CANON 17

A.C. No. 4078 July 14, 2003

WILLIAM ONG GENATO, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ESSEX L. SILAPAN, respondent.
PUNO, J.:
In this complaint for disbarment filed by William Ong Genato against respondent Atty. Essex L. Silapan, complainant alleged
that in July 1992, respondent asked if he could rent a small office space in complainant's building in Quezon City for his law
practice. Complainant acceded and introduced respondent to Atty. Benjamin Dacanay, complainant's retained lawyer, who ac-
commodated respondent in the building and made him handle some of complainant's cases. Hence, the start of the legal rela-
tionship between complainant and respondent.
The conflict between the parties started when respondent borrowed two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) from complai-
nant which he intended to use as downpayment for the purchase of a new car. In return, respondent issued to complainant a
postdated check in the amount of P176,528.00 to answer for the six (6) months interest on the loan. He likewise mortgaged to
complainant his house and lot in Quezon City but did not surrender its title claiming that it was the subject of reconstitution pro-
ceedings before the Quezon City Register of Deeds.
With the money borrowed from complainant, respondent purchased a new car. However, the document of sale of the car was is-
sued in complainant's name and financed through City Trust Company.
In January 1993, respondent introduced to complainant a certain Emmanuel Romero. Romero likewise wanted to borrow money
from complainant. Complainant lent Romero the money and, from this transaction, respondent earned commission in the
amount of P52,289.90. Complainant used the commission to pay respondent's arrears with the car financing firm.
Subsequently, respondent failed to pay the amortization on the car and the financing firm sent demand letters to complainant.
Complainant tried to encash respondent's postdated check with the drawee bank but it was dishonored as respondent's account
therein was already closed.
Respondent failed to heed complainant's repeated demands for payment. Complainant then filed a criminal case against re-
spondent for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and a civil case for judicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage.
In the foreclosure case, respondent made the following allegation in his Answer:
xxx xxx xxx
4. That complainant is a businessman who is engaged in the real estate business, trading and buy and sell of deficiency taxed
imported cars, shark loans and other shady deals and has many cases pending in court;
xxx xxx xxx
Complainant denied respondent's charges and claimed that respondent's allegation is libelous and not privilege as it was irrele-
vant to the foreclosure case. Complainant further pointed to paragraph 12 of respondent's Answer, thus:
12. That on January 29, 1993, before paying for the next installment on his car on January 30, 1993, defendant Essex L. Sila-
pan asked the complainant to execute a Deed of Sale transferring ownership of the car to him but the latter said that he will only
do so after the termination of his criminal case at Branch 138 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila, x x x where he
(complainant) wanted Essex L. Silapan, his former counsel in that case, to offer bribe money to the members of the review com-
mittee of the Department of Justice where a petition for review of the resolution of the Investigating Prosecutor was pending at
the time, x x x or, in the event that the said petition for review is denied, he wanted Essex L. Silapan to offer bribe money to the
prosecutor assigned at the above-mentioned Court, and even to the presiding Judge, for his eventual acquittal, which defendant
Essex L. Silapan all refused to do not only because such acts are immoral and illegal, but also because the complainant confid-
ed to him that he was really involved in the commission of the crime that was charged of in the above-mentioned case. (empha-
sis supplied)
Complainant gripes that the foregoing allegations are false, immaterial to the foreclosure case and maliciously designed to de-
fame him. He charged that in making such allegations, respondent is guilty of breaking their confidential lawyer-client relation-
ship and should be held administratively liable therefor. Consequently, he filed this complaint for disbarment, praying also that
an administrative sanction be meted against respondent for his issuance of a bouncing check.
When required by the Court to comment, respondent explained1 that it was complainant who offered him an office space in his
building and retained him as counsel as the latter was impressed with the way he handled a B.P. 22 case2 filed against complai-
nant. Respondent insisted that there was nothing libelous in his imputations of dishonest business practices to complainant and
his revelation of complainant's desire to bribe government officials in relation to his pending criminal case. He claimed to have
made these statements in the course of judicial proceedings to defend his case and discredit complainant's credibility by estab-
lishing his criminal propensity to commit fraud, tell lies and violate laws. He argued that he is not guilty of breaking his confiden-
tial lawyer-client relationship with complainant as he made the disclosure in defense of his honor and reputation.
Secondly, respondent asserted that he executed the real estate mortgage in favor of complainant without consideration and on-
ly as a "formal requirement" so he could obtain the P200,000.00 loan and for this reason, he did not surrender his title over the
mortgaged property to complainant.
Thirdly, respondent claimed that he issued the postdated check, not for account or for value, but only: (a) to serve as "some
kind of acknowledgment" that he already received in advance a portion of his attorney's fees from the complainant for the legal
services he rendered, and (b) as a form of assurance that he will not abandon the cases he was handling for complainant.
Lastly, respondent denied that he received a P52,289.90 commission from Romero's loan which he allegedly helped facilitate.
He alleged that the amount was paid to him by Romero as attorney's fees, the latter being his client. He used this amount to pay
his arrears with the car financing firm. On January 29, 1993, before paying the next amortization on the car, he asked complai-
nant to execute a deed of sale transferring ownership of the car to him. Complainant refused and insisted that he would transfer
ownership of the car only after the termination of his criminal case which respondent was handling as his defense lawyer. Con-
sequently, respondent stopped paying the amortization on the car. Respondent also alleged that he filed a perjury case against
complainant who, in turn, filed a complaint for libel against him.
In a Resolution, dated October 27, 1993, the Court referred the administrative case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
for investigation, report and recommendation.
On August 3, 2002, the Board of Governors of the IBP approved the report of the investigating commissioner finding the re-
spondent guilty as charged and recommending his suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year.
We affirm the findings and recommendation of the IBP.
Prefatorily, we stress that we shall not delve into the merits of the various criminal and civil cases pending between the parties.
It is for the trial courts handling these cases to ascertain the truth or falsity of the allegations made therein. For this reason, it is
not for us to sanction respondent for his issuance of a bouncing check. His liability has yet to be determined by the trial court
where his case is pending.
The only issue in this administrative case is whether respondent committed a breach of trust and confidence by imputing to
complainant illegal practices and disclosing complainant's alleged intention to bribe government officials in connection with a
pending case.
Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him. The long-established rule is that an attorney is not permitted to disclose
communications made to him in his professional character by a client, unless the latter consents. This obligation to preserve the
confidences and secrets of a client arises at the inception of their relationship.3 The protection given to the client is perpetual
and does not cease with the termination of the litigation, nor is it affected by the party's ceasing to employ the attorney and re-
taining another, or by any other change of relation between them. It even survives the death of the client.4
It must be stressed, however, that the privilege against disclosure of confidential communications or information is limited only to
communications which are legitimately and properly within the scope of a lawful employment of a lawyer. It does not extend to
those made in contemplation of a crime or perpetration of a fraud.5 If the unlawful purpose is avowed, as in this case, the com-
plainant's alleged intention to bribe government officials in relation to his case, the communication is not covered by the privilege
as the client does not consult the lawyer professionally. It is not within the profession of a lawyer to advise a client as to how he
may commit a crime as a lawyer is not a gun for hire. Thus, the attorney-client privilege does not attach, there being no profes-
sional employment in the strict sense.
Be that as it may, respondent's explanation that it was necessary for him to make the disclosures in his pleadings fails to satisfy
us. The disclosures were not indispensable to protect his rights as they were not pertinent to the foreclosure case. It was im-
proper for the respondent to use it against the complainant in the foreclosure case as it was not the subject matter of litigation
therein and respondent's professional competence and legal advice were not being attacked in said case. A lawyer must con-
duct himself, especially in his dealings with his clients, with integrity in a manner that is beyond reproach. His relationship with
his clients should be characterized by the highest degree of good faith and fairness.
Thus, the Court agrees with the evaluation of the IBP and finds that respondent's allegations and disclosures in the foreclosure
case amount to a breach of fidelity sufficient to warrant the imposition of disciplinary sanction against him. However, the recom-
mended penalty of one (1) year suspension of respondent from the practice of law seems to be disproportionate to his breach of
duty considering that a review of the records of this Court reveals that this is the first administrative complaint against him.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent Atty. Essex L. Silapan is ordered suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6)
months effective upon receipt of this Decision. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines. The Court Administrator is directed to circulate this order of suspension to all courts in the
country.
SO ORDERED.

