terms, sexual public trust. Though it uses different 26
Ibid.
assault violates horizontal respect. words, the message in the Joint Ethics 27
Ibid.
Another issue mentioned in the QDR Regulation is clear. Members of DOD 28
Ibid.
is the urgency to implement changes are expected to exhibit both vertical and
29
Ibid., 50–51.
30
Ibid., 51.
needed “to fully realize [DOD’s] deci- horizontal respect. 31
Ibid., 7.
sion to allow gay men and women to Our goal was to come up with an 32
Tyrone C. Marshall, “More Must Be
serve openly in the military.”34 Using do- ethical framework that could be useful in Done to Eliminate Sexual Assault, Hagel Says,”
main theory as a lens, these are items of everyday decisionmaking. The concepts DoD News, December 4, 2014.
the personal domain—personal rights of of vertical and horizontal respect seem
33
Quadrennial Defense Review 2014 (Wash-
ington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense,
expression and association. Again, these to capture just that. Vertical respect is 2014), 7.
are items of horizontal respect. explained via the choice continuum, 34
Ibid., xii.
Just as they did in the choice con- which highlights choices made in the 35
Robert Coles, Lives of Moral Leadership:
tinuum, bystanders too can play an red zone that are inconsistent with our Men and Women Who Have Made a Difference
important role by speaking up when wit- values as members of the Department of (New York: Random House, 2001), ix.
36
Ibid., 7.
nessing violations. Pulitzer Prize winner Defense. Domain theory highlights hori- 37
Ibid., 226.
Robert Coles defines moral leadership as zontal respect and human relationships. 38
The Joint Ethics Regulation, 118–119.
“a willingness to say and do what needs Professionalism means integrating verti-
to be expressed.”35 He further argues, cal and horizontal respect as we execute
“This is one of the hallmarks of a leader— our duties, even at the expense of self-
having the courage to speak up despite interest. Together, vertical and horizontal
others’ moods or discouragement.”36 respect represent a practical framework
Coles concludes that “what happens that can illuminate better choices in ethi-
when moral values are really put to the cal decisionmaking. JFQ

JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015 Baker and Wallis 49

U.S. military and Japan Self-Defense Forces personnel engage in missile defense planning during Integrated Air and Missile Defense Wargame V, February
2014 (U.S. Air Force/Nathan Allen)

Waffles or Pancakes?
Operational- versus Tactical-Level
Wargaming
By Dale C. Eikmeier

sk people what the difference if there is a difference; after all, the enced chefs, however, will tell you the

A is between pancake batter and

waffle batter,1 and some will
quizzically return the question, asking
batter looks the same. A few might
acknowledge some differences but not
know exactly what they are. Experi-
difference is the amount of eggs and
oil in the batter. You can put pancake
batter in a waffle iron and waffle batter
on a griddle and both will cook, but
the products will disappoint, especially
Colonel Dale C. Eikmeier, USA (Ret.), is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Joint and
if you were expecting crispy waffles or
Multinational Operations at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. fluffy pancakes.

50  JPME Today / Operational- versus Tactical-Level Wargaming JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015
 Wargaming at the operational and is the type of questions and issues each Arrangements of unit capabilities in time
tactical levels is a lot like waffle and pan- focuses on. Simply put, the difference is and space to achieve effects and objectives
cake batter: it might look the same and a focus on what to do versus how to do it form the core of tactical-level courses of
share many of the same ingredients, but questions. This is important especially action. Therefore, tactical-level wargaming
it has important and subtle differences. for operational-level planners because deals primarily with the how questions:
Ask military planners what the difference their level is the bridge that connects how are capabilities used, how are they
is between operational-level and tactical- broad strategic guidance and aims toward brought to bear, how are they maneu-
level wargaming methodologies used tactical actions. That bridge is built out vered, supported, and sustained. Like the
in course of action (COA) analysis, and of what questions—what endstate, what operational level, the tactical level is also a
you will probably get the same pancake- effects, what objectives, what tasks, what continuum of what to how questions, but
versus-waffle–type answers, with many capabilities—that are arranged with when the scale at the tactical level is tipped to-
telling you that the difference is nonex- and where questions. If operational-level ward the how side. So at the tactical level,
istent or not important. The truth is the planners do not understand this differ- think big how and little what.
wargaming processes may look the same, ence, they tend to wrestle with the easier
but the “ingredients” and outcomes and more concrete tactical how questions Other Ingredients
are very different. Using a tactical-level rather than the more difficult conceptual The following discussion highlights
wargaming focus at the operational level what questions. Operational wargaming some of the other important but subtle
can result in the direction of well-planned asks, “Are we doing the right things?” differences planners need to be aware of.
and synchronized tactical actions at ques- Tactical wargaming asks, “Are we doing These differences may be generalities,
tionable operational tasks and the aiming things right?” but they do represent key divergences
of mismatched capabilities at ill-defined The purpose of the wargame, at between the two levels.
effects that fail to achieve operational and both levels, is to collect information to Aim. The aim of wargaming at the
strategic objectives. determine the advantages and disadvan- operational level, according to joint
Many planners agree that opera- tages of each COA when compared to an doctrine, is to determine the feasibility
tional-level wargaming using the Joint evaluation criteria.2 The operational-level and acceptability of a course of action.3
Operation Planning Process is different COA and its wargame analysis are largely At the tactical level, according to Army
from tactical-level wargaming using the concerned with identifying and arranging doctrine, the aim is to refine, identify,
Military Decision Making Process or the the right endstates, objectives, effects, analyze, develop, and determine key
Marine Corps Decision Process. But they and tasks, along with matching the elements of the COA.4 This doctrinal
struggle with understanding the differ- tasks to capabilities and resources in the difference reflects some of the what are
ences because Service doctrines and joint correct sequence. These arrangements we doing versus the how we are going
doctrine describe only the processes and in time (when and sequencing), space to do it approaches of operational and
do not compare or point out differences (where), and purpose (goals) to achieve tactical levels. COA development at
between them. Not fully understanding an endstate form the core of operational- both levels uses the screening criteria
the subtle differences, planners default to level courses of action. Therefore, the of adequate, feasible, acceptable, distin-
what they know best—which is usually operational level deals primarily, although guishable, and complete.5 The tactical
the tactical level—and will apply tactical not exclusively, with the what questions— level, however, assumes that a COA
“pancake techniques” to the operational what is the endstate, what objectives will has already met the screening criteria
“waffle processes.” This manifests itself achieve it, what effects must we create to and that the aim of the wargame is to
when planners lose focus on the opera- achieve the objectives, and what tasks and determine the how to details of the COA.
tional-level issues and drift toward trying action will produce those effects—and The operational level does not assume
to maneuver and fight functional or lastly the other what questions—when, the screening criteria have been met.
Service-component tactical actions rather where, and who will execute those tasks With its focus on what questions, the
than focusing on identifying and validat- and actions. This is not to say there are wargame is the tool to determine feasi-
ing operational-level tasks. Planners can no how questions at the operational level, bility and acceptability.6
avoid this tactical drift only if they un- but they are secondary to the more criti- Focus. The operational-level com-
derstand the difference between “tactical cal what questions; if they are wrong, it mander is concerned with identifying what
pancakes” and “operational waffles.” does not matter how well tactical actions to do, and the wargame helps validate
are executed. So think big what and little the selection of objectives, effects, and
What versus How how at the operational level, but keep in tasks that will create the endstate condi-
The two wargaming processes are mind both are present; the scale simply is tions. The commander then resources,
similar but not identical, and when things tipped toward what questions. sequences, and synchronizes those tasks,
are not identical, the differences are im- The tactical level is concerned with and subsequently assigns those tasks to
portant. The key difference between the how to achieve assigned missions and components. The COA is an arrange-
operational- and tactical-level wargame objectives using the resources provided. ment of these elements, and the wargame

JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015 Eikmeier 51

helps determine if the arrangement will methods are scope and detail. The op- multinational forces, and nongovernmen-
accomplish the mission and discern any erational level is larger in scope, broader tal and private sector organizations.8 If a
advantages and disadvantages. and less specific on details, and makes unified action partner cannot participate
The tactical-level component or more assumptions. It is a macro approach for security reasons, a responsible subject
Service commander figures out how that focuses on doing the right things at matter expert should replicate its actions,
best to accomplish the assigned mis- the right time and leaves fine details of reactions, and counteractions. The inclu-
sion/task. Most of the whats have execution planning for component plan- sion of unified action partners (other than
been determined and provided, so the ners. The tactical level is smaller in scope, military) can occur at the tactical level, but
tactical focus is on how to apply capa- more specific and detailed, and strives to it is the exception rather than the norm.
bilities against them. The tactical-level turn assumptions into facts. It is a micro Higher Authority. The approving
wargame uses creative combinations of approach that places importance on the higher authority at the operational level
standard doctrinal schemes of maneu- details of how to execute the tasks and will include military and/or civilian po-
ver, drills, techniques, and procedures accepts that the operational planners cor- litical leaders and possibly multinational
against the situation. rectly selected and assigned the tasks. organizations. Their guidance can
Process. Both levels use the same Media. Both levels use maps and tend to be broad, vague, and open to
action-reaction-counteraction model. matrices. However, the operational level’s interpretation. At the tactical level, the
However, there are slight nuances. The re- primary focus on what questions and higher authority, with few exceptions,
action in the tactical wargame is generally the arrangement of objectives and tasks is a military organization. Its guidance
confined to the enemy and local popula- to capabilities, resourcing, and sequenc- tends to be direct, specific, and less
tion in the immediate area of operations, ing are generally more suited to a matrix subject to interpretation.
while the operational level considers the supported by a map. The tactical level’s Time-Space Factors. Time-space fac-
reaction of a broader community, includ- primary focus on how questions deals more tors at the operational level help define
ing domestic and international audiences with schemes of maneuver, ranges, and the realm of possibilities, which are often
as well as adversaries. time-distance relationships and is more defined by logistics and force structure.
Certainty. Operational-level plan- suited to a map supported by a matrix. The operational level uses these factors
ners may start with a blank sheet of paper Purpose and Outcomes. The purpose primarily to determine the approximate
and a vague directive to begin planning. and outcomes are essentially the same at sequencing of tasks. However, estimates
They need to realize that some of their both levels: to generate and collect data of these factors are generally rough fig-
questions may be unanswerable at the so that advantages and disadvantages, ures for a number of reasons. Exactness
time of planning or have no answers at strengths and weaknesses can be deter- and precision at the operational level dur-
all. Therefore, operational-level planners mined and used in COA refinement and ing planning are rarely possible, and there
must be comfortable with higher degrees the comparison process. are too many variables and decisions to be
of ambiguity and working with a greater Elements of Power. The generally ac- made. In addition, the pursuit of preci-
number of assumptions. While details and cepted elements of power are diplomatic, sion can be counterproductive it if wastes
specifics are desirable and planners should informational, military, and economic. time and results in rigidity. For example,
work diligently to obtain or produce The operational level considers all the ele- an estimate that it takes x days to destroy
them, their absence cannot be an excuse ments in the development and analysis of an enemy capability may be sufficient for
not to plan. COAs and is the primary integrator and wargame purposes. Attempting to know
Tactical planners, while also working in synchronizer of the elements. Therefore, the exact number of assets and amount of
ambiguous environments, normally have the wargame considers all the elements. time required moves the operational-level
the benefit of an operational- or higher The tactical level can consider all the ele- planner to a tactical level that has not yet
level plan or planning guidance, which has ments, but it focuses mainly on military been planned. The tactical level attempts
attempted to reduce ambiguity, on which execution. At the tactical level, the other to use precise time-space factors for the
to build detailed plans. They should strive elements of power to be considered gen- synchronization and execution of opera-
to reduce uncertainty and put as much erally are environmental factors. Unless tions because it is wargaming the actual
detail as possible into tactical plans. otherwise tasked, the tactical level leaves execution of a specific assigned task.
Method. The methods described the integration or synchronization of the Number of Levels Down. Army
in doctrinal manuals include the other elements to the operational level. doctrine recommends wargaming two
timeline analysis, critical events, and Participants. Because the operational levels down; while joint doctrine does not
phasing of joint doctrine and the belt, level considers all the elements of power explicitly state two levels down, it does
avenue-in-depth, and box procedures and synchronizes, coordinates, and oc- hint at it.9 This reflects the difference
of wargaming.7 These methods are all casionally integrates them, it is normal in the amount of detail necessary at the
temporal or spatial variations and offer to include some unified action partners operational and tactical levels. Both look
options on which actions to wargame. in the wargame. Unified action partners two levels down in practice, but they are
The main differences between these include interorganizational representatives, looking at different things and asking

52  JPME Today / Operational- versus Tactical-Level Wargaming JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015
Soldiers provide covering fire for platoon during assault on enemy position during wargame exercise at Fort Bragg (U.S. Army/Michael J. MacLeod)

different questions. The operational level Not recognizing these differences can
looks for the correct assignment of tasks result in the wrong things done right,
to components one level down and asks just like putting pancake batter in a waffle
whether the component has the correct iron. JFQ
capabilities two levels down to achieve
the assigned task. The primary questions
asked are who has the task and whether Notes
they have the resources or capabilities to
accomplish it. Resourcing the right capa-
1
Credit for the pancake/waffle anal-
ogy goes to Dwayne Wagner, Command and
bilities at the right time is the operational General Staff Officers Course Instructor, Fort
level’s primary focus; how the capabilities Leavenworth, Kansas.
are used is secondary. The tactical level 2
Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, Joint Operation
looks at how the subordinate one level Planning (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff,
down will use assets two levels down to August 11, 2011), IV-27.
3
Ibid., IV-29.
accomplish the task. Using capabilities is 4
Field Manual (FM) 5-0, The Opera-
the tactical level’s primary focus; resourc- tions Process (Washington, DC: Headquarters
ing them is secondary. Department of the Army, March 2010), B-
The processes of wargaming at the 32–B-33.
operational and tactical levels are similar
5
JP 5-0, IV-24–IV-25; FM 5-0, B-15.
6
JP 5-0, IV-29.
but not identical, and it is the differences 7
Ibid., IV-32; FM 5-0, B-26.
that become important. The key differ- 8
JP 3-0, Joint Operations (Washington,
ence is a primary focus on questions of DC: The Joint Staff, August 11, 2011), I-8.
what at the operational level and ques- 9
JP 5-0, IV-30; FM 5-0, B-31.
tions of how at the tactical level. Planners,
especially at the operational level, need
to fully understand the differences. The
operational-level wargame strives to de-
termine if we are doing the right things
and creating the right effects. The tacti-
cal-level wargame strives to determine the
right way to accomplish the right thing.

JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015 Eikmeier 53

An Interview with
Christopher C. Bogdan
n May 12, 2015, Dr. William T. dollars, like FY12. We think we can get F-35) within 10 percent of the cost per

O Eliason, Editor in Chief of Joint

Force Quarterly, interviewed
Lieutenant General Christopher C.
to an $80–85 million aircraft. So from a
production point of view, we think we have
a good understanding of the costs and what
flying hour of an F-16. (That’s the best
apples-to-apples comparison because
the current F-16 cost per flying hour is a
Bogdan, USAF, Program Executive the drivers are to bring those costs down. standard measure for operating costs of
Officer for the F-35 Lightning II The big number is the O&S—the military aircraft.) Right now, despite what
Program, at Bogdan’s office in Arling- operations and sustainment cost. That’s people think, that curve is coming down
ton, Virginia. Erin L. Sindle tran- an estimate and, unfortunately, in this pretty nicely and we clearly understand
scribed the interview. program it’s a 50-year estimate; and it’s in the program office that there are a
an estimate that includes 2,443 U.S. lot of skeptics out there; we understand
JFQ: Most critics of the F-35 start with airplanes. So by anybody’s measure, that’s that the only way we can change minds
the cost of the program. What did you going to be a huge number; and that’s is by showing them results. The words
and Assistant Secretary of the Navy for what gets people taken aback when we don’t mean much—the results mean
Research, Development, and Acquisition talk about the O&S cost of the F-35 everything. Relative to cost, I would say
Sean Stackley recently tell Congress program. That’s where we get the “T” we understand the three areas of develop-
about the state of the program and this word—the trillion-dollar number. That ment, production, and O&S. They’re
issue of cost? number doesn’t mean a whole lot to me. stable, and in those key areas we’re doing
What I care about is what are we doing things to drive them down.
Lieutenant General Bogdan: We today in this program—concrete things—
said that costs are stable and actually to drive that cost down, and are we JFQ: When you speak to public audiences
coming down. When we look at cost, seeing the results? The answer is yes. The about the program, how do you describe
we look at three different areas. First, bottom line is since 2011 we’ve dropped the capability of these weapon systems
the cost of finishing the development that estimate down 13 percent, and the compared to current or legacy aircraft,
program; and we have not asked for a CAPE [Cost Assessment and Program both U.S. and foreign made?
penny more than what we were given Evaluation] came in last year and did its
in 2011 when we re-baselined the pro- own independent cost estimate of the Lt Gen Bogdan: I concentrate primar-
gram. We believe that we’re going to O&S costs, and it validated that from ily on two attributes that this airplane
finish the development program with- 2011 to 2013 we dropped 9 percent. But brings, and I listen to what warfighters
out asking for any more money. The the real issue is what are we doing now say and what they believe are game
second piece is the cost of producing to reduce future O&S costs. We started changers. The first of these game chang-
the airplane; and the price of buying the a full-blown reliability/maintainability ers is the notion that a pilot can fly this
airplane has continued to come down. program, and we started a so-called “war airplane into complex, heavily defended
We think that trend will continue. In on cost” room where we actually put the areas and be survivable. The survivability
fact, we’ve set a target (delivered price industry guys in along with some of our comes about because of a combination
per aircraft) for 2019 that when we sign consultants and the program office folks. of three aircraft characteristics: stealth,
the contract for those airplanes in 2019, Any idea on how to reduce costs gets speed, and sensors.
we’re looking for an airplane with an vetted. We look at return on investment Second, when this airplane is working
engine, with fee in then-year dollars, to and what it costs to invest; we look at right, it is extremely smart. It has multiple
be $80–85 million per F-35. the payback time; we look at how long it sensors that absorb lots of information,
It’s important that I give you those will take to implement; the team comes and then it can fuse that information to
three caveats (aircraft, engine, and fee) to the front office once a quarter and we give the pilot a picture of the battlespace
because sometimes industry likes to report decide on which things we will invest that is clear, concise, and accurate. It can
without the fee, which is just the cost. in and then adopt those improvements. also do that in places where the airplane
Sometimes the airframe guy likes to report We start taking concrete action today to remains virtually undetected. The pilot
his cost without the engine, and a lot of drive down costs later. We think that by can get into a battlespace, see things,
times they like to report the anticipated cost about the 2021 timeframe, we can at least and then leave. That kind of situational
of a delivered F-35 in 2019 in base-year get an A-model (U.S. Air Force version awareness is not only important for the

54  Commentary / An Interview with Christopher C. Bogdan JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015
F-35, but it’s important for the rest of the
weapons systems around the F-35. When
we connect with them, it makes them
and all those around the F-35 that much
smarter and more survivable.

JFQ: How has the program evolved

since you arrived as its Deputy Program
Executive Officer and later moving up
to lead it?

Lt Gen Bogdan: My predecessor

came in and re-baselined the program
because it had run off the rails. Vice
Admiral David J. Venlet did a great job
of putting some realism into that new
baseline, and he brought some credibil-
ity back into the program. I picked up
the ball, and now we’ve been execut-
ing—and we’ve been executing pretty
well. Schedule-wise, we haven’t missed
a major milestone. We are still on track
for Marine Corps IOC [initial operating
capability] this summer and Air Force
IOC next year. We are also on track
to meet partner and FMS [Foreign
Military Sales] deliveries in the future.
Another aspect of the program that
is accelerating is the building of a global
sustainment enterprise. This is a major
undertaking. There are some additional
complicated undertakings for which the
program is responsible that I am sure Lieutenant General Christopher C. Bogdan, USAF (U.S. Air Force/Andy Morataya)
people are unaware of in this area. For
example, we’re building two factories First and foremost, the most impor- what we did and why we did it. Whether
other than just the one at Fort Worth tant principle is integrity. You’ve got to it’s the parliament of a partner nation,
to build this airplane; we’re building a run the program with integrity—and that whether it’s Congress, whether it’s the
factory in Italy and a factory in Japan to starts with me. My team knows that we press, or OSD [Office of the Secretary
fabricate and check-out F-35s. For the always do things with integrity so people of Defense], people need to know what
engine, we’re also building a factory in believe us and we remain credible because we’re doing and why we’re doing it so
Turkey and another in Japan. We are the program runs on trust. We tell people they can continue to have trust in what
also building a supply, repair, and heavy the truth whether it’s good, bad, or ugly, we’re doing.
maintenance capability in both Europe and we don’t spin things. The third principle is accountability.
and the Pacific regions—just like the The second principle is transparency. Accountability in one direction is easy.
one we are building here in North When you’re spending the kind of money The program office is going to hold the
America. Creating a global sustainment we are spending and you’re the big- contractor accountable—this is a simple
enterprise with 14 different customers gest program in DOD [Department of concept to understand because that’s
across 3 regions of the globe is a very, Defense] history and you’ve got 14 cus- what people expect, that’s what’s built
very complex task. tomers who are depending on you, you into our job title in the program office.
From a fundamental level, since I had better bet your bottom dollar that What’s a lot harder with accountability is
took charge I’ve tried to institute four people are going to want to know what’s holding yourself accountable and holding
different principles in the way we do going on. For us, transparency is a way of the rest of the enterprise and stakeholders
business here, and I think if we get life. Every decision we make, every dollar accountable because if you’re not careful,
these four right, we’ve got a better shot we spend, we’d better be ready to stand your stakeholders and the people who
at succeeding. up in front of whomever and tell them have an influence on this program can do

JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015 Bogdan 55

some pretty bad things to it despite their Here’s what I can tell you today. discipline, software metrics, testing,
best intentions. So we preach 360-degree Every one of those problems is either design reviews—all the stuff we lacked
accountability. We make commitments, solved or on the path to being solved. years ago. From my perspective, there are
we hold ourselves accountable to those So for us, the measure of a good always going to be problems. There are
commitments, but we make sure every- program is not zero problems; the going to be things you don’t know about
one else in the enterprise also recognizes measure of a good program is having now but you’re going to know about
that they have to be held accountable to problems, making discoveries, and solv- later. The mark of a good program is that
their commitments also. ing them—and you solve them in a way you can get over them.
Finally, the last principle is discipline. that keeps the program on track. But The last problem I will share with you
We don’t have the time or the money, now a different set of problems is in the is the structural integrity of the B-model,
and the enterprise doesn’t have the headlines. Last year we had an engine which has cracked in places where we
patience anymore for us to have to do problem that created a fire on the air- thought it might from the models, but
things over again. We just can’t have plane. Guess what? We have all of that more severely than we thought it would.
“redos.” The way you can avoid do- taken care of. Production engines are There are a couple of reasons for that.
overs is with discipline up front. You’ve now being built with new pieces and The first reason goes back to early in
got to start things with discipline and parts so that won’t ever happen again. this program when the B-model went
then you’ve got to keep that discipline We are retrofitting the entire fleet with through a weight-reduction. It was
throughout—even if it might take you a new parts as well. So with that engine thousands of pounds overweight. One
little bit longer initially—because in the anomaly, which was a significant nega- of the ways we took weight out was to
endgame it won’t take you longer if you tive event on the program, we got to reduce the thickness of a lot of the struc-
get it right. It will take you a lot longer if the root cause, we got to the solution, ture. We also switched from titanium to
you have to redo it. and we implemented the solution. aluminum on a number of structures,
With those four principles, no mat- What’s not behind us yet is soft- which is lighter, but not as strong. That
ter what program you’re running, if ware—there are more than eight has come back to haunt us a little bit. We
you have those in place and you have million lines of code on this airplane. went through a significant event last year
your team operating and behaving that That’s about four times as many as on when we cracked the main bulkhead on
way, you probably have a better chance legacy airplanes. Offboard, the systems the B-model. We thought it could crack,
of success. that surround the airplane—mis- but when it did, it transferred loads to a
sion planning, reprogramming, ALIS bunch of the other bulkheads and they
JFQ: A number of earlier issues were [Autonomic Logistics Information cracked too. So we have been working
widely reported in the press, each System]—contain twice that amount for over a year to come up with a newly
seemingly difficult to solve, such as the of software. If we don’t get software designed bulkhead, which we now have
specialized flight helmet. Are any of right on this program, we’re going to in production for lot number 9. We also
these issues showstoppers in terms of be in big trouble. That’s number one. are trying to get a process known as laser
meeting your planned schedule? If so, Number two is our Autonomic Logistics shock peening qualified on the airplane.
which ones and how are you dealing Information System (ALIS), which is a This process can reinforce and strengthen
with them? heck of a lot harder than anybody ever the crack-prone areas of the bulkhead
thought. We treated the ALIS system without adding weight and without hav-
Lt Gen Bogdan: That’s a great ques- early on in this program like a piece of ing to tear apart the bulkheads.
tion. If you’d taken a snapshot of the support equipment. It’s not; it’s way
program 3 years ago, I could give you a more complicated and important than JFQ: As the largest customer of the air-
list of four or five technical things that that. It’s the brains and blood of op- craft, what does the U.S. Air Force think
were always in the front of everybody’s erating this weapons system. It has the about the F-35A’s ability to meet all the
mind. We had a problem with the hook maintenance information in it. It has missions it expects it to perform, particu-
on the C-model; it couldn’t catch the the logistics information in it. It has the larly close air support [CAS]?
cable. We had a problem with the hel- airplane configuration in it. It has all
met, which had glow problems, “jitter” of the training for the maintainers and Lt Gen Bogdan: The part of the dia-
problems, and stability problems. We the pilots in it. It talks to the ordering logue that has been missing about the
had problems because the plane couldn’t systems when it needs parts. We fielded CAS mission is that we are delivering
fly in lightning. We had problems when an airplane—long before ALIS was ma- CAS capability in two increments. We
we released fuel out of the wing dump ture—and that ended up putting a lot designed the program so that in the
system; fuel would stick to the bottom of stress on the maintenance guys out in initial years, it wouldn’t have all its ca-
of the wing and migrate into panels in the field. pability; it’s incremental. Will F-35 be
the fuselage. We also had reliability and We treat ALIS today as if it were its a good CAS airplane by 2018? You bet.
maintainability problems. own weapons system with an engineering But it’s not there yet. It will have a gun,

56  Commentary / An Interview with Christopher C. Bogdan JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015
Captain Brent Golden, 16th Weapons Squadron instructor, taxis F-35A Lightning II at Nellis Air Force Base, January 2015 (U.S. Air Force/Siuta B. Ika)

and that gun will work, but it’s not the F-35’s survivability, sensor fusion, and is a great lesson for them. Also, we have
only thing we use in the CAS mission. the situational awareness it brings, you all eight of our other partners’ personnel
It will be used in conjunction with have an excellent weapon system. in the program office who work as part
other capabilities such as precision- of the program—another great learning
guided munitions. It will have the right JFQ: Can you talk about the interna- experience for them and for us.
kinds of communications systems to tional portion of the program and how There are two other important
work with ground forces. Eventually in that has evolved? aspects of the partnership. First is the
Block 4, we’ll have full-mission video. ability for our partners to be able to fight
The jet already has incredible sensors, Lt Gen Bogdan: There’s a much deeper alongside us as equals and be able to use
so at night and in inclement weather relevance to the international part of the the same ROEs [rules of engagement]
you have the same capabilities as day- program, and I’ll start first with the part- because their airplanes, pilots, and main-
time. I think it’s a little unfair when nership itself. There are nine partners in tainers are just as capable as we are. This
folks who have an affinity for other the program when you count the United means they can also lead in the hardest
airplanes in the CAS role compare those States as a single partner; so we have eight missions. The last piece has to do with
aircraft to an F-35 without acknowledg- other partners, with most of them in the fifth-generation technology and our
ing that the F-35 can do so many other Europe. The only two not in Europe are partners’ industries participating in the
things that those aircraft cannot do be- Canada and Australia. The first important program. We’re providing technologies
yond the CAS mission. When you build piece about the partnership is that the that we expect our partners to protect,
a multirole airplane, it’s probably not partners get a say in what happens with just like we would. So, in one sense, we’re
going to be a superstar in everything it this program, and for some of them, that requiring them to upgrade their security
does, but it’s going to do a lot of things experience of being part of a big and infrastructure to a level beyond what they
really well. And, when you compare the complicated airplane acquisition program may already have. Also, many partner

JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015 Bogdan 57

 F-35B Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter taxis on flight deck
of USS Wasp during night operations as part of Operational
Testing 1 (U.S. Marine Corps/Anne K. Henry)

58  Commentary / An Interview with Christopher C. Bogdan JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015
industries involved in the program are Now let’s talk about the airplane to be in 10, 15, or 20 years, we’ll have
getting an opportunity to understand and the weapons system itself. Without 2,000-plus airplanes out there, located
and be part of modern manufacturing getting into details, what I will tell you all over the globe and being flown by
techniques and advanced technologies is if you know from the beginning of at least 14 customers. We are trying
and are being asked to hold themselves a program you will be exporting the to build the support and sustainment
to a pretty high standard if they want to weapon system—and you want to hand system to take care of all those airplanes.
be suppliers on this program. From the it to allies to let them operate it in their We’re building depot and heavy main-
DOD’s perspective, a stronger, allied own environments—you can, from the tenance capabilities in the Pacific and
industrial base gives us future access to start of the program, build in the ap- Europe just like we have here in the
better technologies and also pushes U.S. propriate protections. This is one of the United States. We are creating a global
industry to get better. first airplanes that I know of where at supply chain; we are creating a global
the start of the program we consciously network of repair capability in all 3
JFQ: News media reports have mentioned knew it would be an exportable weapon regions. All of this is not fully built or
an increasing number of cyber attacks system. Therefore, from a design and ar- mature yet. Over the next 5 to 7 years
being conducted against the Defense chitectural standpoint, one of the upfront the person who comes next is going to
Department in recent years. What impact requirements was to protect the critical have to take that onboard full steam
has this growing threat of cyber attacks technologies of the weapons system. That because our partners and FMS custom-
had on your program’s ability to deliver is pretty powerful when you start from ers will have aircraft in operations soon.
a capability that can effectively deal with the beginning because you don’t have to We’re adding 17 operating locations in
these cyber-related concerns? adapt, you don’t have to strap things on, the next 5 years and almost half of them
you don’t have to make what I would are overseas. We’ve got to be ready to
Lt Gen Bogdan: When we talk about consider to be secondary or tertiary have a global sustainment structure in
cyber threats to this program, we talk changes to protect things. As a result, it place and ready to operate. We’re on a
about them in two different environ- has what I would consider to be a very really tight timeline to get that done for
ments. The first environment is the strong built-in protection scheme. our partners and Foreign Military Sales
infrastructure we use to design, develop, customers. They expect that the day
sustain, and field the airplane; for exam- JFQ: What challenges and risks do you they get their airplanes in country, all
ple, the F-35 IT system we use to pass see for the program ahead and what will the infrastructure they need to support
program and design information among you recommend your successor focus on? the weapon system will be in place and
the partners, services, and program of- ready to go: supply chain, repair chain,
fice. From this perspective, I have the Lt Gen Bogdan: From a technical and maintenance manuals, training systems,
utmost confidence in the protections the performance standpoint, I think we etc.—all of it. That’s big. From that per-
Department of Defense has put in place will be able to solve any problems we spective, it’s probably where the focus
for those IT systems. We still have to encounter. We have to think about really needs to be in the next 5 years.
remain extremely vigilant when it comes continuing to evolve the airplane to
to industry’s systems. In the past, this is meet future threats. The good news is JFQ: Would you recommend future
where we have found vulnerabilities in the architecture of the airplane was built weapons systems that meet similar
the F-35 program. Consequently, DOD such that it has growth potential. We’re requirements for multiple Services be
and industry have worked together to working toward things like open-systems managed by a joint program office such
increase the protections we put in place architecture for sensors. We have already as this one?
to prevent F-35 information from get- done our first upgrade of all the major
ting into the wrong hands. Each and computers on the program and are plan- Lt Gen Bogdan: First, if the warfighters
every day we’re feeling a little bit better ning another upgrade in about 4 or 5 and customers are willing to compromise
about both government IT and industry years. So from a technical standpoint, I with each other on the requirements,
IT systems. I say this because a number would tell my successor to keep an eye joint programs can work. Our history of
of times every year multiple agencies—to on the need to make the weapon system joint programs is such that they don’t
include [U.S.] Cyber Command and more open. In addition, I would tell my work very well—not only because of the
22nd Air Force—visit the F-35 program successor that from a business perspec- lack of compromise but because we’ve
and do penetration and vulnerability tive I think we’re starting to get costs also thrown on some mismanagement.
testing. Not of the airplane and the under control, but we must continue When you put those two together—folks
weapons system, but of our IT systems. to take deliberate actions now to drive who weren’t willing to compromise with
So from that perspective, they are truly down future costs. The real big thing their requirements along with a program
helping us by showing us what we need that’s still out there is building what I that doesn’t have those management
to do to make ourselves more resilient, call the global sustainment enterprise. and leadership fundamentals down pat—
robust, and secure. If you think about where we’re going you’ve got a train wreck coming. We’ve

JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015 Bogdan 59

 Navy test pilot flies F-35B Joint Strike Fighter aircraft BF-3 with
inert AIM-9X Sidewinder missiles over Atlantic Test Range (U.S.
Navy/Courtesy of Lockheed Martin/Michael Jackson)

seen that in the past and the result is world can be very effective and efficient. or 40 years, you’d better start building
that the program dies or is split up along If you’re a U.S. Marine Corps B-model them so they have growth potential
Service lines. deployed in the Pacific and something and adaptability.
Congress has asked me this same goes wrong with the airplane, you can get
question a number of times. If you a part or repair in the Pacific theater from JFQ: Is anything you would like to add
would have tried to develop an A-model a partner or FMS customer. From that that we have not discussed?
for the Air Force, a B-model for the perspective, I think the program has an
Marine Corps, and a C-model for the advantage over a single-Service program. Lt Gen Bogdan: The biggest issue I
Navy as separate programs, I think you But joint programs are hard to manage. would like your readers to understand
would have probably run into similar They tend to be riskier for all the reasons is that this is not the same program
problems, but the solutions and cost and discussed compared to single-Service pro- it was years ago. We had some really
time required to implement those solu- grams, but the rewards are greater if you rough times in the past, and I think the
tions would have been a unique Service can get it there. Department, the partnership, and indus-
problem versus a partnership problem. Additionally, in this austere budget try have begun moving this program in
The advantage this program has over environment, the Department and a better direction. We’re not there yet,
three separate programs is that there are Services must share technology, not but like a large ship, it takes a long time
huge economies of scale to be had: for duplicate effort, and build airplanes to turn . . . but it is turning. I would
example, global supply pooling (where that can adapt and do many things. ask people to judge the program on the
one part can service many customers) Adaptability is very important. If we’re progress it’s made since the re-baseline
or multiple repair facilities around the going to keep airplanes around for 30 and not look in the rearview mirror. JFQ

60  Commentary / An Interview with Christopher C. Bogdan JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015
Civilian Expeditionary Workforce member engages local business owner in discussion regarding
poultry feed production, Kandahar Province (Kentucky National Guard/Dallas Kratzer)

Turnaround
The Untold Story of the Human Terrain System
By Clifton Green

he U.S. Army’s Human Terrain early experiences had a lasting impact the organization’s progress over time,

T System (HTS), a program that

embedded social scientists with
deployed units, endured a rough start
on the program. Although critics
have written extensively about HTS
struggles with internal mismanage-
and ultimately gave the impression
that HTS was never able to make
needed corrections. Far from being a
as it began deploying teams to Iraq ment, most accounts simply cataloged failure, though, HTS is a remarkable
and Afghanistan in 2007.1 These problems, yielded little insight into turnaround story and should serve as
a case study for how organizations can
implement fundamental organizational
Clifton Green is a Human Resources (HR) Business Partner at the Department of Health and
changes. Even more importantly, the
Human Services. Previously, he was an HR Manager and Advisor with the Human Terrain System. reformed version of HTS provides

JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015 Green 61

 Human Terrain System member speaks with Afghan during Key Leader
Engagement in Kandahar Province to discourage locals from hiding
contraband for Taliban (DOD/Crystal Davis)

a template that could significantly Prior to U.S. involvement in Iraq In the mad dash to fill positions, HTS
improve existing Department of and Afghanistan, cultural research and hiring standards ranged from minimal
Defense (DOD) support to deployed analysis had only a small place in the to nonexistent. In many cases, new em-
civilians, thousands of whom have pro- Army thought process. HTS changed ployees were not even interviewed. When
vided critical services to war-fighters that. Designed to provide a better un- combined with high starting salaries, this
around the globe. derstanding of indigenous populations in lack of selectivity caused HTS to attract
these countries, it was hoped that HTS a peculiar mix of highly qualified person-
History would help U.S. and allied forces reduce nel, absolutely unqualified personnel, and
Inception to Government Transition. violent misunderstandings and dampen everyone in between.
HTS was developed as a response to the insurgencies. In 2006, the Army, fac- As the number of workers swelled
concerns about mismanagement of ing progressively worsening situations in at the HTS base of operations in Fort
U.S. military operations in Iraq and Iraq and Afghanistan, needed new ideas Leavenworth, Kansas, two distinct camps
Afghanistan, in particular the lack of and thus backed a $20 million, five-team emerged. Army Reservists, with varying
cultural understanding of these coun- HTS proof of concept. Even before all levels of military experience, formed one
tries demonstrated by the U.S. military. five teams had been deployed, early reac- group, while contractors formed another.
Soldiers, commanded by leaders with tions from theater commanders were Although it is contractors who typically
limited cross-cultural experience, were favorable. Within a year, the requirement play a supporting role to government
being asked to navigate a complex foreign for Human Terrain Teams mushroomed and military personnel, in the early days
environment with little or no training, to 26 teams as the price tag surpassed of HTS it was the military members who
and they were failing. $100 million annually. lacked a clearly defined role. The vast

62  Commentary / The Untold Story of the Human Terrain System JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015
majority of deployed team members and the jurisdiction of the Iraqi legal system. decision to relocate several sections of the
support staff were contractors, while Panicked that Iraqi police (or insurgents organization caused further division. At
HTS acquired Reservists with no plan to masquerading as Iraqi police) might ar- the same time, the lack of strong manage-
integrate them. In some cases, military rest employees, HTS initiated a plan to ment limited the organization’s ability
personnel battled the contractors for convert all 150 Human Terrain Team to make necessary changes. Competing
control, but the HTS support contract (HTT) members from contractors to HTS staff elements struggled to fill the
required that contractors administer most government employees. To facilitate the vacuum, resulting in a critical lost year.
daily operations. This difficult situation process, a government transition assistant In the middle of the conversion
was exacerbated by the fact that HTS’s was assigned to manage the conversion process, the HTS program manager
program manager and its contract over- from Fort Monroe, Virginia, with HTS created a Program Management Office–
sight were both based a thousand miles designating several personnel to assist. Forward (PMO-Forward) in both Iraq
away in Virginia. All HTS team members had to become and Afghanistan in response to real
To deal with these problems and government employees by May 31, 2009, problems, including the lost account-
provide better government oversight, a or return to the United States. ability of employees in a war zone. The
deputy program manager was appointed The conversion, which seemed role of the PMO-Forwards, however,
at Fort Leavenworth in late 2008. His simple in the abstract, quickly became was never clearly established, and HTS
role was to oversee the work of both a nightmare. HTS employees, a notori- staff members generally viewed the
contractors and military personnel. It was ously vocal workforce, were bewildered PMO-Forwards as deployed staff ele-
a difficult task. HTS’s highly matrixed by the turn of events. They deluged ments. The PMO-Forwards, by contrast,
organization, internal rivalries, and lack of the transition assistant with thousands considered themselves deputy program
controls had created a dysfunctional work of questions, complaints, and pages of managers. Mutual mistrust inhibited col-
environment, which operated in an ad paperwork, and productivity in theater laboration, and a months-long standoff
hoc manner in almost every way. Policies declined while employees wondered ensued. In spite of the need for internal
and procedures were virtually nonexis- about their futures and haggled for better cooperation, HTS program manage-
tent, and most work was done by key terms. At the same time, numerous other ment never publicized or enforced clear
employees with narrow areas of expertise. issues, from travel orders to timesheets, guidelines for how the PMO-Forwards
Mid- to senior-level managers were, in required HTS to establish a large number should interact with the staff. Staff
too many cases, absent or ineffective. of new internal processes. Like HTS meetings between PMO-Forwards and
Some HTS managers who did work managers, the transition assistant had no U.S.-based support staff devolved into
hard to address the program’s problems system to handle the volume and was uncomfortable stalemates. The ensuing
were overwhelmed. When decisions quickly overwhelmed. As the situation discord severely restricted HTS capacity
were made, they were often inadequate deteriorated, it was unclear whether the to improve support processes and fed
to resolve the problem or simply too deadline could be met, or if HTS would into the HTS culture of dysfunction.
late to matter, and the staff required to be forced to embarrassingly remove all Once teams were staffed with gov-
implement the decisions was insufficient. personnel from theater. ernment employees, HTS found itself
Such problems were largely due to Fortunately, through furious last- poorly equipped to meet the needs of its
management officials who had difficulty minute efforts by HTS and U.S. Army workforce. Contractor-to-government
navigating the unstructured work envi- Training and Doctrine Command transition planning had been exclusively
ronment. Instead of establishing systems (TRADOC) staff members, the conver- focused on the conversion process; little
and frameworks to deal with problems, sion process was completed on time. preparation had been made for actually
managers generally approached each However, tremendous damage had supporting government civilians. As
problem as a unique circumstance. At the already been done to HTS credibility, and contractors, HTS personnel had been
same time, the lack of structure enabled dozens of employees (over one-third of supported by corporate human resource
many employees to perform poorly and the HTS deployed workforce) had quit. (HR) and finance sections, but now those
face few consequences. Without structure Bureaucratic infighting caused several organizations were out of the picture.
to regulate behavior, HTS employees staff principles, including the deputy pro- While regulations and support agencies
often succumbed to a kind of organi- gram manager, to depart in mid-2009, already existed for government civilian
zational attention deficit disorder. This and a large portion of the organiza- HR and finance issues, those agencies
combination of factors created serious tion was suddenly moved from Fort were unequipped to deal with the range
deficiencies for HTS quality of support.2 Leavenworth to Virginia. Although HTS and complexity of issues presented by
In late 2008, these problems were had survived the crisis, many inside and HTS employees.
compounded by a new looming crisis. outside of the program began to question HTS needed experts to create pro-
The United States and Iraq had signed HTS’s fundamental level of competence. cesses and integrate systems. Lacking
a Status of Forces Agreement that put Wandering in the Wilderness. After both, the newly formed HTS HR
U.S. contractors working in Iraq within the conversion debacle, HTS drifted. The Directorate was drowning in problems.

JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015 Green 63

For instance, the HTS finance section was and an internal audit by the TRADOC each had been hindered by a lack of
staffed by one timekeeper, a Soldier with Internal Review and Audit Compliance expertise or a failure to follow through.
no background in civilian finance. The office, were bubbling up as well. HTS’s While HTS had a large staff, most staff
lack of support caused the number of pay flaws had become impossible to ignore. members were unaware of the mechan-
problems to snowball over time, damag- Reform. Virtually every HTS ics of how the program functioned. The
ing morale and productivity. Meanwhile, employee acknowledged the need for few “old hands” who understood the
employees in theater had received virtu- change. The real question was what nuts and bolts of HTS typically tried to
ally no training on proper pay practices shape reform would take. Many wanted fly under the radar amid staff infighting.
and would regularly claim to be working the program to simply break away from When ideas did coalesce into concrete
in excess of 12 hours per day, 7 days a the intrusive rules and regulations, and proposals, HTS staff principals were gen-
week. This led to real integrity problems believed that most problems could be erally unable to implement changes due
for the organization. While the tempo of solved if HTS left TRADOC, which to being overwhelmed by problems and
operations in theater was certainly high, they viewed as both unhelpful and uncertain of the second- and third-order
reports suggested that not everyone was adversarial, and moved to U.S. Army effects of any proposed solution. HTS
being truthful on their timecards. One Forces Command or U.S. Special program management had done little to
team leader did implement significant Operations Command. Others thought encourage organizational discipline of any
restrictions on the number of hours this analysis missed the point. In their kind. This created an environment largely
employees could claim and was imme- view, HTS would have to adapt to the free of formal consequences, such as
diately hounded from theater—“fired” Army and to civilian employment law reprimands or terminations, even in the
by a PMO-Forward who had no legal regardless of which command it fell face of egregious behavior. To become
authority to fire anyone. With no one under. Resistance was not only futile more legally compliant and effective,
controlling payroll and a generally law- but also destructive and would only HTS would need to irritate many of its
less atmosphere, team productivity was cripple the program. HTS would have longtime employees, who had become
highly variable. Unfortunately, there is to learn how to follow the rules. accustomed to the consequence-free
little doubt that some HTS employees This conflict had remained unresolved environment. Taking them on, however,
took advantage of the situation to pad for most of the program’s history. The risked pushback from both employees
their timecards while doing little work HTS program manager had often made and other managers, so most managers
(a practice that was regrettably common a point of emphasizing the program’s found it safer to do nothing.
among deployed Federal workers in Iraq uniqueness and claimed that this made Because HTS was overseen by
and Afghanistan, not just at HTS).3 HTS incompatible with the Army’s TRADOC G2 and had, over the
HTS was simply not operating existing bureaucracy. TRADOC, which course of several years, proved unable
in accordance with established rules. provided oversight of HTS activities, to effectively self-manage, TRADOC
However, with the government transi- represented that bureaucracy, and as a gradually took on a more active role.
tion complete, it had inherited a rather result was often perceived as an existen- Unfortunately, the logistics of this re-
large rulebook. At the same time, HTS tial threat and met with hostility within lationship were problematic. Most of
often lacked clear lines of authority HTS. This animosity was at times mutual. HTS was physically remote from the
within its mix of military, civilian, and Many viewed HTS fiscal wastefulness TRADOC G2 offices. TRADOC G2
contract workers, all of whom were led and poor internal regulation as some- lacked experience overseeing a program
by a program manager who served on thing of a threat as well, since it would such as HTS, and it had both limited
an Intergovernmental Personnel Act be TRADOC—not the HTS itinerant access to what was going on within
agreement, an unusual employment ar- workforce—that would be left to clean up the program and limited manpower.
rangement that further confused matters. after HTS failures. TRADOC managers Additionally, HTS sometimes attempted
The lack of administrative clarity created also found HTS’s grandiose plans, such to replicate TRADOC management
an overall impression that HTS had no as a training directorate with more staff functions within itself, creating confu-
rules, and large numbers of disgruntled than students, to be exasperating. These sion and making cooperation difficult.
HTS employees soon found their way conflicting perspectives caused the rela- These factors prevented TRADOC G2
to the inspector general, various elected tionship between the two organizations from being able to implement reforms
representatives, and Equal Employment to sour over time, and TRADOC found unless HTS was an active and engaged
Opportunity offices. Between late 2009 itself confronted daily with the question of participant. Unfortunately, because HTS
and early 2010, Congress had withheld how much leeway to give HTS. With the leadership generally viewed TRADOC
tens of millions of dollars from the HTS United States engaged in two concurrent with suspicion, there was little in the way
budget and had directed the Center for wars, there was no easy answer. of productive dialogue.
Naval Analyses to perform an assessment Nevertheless, several abortive efforts In early 2010, a small group of
of the program. Other investigations, in- to clean up aspects of the program from HTS personnel and TRADOC G2
cluding an Army Regulation 15-6 inquiry within had taken place. Unfortunately, management officials operating out of

64  Commentary / The Untold Story of the Human Terrain System JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015
Fort Monroe, Virginia, began intensive
work on overhauling the program’s
administration. The group had detailed
insight into the workings of HTS
and significant expertise in civilian
HR and finance. Over the next few
months, a number of policies cover-
ing a range of issues were drafted and
sent to HTS program management for
review. At the same time, the group
received additional manpower and was
able to improve payroll processing,
eliminating a backlog of over 80 pay-
related complaints that affected most
deployed employees. Unfortunately,
implementation of other policy changes
was limited. Although the proposals
provided a clear and legally compliant
model for managing the program, they
remained in limbo, neither approved
nor rejected. The HTS program man-
ager was simply not enthusiastic about
institutionalizing the program.4
By mid-June 2010, the pressure of
the investigations and HTS manage-
ment’s continuing resistance to reform
brought the situation to a breaking
point. Two key changes, however, ap-
Afghan girl peeks around door as U.S. Special Forces and Cultural Support Team speak with her
peared to signal a fresh start for the father, Uruzgan Province (DOD/Kaily Brown)
program. First, the position of program
manager was eliminated. Second, an New guidance documents eventually with the position of Theater Support
Active-duty Army colonel, who had covered dozens of topics, and improved Officer, which reported to the HTS
previously served as the TRADOC internal processes gave managers better director of operations.
Deputy G2 and was thus familiar with insight into how well HTS was running. While process improvements occurred
the HTS program and its difficulties, In addition, new HTS policies estab- rapidly, improving the HTS workforce
was named director. The new director lished a change management structure took longer. Because HTS had been will-
had longstanding and positive relation- that allowed the program to continue ing to hire almost anyone in the early days,
ships with TRADOC G2 staff members to improve. Finally, more discipline was it had a large number of unproductive
and thus understood how to balance the imposed on the hiring process, resulting employees. Other employees were com-
considerations of TRADOC with the in more accurate recruitment targets and petent professionals but had a contentious
goals of HTS. Most importantly, she was 61 percent lower attrition in training.5 As relationship with the program as a result
more pragmatic than her predecessor, positive change continued, many employ- of the years of mismanagement. By 2012,
who had generally declined to focus on ees expressed relief that HTS was finally however, a combination of changes had
day-to-day management issues. turning a corner. significantly improved workforce qual-
Anxious to implement change, the Not everyone agreed, however. For ity. These included better management,
HTS director gave the green light to a example, although travel privileges had the termination of more than a dozen
number of the policies drafted by the been significantly misused, some super- employees, more stringent hiring criteria,
Fort Monroe group. The group also visors were annoyed about having to and a requirement that most employees
gained authority and leadership support ask for permission under the new, more separate from HTS at the end of their
in a number of significant areas, includ- accountable procedures. Timesheet deployment. Employees wishing to deploy
ing program administration, program reviews turned up cases of excess that, again could reapply just like anyone else.
development, payroll, travel, hiring, and when addressed, created some hostility. This not only improved workforce quality,
separations. These changes significantly The PMO-Forward positions, which but it also enhanced the program’s ability
improved efficiency, transparency, regula- lacked accountability to other staff to fine-tune recruiting requirements. By
tory compliance, and internal controls. elements, were abolished and replaced 2013, terminations for cause had declined

JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015 Green 65

 greatly, reflecting an increasingly stable
Soldiers from Charlie Troop, 2-38 Cavalry, and DA civilians, Human Terrain and professional workforce.
System, with local Afghan villagers during Key Leader Engagement in Although HTS had made remarkable
Kandahar Province (DOD/Crystal Davis) internal transformations, media cover-
age of the program was stuck in 2009.6
HTS’s most frequent critic, a blogger
named John Stanton, had written nu-
merous articles that reflected extensive
employee disgruntlement and captured
some of HTS’s chronic mismanagement.7
As things improved, however, critics
either minimized or failed to notice the
changes made in the program. While this
may have been intentional, it seems more
likely that they simply were not aware of
what was happening. The HTS of 2009
was wide open to the media, a decision
that did not serve the program well. To
combat this, HTS post-2010 was more
closed. Public relations and other out-
reach efforts continued, but other forms
of openness diminished. At the same
time, investigations into HTS’s 2009-era
failures were being broadly disseminated
on the Internet. Even though the pro-
gram had significantly improved, HTS
critics had few ways of discovering this,
as they received most of their informa-
tion from public sources and disgruntled
employees. Given the lack of information,
they assumed that little had changed.
They were wrong. HTS had, in many
ways, become an example of how to do
things correctly. A 2013 external review
pointed out progress toward institu-
tionalizing the program.8 Subsequent
internal reviews, audits, and investigations
conducted during 2013 and 2014 found
an effectively managed organization that
complied with regulations. This was veri-
fied by a comprehensive audit conducted
by the Army Audit Agency in 2014. The
HTS experience offers important lessons
that can shape the way DOD deploys civil-
ians during the next conflict. It also offers
broader lessons about how to improve the
government’s employment practices.

Implications
Centralizing Support for Deployed
Civilians. While poor management
limited HTS during its early years, the
program was also hindered by DOD’s
ineffective civilian deployment system. The
U.S. military is capable when deploying

66  Commentary / The Untold Story of the Human Terrain System JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015
uniformed Servicemembers, but its civil- wars may require wholly different and would also ensure that deployed civilians
ian deployment process is minimal and unexpected types of knowledge. In the received proper assistance and care, while
poorly integrated. For small organizations, past, such needs were often filled through making certain they performed the work
or units with only a few civilians, this is a the contracting process. However, gov- they were hired to do.
nuisance to be endured. For HTS, which ernment civilians may be preferable to Such a program would need to ac-
deployed civilians at a larger scale, the contractors for several reasons: they are commodate itself to the reality of defense
system’s weaknesses created massive chal- more cost effective; they fall under the budget cycles, expanding and contracting
lenges to mission accomplishment. direct control of government authorities; as required. During peacetime, it could
The effects were significant. The U.S. and they can perform inherently govern- be sustained by a minimal number of
Government spent almost $800 million on mental functions. In other cases, the use of employees; during wartime, it would ex-
HTS from its inception through the 2014 contractors is unnecessary because the de- pand by using limited-term government
Afghanistan drawdown, a period of over 7 sired expertise already exists within DOD’s employees and contractor support. The
years. During much of that time, misman- permanent civilian workforce. This capa- program would serve individual deployers
agement, excess attrition, inflated salaries, bility was previously leveraged through the as well as large organizations and would
and poor support practices wasted hun- Civilian Expeditionary Workforce (CEW) centralize functions currently duplicated
dreds of millions of dollars. Furthermore, program, which provided opportunities across DOD, paying for itself by elimi-
assuming HTS provided value to battlefield for existing government civilians to deploy. nating waste. As a “one-stop shop,” the
commanders, the years it took to fix these Regardless of the source, though, experi- program would encourage consistent
issues and field more effective teams may ences in Iraq and Afghanistan prove that support of deployed civilians while
well have cost lives and worsened the out- such skills will be required. maintaining administrative best practices,
comes in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Unfortunately, civilian personnel are reducing the amount of waste and fraud
Some might argue that waste was an often inadequately prepared to deal with committed during deployments.
inevitable byproduct of the program’s the military deployment bureaucracy, which Naturally, there are always concerns
rapid creation in the middle of two con- is focused primarily on military person- about the use of government employees
flicts. There is truth to that. However, if nel and contractors. As an example, HTS rather than contractors. First, government
a civilian deployment infrastructure had employees who received care at military hiring is an extremely slow process. To
existed prior to the creation of HTS, treatment facilities in theater would often circumvent this issue, HTS developed a
the program could have used it directly. be categorized as “contractors” simply be- hybrid contractor/government hiring pro-
Instead, HTS, like other programs that cause there was no option for “government cess that utilized the strengths of the private
deploy civilians, had to figure everything civilian,” creating unnecessary challenges sector to augment government hiring
out, build its own infrastructure, and to medical support. Civilians drawn from methods. Contract recruiters were able to
endure numerous failures on the road to the private sector had even greater dif- find large numbers of potential candidates
getting things right. That was a phenom- ficulty adapting to the military’s way of with needed expertise. The candidates
enally inefficient way of doing business. It doing business. These distractions made were screened and their names were then
was also completely unnecessary. them and their organizations less produc- submitted for government qualification. If
DOD should establish a program tive and increased the amount of turnover. qualified, the candidates attended a training
to manage the recruitment, training, The HTS experience demonstrates that an class prior to being sworn in as government
deployment, and sustainment of gov- entire program’s operations can be hobbled civilians. This approach allowed HTS to
ernment civilian personnel in overseas by the investigations, negative publicity, and provide a volume of personnel that would
environments. This centralized program employee issues that accompany deficien- never have been possible using normal gov-
would enable deployed forces to quickly cies in administrative support. ernment recruiting methods.
obtain needed civilian skills to augment A centralized DOD civilian deploy- The second main issue with govern-
their capabilities. At the same time, it ment program would provide support ment workers is the concern that they
would allow programs and supported throughout the entire tour, from the become permanent employees who are
units to focus on core competencies receipt of notice to deploy through to the difficult to remove from service. This is
rather than administrative distractions. end of the deployment. Programs and units not the case. Term-limited appointments
Finally, such a program, by eliminating sending civilians downrange would use this allow management to decline employment
inefficiencies, could save the government program’s centralized support capabilities extensions as needed. Term employment
hundreds of millions of dollars during fu- and expertise. It would prepare civilians thus makes adjustments to the size of the
ture conflicts. While that may sound like for deployment, ensure coordination with workforce relatively easy, avoiding the
an overstatement, the HTS experience deployment centers and receiving units, ac- need for a reduction in force, and provides
demonstrates that cost savings of this count for them in theater, ensure a smooth a mechanism to release underperforming
magnitude are not theoretical. redeployment home, and provide accurate employees while avoiding the difficult and
While HTS provided civilian cultural administrative, finance, and logistical sup- emotionally draining termination process.
expertise in Iraq and Afghanistan, future port throughout the entire process. It Employment can end with the expiration

JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015 Green 67

of an employee’s term rather than through Pay and Performance. Prior to the unit’s sociocultural understanding of the
termination, allowing the employee to save 2009 HTS conversion from contractor environment. More importantly, HTS,
face and ensuring that he or she is able to to government workforce, deployed which in the early years suffered a signifi-
file for unemployment. Unfortunately, team members typically made between cant number of team implosions, mutinies,
however, termination can be necessary in $250,000 and $400,000 per year. While and cases of job abandonment, saw a
some cases. At HTS, 18 employees were this rate of pay was not unusual for substantial decrease in these types of inci-
terminated over a 5-year period, a rate deployed contractors at the time, large dents. Furthermore, while HTT members
considerably higher than normal for the salaries alone were not sufficient to recruit in 2008 often lacked basic competencies
Federal Government. This was possible top-quality personnel for Human Terrain (human terrain analysts were sometimes
because of effective coordination between Teams. In some cases, team members considered suitable only for vehicle wash-
HR, supervisors, and program leadership. lacked even basic social science and re- ing duties), by 2014 the average HTT
An effective civilian deployment program search skills. Despite these shortcomings, member was significantly more capable.
could provide supervisors with the neces- individuals were uniformly paid large sala- How was HTS able to cut salaries in
sary expertise to separate employees with ries, with highly inconsistent results. half and yet still achieve superior results?
performance or behavioral issues. Over time, the salaries paid to HTS First, the exorbitant salaries of 2008 were
Clearly there is an unmet need to employees gradually diminished. After simply part and parcel of the military’s
improve support for deployed civilians. the government conversion, the salary institutional culture at the time. With
While the CEW program performed range for HTS employees dropped to Congress appropriating hundreds of
some of the functions mentioned above, roughly $180,000–$300,000 per year. billions of dollars as part of the late war
it was limited in scope and served mainly Not only was this less than they had made surges, budget discipline was significantly
as a matchmaker, posting deployed posi- as contractors, but as government civil- relaxed. Unfortunately, while those exces-
tions that individuals could apply for. ians every dollar of salary was taxable as sive salaries lured few serious academics,
Although it filled a useful role, CEW did well. (Contractor salaries enjoy significant they did attract a wide variety of individu-
not provide the kind of “cradle to grave” tax benefits.) In addition, the team leader als who were more interested in cashing
support that is necessary for maximum and social scientist positions that had in than achieving the Army’s goals. At the
workforce effectiveness. been graded as GG-15 were reclassified as same time, HTS’s no-rules internal culture
DOD must act quickly to improve GG-14, cutting the top end of the salary imposed significant costs on supervisors
support before more institutional range by another 15 percent. who tried to conscientiously enforce re-
knowledge is lost. A 2012 Government In 2013, sequester restrictions strictions. When HTS team members were
Accountability Office report outlined forced Army commands to implement contractors, the company lost money if
how DOD neglected to learn from civil- restrictions on overtime work for all personnel were not deployed and claiming
ian deployment experiences in Bosnia, employees, including deployed civil- long hours. At the same time, the HTS
which led to costly and preventable ians. While these restrictions were not leadership team believed that it needed
failures in Iraq and Afghanistan just a few well enforced by many units in theater, to fill teams at all costs. The incentives
years later.9 TRADOC G2 implemented meaningful within HTS were strongly arrayed against
Sadly, history seems to be repeating restrictions on overtime use. As a result, any kind of internal restrictions, with all
itself. In March 2014, the CEW Web site the average annual salary of a deployed of the attendant disciplinary problems. As
announced that the program would no HTS team leader, which had hovered a result, HTS quickly earned a reputation
longer provide a “sourcing solution for around $400,000 in 2008, dropped to as a haven for problematic personalities,
joint civilian requirements,” and that this around $200,000 in 2014. Although which harmed future recruiting efforts and
function would instead be performed by HTS employees were generally displeased created a negative feedback loop.
the Army G1.10 (The remnants of the with these changes, support to deployed Over time, as salaries shrank and
CEW program have since migrated to units remained consistent, and internal regulations governing conduct increased,
U.S. Army Central Command.) With assessments showed that commander the greedy gradually departed. While this
drawdowns continuing, cuts to CEW satisfaction remained high. was a positive step, the large salaries set at
were inevitable. Unfortunately, it appears Despite this dramatic cost savings, the beginning severely limited the ability
that this migrated function, now renamed there is no evidence that HTS employees to hire employees at the proper wage.
the International/Expeditionary Policy in 2014 were any less capable than em- It also ensured higher program costs
Office, will provide fewer capabilities than ployees in 2008. While comparing the throughout the program’s lifespan. While
CEW did. A less effective organization is two periods is difficult due to the lack of the excessive salaries of 2008 may have
not the answer. Senior leaders must un- verifiable metrics from 2008, deployed enabled HTS to build its workforce more
derstand this challenge and recognize that commanders and staff who responded to quickly than it could have otherwise, it is
supporting civilians properly is not just the internal surveys in 2014 almost uniformly unclear that employees obtained this way
right thing to do; it also improves effec- agreed that HTS products were relevant, were worth having at all. The HTS expe-
tiveness and makes sound financial sense. aided decisionmaking, and added to the rience demonstrates that high salaries are

68  Commentary / The Untold Story of the Human Terrain System JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015
not necessarily beneficial for hiring and size. Employees, supervisors, leadership, the important role civilians will play in
that they can be more destructive than and support sections all possessed limited winning future conflicts. JFQ
helpful, both financially and operationally. faith in one another’s abilities and motives.
Process Defeats Politics. During its Additionally, the “short timer” mentality
early years, HTS was an organization of many employees, a high turnover rate, Notes
driven by personalities, not procedures. and a lack of coordination all enhanced
When difficult or unusual situations in- this lack of confidence. When employees
1
For a detailed account of Human Ter-
rain System (HTS) history, see Christopher
volving HTS employees arose (an almost asked a question and received an answer J. Lamb et al., Human Terrain Teams: An
everyday occurrence), staff members they did not like, they had learned to Organizational Innovation for Sociocultural
would many times quickly defer the ques- simply ask another decisionmaker until Knowledge in Irregular Warfare (Washington,
tion to the program manager, who was someone provided the desired answer. DC: Institute of World Politics Press, 2013),
not physically present and likely would Leaders often had trouble saying no to which is detailed, even-handed, and accurate.
Unfortunately, it does have some blind spots,
not make a decision. This was a symptom reasonable-sounding requests that were, in but this article fills in some of those.
of HTS’s broader challenge wherein the fact, not reasonable. By establishing clear 2
Ibid., 147. Lamb et al. reference three
organization’s decisionmaking process and enforceable written policies, HTS types of Human Terrain Team (HTT) mem-
had failed to evolve in the face of rapid significantly reduced this deeply ingrained bers: “ne’er-do-wells,” “fantasists,” and “work-
growth. Because the program had few and disruptive pattern of behavior. Given ers.” While these categories are crude, they are
also quite accurate. Within the HTS staff, the
policies or guidelines, even a minor the complexity of government personnel vast majority of personnel could be categorized
variation to a routine procedure created rules and the volume of turnover, merely as ne’er-do-wells or fantasists. Even if new
decisional gridlock. As a result, every establishing informal guidelines would not arrivals did not begin their tenure with HTS in
decision point became an opportunity for have been effective. one of those two frames of mind, the environ-
organizational politics or simple inertia to This approach benefited HTS in ment tended to have a negative effect on those
exposed to it. Workers were rare.
run the program aground. numerous ways. The amount of atten- 3
It is important to note that timecard
To meet this challenge, HTS gen- tion from management that was required exploitation was routine for civilians in Iraq and
erated internal policies, an employee to administer the program declined Afghanistan. To HTS’s credit, team members
handbook, a pay and allowances guide, significantly because routine matters never approached the excesses of deployed
and more than a dozen internal “bul- could be handled at a lower level. In Department of Justice employees, who often
claimed to continuously work 16 hours per day,
letins” that explained the nuances of addition, rather than having to bargain 7 days a week. See Department of Justice, Of-
complex issues such as workers’ com- for everything, employees could review fice of the Inspector General, An Investigation
pensation and emergency leave. Because HTS policies and understand what they of Overtime Payments to FBI and Other Depart-
of the continuously changing nature of were and were not entitled to. As a result, ment of Justice Employees Deployed to Iraq and
the HTS program, a fixed catalogue of when disgruntled employees disagreed Afghanistan (Washington, DC: Department of
Justice, 2008), available at <www.justice.gov/
policies would have been inadequate. with established policies and filed com- oig/special/s0812/final.pdf>.
Documents were thus revised as nec- plaints, it was relatively straightforward 4
Lamb et al., 73–74.
essary to ensure that they remained to have the complaints dismissed. Finally, 5
Based on decline in attrition from HTS
relevant, sensible, and responsive. In once the values animating those policies training, from 2009 to 2013.
addition, HTS policies were designed became entrenched, a cultural change
6
Tom Vanden Brook, “Army Plows
Ahead with Troubled War-Zone program,”
in such a way that they were not only took hold and HTS became a radically USA Today, February 28, 2013, avail-
enforceable, but would also actually be different place at which to work. able at <www.usatoday.com/story/news/
enforced. This proved crucial to mak- world/2013/02/17/human-terrain-system-
ing the changes work. Where possible, While HTS may be remembered for its iraq-afghanistan/1923789>.
consequences were applied automati- chaotic early blunders, the program’s later,
7
John Stanton’s articles were the product
of numerous sources within the program, but
cally rather than at the discretion of a quieter years demonstrate the effectiveness were also largely based on second-or third-hand
manager. This limited accusations of of its turnaround. Although the program rumors. In many if not most cases, his specific
favoritism and ensured fair treatment may not survive in today’s difficult fiscal allegations were inaccurate. However, his
across the workforce. environment, future sociocultural research articles often did accurately reflect the tone of
As these reforms were implemented, efforts will likely be institutionalized in internal dissent within HTS.
8
Lamb et al., 78–79.
some within the program argued that new and different ways. However, there 9
Government Accountability Office
a policy-centric and enforcement- does not appear to be any equivalent effort (GAO), Afghanistan: Improvements Needed to
based approach was too heavy handed. to improve DOD’s poorly functioning Strengthen Management of U.S. Civilian Pres-
Unfortunately, HTS’s toxic environment civilian deployment system. It would be a ence, GAO-12-285 (Washington, DC: GAO,
required far greater articulation of the shame to throw away $800 million worth 2012), available at <www.gao.gov/products/
GAO-12-285>.
rules and far more comprehensive enforce- of hard-won experience. After more than 10
Department of Defense, “The Civilian
ment strategies than would ordinarily a decade of counterinsurgency and uncon- Deployment Experience,” available at <cpms.
have been required in a program of its ventional warfare, leaders must recognize osd.mil/expeditionary/home.html>.

JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015 Green 69

 Army Rangers assigned to 2nd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, prepare for
extraction during Task Force Training on Fort Hunter Liggett, CA, January
2014 (U.S. Army/Steven Hitchcock)

On Military Professionalism and

Civilian Control
By Carnes Lord

ecently, the subject of military E. Dempsey has directed each of the starting to be given to improving and

R “professionalism” has gripped the

attention of top echelons of the
Department of Defense (DOD) to a
Services to review and rearticulate its
understanding of the profession of arms
in the context of its particular missions,
systematizing the way the U.S. military
develops its leaders and communicates
what it expects of them. In the discus-
degree that is perhaps unprecedented. traditions, and practices. Former Secre- sion that follows, I focus on the issue
Most notably, Chairman of the Joint tary of Defense Chuck Hagel signaled of military professionalism in a broad
Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) General Martin his own concern with such matters by joint or DOD perspective, leaving aside
appointing a two-star admiral as his for the most part Service-related profes-
special assistant for military profession- sionalism issues.
Dr. Carnes Lord is Professor of Strategic
alism and ethics. And at both the joint There are several proximate rea-
Leadership at the Naval War College. and Service levels, serious attention is sons for the renewed focus on military

70  Commentary / On Military Professionalism JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015

professionalism. A steady drumbeat What is military professionalism? is eroded by bureaucratization, the ac-
of scandal has dogged the military in Surprisingly little serious thought seems complishment of that mission has a
recent years: the Abu Ghraib abuses in to have been given to this question since tendency to take second place to the
Iraq, desecration of enemy corpses in Samuel P. Huntington’s classic work The care and feeding of the organization and
Afghanistan, cheating on proficiency Soldier and the State, published more its individual members. At this point,
tests, personal corruption, and sexual than a half-century ago.2 Many seem to professional pride tends to be eclipsed by
misbehavior of all kinds. Particularly understand “professionals” as merely the a trade union mentality and loyalties be-
alarming is the widespread and well- opposite of “amateurs”—that is, people come focused on the organization more
publicized incidence in the military who are paid to do a job requiring a than on the larger society it is meant to
(including relatively senior ranks) of high level of competence and skill. (Like serve. When this happens in a military or-
sexual harassment and sexual assault, professional football players, so the joke ganization, the trust the broader society
which has resulted in intense political goes, military officers are skilled at what reposes in that organization is at risk and
pressure on the military to take drastic they do and “look good in a uniform.”) fundamental frictions in the civil-military
steps to address this problem. At a more A recent survey of junior Army officers relationship are likely to result.
fundamental level, however, there seems revealed considerable uncertainty and In Huntington’s well-known analysis,
to be a sense among Pentagon leaders doubt as to the meaning of professional- military professionalism is the key to
that the demands of “the long war” have ism in that Service. One respondent healthy civil-military relations—what he
taken a psychological toll on our mili- claimed, “I know very few Army officers calls “objective control” of the military
tary—especially the Army and Marine [who] consider [themselves] under the by its civilian superiors. Under a system of
Corps—that has contributed to a notice- term ‘professional’ in the same category objective control, the military is conceded
able erosion of the traditional values as doctors and lawyers.” Some felt that substantial autonomy in the areas just
underpinning the professional ethos of Army professionalism had been degraded mentioned in return for its respect for
the Armed Forces. by various monetary incentives; others and noninterference in the decisionmak-
Compounding these concerns cited pervasive micromanagement and ing of the civilian leadership. But this is
is what can only be described as the lack of trust on the part of senior leaders possible only if the military is a profes-
continuing disintegration of traditional as factors undermining their professional sional one. By contrast, nonprofessional
moral and cultural values in the larger status.3 All of this is symptomatic of a forces (for example, civilian militias)
society. The weakening of organized larger problem extending throughout the require “subjective control”—that is,
religion in much of the country, the Services: the creeping bureaucratization direct and continuous involvement by the
breakdown of the family, the impact of the military establishment. political authorities in managing them.4
of Hollywood and popular music, and A government bureaucracy, like a It has to be said at once that the
related developments pose a formidable traditional business corporation, is a hier- American experience has never been
challenge to the good order and disci- archical structure designed to maximize completely congruent with Huntington’s
pline of a military that, thanks to the efficiency through highly routinized objective control model.5 But his argu-
Internet and contemporary social media, processes and behaviors. The military ment about the importance of military
is even more inextricably embedded in Services are and indeed have always professionalism for the civil-military rela-
civilian society and culture than ever been bureaucracies, with the patholo- tionship remains a fundamental insight.
before. Our military leadership has for gies inherent in such organizations. But Since the end of the Cold War, some ob-
the most part resisted the temptation the Services have also had a professional servers have called attention to what they
to blame bad behavior by the troops on component that has served to limit and believe to be signs of growing frictions, if
the external environment (“the culture counteract the ill effects of bureaucracy. not an incipient crisis, in civil-military re-
made me do it”). It is, rightly, sensitive A key aspect of professionalism is in- lations in the United States. Others have
to the danger of encouraging those in stitutional autonomy. The military art expressed concerns over an alleged “mili-
uniform to look down on their civilian cannot be reduced to a set of routinized tarization” of American foreign policy as
counterparts. At a certain point, how- rules of behavior but requires indepen- exemplified in the increasingly important
ever, one wonders whether some hard dent or discretionary judgment and diplomatic roles of our regional combat-
choices will not have to be made in this the intellectual and moral preparation ant commanders. Whatever the truth of
respect. The Marine Corps has long rec- to exercise it responsibly. By the same the matter (it is easy enough to argue
ognized that the socialization of young token, a true profession is self-policing that such concerns are sometimes grossly
recruits necessitates a certain counter- in terms of recruitment, the setting of exaggerated), any rethinking of military
cultural stance toward American society.1 standards of competence, and promotion. professionalism today needs to be cen-
The time may well be approaching when Professionalism rightly understood serves tered in these larger issues.6
the other Services will have to follow suit a particular mission that the professional Every profession must understand
if American military professionalism is to body alone has a socially recognized and accept its mission and the nature
be sustained over the long run. ability to perform. When professionalism of the competencies that enable it to

JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015 Lord 71

 Army Ranger sights target with M240L machine gun
during company live-fire training at Camp Roberts, CA,
January 2014 (U.S. Army/Teddy Wade)

72  Commentary / On Military Professionalism JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015

achieve the mission. These competencies There is an obvious link between complacency. The extent to which
are sometimes referred to in the relevant the orphaned condition of strategy in Service parochialism not only tarnishes
literature as “jurisdictions.”7 These ju- American national security policymaking public and congressional perceptions
risdictions are not necessarily stable but and other jurisdictional arenas, which of the military but also sets a poor
rather are subject to change over time, remain problematic and contested. The leadership/ethical example throughout
as the mission itself evolves in differing most important of these are counter- the chain of command does not seem
circumstances or other competing organi- insurgency; postconflict stability and to be well understood.
zations vie for them. They are subject to reconstruction operations; engineering A related issue central to military
negotiation and renegotiation both hori- and business expertise; language and cul- professionalism and civil-military rela-
zontally (with competing organizations) tural expertise; and the contracting-out tions is the ability and willingness of
and vertically (with higher authority). of traditional military missions (for ex- military leaders to “speak truth” to
In Huntington’s study, the mission or ample, security in a war zone). Arguably, civilian power in supporting their inde-
jurisdiction of the military profession is it is incumbent on a truly professional pendent military judgment. If the main
famously said to be “the management of military to recognize the need to clarify interest of the leadership is protecting
violence.” This is clearly inadequate, both and, where necessary, to re-adjudicate the military’s bureaucratic equities,
because it is too general (remember the its jurisdictions. For the most part, the it will tend to develop a transactional
professional football player) and because U.S. military does not seem to recognize relationship with the civilian hierarchy
it is too narrow to account for all the this to the extent it should. One recent that mutes disagreement or challenges
competencies militaries necessarily (or important exception is the doctrinal to policy in exchange for favorable treat-
often, or ideally) require. A more current elevation of stability and reconstruction ment on matters of immediate concern
term, subject to similar objections, would operations to the same status as warf- to it. This was central to the failure of
be warfighting. ighting as a military mission in the wake the Joint Chiefs to challenge wrong-
There is a considerable lack of agree- of our manifest failure to manage the headed civilian decisionmaking during
ment and basic clarity about the current postconflict situation in Iraq. It remains the Vietnam War and perhaps more
jurisdictions of the U.S. military, both to be seen, however, what the opera- recently as well.10 It is a fundamental
within and outside its ranks. Perhaps tional realities of this move will turn out failure of military professionalism.
most striking is the issue of “strategy.” to be in the strategic environments of Finally, let us return briefly to the
The U.S. military over the years has the future. This stands in stark contrast question of military professionalism and
tended to be reluctant to take full owner- to the way the U.S. military establish- ethics. In the bureaucratic world of the
ship of strategy as a mission, and at times ment prepared for postwar governance U.S. military today, ethics for all practi-
has seemed to abdicate it in favor of and reconstruction during the later years cal purposes amounts to little more than
civilians (in the case of nuclear strategy of World War II.9 broad slogans—“honor, courage, com-
or McNamaran systems analysis) or to Another significant arena in which mitment” in the case of the Navy and
higher authority (the State Department the tension between military profes- Marine Corps—supported by a labyrinth
or National Security Council). It is some- sionalism and bureaucracy is evident is of quasi-legal programmatic regulations
times suggested that the ascendency of resource allocation. To the extent that and mandatory training requirements.
operational art at the expense of strategy the military seems to be dominated The focus is on preventing negative out-
in current military parlance has been by Service parochialism in its search comes rather than encouraging positive
significantly motivated by an essentially for funding rather than by an honest ones, but the implicit message is one of
bureaucratic desire to minimize civilian assessment of what is good for the lack of trust in the force to do the right
interference in the military sphere.8 It is military as a whole in achieving its thing. Any attempt to recover a genuine
doubtful that any of the Services have mission, military professionalism is and robust professionalism in the Armed
really operationalized strategy in their undermined. When this happens, civil- Forces should begin by coming to grips
personnel and education systems. There ian authority (Office of the Secretary with this profoundly demoralizing state
has been a proliferation of so-called of Defense, Office of Management of affairs. JFQ
strategy documents in the military and and Budget, Congress) is likely to
within the U.S. Government generally intervene in the process and impose
in recent years. Few if any of these have its own solution, with significant dam- Notes
anything to do with genuine strategic age to the autonomy of the military
thinking. Meanwhile, the performance of and the trust necessary to maintain it.
1
The classic account is Thomas E. Ricks,
Making the Corps (New York: Simon & Schus-
the American military and government at Service parochialism will clearly never ter, 1997).
the strategic level in Iraq and Afghanistan be completely eradicated. However, 2
Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the
over the last decade has clearly left much in spite of the mantra of “jointness,” State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military
to be desired. Was this a failure of the one can argue it is regarded by many Relations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univer-
military profession? If not, why not? in the military today with unwarranted sity Press, 1957). See also Morris Janowitz,

JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015 Lord 73

General Dempsey testifies on sexual assault in military before U.S. Senate Arms Services Committee, June 2013 (DOD/Sean K. Harp)