CANON 18

A.C. No. 9149 September 4, 2013

JULIAN PENILLA, COMPLAINANT,
vs.
ATTY. QUINTIN P. ALCID, JR., RESPONDENT.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before this Court is an administrative complaint1 filed against respondent Atty. Quintin P. Alcid, Jr. for violation of the Lawyer’s
Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, and for gross misconduct in the performance of his duty as a lawyer.
The antecedent facts follow:
Complainant Julian Penilla entered into an agreement with Spouses Rey and Evelyn Garin (the spouses) for the repair of his
Volkswagen automobile. Despite full payment, the spouses defaulted in their obligation. Thus, complainant decided to file a
case for breach of contract against the spouses where he engaged the services of respondent as counsel.
Respondent sent a demand letter to the spouses and asked for the refund of complainant’s payment. When the spouses failed
to return the payment, respondent advised complainant that he would file a criminal case for estafa against said spouses. Re-
spondent charged ₱30,000 as attorney’s fees and ₱10,000 as filing fees. Complainant turned over the relevant documents to
respondent and paid the fees in tranches. Respondent then filed the complaint for estafa before Asst. City Prosecutor Jose C.
Fortuno of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City. Respondent attended the hearing with complainant but the spouses
did not appear. After the hearing, complainant paid another ₱1,000 to respondent as appearance fee. Henceforth, complainant
and respondent have conflicting narrations of the subsequent events and transactions that transpired.
Complainant alleges that when the case was submitted for resolution, respondent told him that they have to give a bottle of Car-
los Primero I to Asst. City Prosecutor Fortuno to expedite a favorable resolution of the case. Complainant claims that despite ini-
tial reservations, he later acceded to respondent’s suggestion, bought a bottle of Carlos Primero I for ₱950 and delivered it to
respondent’s office.
Asst. City Prosecutor Fortuno later issued a resolution dismissing the estafa case against the spouses. Respondent allegedly
told complainant that a motion for reconsideration was "needed to have [the resolution] reversed."2 Respondent then prepared
the motion and promised complainant that he would fix the problem. On February 18, 2002, the motion was denied for lack of
merit. Respondent then told complainant that he could not do anything about the adverse decision and presented the option of
filing a civil case for specific performance against the spouses for the refund of the money plus damages. Complainant paid an
additional ₱10,000 to respondent which he asked for the payment of filing fees. After complainant signed the complaint, he was
told by respondent to await further notice as to the status of the case. Complainant claims that respondent never gave him any
update thereafter.
Complainant asserts having made numerous and unsuccessful attempts to follow-up the status of the case and meet with re-
spondent at his office. He admits, however, that in one instance he was able to talk to respondent who told him that the case
was not progressing because the spouses could not be located. In the same meeting, respondent asked complainant to deter-
mine the whereabouts of the spouses. Complainant returned to respondent’s office on January 24, 2005, but because respond-
ent was not around, complainant left with respondent’s secretary a letter regarding the possible location of the spouses.
Complainant claims not hearing from respondent again despite his several letters conveying his disappointment and requesting
for the return of the money and the documents in respondent’s possession. Complainant then sought the assistance of the radio
program "Ito ang Batas with Atty. Aga" to solve his predicament. Following the advice he gathered, complainant went to the Of-
fice of the Clerk of Court of the Caloocan City Metropolitan Trial Court and Regional Trial Court (RTC). Complainant learned that
a civil case for Specific Performance and Damages was filed on June 6, 20023 but was dismissed on June 13, 2002. He also
found out that the filing fee was only ₱2,440 and not ₱10,000 as earlier stated by respondent. Atty. Aga of the same radio pro-
gram also sent respondent a letter calling his attention to complainant’s problem. The letter, like all of complainant’s previous let-
ters, was unheeded.
On January 9, 2006, complainant filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) the
instant administrative case praying that respondent be found guilty of gross misconduct for violating the Lawyer’s Oath and the
Code of Professional Responsibility, and for appropriate administrative sanctions to be imposed.
Respondent harps a different tale.
In an Answer4 filed on January 30, 2006, respondent prayed that the case be dismissed for lack of merit. He denied charging
complainant ₱10,000 as filing fees for the estafa case and claimed that he charged and received only ₱2,000. He also coun-
tered that the payment of ₱30,000 made by the complainant was his acceptance fee for both the estafa case and civil case. Re-
spondent likewise denied the following other allegations of complainant: that he assured the success of the case before the
prosecutor; that he asked complainant to give a bottle of Carlos Primero I to the prosecutor; that he promised to fix the case;
and that he charged ₱10,000, as he only charged ₱5,000, as filing fee for the civil case.
Respondent explained that it was not a matter of indifference on his part when he failed to inform petitioner of the status of the
case. In fact, he was willing to return the money and the documents of complainant. What allegedly prevented him from commu-
nicating with complainant was the fact that complainant would go to his office during days and times that he would be attending
his daily court hearings.
The IBP-CBD called for a mandatory conference on April 28, 2006. Only complainant and his counsel attended.5 The confer-
ence was reset and terminated on June 9, 2006. The parties were directed to file their verified position papers within 15
days,6 to which complainant and respondent complied.7
On July 18, 2006, respondent filed a Reply8 praying for the dismissal of the case for lack of factual and legal bases. He stated
that he had performed his duties as complainant’s counsel when he filed the criminal case before the Office of the City Prosecu-
tor of Quezon City and the civil case before the RTC of Caloocan City. He averred that he should not be blamed for the dismiss-
al of both cases as his job was to ensure that justice is served and not to win the case. It was unethical for him to guarantee the
success of the case and resort to unethical means to win such case for the client. He continued to deny that he asked complai-
nant to give the prosecutor a bottle of Carlos Primero I and that the filing fees he collected totalled ₱20,000. Respondent argued
that it is incredulous that the total sum of all the fees that he had allegedly collected exceeded ₱30,000 – the amount being
claimed by complainant from the spouses.
In its Report and Recommendation9 dated September 12, 2008, the IBP-CBD recommended the suspension of respondent from
the practice of law for six months "for negligence within the meaning of Canon 18 and transgression of Rule 18.04 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility," viz:
In the case under consideration, there are certain matters which keep sticking out like a sore thumb rendering them difficult to
escape notice.
One is the filing of a criminal complaint for estafa arising out of a violation of the contract for repair of the Volks Wagon (sic) car.
It is basic that when an act or omission emanates from a contract, oral or written, the consequent result is a breach of the con-
tract, hence, properly actionable in a civil suit for damages. As correctly pointed out by the Investigating Prosecutor, the liability
of the respondent is purely civil in nature because the complaint arose from a contract of services and the respondent (spouses
Garin) failed to perform their contractual obligation under the contract.
xxxx
Another one is the filing of a civil complaint for specific performance and damages (after the dismissal of the criminal complaint
for estafa) in the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City where the actual damages claimed is ₱36,000.00.
It is also basic that the civil complaint for ₱36,000.00 should have been filed with the MTC [which] has jurisdiction over the
same. One of the "firsts" that a lawyer ascertains in filing an action is the proper forum or court with whom the suit or action shall
be filed. In June 2002 when the civil complaint was filed in court, the jurisdiction of the MTC has already expanded such that the
jurisdictional amount of the RTC is already ₱400,000.00.
xxxx
Another thing is the various follow-ups made by respondent’s client as evidenced by the letters marked as Exhibits "D", "E", "F",
"G" and "H" which were all received by complainant’s secretary, except for Exhibit "H" which was received by Atty. Asong, not to
mention Exhibit "M" which was sent by "Atty. Aga". These efforts of the complainant were not reciprocated by the respondent
with good faith. Respondent chose to ignore them and reasoned out that he is willing to meet with the complainant and return
the money and documents received by reason of the legal engagement, but omitted to communicate with him for the purpose of
fixing the time and place for the meeting. This failure suggests a clear disregard of the client’s demand which was done in bad
faith on the part of respondent.10
On December 11, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVIII-2008-646, adopting and approving the recom-
mendation of the IBP-CBD. The Resolution11 reads:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED the Report and Recommendation of the In-
vestigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recom-
mendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondent’s violation
of Canon 18 and Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for his negligence, Atty. Quintin P. Alcid, Jr. is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months.
On April 24, 2009, respondent sought reconsideration12 and asked that the penalty of suspension be reduced to warning or rep-
rimand. After three days, or on April 27, 2009, respondent filed a "Motion to Admit Amended ‘Motion for Reconsideration’ Upon
Leave of Office."13 Respondent asserted that the failure to inform complainant of the status of the cases should not be attributed
to him alone. He stressed that complainant had always been informed that he only had time to meet with his clients in the after-
noon at his office in Quezon City. Despite such notice, complainant kept going to his office in Tandang Sora. He admitted that
though he committed lapses which would amount to negligence in violation of Canon 18 and Rule 18.04, they were done un-
knowingly and without malice or bad faith. He also stressed that this was his first infraction.
In its Resolution No. XIX-2011-473 dated June 26, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors denied respondent’s Motion for Reconsid-
eration for lack of merit.14 On August 15, 2011, respondent filed a second Motion for Reconsideration15 which was no longer act-
ed upon due to the transmittal of the records of the case to this Court by the IBP on August 16, 2011.16
On September 14, 2011, the Court issued a Resolution17 and noted the aforementioned Notices of Resolution dated December
11, 2008 and June 26, 2011. On December 14, 2011, it issued another Resolution18 noting the Indorsement dated August 16,
2011 of Director Alicia A. Risos-Vidal and respondent’s second Motion for Reconsideration dated August 15, 2011.
We sustain the findings of the IBP that respondent committed professional negligence under Canon 18 and Rule 18.04 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, with a modification that we also find respondent guilty of violating Canon 17 and Rule 18.03
of the Code and the Lawyer’s Oath.
A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath, a patent disregard of his duties, or an odious deportment
unbecoming an attorney. A lawyer must at no time be wanting in probity and moral fiber which are not only conditions precedent
to his entrance to the Bar but are likewise essential demands for his continued membership therein.19
The Complaint before the IBP-CBD charged respondent with violation of his oath and the following provisions under the Code of
Professional Responsibility:
a)
Canon 15 – A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his client;
b)
Rule 15.[06, Canon 15 – A lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to influence any public official, tribunal or legislative
body;
c)
Rule 16.01[, Canon 16 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from his client;
d)
Canon 17 – A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him;
e)
Canon 18 – A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence;
f)
Rule 18.03[, Canon 18 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith
shall render him liable; and
g)
Rule 18.04[, Canon 18 – A lawyer shall keep his client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable
time to the client’s request for information.20
A review of the proceedings and the evidence in the case at bar shows that respondent violated Canon 18 and Rules 18.03 and
18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Complainant correctly alleged that respondent violated his oath under Canon
18 to "serve his client with competence and diligence" when respondent filed a criminal case for estafa when the facts of the
case would have warranted the filing of a civil case for breach of contract. To be sure, after the complaint for estafa was dis-
missed, respondent committed another similar blunder by filing a civil case for specific performance and damages before the
RTC. The complaint, having an alternative prayer for the payment of damages, should have been filed with the Municipal Trial
Court which has jurisdiction over complainant’s claim which amounts to only ₱36,000. As correctly stated in the Report and
Recommendation of the IBP-CBD:
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129[,] as amended by R.A. No. 7691 which took effect on April 15, 1994[,] vests in the MTCs of Metro
Manila exclusive original jurisdiction of civil cases where the amount of demand does not exceed ₱200,000.00 exclusive of inter-
est, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and costs (Sec. 33), and after five (5) years from the effectiv-
ity of the Act, the same shall be adjusted to ₱400,000.00 (Sec. 34).21
The errors committed by respondent with respect to the nature of the remedy adopted in the criminal complaint and the forum
selected in the civil complaint were so basic and could have been easily averted had he been more diligent and circumspect in
his role as counsel for complainant. What aggravates respondent’s offense is the fact that his previous mistake in filing the esta-
fa case did not motivate him to be more conscientious, diligent and vigilant in handling the case of complainant. The civil case
he subsequently filed for complainant was dismissed due to what later turned out to be a basic jurisdictional error.
That is not all. After the criminal and civil cases were dismissed, respondent was plainly negligent and did not apprise complai-
nant of the status and progress of both cases he filed for the latter. He paid no attention and showed no importance to complai-
nant’s cause despite repeated follow-ups. Clearly, respondent is not only guilty of incompetence in handling the cases. His lack
of professionalism in dealing with complainant is also gross and inexcusable. In what may seem to be a helpless attempt to
solve his predicament, complainant even had to resort to consulting a program in a radio station to recover his money from re-
spondent, or at the very least, get his attention.
Respondent’s negligence under Rules 18.03 and 18.04 is also beyond contention. A client pays his lawyer hard-earned money
as professional fees. In return, "[e]very case a lawyer accepts deserves his full attention, skill and competence, regardless of its
importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins a law-
yer not to ‘neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.’ He must
constantly keep in mind that his actions or omissions or nonfeasance would be binding upon his client. He is expected to be ac-
quainted with the rudiments of law and legal procedure, and a client who deals with him has the right to expect not just a good
amount of professional learning and competence but also a whole-hearted fealty to the client’s cause."22 Similarly, under Rule
18.04, a lawyer has the duty to apprise his client of the status and developments of the case and all other information relevant
thereto. He must be consistently mindful of his obligation to respond promptly should there be queries or requests for informa-
tion from the client.
In the case at bar, respondent explained that he failed to update complainant of the status of the cases he filed because their
time did not always coincide. The excuse proffered by respondent is too lame and flimsy to be given credit. Respondent himself
admitted that he had notice that complainant had visited his office many times. Yet, despite the efforts exerted and the vigilance
exhibited by complainant, respondent neglected and failed to fulfill his obligation under Rules 18.03 and 18.04 to keep his client
informed of the status of his case and to respond within a reasonable time to the client’s request for information.
Finally, respondent also violated Canon 17 of the Code which states that "[a] lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and
he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him." The legal profession dictates that it is not a mere duty, but an
obligation, of a lawyer to accord the highest degree of fidelity, zeal and fervor in the protection of the client’s interest. The most
thorough groundwork and study must be undertaken in order to safeguard the interest of the client. The honor bestowed on his
person to carry the title of a lawyer does not end upon taking the Lawyer’s Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys. Rather, such
honor attaches to him for the entire duration of his practice of law and carries with it the consequent responsibility of not only
satisfying the basic requirements but also going the extra mile in the protection of the interests of the client and the pursuit of
justice. Respondent has defied and failed to perform such duty and his omission is tantamount to a desecration of the Lawyer’s
Oath.
All said, in administrative cases for disbarment or suspension against lawyers, it is the complainant who has the burden to prove
by preponderance of evidence23 the allegations in the complaint. In the instant case, complainant was only able to prove re-
spondent’s violation of Canons 17 and 18, and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Law-
yer’s Oath. Complainant failed to substantiate his claim that respondent violated Canon 15 and Rule 15.06 of the Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility when respondent allegedly instructed him to give a bottle of Carlos Primero I to Asst. City Prosecutor
Fortuno in order to get a favorable decision. Similarly, complainant was not able to present evidence that respondent indeed vio-
lated Rule 16.01 of Canon 16 by allegedly collecting money from him in excess of the required filing fees.
As to respondent’s proven acts and omissions which violate Canons 17 and 18 and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility, and the Lawyer’s Oath, we find the same to constitute gross misconduct for which he may be suspend-
ed under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, viz:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. – A member of the bar may be disbarred
or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such
office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the
oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party
to a case without authority to do so. x x x.
WHEREFORE, the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors adopting and approving the Decision of the Investigating Commis-
sioner is hereby AFFIRMED with a MODIFICATION that respondent Atty. Quintin P. Alcid, Jr. is hereby found GUILTY of gross
misconduct for violating Canons 17 and 18, and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as well as
the Lawyer’s Oath. This Court hereby imposes upon respondent the penalty of SUSPENSION from the practice of law for a peri-
od of SIX (6) MONTHS to commence immediately upon receipt of this Decision. Respondent is further ADMONISHED to be
more circumspect and diligent in handling the cases of his clients, and STERNLY WARNED that a commission of the same or
similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Court Administrator to be disseminated to all courts throughout the
country, to the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to Atty. Quintin P. Alcid, Jr.’s personal records, and to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines for its information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