The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political to America Today (Cambridge: Cambridge
Portrait (New York: Free Press, 1960). University Press, 2012), chap. 8.
3
Gayle L. Watkins and Randi C. Cohen, 7
See James Burk, “Expertise, Jurisdiction,
“In Their Own Words: Army Officers Discuss and Legitimacy of the Military Profession,” in
Their Profession,” in The Future of the Army The Future of the Army Profession, chap. 2.
Profession 2nd ed., dir. Don M. Snider and ed. 8
Justin Kelly and Mike Brennan, Alien:
Lloyd J. Matthews (Boston: McGraw Hill, How Operational Art Devoured Strategy
2005), chap. 5. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College,
4
Huntington, chap. 4. September 2009).
5
For a recent perspective, see especially 9
See especially Richard Lacquement,
Mackubin Thomas Owens, U.S. Civil-Military “Mapping Army Professional Expertise and
Relations After 9/11: Renegotiating the Civil- Clarifying Jurisdictions of Practice,” in The Fu-
Military Bargain (London: Continuum, 2011). ture of the Army Profession, chap. 9; and Nadia
6
The contemporary debate on civilian Schadlow, Charles Barry, and Richard Lacque-
control of the U.S. military was initiated by ment, “A Return to the Army’s Roots: Gover-
Richard H. Kohn, “Out of Control,” The Na- nance, Stabilization, and Reconstruction,” in
tional Interest 35 (Spring 1994), 3–17. On the The Future of the Army Profession, chap. 11.
combatant commanders’ role, see Dana Priest, 10
H.R. McMaster, Dereliction of Duty: Lyn-
The Mission: Waging War and Keeping Peace don Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs
with America’s Military (New York: Norton, of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam (New
2003), as well as Carnes Lord, Proconsuls: Del- York: HarperCollins, 1997).
egated Political-Military Leadership from Rome

74  Commentary / On Military Professionalism JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015

President Obama speaks at DHS about how his budget
would safeguard cyberspace and strengthen national
preparedness and resilience (DHS/Jetta Disco)

Detangling the Web

A Screenshot of U.S. Government
Cyber Activity
By G. Alexander Crowther and Shaheen Ghori

The world must collectively recognize the challenges posed by malevolent actors’ entry into
cyberspace, and update and strengthen our national and international policies accordingly. Activities
undertaken in cyberspace have consequences for our lives in physical space, and we must work towards
building the rule of law, to prevent the risks of logging on from outweighing its benefits.
—U.S. International Strategy for Cyberspace, May 2011

lackouts. School testing. Electri- they have all been targets for cyber thousands of cyber assaults every

B cal grids. Insurance. These all

have one major thing in common:
attacks in a period of two weeks during
March 2015. The United States faces
day. States, state-sponsored organiza-
tions, other groups and individuals all
combine to incessantly probe, spy on,
and attack public and private organiza-
tions as well as denizens of the United
Dr. G. Alexander Crowther is Deputy Director of the Center for Technology and National Security States. These ongoing problems require
Policy (CTNSP), Institute for National Strategic Studies, at the National Defense University. Shaheen
Ghori has a Bachelor of Arts in International Relations from American University and is entering the
a U.S. Government response, so it
Intelligence Community. adopted a bureaucratic approach that

JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015 Crowther and Ghori 75

has resulted in a complex system that The President has further refined the dates to 2002. Congress came close to
is constantly evolving as new problems document and identified his five priorities passing comprehensive cyber security leg-
are recognized. This article provides a for cyber issues:3 islation in 2012 and 2013.5 Efforts failed
comprehensive look at how the United in 2012 because business balked at the
•• protecting the country’s critical infra-
States has organized to address these prescriptive nature of proposed legislation,
structure—our most important infor-
challenges. Although U.S. Government while the 2013 proposed legislation was
mation systems—from cyber threats
efforts seem sizable, private use of the overcome by political maneuvering leading
•• improving the public- and private-
Internet dwarfs government usage.1 up to the closing of the U.S. Government.
sector abilities to identify and report
Congress did pass the National
cyber incidents to enable responses
Policies and Strategies Cybersecurity Protection Act,6 Federal
in a timely manner
The U.S. Government articulates its Information Security Modernization Act,7
•• engaging with international partners
cyber policy through a series of initia- and Department of Homeland Security
to promote Internet freedom and
tives, policy decisions, and published Cybersecurity Workforce Recruitment and
build support for open, interoper-
strategies. The foundational document Retention Act8 in December 2014, which
able, secure, and reliable cyberspace
of the U.S. Government’s approach to address various aspects of cyber security in
•• securing Federal networks by
cyber policy is National Security Policy the United States. Congress is currently
setting clear security targets and
Decision 38, The National Strategy to working on comprehensive cyber legisla-
holding agencies accountable for
Secure Cyberspace, dated July 7, 2004. tion designed to address indemnity and
meeting targets
Since its publication, a number of new liability with the goal of passing the legisla-
•• shaping a cyber-savvy workforce and
policies and strategies have appeared tion in the summer of 2015.
moving beyond passwords in part-
that refine the government’s approach. At the level of implementing the
nership with the private sector.
A short list includes: national-level policies and strategies, the
boundaries between the various Federal
•• Comprehensive National Cybersecu-
Cyber Legislation agencies have also evolved. Today, the
rity Initiative, March 2, 2010
The Executive Branch’s approach to the Department of Homeland Security
•• Clarifying Cybersecurity Responsi-
U.S. Government’s cyber posture has (DHS), Department of Justice, and
bilities and Activities of the Execu-
yet to be mirrored in legislation affecting Department of Defense (DOD) share
tive Office of the President and the
the private sector. There are four major prominence but play discrete roles in
Department of Homeland Security,
problems. First is the sheer size and com- countering the cyber threat.
July 6, 2010
plexity of the U.S. infosphere, still the
•• International Strategy for Cyberspace,
largest national component of the global Department of
May 2011
system. The second involves conflicting Homeland Security
•• Presidential Policy Directive (PPD)
political aims—the desire to provide DHS coordinates the national protec-
20, U.S. Cyber Operations Policy,
effective information-sharing to iden- tion, prevention, and mitigation of and
October 16, 2012
tify potential threats versus the deeply recovery from cyber incidents; dissemi-
•• National Cybersecurity Protection
ingrained national desire for personal nates domestic cyber threat and vulner-
Act of 2014, December 18, 2014
privacy and suspicion of government ability analysis; protects critical infra-
•• Executive Order 13691, Promoting
overreach. The size and nature of the structure; secures Federal civilian systems
Private Sector Cybersecurity Informa-
U.S. economy poses a third challenge. (the dot.gov domain); and investigates
tion Sharing, February 13, 2015.
Private companies fear that information- cyber crimes under its jurisdiction.
The capstone document is the 2015 sharing will lead to exposure to potential The DHS vision is to ensure a home-
National Security Strategy, which states: prosecution, the loss of proprietary infor- land that is safe, secure, and resilient
mation to competitors, and a loss of faith against terrorism and other hazards.9 One
Our economy, safety, and health are linked by their customers. A fourth challenge is of the five core missions of DHS is to
through a networked infrastructure that is the free-rider problem, with many par- safeguard and secure cyberspace, which
targeted by malicious government, crimi- ticipants in information-sharing schemes involves the following components:
nal, and individual actors who try to avoid absorbing more information than they
•• strengthen the security and resilience
attribution. Drawing on the voluntary contribute, and with many participants
of critical infrastructure
cybersecurity framework, we are secur- treating information-sharing as market-
•• secure the Federal civilian govern-
ing Federal networks and working with ing opportunities for their own security
ment information technology
the private sector, civil society, and other solutions.4
enterprise
stakeholders to strengthen the security and Legislation has fallen short for these
•• advance law enforcement, incident
resilience of U.S. critical infrastructure.2 reasons as well as the challenges of
response, and reporting capabilities
operating in a highly polarized partisan en-
•• strengthen the (cyber) ecosystem.10
vironment. The last major cyber legislation

76  Features / Detangling the Web JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015

 Subject matter expert assigned
to Navy Information Assurance
and Cyber Security Program Office
demonstrates tactical key loader
cryptographic key fill device (U.S.
Navy/Rick Naystatt)

DHS essentially sees itself as facilitat- government services. It also leads efforts and cybersecurity initiatives for both
ing the cyber neighborhood watch for to protect the Federal dot.gov domain of government and industry partners,
the United States.11 The core division civilian government networks and collabo- and is the Executive Secretariat for the
of DHS that addresses cyber threats is rate with the private sector—the dot.com Joint Program Office for the NS/EP
the National Protection and Programs domain—to increase the security of critical Communications Executive Committee.
Directorate (NPPD), whose primary networks.13 CS&C carries out its mission CS&C relies on SECIR to streamline co-
goal is to reduce the risks of homeland through its five divisions: ordination and engagement with external
threats and make the physical and digital partners, while leveraging capabilities and
•• The Office of Emergency
infrastructure of the U.S. Government significant subject matter expertise to
Communications
more resilient and secure.12 Within the meet stakeholder requirements.14
•• The National Cybersecurity and
NPPD, the most prominent cyber secu- The National Cybersecurity and
Communications Integration Center
rity offices are the Office of Cybersecurity Communications Integration Center
•• Stakeholder Engagement and Cyber
and Communication (CS&C), Office (NCCIC) serves as a focal point for
Infrastructure Resilience
of Infrastructure Protection, and Office coordinating cyber security information-
•• Federal Network Resilience
of Cyber and Infrastructure Analysis. sharing with the private sector; provides
•• Network Security Deployment.
Outside of the NPPD, cyber security technical assistance, onsite analysis, miti-
operations also take place within U.S. The CS&C Stakeholder Engagement gation support, and assessment assistance
Immigrations and Custom Enforcement and Cyber Infrastructure Resilience to cyber attack victims, as well as situ-
and the U.S. Secret Service. (SECIR) division is the primary DHS ational awareness capability that includes
CS&C works to prevent or minimize point of engagement and coordina- integrated, actionable information about
disruptions to critical information net- tion for national security/emergency emerging trends, imminent threats, and
works to protect the public, economy, and preparedness (NS/EP) communications the status of incidents that may impact

JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015 Crowther and Ghori 77

critical infrastructure; and coordinates The NCC continuously monitors state-of-the-art center offers cyber crime
the national response to significant cyber national and international incidents support and training to Federal, state,
incidents affecting critical infrastruc- and events that may impact emergency local, and international law enforcement
ture.15 Under the National Infrastructure communications. NCC works with both agencies.25 The most important sector of
Protection Plan framework, the col- US-CERT and ICS-CERT to monitor the C3 in dealing with cyber security is
laborative activity of the NCCIC blends and resolve issues impacting cyber and the Cyber Crimes Unit, which provides
together the interdependent missions of communications during an emergency.22 the management and oversight of the
the National Coordinating Center for The Office of Infrastructure agency’s cyber-related investigations by
Telecommunications, U.S. Computer Protection leads the coordinated national focusing on the transnational criminal
Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT), effort to reduce risk to critical U.S. infra- organizations that use cyber capabilities
DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis, structure and to help respond and quickly to further their capital enterprise. This
and National Cyber Security Center.16 recover in case of terrorist attacks, natural unit provides training, investigative sup-
The NCCIC mission is to reduce the disasters, or other emergencies. The of- port, and guidance to HSI field offices
likelihood and severity of incidents fice conducts and facilitates vulnerability in emerging cyber technologies as well
against the Nation’s critical technology and consequence assessments to help crit- as subject matter expertise in cyber-
and communications networks17 and ical infrastructure owners and operators, related investigations related to identity
to build capacity and resilience in other as well as state, local, tribal, and territorial and benefit document fraud, money-
organizations18 through its four branches: partners understand and address risks.23 laundering, financial fraud, commercial
the NCCIC Operations and Integration, The office is the sector-specific agency for fraud, counterproliferation investigations,
US-CERT, Industrial Control Systems six of the critical infrastructure sectors: narcotics-trafficking, and illegal exports.26
Cyber Emergency Response Team (ICS- chemical, commercial facilities, critical The Secret Service leads a network
CERT), and National Coordination manufacturing, dams, emergency ser- of electronic crimes task forces to bring
Center for Communications (NCC). vices, and nuclear, together Federal, state, and local law en-
US-CERT provides a single account- The Office of Cyber and forcement, prosecutors, private industry,
able focal point to improve the Nation’s Infrastructure Analysis implements PPD and academia for the common purpose
cyber security posture, coordinate cyber 21, which calls for integrated analysis of preventing, detecting, mitigating, and
information-sharing, and proactively of critical infrastructure, and Executive investigating various forms of malicious
manage cyber risks to the Nation while Order 13636, which identifies critical in- cyber activity. The Secret Service also
protecting the constitutional rights of frastructure where cyber incidents could runs the National Computer Forensics
Americans.19 Additionally, US-CERT have catastrophic impacts to public health Institute, a training center dedicated to
collaborates with Federal agencies; the and safety, the economy, and national se- providing state and local law enforcement
private sector; the research community; curity. The mission is to support efforts to and legal and judicial professionals a free,
academia; state, local, and tribal gov- protect the Nation’s critical infrastructure comprehensive education on current cyber
ernments; and international partners. by providing analytic support to DHS crime trends, investigative, methods, and
Through coordination with various leadership, operational components, and prosecutorial and judicial challenges.27
national security incident centers in field personnel during steady-state opera-
responding to potential security events tions and crises on emerging threats and Department of Justice
and threats on both classified and incidents; assessing and informing na- The Department of Justice investigates,
unclassified networks, US-CERT dis- tional risk management strategies on the attributes, disrupts, and prosecutes
seminates cyber security information to likelihood and consequence of emerging cyber crimes; has the lead for domestic
the public.20 and future risks; and developing and national security operations; conducts
ICS-CERT operates cyber secu- enhancing capabilities to support crisis domestic collection, analysis, and dis-
rity operations centers that focus on actions by identifying and prioritizing semination of cyber threat intelligence;
responding to and analyzing control infrastructure through the use of analytic supports the national protection, pre-
systems–related incidents; conduct- tools and modeling capabilities.24 vention, mitigation of, and recovery
ing vulnerability, malware, and digital Homeland Security Investigations from cyber incidents; and coordinates
media analysis; providing onsite incident (HSI) operates the Cyber Crime Center cyber threat investigations.
response services; providing situational (C3), which is responsible for provid- Justice developed its 2014–2018
awareness in the form of actionable intel- ing domestic and international training strategy to include priorities and pro-
ligence; coordinating the responsible and the support, coordination, and grams that address the President’s
disclosure of vulnerabilities and associated deconfliction of cyber investigations priorities.28 Its number one goal is to
mitigations; and sharing and coordinat- related to online economic crime, digital “prevent terrorism and promote the na-
ing vulnerability information and threat theft of export-controlled data, digital tion’s security consistent with the rule of
analysis through information products theft of intellectual property, and online law,” and it aligns cyber efforts under that
and alerts.21 child exploitation investigations. This goal. It intends to combat cyber-based

78  Features / Detangling the Web JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015

threats and attacks through the use of financial investigative approaches to the computer crimes by working with other
all available tools, strong public-private cyber domain, and maintaining an around- government agencies, the private sec-
partnerships, and the investigation and the-clock cyber incident management tor, academic institutions, and foreign
prosecution of cyber threat actors.29 Its watch. Because task force members repre- counterparts. In pursuing all these goals,
cyber strategy involves an all-tools ap- sent many state, Federal, and international CCIPS attorneys regularly run complex
proach including both investigation and jurisdictions, collaboration at the NCIJTF investigations; resolve unique legal and
prosecution, with a focus on the disrup- is critical to ensuring that all legal means investigative issues raised by emerg-
tion of the threat.30 and resources available are used to track, at- ing computer and telecommunications
The Federal Bureau of investiga- tribute, and take action against these cyber technologies; litigate cases; provide litiga-
tion (FBI) leads the national effort to threats and to ultimately place international tion support to other prosecutors; train
investigate high-tech crimes, including cyber criminals behind bars and off our Federal, state, and local law enforcement
cyber-based terrorism, espionage, com- global networks. personnel; comment on and propose
puter intrusions, and major cyber fraud Other examples of cyber collaboration legislation; and initiate and participate in
by gathering and sharing information and fostered by the FBI are: international efforts to combat computer
intelligence with public- and private-sector and intellectual property crime.37
•• InfraGard, an association of persons
partners worldwide.31 It has developed The Offices of the U.S. Attorneys is
who represent businesses, academic
a number of initiatives to perform these the last major part of Justice that works
institutions, state and local law
missions. Internally, the headquarters cyber issues. One of their 10 priority
enforcement agencies, and other par-
now contains the Cyber Division to bring areas is cyber crime.38 Their three areas
ticipants dedicated to sharing infor-
together various FBI cyber initiatives and of concentration are Internet stalking,
mation and intelligence to prevent
missions and has placed cyber task forces computer hacking, intellectual property
hostile acts against the United States.
in all 56 field offices to focus exclusively rights and forensics. They also assist the
•• The National Cyber-Forensics and
on cyber security threats and synchronize National Computer Forensics Institute.
Training Alliance, which has become
domestic cyber threat investigations in the
an international model for bringing
local community.32 Department of Defense
together law enforcement, private
The Cyber Action Team (CAT) is The DOD mission is to secure the
industry, and academia to share
the FBI Cyber Division’s investigative Nation’s freedom of action in cyber-
information to stop emerging cyber
rapid response team that can be on scene space and help mitigate risks to national
threats and mitigate existing ones.33
within 48 hours. The CAT mission is security resulting from America’s
•• The Strategic Alliance Cyber Crime
to deploy globally at the direction of growing dependence on cyberspace.
Working Group, started at FBI head-
FBI Cyber Division to bring in-depth Specific mission sets include directing,
quarters in September 2006, which
cyber intrusion expertise and specialized securing, and defending DOD Informa-
consists of cyber law enforcement
investigative skills to initiatives, cases, and tion Network (DODIN) operations
bodies from Australia, Canada, New
emergencies deemed critical and signifi- (including the dot.mil domain); main-
Zealand, the United Kingdom, and
cant. When deployed, CAT objectives taining freedom of maneuver in cyber-
the United States.34
are to provide support to the local field space; executing full-spectrum military
office to make the case move as quickly The Justice Department’s National cyberspace operations; providing shared
and effectively as possible and to provide Security Division and Criminal Division situational awareness of cyberspace
detailed intrusion analysis using a blend each concentrates on its own cyber operations, including indications and
of FBI investigative techniques. issues. The division deals with cyber- warning; and providing support to civil
Today, the National Cyber Investigative based threats to the national security.35 authorities and international partners.39
Joint Task Force (NCIJTF) is the focal It created the National Security Cyber DOD articulates its cyber policy
point for government agencies to coor- Specialist network that is a new tool in through the DOD Strategy for Operating
dinate, integrate, and share information the government’s cyber toolkit and a in Cyberspace, dated July 2011, and Joint
related to domestic cyber threat investiga- critical part of the department’s efforts Publication 3-12, Cyberspace Operations,
tions. The FBI is the executive agent for to better address cyber intrusions and dated February 5, 2013. DOD’s opera-
the joint task force and partners with the attacks carried out by nation-states or ter- tions are designed to achieve and maintain
National Security Agency (NSA), Central rorist organizations.36 cyberspace superiority, defined as “the
Intelligence Agency, Secret Service, DHS, The Criminal Division contains degree of dominance in cyberspace by
and United States Cyber Command the Computer Crime and Intellectual one force that permits the secure, reliable
(USCYBERCOM). Its five mission areas Property Section (CCIPS), which imple- conduct of operations by that force, and
include coordinating whole-of-government ments Justice’s national strategies in its related land, air, maritime, and space
campaigns against known cyber threats, ex- combating computer and intellectual forces at a given time and place without
ploiting valuable cyber data, analyzing and property crimes worldwide. CCIPS prohibitive interference by an adver-
reporting on that data, applying traditional prevents, investigates, and prosecutes sary.”40 DOD organizations are allowed

JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015 Crowther and Ghori 79

 Cyber systems operations technician prepares
radio frequencies kit during Vigilant Shield
15, which emphasizes integrated DOD and
civil response in support of national strategy
of aerospace warning and control, defense
support of civil authorities, and homeland
defense (U.S. Air Force/Justin Wright)

80  Features / Detangling the Web JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015

to perform defensive cyber operations; USCYBERCOM was formed in COM, and U.S. Transportation
however, full-spectrum cyber operations 2010 by consolidating two U.S. Strategic Command.48
(including offensive cyber operations) are Command (USSTRATCOM) subordi- •• JFHQ-DODIN defends
approved by the President and directed by nate organizations: the Joint Functional DOD information networks at
the Secretary of Defense.41 Component Command–Network USCYBERCOM.49
Combatant Commands (CCMDs) Warfare and Joint Task Force–Global
The Services and Cyber. The Service
provide operations instructions and com- Network Operations.46 It is a subuni-
chiefs will provide cyber operations
mand and control to the Armed Forces and fied command under USSTRATCOM.
capabilities for deployment/support to
have a significant impact on how they are USCYBERCOM plans, coordinates,
CCMDs as directed by the Secretary
organized, trained, and resourced—areas integrates, synchronizes, and conducts
of Defense and remain responsible for
over which Congress has constitutional activities to direct the operations and
compliance with USSTRATCOM’s di-
authority.42 CCMDs share cyber informa- defense of specified DODIN. It also
rection for operation and defense of the
tion largely through USCYBERCOM and prepares, when directed, to conduct full-
DODIN.50 In addition to the joint strat-
their own joint cyber centers, but various spectrum military cyberspace operations
egy and doctrine, each Service also has its
personnel also meet periodically to share to enable actions in all domains, ensure
own doctrine to deal with cyber issues:
information in collaboration sessions.43 U.S./allied freedom of action in cyber-
The National Security Agency is space and deny the same to adversaries.47 •• The Army publishes Field Manual
the Nation’s cryptologic organization USCYBERCOM’s main instrument 3-38, Cyber Electromagnetic Activi-
that coordinates, directs, and performs of power consists of the Cyber National ties, and is currently developing a
highly specialized activities to protect Mission Force, which conducts cyber- new Cyber Branch and Military
U.S. information systems and to produce space operations to disrupt and deny Occupational Specialty to facili-
foreign signals intelligence information. adversary attacks against national critical tate the development of its cyber
It supports military customers, national infrastructure. It is the U.S. military’s first workforce.
policymakers, and the counterterrorism joint tactical command with a dedicated •• The Navy has a set of approaches
and counterintelligence communities, as mission focused on cyberspace opera- including the Department of the
well as key international allies. The NSA tions. It plans to create 133 cyber mission Navy Cybersecurity/Information
also shares information about software teams by the end of fiscal year 2016, Assurance Workforce Management,
vulnerabilities with vendors and users in which will consist of National Mission Oversight and Compliance; the
any commercial product or system (not Teams, which perform full-spectrum Navy Information Dominance Corps
just software) used by the United States cyber operations; National Support Human Capital Strategy 2012–2017;
and its allies, with an emphasis on risk Teams, which provide direct support Navy Cyber Power 2020; the U.S.
mitigation and defense.44 to the National Missions Teams; and Navy Information Dominance
The Defense Information Systems National Cyber Protection Teams, which Roadmap 2013–2028; and the Navy
Agency (DISA) provides, operates, protect whomever they are assigned to. Strategy for Achieving Information
and assures command and control, Combat Mission Forces are similar Dominance 2013–2017. The Service
information-sharing capabilities, and a to the National Mission Teams but created the Information Dominance
globally accessible enterprise informa- rather than serving at the national level, Corps, a unified body that produces
tion infrastructure in direct support to they conduct cyberspace operations precise, timely warfighting deci-
joint warfighters, national-level leaders, to achieve combatant commanders’ sions51 by bringing together the
and other mission and coalition partners objectives and are geographically and intelligence, information profes-
across the full spectrum of operations. functionally aligned under one of sional, information warfare, meteo-
They are overall responsible for DODIN. four Joint Force Headquarters–Cyber rology and oceanography communi-
Each Service also has its own equivalent to (JFHQ-C) in direct support of geo- ties, and members of the space cadre.
DISA that operates its part of DODIN. graphic and functional CCMDs: •• The Marine Corps has Marine Corps
The Defense Cyber Crime Center Doctrinal Publication 1-0, Marine
•• JFHQ-C Washington supports U.S.
delivers superior digital forensics and Corps Operations. The Service recog-
Special Operations Command, U.S.
multimedia laboratory services, cyber nizes five types of cyber operations:
Pacific Command, and U.S. South-
technical training, research, development, network operations, defensive and
ern Command.
testing and evaluation, and cyber analysis offensive cyber operations, computer
•• JFHQ-C Georgia supports U.S.
capabilities supporting cyber counterin- network exploitation, and informa-
Central Command, U.S. Africa
telligence and counterterrorism, criminal tion assurance.
Command, and U.S. Northern
investigations, intrusion forensics, law en- •• The Air Force codified its cyber doc-
Command.
forcement, the Intelligence Community, trine in Air Force Doctrine Document
•• JFHQ-C Texas supports U.S.
critical infrastructure partners, and infor- 3-12, Cyberspace Operations, pub-
European Command, USSTRAT-
mation operations for DOD.45 lished in 2010 and updated in 2011.52

JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015 Crowther and Ghori 81

 It has also created its own cyber control of assigned forces and to coordi- confusion with private-sector stakeholders
branch by carving out part of the Air nate with other naval, coalition, and joint and an increased level of competition for
Force communications community. task forces to execute the full spectrum limited skilled resources. The abundance
of cyber, electronic warfare, informa- of Federal Government actors was not
Each of the Services also has its own
tion operations, and signal intelligence a planned response. Many of these or-
cyber organizations. Under their Title 10
capabilities and missions across the cyber, ganizations were created as the result of
role as force providers to the combatant
electromagnetic, and space domains.58 bottom-up initiatives from within the
commanders, the Services recruit, train,
Marine Corps Forces Cyber Command various departments seeking to respond
educate, and retain the military cyber force.
has two subordinate elements: the Marine to an emerging, ill-defined threat area.
These are U.S. Army Cyber Command/2nd
Corps Network Operations and Security Executive branch decision memoranda,
U.S. Army, U.S. Fleet Cyber Command/
Center and L Company of the Marine policy statements, and strategies are
U.S. 10th Fleet, 24th Air Force, and U.S.
Corps Support Battalion.59 It has also beginning to bring some organization to
Marine Corps Forces Cyber Command.53
been innovative in its deployment of cyber the interdepartmental effort; however, a
Service-Specific Structure. U.S.
forces, with the Marine Air-Ground Task statutory blueprint (with corresponding
Army Cyber Command or 2nd U.S.
Force Cyberspace and Electronic Warfare budgetary guidance) has yet to be ap-
Army is the single information
Coordination Cell being embedded into proved by Congress. Whether it is wise to
technology provider for all network
the Marine Expeditionary Unit onboard prune the Federal Government’s response
communications and is responsible for
ships where it provides support directly to to the cyber threat is a policy decision yet
the Army section of the DODIN.54
deployed forces. to be made, but the current state of af-
The U.S. Intelligence and Security
Air Forces Cyber or the 24th fairs clearly requires a map to understand
Command conducts intelligence,
Air Force is self-described as an its full scale and scope. This article has
security, and information operations
“Operational war-fighting organization looked at the structure that exists in 2015.
for military commanders and national
that executes full spectrum cyberspace No doubt the structure, roles, and mis-
decisionmakers.55 The command is
operations to ensure friendly forces sions will continue to change as the cyber
also responsible for the Joint Forces
maintain a warfighting advantage.”60 It realm itself matures. JFQ
Headquarters Cyber in Georgia.
has several subordinate elements:
U.S. Fleet Cyber Command (FCC)
and 10th Fleet compose combined •• 624th Operations Center serves as the
Notes
headquarters at Fort Meade, Maryland. cyber operations center for the Air
FCC is the staff organization to organize Force. 1
Interview with Brigadier General Greg
forces, and 10th Fleet is the operational •• 67th Cyberspace Wing operates the Touhill, USAF (Ret.), Deputy Assistant Sec-
staff that provides command and con- Air Force Information Network, retary of Homeland Security, Cyber Security
trol.56 FCC has a mission set similar to which is the Air Force section of Operations Program, March 27, 2015.
2
National Security Strategy (Washington,
the other Services: direct cyberspace DODIN. DC: The White House, February 2015),
operations globally to deter and defeat •• 688th Cyberspace Wing delivers 12–13, available at <www.whitehouse.gov/
aggression and to ensure freedom of proven information operations sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_secu-
action to achieve military objectives in engineering and infrastructure rity_strategy.pdf>.
and through cyberspace; organize and capabilities.
3
“Cybersecurity,” The White House,
March 18, 2015, available at <www.white-
direct cryptologic operations worldwide •• 5th Combat Communications Group house.gov/issues/foreign-policy/cybersecu-
and support information operations delivers expeditionary communica- rity>.
and space planning and operations, tions, information systems, engi- 4
Testimony of Steven R. Chabinsky before
as directed; execute cyber missions as neering and installation, air traffic the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland
directed; direct, operate, maintain, se- control, and weather services to the Security and Governmental Affairs, “Strength-
ening Public-Private Partnerships to Reduce
cure, and defend the Navy’s portion of President, Secretary of Defense, and Cyber Risks to our Nation’s Critical Infrastruc-
the DODIN; deliver integrated cyber, combatant commanders.61 ture,” Washington, DC, March 26, 2014.
information operations, cryptologic, and 5
The authors would like to thank Thomas
space capabilities; deliver global cyber Wingfield, Esq., for providing his thoughts on
network operational requirements; assess
Conclusion cyber legislation.
The United States both benefits from 6
“S.2519—National Cybersecurity Protec-
cyber readiness; and manage, man, train, tion Act of 2014,” U.S. Congress, Decem-
and is challenged by a wide variety of
and equip functions associated with Navy ber, 18, 2014, available at <www.congress.
Federal Government actors in the cyber
Component Commander and Service gov/113/bills/s2519/BILLS-113s2519enr.
realm. The benefit comes from pursu- pdf>.
Cryptologic Commander responsibili-
ing multiple responses simultaneously, 7
“S.2521—Federal Information Security
ties.57 The mission of 10th Fleet is to serve
leading to agility and greater defense Modernization Act of 2014,” U.S. Congress,
as the Numbered Fleet for Fleet Cyber December 18, 2014, available at <www.
in-depth. However, this same approach
Command and exercise operational congress.gov/113/bills/s2521/BILLS-
is far more expensive and may lead to

82  Features / Detangling the Web JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015

113s2521enr.pdf>. <www.ice.gov/cyber-crimes>. 45
“Mission,” Defense Cyber Crime Center,
8
“S.2354—DHS Cybersecurity Workforce 26
Ibid. available at <www.dc3.mil/index/mission>.
and Recruitment and Retention Act of 2014,” 27
“About,” National Computer Forensics 46
U.S. Cyber Command’s Web site is avail-
U.S. Congress, July 14, 2014, available at Institute, available at <www.ncfi.usss.gov/ncfi/ able at <www.jtfgno.mil>.
<www.congress.gov/113/bills/s2354/BILLS- pages/about.jsf>. 47
“Mission Statement,” U.S. Cyber Com-
113s2354rs.pdf>. 28
“Strategic Plan Fiscal Years 2014–2018,” mand, available at <www.jtfgno.mil/default.
9
“Our Mission,” Department of Homeland U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), available at aspx>.
Security (DHS), available at <www.dhs.gov/ <www.justice.gov/about/strategic-plan-fiscal- 48
“Advance Questions for Vice Admiral
our-mission>. years-2014-2018>. Michael S. Rogers,” Senate Armed Services
10
“The 2014 Quadrennial Homeland 29
Ibid., 10. Committee, March 11, 2014, available at
Security Review,” DHS, June 18, 2014, 78, 30
Ibid., 19. <http://fas.org:8080/irp/congress/2014_
available at <www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/ 31
“Cyber Crime,” Federal Bureau of hr/031114rogers-q.pdf>.
publications/2014-qhsr-final-508.pdf>. Investigation (FBI), available at <www.fbi.gov/ 49
“Statement of Admiral Michael S. Rog-
11
Touhill interview. about-us/investigate/cyber>. ers,” Senate Armed Services Committee, March
12
Touhill interview; and “NPPD at a 32
“Cyber Task Forces: Building Alliances 19, 2015, available at <http://fas.org:8080/
Glance,” DHS, available at <www.dhs.gov/ to Improve the Nation’s Cybersecurity,” FBI, irp/congress/2015_hr/031915rogers.pdf>.
sites/default/files/publications/nppd-at-a- available at <www.fbi.gov/about-us/investi- 50
JP 3-12(R), ix.
glance-071614.pdf>. gate/cyber/cyber-task-forces-building-allianc- 51
“Navy Information Dominance Corps
13
Touhill interview; and “Office of Cyber- es-to-improve-the-nations-cybersecurity-1>. Human Capital Strategy 2012–2017,” U.S.
security and Communications,” DHS, available 33
“The NCFTA: Combating Force to Fight Navy, iv, available at <www.public.navy.mil/
at <www.dhs.gov/office-cybersecurity-and- Cyber Crime,” FBI, September 16, 2011, fcc-c10f/Strategies/Navy_Information_Domi-
communications>. available at <www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2011/ nance_Corps_Human_Capital_Strategy.pdf>.
14
“Stakeholder Engagement and Cyber september/cyber_091611>. 52
Air Force Doctrine Document 3-12,
Infrastructure Resilience,” DHS, available at 34
“Cyber Solidarity: Five Nations, One Cyberspace Operations, U.S. Air Force, July 15,
<www.dhs.gov/stakeholder-engagement-and- Mission,” FBI, March 18, 2008, available at 2010 (updated November 30, 2011).
cyber-infrastructure-resilience>. <www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2008/march/ 53
“DOD Strategy for Operating in Cyber-
15
“The 2014 Quadrennial Homeland cybergroup_031708>. space,” DOD, July 2011, available at <www.
Security Review.” 35
“Combatting National Security Cyber defense.gov/news/d20110714cyber.pdf>.
16
“Cybersecurity: DHS’s Role, Federal Ef- Threats,” DOJ, available at <www.justice.gov/ 54
“NETCOM,” U.S. Army Cyber Com-
forts, and National Policy,” U.S. Government nsd/about-division-0>. mand, available at <www.arcyber.army.mil/
Printing Office (GPO), June 16, 2010, 12, 36
“New Network Takes Aim at Cyber org-netcom.html>; and <www.army.mil/info/
available at <www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG- Threats to National Security,” DOJ, November organization/unitsandcommands/command-
111hhrg64697/pdf/CHRG-111hhrg64697. 14, 2012, available at <www.justice.gov/opa/ structure/netcom/>.
pdf>. blog/new-network-takes-aim-cyber-threats- 55
“INSCOM,” U.S. Army Cyber Com-
17
“National Cybersecurity Communica- national-security>. mand, available at <www.arcyber.army.mil/org-
tions Integration Center,” DHS, available at 37
“Computer Crime and Intellectual Prop- inscom.html>; and <www.inscom.army.mil/>.
<www.dhs.gov/about-national-cybersecurity- erty Section,” DOJ, available at <www.justice. 56
Email from CAPT Stephanie Keck, Divi-
communications-integration-center>. gov/criminal/cybercrime/>. sion Director, Information Dominance Corps
18
Touhill interview. 38
“Cyber Crime,” Offices of the U.S. At- and Foreign Area Officer Assignments, Navy
19
“About Us,” U.S. Computer Emergency torneys, available at <www.justice.gov/usao/ Personnel Command.
Response Team, available at <www.us-cert.gov/ priority-areas/cyber-crime>. 57
“U.S. Fleet Cyber Command Mission
about-us>. 39
Vice Admiral Michael S. Rogers, USN, and Vision,” U.S. Fleet Cyber Command, avail-
20
“Cybersecurity: DHS’s Role, Federal Nominee for Commander, U.S. Cyber Com- able at <www.fcc.navy.mil/>.
Efforts, and National Policy,” GPO, June 16, mand, Congressional Testimony, March 11, 58
“U.S. Tenth Fleet Mission,” U.S. Fleet Cy-
2010, 15, available at <www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 2014. ber Command, available at <www.fcc.navy.mil/>.
pkg/CHRG-111hhrg64697/pdf/CHRG- 40
Joint Publication (JP) 3-12(R), Cyber- 59
Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication
111hhrg64697.pdf>. space Operations (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs 1-0, Marine Corps Operations (Washington,
21
“About the Industrial Control Systems of Staff, February 5, 2013), GL-4, available at DC: Department of the Navy, Headquarters
Cyber Emergency Response Team,” Industrial <www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_12R. U.S. Marine Corps, August 9, 2011), 2-17 and
Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response pdf>. 2-18.
Team, available at <https://ics-cert.us-cert. 41
Rogers Congressional Testimony, March 60
“24th Air Force Fact Sheet,” 24th Air
gov/About-Industrial-Control-Systems-Cyber- 11, 2014. Force, available at <http://newpreview.afnews.
Emergency-Response-Team>. 42
Andrew Feickert, “The Unified Com- af.mil/24af/library/factsheets/factsheet.
22
“National Coordinating Center for Com- mand Plan and Combatant Commands: asp?id=15663>.
munications,” DHS, available at <www.dhs. Background and Issues for Congress,” R42077 61
“24th Air Force Units,” 24th Air Force,
gov/national-coordinating-center-communica- (Washington, DC: Congressional Research available at <www.24af.af.mil/units/index.
tions#>. Service, January 3, 2013), available at <http:// asp>.
23
“Office of Infrastructure Protection fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42077.pdf>.
Strategic Plan: 2012–2016,” DHS, available 43
Rita Boland, “Command’s Cybersecu-
at <www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publica- rity Crosses Domains, Directorates,” Sig-
tions/IP-Strategic-Plan-FINAL-508.pdf>. nal, June 1, 2013, available at <www.afcea.
24
“Office of Cyber and Infrastructure org/content/?q=command%E2%80%99s-
Analysis,” DHS, available at <www.dhs.gov/ cybersecurity%E2%80%A8-crosses-domains-
office-cyber-infrastructure-analysis>. directorates>.
25
“Cyber Crimes Center,” U.S. Immigra- 44
Rogers Congressional Testimony, March
tion and Customs Enforcement, available at 11, 2014.

JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015 Crowther and Ghori 83

Dr. Josh Kvavle, right,
demonstrates Google Glass
headset for Chief of Naval
Operations Admiral Jonathan
Greenert during Rapid
Innovation Cell meeting (U.S.
Navy/Peter D. Lawlor)

One Size Does Not Fit All

The Multifaceted Nature of Cyber Statecraft
By Andrea Little Limbago

yberspace is frequently referred their objectives. It is an understatement and was dubbed by some researchers as

C to as the fifth domain, alluding

to its perceived role as the next
major battlefield after land, sea, air, and
to say that the introduction of cyber-
space as a fifth domain has had disrup-
tive effects on the international system,
a #cybercoup.
To better evaluate the strategic
implications of cyber as a domain in
space. However, this oversimplification but to date there has been little discus- which to achieve national security ob-
of cyberspace underestimates its trans- sion on the myriad ways in which actors jectives—from antiaccess/area denial
formational impact within and across exploit cyberspace for geopolitical gain. to governance, democratization, and
each of these domains. Moreover, From Stuxnet at one extreme to gov- economic growth—policymakers need
framing cyber solely as a battlefield and ernment-sponsored Facebook accounts a rigorous, multifaceted framework that
coercive domain ignores the diverse at the other, digital disruption has examines cyber statecraft not only as a
ways in which both state and nonstate significantly increased the tools avail- military tool, but also as a more holistic
actors use cyber statecraft to pursue able to state and nonstate actors. Even form of statecraft. Such a framework is
transitions of power are now often first long overdue to help make sense of the
publicized in cyberspace. For example, great technological disruption that con-
following the recent coup in Thailand, tinues to shape the international political
Dr. Andrea Little Limbago is the Principal Social
Scientist at Endgame, a security intelligence and
martial law was officially declared via system. While the military component is
analytics software company. Twitter and a new Facebook account essential, cyber statecraft is often viewed

84  Features / The Multifaceted Nature of Cyber Statecraft JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015
 Soft Power Hard Power
(carrots) (sticks)

only through this coercive lens, when in

fact it is much broader. Even within the Figure 1. Interest Over Time News Headlines
military aspects of cyber statecraft, little
has been written about the various tools
available to actors in this domain, which
has led to everything from cyber censor-
ship to cyber espionage being lumped
together under the broad umbrella of
cyber attacks. These comparisons greatly
impede the ability of practitioners and
theorists alike to assess the strategic impli-
cations of cyber statecraft.
In comparing cyber studies to the evo-
lution of nuclear strategic studies, Joseph 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013
Nye notes, “Strategic studies of the cyber
domain are chronologically equivalent to
1960 but conceptually more equivalent to
1950.”1 In short, cyberspace analyses and
theories lag behind changes in the operat-
ing environment, resulting in a theoretical Figure 2. Cyber Statecraft Spectrum
and operational void that has strategic im-
plications. The classification of cyberspace
as solely a domain of conflict has contrib- Investment in Internet Factual Information and Propaganda Censorship Offensive
Infrastructure & Access Data Dissemination Cyber Attacks
uted to this theoretical stagnation, limiting
policymakers’ understanding of the ways
in which cyberspace can be leveraged for
broader applications of statecraft. But the
militarization of cyberspace is not the only Soft Power Hard Power
culprit here; the gap between the technical (carrots) (sticks)
and national security policy communities
is also partially to blame. The technical
nature of discussions on cyberspace has impacts of cyberspace. In fact, discus- political instrument, cyber statecraft can
hindered a coherent understanding of sion of cyberspace as a unique domain be similarly regarded as the use of cyber
Figure 1. Interest Over Time News Headlines
cyber as statecraft. Moreover, the phenom- has decreased dramatically over the last tools to achieve political objectives.
enal speed of technological change has 15 years. This trend is quite stark when Moreover, unlike other tools of state-
rendered it difficult for policymakers and conducting a quick review of Google craft, cyber tools are not pigeonholed
the larger strategic studies community to search term trends for cyberspace, as into a discrete category. Cyber statecraft
remain apace of developments within the depicted in figure 1. Cyber is increas- permeates each of the diplomatic, infor-
cyber domain. ingly used as a prefix for a variety of mation, military, and economic elements
offensive activities such as cyberwar, of power. This likely is due to the unique
The Cyber Statecraft Spectrum cybercrime, and cyber attacks. nature of cyberspace and its multiple
On the surface, it may seem pedantic This trend parallels changes in per- layers, including both the physical and
to build a theoretical framework for ceptions of economic statecraft, which communication domains. In each case,
analyzing and understanding the various was initially viewed as a form of state co- however, cyber statecraft serves as the
implementations of cyber statecraft. ercive power. As mercantilism gave way means to achieve political goals within
2005 2007 2009 2011 2013
Lacking such a framework, however, to a more liberal global economy, strate- that element of power. Similar to the
cyber statecraft risks perpetuating the gists began to attribute pacifying effects rise of economic statecraft during the
perception that it is solely an offensive to economic statecraft as well. The mercantilist period, cyber statecraft
tool. In his book A Fierce Domain, recognition of the potential of economic has emerged as an omnipresent tool of
Jason Healey notes the increasing tools to promote peace and develop- choice in the current era of globalization
militarization of the term cyber.2 While ment helped ensure that economic and pervasive information technology.
initially a neutral term, current refer- statecraft was viewed as more than just Contrary to common perceptions,
ences to cyber generally imply offensive a coercive tool in power politics. Just cyber statecraft is used to exert both hard
behavior, while Internet is used when as economic statecraft generally refers power (that is, coercion, punishment) and
discussing the positive technological to the use of economics as a persuasive soft power (such as persuasion to adopt

JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015 Limbago 85

 mechanism through which governments
transmit content used for attraction and
persuasion. Numerous positive political
and economic externalities have been
associated with greater Internet access,
especially in the developing world.
Greater Internet access can increase
private-sector competitiveness, enhance
educational opportunities, and spark
economic efficiencies. For instance, tech-
nological participation—only possible
via an existing cyber infrastructure—can
provide a means for reaching at-risk
populations. Connectivity could become
a key tool in combating radicalization by
providing greater access to information,
education, and economic opportunities
as well as entertainment. The possible
economic benefits are particularly preva-
lent in populations that rely on mobile
money transfers and Internet banking as
Maryam Mirzakhani was awarded 2014 Fields Medal—International Congress of Mathematicians’ first core components of their economy.
female prize winner in its 80-year history—for “her outstanding contributions to the dynamics and The potential for this soft power mode
geometry of Riemann surfaces and their moduli spaces” (courtesy of Maryam Mirzakhani) of cyber statecraft to shape the current
geopolitical environment is likely to grow
similar goals, attraction), and everything in to include the diversity of tools accessible as Internet access continues to spread
between. While by no means an exhaustive within this domain along the power spec- globally—especially as countries leapfrog
list, figure 2 depicts a broad categorization trum. Moreover, as the examples illustrate, archaic technologies in favor of modern
of the cyber tools most frequently em- cyber statecraft is unique in its asymmetric communication systems. For instance, the
ployed, ranging from positive incentives nature, capable of empowering not only 2012 World Bank report Information and
for Internet freedom and access on one major powers but also serving as a means Communication for Development identi-
extreme to offensive cyber attacks on the for weaker actors to have a disproportion- fies mobile broadband as having an even
other. This framework depicts the physical ate impact in the international arena. stronger impact on economic growth than
layers of cyberspace on either extreme of fixed broadband.3 In many developing
the spectrum, with the communication Investment in Internet countries, mobile money platforms enable
aspects occupying the middle ground. Infrastructure and Access both aid organizations and the domestic
The remainder of this article provides State investment in cyber infrastruc- population to circumvent economic
current, concrete examples of the use of ture—while also promoting connectivity blockades and provide assistance as well as
cyber statecraft across the power spectrum through physical infrastructure—fosters integration with the global economy.
and, in doing so, suggests a strategic technology-driven solutions to a wide Kenya is one of a growing number
framework for understanding and lever- range of economic, political, and social of countries that has received accolades
aging cyber as tool of statecraft. As the issues that plague the developed and for its concerted expansion of Internet
following examples illustrate, state and developing world alike. Many gov- access over the past few years. According
nonstate actors employ cyber statecraft in ernments—and even some nonstate to the World Bank World Development
diverse ways to pursue a range of objec- actors—implement cyber infrastructure Indicators, Internet usage in Kenya has
tives. As with other forms of statecraft, to empower populations through the increased by 400 percent over the last
cyber statecraft can be used for benign positive externalities that often coin- 5 years.4 This is significant, particularly
or malicious intents. In conjunction with cide with Internet access. Therefore, since Kenya was threatened with rising
the tool employed, intent becomes an government investment both in the unrest following a controversial election
additional determining factor of whether expansion of physical infrastructure in 2007, when less than 10 percent of
the application of cyber statecraft is a car- as well as in access to the Internet is the population had Internet access. The
rot or a stick. Therefore, the goal is not to absolutely essential for achieving politi- impact of this expanded access is not
provide an exhaustive overview of every cal objectives. Information technology solely economic. It also encourages the
tool possible within cyber statecraft, but infrastructure—including the hardware development of human capital through
rather to expand perceptions of cyberspace as well as its legal aspects—serves as the access to online education tools and

86  Features / The Multifaceted Nature of Cyber Statecraft JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015
information such as daily market prices—
essential knowledge in agrarian areas. As
Kenya’s situation demonstrates, invest-
ments in Internet expansion are critical
to a government’s ability to provide the
environmental conditions for the effective
use of soft power. While not necessar-
ily new, this phenomenon has recently
received more rigorous attention as
governments devote resources specifically
for the creation and expansion of Internet
architecture and a technology-based
economy. In the 1970s, for example, India
set aside an area near Bangalore to create
an electronic city. However, the legal and
economic systems lagged behind, and the
information technology hub did not truly
begin to emerge until economic liberaliza-
tion took hold in the 1990s.
Building up a cyber architecture is not
solely a tool for achieving inward-facing
domestic objectives, but it is also emerging Ohio National Guard Computer Network Defense Team members conduct operations during Cyber
as a component of power politics as states Shield 2015, March 2015, at Camp Atterbury, IN (Ohio National Guard/George Davis)
vie for regional influence. For example,
fiber networks and cell towers can be used state and nonstate actors also lever- people interact with the new military-
to help build alliances between countries age cyberspace as a means to diffuse led government.
and expand a major power’s sphere of factual information to their popula- Governments also employ cyber tools
influence. This tactic is also increasingly tions, provide greater transparency, and to defend their actions or indirectly signal
employed by some multinational corpo- signal their intent. In Iran, President intent that would be politically imprudent
rations to achieve their own objectives. Hassan Rouhani ran on a platform of to express directly. For instance, President
Google’s Project Link, which aims to greater Internet openness. While he Dilma Rousseff used her Twitter account
build fiber networks in Africa, is a case has undoubtedly implemented coercive to defend Brazil’s preparation for the
in point. Conversely, the Europe/Brazil cyber tools, which will be discussed World Cup. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe
effort to build an underwater cable with subsequently, Rouhani simultaneously also appears to be using his Twitter ac-
the goal of circumventing U.S. surveil- uses his Twitter account to spread a count to signal to the Japanese people his
lance efforts demonstrates the role of more positive message of transparency. foreign policy intentions. Abe only follows
power politics within cyberspace. Finally, Recently, he used Twitter to congratu- a handful of people on Twitter, but India’s
the creation of cyber infrastructure could late Iranian mathematician and Fields Prime Minister Narendra Modi is one of
become a tool in peacekeeping missions Medal–winner Maryam Mirzakhani, them. It is too soon to tell whether this in-
and conflict interventions. Following a and included a picture of her without dicates closer future ties between the two
conflict, restoring the cyber infrastructure a headscarf—an apparent attempt at countries, but social media is an easy and
may become just as important as provid- demonstrating openness and prevent- subtle way to inform the population of a
ing access to essential services such as ing further “brain drain” from Iran. leader’s intent or interests.
security, water, and electricity as technol- This is not a single occurrence with Finally, mobile technologies have
ogy becomes the medium through which Rouhani. He also previously tweeted provided the technological foundation
disparate aid efforts and financial assistance the content of his call with President for community policing programs in
can be coordinated and systematically dis- Barack Obama following the Septem- both the developing and the developed
persed, while also serving as the bedrock ber 2013 United Nations General world. Rwanda has implemented crowd-
for reconstructing postconflict political, Assembly in New York. Similarly, the sourcing initiatives that leverage mobile
economic, and social institutions. Thai government’s tweet announcing platforms to strengthen the rule of law,
martial law can be viewed as a means thereby enabling the community to pass
Factual Information and of promoting transparency by openly along information regarding looting and
Data Dissemination disseminating critical information to violent incidents and to simply serve as
While the popular discussion focuses the greater population. Twitter remains citizen journalists. The crowd-sourcing of
heavily on Internet censorship, many a mechanism through which the Thai information for the purpose of depicting

JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015 Limbago 87

 Slovenian soldier assesses mission group’s response to cyber attack during Combined Endeavor 14,
world’s largest C4 systems exercise (U.S. Marine Corps Forces Europe/Derrick K. Irions)

88  Features / The Multifaceted Nature of Cyber Statecraft JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015
events factually and in real time is not Violent extremist organizations ship to control the narrative, removing
limited to state actors but is actually a similarly employ cyber statecraft as a sites that highlighted erroneous gov-
tactic employed more often by nonstate propaganda tool and a key mechanism ernment actions or were critical of the
actors such as nongovernmental organi- for recruitment and radicalization. Social government writ large.
zations as well as the general population. media is largely used as the venue for While the previous examples focus
This is apparent during events as diverse these propaganda instruments. However, on Internet censorship as a means to
as the Venezuelan protests, the Wenzhou some of the more tech-savvy groups, limit antigovernment content, China
train crash in China, and the recent Ebola such as Hizballah, have also created apps has taken a somewhat different ap-
crisis in West Africa. Of course, intent to recruit followers and disperse their proach, albeit with similar tools. A recent
plays a key role in categorizing cyber ideologies. Other nonstate groups, such Harvard publication, “How Censorship
behavior as the insertion of factual infor- as the Sinaloa Cartel and those linked in China Allows Government Criticism
mation or as propaganda. Government closely to governments such as the but Silences Collective Expression,”5
propagation of false information is in- Syrian Electronic Army, similarly create analyzes a wide range of social media data
creasingly common. YouTube videos and Twitter accounts as and finds that the major goal of Chinese
revisionist mechanisms to shape the dis- censorship is to prevent social mobiliza-
Propaganda course on current events or to propagate tion. While the previous examples focus
The spectrum of cyber statecraft has the promise of a luxurious lifestyle as a on limiting antigovernment rhetoric,
geopolitical relevance not only through member of their groups. Chinese leadership is much more likely
its positive tools of persuasion and to censor any content that may lead to
attraction. Cyber statecraft is also used Censorship group mobilization, regardless of the
by governments and nonstate actors State use of cyberspace applies to both topic of the content. This tendency sur-
for more punitive intents and the the manipulation of content, as previ- faced in 2014 with the 25th anniversary of
dispersal of misinformation. Vladimir ously discussed, and the censorship of the 1989 Tiananmen Square Massacre.
Putin’s aggressive behavior epitomizes it. Internet censorship has produced Chinese censors blocked major social
the exploitation of cyberspace as a a wide range of outcomes, and the media outlets and references pertain-
propaganda machine. He has used fake conditions under which it achieves the ing directly or indirectly to Tiananmen
Facebook accounts and other well- desired result remain vague. Depend- Square, with the objective of preventing
known social media outlets to depict ing on its depth and breadth, Internet any similar social mobilization.
the Crimean annexation in a positive censorship may actually fuel unrest
light. This includes, but is not limited instead of extinguishing it. For instance, Offensive Cyber Attacks
to, falsifying crimes and atrocities com- Venezuela’s attempts in 2014 to censor At the extreme end of the cyber state-
mitted by Ukrainian extremists. He also Twitter only ignited growing protests craft spectrum, an actor’s offensive use
has employed the Web to shape the against the government. Thailand has of cyber tools rounds out their punitive
narrative regarding Malaysian Flight 17, similarly tried to censor various social uses in statecraft. Offensive cyber tools
providing a range of incredible scenarios media sites, both after protests began range dramatically in severity and they
ranging from denial that it was shot last year and after the imposition of themselves comprise a broad spectrum
down to claiming he was the intended martial law. Turkey recently lifted its of statecraft tools. They could arguably
target. Similar to how leaders used block on YouTube, which was enacted be compartmentalized into four distinct
traditional tools of statecraft in previous after recordings of a security meeting areas: insertion (for example, malware),
eras, he relies on cyber tools to promote were leaked. The subsequent politi- blocking (distributed denial of service
a rally-round-the-flag effect and gain cal crisis resulted in increased Internet [DDoS]), removal (cyber espionage),
domestic support for Russian policy. censorship over the last year, which and destruction (such as of critical
As in historical examples, Putin applies sparked protests that still plague the information or infrastructure). In 2009,
not just one tool of cyber statecraft but Recep Tayyip Erdogan government. the United Arab Emirates relied on the
instead integrates cyber propaganda Similarly, Rouhani recently banned partially state-owned telecommunica-
with rising censorship and greater gov- Instagram, which now joins Facebook tions company Etisalat to request that
ernment control of the Internet. China and Twitter as an officially banned its BlackBerry users update their phones
takes a somewhat different approach social media outlet in Iran. Ironically, with service enhancements, which
to online propaganda. The govern- Rouhani himself is a prolific Instagram consequently implemented spyware on
ment hires online commentators, often user with a large following. Finally, the devices that provided the government
referred to as the 50-cent party, who Serbian government’s mismanagement with unauthorized access to private
are paid to participate in online com- in the wake of some of the country’s information. The pro-government Syrian
munities to counter anti-party content, worst flooding in over a century ignited Electronic Army, a loosely knit group of
promulgate the party agenda, or deter a vocal cyber backlash. In response, the hacktivists, went even further and has
sensitive content. Serbian government employed censor- been credited with—among other cyber

JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015 Limbago 89

attacks—the implementation of Dark nonstate actors. Chinese hackers recently attraction to coercion along the soft-hard
Comet and Blackshades malware against stole health records by exploiting the power continuum. Applying a more
antigovernment activists. Although the Heartbleed bug, while the Target and formalized statecraft model to cyber-
strength of its direct ties to the Bashar Neiman Marcus data breaches are perhaps space helps add robustness and promote
al-Asad regime is unclear, the nonstate the most prominent examples of successful greater comprehension of the role of
group does function as a government cyber espionage aimed at multinational cyber statecraft for security and policy
surrogate and has aimed domestic attacks corporations. The decentralized, loosely leaders, while adding to the international
against antigovernment activists. Many knit hacktivist group Anonymous has relations community’s understanding
of their tools bear a resemblance to aimed its tools at both state and nonstate of the national security and geopoliti-
those used by Iran against its population groups, carrying out DDoS attacks against cal implications of cyber statecraft and
during the Green Revolution, and many the Israeli government and using their cyberspace writ large.
analysts believe Syria is using Iranian- cyber exploits to support Arab Spring It is time to end the hyperfocus on
designed offensive software. It is possible movements. Nevertheless, governments cyber as a predominantly offensive tool
the Asad regime used similar tools in are countering the group’s influence. that is not only inherently destabilizing
2012 during the unprecedented 2-day The British government’s DDoS attacks and exacerbates the security dilemma, but
Internet blackout in Syria. against Anonymous might be the first also omits the diverse ways states operate
These examples illustrate the increas- publicized instance of a state-sponsored within the domain. The examination of
ing trend of states employing cyber sticks DDoS campaign. As these examples cyber as statecraft would also benefit from
against their own populations. Of course, continue to surface, each new revelation increased coordination between the tech-
offensive cyber statecraft is not limited to sets a precedent for a potential rise in of- nology and strategic studies communities.
domestic implementations. Cyber attacks fensive cyber statecraft within cyberspace. The technical nature of this domain is
have also clearly become a tool in interstate However, attribution issues escalate the likely one of the causes of the inattention
power politics, evident in conflicts and role of misperception within cyberspace, cyber statecraft has received relative to its
disputes as diverse as those between North rendering it much more difficult to com- importance in the international system.
and South Korea, Russia and Georgia, and prehend the long-term impact that the Although still in its infancy as a domain,
India and Pakistan. In some of these in- instantiation of these tools will have on a cyber statecraft framework will enable
stances, similar to how the Syrian Electronic international relations. more holistic thinking about how actors
Army has perpetrated cyber offense, non- leverage cyberspace and will ideally open
state groups closely aligned with the state Conclusion the door for future research at the tech-
government actually carry out the cyber This initial overview of a cyber state- nology-policy nexus, and thus promote
attack, elevating the complexity of the inter- craft framework—and the range of an expanded comprehension of the ways
state conflict due to the ambiguous nature tools available to state and nonstate in which this technical disruption affects
of attribution in cyberspace. States certainly actors—provides a more structured and global affairs. JFQ
have the advantage in implementing highly nuanced approach for exploring and
technical and complex offensive tools such understanding the growing use and
as those used in the Olympic Games, the implications of cyber statecraft. This is Notes
German-based R2D2 Trojan, and Russian long overdue, as the national security
CosmicDuke. Similarly, to date, interstate implications of cyber statecraft remain
1
Joseph S. Nye, “Nuclear Lessons for
Cyber Security,” Strategic Studies Quarterly 5
dynamics maintain a monopoly on the use greatly underexplored yet are rising in (2011), 19.
of destructive cyber tools such as Stuxnet, importance. Cyber as a tool of statecraft 2
Jason Healey, ed., A Fierce Domain: Con-
which damaged Iranian nuclear reactors has been commandeered by an over- flict in Cyberspace, 1986 to 2012 (Vienna, VA:
in Natanz, as well as the Shamoon virus, emphasis on its militarized aspects. This Cyber Conflict Studies Association, 2013).
which attacked the Saudi Arabian oil com- focus on cyber’s offensive manifestations
3
World Bank, Information and Commu-
nication for Development: Maximizing Mobile
pany Saudi Aramco. Shamoon infected ignores the nuanced nature of this criti- (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2012).
three-quarters of the company’s personal cal domain and its broader application to 4
World Bank, World Development Indica-
computers (PCs), but was stopped before geopolitics. Although powerful and dis- tors (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2015),
affecting the oil supply. The Aramco attack ruptive, cyber statecraft comprises much available at <http://data.worldbank.org/prod-
required the company to replace tens of more than just intelligence or offensive ucts/wdi>.
5
Gary King, Jennifer Pan, and Margaret
thousands of its PCs and is believed to have capabilities. Analysts and policymakers E. Roberts, “How Censorship in China Allows
originated from Iran. alike must begin viewing cyber statecraft Government Criticism but Silences Collective
Given the asymmetric nature of the not as a discrete offensive tool useful Expression,” American Political Science Review
cyber domain, these tools do not reside only in narrow cases, but rather as a form 107 (May 2, 2013), available at <http://gking.
solely in the domain of state actors, of statecraft on par with other more harvard.edu/files/gking/files/censored.pdf>.
although the scale and scope can obvi- traditional forms of statecraft, with state
ously vary significantly when employed by and nonstate applications ranging from

90  Features / The Multifaceted Nature of Cyber Statecraft JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015
Standard Missile 3 launched from Aegis combat system–
equipped USS Decatur during Missile Defense Agency
ballistic missile flight test intercepting separated ballistic
missile threat target (U.S. Navy)

Understanding the Indications

and Warning Efforts of U.S.
Ballistic Missile Defense
By Thomas K. Hensley, Lloyd P. Caviness, Stephanie Vaughn, and Christopher Morton

It is true today as it was ten years ago that this effort holds the promise of changing the
course of human history, by freeing the world from the ominous threat of ballistic missile
attack. Given the choice, shouldn’t we seek to save lives rather than avenge them?
—President Ronald Reagan on the 10th Anniversary of the Announcement of the Strategic Defense Initiative

JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015 Hensley et al. 91

 he critical mission of defending adversaries. These weapons could be also creating concerns for the United

T the U.S. homeland—homeland

defense—requires a fully inte-
grated capability to identify, catego-
used to reduce military options for com-
batant commanders and decrease the
survivability of regional military assets.”4
States.
North Korea continues to advance
its existing ICBM arsenal. In December
rize, and fuse strategic and tactical These threats from state actors will 2012, the North Koreans demonstrated
indications and warnings (I&W) by likely become more dangerous due to their technological advancements in
U.S. Strategic Command (USSTR AT- increases in the numbers, capabilities, potentially launching an ICBM by suc-
COM), North American Aerospace and lethality of delivery systems and cessfully placing a satellite in orbit using
Defense Command (NOR AD), U.S. payloads in development. North America an Unha-3 rocket. A variation of the
Northern Command (USNORTH- currently has a modest BMD system Taepo Dong-2 ICBM, the Unha-3 is a
COM), and U.S. Pacific Command specifically developed to counter in- three-stage rocket.8 North Korea cur-
(USPACOM). Today’s fiscally con- tercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) rently possesses two potential ICBM
strained environment may encourage threats from rogue nations. BMD is a vehicles: the Taepo Dong-2 and KN-08.9
decisionmakers to eliminate perceived system of systems employing a layered In March 2013, Joint Chiefs of Staff Vice
I&W “redundancies” and create an defense architecture.5 It architecture Chairman Admiral James Winnefeld com-
I&W stovepipe for weapons release integrates BMD capabilities and intel- mented, “We believe the KN-08 probably
authorities (WR As). In a mission ligence systems for I&W to defeat does have the range to reach the United
area where time is of the essence and ballistic missile threats.6 Despite the vast States.”10 In addition, North Korea
failure would result in grave damage to array of terrestrial and space-based col- has taken steps to develop road-mobile
national security, such an arrangement lection assets designed to provide I&W, KN-08 launchers, complicating timely
would create an unacceptable risk to however, the Intelligence Community I&W prior to launch and thereby creating
homeland defense. faces challenges with providing strategic exceptionally tight timelines for ICBM dis-
I&W. In particular, prioritization of crimination and ground-based interceptor
Overview geographic combatant commanders’ (GBI) targeting post-launch.11
According to the U.S. Missile Defense priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) Currently, the North Koreans do
Agency, “countries invest in ballistic could potentially create gaps in coverage, not possess the means to place a nuclear
missiles because they are a means to affecting timely intelligence that supports warhead on either of these platforms.
project power in regional and strategic WRAs for effective BMD employment. However, coupling their ICBM progress
contexts” and provide “a capability to This is important because of the limited with the detonation of a third nuclear
launch an attack from a distance.”1 This engagement timeframe for incoming bal- device in February 2013, North Korea
has led to an increase in ballistic missiles listic missiles from launch to impact. The is either intentionally or unintentionally
over the past 5 years. The total number decision by a WRA to engage must occur signaling a desire to develop a capability to
of these systems outside the United within minutes of a launch to enable de- threaten North America.12 As a result, in
States, the North Atlantic Treaty Orga- feat of the incoming weapon. March 2013, Secretary of Defense Chuck
nization, Russia, and China has risen Hagel announced that “the United States
to over 5,900.2 Hundreds of launchers Rogue State ICBM Threats would be bolstering its missile defenses.”13
and missiles are currently located within to North America For the past 60 years, North Korea,
range of deployed U.S. forces.3 Originally intended to counter the with its isolated, authoritarian regime led
According to the U.S. Intelligence Soviet nuclear threat during the Cold by a succession of unstable leaders, has
Community, current trends indicate that War, BMD technology in the 21st been a seemingly intractable and excep-
ballistic missile systems using advanced century has shifted focus to defending tionally dangerous security and stability
liquid- or solid-propellant propulsion the U.S. homeland against regional problem. There are numerous specific
technologies are becoming increas- actors such as Iran and North Korea.7 examples where Pyongyang’s erratic and
ingly mobile, reliable, survivable, and North Korea’s advancements in its irrational behavior nearly reignited conflict
accurate, and have the ability to strike existing ICBM inventory and nuclear on the Korean Peninsula. A nuclear-armed
targets over longer distances. Moreover, capabilities are a concern. While Iran North Korea significantly changes the
the “proliferation of ballistic missiles does not currently possess an ICBM, security calculus and the ability of the
is increasing the number of anti-access Tehran is making tremendous strides United States to negotiate with or influ-
weapons available to potential regional in pursuit of ICBM technologies, ence Pyongyang. In April 2012, North
Korea changed its constitution, describing
the country as a “nuclear-armed nation.”14
Colonel Thomas K. Hensley, USAF, is Deputy Director of Intelligence at the North American Aerospace In February 2013, Pyongyang threatened
Defense Command–U.S. Northern Command. Colonel Lloyd P. Caviness, USARNG, is Chief of Staff– South Korea and the United States with
Army National Guard at the Fires Center of Excellence, Fort Sill, Oklahoma. Colonel Stephanie Vaughn,
USA, is Deputy Director of the Nuclear Technologies Department at the Defense Threat Reduction a preemptive nuclear strike, further com-
Agency. Christopher Morton is an Operations Chief in the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. plicating the situation.15 Whether North

92  Features / Indications and Warning Efforts of BMD JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015
Korea would actually use nuclear weapons in its overall strategy to “deter—and of a high-resolution X-band radar
is hotly debated. However, an irrational if need be retaliate—against forces in primarily deployed in support of U.S.
North Korea equipped with nuclear- the region, including U.S. forces.”21 allies in Asia, Europe, and the Middle
armed ICBMs perceiving a threat to its An Iran equipped with nuclear-tipped East; however, it can also provide
regime could result in a serious and dan- ICBMs would likely extend that strat- acquisition and tracking data for the
gerous miscalculation that would threaten egy to include North America, thereby integrated BMD system.25
North America. seriously affecting the U.S. position Sea-based components of the BMD
Iran does not currently possess an and leverage against Iran in regional warning system include the ship-based
ICBM capability; however, Tehran security issues by holding major U.S Aegis and semi-submersible platform-
continues to prioritize and advance its population areas hostage. Again, any based radars, which can each detect and
ballistic missile programs. Since the perceived threat to the Iranian regime provide acquisition and tracking informa-
1980s, Iran has relied on its North could result in a serious miscalculation. tion for the BMD system. The mobile
Korean and Syrian partners to export nature of naval platforms allows them to
and then assist in the development of I&W Capabilities for BMD be repositioned around the globe with
short- and medium-range ballistic mis- To effectively use ground-based inter- efficiency to improve BMD detection cov-
sile systems. Despite its original reliance ceptors to counter threats, WRAs must erage during heightened tensions within a
on third parties, Iran’s missile program have substantial intelligence resources given region. There are currently 31 cruis-
has evolved over time, demonstrating to detect and monitor perceived indi- ers and destroyers based in the Atlantic
the engineering and technical expertise cators via analysts and tools that may and Pacific fleets that are fitted with the
necessary to develop missile technolo- offer adequate warning. Whether a Aegis BMD system, with an additional
gies on its own.16 In particular, Iran single source of information or a fusion two undergoing installation. Aegis Ashore
has continued to work on its satellite of multiple sources, I&W intelligence Installations will be located in Romania
launch vehicles (SLVs). In February provides time-sensitive information to and Poland as part of the European
2009, Iran successfully launched a military commanders or other senior Phased Adaptive Approach, with an Aegis
satellite into orbit using its Safir-2 SLV leaders who may authorize a response Ashore test facility in Hawaii.26 The Aegis
platform. Since then, it has been work- to an adversarial action or intention. system works in conjunction with the
ing on upgrades for delivering heavier BMD warning is enabled by a layered Army Navy/Shipboard Phased-Array
payloads into higher orbits.17 According multisensor architecture that consists Radar (AN/SPY-1) S-Band radar and can
to Director of National Intelligence of fixed and mobile land-, sea-, and detect, cross-cue, and track ballistic mis-
James Clapper, “Iran continues to ex- space-based assets located around the siles to provide warning to other regional
pand the scale, reach and sophistication world. Future I&W capabilities for and national assets.27 Aside from U.S.-
of its ballistic missile forces—many of BMD will most likely include greater operated systems, Japan purchased Aegis
which are inherently capable of carrying numbers of systems as described, for its four Kongo-class guided missile
a nuclear payload.”18 in addition to more technologically destroyers,28 and smaller, less capable Aegis
The Defense Intelligence Agency robust systems in development. Nev- versions are carried by Australia, Norway,
assesses that Iran’s development of large ertheless, the U.S. Government has South Korea, and Spain.29 Furthermore,
space launch vehicles demonstrates an signaled it will also incorporate joint the Sea-Based X-Band (SBX) radar is
intent to develop ICBM technologies. and multinational efforts beyond those mounted on a twin-hulled, self-propelled
In January 2012, Secretary of Defense that already exist.22 drilling platform that is jointly operated by
Leon Panetta noted that “Iran might be Land-based components of the the Missile Defense Agency and Military
able to develop a nuclear-armed missile BMD warning system include fixed sites Sealift Command.30 Primarily used for
about a year or two after developing a and mobile phased-array radar sensors. BMD testing purposes in the Pacific, the
nuclear explosive device.”19 The rapid Upgraded early warning radars located SBX radar can also be deployed in support
progress of Iranian missile technology in Alaska, California, Greenland, and of homeland defense. The land-, sea-, and
and development is changing the minds the United Kingdom provide all- space-based sensor systems can provide
of many senior leaders who had been weather, long-range tactical warning target track information to the command,
skeptical about the future of Iranian of ballistic missile launches, including control, battle management, and commu-
ICBM capabilities and ability to threaten estimated launch and impact points, to nications (C2BMC) system, which then
North America.20 the command authority.23 The Cobra provides tracking information to other
Similar to North Korea, concerns Dane Upgrade is a midcourse radar radar systems and track and discrimination
exist regarding an ICBM-equipped in Alaska that detects missiles out to information to the shooter systems for
Iran armed with nuclear devices. Iran 2,000 miles and operates in the L-band organic or remote engagement.
possesses an extensive inventory of radio frequency.24 The Army Navy/ Space-based systems have provided
short- and medium-range ballistic mis- Transportable Radar Surveillance and the United States a strategic and tacti-
siles. Tehran incorporates these missiles Control (AN/TPY-2) consists in part cal I&W capability for more than five

JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015 Hensley et al. 93

Patriot Advanced Capability–2 missile launcher during crew drill (U.S. Air Force/Nathanael Callon)

decades. The once-classified, second-gen- warning capabilities. In addition, multi- I&W for ICBM threats as well as plan-
eration satellite constellation known as national efforts in the Asian, European, ning and operational issues related to
the Defense Support Program (DSP) was and Middle Eastern regions will become BMD, each geographic combatant
first launched into orbit in 1970.31 DSP more robust and include nontraditional commander is responsible for protect-
satellites use short- and mid-wave infrared partners such as China and Russia,35 ing the homeland in the command’s
sensors in a geosynchronous Earth orbit suggesting that the United States and its respective area of responsibility (AOR).
(GEO), allowing constant or near-con- allies perceive North Korea and Iran as USNORTHCOM and USPACOM
stant vigilance in support of the overhead the primary antagonists of the ballistic have specific roles and tasks within
persistent infrared mission.32 The third- missile threat. These future platforms will this construct.36 The USNORTH-
generation satellite constellation known enable earlier I&W, which will increase COM commander has the overarching
as Space-Based Infrared Systems uses a the engagement windows for the BMD responsibility of protecting North
mix of GEO and highly elliptical orbit systems and provide additional decision America as the supported command,
satellites, which allows for scanning and timeframes for the WRAs. with assistance from USPACOM and
staring33 of selectively targeted areas with NORAD as supporting commands.37
increased sensitivity as compared to the Combatant Commander The USSTRATCOM commander
older DSP satellites.34 Responsibilities for I&W is responsible for synchronizing global
Future sensors are in development Although USSTRATCOM provides BMD plans and operations, in addi-
to improve and enhance current BMD subject matter expertise on global tion to providing missile warning to

94  Features / Indications and Warning Efforts of BMD JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015
NORAD and other combatant com- by sharing targeting information and ICBM flight last less than 30 minutes.
manders if the appropriate combatant engagement control for a WRA. During this time, a WRA must identify
command is unable to do so.38 To The U.S. GMD missile system cur- the ICBM launch, determine if the
this end, the USSTRATCOM com- rently is the only demonstrated capability launch is a threat to the United States,
mander established the Joint Functional for defense against ICBM threats to the decide to engage the ICBM with GBIs,
Component Command for Integrated United States.43 Planners bin ballistic mis- and achieve a successful kill while the
Missile Defense (JFCC-IMD) as the siles into one of five categories based on missile is still in its midcourse phase of
synchronizing body for the BMD sys- their maximum range capabilities: close flight. Currently, the BMD system relies
tem.39 The Missile Defense Agency and range (62–186 miles), short range (under on intelligence and sensors to indicate
JFCC for Intelligence, Surveillance, and 620 miles), medium range (between 620 the construction or deployment of
Reconnaissance support JFCC-IMD in and 1,800 miles), intermediate range rogue nation systems to provide warning
providing “shared situational awareness, (between 1,800 and 3,400 miles), and of an impending attack. This additional
integrated battle management C2 [com- intercontinental (greater than 3,400 time allows for deployment of additional
mand and control], adaptive planning, miles).44 For ICBM threats to the United radar sensors toward the anticipated
and accurate and responsive battle dam- States, the BMD system relies on GBIs launch site in order to detect and track
age assessment.”40 launched from U.S. bases to intercept any incoming missile.
and kill the missile or warhead during
BMD System the midcourse phase of its flight. (GBIs Integrated Threat Analysis:
The ballistic missile defense system is a are the only system available to attack an Current Situation
complex, distributed system of five ele- ICBM during this phase.) The United A number of factors degrade effective
ments (four shooter elements and one States currently has GBI silos at Fort strategic I&W, creating a particularly
C2 element), five sensor systems (four Greely, Alaska, and Vandenberg Air Force dangerous situation with respect to the
radar systems and one space-based Base, California.45 North Korean ICBM threat and timely
system), and supporting efforts. The Ground-based interceptors are WRA response for BMD employment.
integration of these many elements and three-stage, solid-fueled boosters with an First, North Korea is an isolated, closed
efforts enable a robust, layered defense exoatmospheric kill vehicle (EKV). Upon state that denies robust, comprehensive
against a hostile missile in all phases of ICBM launch detection and recognition intelligence collection operations. As
flight.41 The shooter elements include as a threat to the United States, a WRA a result, the Intelligence Community
the Aegis BMD, Terminal High- can launch GBIs in self-defense. The relies on nonpersistent, space-based
Altitude Area Defense system, Patriot decision to launch must be made with imagery collection for North Korea.50
missile defense system, and Ground- enough time available for the GBI to reach Second, these nonpersistent,
Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) the ICBM during the midcourse phase. space-based assets are in high demand, es-
system. The sensor systems include During the GBI flight, the EKV separates pecially by coalition commanders focused
the Aegis BMD AN/SPY-1 radar, from its booster and uses onboard sen- on the Korean Peninsula. The capabilities
Cobra Dane radar, upgraded early sors for target detection, guidance, and needed for BMD I&W are shared with
warning radars, AN/TPY-2 (forward- discrimination, resulting in a collision with other PIRs, such as North Korean long-
based mode) radar, and Space-Based the targeted reentry vehicle while it is still range artillery; short-, medium-, and
Infrared Systems/DSP. In addition, in its midcourse phase.46 intermediate-range ballistic missiles; and
the Sea-Based X-Band radar (primar- ICBMs have three stages of flight: ground, air, and air defense forces.
ily a test asset that can be operation- boost, midcourse, and terminal. The Third, even when these space-based
ally deployed as needed) will be used boost phase begins with the launch of assets are used to collect information on
within the BMD system when available. the missile/warhead and lasts until the North Korean ICBMs, the road-mobile
The command and control element rocket engine burns out, approximately threats, combined with North Korean
is the C2BMC, a vital operational 3 to 5 minutes.47 The midcourse phase, camouflage, concealment, and deception
system that enables the President, which is the longest phase of flight, efforts, make them extremely difficult to
Secretary of Defense, and combatant starts after rocket engine burnout and find and track. Thus, it is conceivable that
commanders at strategic, regional, continues with the missile/warhead the first indication of a North Korean
and operational levels to systematically exiting Earth’s atmosphere, reaching its ICBM launch against North America
plan BMD operations, collectively see apogee, and beginning its descent, and would come from tactical I&W from
the threat develop, and dynamically can last up to 20 minutes.48 During the overhead persistent infrared assets, start-
manage designated networked sensors terminal phase of flight, the detached ing the clock for a WRA to make a GBI
and weapons systems to achieve global warhead reenters Earth’s atmosphere engagement decision.
and regional mission objectives.42 This and continues until detonation or According to Joint Publication 3-27,
group of automated systems enables impact. This generally lasts less than a Homeland Defense, and the Unified
each sensor and shooter to integrate minute.49 In total, the three stages of Command Plan, it is incumbent upon

JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015 Hensley et al. 95

 imperative that leaders understand the
importance of the BMD system and
component systems to ensure con-
tinued funding for these systems and
I&W platforms. This will reduce the
chances of creating stovepipe systems
that cannot (or are slow to) commu-
nicate with other systems. In a mission
area where time is of the essence and
failure would result in grave damage to
national security, failure to support the
BMD system would create an unaccept-
able risk to homeland defense. It is also
imperative that we continue to improve
and grow I&W capabilities for BMD
throughout the combatant commands.
Although USSTRATCOM is
responsible for synchronizing global
I&W for ballistic missile threats,
USNORTHCOM, along with
USPACOM, requires its own organic
I&W capability for BMD for four pri-
mary reasons. First, a USNORTHCOM
ballistic missile defense I&W element,
specifically focused on ICBM threats
to the homeland, can collaborate with
USPACOM, USSTRATCOM, and the
Intelligence Community to leverage the
imagery collection resources for strategic
I&W of the Pacific region, primarily
North Korea. Without this focused atten-
tion and emphasis, other commands may
weight collection efforts more toward
peninsula-focused PIRs, especially during
times of increased tensions, and thereby
create gaps in collection coverage.
Second, a USNORTHCOM BMD
I&W element, in close collaboration
with USSTRATCOM and USPACOM
and focused on tracking strategic I&W
Oscar-01 launch control facility missile trailer at Whiteman Air Force Base, MO (U.S. Air Force) developed by monitoring ICBM activ-
ity on the Korean Peninsula, would
USPACOM, USNORTHCOM, and the necessity of I&W and BMD system exponentially increase overall situational
USSTRATCOM to use the I&W re- capabilities within the combatant com- awareness of North Korean preparations
sources in their toolkits to warn against mand to ensure timely response and and intentions for launching an ICBM.
ballistic missile threats.51 Regional assets, engagement of all BMD threats to the Strategic I&W is critical in order to posi-
such as Aegis cruisers and destroyers, United States. tion other mobile platforms as well as to
fixed early warning radar sites, and mo- prepare the BMD system, should indica-
bile radar systems, provide information Conclusion and tions show a North Korean desire and
to the combatant commanders for I&W. Recommendations readiness to launch.
The President has delegated weapons Ballistic missile defense is a no-fail Third, should North Korea launch
release authority to USNORTHCOM, mission that requires an interdependent an ICBM against North America, a
precluding USSTRATCOM from WRA and complementary effort to generate USNORTHCOM BMD I&W element
for engaging targets.52 These combatant and track strategic and tactical indica- could ensure that the intelligence-to-
commander responsibilities reinforce tions and warning intelligence. It is shooter is properly communicated in a

96  Features / Indications and Warning Efforts of BMD JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015
timely manner to the USNORTHCOM (July–August 2013), 80, available at <www. It is self-scanned electronically, can provide
worldaffairsjournal.org/article/us-missile- enhanced sensitivity, and is suitable for light-
commander. Upon notification of a defense-closing-gap>. weight cameras [emphasis added].” See Lester
launch, the commander has only a few 14
Emma Chanlett-Avery and Ian Rinehart, J. Kozlowski and Walter F. Kosonocky, “Infra-
minutes from launch identification to de- North Korea: U.S. Relations, Nuclear Diplo- red Detector Arrays,” 33.6–33.7, available at
termine if it is a threat to North America macy, and Internal Situation, R41259 (Wash- <www.mhprofessional.com/handbookofoptics/
and to successfully engage the threat. ington, DC: Congressional Research Service, pdf/Handbook_of_Optics_vol2_ch33.pdf>.
2013), 6, available at <www.fas.org/sgp/crs/ 34
“Infrared Space Systems Directorate,”
Finally, due to limited time and
nuke/R41259.pdf>. U.S. Air Force Fact Sheet, November 23, 2011,
resources, actions and reactions to a mis- 15
Ibid., 1. available at <www.losangeles.af.mil/library/
sile launch must be flawless, especially 16
Chris Smith and Matthew Wallin, “Irani- factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=5330>.
among geographic combatant command an Ballistic Missiles,” AmericanSecurityProject. 35
BMDR, 31–35.
areas of responsibility. The entire system org, August 2013, 1, available at <http://amer- 36
JP 3-27, Homeland Defense, II-18.
icansecurityproject.org/featured-items/2013/ 37
Ibid., III-17–III-19.
must work as one unit despite its geo-
fact-sheet-iranian-ballistic-missiles/>. 38
Ibid., III-19.
graphically distributed parts. To aid in the 17
Ibid., 5. 39
Ibid., III-18–III-19.
effective handoff of BMD responsibilities 18
Masters and Bruno, 6. 40
Ibid.
between AORs, shared, pristine situ- 19
Kenneth Katzman, Iran: U.S. Concerns 41
“A System of Elements,” Missile Defense
ational awareness is paramount. North and Policy Responses (Washington, DC: Council Agency Fact Sheet, July 18, 2013, available at
on Foreign Relations, 2012), 36, available at <www.mda.mil/system/elements.html>.
Korean intent is evident. Ballistic missile
<www.cfr.org/iran/crs-iran-us-concerns-policy- 42
“Command, Control, Battle Manage-
defense of the homeland is a no-fail mis- responses/p282737>. ment, and Communications (C2BMC),”
sion that starts with collaborative and 20
Smith and Wallin, 6. Missile Defense Agency Fact Sheet, November
timely strategic and tactical I&W pro- 21
Katzman, 36. 2012, available at <www.mda.mil/system/
vided by USNORTHCOM, USPACOM,
22
Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report c2bmc.html>.
(BMDR) (Washington, DC: Department of 43
Baker Spring, “Protecting U.S. Terri-
and USSTRATCOM. JFQ
Defense, February 2010), v–vii. tory Against Long-Range Missiles: Second
23
“Upgraded Early Warning Radar,” Mis- Approach Needed,” Heritage Foundation Issue
sile Defense Agency Fact Sheet, April 2013, Brief #3987, July 15, 2013, available at <www.
Notes available at <www.mda.mil/global/docu- heritage.org/research/reports/2013/07/pro-
ments/pdf/uewr1.pdf>. tecting-us-territory-against-long-range-missiles-
1
“The Threat,” Missile Defense Agency 24
“Cobra Dane,” Missile Defense Agency 2nd-approach-needed>.
Fact Sheet, December 2014, available at <www. Fact Sheet, February 2013, available at <www. 44
Masters and Bruno, 1–2.
mda.mil/system/threat.html>. mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/cobradane. 45
Ibid., 4.
2
Ibid. pdf>. 46
Weitz, 83.
3
Ibid. 25
“Army Navy/Transportable Radar 47
Robert G. Gard and Kingston Reif, “Fact
4
Ibid. Surveillance (AN/TPY 2),” Missile Defense Sheet: U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense,” Center
5
Bernard Ulfers and George LeFurjah, “AN/ Agency Fact Sheet, February 2013, available for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, 2013,
SPY-1B/D RADAR Design Changes Supporting at <www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/ available at <http://armscontrolcenter.org/is-
Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense,” Leading Edge 7, an_tpy2.pdf>. sues/missiledefense/articles/fact_sheet_us_bal-
no. 2 (2013), 101. 26
“Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense,” Missile listic_missile_defense/>.
6
Ibid. Defense Agency Fact Sheet, August 2013, 48
Ibid., 1.
7
Jonathon Masters and Greg Bruno, “U.S. available at <www.mda.mil/system/aegis_bmd. 49
Ibid.
Ballistic Missile Defense,” Council on Foreign html>. 50
JP 3-14, Space Operations (Washington,
Relations Backgrounder, May 2006, available 27
Ronald O’Rourke, Navy Aegis Ballistic DC: The Joint Staff, January 6, 2009), V-5‒V-6.
at <www.cfr.org/defensehomeland-security/us- Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background 51
JP 3-27, Homeland Defense, II-9, II-12,
ballistic-missile-defense/p30607>; Joint Publi- and Issues for Congress, RL33745 (Washington, III-13.
cation (JP) 3-27, Homeland Defense (Washing- DC: Congressional Research Service, 2011), 52
Ibid., III-19.
ton, DC: The Joint Staff, 2009), III-18. 2–3, available at <https://opencrs.com/docu-
8
Frank Harvey, North Korea, Ballistic Mis- ment/RL33745/>.
sile Defence, and Canada-US Defence Coopera- 28
“Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense.”
tion, Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs 29
O’Rourke, 3.
Institute (CDFAI) Policy Paper (Calgary, 30
“Sensors,” Missile Defense Agency Fact
AB: CDFAI, 2013), 1, 5, available at <www. Sheet, November 2012, available at <www.
cdfai.org/PDF/North Korea Ballistic Missile mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/sbx.pdf>.
Defence.pdf>. 31
“Defense Support Program: Satellites,”
9
Greg Thielmann, Sorting Out the Nuclear U.S. Air Force Fact Sheet, February 2, 2011,
and Missile Threats from North Korea (Wash- available at <www.losangeles.af.mil/library/
ington, DC: Arms Control Association, 2013), factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=5323>.
6, available at <www.armscontrol.org/files/ 32
Ibid., 1.
TAB_Sorting_Out_North_Korea_2013.pdf>. 33
“The two basic types of focal plane
10
Ibid., 7. arrays are scanning and staring. The simplest
11
Ibid., 3, 6. scanning device consists of a linear array. An
12
Ibid., 1. image is generated by scanning the scene
13
Richard Weitz, “US Missile Defense: across the strip. . . . A staring array is the
Closing the Gap,” World Affairs Journal two-dimensional extension of a scanning array.

JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015 Hensley et al. 97

South Korean soldier briefs General Dempsey on points of interest at
Demilitarized Zone in South Korea, November 2012 (DOD/D. Myles Cullen)

Spinning the Top

American Land Power and the Ground
Campaigns of a Korean Crisis
By John Johnson and Bradley T. Gericke

Lieutenant General John “JD” Johnson, USA, is Director of the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat
Organization. Colonel Bradley T. Gericke, USA, currently serves on the Army Staff.

98  Features / American Land Power and a Korean Crisis JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015
 ashed from the yellow earth and But now a young leader sitting atop economic, and security interests tightly

G scarred by lacerating wire bound

to steel posts, the moment Korea’s
Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) comes into
the North Korean regime threatens anew
what has become fashionable to blink
at: escalatory conflict on the Korean
bound to this dynamic region. Since
1898, the United States has waged four
major Pacific conflicts—the Philippine
view, you cannot avoid the impression Peninsula. The standoff there is not Campaign (1899–1913), World War II
that you are witness to a crime. In a simply a relic of the Cold War or a quaint (1941–1945), Korean War (1950–1953
way, you are. The DMZ is an ominous regional affair whose consequences can and through today), and Vietnam War
wound from an unfinished conflict be held distant from American shores. (1962–1972)—as well as numerous
dividing the Korean Peninsula and The implications for American security smaller scale operations and deployments.
serving as a boundary between incar- and prosperity are global and increasingly Despite the common perception that the
ceration and freedom. It carves its way urgent. War in Korea would inflict a ter- Pacific is an air-maritime theater, since
between Korea’s sharp-sloped green hills rible toll, and the United States could not 1898 the U.S. Army has waged more
only 20 short miles from the megacity of avoid the butcher’s bill. ground campaigns in the Pacific than
Seoul and its surrounding environs with For the joint force, and for the anywhere else in the world. Likewise,
its 25 million people who, after decades U.S. Army in particular, a clear-eyed Asian states have themselves fought
of economic development, are enjoying consideration of the high-intensity ground wars, and with sizeable forces.
increasingly prosperous lives. The DMZ demands of a 21st-century war in Korea The Army’s attention to this theater is
both signifies suffering already endured is overdue. We must be clear about the historically rooted in genuine posture and
and foreshadows violence yet to come. fundamental nature of a war waged on readiness demands.3
It represents a status quo inter-bellum, the Korean Peninsula. A centerpiece As each of the Services seeks to bal-
which cannot endure. It is like no other of U.S. joint campaigns would be a ance worldwide commitments in an era
place in the world. And the complex ground war—American boots on the of domestic fiscal constraint, the effects of
strategic and operational challenge that ground in Asia. And those ground posture decisions will be felt in the Korean
it poses to America’s joint force is like- forces, as members of a joint force in theater. In concert with Army choices, the
wise daunting. partnership with our ROK ally, would stationing or rotational presence of Navy
The fact that war has not yet returned be called on not only to prosecute ships, Air Force strike aircraft, and Marine
to the Korean Peninsula is in large mea- multiple, often simultaneous operations forces will matter greatly. The time it takes
sure due to U.S. security assurance. In to achieve the essential military objec- to bring U.S. capabilities to bear in the
close and enduring partnership with the tives necessary to defeat North Korean event of conflict becomes an enemy itself
armed forces of the Republic of Korea military forces, but also to secure the if joint capabilities are moved farther from
(ROK), American military power has to North’s weapons of mass destruction the Korean Peninsula.
date tempered hostilities and assured all (WMD) and the enabling components North Korea’s violent provocations
actors that the cost of military ambition of WMD networks, facilitate the deliv- and bombastic pronouncements that
would be high. By no means, however, ery of humanitarian assistance to the have ratcheted up tensions in recent
is the tumultuous history between the population, and assure order to set the years mark a familiar recurrence in the
states and peoples of this critical region conditions for the return of civil au- constructed, public confrontations so
finished, nor should the absence of thority. Thus, if war erupts, it would be necessary to the North. The regime
major war in recent decades be seen as extraordinarily complex and dangerous. capably underpins its diplomacy through
a diminished mandate for U.S. military Accomplishing these tasks would a double-bind approach that generates a
deterrence, shaping activities, and opera- require much of our Armed Forces. In political crisis to set conditions, followed
tional readiness. addition to the layered threats posed by by facile concessions to reset conditions
In every so-called balance of power, the North’s armed forces, the deeply iso- ante, underpinned with the threats posed
stability is a constructed outcome that lated political and economic character of by an industrial-scale WMD program and
puts competing interests in suspen- the North Korean state means denial of improving missile delivery systems.
sion. Stability is not an accident, and it air and sea environments alone would be North Korea is a security-first state.4
requires active intervention to endure. necessary and enabling, yet not sufficient Perpetual tension with South Korea (and
Like spinning a top, sustained inter- to the prosecution of a campaign on the the United States) is the raison d’être for
vention in the form of applied force is peninsula. Land dominance would be es- the North Korean regime. Manufactured
necessary to keep the thing going. If sential to military success.2 vexation directed against the South and
the top loses its spin, equilibrium is lost. the United States is employed to justify
For more than 60 years that force has The Strategic Environment the hardships imposed on the North
been applied in Korea on the ground While not recently in the forefront of Korean people by the North’s leaders.
by American troops. They have been military planning, Asia is a familiar battle- These leaders are not irrational—but they
Northeast Asia’s key guarantors of stabil- ground. The United States is a Pacific do not see the world as the West does,
ity. They have kept the top spinning.1 nation, with our country’s political, either. Why would they hazard a war? One

JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015 Johnson and Gericke 99

Republic of Korea and U.S. Soldiers at Demilitarized Zone in South Korea face North Korea (DOD/D. Myles Cullen)

catalyst would be the perceived threat It is better to remain firmly in control and and even Bashar al-Asad are surely near to
posed by the West to regime leadership. resist for as long as possible than to incur mind; none serves as models for paths to
Readiness—and the sacrifices demanded the high risk posed by instability. accommodation with the United States.
by the public to stay ready—to fight to It is axiomatic that North Korea’s Thus U.S. and ROK military planning
protect the ethnic Korean nation whose leaders see their own authority as an exis- must admit that North Korea’s leaders
only true defender is the North is inherent tential issue and would have little interest are motivated to protect their interests.
to their ruling ideology. North Korea’s in restraint in defending themselves. They That translates to war across the range of
leaders comprehensively prioritize a would employ every tool at their disposal military operations, against a determined
military mindset and act accordingly.5 to preserve their regime: conventional adversary, in Asia—complexity posing
Their ambition to protect the North’s forces, special operations capabilities, severe challenges for American planners.
self-declared concept of Korean racial cyber attacks, missile and artillery volleys, The North’s aggressive promotion
and cultural purity means that the regime and, logically, WMD. The U.S. joint of confrontation also heightens the risk
cannot go far down the path of economic force must not presume that the selective of unintended consequences such as
reform and political liberalism. The elastic- application of U.S. weapons in an attempt an escalatory spiral driven by emotion,
ity that Western policymakers seek from to limit the scope of the conflict would be miscalculation, and chance. It is entirely
the regime is simply incompatible with feasible. Once its ruling elites see them- feasible—in fact most likely—that any
that mindset. This does not mean the selves in jeopardy, North Korea could be major military engagements would start
North’s rulers are martyrs, but it does expected to fight with all its capabilities. with little or no notice. The scenarios for
leave plenty of decision space to risk a war, The fates of recent U.S. adversaries such escalation are remarkably complex and
even if they could be defeated eventually. as Muammar Qadhafi, Saddam Hussein, merit a clear-eyed consideration of the

100  Features / American Land Power and a Korean Crisis JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015
kind of campaigns likely to be waged in longstanding approach of provocation highly suited to the diverse challenges
crisis. In all cases military action would followed by extraction of concessions posed by North Korea.
certainly be many things: fast-paced, continues to work. This is especially true
violent, fought in multiple domains, high now, as Kim Jong-un tightens his author- The Operational Environment
risk, and international in scope. What it ity through assassination of his political If wars really do end in the mud, then
would not be is easily limited or waged rivals in a rare third-generation hereditary the physical environment of northeast
only on American terms. transition within an autocratic state. Asia offers plenty. Korea’s weather is
Here is where U.S. policy desires and In the meantime, change is under extreme—brutally humid and monsoonal
the shadow of history collide. Common way south of the DMZ, which further in the summer and bitterly cold in the
wisdom asserts that another war on the heightens military risk. The population winter. Most of the peninsula features
Korean Peninsula is, in effect, unthink- of South Korea is justifiably proud of rugged, compartmented terrain char-
able. Regional stakes are too high. Too hard-earned prosperity, and while they acterized by low-lying rice paddies and
many global powers and their economies long tolerated provocations by the farm fields with steeply sloped moun-
are in play. Enormous populations are at North, that forbearance is now being tains. U.S. mobility would be challenged.
risk. At home, an American public and sorely tested.7 The public made their Logistical support would be severely
policy class is weary from a decade of displeasure known by reacting with tested. In short, the Korean Peninsula
war in the Middle East. The default then revulsion to the civilian loss of life as a presents considerable challenges that
is to hold the prospect of war in Asia at consequence of the Yeonpyeong shell- would test U.S. troops and equipment.
arm’s length while hoping for time to re- ing. In the years since, the public’s The military resources available to
muster American military strength and perception of their security has declined the North are more formidable than
for something—anything—to change significantly.8 ROK political leaders they may at first appear. Despite their
on the Korean Peninsula that leads to an have taken note. After each of the aging equipment, inadequate transport,
end-of-Cold-War–style soft landing. But North Korean provocations in 2010, outdated communications gear, and poor
given North Korea’s record, one should senior ROK leaders were dismissed, maneuver training, they retain significant
hold little optimism for a negotiated including ministers of defense, the lethal capabilities. While conquest of the
settlement to conclusively lessen tension chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, peninsula may no longer be feasible—a
on the peninsula.6 It is a risky proposi- and a number of general officers. The fact that the North’s military leaders likely
tion to assume that the relatively orderly result is that the armed forces are more understand—the North’s armed forces
endgame of the Cold War in Europe determined and readier than ever to pose multiple, in-depth, and complex chal-
would be replicated in northeast Asia. deliver a prompt, firm, and unequivocal lenges to U.S. and ROK armed forces.11
The history is simply different, and so military response in the event of an- The North Koreans would still be a for-
are the cultures in play. other such North Korean attack. This is midable adversary in ground combat and
It should not be surprising then that just the kind of tinder that could spark possess strategic and operational attack
the North’s leaders appear to be sticking a broader conflagration. options via robust short-, medium-, and
to their playbook. Their March 2010 A salutary development at the long-range missile and cannon capabili-
sinking of the ROK Cheonan, with the level of national policy is that the U.S. ties, which alone could put at risk most
loss of more than 40 ROK sailors, and Department of Defense is beginning of the ROK’s population. North Korea’s
the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in the rebalance of force capabilities to the armed forces are the fourth largest in the
November of that year, the largest mili- Asia-Pacific region.9 In addition, the world, including an active-duty strength
tary assault against the South since the U.S. Army, despite its ongoing commit- of more than 1.2 million—at least twice
armistice, are provocations very much ments in the Middle East, has recently the size of the South’s.12 The North does
in the North’s customary style. Then published its operating concept, Win in a not possess the professional officers and
in April 2012, North Korea launched Complex World, with its embedded idea modernized equipment of the South,
a 90-ton Unha-3 rocket ostensibly for of “joint combined arms operations.” but the regime’s military leadership is
the purpose of placing a satellite in orbit Such operations consist of “synchronized, indoctrinated and loyal, and the North
but likely serving as a test platform for simultaneous, or sequential application Korean People’s Army (NKPA) boasts
long-range missile technologies. (It is of two or more arms or elements of one both large numbers of armored vehicles
in this context that the alleged cyber service, along with joint inter-organiza- and an especially lethal indirect fire inven-
attacks by North Korea against Sony in tional and multinational capabilities to tory: 7,500 mortars, 3,500 towed artillery
late 2014 must be understood.) And of ensure unity of effort and create multiple pieces, 4,400 self-propelled cannons, and
course even more seriously, the North has dilemmas for the enemy.”10 The Army’s 5,100 multiple-rocket launchers. These
claimed several successful underground concept proposes the kind of integrated, can deliver both standard high explosives
nuclear tests in recent years. Leaders in adaptable maneuver that would be neces- and chemical munitions.
Pyongyang no doubt see little incentive sary to confront and then defeat likely Swiftly neutralizing a large number
to try a new approach so long as their adversaries in any theater, but seems of delivery systems is problematic even

JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015 Johnson and Gericke 101

for U.S. and ROK forces that possess remains resilient and strong. In fact, U.S. offensive WMD capability and protect
decided qualitative advantages. And of troop levels in Korea have stabilized after the capital of Seoul (existential and im-
course, North Korea has declared itself to several years of drawdown, and the U.S. mediate), secure WMD sites and defeat
be nuclear-weapons capable. Interrupting Army is modernizing and improving North Korean conventional and uncon-
and then rendering safe whatever nuclear readiness of its forces stationed on the ventional forces (existential and essential);
materials do exist is a wicked problem.13 peninsula.15 The ROK army is a highly and conduct WMD site exploitation and
Thus the counter weapons of mass motivated force that is earnestly modern- stability functions to aid the population
destruction (CWMD) mission set plays izing and would fight hard. But it is also and enable ROK-led reunification of the
a regular and prominent role for U.S. a force that is challenged to perform peninsula under a responsible civilian
Army forces on the peninsula. The pros- offensively with the speed and alacrity of authority (conflict termination). The
pect of waging war with conventional U.S. forces. South Koreans and our allies operational space in which these missions
means against a nuclear-capable foe in the region expect that the U.S. Armed must be performed would be chaotic,
would itself constitute a new chapter in Forces would fulfill alliance obligations friction would dominate, and U.S. forces
modern warfare, one whose implications and would carry a hefty share of the would meet resistance in all domains.
deserves extensive scrutiny. warfight. To do less would irreparably The timeline from steady state to the
With these capabilities, the North damage U.S. prestige, risk U.S. inter- outbreak of crisis would likely be a short
could launch indirect-fire raids against ests in the region, and likely exacerbate one. There is little reason to believe that
key ROK cities and U.S. military instal- human suffering. there would be accurate information
lations while deploying large numbers regarding North Korean intentions. With
of its 60,000-strong special operations A Three-Campaign Land War ambiguity dictating the opening phases of
forces (SOF) across the peninsula, and Two frequently encountered assump- a crisis, the ability of ROK and U.S. policy-
conduct limited objective incursions to tions about war on the peninsula are makers to make timely decisions would be
seize key terrain south of the DMZ for that the war would move lockstep up hampered, compressing the time available
use as negotiating leverage later. Such an the peninsula, phase line by phase line for military preparations. Our recent expe-
offensive would pose a potent combina- in a replay of 1950–1953, or that con- rience in the Middle East would hinder us
tion that would be difficult to repel. The flict would be limited to a specific piece in Korea. U.S. forces have historically been
North’s battlefield dispositions pose a of terrain, waged primarily by select— accustomed to generating combat power
challenge much more akin to the condi- standoff—military platforms. We should over time from largely sheltered operating
tions at Verdun than the rapid offensive employ greater imagination and resist bases that could receive, equip, and sustain
of 1950. This is not to say that the the temptation to believe that the the onward-moving tactical echelons.
NKPA could not conduct limited attacks adversary would allow U.S and ROK Even when expeditionary packages are
and seize terrain; it likely could. But forces to march the length of the pen- deployed, they are not large and they too
the army’s strength comes from wag- insula as the North succumbs to “shock benefit from an extensive support network
ing a defensive struggle, inflicting ROK and awe.” While U.S. precision strike that is protected in the theater. Our forces
and U.S. casualties, panicking the large capability is certainly a good thing, it in Korea would be both at immediate risk
population of Seoul, buying time for its just would not be enough because the and in high demand.
national leadership to employ asymmet- nature of the war would reflect the Operational risk climbs quickly over
ric weaponry and to press for an early totality of its objectives.16 It would be time if necessary capabilities are lack-
diplomatic accommodation that leaves fought in checkerboard fashion, with ing. The requirements would not only
the regime intact. ground, sea, air, and cyber operations be ordinary classes of supply but would
South of the DMZ, Koreans today occurring simultaneously. Central to the also consist of specialized formations
are justifiably proud of their economic contest would be the need to seize and and often highly technical equipment,
success and protective of their hard-won hold ground. again demanding ready access if they are
affluence that has witnessed the explosive For U.S. forces, the burden of waging to be employed effectively. The distance
growth of a middle class in recent years.14 war would fall first on U.S. Forces Korea between Seoul and Los Angeles is about
One result is a deeper calculation by the (USFK), a subunified command that also 6,000 miles—a long way to ship or airlift
South of the intersection of its economic shoulders the responsibility of represent- heavy reinforcements, and a trip that
and security interests. Trade and defense ing the United Nations as the United would simply take too long if the right
issues between South Korea, China, Nations Command and partner to the mix of capabilities is not already accessible
Japan, and the United States are deeply ROK as it contributes to the bilateral to commanders. At the onset of crisis,
intertwined. Even as the South and the Combined Forces Command.17 USFK ground forces would face the prospect
United States continue to negotiate force troops and arriving joint forces from the of several major tasks: evacuation of
posture issues and matters of operational region and the continental United States noncombatants out of tactical harm’s way
control of forces within their alliance would be required to wage three broad (likely more than 175,000 persons), and
framework, the military partnership campaigns: neutralize North Korea’s the reception, staging, and integration of

102  Features / American Land Power and a Korean Crisis JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015
follow-on forces from all Services to the
peninsula. These alone are monumental
undertakings that would require dedi-
cated manpower and consume that most
precious commodity, time. And then,
when conflict erupts, U.S. forces would
confront a threat posing complexity and
scale unlike any combination faced else-
where in the world.
In the face of this threat, the first
campaign to command the attention of
the world’s capitals would be to render
neutral North Korea’s strategic weapons
and associated capabilities, especially
nuclear weapon launch and detonation.
In 2006, the North publicly declared
that it had conducted a successful un-
derground nuclear test, and 3 years later
it claimed to possess a nuclear weapon.
No doubt it continues to pursue nuclear
weapons capability, the only purpose of
which could be to hold its neighbors
and adversaries hostage, including the
United States. In the interim, the North
is ambitiously developing a range of mis-
sile technologies and platforms, some of
them near fielding and possibly already in
low-rate production, which could enable
it to strike farther into the depth of the
peninsula and as far as Japan.
Taking down the North’s strategic U.S. Army Prepositioned Stock IV receives upgraded Bradley Fighting Vehicles as ongoing effort to
and operational strike weapons capabil- strengthen readiness across Korean Peninsula (U.S. Army/Bryan Willis)
ity would include eliminating its ability
to perform centralized command and a massive artillery and rocket barrage if the officially sanctioned SOF, armed
control. The regime, being the center of it is afforded the opportunity to do so. bands inspired either through deprivation
gravity of the North Korean state, would Vigorous measures from the ground, sea, and hope of food or gain or simply out
remain a viable political reality only and air would be necessary to stymie the of desperation and fear of ROK and U.S.
as long as it could provide centralized North’s indirect fire attacks. troops could be expected to resist vehe-
control. However, as we have seen in the Elsewhere north of the DMZ, uni- mently in northern areas. North Korean
Middle East in recent years, this does formed troops and regime security forces arsenals and underground facilities near
not mean that violence is terminated. would likely continue to fight, what- the border area no doubt number in the
Lack of central authority can in fact ever the status of the central regime in hundreds, replete with munitions and
serve as an accelerant, which leads to the Pyongyang. They would almost certainly explosives that could easily be turned into
next challenge. follow their “last orders” and resist until improvised explosive devices.
The next component of the ground they are killed or unable to offer any re- Finally, it is inevitable that ground
campaign would be to wage a fight that sistance. At the same time, North Korean forces must to some extent participate
in some respects resembles the battlefields SOF, highly trained and well equipped by in stability operations, particularly dur-
of Northern France in 1918 as much as a the regime and one of the largest special ing the transition following offensive
21st-century fight: lots of artillery, lots of operating formations in the world, would combat operations. While the ROK
chemical weapons, and large numbers of pose a significant threat. These purpose- would formally take on the requirement
dug-in forces. One urgent aspect of this built organizations are intended to to establish a competent government
conventional fight is the ROK determina- open a “second front” behind the allied authority to initiate the reconstitution
tion—and U.S. obligation—to protect lines—in both South Korea and North of civic functions and services in the
the city of Seoul and its environs. There is Korea—and could be expected to achieve North, U.S. forces would inevitably be
little doubt that the North would launch considerable disruptive effect. Alongside required to pacify chaotic conditions on

JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015 Johnson and Gericke 103

 U.S. Marine Corps field radio operator climbs
mountainside during mountain warfare training course
as part of Marine Expeditionary Force Exercise MEFEX
2014 in Pohang, South Korea (DOD/Cedric R. Haller II)

the ground. A critical mission within this is denied the ability to employ these
environment is for the Army to lead joint
WMD: New Missions weapons, their elimination—their isola-
force efforts on the ground to perform
on the Ground tion and ultimate destruction—poses
The North’s extensive WMD archi-
CWMD missions.18 Harnessing the full the next inevitable and important step
tecture has matured to the point that
suite of capabilities of the joint force to for U.S. forces in conjunction with our
it is now a dominating feature of the
address the WMD threat would be a nec- ROK allies. There is no U.S. agency
Korean battlespace. It endangers civil-
essary and demanding priority that would with the requisite mission command
ian populations and military forces on
influence nearly every aspect of ground and robust means to protect friendly
the peninsula, and it puts in harm’s
operations. This is a central feature of forces and allies on the ground—and
way, either by deliberate use or even as
the Korean Peninsula’s warfighting with the requisite special skills—other
a result of an accidental release, every
environment and one with worldwide than U.S. Army forces enabled by joint
neighboring state. Once the North
implications for U.S. forces. capabilities.

104  Features / American Land Power and a Korean Crisis JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015
 The precise number, function, and system engenders renders any balance View National Security,” Wall Street Journal–
Asia, April 11, 2013.
location of the North’s WMD sites and of power inherently unstable. 9
Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta in Da-
associated installations are not known. Defeating North Korea militarily vid Alexander, “U.S. Will Put More Warships in
The North keeps its programs shrouded in would require the joint force to operate Asia,” Reuters, June 2, 2012.
secrecy. Thus U.S. and ROK forces would in every domain. The land campaign 10
The U.S. Army Operating Concept: Win
undoubtedly discover many facilities would be decisive. In every eventuality, in A Complex World, U.S. Army Training and
Doctrine Command Pamphlet 525-3-1, Octo-
that are currently hidden. Joint CWMD among key U.S. objectives is that the
ber 7, 2014, 45.
operations would constitute a WMD North Korean WMD program must be 11
Alexandre Y. Mansourov, “North Korea:
“movement to contact” as our forma- rendered safe. If crisis erupts in Korea, Turning in the Wrong Direction,” 38North.
tions gain contact with the adversary’s American military forces on the ground org, April 2013, available at <http://38north.
network and construct a more accurate would be central actors to safeguard U.S. org/2013/04/amansourov041013/>.
12
Anthony Cordesman et al., The Korean
and comprehensive picture of the threat. interests and restore stability. JFQ
Military Balance: Comparative Korean Forces
Operations would require specific chemi- and the Forces of Key Neighboring States (Wash-
cal, biological, radiological, nuclear, and ington, DC: Center for Strategic and Interna-
explosives–trained and –equipped person- Notes tional Studies, 2011), 40.
nel and units at every echelon.19
13
Regarding North Korean nuclear weap-
1
For a short quote from Secretary of State ons effects on select Republic of Korea targets,
The U.S. strategy for combating see Bruce W. Bennett, “Deterring North Korea
Henry Kissinger concerning balances of power,
WMD contains several components, see Niall Ferguson, “America’s Global Retreat,” from Using WMD in Future Conflicts and
including nonproliferation, counterpro- Wall Street Journal, February 21, 2014. Crises,” Strategic Studies Quarterly (Winter
liferation, and consequence management. 2
Lukas Milevski, “Fortissimus Inter Pares: 2012), 125.
WMD-elimination operations are both The Utility of Landpower in Grand Strategy,” 14
“South Korea: EU Bilateral Trade and
Parameters (Summer 2012), 9. Trade with the World,” DG Trade Statistics,
technically demanding and manpower- 3
Andrew Bacevich, “The Endless Army: Is March 21, 2012.
intensive actions to systematically locate, ‘Pacific Pathways’ a Necessary Pivot or Military 15
Raymond T. Odierno, “The U.S. Army
characterize, secure, disable, or destroy Budget Grab?” Boston Globe, January 10, 2014. in a Time of Transition: Building a Flexible
WMD programs and related capabilities, 4
The crimes of the North Korean regime Force,” Foreign Affairs, May–June 2012.
each of which is manpower intensive.20 against its own people are increasingly well 16
Not discussed in this article are the
documented, adding further pressures to enabling operations to be waged in cyberspace
There is no substitute for trained and and space, or other instruments of national
regime decisionmaking. See “Commission of
ready forces on the ground to perform Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic power such as economic sanctions or blockades.
these necessary mission tasks. People’s Republic of Korea,” United Nations Nor discussed are the prominent roles to be
Office of the High Commissioner for Human played by key powers in the region, to include
In Summary Rights, February 2014. Russia, Japan, and prominently, China.
5
See B.R. Myers, “Planet Pyongyang,” 17
About 20,000 of the 28,000 troops
During the intervening six decades since stationed in Korea are U.S. Army Soldiers.
Newsweek, April 15, 2013. See also B.R. My-
the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement, ers, The Cleanest Race: How North Koreans It is already fashionable among the military
the divide between North and South— See Themselves and Why It Matters (New York: intelligentsia to charge that the Air-Sea Battle
in effect between the past and the Melville House, 2010). Professor Myers’s book concept will trump the imperative of U.S. Army
future—has only deepened. This dispar- offers a penetrating assessment of the North forces in Asia. The facts on the ground speak
Korean regime’s ideology. differently. For a short review of the debate
ity is increasingly perilous as the regime 6
Provocations of course are longstand- among the Services, see Sydney J. Freedberg,
in the North depends ever more exclu- ing features of North Korean behavior. In the Jr., “The Next War,” Government Executive
sively on its military-political complex mid-1960s the North initiated more than a Magazine, August 15, 2012.
for its survival. It lacks international decade of violent acts along the Demilitarized 18
See Joint Publication (JP) 3-40, Counter-
legitimacy and possesses only a fractured Zone (DMZ) that took dozens of lives. Major ing Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington,
terrorist actions included a raid to assassinate DC: The Joint Staff, October 31, 2014).
and declining economy, and its people
the South’s president, Park Chung-hee, at his 19
“White Paper,” U.S. Army 20th Support
have been starved, slaughtered, brain- official residence in the Blue House in Seoul Command (CBRNE) [chemical, biological,
washed, and coerced into submission. (1968); seizing the U.S. naval vessel USS radiological, nuclear, and explosives], Back-
In a region featuring important Pueblo (1968); and the murder of two U.S. ground Information, September 2011.
U.S. national interests, the persistent Army Officers in the DMZ (August 18, 1976). 20
JP 3-40, A-1.
presence of American forces and capa-
7
Karl Friedhoff, “South Korean Public
Opinion Following North Korea’s Third
bilities, in close partnership with the Nuclear Test,” Public Opinion Studies Center,
Republic of Korea and regional part- The Asan Institute for Policy Studies, March 8,
ners, has kept war at bay. How much 2013. For the South’s immediate response in
longer this balance (the spinning top) 2010, see Keith B. Richburg, “South Korean
can be kept in play cannot be known. President Takes Responsibility for Failing to
Protect Country, Signals Hardened Military
The severe rigidity of the North Korean Stance Toward North,” Washington Post, No-
political-military nexus and the po- vember 29, 2010.
tential for miscalculation that such a 8
Karl Friedhoff, “How South Koreans

JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015 Johnson and Gericke 105

 Soldiers of 91st Brigade Engineer
Battalion, 1st Brigade Combat Team,
1st Cavalry Division, prepare to breach
road block set up by opposition forces
during exercise Combined Resolve II at
Joint Multinational Readiness Center
in Hohenfels, Germany, May 2014 (U.S.
Army/Nicholaus Williams)

Making Soup with Stones

JMTC Partnership and the NATO Connected
Forces Initiative
By John G. Norris and James K. Dunivan

irst published in Europe in 1947 approaching a village where the peas- The people of the village, impressed by

F by Marcia Brown after World War

II, many children have grown up
reading a classic story titled “Stone
ants hid their meager rations of food
upon learning of their approach. In
a wily and enterprising solution, the
this notion, begin contributing bits and
pieces of meat and vegetables to create
a meal for everyone, thus highlighting
Soup.” Most of us are probably familiar soldiers begin boiling a large pot of the power and importance of coopera-
with this tale, based on French folk- water in the town square as they profess tion and what small contributions by all
lore, of three hungry and tired soldiers to make soup from three small stones. can produce for the greater good.
The overarching theme of this story
still resonates today, particularly among
Colonel John G. Norris is Commander of Operations Group and the Joint Multinational Readiness Center
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(JMRC) in Hohenfels, Germany. Lieutenant Colonel James K. Dunivan is Brigade Senior Trainer at JMRC. (NATO) countries. During the 50th