CANON 20

A.C. No. 3773 September 24, 1997

ANGELITA C. ORCINO, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JOSUE GASPAR, respondent.

PUNO, J.:
On June 14, 1992, complainant Angelita C. Orcino filed with this Court a letter-complaint dated December 10, 1991 against re-
spondent Atty. Josue Gaspar, her former counsel. Complainant prayed that this Court impose disciplinary sanctions on respond-
ent for abandoning his duties and for failing to return the legal fees she fully paid for his services.
The complaint arose from the following facts: Complainant engaged the services of respondent to prosecute a criminal case she
intended to file against several suspects in the slaying of her husband. In consideration thereof, complainant bound herself to
pay respondent legal fees of P20,000.00 — P10,000.00 to be paid upon signing of the contract and the balance to be paid on or
before the conclusion of the case. Complainant was also to pay P500.00 per appearance of respondent before the court and fis-
cal. This agreement was embodied in a contract executed on February 22, 1991.1
In accordance with the contract, complainant paid respondent the sum of P5,000.00 on February 25, 1991,2 another P5,000.00
on March 31, 1991,3 and P10,000.00 on May 21, 1991,4 for a total of P20,000.00.
Forthwith, respondent entered into his duties. He interviewed witnesses and gathered evidence to build a case against the sus-
pects. He drew up the necessary sworn statements and dutifully attended the preliminary investigation. The case was thereafter
filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 37, Baloc, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija.5
As private prosecutor, respondent religiously attended the bail hearings for the accused although these hearings were post-
poned on motion of the accused's counsel. Respondent however failed to attend the hearing scheduled in August 1991. It was
at this nearing that the court, over complainant's objections, granted bail to all the accused. After the hearing, complainant im-
mediately went to respondent's residence and confronted him with his absence.6 Respondent explained that he did not receive
formal notice of the hearing.7 Complainant became belligerent and started accusing him of jeopardizing the case by his ab-
sence. Respondent said that her suspicions were based on rumors and intrigues fed to her by her relatives.8 Complainant, how-
ever, continued accusing him belligerently. She asked for the records of the case saying that she could refer them to another
lawyer. Stung by her words, respondent gave her the records.9
Complainant never returned the records nor did she see respondent. On September 18, 1991, respondent filed before the trial
court a "Motion to Withdraw as Counsel."10 The motion did not bear the consent of complainant.
On October 23, 1991, the court issued an order directing respondent to secure complainant's consent to the motion "and his ap-
pearance as private prosecutor shall continue until he has secured this consent."11
Complainant refused to sign her conformity to respondent's withdrawal.12 Meanwhile, the hearings in the criminal case contin-
ued. Respondent did not appear at the hearings nor did he contact complainant. Complainant was thus compelled to engage
the services of another lawyer. Hence, the letter-complaint.
We referred the letter-complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Commission on Bar Discipline, for investigation, report
and recommendation.
The rule in this jurisdiction is that a client has the absolute right to terminate the attorney-client relation at any time with or with-
out cause. 13 The right of an attorney to withdraw or terminate the relation other than for sufficient cause is, however, considera-
bly restricted.14 Among the fundamental rules of ethics is the principle that an attorney who undertakes to conduct an action im-
pliedly stipulates to carry it to its conclusion.15 He is not at liberty to abandon it without reasonable cause.16 A lawyer's right to
withdraw from a case before its final adjudication arises only from the client's written consent or from a good cause.17
Section 26 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 26. Change of attorneys — An attorney may retire at any time from any action or special proceeding, by the written con-
sent of his client filed in court. He may also retire at any time from an action or special proceeding, without the consent of his cli-
ent, should the court, on notice to the client and attorney, and on hearing, determine that he ought to be allowed to retire. In
case of substitution, the name of the attorney newly employed shall be entered on the docket of the court in place of the former
one, and written notice of the change shall be given to the adverse party.
xxx xxx xxx
A lawyer may retire at any time from any action special proceeding with the written consent of his client filed in court and copy
thereof served upon the adverse party. Should the client refuse to give his consent, the lawyer must file an application with the
court. The court, on notice to the client and adverse party, shall determine whether he ought to be allowed to retire. The applica-
tion for withdrawal must be based on a good cause.18
In the instant case, complainant did not give her written consent to respondent's withdrawal. The court thus ordered respondent
to secure this consent. Respondent allegedly informed the court that complainant had become hostile and refused to sign his
motion.19 He, however, did not file an application with the court for it to determine whether he should be allowed to withdraw.
Granting that respondent's motion without complainant's consent was an application for withdrawal with the court, we find that
this reason is insufficient to justify his withdrawal from the case. Respondent's withdrawal was made on the ground that "there
no longer exist[ed] the . . . confidence" between them and that there had been "serious differences between them relating to the
manner of private prosecution."20
Rule 22.01 of Canon 22 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
CANON 22 — A LAWYER SHALL WITHDRAW HIS SERVICES ONLY FOR GOOD CAUSE AND UPON NOTICE APPROPRI-
ATE IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES.
Rule 22.01— A lawyer may withdraw his services in any of the following cases:
a) When the client pursues an illegal or immoral course of conduct in connection with the matter he is handling;
b) When the client insists that the lawyer pursue conduct violative of these canons and rules;
c) When his inability to work with co-counsel will not promote the best interest of the client;
d) When the mental or physical condition of the lawyer renders it difficult for him to carry out the employment effectively;
e) When the client deliberately fails to pay the fees for the services or fails to comply with the retainer agreement;
f) When the lawyer is elected or appointed to public office; and
g) Other similar cases.
A lawyer may withdraw his services from his client only in the following instances: (a) when a client insists upon an unjust or im-
moral conduct of his case; (b) when the client insists that the lawyer pursue conduct violative of the Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility; (c) when the client has two or more retained lawyers and the lawyers could not get along to the detriment of the
case; (d) when the mental or physical condition of the lawyer makes him incapable of handling the case effectively; (e) when the
client deliberately fails to pay the attorney's fees agreed upon; (f) when the lawyer is elected or appointed to public office; (g)
other similar cases.
The instant case does not fall under any of the grounds mentioned. Neither can this be considered analogous to the grounds
enumerated. As found by the Commission on Bar Discipline, this case arose from a simple misunderstanding between complai-
nant and respondent. Complainant was upset by respondent's absence at the hearing where bail was granted to the suspected
killers of her husband. She vehemently opposed the grant of bail. It was thus a spontaneous and natural reaction for her to con-
front respondent with his absence. Her belligerence arose from her overzealousness, nothing more. Complainant's words and
actions may have hurt respondent's feelings considering the work he had put into the case. But her words were uttered in a
burst of passion. And even at that moment, complainant did not expressly terminate respondent's services. She made this clear
when she refused to sign his "Motion to Withdraw as Counsel."
Assuming, nevertheless, that respondent was justified in terminating his services, he, however, cannot just do so and leave
complainant in the cold unprotected. The lawyer has no right to presume that his petition for withdrawal will be granted by the
court.21 Until his withdrawal shall have been approved, the lawyer remains counsel of record who is expected by his client as
well as by the court to do what the interests of his client require.22 He must still appear on the date of hearing23 for the attor-
ney-client relation does not terminate formally until there is a withdrawal of record.24
Respondent expressly bound himself under the contract to bring the criminal case to its termination. He was in fact paid in full
for his services. Respondent failed to comply with his undertaking, hence, it is but fair that he return to complainant half of the
amount paid him. The peculiar circumstances of the case have rendered it impossible for respondent and complainant to contin-
ue their relation under the contract.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent is admonished to exercise more prudence and judiciousness in dealing with his clients. He is
also ordered to return to complainant within fifteen (15) days from notice the amount of ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) repre-
senting a portion of his legal fees received from the latter with a warning that failure on his part to do so will result in the imposi-
tion of stiffer disciplinary action.
SO ORDERED.

CANON 22
A.C. No. 6934
HELEN CHANG, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JOSE R. HIDALGO, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
LEONEN, J.:
A lawyer cannot simply withdraw from a case without notice to the client and complying with the requirements in Rule 138, Sec-
tion 26 of the Rules of Court. Otherwise, the lawyer will be held liable for violating Canons 17 and 18 ofthe Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Complainant Helen Chang (Chang) filed this administrative Complaint1 before the Office of the Bar Confidant of this Court on
November 7, 2005. Chang prayed that this Court discipline respondent Atty. Jose R. Hidalgo (Atty. Hidalgo) for being remiss in
his duties as her counsel and as an officer of the court. 2 She claimed that Atty. Hidalgo failed to "handle [her] cases to the best
of his ability and to deal with [her] in all honesty and candor."3
In her Complaint, Chang alleged that she engaged the services of Atty. Hidalgo as legal counsel to represent her in several col-
lection cases pending in various courts.4 Pursuant to the contract they executed, Chang issued five (5) checks in favor of Atty.
Hidalgo totaling ₱52,000.00.5 Atty. Hidalgo also collected ₱9,500.00 as "hearing fee."6 Chang claimed that despite receiving a
total of ₱61,500.00, Atty. Hidalgo did not attend any of the hearings in the collection cases and, instead, sent another lawyer
without her consent.7 The other lawyer failed to attend all hearings, which resulted in the dismissal of the cases.8 Chang prayed
that Atty. Hidalgo be administratively disciplined by this Court.9
On December 12, 2005, Atty. Hidalgo was required to comment on the Complaint in the Resolution10. The Notice of Resolution
sent to Atty. Hidalgo in the address provided by Chang was returned unserved with the notation that Atty. Hidalgo had moved
out from the address.11
Chang was then ordered to submit Atty. Hidalgo’s correct and present address.12 She filed her Compliance13 and attached a
Certification14 from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines stating Atty. Hidalgo’s known address. This Court also ordered the Of-
fice of the Bar Confidant to provide Atty. Hidalgo’s address "as appearing in its files[.]"15
Still, notices of the Resolution dated December 12, 2005 sent to these addresses were returned unserved with the notation that
the addressee, Atty. Hildalgo, had already moved out.16
Finally, on October 31, 2007, Atty. Hidalgo received the Notice of the Resolution requiring him to comment.17 However, he still
failed to do so.18 Thus, in the Resolution19 dated June 2, 2008, this Court considered the submission of the comment as
waived and referred the case "to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report[,] and recommendation[.]"20
The Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines then set a Mandatory Conference/Hearing on Sep-
tember 30, 2008.21 During the mandatory conference, only Chang appeared.22 The Investigating Commissioner noted that the
notice for Atty. Hidalgo was returned and not served on him.23 In the Order24 dated September 30, 2008, the Investigating
Commissioner directed Atty. Hidalgo to file his Comment.25 This Order was received by Atty. Hidalgo.26
On November 10, 2008, the Commission on Bar Discipline received a handwritten and unverified Comment27 from Atty. Hidal-
go.28 In his Comment, Atty. Hidalgo admitted that Chang retained him as counsel but countered that he attended the hear-
ings.29 He denied allowing another lawyer to appear on his behalf.30 Although he denied waiving his appearance fee, he claim-
ed that he did not receive "such a sum [referring to the acceptance fee] from [Chang] mainly because of the length of time [that]
passed."31 Atty. Hidalgo insisted that due to the "transigient [sic] and uncooperative"32 attitude of Chang, he decided that he
"could no longer perform [his job as Chang’s counsel] adequately."33 He reasoned that he could not put up an effective defense
due to his illness and his impoverished state.34 He prayed that the administrative case against him be dismissed.35
After receiving the Comment, the Investigating Commissioner noted that it was not verified, in violation of the Rules of Proce-
dure of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.36 Thus, the Investigating Commissioner did not consider it.37 Instead, he set an-
other mandatory conference on January 13, 2009.38
This Order was again returned unserved.39 The notation in the returned Order stated "RTS [Return To Sender], Refused to Ac-
cept[.]"40 The Investigating Commissioner set another mandatory conference on February 11, 2009.41 Chang appeared, but
Atty. Hidalgo again failed to appear.42
On August 6, 2010, the Investigating Commissioner found Atty. Hidalgo guilty of gross misconduct and of violating Canons 17,
18, and 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.43 Investigating Commissioner Albert R. Sordan discussed:
While this Commission commiserates with the hard luck story and plight of the impecunious respondent, the indubitable fact re-
mains that his misconduct runs afoul with the Code of Professional Responsibility. Further, it is incumbent upon respondent to
meet the issue head-on and overcome the evidence against him. He must show proof that he still maintains that degree of mor-
ality and integrity which at all times is expected of him. These, respondent has failed miserably to do. The record is bereft of any
evidence to show that respondent has presented any countervailing evidence to dispute the charges against him. In his unveri-
fied and belated answer, he has not even denied complainant’s allegations. He has only prayed that the complaint be dismissed
out of pity for a man of straw.44
The dispositive portion of the Investigating Commissioner’s Report and Recommendation45 reads:
WHEREFORE, premised [sic] considered, respondent Atty. Joel R. Hidalgo has been found GUILTY of gross misconduct. Ac-
cordingly, it is hereby recommended that he be SUSPENDED for a period of TWO (2) YEARS from the practice of law, with
a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or a similar act will be dealt with more severely.46 (Emphasis in the original)
On December 14, 2012, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines passed the Resolution47 adopting with
modification the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. The Board of Governors recommended de-
creasing the penalty to one (1) year suspension from the practice of law and "[o]rdering [him] to [r]eturn the amount of Sixty One
thousand (P61,000.00) [sic] Pesos to complainant [Chang] within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice with legal interest reck-
oned from the time the demand was made."48
On April 11, 2013, Atty. Hidalgo moved for reconsideration.49 This time, he admitted receiving money from Chang as agreed at-
torney’s fees.50 He reiterated that he attended the hearings set for the cases.51 However, he claimed that he filed a Notice of
Withdrawal as Counsel due to Chang’s stubbornness and uncooperative behavior in the handling of the cases.52 Since he
transferred residence, he was not able to verify if the court granted his Notice of Withdrawal.53 Nonetheless, Atty. Hidalgo al-
leged that he was entitled to the acceptance fees for exerting time and effort in the preparation of the cases and in the collation
of evidence.54 He maintained that the return of the fees, as ordered by the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Phil-
ippines, was not possible because his only means of income was the Social Security System pension he has been receiving,
and even that was not enough for his health maintenance.55
On February 11, 2014, the Board of Governors denied56 Atty. Hidalgo’s Motion for Reconsideration.1âwphi1
We resolve whether respondent Atty. Jose R. Hidalgo is guilty of gross misconduct for failing to render legal services despite re-
ceipt of payment of legal fees.
In an administrative case against a lawyer, the complainant has the burden of proof to show by preponderance of evidence that
the respondent lawyer was remiss of his or her duties and has violated the provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibili-
ty.57
Here, it is established that respondent was engaged as counsel for complainant to represent her in various collection cases and
that he received ₱61,500.00 from her as attorney’s fees. Respondent also admitted withdrawing from the cases allegedly due to
complainant’s uncooperative demeanor. However, there is no showing that complainant agreed to the withdrawal, or that re-
spondent filed the proper motion before the courts where the cases were pending.
During the mandatory conferences before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, complainant appeared but respondent did not
make any appearance despite receiving notice.
Respondent failed to present proof that he performed any act in relation to complainant’s collection cases or attended the hear-
ings for the collection cases. Instead, respondent merely claimed:
Also, respondent [Atty. Hidalgo] devoted substantial time and energy in researching and preparing the case for trial, and he
even attended hearings to that effect. He exerted his best efforts in collating their evidences [sic] and their defense. However,
the complainant [Helen Chang] would not listen to respondent. Complainant has other matters and line of defense on her mind
because she keeps on insisting they do things her way. Respondent felt that he could no longer work for the complainant as
[sic]. Left without any recourse, respondent advised the complaint [sic] to seek the services of another lawyer as he could no
longer perform adequately and this was done in good faith. And the actuations of the complainant apparently precipitated the re-
spondent to file the withdrawal as counsel. The respondent is entitled to the acceptance fees he collected from the complainant,
or at least a portion of it.58
The Investigating Commissioner found that respondent failed to refute complainant’s allegations. Thus:
Prescinding from the foregoing, Atty. Hidalgo acknowledged the special retainer he had with Helen Chang. Atty. Hidalgo failed
to debunk claims of Helen Chang that he failed to perform his bounden duty despite receipt of the sixty-one thousand five hun-
dred pesos (₱61,500.00). Worse, the cases were dismissed summarily.59
We find respondent remiss of his duties as complainant’s counsel.
Respondent’s acts constitute violations of Canon 17 and Canon 18, Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
which state:
CANON 17 — A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in
him.
CANON 18 — A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
....
Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render
him liable.
In Layos v. Villanueva,60 this Court reiterated that a "lawyer must constantly keep in mind that his [or her] actions, omissions, or
nonfeasance would be binding upon his [or her] client."61
Due to respondent’s withdrawal as complainant’s counsel for the cases, he did not anymore attend any of the hearings. Since
the withdrawal was without the conformity of complainant, new counsel was not engaged. This necessarily resulted in the sum-
mary dismissal of the collection cases as alleged by complainant.
Complainant could have obtained the services of another lawyer to represent her and handle her cases with the utmost zeal
and diligence expected from officers of the court. However, respondent simply opted to withdraw from the cases without comply-
ing with the requirements under the Rules of Court and in complete disregard of his obligations towards his client.
Rule 138, Section 26 of the Rules of Court provides, in part:
RULE 138
Attorneys and Admission to Bar
....
SECTION 26. Change of attorneys. — An attorney may retire at any time from any action or special proceeding, by the written
consent of his client filed in court. He may also retire at any time from an action or special proceeding, without the consent of his
client, should the court, on notice to the client and attorney, and on hearing, determine that he ought to be allowed to retire. In
case of substitution, the name of the attorney newly employed shall be entered on the docket of the court in place of the former
one, and written notice of the change shall be given to the adverse party.
Respondent admittedly withdrew from the cases but he failed to provide any evidence to show that complainant, his client,
agreed to the withdrawal or, at the very least, knew about it. The offensive attitude of a client is not an excuse to just disappear
and withdraw from a case without notice to the court and to the client, especially when attorney’s fees have already been paid.
In Ramirez v. Buhayang-Margallo:62
The relationship between a lawyer and a client is "imbued with utmost trust and confidence." Lawyers are expected to exercise
the necessary diligence and competence in managing cases entrusted to them. They commit not only to review cases or give
legal advice, but also to represent their clients to the best of their ability without need to be reminded by either the client or the
court.63 (Citations omitted)
Similarly, in Nonato v. Fudolin, Jr.:64
A lawyer is bound to protect his client’s interests to the best of his ability and with utmost diligence. He should serve his client in
a conscientious, diligent, and efficient manner; and provide the quality of service at least equal to that which he, himself, would
expect from a competent lawyer in a similar situation. By consenting to be his client’s counsel, a lawyer impliedly represents that
he will exercise ordinary diligence or that reasonable degree of care and skill demanded by his profession, and his client may
reasonably expect him to perform his obligations diligently. The failure to meet these standards warrants the imposition of disci-
plinary action.65 (Citations omitted)
We sustain the Integrated Bar of the Philippines’ recommended penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of
one (1) year.
In several cases, this Court has imposed the penalty of one (1) year suspension from the practice of law for violation of Canons
17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.66
Further, restitution of acceptance fees to complainant is proper. Respondent failed to present any evidence to show his alleged
efforts for the cases. He failed to attend any of the hearings before the Commission on Bar Discipline. There is no reason for re-
spondent to retain the professional fees paid by complainant for her collection cases when there was no showing that respond-
ent performed any act in furtherance of these cases.67
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Jose R. Hidalgo is found guilty of violating Canon 17 and Canon 18, Rule 18.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year, with warning that repetition
of the same or similar acts will merit a more severe penalty. Respondent is also ORDERED to return to complainant Helen
Chang the amount of P61,500.00, with interest at 6% per annum from the date of promulgation of this Resolution until fully paid.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondent's personal record as
attorney, to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and to the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts
throughout the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