106  Features / JMTC Partnership and NATO JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015
anniversary of the Munich Security making these capabilities work together Proximity does not directly equal
Conference on February 1, 2014, most effectively. The Connected Forces access, however, so the JMTC uses the
then–Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel Initiative mobilises all of NATO’s resources “3P” approach to developing partner-
outlined “renewed and enhanced” part- to strengthen the Allies’ ability to work ship—persistence, patience, and presence.
nership and cooperation with NATO as a together in a truly connected way. This is Once trust, confidence, sincerity, and
fundamental component of our National particularly important as we wind down respect are achieved at all levels of en-
Security Strategy: our combat operations in Afghanistan at gagement, the access we acquire enables
the end of 2014. I see three areas to focus effective training and presents more
In reviewing U.S. defense priorities, tem- our efforts in the coming years: expanded training opportunities. This access pro-
pered by our fiscal realities, it’s clear that education and training; increased exer- motes mutual understanding and greater
our military must place an even greater cises, especially with the NATO Response interoperability among soldiers and lead-
strategic emphasis on working with our al- Force; and better use of technology.3 ers. Brigadier General Walter Piatt, the
lies and partners around the world. . . . The JMTC commander, likes to remind us
United States will engage European allies These three important focus areas of that “Nations do not have relationships,
to collaborate more closely, especially in CFI are complementary to Secretary people do. We gain credibility through
helping build the capabilities of other global Hagel’s defense priorities of collabora- shared hardship.”5
partners. We’re developing strategies to ad- tion and building joint capacity with Global challenges have offered ample
dress global threats as we build more joint our European Allies. occasions to share hardship, but as the
capacity, joint capacity with European These three focus areas are also United States and NATO prepared to
militaries. In the face of budget constraints manifested within the U.S. Army conclude the ISAF mission at the end
here on this continent, as well as in the Chief of Staff Strategic Priorities. of 2014, the Alliance is expected to shift
United States, we must all invest more These tenets of developing “Adaptive its emphasis from operational engage-
strategically to protect military capability Army Leaders for a Complex World,” ment to operational preparedness. This
and readiness. The question is not just how sustaining “A Globally Responsive presents an unprecedented opportunity
much we spend, but how we spend together. and Regionally Engaged Army,” and for education and training with our
It’s not just about burdens we share, but maintaining “A Ready and Modern European partners at JMTC. We can
opportunities, as well.1 Army” provide nested and neces- continue to capitalize on the relationships
sary guide posts for future operations and sustain the partnerships established
This idea not only sustains the and engagements, particularly for a during a time of war, but with latitude to
marriage of cooperation the United Combat Training Center (CTC).4 To shift from an operational environment–
States has developed for the past 12 that end, the leaders and Soldiers of specific “readiness exercise” to a decisive
years with the International Security the U.S. Joint Multinational Training action “leadership laboratory” with first-
Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, Command (JMTC) headquartered at class, realistic training against a near-peer
but also provides an endorsing re- Grafenwoehr, Germany, to include the competitor tailored to specific objectives
minder for Smart Defense outlined Joint Multinational Readiness Center and desired outcomes.
by NATO Secretary General Anders (JMRC) at Hohenfels, have worked While a majority of partnered edu-
Fogh Rasmussen at the 2011 Munich tirelessly to “make soup” with these cation and training occurs at JMTC, a
Security Conference. During his key- “three stones” that comprise the CFI tremendous amount of this effort oc-
note address, aptly titled “Building and advance the intent of our Army and curs on the home soil of our allied and
Security in an Age of Austerity,” the national defense leadership. partner nations. Enabled by geographi-
Secretary General invoked the Alliance cal proximity, a majority of our senior
to recognize Smart Defense—“how Education and Training experienced trainers travel to various
NATO can help nations to build greater The JMTC, especially throughout the countries to conduct leader training
security with fewer resources but more past decade, has been instrumental programs, specialty training, training
coordination and coherence”—as in preparing U.S. and multinational center development, and military-
a means to prudently maintain and units for service abroad in operations to-military cooperation events. This
improve our collective security in a re- in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Kosovo. The expeditionary capability and ability to
source constrained environment.2 state-of-the-art facilities and equipment, export our training expertise has greatly
One year later the Secretary General maneuver area, and most importantly its strengthened our partnership with
identified the Connected Forces Initiative proximity to allied and partner nations other nations, both reinforcing the U.S.
(CFI) as a critical component and ex- in Europe have made the JMTC an Army Europe (USAREUR) and U.S.
ample of Smart Defense: affordable, accessible, and economical European Command (USEUCOM) key
location of choice to train, validate, and task of Theater Security Cooperation
Smart Defence is about acquiring the certify coalition units to enable their and, perhaps demonstrated more tan-
necessary capabilities. Connectivity is about operational success. gibly, enabled U.S. and multinational

JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015 Norris and Dunivan 107

 integrate our forces across a theater of
operations to support our allies with a
responsive combat force.
Following Army Chief of Staff guid-
ance to Combat Training Centers as a
design framework, Combined Resolve
also established a standard for future
exercises at JMRC. Leader development
was paramount as we transitioned from
assessing readiness to a focus on leaders
at all levels training their subordinate
commands. Special operations forces
(SOF)–conventional force interdepen-
dence was not only maintained, but the
inclusion of multinational SOF from
France also demonstrated the interoper-
ability required for coalition warfare.
JMTC inculcated an expeditionary
mindset as the forces from all countries
operated out of tactical assembly areas
in the austere German winter environ-
ment, while leveraging force structure
challenges of working with nonorganic
enablers such as National Guard en-
gineers, U.S. Close Combat Aviation,
and fires provided by Czech Republic
Artillery while receiving support from
a limited logistics footprint. Finally, the
entire exercise scenario exemplified a dy-
Reservist with 6250th U.S. Army Hospital watches for injured Soldiers during mission at U.S. Army’s
namic operational environment as forces
7th Army Joint Multinational Training Command’s Grafenwoehr Training Area, Germany, July 2014 trained in force-on-force missions ranging
(U.S. Army/Christina M. Dion) from combined arms maneuver to wide
area security.6
units to “enter the box” at a higher under such auspices as the Joint Chiefs Adding to the complexity of the
level of training readiness when operat- of Staff exercise program. What is operational environment, the active par-
ing together in the field. unique—and enabled by geographical ticipation of our multinational partners
An increased level of training readi- proximity and personal partnership during Combined Resolve demonstrated
ness obviously contributes to a more in Europe—is JMTC’s eagerness and a positive example of the benefits of
successful outcome. More important, initiative to use an exercise construct CFI and fulfilled the NATO Secretary
completion of a capstone training to increase multinational interoper- General’s goal of bringing together “mod-
event that complements home-station ability and mission command, which ern, tightly connected forces, equipped,
training and offers an opportunity to are vital components of NATO’s vision trained, exercised, and commanded so
work with other Alliance or partner of Smart Defense and CFI in achieving that they can operate together, and with
nations allows units to demonstrate enhanced collective security. partners, in any environment.”7
their national capabilities while increas- In November 2013, the JMTC Given the unparalleled success of
ing interoperability, readiness, and conducted Exercise Combined Resolve, this exercise, JMTC began the process
collective security. A premier manner which was designed as a proof of prin- of planning Combined Resolve II for
to accomplish all of these objectives is ciple for the European Rotation Force May 2014. This exercise, focusing on
through participation in a multinational and focused on improving NATO Army Chief of Staff guidance to sup-
and multi-echelon named exercise. interoperability (nine different nations) port development of responsive forces,
by integrating warfighting functions, will continue as a multinational training
Exercises personnel, and doctrine, while integrat- event that expands upon the interoper-
Exercises in Europe and the JMTC ing the USEUCOM Army Contingency ability lessons learned during Combined
are nothing new—they have been Response Force company to demon- Resolve I. This iteration will include live-
successfully executed for many years strate our ability to rapidly mobilize and fire gunnery and more force-on-force

108  Features / JMTC Partnership and NATO JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015
 Soldiers provide cover for bounding troops
during exercise Combined Resolve III, October
2014, in Grafenwoehr, Germany (U.S. Army/
Marcus Floyd)

training days to truly test the rigors of beyond JMTC to allow multi-echelon virtual, and constructive events. At the
multinational brigade operations and training across a connected domain division level and three-star headquarters,
sustainment in a decisive action environ- throughout Europe. There are many JMTC events focus on using both virtual
ment. Fifteen countries and over 3,000 aspects of technology that drive interop- and constructive realms. Technology
personnel—including the European erability and Smart Defense, many of enables JMTC to conduct exercises that
Response Force from Fort Hood, Texas, which are beyond the JMTC sphere of integrate allied forces based in various
as well as numerous joint, multinational, influence. Relative to our focus within global locations and has been demon-
and National Guard partner states—are CFI, however, is leveraging technology strated in numerous named regional
scheduled to participate in this exercise, to build on our dedication to realistic exercises such as Saber Strike, Saber
making it one of the largest multina- training and increased exercises that Guardian, and Saber Junction. Under
tional exercise events ever to be hosted stress enhanced interoperability and the auspice of Connected Training,
at JMTC. NATO compliance. Accordingly, JMTC JMTC is now pursuing the capability to
is developing an initiative to harness conduct simultaneous live exercises that
Technology network and simulation technology to are distributed among partner CTCs
Given the strong interest and recog- enable “Connected Training.” throughout Europe.
nized value in conducting multinational Currently, JMTC supports individual A majority of USEUCOM and
exercises, JMTC is working to use tech- training to collective training, soldiers USAREUR partner nations have es-
nology to expand these training events to brigades, in exercises that blend live, tablished fully operational and capable

JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015 Norris and Dunivan 109

Combat Training Centers with live, Training will build on the success of in particular, the Connected Training
virtual, and constructive capabilities. previous training and exercises while opportunities that are afforded by
These national CTCs have a unique range sustaining multinational partnerships and JMTC, with prime proximity and years of
of capabilities to host sizable simulated interoperability with our Allies, which productive partnership, are a viable and
command post exercises with maneuver will ultimately fulfill the intent defined by prudent direction to pursue.
space to support company- to battalion- Smart Defense and the CFI. As then-Secretary Hagel noted in
level training, as they are modeled and Munich, “The challenges and choices
equipped similar to JMTC. They are also Stirring the Pot before us will demand leadership that
an excellent way to minimize training None of this will be easy. In his suc- reaches into the future without stumbling
costs as they allow many countries to cessful book Learning to Eat Soup with over the present.”9 While no one can ac-
train at home station or in a neighboring a Knife, John Nagl begins by address- curately predict the region, type, or scope
country. This dramatically cuts the costs ing T.E. Lawrence’s aphorism that of the next conflict, most can agree that
associated with travel and shipment of “Making war upon insurgents is messy agile and adaptive readiness is essential for
large pieces of military equipment as it and slow, like eating soup with a knife. collective security. If we clearly identify
is cheaper to “push electrons” within a . . . It is difficult to fully appreciate with the vision set out by the former
Connected Training network. until you have done it,” he writes in the Secretary of Defense in maintaining
Reduced costs for training will un- foreword, “Intellectually grasping the NATO as “the centerpiece of our trans-
doubtedly lead to continued expansion of concept . . . is a different thing from atlantic defense partnership,” then the
the network and larger exercises in support implementing the measures required to present JMTC initiatives contributing to
of CFI. Building on years of security coop- do it.”8 The same can be said for JMTC CFI will continue to extend our security
eration and numerous military-to-military partnership and the CFI. reach for generations to come. JFQ
partnership-training events, USAREUR Over the past year, however, the
and USEUCOM now have the ability JMTC has fully committed its time,
and the capacity to integrate or “connect” energy, and resources to achieving suc- Notes
a larger number of our allied forces into cess “soup” with the three “stone” focus
their training exercises. Furthermore, the areas of education and training, exercises,
1
Chuck Hagel, Remarks at the 2014 Mu-
nich Security Conference, Munich, Germany,
opportunity to connect regionally in a dis- and technology. There is more to be February 1, 2014.
tributed environment is no longer limited accomplished as we expand partnership 2
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
to the tactical level. We have the capability and pursue technology to fully enable (NATO) Secretary General Anders Fogh Ras-
to connect the tactical to operational level Connected Training, but we are on glide mussen, Keynote Address at the 2011 Munich
command with a corps headquarters, path to achieve irreversible momentum Security Conference, Munich, Germany, Febru-
ary 4, 2011.
establishing a joint operations center at the toward realizing the full potential of 3
NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh
Joint Multinational Simulations Center the CFI and its implications for Smart Rasmussen, Remarks at the Allied Command
in Grafenwoehr to control and “fight” Defense. The associated gains in col- Transformation Seminar, Munich, Washington
the distributed exercise. At the JMRC lective security for the Alliance with DC, February 28, 2012.
in Hohenfels, a multinational brigade interoperability and increased readiness to
4
General Raymond T. Odierno, Chief of
Staff of the Army, “Waypoint #2,” February
headquarters conducts a live exercise with face future contingencies and challenges 21, 2014.
subordinate battalions, companies, or to that security make it all worthwhile. 5
Brigadier General Walter Piatt, USA,
adjacent brigade headquarters located at With NATO CFI as a desired end- commander, U.S. Joint Multinational Training
JMTC partner CTCs throughout Europe. state—or waypoint—our ability to move Command, Combined Resolve Final Brigade
During the post-ISAF environ- forward will continue to depend on a Combat Team After Action Report Notes,
November 25, 2013.
ment paradigm shift of emphasis from willingness to apply “blood and treasure” 6
Raymond T. Odierno, “Transformation
operational engagement to operational to JMTC. With only two U.S. Brigade of the Combat Training Centers,” September
preparedness, the timing and opportunity Combat Teams in Europe, there may be 4, 2013.
are right to fully implement and explore a natural disposition to assume a robust 7
NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh
the capability of Connected Training. training center is not required on this Rasmussen, Remarks at the NATO Defence
Ministers Meeting, Brussels, Belgium, October
This could serve as an ideal training continent. However, as long as policy de- 22, 2013.
model for NATO and Allied Land velopers and decisionmakers view JMTC 8
John A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a
Command as it looks to train its nine as a strategic capability within Europe, Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya
NATO Rapid Deployment Corps and with a scope that extends beyond the and Vietnam (Chicago: University of Chicago
the contributing nations of the NATO training and readiness of our own U.S. Press, 2005), xi–xvi.
9
Hagel.
Response Force, allowing the Alliance forces, then a convincing argument can
to further enhance responsible readiness be made that JMTC is a notable “stone
and collective security. Vigorous explo- soup” that Alliance partners can season.
ration and application of Connected In a resource-constrained environment

110  Features / JMTC Partnership and NATO JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015
 Led by RB-66 Destroyer, pilots flying Air Force F-4C Phantoms drop bombs on
communist military target in North Vietnam, August 1966 (U.S. Air Force)

The Limits of Airpower or the

Limits of Strategy
The Air Wars in Vietnam and Their Legacies
By Mark Clodfelter

or most of the world’s population, destroyer USS Maddox in the Tonkin and Cambodia—supposedly “neutral”

F America’s air wars in Vietnam are

now ancient history. The first U.S.
bombing raids against North Vietnam,
Gulf, occurred a half-century ago this
August. Seven months later, America
began its longest sustained “strate-
countries in the conflict. Four million
tons fell on South Vietnam—America’s
ally in the war against communist
conducted in response to attacks by gic bombing” campaign, Operation aggression. When the last raid by B-52s
North Vietnamese patrol boats on the Rolling Thunder, against the North. over Cambodia on August 15, 1973,
That effort, and the Linebacker cam- culminated American bombing in
paigns that followed, dropped a million Southeast Asia, the United States had
Dr. Mark Clodfelter is a Professor of Military
tons of bombs on North Vietnam. dropped more than 8 million tons of
Strategy at the National War College. Three million more tons fell on Laos bombs in 9 years.1 Less than 2 years

JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015 Clodfelter 111

 In May 1967, Air Force F-100 Super Sabre fires salvo of rockets at jungle target
in South Vietnam (U.S. Air Force)

later, Cambodia, Laos, and South a strategy dependent on it when trying an independent, stable, noncommunist
Vietnam were communist countries. to achieve conflicting political goals. South Vietnam. His successor, President
Did the inability of bombing—and The legacies of the air wars there remain Richard Nixon, pursued a much more
innumerable airlift and reconnaissance relevant to political and military leaders limited goal that he dubbed “peace
sorties—to prevent the fall of South grappling with the prospects of applying with honor”—a euphemism for a South
Vietnam demonstrate the limits of air- airpower in the 21st century. Vietnam that remained noncommunist
power, or did it reveal that the strategy The reliance on airpower to produce for a so-called decent interval, accompa-
that relied heavily on airpower’s kinetic success in Vietnam was a classic rendi- nied by the return of American prisoners
application to achieve success was funda- tion of the “ends, ways, and means” of war (POWs).2
mentally flawed? From the perspective of formula for designing strategy taught Yet those definitions of victory were
50 years after the bombing began, and 40 today at staff and war colleges worldwide. only partial definitions of the term. They
years after the last bomb fell, the answer Airpower was a key “means” to achieve defined the positive political objectives
to both questions remains yes. Yet the the desired “ends”—victory—and how sought—those that could be achieved
two questions are intimately related, and American political and military leaders only by applying military force. Equally
answering them reveals the enormous chose to apply that means to achieve important, though, were the negative
impact that a political leader can have victory yielded the air strategy they fol- political goals—those achievable only by
on the design and implementation of an lowed. Much of the problem in Vietnam, limiting military force. To achieve true
air strategy, especially in a limited war. though, was that the definition of vic- victory in Vietnam, both the positive and
Ultimately, Vietnam demonstrates both tory was not a constant. For President negative objectives had to be obtained—a
the limits of airpower and the limits of Lyndon Johnson, victory meant creating truism for any conflict. That challenge

112  Recall / The Air Wars in Vietnam and Their Legacies JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015
was enormously difficult for American in the South and create a stable govern- than 6,000 Americans died from mines
political and military leaders in Vietnam ment there. Although they knew that and booby traps.5
because the negative goals often appeared the indigenous Viet Cong contributed For President Johnson, the real
to have an equal, if not greater, weight more manpower to the enemy’s cause problem was translating the application
than the positive goals, especially during than did the North Vietnamese army of military force into a stable, noncom-
the Johnson era of the war. (NVA), they also believed that the Viet munist South Vietnam, and doing so in
Cong (VC) could not fight successfully a way that minimized American involve-
Johnson’s Use of without North Vietnamese assistance. ment and the chances of a broader war
Airpower in Vietnam Accordingly, they designed an air with China or the Soviet Union while
President Johnson had a multitude of strategy that gradually increased pres- also maximizing American prestige on the
negative objectives that prevented him sure on the North, allowing President world stage. While airpower had seemed
from applying massive military force in Johnson to gauge reactions from the an ideal means to accomplish those ends,
Vietnam. While he did not intend to Chinese, Soviets, American public, and in truth it could not do so. The original
lose “that bitch of a war” in Southeast other global audiences while he slowly Rolling Thunder raids in March and April
Asia, he also had no intention of surren- opened the bombing spigot. Rolling 1965 bolstered the morale of many South
dering “the woman [he] really loved,” Thunder would creep steadily northward Vietnamese who desired a noncommunist
the Great Society programs aimed at until it threatened the nascent industrial government, but the South’s government
reducing poverty and achieving racial complexes in Hanoi and Haiphong, and was in shambles. After enduring seven
equality.3 Achieving the Great Society North Vietnamese President Ho Chi different regime changes—including five
became an important negative objective Minh, being a rational man who certainly coups—in 1964, South Vietnam’s politi-
for Johnson, one that would prevent prized that meager industry, would real- cal leadership faced another crisis on the
him from applying extensive military ize the peril to it and stop supporting eve of Rolling Thunder, delaying the start
force. Doing so, he feared, would cause the Viet Cong. Denied assistance, the of the air campaign by 2 weeks before a
the American public to turn away from insurgency would wither away, and the semblance of order returned to Saigon.
the Nation’s disadvantaged to focus war would end with America’s high-tech The governments that followed—those
instead on its military personnel in aerial weaponry providing a victory that of presidents Nguyen Cao Ky and
harm’s way. Johnson further feared that was quick, cheap, and efficient. Nguyen Van Thieu—were corrupt and
applying too much force against North Those assumptions provided the out of touch with the Southern popu-
Vietnam would cause its two large foundation for President Johnson’s air lace.6 No amount of American airpower
allies, China and the Soviet Union, to strategy against North Vietnam, and all could sustain such regimes. Indeed, less
increase their assistance to the North, of them were seriously flawed. Battles than 6 weeks after the start of Rolling
possibly even with overt intervention. such as Ia Drang and Khe Sanh, as well as Thunder, National Security Advisor
As a U.S. Senator on the Armed Ser- the Tet Offensive, were anomalies during McGeorge Bundy advised President
vices Committee, he had seen firsthand the Johnson presidency; for most of his Johnson that South Vietnam would fall
what could happen when American time in office, the Viet Cong and their to the Viet Cong if Johnson did not shift
leaders miscalculated regarding China North Vietnamese allies rarely fought the focus of America’s military involve-
during the drive to the Yalu River in the at all. Together, they fought an average ment to ground power. The President
Korean War, and he aimed to prevent of one day a month from 1965 to 1968, ultimately concurred, and in summer
a similar mistake in Vietnam. Finally, and as a result, their external supply re- 1965 he embarked on a program that
Johnson was concerned about America’s quirements were minimal. VC and NVA increased American troop totals from
worldwide image, with the globe seem- forces in August 1967 numbered roughly 75,000 to more than 200,000 by the end
ingly divided into camps of communism 300,000, of whom 250,000 were Viet of the year, with further escalations to fol-
and capitalism. Exerting too much force Cong. Yet that combined force needed low.7 The shift in emphasis from airpower
against North Vietnam would make only 34 tons of supplies a day from to ground power preserved the Saigon
the United States appear as a Goliath sources outside of South Vietnam—an government, but did little to assure that it
pounding a hapless David, and likely amount that just seven 2½-ton trucks governed competently.
drive small nations searching for a bene- could carry and that was less than 1 per- Yet Johnson never completely aban-
factor into the communist embrace. cent of the daily tonnage imported into doned his hope that airpower might
Those negative objectives combined North Vietnam.4 No amount of bombing yield success. In the summer of 1966, he
to produce an air strategy founded could stop that paltry supply total from ordered the bombing of oil storage facili-
on gradual response, particularly for arriving in the South. Still, in fighting ties in Hanoi and Haiphong, convinced
President Johnson’s bombing of North an infrequent guerrilla war, the VC and that trucks were vital to move North
Vietnam. American political and military NVA could cause significant losses. In Vietnamese men and supplies south and
leaders believed that they had to defeat 1967 and 1968, 2 years that together that gasoline was essential to keep the
North Vietnam to stop the insurgency claimed 25,000 American lives, more trucks moving. The attacks destroyed

JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015 Clodfelter 113

President Nixon meeting with Henry Kissinger in the Oval Office, October 8, 1973 (CIA/Oliver Atkins)

much of the North’s oil facilities but American bombing could not prevent the Johnson cronies such as lawyers Clark
failed to affect the pace of the war. A year VC and NVA from stockpiling enough Clifford and Abe Fortas) met with the
later, believing that the loss of North supplies to sustain a series of massive con- President to select Rolling Thunder
Vietnam’s meager electrical power pro- ventional attacks. bombing targets following lunch on
duction capability and its one steel mill Despite the failure of Operation Tuesday afternoons. Not until October
and single cement factory would affect Rolling Thunder to achieve suc- 1967—after Rolling Thunder had been
not only its ability to fight but also its will cess, Johnson monitored it closely underway for more than 2½ years—did
to do so, Johnson bombed those targets. and tightly constrained actions that a military officer sit in regularly on the
The war continued as it had before, even American aircrews could take over the lunch sessions, when Johnson asked
after intrepid Air Force pilots destroyed North. His negative objectives led to a Army General Earle Wheeler, the
the mile-long Paul Doumer Bridge in long list of rules of engagement (ROE) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Hanoi in August 1967. In short, air- that did everything from preventing to begin a steady attendance.9
power could not affect the outcome of flights through the airspace over Hanoi The political restrictions that Johnson
the conflict as long as the VC and North or Haiphong without his personal ap- placed on the air war over North Vietnam
Vietnamese chose to wage an infrequent proval to limiting how closely aircraft caused military commanders tremen-
guerrilla war—and as long as American could fly to the Chinese border. Many dous difficulty in implementing Rolling
political leaders chose to back the inept of those restrictions stemmed from his Thunder, but those constraints were not
government in Saigon. The rationale for “Tuesday lunch” sessions at the White the only ones they had to overcome.
bombing the North became to “place a House, during which Secretary of Indeed, military leaders developed their
ceiling” on the magnitude of war that the Defense Robert McNamara, Secretary own restrictions that limited airpower’s
VC and NVA could wage in the South.8 of State Dean Rusk, National Security effectiveness. Probably the most oner-
That goal faded into oblivion with the Advisor McGeorge Bundy (or Walt ous of those self-inflicted wounds was
opening salvos of the January 1968 Tet Rostow after 1967), and Press Secretary the “Route Package” system created in
Offensive, which demonstrated that Bill Moyers (and often joined by spring 1966 that divided North Vietnam

114  Recall / The Air Wars in Vietnam and Their Legacies JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015
into seven bombing zones. Ostensibly Union provided much of the North’s force with its small number of fighters,
developed to deconflict the multitude hardware, including SA-2 surface-to-air helicopters, and transports. Retired Air
of Air Force and Navy sorties in North missiles and MiG fighters. By 1966, many Force General Richard Myers, who flew
Vietnamese airspace, the system soon analysts considered Hanoi the world’s two tours as an F-4 pilot during the war,
became a warped way to assess which most heavily defended city, an assessment afterward lamented the lack of unity
Service seemingly contributed more that most Air Force fighter pilots would of command: “We had seven air forces
toward Rolling Thunder’s effectiveness. certainly have endorsed.14 working over there. Coordination be-
The Navy received four of the bombing In contrast to the limited inputs that tween bombers and fighters was a rarity.
zones, while the Air Force received the American military leaders had in select- Seventh Air Force, Thirteenth Air Force,
other three. Targets in the Navy zones ing targets in North Vietnam, in South the Navy, the Marines, bombers, and
were off-limits to Air Force fighters Vietnam the military chiefs faced rela- airlift all did their own thing. It wasn’t
without approval from the Navy, and tively few political restrictions. President as well coordinated as it could’ve—and
those in the Air Force zones were forbid- Johnson and his advisors deemed that should’ve—been.”16
den for Navy aircraft without permission raids against enemy positions in the Much to the chagrin of Air Force
from the Air Force. Such approvals rarely South would provoke only minor reac- leaders, operational control of B-52s
occurred.10 As a result, a competition de- tions from the Chinese or Soviets, and in South Vietnam transferred from the
veloped between the Air Force and Navy that the strikes condoned by Southern Joint Chiefs in Washington, DC, to the
to determine which Service could fly the leaders on their own territory would pro- commander of U.S. Pacific Command,
most sorties into enemy airspace.11 Much duce a meager outcry from the American Admiral Ulysses S. Grant Sharp, Jr., in
as “body count” became the measure of public or world community. Such attacks Hawaii, and finally to Army General
success for commanders on the ground, required approval only from the South William Westmoreland, America’s in-
“sortie count” became the measure of Vietnamese province chief who was re- theater commander, who used the giant
success for air commanders and often led sponsible for the welfare of those living in bombers as flying artillery to support
to promotions. Perhaps the most egre- his province. Yet obtaining that approval ground forces. Air Force Chief of Staff
gious examples of competition occurred did not guarantee a successful mission. General John McConnell believed that
during the bomb shortage of 1966, when American commanders were often un- B-52s were inappropriate for Vietnam
increased bombing had expended much certain of enemy positions and bombed but nevertheless supported their contin-
of the surplus ordnance from World War “suspected” staging areas. In particular, ued employment there, “since the Air
II and the Korean War. To maintain the American and South Vietnamese troops Force had pushed for the use of airpower
desired sortie rate, Air Force and Navy pi- created “free fire zones” where they to prevent Westmoreland from trying
lots flew missions with less than a full load removed the populace and declared that to fight the war solely with ground
of bombs, thereby endangering more anyone found in the area was hostile.15 troops and helicopters.”17 The twisted
aircrews than necessary.12 One Navy A-4 The people traversing the zones, though, parochialism and absence of central-
pilot even attacked North Vietnam’s fa- were often innocent villagers trying to ized control diminished the prospects
mous Thanh Hoa Bridge with no bombs return to their ancestral homes. Raids that the “airpower means” could make
at all, having been told to simply strafe against such areas that killed civilians worthwhile contributions to obtaining
the structure with 20-millimeter (mm) inspired hatred against the United States the desired end of a stable, independent,
cannon fire.13 and the Saigon regime and made excel- noncommunist South Vietnam. Instead,
“Operational controls” amplified lent recruiting vehicles for the Viet Cong. such deficiencies significantly increased
the effects of Rolling Thunder’s political In the effort to win so-called hearts and the likelihood that the aerial means—es-
and military constraints. Those controls minds and enhance the stability of the pecially its kinetic component—would
included such factors as environmental Saigon government, the airpower applied work against achieving that positive end.
conditions and enemy defenses. The over South Vietnam was frequently a America’s subsequent positive goal in
North Vietnamese were masters of double-edged sword. the war would prove easier to achieve
camouflage and carefully obscured the Whereas the air war over North with airpower, but that was because the
highways and trails used to send troops Vietnam was a conflict for control waged negative objectives changed as well, along
and supplies south. Many of those roads between the Air Force and Navy, the air with the character of the war itself.
were extremely difficult to identify to war over the South was an even more
begin with, given the dense jungle veg- disparate affair. An array of air forces Nixon’s Use of Airpower
etation that covered much of the country. participated in it—the Marine Corps in Vietnam
Meanwhile, the North Vietnamese with its helicopters and jets, the Army Despite the high-sounding tone of
supplemented their deception techniques with its helicopters and transport aircraft, “peace with honor,” President Nixon’s
with an extensive air defense system that the Navy with its fighters, the Air Force positive goal in Vietnam was far more
guarded lines of communication and the with its bombers, transport aircraft, and circumscribed, and he relied heavily on
cities of Hanoi and Haiphong. The Soviet fighters, and the South Vietnamese air airpower to help him create a decent

JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015 Clodfelter 115

interval for the South’s development further provided massive doses of close close scrutiny, for they reveal the disas-
and to recover American prisoners of air support and logistical resupply to trous impact that presidential ego and
war. Soon after taking office in 1969, South Vietnamese forces that gradually complex ROE can have on commanders
he decided that bombing was the stiffened their resistance. charged with implementing a desired air
proper means to curtail the buildup of Nixon could apply liberal amounts strategy.
enemy forces in Cambodia, but since of airpower against targets in North For Lavelle, the ROE for air attacks
Cambodia was technically a neutral Vietnam because he, unlike Johnson, against North Vietnam had changed
country, he would have to conduct had few negative political goals. Nixon significantly since President Johnson
the raids secretly. The raids continued and his savvy National Security Advisor ended Rolling Thunder in October
unabated until May 1970, when the Henry Kissinger, who often acted as 1968. According to an agreement after-
New York Times reported on the covert Secretary of Defense and Secretary of ward, seemingly accepted by the North
missions that had escaped the knowl- State as well, had accurately gauged the Vietnamese delegation at the Paris Peace
edge of both the Air Force Secretary growing animosity between China and Talks, American reconnaissance aircraft
and the Chief of Staff.18 The duplicity the Soviet Union and decided to make it could fly over the North but no bomb-
suited Nixon with his moniker, “Tricky a centerpiece of their strategy of détente. ing would occur, provided the North
Dick,” given that he had run for Presi- A key price for securing the promise of Vietnamese did not engage in hostile
dent on the platform of ending the diplomatic recognition to China and a actions against those aircraft.23 Air Force
war and now was enlarging it, albeit strategic arms limitations treaty—and fighters typically escorted those missions
at the request of Cambodian Premier a wheat deal—with the Soviet Union in case the North Vietnamese displayed
Norodom Sihanouk.19 was a free hand in dealing with North hostile intent. If the pilots received fire
The war that Nixon inherited, Vietnam. To Hanoi’s dismay, both or a headset warning tone indicating that
though, was not the same as the one China and the Soviet Union ultimately a SAM radar was tracking their aircraft,
fought by his predecessor. The 1968 provided Nixon with that freedom.21 they could respond with a “protective
Tet Offensive had decimated the VC as Nixon also had no equivalent of the reaction strike.”24 In late 1971, the North
a significant fighting force and had also “Great Society” to restrain his actions, Vietnamese “netted” their radar systems
severely impaired the fighting capabil- and he believed that his success in es- to allow ground-controlled interception
ity of the NVA. Airpower had played a tablishing détente with the Chinese and radars to provide extensive information
key role in the damage inflicted, with Soviets would only enhance his—and to SAM sites that minimized the need for
the bombing around the Marine base America’s—image on the world stage. SAM radar tracking, thereby minimiz-
at Khe Sanh destroying two NVA divi- Nixon’s profound concern for his ing—or eliminating—the warning tone
sions. Because of the losses suffered, the image—and belief in his own infal- pilots received prior to missile launch.25
NVA again reverted to infrequent guer- libility—often spurred impromptu General Lavelle determined that
rilla warfare. When it returned to open actions that had dire consequences this move automatically demonstrated
combat with the “Easter Offensive” for his air commanders. Before the hostile intent from the North Vietnamese
at the end of March 1972, it attacked North Vietnamese launched the Easter because by merely tracking an American
with a fury resembling the World War Offensive, evidence of the buildup for aircraft with any radar, they could now
II German blitzkrieg, minus the air it caused Nixon to order a series of fire at it with SAMs. For him, this blan-
support. More than 100,000 troops, air strikes into North Vietnam in late ket radar activation was sufficient for
supported by Soviet-supplied T-54 tanks December 1971. Then, in a February his pilots to fire on North Vietnamese
and 130mm heavy artillery, attacked in 3, 1972, Oval Office meeting with SAM sites, though he was highly selec-
a three-pronged assault against primar- Kissinger and U.S. Ambassador to South tive in the sites targeted. He received an
ily South Vietnamese forces. (Nixon Vietnam Ellsworth Bunker, Nixon endorsement of this perspective from
had by then removed most American increased the bombing. The President Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird when
troops from the war.20) The fast-paced, directed Bunker to notify Army General Laird visited Saigon in December 1971.
conventional character of the offensive, Creighton Abrams, who had replaced The Secretary told Lavelle to “make
with its heavy requirements for fuel and Westmoreland as theater commander a liberal interpretation of the rules of
ordnance, made it ideal for air attack, in Vietnam, that Abrams could now at- engagement in the field and not come
and the now-vital logistical resupply tack surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites to Washington and ask him, under the
lines and bridges running back through in North Vietnam, given that the North political climate, to come out with an
North Vietnam became prime targets Vietnamese had begun firing SAMs interpretation. I should make them in the
that finally paid dividends. Nixon or- at B-52s.22 Air Force General John D. field,” Lavelle recalled, “and he would
dered Air Force and Navy aircraft to Lavelle, the commander of Seventh back me up.”26 Kissinger also wanted
pound the supply lines relentlessly in Air Force in Saigon, was responsible more intensified bombing, arguing for
Operation Linebacker. He also mined for carrying out the President’s order. large raids on SAM sites in one fell swoop
the port of Haiphong. American aircraft Lavelle’s efforts to accomplish it merit rather than attacks across several days that

116  Recall / The Air Wars in Vietnam and Their Legacies JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015
 U.S. Air Force Boeing B-52F Stratofortress
from 320th Bomb Wing dropping bombs over
Vietnam in mid-1960s (U.S. Air Force)

grabbed sustained attention in the media. reaction to mean preventive reaction on the February 8 report, he scribbled a
The National Security Advisor told where a SAM site is concerned. . . . Who note in the margin for Kissinger: “K—is
Admiral Thomas Moorer, the Chairman the hell’s gonna say they didn’t fire?” The there anything Abrams has asked for that
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Our experi- President added, “Do it, but don’t say I have not approved?”29
ence has been that you get the same anything. . . . He [Abrams] can hit SAM Lavelle’s actions did not, how-
amount of heat domestically for a four sites period.”28 ever, receive universal endorsement.
plane attack as you do for 400.”27 Nixon’s directive reached Lavelle, Lonnie Franks, an Air Force technical
At the meeting with Kissinger and who then began an assault on SAM sites sergeant who recorded mission results
Ambassador Bunker on February 3, in the southern panhandle of North for computer compilation in Saigon,
1972, Nixon revealed that his un- Vietnam. Nixon requested to be kept was baffled when pilots erroneously
derstanding of ROE did not exactly apprised of air attacks on all North reported enemy ground fire as the ra-
match that of Laird and Lavelle, but the Vietnamese targets and received a de- tionale for bombing Northern targets.
President’s intent was the same. Nixon tailed, daily compilation of the missions. Lavelle had told subordinates that they
declared that against SAMs, “protective Those reports originated from Lavelle could not report “no enemy reaction”
reaction strikes” would now become and were in turn passed up the chain after raids, but he had failed to explain
“preventive reaction strikes” and that of command, with Admiral Moorer, that any North Vietnamese radar ac-
no one would know if SAMs had been Secretary Laird, and Kissinger reviewing tivation constituted a hostile act that
fired at American aircraft first or not. them before they went to the President. justified a bombing response. The form
He elaborated, “I am simply saying that On no occasion did Nixon express dis- that Franks used to record data con-
we expand the definition of protective pleasure with the bombing; in contrast, tained only four reasons for expending

JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015 Clodfelter 117

 ordnance over North Vietnam: fire
Flying under radar control with B-66 from antiaircraft artillery, MiGs, SAMs,
Destroyer, Air Force F-105 Thunderchief or small arms—no block existed for
pilots bomb North Vietnam military target, “radar activation.” Pilots thus chose
June 14, 1966 (U.S. Air Force/NARA/Cecil one of the listed options, and Franks,
J. Poss)
knowing that the selections were incor-
rect, thought that the effort to deceive
was deliberate and wrote his Senator.
An Inspector General investigation
ensued and Lavelle was removed from
command and demoted to major gen-
eral following hearings by the House
and Senate Armed Services committees.
When Nixon heard of Lavelle’s dis-
missal, the President expressed remorse
that the general had been sacked for con-
ducting missions that Nixon had ordered.
“I just don’t want him to be made a goat,
goddammit,” Nixon said to Kissinger in
June 1972. Kissinger responded, “What
happened with Lavelle was he had reason
to believe that we wanted him to take
aggressive steps,” to which Nixon replied,
“Right, that’s right.” The President then
stated, “I don’t want a man persecuted
for doing what he thought was right. I
just don’t want it done.” He then dispar-
aged Sergeant Franks, comparing him
to Daniel Ellsberg, who had leaked the
Pentagon Papers. Kissinger replied, “Of
course, the military are impossible, too,”
to which Nixon responded, “Well, they
all turn on each other like rats.” Kissinger
offered, “I think that this will go away.
I think we should just say a . . . after all
we took corrective steps. We could have
easily hidden it. I think you might as
well make a virtue of necessity.” To that,
Nixon responded, “I don’t like to have
the feeling that the military can get out of
control. Well, maybe this censures that.
This says we do something when they, . .
.” and he stopped in mid-sentence. Then
he added, “It’s just a hell of a damn. And
it’s a bad rap for him, Henry.”30
A week later, Nixon decided to take
Kissinger’s advice. In a June 22 news
conference, the President answered ques-
tions about Lavelle’s dismissal by stating,
“The Secretary of Defense has stated
his view on that; he has made a decision
on it. I think it was an appropriate deci-
sion.”31 Nixon further stated to the press
a week later, “But he [Lavelle] did exceed
authorization; it was proper for him to be

118  Recall / The Air Wars in Vietnam and Their Legacies JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015
relieved and retired. And I think it was military leaders as they worked to imple- risking the B-52—a vital component of
the proper action to take, and I believe ment his increasingly effective air strategy. America’s nuclear triad—in raids against
that will assure that kind of activity may That strategy proved successful partly targets in the well-defended Northern
not occur in the future.”32 because the North Vietnamese persisted heartland would demonstrate just how
Lavelle became the highest-ranking in waging conventional war. As long as serious his efforts were to end the war.
American officer to receive a public they did so, their troop concentrations On December 14, in Washington, Nixon
rebuke for trying to implement his in the South were vulnerable to aerial gave the order for bombing to begin 3
President’s air strategy, but he was not assault, as were their vital supply lines. days later—December 18 in Vietnam.
the only air commander to suffer from The strategy was also successful because In customary fashion, he told Admiral
Nixon’s callousness and ego. Air Force the positive ends that Nixon sought from Thomas H. Moorer, the Chairman of the
General John W. Vogt, Jr., who replaced it were extremely limited. Besides secur- Joint Chiefs of Staff, “I don’t want any
Lavelle, visited the White House on his ing the return of American POWs, he more crap about the fact that we couldn’t
way to Saigon and described Nixon as aimed for an agreement assuring South hit this target or that one. This is your
“wild-eyed” as he berated commanders Vietnam’s survival for a brief period of chance to use military power effectively
for lacking aggressiveness in attacking the time, and personally guaranteed to South to win this war and if you don’t I’ll con-
Easter Offensive. “He wanted somebody Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu sider you personally responsible.”36
to use imagination—like Patton,” Vogt that the South would not fall while he For the crews of more than 200
remembered.33 The President elaborated was in office.35 Accordingly, Nixon had B-52s, the operation dubbed Linebacker
on those thoughts to Kissinger in a Kissinger propose an “in-place cease-fire” II marked the first time that any of them
memorandum soon after the Linebacker to Northern negotiators in Paris, which had flown against targets in Hanoi; the
campaign had begun: spurred NVA efforts to secure additional bombers had raided Haiphong targets
territory despite the aerial pounding only once before, in April 1972. Still, as
I want you to convey directly to the Air they sustained. The North Vietnamese the influx of bombers in the Pacific had
Force that I am thoroughly disgusted with responded to Nixon’s offer by dropping steadily increased, Air Force General
their performance in North Vietnam. their demand for Thieu to resign, and a J.C. Meyer, the SAC commander, an-
Their refusal to fly unless the ceiling is peace accord appeared imminent in late ticipated such an operation and ordered
4,000 feet or more is without doubt one October 1972 when the President ended Lieutenant General Gerald Johnson,
of the most pusillanimous attitudes we Linebacker. Neither Nixon nor Kissinger the commander of Eighth Air Force, on
have ever had in the whole fine history had informed Thieu of the in-place Guam, to design a plan for it. Johnson
of the U.S. military. I do not blame the cease-fire offer, however, and once Thieu and his staff submitted the desired plan
fine Air Force pilots who do a fantastic learned of it, he was incensed. to Meyer in November 1972.37 Yet when
job in so many other areas. I do blame the Thieu’s refusal to accept the tenta- Nixon’s order to begin the assault arrived
commanders who, because they have been tive Paris settlement led to a breakdown at SAC headquarters, Meyer chose to
playing “how not to lose” for so long, now in the peace talks and caused Nixon to disregard the Eighth Air Force plan, and
can’t bring themselves to start playing “how return to his “airpower means” to secure had his own staff in Omaha, Nebraska,
to win.” Under the circumstances, I have his positive ends—which now included create one instead.
decided to take command of all strikes in convincing Thieu that he could depend The short timespan to produce a plan
North Vietnam in the Hanoi-Haiphong on Nixon’s promise of future military led to a design with minimal ingenuity.
area out from under any Air Force juris- backing. In addition, the President now Aircraft used the same flight paths to
diction whatever. The orders will be given had a negative political objective that attack targets at the same times for the
directly from a Naval commander whom would constrain the amount of force first 3 nights. The North Vietnamese
I will select. If there is one more instance of that he could apply. Although he had took advantage of the repetitive routing
whining about target restrictions we will won a resounding reelection victory in to mass their SAM batteries in the areas
simply blow the whistle on this whole sorry early November, the Democrats seized where the B-52s turned off target and
performance of our Air Force in failing for control of both houses of Congress and then fired their SAMs ballistically, which
day after day after day in North Vietnam threatened to terminate spending for the negated the bombers’ defensive capabili-
this past week to hit enormously important war when Congress convened in early ties. The initial 3 nights produced the loss
targets when they had an opportunity to January. With limited time available to of eight bombers, with five more heavily
do so and were ordered to do so and then achieve results, Nixon decided to turn damaged; another two fell to SAMs on
wouldn’t carry out the order.34 to the B-52, with its enormous 30-ton the night of December 21. Meyer ended
bomb load, to do the job. The President the repetitive routing and, after a 36-hour
Nixon never followed through on had already shifted more than half of stand-down for Christmas, turned over
his threat to eliminate Air Force com- the Strategic Air Command (SAC) fleet planning for the remainder of the opera-
manders from the air war against North of 400 heavy bombers to air bases in tion to Eighth Air Force.
Vietnam, but he continued to berate Guam and Thailand. He thought that

JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015 Clodfelter 119

 Side view of HH-53 helicopter of 40th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery
Squadron as seen from gunner’s position on A-1 of 21st Specialist
Operations Squadron (U.S. Air Force)

On December 26, General Johnson’s the North Vietnamese downed 15 bomb- spring 1965.40 Nixon himself made a
staff implemented the plan they had ers, but in doing so exhausted most of similar assertion in April 1988 when he
designed, with 120 B-52s attacking their supply of SAMs. The mercurial appeared on Meet the Press and stated
targets in Hanoi and Haiphong from Nixon credited the Air Force with suc- that his greatest mistake as President
nine different directions in a 15-minute cess, telling aide Chuck Colson, “The was not Watergate but the failure to
timespan. Two bombers fell to SAMs North Vietnamese have agreed to go conduct Linebacker II in 1969 after he
(a loss rate of 1.66 percent), and the back to the negotiating table on our took office. “If we had done that then,”
next day, in Washington, Nixon received terms. They can’t take bombing any lon- he said, “I think we would have ended
word that the North Vietnamese were ger. Our Air Force really did the job.”39 the war in 1969 rather than 1973.”41
ready to resume negotiations in Paris on The President continued bombing North Such assertions demonstrate that the
January 8. The President responded that Vietnam south of the 20th parallel until Commander in Chief—as well as many
negotiations had to begin on January 2 the initialing of the Paris Peace Accords military leaders—never really understood
and would have a time limit attached, on January 23, 1973. that the character of the war in 1972 had
and that the North Vietnamese could For many air commanders, Nixon’s changed dramatically from what it had
not deliberate on agreements already dramatic “Christmas Bombing” vindi- been for most of the conflict. The change
made.38 On December 28, Hanoi ac- cated their belief that airpower could to conventional warfare with the Easter
cepted Nixon’s conditions, and he ended have won the war had President Johnson Offensive was a key reason why airpower
Linebacker II the next day. In 11 days, employed a comparable operation in yielded tangible results.