CANON 1

A.M. No. MTJ-05-1591. July 14, 2005

RODRIGO "JING" N. VIDAL, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE JAIME L. DOJILLO, JR., Municipal Trial Court, Manaoag, Pangasinan, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a complaint filed by complainant Rodrigo "Jing" N. Vidal against Judge Jaime L. Dojillo, Jr., Presiding Judge of the
Municipal Trial Court of Manaoag,Pangasinan.
The antecedent facts, as accurately narrated in the report of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), are as follows:
The Hon. Jaime L. Dojillo, Jr., Presiding Judge of Municipal Trial Court at Manaoag, Pangasinan is here charged with "Miscon-
duct." The charge stemmed from an Election Protest filed by the brother of Judge Dojillo at the Municipal Circuit Trial Court sta-
tioned at San Fabian, Pangasinan to protest the proclamation of herein complainant as Barangay Captain in the 2002 election.
Mr. Vidal [herein complainant] alleged that during the 29 and 30 July 2003 hearings of the Election Protest, Judge Dojillo "sat
beside the counsel of his brother" and "actively coached, aided, assisted, and guided said counsel by now and then saying
something, handing piece of writing, reminding, and or stopping the counsel from manifesting something to the court, and other
similar acts."
Complainant continued that herein respondent’s "assertive presence and display of partisan activities in full public view could
not have been ignored or unnoticed by the court a quo and would give the impression and suspicion of partiality of the said court
in favor of respondent’s brother."
Judge Dojillo admitted that he was present during the mentioned hearings but explained that he did not sit beside his brother’s
lawyer but in the area reserved for the public; and that the main reason why he was there was to observe how election protests
are conducted as he has never conducted one. His other reason was to give moral support to his brother.
This matter was referred for investigation and, in her report, the Hon. Tita Rodriguez-Villarin, Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 46,
Urdaneta City observed that:
From the evidence submitted by the parties, [the] undersigned noted that although the complainant and his witness claim they
saw the respondent talking to the lawyer and respondent’s brother and handing notes they did not hear the alleged conversa-
tion and they did not state what were those notes. Neither did they see respondent do other acts to interfere with the proceed-
ings.
Considering that the presence of the respondent during the hearings of the election protest of his brother was admitted by both
parties, the only issue left is whether or not such presence constitutes misconduct. In this respect, [the] undersigned further not-
ed that the complainant, by himself or thru his lawyer, did not call the attention of the court much less raised objection to the re-
spondent’s presence. This is an indication that during the hearings[,] respondent’s presence did not stir any impression or suspi-
cion of intention to influence [the] court’s ruling. As declared by the complainant, he became suspicious and apprehensive he
lost the case even before receiving the decision when he was informed later that not having a brother judge he was surely a los-
er.
The OCA then recommended that the complaint against respondent be dismissed but respondent judge should be advised to
be more circumspect in his actions in the future.
We do not agree with the OCA recommendation.
Respondent, in his defense, stated that he attended the hearing of his brother’s election protest case just to give moral support
and, in the process, also observe how election protest proceedings are conducted. Although concern for family members is
deeply ingrained in the Filipino culture, respondent, being a judge, should bear in mind that he is also called upon to serve the
higher interest of preserving the integrity of the entire judiciary. Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct requires a judge to
avoid not only impropriety but also the mere appearance of impropriety in all activities. Even if respondent did not intend to use
his position as a judge to influence the outcome of his brother’s election protest, it cannot be denied that his presence in the
courtroom during the hearing of his brother’s case would immediately give cause for the community to suspect that his being a
colleague in the judiciary would influence the judge trying the case to favor his brother. The fact that neither complainant nor his
counsel objected to the presence of respondent during the hearing is immaterial. Respondent himself should have refrained
from publicly showing his seemingly active interest and participation in the case, for he does not deny that he whispered and
passed notes to his brother’s lawyer during the course of the hearing. Thus, we emphasize our ruling in Cañeda vs.
Alaan,1 that:
Judges are required not only to be impartial but also to appear to be so, for appearance is an essential manifestation of reality.
Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to avoid not just impropriety in their conduct but even the mere appear-
ance of impropriety.
They must conduct themselves in such a manner that they give no ground for reproach.
[Respondent’s] acts have been less than circumspect. He should have kept himself free from any appearance of impropriety
and endeavored to distance himself from any act liable to create an impression of indecorum.
...
This reminder applies all the more sternly to municipal trial court judges like respondent because they are the judicial frontliners
who have direct contact with the parties. They are the embodiments of the people’s sense of justice. . . .
Indeed, respondent must always bear in mind that:
A judicial office traces a line around his official as well as personal conduct, a price one has to pay for occupying an
exalted position in the judiciary, beyond which he may not freely venture. Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct en-
joins a judge to avoid not just impropriety in the performance of judicial duties but in all his activities whether in his
public or private life. He must conduct himself in a manner that gives no ground for reproach. (Emphasis supplied)
Verily, respondent failed to live up to the degree of propriety required of him by the Code of Judicial Conduct.
In view of the all the foregoing, Judge Jaime L. Dojillo, Jr., is found GUILTY of violation of Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct and is hereby REPRIMANDED with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts would be dealt with more
severely.
SO ORDERED.