120  Recall / The Air Wars in Vietnam and Their Legacies JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015
 Moreover, the success that Nixon South Vietnamese government lasted for Our airpower did not fail us; it was the de-
achieved with airpower stemmed from his a few more years. cision makers. And if I am unsurprisingly
pursuit of positive and negative political critical of those decision makers, I offer no
objectives that differed significantly from Legacies of Airpower in Vietnam apology. My conscience and my professional
those of his predecessor. Nixon had no In the final analysis, several legacies record both stand clear. Just as I believe
illusions about pursuing a stable, inde- emerged from airpower’s ordeal in unequivocally that the civilian authority
pendent, noncommunist South Vietnam; Vietnam. The dismal lack of unity of is supreme under our Constitution, so I
the shock of the 1968 Tet Offensive command displayed there spurred hold it reasonable that, once committed,
turned American public opinion against development of the joint force air com- the political leadership should seek and,
the war and made leaving Vietnam the ponent commander concept, in which a in the main, heed the advice of military
new positive goal. Although he labeled single air commander directs the flying professionals in the conduct of military
that objective “peace with honor,” in the activities of multiple Services to achieve operations.46
end Nixon accepted a settlement that objectives sought by the joint force
offered South Vietnam a possibility of commander. In terms of Air Force doc- Many American Airmen from the war
survival, not a guarantee. He gave South trine, Linebacker II’s perceived success likely agreed with Sharp’s critique.
Vietnamese President Thieu an ultima- in compelling the North Vietnamese Operation Rolling Thunder high-
tum to accept that agreement, noting to negotiate reinforced the belief that lighted how negative political objectives
that without Thieu’s approval the U.S. airpower could achieve political goals could limit an air campaign. Indeed,
Congress would likely cut off all funding cheaply and efficiently. The 1984 in the American air offensives waged
to South Vietnam. Whether Linebacker edition of the Air Force’s Basic Doctrine since Vietnam—to include the use of
II persuaded Thieu that he could count Manual noted: unmanned aerial vehicles against “high-
on Nixon for support after the signing of value” terrorist targets—negative goals
the Paris Peace Accords remains a matter unless offensive action is initiated, military have continued to constrain the use of
for conjecture; the agreement that Thieu victory is seldom possible. . . . Aerospace military force. Projecting a sound image
reluctantly endorsed in January 1973 forces possess a capability to seize the of- while applying airpower was difficult
differed little from what Kissinger had fensive and can be employed rapidly and enough for American leaders in Vietnam;
negotiated in October 1972. directly against enemy targets. Aerospace today’s leaders must contend with 24/7
Nixon’s lack of negative political forces have the power to penetrate to the news coverage as well as social media
goals enabled him to apply airpower heart of an enemy’s strength without first accounts that enable virtually anyone to
more aggressively than Johnson. With no defeating defending forces in detail.44 spin a story and reach a large audience.
conflicting loyalties to a domestic agenda In the limited wars that the Nation will
like Johnson, and with détente effectively The manual further encouraged air fight, negative objectives will always be
removing China and the Soviet Union commanders to conduct strategic present, and those objectives will produce
from the equation, Nixon had mainly to attacks against “heartland targets” that ROE that limit airpower. “War is always
worry about the compressed time that would “produce benefits beyond the going to have restrictions—it’s never
Congress gave him to achieve a settle- proportion of effort expended and costs going to be [Curtis] LeMay saying ‘Just
ment. Nixon knew that his image would involved,” but cautioned that such bomb them,’” stated General Myers, the
suffer because of the intensified bombing attacks could “be limited by overrid- most recent Air Force Chairman of the
and was willing to accept that tarnishing, ing political concerns, the intensity of Joint Chiefs of Staff.47 Against insurgent
though he did not condone indiscrimi- enemy defenses, or more pressing needs enemies, the negative objectives may well
nate attacks. The 20,000 tons of bombs on the battlefield.”45 eclipse the positive goals sought. When
dropped in Linebacker II killed 1,623 The impact of such “overriding that occurs, kinetic airpower’s ability to
civilians, according to North Vietnamese political concerns” on the application of yield success will be uncertain.
figures—an incredibly low total for the airpower is a key legacy of the air wars Yet because airpower, as a subset of
tonnage dropped.42 Yet in all likelihood, in Vietnam. To commanders who had war, is not only a political instrument
the comparatively unrestrained, nonstop fought as junior officers in World War II, but also one that is applied by humans,
aerial pounding that the NVA received in where virtually no negative objectives lim- it will be subject to the whims and frail-
South Vietnam counted as much, if not ited military force, the tight controls that ties of the political leader who chooses
more, than Nixon’s focused bombing President Johnson placed on bombing to rely on it. Richard Nixon saw himself
of the North. The attacks in the South North Vietnam chafed those charged with as a Patton-esque figure who could
directly threatened the NVA’s survival, wielding the air weapon. Navy Admiral swiftly and efficiently brandish military
and without that force on Southern soil, U.S. Grant Sharp, who directed Rolling force to achieve his aims. He felt little
the North faced a more difficult path Thunder as the commander of U.S. Pacific compunction in berating his air com-
conquering South Vietnam.43 Ultimately, Command, wrote in the preface of his manders or—in the case of General
airpower helped to assure that a flawed 1977 memoir Strategy for Defeat: Lavelle—casting one adrift when he

JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015 Clodfelter 121

 air wars in Vietnam is the one that applies
Two U.S. Navy Douglas A-7B
to any military strategy—uncertainty,
Corsair II from attack squadron chance, danger, and stress will be certain
VA-25 during 1969 Ironhand to limit it. JFQ
mission over North Vietnam
(U.S. Navy) This article was originally presented
as a lecture at the Royal Australian
Air Force’s airpower conference in
Canberra, Australia, March 2014,
and appears as a chapter in the con-
ference proceedings A Century of
Military Aviation 1914–2014, edited
by Keith Brent (RAAF Air Power
Development Centre, 2015).

Notes
1
Raphael Littauer and Norman Uphoff,
eds., The Air War in Indochina (Boston:
Beacon Press, 1972), 11, 168–172; and Earl H.
Tilford, Jr., Crosswinds: The Air Force’s Setup in
Vietnam (College Station: Texas A&M Univer-
sity Press, 1993), 109.
2
U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970s: Shaping
a Durable Peace—A Report to the Congress by
Richard Nixon, President of the United States,
thought that doing so might save him with thoughtful solemnness—with the re- May 3, 1973 (Washington, DC: U.S. Gov-
embarrassment. Nixon believed that alization that innocent people, along with ernment Printing Office, 1973), 59. Nixon
airpower gave him the ideal military combatants, will get hurt.49 commented about the Paris Peace Agreement:
tool for threatening an opponent or “While our essential principles were met, we
and the Communists had to make compro-
persuading an ally, and that perspective Were he alive today, the Prussian mises. Many of these were more significant for
has gained traction since he left the military philosopher Carl von Clausewitz our ally than for us. . . . Our friends have every
White House. The last four occupants would doubtless nod in agreement at opportunity to demonstrate their inherent
of the Oval Office, to include President General Myers’s observation. strength.” Two months earlier the President
Barack Obama, have all relied heavily But Clausewitz never saw an airplane; had told Alexander Haig: “The country would
care if South Vietnam became Communist in
on airpower in the conflicts they have if he had, though, his airpower notions a matter of six months. They would not give
fought. The positive goals pursued— would likely have been unsurprising. a damn if it’s in two years.” See Tape Subject
“stability,” “security,” and, on occasion, Had he examined America’s air wars in Log, Conversation 416-43, Nixon Presidential
“democracy”—have proved difficult Vietnam, he would certainly have com- Library and Museum, March 17, 1973 (hereaf-
to achieve with any military force, mented about the difficulty of achieving ter, Nixon Presidential Library).
3
Doris Kearns Goodwin, Lyndon Johnson
particularly with airpower. Its siren political objectives in a limited war. In and the American Dream (New York: Signet,
song is an enticing one, however, as all probability, he would have looked at 1976), 263.
Johns Hopkins Professor Eliot Cohen President Johnson’s Tuesday lunch–tar- 4
“Meeting with Foreign Policy Advisors on
has astutely observed, “Airpower is an geting process, the Route Package system Vietnam,” August 18, 1967, Meeting Notes
unusually seductive form of military dividing North Vietnamese airspace, the File, Box 1, Lyndon Baines Johnson Presi-
dential Library (hereafter, Johnson Library);
strength, in part because, like modern creation of free fire zones in the South, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Analysis of
courtship, it appears to offer gratifica- Nixon’s condemnation of his air com- Effectiveness of Interdiction in Southeast Asia,
tion without commitment.”48 That manders and dismissal of General Lavelle, Second Progress Report, May 1966, Air Force
promise is a dangerous one, as General the repetitive B-52 routing for Linebacker Historical Research Agency (hereafter, AF-
Myers warns: II, and any number of other elements HRA), file K168.187-21, 7. Robert McNamara
acknowledged in 1967 that communist forces
of the U.S. experience in Vietnam fought an average of 1 day in 30 and that they
The last thing that we want is for the po- and stated simply: “Friction rules.” needed 15 tons of supplies daily from external
litical leadership to think war is too easy, “Everything in strategy is very simple,” sources. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had estimated
especially in terms of casualties. It’s awful; Clausewitz wrote, “but that does not in August 1965 that the enemy needed 13 tons
it’s horrible, but sometimes it’s necessary. mean that everything is very easy.”50 per day of “external logistical support.” See
U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed
[The decision for war] needs to be taken Perhaps the most enduring legacy of the

122  Recall / The Air Wars in Vietnam and Their Legacies JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015
Services, Preparedness Investigating Subcom- 10
U.S. Air Force Oral History interview strongholds . . . virtually uninhabited by
mittee, Air War against North Vietnam, 90th of Major General Robert N. Ginsburgh by noncombatants” where any identified activity
Cong., 1st sess., August 25, 1967, pt. 4, 299; Colonel John E. Van Duyn and Major Richard was presumed to stem from enemy forces and
and Annex A to JCSM 613-65, August 27, B. Clement, May 26, 1971, AFHRA, file was thus susceptible to immediate air or artil-
1965, National Security Files (hereafter, NSF), K239.0512-477, 65–68; and interview of Lieu- lery strikes. See Sean A. Kelleher, “Free Fire
Country File: Vietnam, Folder 2 EE, Box tenant Colonel William H. Greenhalgh by the Zones,” in Dictionary of the Vietnam War, ed.
75, Johnson Library. The standard military author, Maxwell Air Force Base, May 17, 1985. James S. Olson (Westport: Greenwood, 1988),
2½-ton truck could transport 5 tons of goods 11
U.S. Air Force Oral History interview of 163.
over roads and 2½ tons overland. Regarding Lieutenant General Joseph H. Moore by Major 16
Interview of General Richard Myers by
North Vietnam’s import capacity, see Walt Samuel E. Riddlebarger and Lieutenant Colo- the author, National Defense University, No-
Rostow to the President, May 6, 1967, NSF, nel Valentino Castellina, November 22, 1969, vember 26, 2013.
Country File: Vietnam, Folder 2EE, Box 75, AFHRA, file K239.0512-241, 17–18. 17
John Schlight, The United States Air
Johnson Library; and The Pentagon Papers: The 12
Robert L. Gallucci, Neither Peace nor Force in Southeast Asia: The War in South
Defense Department History of United States Honor: The Politics of American Military Policy Vietnam: The Years of the Offensive 1965–1968
Decisionmaking on Vietnam, The Senator Gravel in Viet-Nam (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History,
Edition, 5 vols. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), University Press, 1975), 80–84; Littauer and 1988), 82.
4: 146. Uphoff, 38. In July 1966, after a span of poor 18
Earl H. Tilford, Jr., Setup: What the Air
5
Guenter Lewy, America in Vietnam (New weather obscured targets over the North, Sev- Force Did and Why in Vietnam (Maxwell Air
York: Oxford University Press, 1978), 309. enth Air Force Commander General William C. Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1991),
6
Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History (New Momyer ordered his fighter pilots not to fly and 196. The secret bombing deposited 120,578
York: Penguin Books, 1997), 455–456, 672, called for ground crews to perform preventive tons of bombs on Cambodian soil. See Carl
675. maintenance on the aircraft. A message then Berger, ed., The United States Air Force in
7
National Security Action Memorandum arrived from the Pentagon telling Momyer to Southeast Asia, 1961–1973: An Illustrated Ac-
328, April 6, 1965, NSF, Boxes 1–9, Johnson fly to prevent the Navy from achieving a higher count (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force
Library. sortie count. See Greenhalgh interview, May History, 1984), 141.
8
Memorandum, McNamara for the Presi- 17, 1985. 19
Tilford, 194; and Richard Nixon, RN:
dent, July 28, 1965, NSF, National Security 13
Interview by the author of a Navy A-4 The Memoirs of Richard Nixon, 2 vols. (New
Council History, “Deployment of Major U.S. pilot who wished to remain anonymous. York: Warner Books, 1978), 1: 472.
Forces to Vietnam, July 1965,” Vol. 1, Box 40, 14
Air Force Colonel Jack Broughton, a 20
By May 1972, only 69,000 American
Johnson Library. veteran F-105 pilot, called North Vietnam “the troops remained in Vietnam, and most of them
9
David C. Humphrey, “Tuesday Lunch center of hell with Hanoi as its hub.” See Jack were not in combat units.
at the Johnson White House: A Preliminary Broughton, Thud Ridge (New York: Bantam 21
Hanoi’s communist party newspaper
Assessment,” Diplomatic History 8 (Winter Books, 1969), 24. Nhan Dan described China and the Soviet
1984), 90. 15
Free fire zones were “known enemy Union’s policy of détente as “throwing a life-

U.S. Air Force F-5 aircraft refueling from KC-135 tanker before bombing
Viet Cong position (U.S. Air Force photo)

JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015 Clodfelter 123

buoy to a drowning pirate . . . in order to serve 28
“Conversation Among President Nixon University of Virginia, available at <http://
one’s narrow national interests.” See Nhan et al.,” 74–75. whitehousetapes.net/clips/1972_0803_viet-
Dan editorial, August 17, 1972, in Gareth Por- 29
“Memorandum for the President from nam/index.htm>.
ter, ed., Vietnam: The Definitive Documentation Henry A. Kissinger, Subject: Secretary Laird’s 36
Nixon, RN, 2: 242.
of Human Decisions, 2 vols. (Stanfordville, NY: Daily Report on Southeast Asia Situation,” 37
Interview of Colonel Clyde E. Boden-
Earl M. Coleman, 1979), 2: 568. February 8, 1972; Folder: Vietnam, January– heimer by the author, January 7, 1983, Max-
22
“Conversation Among President Nixon, February 1972 (2 of 3); Box 158, National Se- well Air Force Base.
the President’s Assistant for National Security curity Council Files, Nixon Presidential Library. 38
Kissinger, White House Years, 1457–
Affairs (Kissinger), and the Ambassador to Emphasis in original. 1458; and Nixon, RN, 2: 250.
South Vietnam (Bunker),” Washington, DC, 30
“Meeting between Henry Kissinger and 39
Charles W. Colson, Born Again (Grand
February 3, 1972, in Foreign Relations of the the President,” June 14, 1972, Oval Office, Rapids, MI: Chosen Books, 1976), 78.
United States, 1969–1976, Vol. VIII: Vietnam, WHT Reference Cassette, C-2240 RC-2, 733- 40
See, for example, “What Admiral Moorer
January–October 1972 (Washington, DC: U.S. 6, Nixon Presidential Library. Really Said About Airpower’s Effectiveness in
Government Printing Office, 2010), 71–78. 31
“Transcript of the President’s News Con- SEA,” Air Force Magazine, November 1973,
23
In addition to agreeing not to fire on ference Emphasizing Domestic Matters,” New 25; Howard Silber, “SAC Chief: B-52s Devas-
American reconnaissance aircraft in return for York Times, June 23, 1972. tated Viet Air Defenses,” Omaha World Herald,
a bombing halt, North Vietnamese negotiators 32
“Transcript of President Nixon’s News February 25, 1973; U.S. Air Force Oral His-
also seemingly agreed that their forces would Conference Emphasizing Foreign Affairs,” New tory Interview of Lieutenant General Gerald W.
not move men and supplies across the DMZ or York Times, June 30, 1972. Johnson by Charles K. Hopkins, April 3, 1973,
fire on major South Vietnamese cities. President 33
Quoted in Seymour M. Hersh, The Price Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, AFHRA, file
Johnson was convinced that North Vietnamese of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White House K239.0512-831, 11–13; U.S. Air Force Oral
subscribed to the “agreement.” He wrote in his (New York: Summit Books, 1983), 506. History Interview of General John W. Vogt by
memoirs: “Before I made my decision [to halt 34
“Memorandum for Henry Kissinger and Lieutenant Colonel Arthur W. McCants, Jr.,
the bombing], I wanted to be absolutely certain Al Haig from the President,” May 19, 1972, and Dr. James C. Hasdorff, August 8–9, 1978,
that Hanoi understood our position. . . . Our White House Special Files, Staff Member and AFHRA, file K239.0512-1093, 69; U.S. Grant
negotiators reported that the North Vietnam- Office Files, President’s Personal File, Box Sharp, Strategy for Defeat: Vietnam in Retro-
ese would give no flat guarantees; that was in 4, “Memo—May 1972,” Nixon Presidential spect (San Rafael, CA: Presidio Press, 1978),
keeping with their stand that the bombing had Library. Emphasis in original. 252, 255, 272; and William W. Momyer,
to be stopped without conditions. But they had 35
Nixon expressed this commitment to Airpower in Three Wars (Washington, DC: U.S.
told us if we stopped the bombing, they would Thieu in a letter dated January 5, 1973, and Government Printing Office, 1978), 339.
‘know what to do.’ [American negotiators] sent Alexander Haig to Saigon in the middle of 41
Richard M. Nixon, statement on NBC’s
were confident Hanoi knew precisely what we the month to convey the President’s commit- Meet the Press, April 10, 1988.
meant and would avoid the actions that we had ment personally. See Nixon, RN, 2: 245–246; 42
Murray Marder, “North Vietnam: Taking
warned them would imperil a bombing halt.” and Henry A. Kissinger, White House Years Pride in Punishment,” Washington Post, Febru-
Lyndon Baines Johnson, The Vantage Point: (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), 1459–1462, ary 4, 1973.
Perspectives of the Presidency, 1963–1969 (New 1469. Yet in forthright conversation with 43
Observed General Tran Van Tra, com-
York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1971), 518. Kissinger during an intense phase of the mander of communist forces in the southern
24
Aloysius Casey and Patrick Casey, Paris negotiations, Nixon confessed, “Let’s be half of South Vietnam, after having undergone
“Lavelle, Nixon, and the White House Tapes,” perfectly cold-blooded about it. If you look at 9 months of continual bombing: “Our cadres
Air Force Magazine, February 2007, 87. it from the standpoint of our game with the and men were fatigued, we had not had time to
25
Ibid. Soviets and the Chinese, from the standpoint of make up for our losses, all units were in disar-
26
Quoted in ibid. In a 2007 letter to the running this country, I think we could take, in ray, there was a lack of manpower, and there
editor of Air Force Magazine, Melvin Laird my view, almost anything, frankly, that we can were shortages of food and ammunition. . . .
stated, “It was certainly true that in my meet- force on Thieu. Almost anything. I just come The troops were no longer capable of fighting.”
ings with Gen. John Lavelle I told him that my down to that. You know what I mean? Because Tran Van Tra, Concluding the 30-Years War
order on ‘protective reaction’ should be viewed I have a feeling we would not be doing, like I (Ho Chi Minh City, 1982 [in Vietnamese];
liberally. . . . Prior to my order, there was no feel about the Israeli[s], I feel that in the long reprint ed. [in English], Arlington, VA: Joint
authorization (under McNamara or [Secretary run we’re probably not doing them an in—uh Publications Research Service, 1983), 33;
of Defense Clark] Clifford) to destroy danger- . . . a disfavor due to the fact that I feel that the quoted in Gabriel Kolko, Anatomy of a War:
ous targets except when fired upon without North Vietnamese are so badly hurt that the Vietnam, the United States, and the Modern His-
special permission. Gen. Bus Wheeler [Moor- South Vietnamese are probably going to do torical Experience (New York: Pantheon Books,
er’s predecessor as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs fairly well. But also due to the fact—because 1985), 444–445.
of Staff], Adm. Tom Moorer, and Gen Abrams I look at the tide of history out there, South 44
Air Force Manual 1-1, Basic Aerospace
all agreed with the liberal interpretation on my Vietnam is never going to survive anyway. I’m Doctrine of the United States Air Force (Wash-
order on protective reaction. The new orders just being perfectly candid.” The conversation ington, DC: Headquarters U.S. Air Force,
permitted hitting anti-aircraft installations and continued, with Kissinger concluding, “So March 16, 1984), 2–6.
other dangerous targets if spotted on their mis- we’ve got to find some formula that holds the 45
Ibid., 2–12.
sions, whether they were activated or not.” See thing together for a year or two, after which— 46
Sharp, xvii.
Melvin R. Laird, “Letter to the Editor,” Air after a year, Mr. President, Vietnam will be a 47
Myers interview, November 26, 2013.
Force Magazine, May 2007, 4. backwater. If we settle it, say, this October, 48
Eliot A. Cohen, “The Mystique of U.S.
27
“Minutes of a Senior Review Group by January ’74 no one will give a damn.” See Airpower,” Foreign Affairs 73 (January–Febru-
Meeting, Subject: Vietnam Assessment,” Wash- “Conversation between President Richard Nix- ary 1994), 109.
ington, DC, January 24, 1972, Foreign Rela- on and Henry Kissinger,” Conversation 760-6, 49
Myers interview, November 26, 2013.
tions of the United States, 1969–1976, Vol. VIII August 3, 1972, Richard Nixon Presidential 50
Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Materials Project, NARA, Presidential Record- trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princ-
Office, 2010), 25. ings Program, Miller Center of Public Affairs, eton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 178.

124  Recall / The Air Wars in Vietnam and Their Legacies JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015
 This book is the definitive history Once formed, training for the 15th New
of the 369th Regiment in World War I, York National Guard Regiment was dif-
an outstanding black infantry regiment ficult for a number of reasons, most of
comprised of 3,000 men led by a white them racial.
command element. It is the most com- Black political and social leaders
plete, scholarly, and fully documented including W.E.B. Du Bois thought there
account of this famous (and underpub- was a positive correlation between serving
licized) unit, unlikely to be superseded. as uniformed soldiers and possessing full
The authors, both prominent historians, citizenship. Why they believed they could
are renowned experts in their fields. improve the situation of black Americans
Sammons and Morrow tell the through military service is difficult to
complete story of the 369th—a combat understand. A dearth of both recognition
unit that grew out of the 15th New York and reward defined the service of black
National Guard Regiment—from the soldiers during the Civil War, in which
bigotry that black leaders initially had to nearly 40,000 died, the Indian Wars,
overcome to create the unit and the her- in which they comprised a far greater
culean efforts required to convince both proportion of the Army than they did
New York city and state politicians hostile the U.S. population in general, and the
to the idea of an all-black unit to their Spanish-American War, during which
valiant service in France and their ulti- all four historic black regiments fought.
mately humiliating return to the United These black leaders struggled continually
States after having spent more time in the to convince the War Department and
Harlem’s Rattlers and the Great trenches that any other U.S. combat unit. U.S. Government to establish black in-
War: The Undaunted 369th The book also examines the postwar trib- fantry units and to permit blacks to serve
Regiment and the African ulations of the 369th and contains several in combat. Even men as sophisticated
American Quest for Equality epilogues that detail the unit’s combat as Du Bois, however, underestimated
losses, postwar histories of the key officers the depth of bigotry in the country;
By Jeffrey T. Sammons and John H.
and men, and unfortunate lives of two of there would be no rewards for the black
Morrow, Jr.
the unit’s most famous warriors: Henry soldiers for their service in World War I.
University Press of Kansas, 2014
Johnson, who, nearly 100 years after the In fact, following the end of the conflict,
616 pp. $34.95
war’s end, is under consideration to re- political and social conditions for black
ISBN: 978-0700619573
ceive the Congressional Medal of Honor, civilians were worse than they had been
Reviewed by Alan L. Gropman and Neadom Roberts. prior to its outbreak.
Why the title Harlem’s Rattlers? Training for the 369th was to have
That was what the men called them- been completed in Spartanburg, South
n 1903, W.E.B. Du Bois, the selves—not “Men of Bronze” or Carolina, prior to the soldiers’ depar-

I eminent American sociologist,

scholar, and leader, wrote that “the
problem of the twentieth century is
“Harlem’s Hellfighters,” terms often
used incorrectly in other histories of
the unit. The men of the 369th thought
ture for the frontlines in France. Racist
treatment of the soldiers by the city’s
inhabitants, however, nearly provoked an
the problem of the color-line.” Recent of the rattlesnake as a symbol of power armed attack on Spartanburg by the unit,
events in Ferguson, Missouri; Staten (like the Gadsden flag used during the forcing the War Department to send the
Island, New York; Cleveland, Ohio; Revolutionary War that depicted a coiled 369th overseas without having been fully
and North Charleston, South Carolina snake atop the words “Don’t Tread trained. Once in France, the American
should make us realize that, despite on Me!”). This and many of the other Expeditionary Force commanders did
America’s recent racial progress, the myths associated with the 369th are not want to attach the 369th to any U.S.
problem of the 21st century is still the rewritten by the authors, bringing truth- division and instead assigned them to a
color-line. Harlem’s Rattlers lays bare fulness and clarity to a story that has long French division. The performance of the
the bigotry that African-American been riddled with inaccuracies. 369th in combat was distinguished, and
citizens faced in the early 20th century The authors devote approximately the men of the unit were highly praised
and, more importantly, details the one-fifth of the book to describing the by their French commanders for their de-
innumerable accomplishments by domestic political issues within both the termination, cohesion, high morale, and
black American soldiers despite the New York state and the federal govern- fighting capability. Despite this, when the
racism propagated by the President of ments, as well as the turbulent conflict U.S. Army Chief of Staff asked the Army
the United States, U.S. military, and within the black community, over the War College in 1924 to make recom-
bigoted American civilians. formation of an all-black combat unit. mendations regarding future racial policy,

JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015 Book Reviews 125

the authors of the study disregarded the his words, “the private sector equivalent
heroism of the 369th and produced a of combat arms.” As he notes, the most
document that was blatant in its racism. disturbing aspect of the Pentagon’s
The chief was advised to maintain increasing reliance on contractors is “the
racial segregation and to ensure that all- decision to outsource lethal force.” He
black fighting units were commanded by places these companies in two categories.
whites. The study concluded, incorrectly, Those that directly apply military force
that blacks believed themselves to be are “mercenaries,” while those that train
inferior to whites and that they were “by others to do so are “enterprisers.” These
nature” subservient, lacking “initiative categories represent two distinct mar-
and resourcefulness” because, as stated kets. Mercenaries exist as a free market
in the report, “[t]he cranial cavity of the in which each individual sells his or her
Negro is smaller than the white; his brain services directly to the buyer, offering
weighs 35 ounces contrasted with 45 for the means of war to anyone who can
the white.” Most damning, however, was afford it. Enterprisers represent a medi-
the illogical argument that “[i]n physical ated market in which the company is an
courage . . . the American Negro falls well arbitrator between the individual and the
back of the white man and possibly be- buyer. Essentially, the company recruits
hind all other races.” This statement flew and organizes personnel to fulfill specific
in the face of the numerous black soldiers mission/contract requirements as defined
who had served with honor in the Civil by the buyer. For good business reasons,
War, Indians Wars, and Spanish-American enterprisers are more discriminating in
War and were awarded congressional The Modern Mercenary: both the clients and tasks they accept.
medals of honor in recognition of their Private Armies and What Unfortunately, if business demands, en-
courage and valor. (No medals of honor They Mean for World Order terprisers can easily slip to the mercenary
were awarded during the 20th century for side of the scale.
By Sean McFate
World War I.) The report was prepared McFate does not see mercenaries
Oxford University Press, 2014
by the entire student body and faculty at and enterprisers in the same light. Using
235 pp. $29.95
the Army War College in 1924 and 1925 Somalia as a case study, he argues that
ISBN: 978-0199360109
with nine additional iterations appearing free market mercenaries are likely to
prior to the start of World War II; the Reviewed by T.X. Hammes contribute to increased instability and will
same racist notions were included in each not improve a state’s chances of success.
report. The United States in general— In contrast, enterprisers offer a state an
and the U.S. Army in particular—paid t their peak, contractors com- opportunity for success. He uses Liberia
a steep price for allowing the country’s
deeply entrenched racism to define—and
limit—the use of a courageous, deter-
A prised more than 50 percent
of U.S. personnel in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Furthermore, despite
as a case study where, as a DynCorp
employee, he participated in raising and
training the new Liberian army. However,
mined, and highly capable fighting force complaints about contractor perfor- his argument for enterprisers is weak-
in World War II. mance, the Pentagon has stated that ened by the lack of success in Iraq and
Harlem’s Rattlers is a soundly re- contractors will make up half of any Afghanistan despite the presence of doz-
searched and documented history that future U.S. force deployments. Why? ens, if not hundreds, of enterprisers.
all Americans—and especially military Because they work. This reality requires In one of the most interesting aspects
officers—should read. JFQ defense professionals to seek a deeper of this intriguing work, McFate applies
understanding of what contractors the concept of neo-medievalism—the
do and the implications for future belief that the world is becoming
Dr. Alan L. Gropman is Professor Emeritus in conflict—making Sean McFate’s The increasingly non–state-centric and mul-
the Dwight D. Eisenhower School for National
Security and Resources Strategy at the National Modern Mercenary a very timely book. tipolar—to describe the emerging global
Defense University. In it, he not only carefully examines security environment. While states will
contractors, but also describes the remain major players, overlapping au-
changing international environment in thorities and allegiances will have major
which they will operate. impacts on how and why wars are fought
McFate does not claim his book and who fights them.
covers all aspects of contracting. Rather, In this environment, McFate states,
he focuses on the most controversial ele- “the private military industry has a bright
ment: private military companies or, in future. This multi-billion-dollar industry

126  Book Reviews JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015

will not simply evaporate once the United Department policy indicates he is—any
States withdraws from overseas deploy- U.S. forces deployed overseas must
ments such as Afghanistan. In fact, the expect to work with, and perhaps fight
opposite will occur: contractors will help against, armed contractors. It is a subject
fill the security vacuum left by US forces. that requires our professional attention,
. . . Already, private military companies of and The Modern Mercenary is a great
all stripes are seeking new opportunities place to start. JFQ
in conflict zones in Africa, the Middle
East, and Latin America.” He notes
four trends that are driving this global Dr. T.X. Hammes is a Distinguished Research
Fellow in the Center for Strategic Research,
expansion. First, private companies are Institute for National Strategic Studies, at the
resilient and strive to grow. They will be National Defense University.
assisted in that growth by the next two
trends: globalization and indigenization.
Globalization is driving military con-
tracting to seek overseas markets. At the
same time, the numerous third country
nationals who were hired by U.S. firms in
Iraq and Afghanistan will take their new
business and technical skills home and
indigenize the market. Finally, the market
will bifurcate into two major categories:
mediated and free-market segments. Meeting China Halfway:
McFate’s meticulously researched How to Defuse the Emerging
and well-presented work concludes that U.S.-China Rivalry
“private military actors worsen security
By Lyle J. Goldstein
in a free market such as Somalia but
Georgetown University Press, 2015
increase it in a mediated market such
400 pp. $29.95
as Liberia and under the right market
ISBN: 978-1626161603
conditions could even prove a powerful
tool for the United Nations and oth- Reviewed by Christopher Nelson
ers.” This reviewer found McFate’s two
categories useful, but they understate
the complexities of modern military con- hina is on the minds of many
tracting. The reader must understand
that McFate is really describing a spec-
trum from pure individual mercenary to
C today. In fact, an informal term
has been coined for the group of
scholars and defense officials who spend
major corporate enterpriser. most of their waking hours thinking,
McFate concludes by cautioning talking, and writing about China. They
that the: are so-called China Watchers. In no
other foreign policy realm is a similar
United States has limited regulation of term used with such frequency. This
and oversight over the private military alone should give everyone pause.
industry despite employing it widely. This Watching for what, exactly?
creates opportunities for abuse by contac- With “watchers” there comes read-
tors as firms subtly steer client decisions in ers. There is an unending stream of
favor of profit over policy goals, altering books and magazine articles on China.
strategic outcomes in the process. The objec- Of course, this is both frustrating and
tives of [private military companies] and promising. It is frustrating because there
their clients will differ, just as those of the are too many books to choose from;
condottieri and the provveditori did in the many of us simply do not have the time
Middle Ages. to read, let alone to think about many of
these issues. It is promising because with
If he is right about the growth of mili- more minds turned to the challenges
tary contracting—and current Defense and opportunities of a rising China,

JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015 Book Reviews 127

statistically one hopes, good ideas and least 50 policy recommendations tied to by one set of rules, but China, on the
solutions will surface. cooperation spirals. other hand, desires a region that abides
Policy books on China generally fall Take, for example, the current by another.
into one of two categories. First, there U.S.-China hot topic issue: the South Goldstein has written a book that is
is the realist camp, which is occupied China Sea. In the chapter titled “The ambitious and is one of few China policy
by authors and officials who believe the New ‘Fulda Gap,’” Goldstein acknowl- books arguing for a conciliatory way
United States should engage China on edges that the South China Sea is the forward in this tense and possibly deadly
issues of mutual concern (for example, region with the “greatest arena of game of brinksmanship. Regardless if
humanitarian assistance/disaster relief contention.” He then offers 10 policy you agree with Goldstein’s arguments
and antipiracy operations), yet at the recommendations—5 for the U.S. and or prescriptions, any China Watcher will
same time ensure the U.S. military, 5 for China—to stabilize the region. He get something out of his close reading of
particularly the U.S. Navy, is prepared, begins with the United States allowing Chinese and English policy and military
armed, and equipped to defeat Chinese the Chinese to participate in Cooperation documents. To his credit, Goldstein notes
aggression if necessary. At the heart of the Afloat Readiness and Training exer- that there are voices in China that are not
realist opinion is the belief that humanity cises. Following this, the Chinese could monolithic and xenophobic. To believe
is inherently competitive and nonbe- propose a joint counterpiracy patrol in in an inevitable fight between the United
nevolent and that conciliatory gestures the Strait of Malacca. Next, the United States and China is fatalistic. Rather, one
will only weaken one’s national security. States should propose a Southeast Asia should read Goldstein’s work with both
Aaron Friedberg’s book The Contest for coast guard forum, and then the Chinese an open mind and healthy skepticism. JFQ
Supremacy falls somewhere in this de- should open the Hainan naval complex to
scription. The second type of policy book visits from the Association of Southeast
comes from the liberal internationalism Asian Nations. Goldstein also recom- Lieutenant Commander Christopher Nelson, USN,
is an Intelligence Officer and recent graduate
crowd. This view stresses that problems mends that the United States should of the U.S. Naval War College and Maritime
are better resolved in an international reduce its surveillance flights in parts of Advanced Warfighting School.
forum: a system composed of states in the South China Sea, and then China
which diplomacy reigns supreme and should clarify its island claims. Finally,
where bargains and compromise are he works his way up to the last of 10
the ultimate goals. Hugh White’s book policy prescriptions: the Chinese should
The China Choice: Why We Should Share end their military cooperation with
Power fits this description. the Philippines and Indonesia, and the
Lyle J. Goldstein, then, in his ambi- United States should then end its military
tious new book Meeting China Halfway cooperation with Vietnam. His book il-
continues where White leaves off. lustrates this back-and-forth quite nicely
Goldstein, a professor at the Chinese by using a graphic in each chapter show-
Maritime Studies Institute at the U.S. ing the cooperation spiral using arrows
Naval War College, and a fluent Chinese and text in English and in Chinese.
speaker and reader, takes White’s argu- Goldstein anticipates the criticism
ment for sharing power with China and that his book will generate. Namely he
expands on it, arguing that the United knows that there are plenty of critics who
States needs to develop “cooperation spi- will label his idea of cooperation spirals
rals.” With these spirals, Goldstein asserts, appeasement. These critics, of course, are
“trust and confidence are built over time coming from the more hawkish corners
through incremental and reciprocal steps of the U.S. Government, including the
that gradually lead to larger and more military. Yet a more pressing criticism is
significant compromises.” Goldstein that if U.S. and Chinese interests are so
then proceeds to take a host of issues that opposed then any conciliatory efforts
concern the United States and China— are meaningless. Even if China and the
Taiwan, the economy, the environment, United States accepted some provisions
the developing world, the Persian Spring, of Goldstein’s cooperation spiral, this
the Korean Peninsula, Southeast Asia, would not ensure greater security; it
and finally, India—and then applies a co- would only mean that both nations have
operation spiral to each. This adds up to found some common ground on issues
a healthy amount of policy prescriptions. that are at the periphery. The crux of the
By the end of the book Goldstein has matter still remains: The United States
provided, for the United States alone, at desires a region that behaves and abides

128  Book Reviews JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015

U.S. Air Force F-22 Raptor aircraft after conducting
airstrikes in Syria as part of large coalition to strike
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant targets, September
2014 (DOD/Jefferson S. Heiland)

Three Approaches to Center of

Gravity Analysis
The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
By Daniel J. Smith, Kelley Jeter, and Odin Westgaard

ince the establishment of the “This process cannot be taken lightly, COGs has been a point of contention

S center of gravity (COG) concept

as a fundamental planning factor
in joint military doctrine, its proper
since a faulty conclusion resulting
from a poor or hasty analysis can have
very serious consequences, such as the
and debate. Currently, the definition
of center of gravity and the process for
determining it are outlined in joint doc-
identification has been considered inability to achieve strategic and opera- trine, specifically in Joint Publication (JP)
crucial in successful attainment of tional objectives at an acceptable cost.”1 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the
desired objectives. Joint Publication Since its inception as a core plan- United States, JP 3-0, Joint Operations,
5-0, Joint Operation Planning, states, ning tenet, the process for determining and JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning,

JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015 Smith, Jeter, and Westgaard 129

as encompassed in the Joint Operation provides moral or physical strength, •• Step one: identify ends. The grand
Planning Process (JOPP) within those freedom of action, or will to act.”6 Eik- strategic objective is to win a cham-
publications. Speculation on proper meier’s proposed COG definition states pionship. Other strategic objectives
COG determination has given rise to that “the center of gravity is the primary are winning games or winning a divi-
other COG methodologies, which have entity that possesses the inherent capa- sion. Operational objectives are to
both questioned and challenged estab- bility to achieve the objective.”7 With score touchdowns. Tactical objectives
lished doctrine for COG determination. this COG specificity, Eikmeier’s method are scoring first downs.
Therefore, the objective of this article is is comprised of six steps:8 •• Step two: the ways (critical capabili-
to compare and contrast different COG ties) to achieve the endstate, which
•• Identify the desired ends or
determination methodologies to reveal are expressed as verbs. Strategically,
objectives.
strengths and weaknesses of each and they would include assembling a
•• Identify the ways to achieve the ends,
ultimately to make recommendations for winning team, recruiting/retain-
and select the one that evidence sug-
changes to joint doctrine. To accomplish ing the right players, emplacing/
gests is most likely to work. (Ways
this objective, three different COG substituting the right players, calling
are actions, so they are expressed as
methodologies are applied to the cur- the right plays, and making the
verbs.) Then select the most elemen-
rent Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant right calls. Strategically, the types
tal or essential action—that selection
(ISIL)2 problem set: Dale C. Eikmeier’s of offense that coaches employ and
is the critical capability. The ways are
COG determination method, James P. their decisionmaking both determine
critical actions that will achieve the
Butler’s Godzilla COG methodology, operationally who will run, pass/
endstate. Critical capabilities (CC)
and the Critical Factors Analysis, outlined catch, block, kick, and so forth.
are the same verbs expressed in the
in the JOPP.3 Findings of the analyses will •• Step three: means (critical require-
ways; therefore, ways equal critical
be critically compared to produce recom- ments) required to accomplish the
capabilities.
mendations for changes in joint doctrine ways. Strategically, coaches and
•• List the means (critical requirements)
COG determination. their supporting staffs are the means
needed to enable and execute the
When ISIL initiated large-scale of- necessary to manage, organize,
ways (critical capabilities).
fensive operations into Iraq in early June train, and supply a football team.
•• Select from the list of means the
2014, it propelled itself onto the global Operationally, the means are, but are
entity (noun) that possesses the
stage. While other contemporary Islamic not limited to, adequate equipment,
innate way (CC) to tangibly achieve
militant groups have stated similar objec- practices, physical training facilities,
the end. This selection is the center
tives for establishing an Islamic caliphate,4 morale, and the players themselves.
of gravity.
ISIL is unique in that it has made sig- •• Step four: entity (noun) from the list
•• From the remaining items on the list,
nificant progress in pursuit of that goal of means that intrinsically possesses
select those that are critical for the
by seizing control of large amounts of the capabilities to achieve the ends.
execution of the critical capability,
territory in Iraq and Syria. With manning From the list, only the players can
which are the critical requirements.
estimated at around 20,000 to 31,500,5 run, pass, catch, and execute plays—
•• Complete the process by identifying
ISIL has been forcefully seizing territory they are the operational COG. The
those critical requirements vulnerable
in a conventional military fashion (while coaches possess the inherent capabil-
to adversary actions.
still sometimes employing contemporary ity to decide which players will play
insurgency-type tactics). In doing so, Once these steps are complete, the (run, pass, and so forth); therefore,
ISIL has been acquiring more sup- results of the COG analysis must pass the they are the strategic COG.
plies and sources of revenue to fuel its “does/uses” test; that is, the center of •• Step five: critical requirements essen-
operations. The following COG method- gravity is the means (critical requirement) tial for the centers of gravity to reach
ologies will not only explicate each one’s that has the intrinsic force necessary, the ends. These include recruiting,
structured processes, but also reveal other which “does” the action (critical capa- player placement, practices, fitness
essential variables in detail. bility), but it “uses” or requires other facilities/programs, and morale.
resources (means) to “do” the action. While these requirements are essen-
The Eikmeier COG Methodology An example is the game of football. (For tial, they are not centers of gravity.
Joint Publication 5-0 defines center simplicity’s sake, the example focuses only Coaches choose/insert players, and
of gravity as “a source of power that on offense.) players win games.
Now that we understand this meth-
odology, we apply it to determine ISIL’s
Major Daniel J. Smith, USA, is a Strategic Intelligence Officer currently serving as the Ground Force
Analysis Manager with the Technology Long-Range Analysis Division at the Defense Intelligence
center of gravity (figure 1).
Agency. Major Kelley Jeter, USAF, currently serves as a Public Affairs Officer at the Headquarters Step One: Identifying ISIL’s Ends.
U.S. Air Force press desk. Master Gunnery Sergeant Odin Westgaard, USMC, currently serves as a The group’s identified strategic objective
Sustainment Observer/Trainer in the Joint Staff J7.

130  Joint Doctrine / Three Approaches to COG Analysis JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015
since 2014 has been the establishment of
an Islamic caliphate in which it possesses Figure 1.
authority over Muslims worldwide and
aims to bring most Muslim-inhabited
regions of the world under its politi- STRAT COG- STRAT CCs- OP COG- OP CCs- OBJs (Ends)
Means that does Ways (verb) Means that Ways (verb)
cal control, beginning with the Levant CCs for OP COG do CCs Operational Strategic
region, which generally includes Syria,
Jordan, Israel, Palestine, Lebanon, Lead/Direct/Organize Maneuver

Cyprus, and part of southern Turkey.9 On Opposition

Defeated
June 29, 2014, ISIL declared the estab- Motivate/Influence Destroy/Neutralize

Land, Money,
lishment of a caliphate. Its current leader, ISIL ISIL Forces Oil secured
Leadership (Fighters)
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who has renamed
Seize
Govern
Abu Bakr Governance Islamic
himself Amir al-Mu’minin Caliph al-Baghdadi, emplaced State
inner circle, Occupy Caliphate
Ibrahim, was named as caliph.10 and combat
Sharia Rule
of Law
To accomplish this strategic objective, leaders
Enforce Commerce
the following operational objectives must Established
be successfully completed: Opposition in Fund
Susceptible
Syria and Iraq (military and civilian) must Recruit/Equip/Maintain
recruitment
be neutralized or destroyed.11 Land must population
CRs (other
be seized and secured within Syria and Baghdadi both
shapes and
Pay, personal gain, emigration, INS
Group mergers, thrills, no choice, critical means)
Iraq.12 Governance must be established uses ideology protection, social, religious, political

in conquered areas.13 Sharia law must be

established in conquered territory (this ISIL Military Money
ideology Equipment Resources
is implied as a caliphate requirement).
Adequate revenue to establish sufficient
commerce for governance and funding
must be gained and maintained (with oil
as the main resource).14
Step Two: Ways (CCs) Necessary for personnel carriers, antiaircraft nization or face the threat of severe
ISIL to Accomplish Objectives. weaponry, and various other rocket- consequences.20
launcher systems.17 •• Funding: ISIL funds itself through
•• Maneuver to conduct offensive
•• Leadership and leadership structure: the seizure of assets in conquered
operations
ISIL has a clear leader with a well- territory, the sale of oil on the black
•• destroy/neutralize opposition
structured cabinet and subordinate market, extortion, and external
•• ability to seize territory
leadership. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi support.21
•• ability to occupy seized lands
is the declared caliph, and he has a
•• enforce sharia law Step Four: Entities That Possess
cabinet of advisors that includes two
•• govern provinces, cities, and territory Distinctive Ways to Achieve Operational
deputy leaders, one for Iraq and one
•• fund operations and new governance and Strategic Ends. These selections
for Syria. There are also 12 local gov-
•• lead, direct, and organize ISIL are the respective centers of gravity. The
ernors with supporting staffs.18
•• motivate and influence ISIL recruit critical requirement that possesses the
•• Fighter morale/will to fight: Islamic
and maintain capable forces.15 capability to accomplish the identified
ideology is one morale factor that
objectives is the ISIL fighters themselves;
ISIL leadership uses for recruit-
Step Three: Means or Critical therefore, this army is ISIL’s operational
ment and for exploiting common
Requirements Necessary to Execute Ways center of gravity. However, it took
demographics and psychosociological
(Critical Capabilities). significant effort to mobilize the ISIL
factors found in many members of
army. ISIL leadership “does” the work
•• Adequate fighter strength: ISIL terrorist organizations.19 However,
of recruiting, organizing, governing, and
fighters are estimated to number ISIL leadership also lures recruits
continually motivating ISIL fighters and
around 20,000–31,500.16 with pay/housing incentives and
“uses” them to maneuver, defeat, seize, oc-
•• Military equipment: ISIL has protection. Some recruits are thrill-
cupy, and enforce as necessary for ISIL to
attained large amounts of assault seekers, while some join only for per-
accomplish its objectives. Therefore, Abu
rifles, machine guns, rocket-pro- sonal gain. Smaller insurgent groups
Bakr al-Baghdadi and his inner circle are
pelled grenades, surface-to-air mis- join ISIL as a merger of convenience.
the strategic center of gravity.
siles, other antiarmor weapons, artil- Tribes that have surrendered to ISIL
lery, tanks, light vehicles, armored are often compelled to join the orga-

JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015 Smith, Jeter, and Westgaard 131

 Two U.S. Air Force F-15E Strike Eagle aircraft fly over northern Iraq after conducting airstrikes
against ISIL targets in Syria (DOD/Matthew Bruch)

Step Five: Further Validates COG Iraq in 2010 and developed it into the Events such as these could also poten-
Selection. From the remaining items on formidable force that it is today.23 As tially increase friction and distrust in
the critical requirement list that are vital a kingdom requires a king, a caliphate leadership. Exploitation of these vulner-
for the execution of the critical capabili- requires a caliph, and al-Baghdadi estab- abilities could significantly damage ISIL’s
ties, the fighters “do” the operational lished himself as the first caliph. It is one centers of gravity.
work by “using” the other critical thing to need or employ an existing force; Eikmeier’s COG determination
requirements necessary, which were it is another thing to create it first. If ISIL methodology provides tangible centers
mostly seized by the fighters in the first becomes more firmly established and of gravity, which are determined through
place. The fighters themselves seized continues to be successful, the strategic a testable “does/uses” criteria. For the
more weapons and equipment for use center of gravity likely will shift toward its operational COG, identification of this
and did not attain enhanced capabilities revenue sources. Removing a key leader criterion is a more objective process than
as a result of prior government issuing. from a securely established entity prob- with identification of the strategic COG,
Furthermore, although ISIL has gained ably would not cause it to collapse, as but it is still testable under the criteria. If
greater capabilities, its fighters—infantry- a new leader would move in to take his the methodology is followed correctly,
men—are ISIL’s core strength. Military place; however, as of now, ISIL is still a COG identification likely would be more
equipment, money, and other resources nascent organization that requires astute consistent with its results, regardless of
cannot be employed, seized, or exploited leadership to hold it together.24 who applies the technique.
without ISIL fighters. The process concludes by identifying
ISIL leadership “does” the work those critical requirements vulnerable to Godzilla COG Methodology
to create, maintain, and lead its army, adversary actions. As the ISIL fighters Another alternative methodology that
and “uses” this army to accomplish its are the operational COG, various factors possesses testable criteria is Butler’s
objectives. If ISIL were already a state contribute to the filling of ISIL’s fighter Godzilla COG determination approach.
actor with an established government, ranks. The mergers of convenience The Godzilla methodology is relatively
military, and economy, its current leader- (personal/group survival and protec- simple. Butler essentially determines
ship would not qualify as the strategic tion) indicate that if more ideal options the overall strategic goal of the force to
center of gravity, according to Eikmeier.22 became available, fighters might consider be examined—friendly or enemy—and
However, ISIL is not a state actor. Abu renouncing ISIL. Disruption in revenue examines the objective that must be met
Bakr al-Baghdadi took the helm of the could hinder incentives to fight for ISIL, to achieve that goal. Once the opera-
moderately effective Islamic State in inciting reconsiderations of convictions.25 tional objective has been determined,

132  Joint Doctrine / Three Approaches to COG Analysis JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015
the critical strengths for achieving that
objective are identified. Next, these Figure 2.
strengths are removed and examined Center of Gravity Candidates (Identified Critical Strengths)

one at a time. The Godzilla methodol- ISIL leader removed ISIL Leader GODZILLA
ogy posits that one of these critical • Could slow momentum Seize
or even cause collapse Funding/resources Islamic State
strengths is the center of gravity. To • Could be replaced
land and
control Caliphate
Equipment
identify that center, as a critical strength • Remaining strengths people
is removed, the question then asked could still accomplish OBJs
NOT COG
is: can the objective still be achieved Funding sources removed
ISIL Leader
without this strength? If the answer • Would slow momentum
Seize
ISIL Leader • Can extort & steal Funding/resources
GODZILLA
land and Islamic State
is yes, that strength is not the center • Leader still has army and Equipment control Caliphate
of gravity. The strength is replaced Funding/ equipment to seize land people
(more resources) and control ISIL army
and another is removed, asking the Resources people
NOT COG
same question. Once we find the sole Equipment removed ISIL Leader
strength—the removal of which pre- Equipment • Did not originally have as Seize
Funding/resources
much equipment; gained it land and Islamic State
cludes the accomplishment of the objec- incrementally; funding could control Caliphate
ISIL Army Equipment GODZILLA
tive—the center of gravity has been procure more equip people
ISIL army
• Army still present to lead
identified (see figure 2).26 NOT COG
Butler uses Milan Vego’s defini- ISIL army removed ISIL Leader
tions to best describe critical strengths • no army for leader Seize
Funding/resources land & Islamic State
as the “primary sources of physical or • money alone cannot seize
control Caliphate
territory; weapons cannot wield Equipment
moral potential/power or elements that themselves; only ISIL army can people
integrate, protect, and sustain specific seize land and control people ISIL army GODZILLA

COG
sources of combat potential/power.”27 ISIL leader, funding, and equipment are certainly critical strengths, but these strengths are applied to ensure ISIL
Strengths are therefore considered criti- has a capable army to accomplish its objectives. The leader needs an army. Critical to amassing a capable army is
cal if they “affect or potentially affect adequate funding. Only its army can physically seize and control people–other strengths are enablers to this.
Just because the ISIL army is the COG as per the Godzilla method does not mean planning excludes focus on the
achievement of the objective.”28 other critical strengths. Contrarily, if unable to kinetically destroy the army, then focusing on some or all of the
To get to that point with ISIL, we identified strengths may be the only way to dismantle the ISIL army.
must examine its stated strategic objec-
tive and means for achieving it. ISIL has
declared an Islamic caliphate, and its stra- next removed one at a time to identify the throughout its territory in Iraq and Syria.
tegic objective is to expand the borders indispensable strength that is the center They are well armed, trained, brutal,
and influence of that caliphate as far as of gravity. and, from all outward appearances, moti-
possible, governing all its citizens under Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s leadership vated and highly capable of conquering,
strict sharia law. With this as its stated and will to expand territory and govern holding, and governing the territories
strategic objective, what must ISIL ac- people are key elements that set ISIL and people they are charged with domi-
complish to make this goal a reality? apart from its contemporaries. Removing nating. ISIL is well armed largely because
First and foremost, what ISIL has so that leadership in the early days of the of the sizeable amounts of military hard-
far accomplished is what sets it apart from movement might have completely ware it has captured through progressive
other Islamic extremist groups. It has derailed its progress and dispersed its victories. Through these victories,
seized land, controls a large population, followers. But the momentum of the ISIL also has seized valuable sources of
and currently governs as the declared organization, as it currently is, has revenue, notably oil fields, to continue
caliphate. Therefore, controlling land and grown beyond just the influence of one funding its operations.
people to spread its sphere of governance man, and removing al-Baghdadi might Large quantities of newly acquired
is the decisive operational objective that even promote him to martyr status and weapons, while critical, cannot exclusively
defines the caliphate. Accomplishing galvanize his followers behind his replace- accomplish ISIL’s objectives; someone
these advances has taken several critical ment. The replacement might not be as must wield them. Impeding money and
strengths unique to ISIL: capable and effective a leader, but there is no guar- resources could prove critical in suppress-
charismatic leadership, an army of 20,000 antee that removing this strength would ing ISIL, but its fighters intrinsically retain
to 31,500 armed members, large amounts prevent ISIL from attaining its objectives. the capability to seize territory, subjugate
of equipment, and highly lucrative fund- Therefore, it does not follow at this point citizens, and hold territory. Removing these
ing sources. This army has been critical that al-Baghdadi is the center of gravity. militants from the equation would render
in seizing much of the previously men- The army ISIL has amassed is a mo- the leadership of ISIL relatively impotent.
tioned equipment and revenue. Using the tivated group that has obeyed the orders Declaring a caliphate will fall on deaf ears
Godzilla methodology, these strengths are to seize territory and subjugate citizens if the means for enforcing it and growing

JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015 Smith, Jeter, and Westgaard 133

 3a. Strategic Center of Gravity: radical
Figure 3. ISIL ideology.
3b. Operational Center of Gravity: ISIL
Strategic Ends:
COG CC CR CV forces.
Islamic Caliphate State

Ways:
Extreme
Violence
4. Critical Capabilities
• Recruiting Counters a. ability to recruit followers
Garner Legitimacy
• Command and Control
Ideological Legitimacy b. ability to garner support for
• Ideological Support
Support Lack of ideology
International
Means: ISIL Ideology Support c. command and control of forces
• Adequate Fighter Strength
across wide areas of terrain.32
• Military Equipment Command Area Contested ISIL
and Control Governors Rule in Region
• Leadership 5. Critical Requirements
• Funding
Recruit Willing
Followers Lose a. legitimacy
Ideological
Followers Fighters
Belief b. sustainment
c. fighters.
Critical Strengths:
• Seized territory 6. Critical Vulnerabilities
• Ability to impose will on people a. no cohesive acceptance of
• Large capable force Islamic ideology (that is, Sunni
• Revenue and Finance
versus Shia) in disputed area
• Weapons and Equipment
b. extreme violence could reduce
willingness of fighters.
it are taken away. Therefore, based on the 1a. Strategic Objective(s)
7. Decisive Points
COG identification criteria outlined by the a. creation of an Islamic State
a. control of towns and villages
Godzilla method, the substantial army that b. uniting all Muslims
within Iraq and Syria
ISIL has amassed is its center of gravity. c. defeating U.S. and Western
b. terrorist activity is a backup to
allies.
overt rule in Iraq and Syria and
Critical Factors Analysis 1b. Operational Objective(s) will contribute to overall objec-
COG Methodology a. control of Sunni areas in Iraq tives of ISIL.
Now that nondoctrinal COG method-
and Syria
ologies have been applied to the current
b. recruit more fighters Based on analysis of the identified criti-
ISIL problem set, the Critical Factors
c. gain funding to support efforts. cal factors, the conclusion we reach is that
Analysis COG determination method-
the ISIL movement appears reliant on the
ology outlined in the JOPP is applied 2a. Critical Strengths
continuation of popular support for the
to ISIL. Joint Publication 5-0 states a. large following of personnel
radical Sunni ISIL ideology, that is, the stra-
that the first step in COG analysis is to willing to fight for the cause
tegic COG. If belief in the strategic COG
identify the desired objectives.29 Upon b. weapons seized from captured
followed by al-Baghdadi and his immediate
examination of ISIL from various open areas in Iraq and Syria
supporters wavers, or if other Islamic ideo-
sources, its main strategic objective is c. financially gain from seized
logical variants garner more support, the
to create an Islamic state across Sunni equipment, oil fields, and traf-
ISIL movement likely will fall apart.
areas of Iraq and in Syria.30 Al-Baghdadi ficking operations
is ISIL’s self-declared leader and seeks d. rule by terror to subjugate
authority over all Muslims. inhabitants.
Comparison Findings
Eikmeier’s COG application identified
Nested with this strategic objective,
2b. Critical Weakness(s) ISIL leadership as the strategic center
operational objectives are to control Sunni
a. nonstate actor (seeking to of gravity, with the ISIL fighters as
areas in Iraq, recruit more fighters, and
become legitimized state) the operational center of gravity. The
continue to gain funding. As the JOPP
b. no international endorsement Godzilla methodology determined
COG methodology next outlines, critical
(further delegitimizes ISIL) that the ISIL fighters are the COG.
strengths, critical weaknesses, centers of
c. rule by terror (could espouse The JOPP method identified the ISIL
gravity, critical capabilities, critical require-
uprising) ideology as the strategic COG, with the
ments, and critical vulnerabilities must be
d. radical followers’ loyalty is tied ISIL fighters as the operational COG.
identified. Finally, decisive points are iden-
to religious and ideological As evident, all three methods yielded
tified (see figure 3). Below, these variables
beliefs of leader. similar results for the ISIL fighters as a
are outlined with the JOPP process.31
COG, with differences in the identifica-

134  Joint Doctrine / Three Approaches to COG Analysis JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015
tion of the strategic COG. With the
Eikmeier application, the ISIL ideology
is identified as a critical requirement
(means) that its leadership shapes and
uses to recruit, motivate, and influence
ISIL fighters to accomplish its objec-
tives. Leadership in this JOPP applica-
tion is not specifically identified as a
critical factor but is inherently implied
within other outlined critical factors; it
is also implied as necessary in the JOPP
method conclusion statement.
For argument’s sake, whether identi-
fied as a COG or a critical requirement,
understanding all variables that contrib-
ute to the effectiveness of ISIL ideology
in recruiting and motivating is essential
if planning is focused on countering the
ideology. To plan operations centered on Then-Secretary Hagel and General Dempsey testify before Senate Armed Services Committee
regarding President Obama’s authorized military strikes in Syria to destroy, degrade, and defeat ISIL
the neutralization of an ideology means (DOD/Daniel Hinton)
to focus on the people it is influencing. In
addition to the ISIL recruitment base de- determination, whereas the JOPP process Center of Gravity,” Joint Force Quarterly 59
scribed earlier, much research conducted lacks a definitive COG qualifying proce- (4th Quarter 2010); James P. Butler, “Godzilla
Methodology: Means for Determining Center
on ideology-driven terrorist organizations dure, making it more subjective in nature of Gravity,” Joint Force Quarterly 72 (1st Quar-
indicates that most terrorists are social and thus more susceptible to biases, pref- ter 2014); Joint Operation Planning Process
solidarity seekers. They search for social erences, or dominant personalities. (JOPP) Workbook, Naval War College Joint
acceptance, with a majority of members With the analyses and findings of these Military Operations Department (Newport, RI:
being poor, unmarried, rejected socially, methodologies, current joint doctrine for U.S. Naval War College, January 21, 2008),
appendix C.
or dislocated from their native lands.33 center of gravity determination should 4
“ISIS Rebels Declare “Islamic State” in
Recent studies on al Qaeda, Fatah, be revised. A new methodology does Iraq and Syria,” BBC News, June 30, 2014,
Hamas, Hezbollah, Palestinian Islamic not necessarily need to directly mirror available at <www.bbc.com/news/world-
Jihad, and Turkish terrorists have revealed Eikmeier’s or Butler’s COG method- middle-east-28082962>; “What is ISIS? The
that a key reason for joining was that a ologies, but it does need to make joint Short Answer,” Wall Street Journal, June 12,
2014, available at <http://blogs.wsj.com/
friend or relative was already a member, a doctrine COG determination a testable briefly/2014/06/12/islamic-state-of-iraq-and-
conclusion consistent with prior research process. Whether it is deliberate elimina- al-sham-the-short-answer/>.
on many other terrorist groups.34 Much tion symbolized by a mythical creature, a 5
Jim Sciutto, Jamie Crawford, and Chelsea
terrorism research tends to gravitate “does/uses” criterion, which singles out a J. Carter, “ISIS Can “muster” Between 20,000
toward ideological causation but fails to distinctive relationship between two vari- and 31,500 Fighters, CIA Says,” CNN.com,
September 12, 2014, available at <www.cnn.
address consistent socioeconomic and ables, or a hybrid of both, joint doctrine com/2014/09/11/world/meast/isis-syria-
demographic variables that are prevalent COG determination should be testable. iraq>.
within terrorist organizations. ISIL is no With qualifying standards, COGs are less 6
JP 5-0, III-22.
exception to this phenomenon. likely to be misidentified. JFQ 7
Eikmeier references that the use of the
The COGs identified with the JOPP word primary is attributed to Joe Strange,
Centers of Gravity and Critical Vulnerabilities:
method are not testable under this pro- Building the Clausewitzian Foundation So That
cess. As different people apply the JOPP Notes We Can All Speak the Same Language, Perspec-
process, varying results are inevitable and tives on Warfighting, no. 4, 2nd ed. (Quantico,
often become subject to debate. All three
1
Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, Joint Operation VA: Marine Corps Association, 1996), ix.
Planning (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, 8
Eikmeier, “Redefining the Center of
methods provide structured processes August 11, 2011), III-23. Gravity.”
for identifying critical COG variables. 2
On May 14, 2014, the Department of 9
“Daash Announce the Establishment of
Objectives (ends), critical capabilities State officially stated that the Islamic State of the Caliphate State and Renamed the ‘Islamic
(ways), critical requirements (means), and Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) will be the terrorist State’ Only without Iraq, Syria,” ArabicCNN.
other critical variables are inherent in all organization’s primary name. Department of com, June 29, 2014, available at <http://
State, “Terrorist Designations of Groups Oper- arabic.cnn.com/middleeast/2014/06/29/
three methods. The primary difference is ating in Syria,” available at <www.state.gov/r/ urgent-isis-declares-caliphate>; Office of
that the Eikmeier and Godzilla applica- pa/prs/ps/2014/05/226067.htm>. the Director of National Intelligence, “Abu
tions provide testable criteria for COG 3
Dale C. Eikmeier, “Redefining the

JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015 Smith, Jeter, and Westgaard 135

Mohammad, letter dated 9 July 2005,”
2, available at <https://web.archive.org/
web/20110522153638/http:/www.dni.gov/
press_releases/letter_in_english.pdf>. Joint Publications (JPs) Under Revision
10
Adam Withnall, “Iraq Crisis: ISIS Changes (to be signed within 6 months)
Name and Declares Its Territories a New Islamic
JP 1-0, Joint Personnel Support
State with ‘Restoration of Caliphate’ in Middle
East,” The Independent (London), June 29, 2014. JP 1-04, Amphibious Embarkation and Debarkation
11
Laura Smith-Spark, “Iraqi Yazidi
Lawmaker: ‘Hundreds of My People Are JP 1-06, Financial Management Support in Joint Operations
Being Slaughtered,’” CNN.com, August JP 3-05.1, Unconventional Warfare
6, 2014, available at <http://edition.cnn.
com/2014/08/06/world/meast/iraq-crisis- JP 3-13.3, Operations Security
minority-persecution/index.html?hpt=hp_t3>.
JP 3-15, Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine Warfare
12
Tim Arango and Michael R. Gordon,
“Iraqi Insurgents Secure Control of Border JP 3-34, Joint Engineer Operations
Posts,” New York Times, June 23, 2014.
13
Bill Roggio, “The Rump Islamic Emirate JP 3-50, Personnel Recovery
of Iraq,” The Long War Journal, October 16, JP 3-61, Public Affairs
2006, available at <www.longwarjournal.org/ar-
chives/2006/10/the_rump_islamic_emi.php>. JP 3-68, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations
14
Max Fisher, “How ISIS Is Exploit-
JP 4-01.2, Sealift Support to Joint Operations
ing the Economics of Syria’s Civil War,” Vox.
com, June 12, 2014, available at <www.vox. JP 4-01.5, Joint Terminal Operations
com/2014/6/12/5802824/how-isis-is-
exploiting-the-economics-of-syrias-civil-war>; JP 4-03, Joint Bulk Petroleum and Water Doctrine
Terrence McCoy, “ISIS Just Stole $425 JP 6-0, Joint Communications System
Million, Iraqi Governor Says, and Became the
‘World’s Richest Terrorist Group,’” Washington
Post, June 12, 2014.
15
J.M. Berger, “How ISIS Games Twit- syria-iraq-hierarchy/index.html?hpt=hp_t1>. dleeast/iraq/11052919/How-Isil-is-funded-
ter,” The Atlantic, June 16, 2014, available 19
ISIL’s foundation is based on al Qaeda’s trained-and-operating-in-Iraq-and-Syria.html>.
at <www.theatlantic.com/international/ ideology and follows well-known jihadist prin- 22
Eikmeier argued that leaders in World
archive/2014/06/isis-iraq-twitter-social- ciples. This form of Islam is anti-Western and War II were not centers of gravity but were
media-strategy/372856/>; Harleen K. uses violence against those who do not agree critical requirements as leaders for their respec-
Gambhir, Dabiq: The Strategic Messaging of with their views. This branch of Islam seeks to tive nations and enablers for the actual centers
the Islamic State, Backgrounder (Washington, return to original thoughts and condemns new of gravity. In a modernized military, Eikmeier
DC: Institute for the Study of War, August 15, ideas, which are believed to be corrupt. See would not identify soldiers as the operational
2014), available at <www.understandingwar. Michael Glint, Can a War With ISIS Be Won? COG. Depending on the military force, the
org/backgrounder/dabiq-strategic-messaging- ISIL/Islamic State/Daesh (ebook, Conceptual COG could be armor formations, air forces, or
islamic-state>. Kings, 2014), 5; Violent Extremism Smartcard some other component—whichever capability
16
Sciutto, Crawford, and Carter. Compendium, TRADOC Culture Center first is critical for accomplishing the objectives. See
17
ISIL has obtained weapons from Saddam draft, September 2012, 45–52. Dale C. Eikmeier, “Center of Gravity Analysis,”
Hussein’s stockpiles, the Syrian civil war, and 20
“Islamic State: An Assessment of Capa- Military Review (July–August 2004), 2–5.
U.S. involvement in Operation Iraqi Freedom. bilities and the Effectiveness of International 23
“ISIS Fast Facts,” CNN.com, Oc-
See John Ismay, “Insight into How Insurgents Intervention,” IHS Jane’s Intelligence Briefing, tober 9, 2014, available at <www.cnn.
Fought in Iraq,” New York Times, October October 30, 2014. com/2014/08/08/world/isis-fast-facts>.
17, 2013, available at <http://atwar.blogs. 21
Over the past 6 months, since the group 24
“Islamic State.”
nytimes.com/2013/10/17/insight-into-how- began sweeping across eastern Syria and into 25
Ibid.
insurgents-fought-in-iraq/?_r=1>; Charles Iraq, experts estimate that its leaders have 26
Butler, 29.
Lister, “Not Just Iraq: The Islamic State Is Also gained access to 1.2 billion pounds in cash— 27
Milan Vego, Joint Operational Warfare:
on the March in Syria,” The Huffington Post, more than the most recent recorded annual Theory and Practice (Newport, RI: U.S. Naval
August 7, 2014, available at <www.huffing- military expenditure of Ireland. ISIL is develop- War College, 2009), VII-16.
tonpost.com/charles-lister/not-just-iraq-the- ing in a vital oil, gas, and trade area of the 28
Butler, 27.
islamic_b_5658048.html?utm_hp_ref=tw>; world. It can grab as it expands. It might earn 29
JOPP Workbook.
Thomas Gibbons-Neff, “ISIS Propaganda up to 5 million pounds a month through extor- 30
“ISIS Fast Facts.”
Videos Show Their Weapons, Skills in Iraq,” tion of local businesses. In the past year, it has 31
JOPP Workbook.
Washington Post, June 18, 2014, available at been estimated that ISIL has made 40 million 32
“ISIL Brings More than Just Brutality
<www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/ pounds from taking hostages, with each foreign to the Battlefield,” AmericanAljazeera.com,
wp/2014/06/18/isis-propaganda-videos- hostage thought to be worth 3 million pounds. November 2, 2014.
show-their-weapons-skills-in-iraq/>. See Harriet Alexander and Alastair Beach, 33
Max Abrahms, “What Terrorists Really
18
Nick Thompson and Atika Shubert, “The “How ISIL is Funded, Trained and Operating Want: Terrorist Motives and Counterterror-
Anatomy of ISIS: How the ‘Islamic State’ Is in Iraq and Syria,” The Telegraph (London), ism Strategy,” International Security 32, no. 4
Run, from Oil to Beheadings,” CNN.com, Sep- August 23, 2014, available at <www.telegraph. (Spring 2008), 97.
tember 18, 2014, available at <http://edition. co.uk/news/worldnews /worldnews/mid- 34
Ibid., 104.
cnn.com/2014/09/18/world/meast/isis-

136  Joint Doctrine / Three Approaches to COG Analysis JFQ 78, 3rd Quarter 2015
 NEW from NDU Press
A Low-Visibility Force Multiplier:
Assessing China’s Cruise Missile Ambitions
By Dennis M. Gormley, Andrew S. Erickson, and Jingdong Yuan
China’s military modernization includes ambitious efforts to
develop antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities to deter
intervention by outside powers. Highly accurate and lethal
antiship cruise missiles and land-attack cruise missiles carried by
a range of ground, naval, and air platforms are an integral part
of this counter-intervention strategy. This comprehensive study
combines technical and military analysis with an extensive array
of Chinese language sources to analyze the challenges Chinese
cruise missiles pose for the U.S. military in the Western Pacific.

“Cruise missiles are key weapons in China’s A2/AD arsenal,

providing a lethal precision-strike capability against naval ships
and land-based targets. The authors use hundreds of Chinese
language sources and expertise on cruise missile technology to
assess China’s progress in acquiring and developing advanced
antiship and land-attack cruise missiles and to consider how
the People’s Liberation Army might employ these weapons in
a conflict. Essential reading for those who want to understand
the challenges China’s military modernization poses to the
United States and its allies.”
—David A. Deptula, Lieutenant General, USAF (Ret.),
Senior Military Scholar, Center for Character and Leadership
Development, U.S. Air Force Academy

“This volume is a major contribution to our understanding of Chinese military modernization.

Although China’s ballistic missile programs have garnered considerable attention, the authors remind
us that Beijing’s investment in cruise missiles may yield equally consequential results.”
—Thomas G. Mahnken, Jerome E. Levy Chair of
Economic Geography and National Security, U.S. Naval War College

“This book provides an excellent primer on the growing challenge of Chinese cruise missiles. It
shows how antiship and land-attack cruise missiles complicate U.S. efforts to counter China’s
expanding A2/AD capabilities and are becoming a global proliferation threat. The authors also
demonstrate just how much progress China has made in modernizing and upgrading its defense
industry, to the point of being able to develop and produce world-class offensive weapons systems
such as land-attack cruise missiles. This book belongs on the shelves of every serious observer of
China’s growing military prowess.”
—Richard A. Bitzinger, Coordinator, Military Transformations Program,
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore

Available online at ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/Books/force-multiplier.pdf

 The Noncommissioned Officer and Petty Officer:
Backbone of the Armed Forces
NDU Press, 2013  •  176 pp.

A first of its kind, this book—of, by, and for noncommissioned officers and petty officers—
is a comprehensive explanation of enlisted leaders across the United States Armed Forces.
It balances with the Services’ NCO/PO leadership manuals and complements The Armed
Forces Officer, the latest edition of which was published by NDU Press in 2007. Written by
a team of Active, Reserve, and retired enlisted leaders from the five Service branches, this
book describes how NCOs/POs fit into an organization, centers them in the Profession
of Arms, defines their dual roles of complementing the officer and enabling the force, and
exposes their international engagement. As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General
Martin E. Dempsey writes in his foreword to the book, “We know noncommissioned offi-
cers and petty officers to have exceptional competence, professional character, and soldierly
grit—they are exemplars of our Profession of Arms.”
Aspirational and fulfilling, this book helps prepare young men and women who strive to
become NCOs/POs, re-inspires currently serving enlisted leaders, and stimulates reflection
by those who no longer wear the uniform. It also gives those who have never served a com-
prehensive understanding of who these exceptional men and women are, and why they are
known as the “Backbone of the Armed Forces.”

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