CANON 2

A.M. No. RTJ-11-2270 January 31, 2011

(Formerly A.M. No. OCA IPI No. 10-3380-RTJ)
ELADIO D. PERFECTO, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE ALMA CONSUELO DESALES-ESIDERA, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Catarman, Northern
Samar, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Eladio D. Perfecto (complainant), in a Complaint1 which was received at the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) on March 5,
2010, charges Judge Alma Consuelo Esidera (respondent), Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Northern Sa-
mar, Branch 20, of soliciting and receiving on January 6, 2010 at the Prosecutor’s Office the amount of One Thousand
(₱1,000.00) from practitioner Atty. Albert Yruma (Atty. Yruma), and the same amount from Public Prosecutor Rosario Diaz
(Prosecutor Diaz), purportedly to defray expenses for a religious celebration and barangay fiesta. To prove her charge, complai-
nant attached the Affidavit2 dated February 16, 2010 of Public Prosecutor Ruth Arlene Tan-Ching (Prosecutor Ching) who claim-
ed to have witnessed the first incident, without respondent issuing any receipt. In the same Affidavit, Prosecutor Ching added
that she "heard" that respondent also solicited the same amount from Prosecutor Diaz.
Complainant also questions the conduct of respondent in Special Proceedings No. C-360, "for Cancellation of Birth Registration
of Alpha Acibar," in which she issued a January 5, 2010 Order directing the therein petitioner to publish said Order in a newspa-
per of general circulation, instead of in the Catarman Weekly Tribune (of which complainant is the publisher), the only accredited
newspaper in the province.
Furthermore, complainant charges respondent with acts of impropriety ─ scolding her staff in open court and treating in an "in-
human and hostile" manner practitioners "who are not her friends." He adds that respondent even arrogantly treats public prose-
cutors assigned to her sala, citing instances of this charge in his complaint.
To the first charge, respondent explains that when she went to the Prosecutor’s office, she was merely following up the pledge
of Adelaida Taldo, a member of a Catholic charismatic group of which she (respondent) belongs, to donate a Sto. Niño image
when Atty. Yruma, who had received a solicitation letter countersigned by Father Alwin Legaspi, the parish priest of San Jose,
overheard her (respondent) and requested her to receive his donation of ₱1,000.00 through her.
Respondent brushes off the above-stated Affidavit of Prosecutor Ching who, she opines, is of "dubious personality" and has a
"narcissistic personality disorder," the details of the bases of which she narrates in her Comment.3
Respecting the complaint against her Order of publication, respondent claims that the Catarman Weekly Tribune is "not in circu-
lation." Respondent echoes her Comment in A.M. OCA IPI No. 10-3340-RTJ, a complaint previously filed by complainant bear-
ing on his claim that all orders of the court should be published in Catarman Weekly Tribune, in which Comment she listed pend-
ing cases the hearing of which had to be reset for failure of the Catarman Weekly Tribune to publish her orders on time.
As for the charge of impropriety, respondent denies the instances thereof cited by complainant in his complaint and claims that
she has been maintaining a professional relationship with her staff and the lawyers who appear in her court.
The OCA has come up with the following:
EVALUATION: There is merit in the allegation of impropriety against respondent Judge Esidera.
xxxx
The fact that she is not the principal author of the solicitation letter or that the solicitation is for a religious cause is immaterial.
Respondent Judge Esidera should have known that going to the Prosecutor’s Office to receive "donations" from a private
lawyer and a public prosecutor does not bode well for the image of the judiciary. Canon 4 of the Code of Judicial Con-
duct for the Judiciary (A.M. No. 03-05-01-SC; date of effectivity: 1 June 2004) explicitly provides that "judges shall avoid impro-
priety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities."
xxxx
Soliciting donations from lawyers is not the only act of impropriety from respondent Judge Esidera. In a 27 May 2010 Comment,
respondent Judge Esidera virtually gave Public Prosecutor Atty. Ruth Arlene Tan-Ching a verbal lashing for the affidavit the
latter executed relative to the solicitation incident. To quote pertinent portions of the Comment of respondent Judge Esidera:
"The affidavit of Fiscal Ruth Arlene Ching should not be believed and accepted simply because she is a fiscal. Not all prosecu-
tors are credible and have integrity and are in possession of their normal mental faculties. x x x Fiscal Ching is one whose per-
sonality is dubious."
"I get the impression that she (Prosecutor Ching) is suffering from some sort of personality disorder and should be subjected to
neurological, psychiatric or psychological examination before she gets worse x x x Having read enough psychological examina-
tion reports of psychologists/psychiatrists submitted in annulment cases, it is my non-expert opinion that the character of Fiscal
Ching falls under the category of narcissistic personality disorder."
"She was one of my students in Taxation in the UEP, College of Law, I was not a judge then. I gave her a ‘3’ because when I
checked her finals test booklet, her ‘codigo’ was still inserted in the examination booklet. Until now, that is one of the gossips
she is spreading around."
xxxx
The use of acerbic words was uncalled for considering the status of respondent Judge Esidera. In Atty. Guanzon, et al.
v. Judge Rufon (A.M. No. RTJ-07-2038; 19 October 2007), the Court found respondent Judge Rufon guilty of vulgar and unbe-
coming conduct for uttering discriminatory remarks against women lawyers and litigants.
"Although respondent judge may attribute his intemperate language to human frailty, his noble position in the bench neverthe-
less demands from him courteous speech in and out of the court. Judges are demanded to be always temperate, patient and
courteous both in conduct and in language," held the Court in the Guanzon case.
Anent the allegations of ignorance of the law and usurpation of authority against respondent Judge Esidera, for issuing a direc-
tive to the petitioner in a special proceedings case to cause the publication of her order in a newspaper of general publication,
this Office finds the same devoid of merit.
Complainant Perfecto had made a similar allegation in OCA I.P.I. No. 10-3340-RTJ, insisting that all orders from the courts of
Northern Samar should only be published in the Catarman Weekly Tribune, the only accredited newspaper in the area.
xxxx
[T]hat Catarman Weekly Tribune is the only accredited newspaper of general publication in Catarman does not bar the publica-
tion of judicial orders and notices in a newspaper of national circulation. A judicial notice/order may be published in a newspaper
of national circulation and said newspaper does not even have to be accredited.
Section 1 of A.M. No. 01-1-07-SC thus provides:
SECTION 1. Scope of application. ─ These Guidelines apply only in cases where judicial or legal notices are to be published in
newspapers or periodicals that are of general circulation in a particular province or city.
Publication of notices for national dissemination may be published in newspapers or periodicals with national circulation without
need of accreditation.
Adopting the comments she made in OCA I.P.I. No. 10-3340-RTJ to the instant case, respondent Judge Esidera claims that she
only arrived at the decision to direct the publication of her orders in a newspaper of national circulation after repeated failure of
the Catarman Weekly Tribune to meet the publication requirements in other pending cases in the court. Respondent Judge Esi-
dera even presented a list of cases where the hearings therein had to be reset because of the failure of the Catarman Weekly
Tribune to publish the pertinent orders on time.
Moreover, the petitioner in the subject special proceedings case where respondent Judge Esidera issued the directive did not
contest the order calling for the publication of the court’s order in a newspaper of national circulation. 4 (emphasis and under-
scoring supplied)
Thus, the OCA RECOMMENDS that respondent be faulted for Impropriety and Unbecoming Conduct for which a fine in the
amount of Five Thousand Pesos (₱5,000.00) should be imposed, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall
be dealt with more severely.
While the Court finds the Evaluation and Recommendation of the OCA that respondent be charged with Impropriety and Unbe-
coming Conduct to be well-taken, it deems the recommendation for the imposition of a fine in the amount of ₱5,000.00 to be in-
sufficient as would impress upon her the gravity of the indictment. Respondent’s improprieties as manifested in, among other
things, her lack of discretion and the vicious attack upon the person of Prosecutor Ching as characterized by her use of uncalled
for offensive language prompts this Court to raise the fine to Ten Thousand Pesos (₱10,000.00).5
Specifically with respect to respondent’s alleged solicitation from Prosecutor Diaz, albeit Prosecutor Ching merely claimed to
have "heard" of it, respondent did not deny it categorically as she merely, as reflected above, brushed off Prosecutor’s Ching’s
Affidavit as coming from one with a "dubious personality" and possessed of a "narcissistic personality disorder." With respect to
the alleged solicitation from Prosecutor Diaz, respondent never disclaimed or disavowed the same.
Respondent’s admission of having received the sum of P1,000.00 from Atty. Yruma – albeit allegedly as a mere accommoda-
tion to the latter, and her failure to disclaim the same act with respect to Prosecutor Diaz, only confirms her lack of understand-
ing of the notion of propriety under which judges must be measured.1âwphi1
In his Annotation on Judges Fraternizing with Lawyers and Litigants,6 Jorge C. Coquia7 commented on the Spirit and Philosophy
of Canon 2 on Impropriety of Judges, viz:
In Castillo vs. Calanog, Jr., 199 SCRA 75 (1991), the Supreme Court said that the Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the
conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of impropriety not only with respect to his performance of his official duties, but also to
his behavior outside his sala and as a private individual. There is no dichotomy of
morality. A public official is also judged by his private morality being the subject of constant public scrutiny. A judge should freely
and willingly accept restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen. (emphasis and under-
scoring supplied)
Respondent’s act of proceeding to the Prosecutor’s Office under the guise of soliciting for a religious cause betrays not only her
lack of maturity as a judge but also a lack of understanding of her vital role as an impartial dispenser of justice, held in high es-
teem and respect by the local community, which must be preserved at all times. It spawns the impression that she was using
her office to unduly influence or pressure Atty. Yruma, a private lawyer appearing before her sala, and Prosecutor Diaz into do-
nating money through her charismatic group for religious purposes.1âwphi1
To stress how the law frowns upon even any appearance of impropriety in a magistrate’s activities, it has often been held that a
judge must be like Caesar’s wife - above suspicion and beyond reproach.8 Respondent’s act discloses a deficiency in prudence
and discretion that a member of the judiciary must exercise in the performance of his official functions and of his activities as a
private individual.
It is never trite to caution respondent to be prudent and circumspect in both speech and action, keeping in mind that her conduct
in and outside the courtroom is always under constant observation.9
WHEREFORE, Judge Alma Consuelo Desales-Esidera is, for Impropriety and Unbecoming Conduct, ORDERED to pay a fine
of Ten Thousand Pesos (₱10,000.00) and WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severe-
ly.
SO ORDERED.

CANON 3

A.M. No. MTJ-06-1636 March 12, 2007

[Formerly OCA IPI No. 05-1662-MTJ]
JULIO B. VERZOSA, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE MANUEL E. CONTRERAS, Municipal Trial Court, Ocampo, Camarines Sur, Respondent.

RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a Verified Complaint1 dated December 30, 2004 of Julio B. Verzosa (complainant) charging Judge Manuel E. Con-
treras (respondent), Municipal Trial Court (MTC), Ocampo, Camarines Sur with Grave Abuse of Authority, Grave Misconduct
(Harassment and Oppression), and Violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, relative to Criminal Case No. 2071, entitled "Peo-
ple of the Philippines v. Rodrigo E. Candelaria."
Complainant alleges: he is a forest ranger of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Protected Area Of-
fice. On April 14, 2004, while conducting surveillance on treasure hunting activities in Mt. Isarog Natural Park, Ocampo, Camar-
ines Sur, he and his co-forest rangers discovered an open pit left in damaged condition, allegedly in violation of Republic Act
No. 7586. They likewise found and confiscated in favor of the Government two metal chains used to overturn huge stones in the
treasure hunting site. He found out later that the alleged treasure hunters were led by a certain Jose Credo (Credo) a.k.a. "Lab-
aw" and Basilio Sumalde (Sumalde) a.k.a. "Moren". The Executive Director of the DENR Region V Office thereafter ordered the
complainant to continue monitoring the said treasure hunting site. Because of his involvement in the treasure hunting activities
and on the basis of the testimony of Credo, he was implicated as an accessory in Criminal Case No. 2071 against Rodrigo Can-
delaria (Candelaria), et al. for robbery. The said case arose from the alleged information relayed by respondent to the Philippine
National Police (PNP) Officers of Ocampo, Camarines Sur in the morning of April 18, 2004, which led to the arrest of the princi-
pal accused. Respondent did not inhibit himself from conducting the preliminary investigation despite his proven bias against all
of the accused, in apparent violation of the guiding principles of Judicial Ethics and Responsibilities. Complainant was not
among the persons on board the truck when the same was apprehended by members of the PNP on April 18, 2004. On the ba-
sis of the affidavit executed by Credo, respondent hastily issued an order for complainant's arrest. After the information reducing
the charge from robbery to simple theft was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 32, Pili, Camarines Sur, Judge
Nilo Malanyaon, in an Order dated September 13, 2004 dismissed the case due to lack of probable cause. Respondent is the
mastermind behind the treasure hunting activities in Ocampo, Camarines Sur and the robbery case for which complainant was
implicated as an accessory was a way of harassing anybody who opposes the activities.
In his Comment,2 respondent contends: on the latter part of March 2004, he went on mountain hiking at Mt. Isarog with the Tina-
blanan River as his destination. While at Mt. Isarog, he received an information that Candelaria, known confidant of the person-
nel of the DENR and by the CARE Philippines, was looting by dismantling the tower antennae of the Philippine Long Distance
and Telephone Company (PLDT) used as a relay station but already inoperational. The PLDT Tower is already a government
property and declared by the provincial government as a tourist attraction and destination being strategically located at the tow-
ering heights of Mt. Isarog. The activity of looting the steel trusses and bars of the PLDT Tower had been going on since Janu-
ary 2004. He directed the police of Ocampo, Camarines Sur to investigate the looting of the steel trusses and bars of the PLDT
Tower. The second time that he went on mountain hiking at Tinablanan River on April 18, 2004, he was again informed that the
steel trusses and bars of the PLDT Tower were already being loaded in a truck bound for the junkshop in Naga City. With the
use of a binocular, he was able to personally confirm the report. He immediately called the PNP Regional Intelligence Group
and in a checkpoint set up by the police, the truck was apprehended with Candelaria and several men aboard. On April 19,
2004, the OIC-Chief of Police of Ocampo, Camarines Sur filed a criminal complaint for robbery before the MTC of Ocampo, Ca-
marines Sur docketed as Criminal Case No. 2071 for preliminary investigation. Upon conclusion of the preliminary investigation
and finding probable cause against the accused for robbery, respondent forwarded the records to the Provincial Prosecutor of
Camarines Sur for appropriate action. However, the provincial prosecutor modified the charge of robbery to theft, and the corre-
sponding information was filed with the RTC, Branch 32, Pili, Camarines Sur, docketed as Criminal Case No. P-3647, presided
by Judge Malanyaon. The latter, finding no probable cause, dismissed the case against complainant and likewise ordered the
arresting officer to adduce additional evidence against the remaining accused for determination of judicial probable cause. Hav-
ing failed to do so, Judge Malanyaon dismissed Criminal Case No. P-3647. Persons motivated with ill-will against him were just
making a failed and porous connection to the alleged treasure hunting activity. If respondent was subsequently seen at Zone 2,
Del Rosario, Ocampo, Camarines Sur after the apprehension of those involved in the looting at the PLDT Tower, it was because
he was then conducting the preliminary investigation in Criminal Case No. 2071 having inquisitorial authority to extend his inves-
tigation on the area. The complainant's surmise that he is the mastermind of the alleged treasure hunting of the group of Su-
malde was based on the alleged information relayed to complainant by Myrna Dacer, Daisy Moran, Salvacion Candelaria, Anali-
za Candelaria, and Mary Ann Candelaria. Complainant imputed bias against him when he did not inhibit from conducting the
preliminary investigation in Criminal Case No. 2071 despite prior knowledge of the looting at the PLDT Tower. Prior knowledge
of the commission of a crime is not a mandatory ground for a first level court judge to recuse himself from conducting prelimina-
ry investigation. It was just incidental that he caused the apprehension of the truck loaded with stolen trusses and bars of the
PLDT Tower. Preliminary investigation is a quasi-judicial function of an MTC judge. The matter of issuance of a warrant of arrest
is discretionary and judicial in nature which is authorized under the rules. If ever complainant perceived that irregularities attend-
ed the issuance of a warrant of arrest against him, he has all available judicial remedies, such as filing a motion to quash war-
rant of arrest, habeas corpus proceedings, or certiorari, but none was availed of by complainant despite being represented and
assisted by a retained counsel. Under the Rules, the result/recommendation of the investigating judge during the preliminary in-
vestigation is subject to review or appropriate action by the provincial prosecutor. The finding of probable cause against the ac-
cused in Criminal Case No. 2071 was sustained by the provincial prosecutor of Camarines Sur upon review, although the rec-
ommended charge of robbery was modified to theft. The dismissal by Judge Malanyaon of the information for theft finding that
no probable cause exists should not militate or be taken against him. He discharged his duties as investigating judge regularly
with faithful adherence to the law and the rules, and he acted in good faith and without malice in his conduct of the preliminary
investigation. The Sangguniang Bayan of Ocampo, Camarines Sur, rendered a committee report stating that an ocular inspec-
tion had been conducted on the alleged site of treasure hunting and they were able to confirm that it was indeed a fishpond
loaded with so many growing fish and not a site of treasure hunting.
In the Agenda Report,3 the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) submitted its evaluation and recommendation, to wit:
EVALUATION:
xxxx
The complainant, in branding the respondent Judge as the mastermind of the alleged treasure hunting activities in Ocampo, Ca-
marines Sur, relied heavily on the narrations of and affidavits executed by Myrna Dacer, Daisy Moran, Salvacion Candelaria,
Analiza and Mary Ann Candelaria. Clearly, these narrations/affidavits are not based on the complainant's own personal knowl-
edge but rather on the personal knowledge of the said persons. The same are, thus, considered hearsay because their proba-
tive force depends, in whole or in part, on the competency and credibility of some persons other tha[n] the complainant. (Estra-
da vs. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, April 3, 2001). For being hearsay, the same are insufficient and inconclusive to deter-
mine the participation of the respondent Judge in the alleged treasure hunting activities in Ocampo, Camarines Sur. In this light,
the complainant failed to submit substantial evidence to support his imputation that the respondent Judge is the mastermind be-
hind the treasure hunting activities in Ocampo, Camarines Sur.
With respect to the issuance of warrant of arrest, such issue is judicial and may be best resolved through judicial adjudication.
As correctly pointed out by the respondent Judge, if there are irregularities in the issuance of warrant against the complainant,
the latter has all available judicial remedies, such as filing a motion to quash, an action for habeas corpus, or a special civil ac-
tion for certiorari. However, the complainant chose not to avail of any judicial remedy.
To merit disciplinary sanction, the error or mistake committed by a judge should be patent, gross, malicious, deliberate, or done
in bad faith and absent a clear showing that the judge has acted errantly; the issue becomes judicial in character and would not
properly warrant the imposition of administrative punishment (Godinez vs. Alano, 303 SCRA 259).
At any rate, the respondent Judge followed the letter of the law, specifically Rule 112, Section 6, paragraph b, when, prior to the
issuance of warrant of arrest against the complainant, he personally conducted preliminary examination in the form of searching
questions and answers on witness Jose Credo and upon finding probable cause and the necessity to place the complainant un-
der custody in order [not] to frustrate the ends of justice.
Anent the respondent Judge's failure to inhibit himself in conducting the preliminary investigation in Criminal Case No. 2071, he
violated Rule 3.12 of the Code of Judicial Conduct (now Canon 3, Section 5 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct) for taking part
in a proceeding where he has personal knowledge of the disputed evidentiary facts. Respondent Judge admitted having prior
knowledge of the looting and dismantling of the PLDT Tower in Ocampo, Camarines Sur. As a matter of fact, he was able to vis-
ually confirm the said activities which he later relayed to the local PNP and led to the arrest of the principal accused in the said
case. [The] Judge still conducted the preliminary investigation.
It should be noted, however, that while no motion for inhibition of respondent judge was filed by the complainant during the pre-
liminary investigation stage of the case, this does not mean that respondent can freely act on the same despite the lingering
doubt created in the minds of the parties that he would not be impartial in his judgment.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than
those mentioned above. While the first paragraph of Article 137 provides for the specific grounds for disqualification and gives
the judicial officer no discretion to sit in a case, the second paragraph leaves the matter of inhibition to the sound discretion of
the judge (People vs. Serrano, 203 SCRA 17).
It does not explicitly enumerate the specific grounds for inhibition but provides a broad policy-oriented ground for disqualification
of judges for just and valid reasons other than those enumerated in the first paragraph (Geotina vs. Gonzales, 41 SCRA 66).
The judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case for just and valid reasons (Paray-
no vs. Meneses, 231 SCRA 807) other than those mentioned in Rule 137, Section 1. The ultimate test in determining the validity
of the court's inhibition is whether or not the petitioner is deprived of fair and impartial trial (Associacion de Agricultures de Talis-
ay-Silay, Inc. vs. Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc., 88 SCRA 294) and the cold neutrality of an impartial judge.
RECOMMENDATION: Respectfully submitted for the consideration of the Honorable Court are our recommendations that:
1. The instant matter be re-docketed as a regular administrative case;
2. Judge Manuel E. Contreras, Municipal Trial Court of Ocampo, Camarines Sur be admonished for violation of Canon 3, Sec-
tion 5 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct with a warning that repetition of the same or similar offense in the future shall be
dealt with more severely.
On September 5, 2006 and September 26, 2006, complainant and respondent manifested their willingness to submit the case
for decision/ resolution based on the pleadings filed, respectively.
We agree with the findings of the OCA except that respondent should be reprimanded instead of being merely admonished.
Preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded
belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.4
The issue of whether a judge should voluntarily inhibit himself is addressed to his sound discretion pursuant to paragraph 2 of
Section 1, Rule 137, Rules of Court, which provides that a judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself
from sitting in a case, for a just or valid reason other than those mentioned in the first paragraph.5
However, respondent failed to consider the proscription under Rule
3.12(a) of Canon 3, Code of Judicial Conduct, to wit:
Rule 3.12. - A judge should take no part in a proceeding where the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned. These
cases include, among others, proceedings where:
(a) the judge has personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding.
In Oktubre v. Velasco,6 citing Perez v. Suller,7 we held that the rule on disqualification of judges under Rule 3.12 and Section 1,
Rule 137 -
[S]tems from the principle that no judge should preside in a case in which he is not wholly free, disinterested, impartial and inde-
pendent. A Judge should not handle a case in which he might be perceived to be susceptible to bias and partiality. The rule is
intended to preserve the people’s faith and confidence in the courts of justice.8
True, a judge should possess proficiency in law so that he can competently construe and enforce the law. However, it is more
important that he should act and behave in such a manner that the parties before him have confidence in his impartiality. In-
deed, even conduct that gives rise to the mere appearance of partiality is proscribed.9
Records reveal that respondent had prior knowledge of the looting and dismantling at the PLDT Tower in Ocampo, Camarines
Sur and he was instrumental in the apprehension of the robbers. Respondent should have been aware of the impropriety of con-
ducting the preliminary investigation considering that Rule 3.12(a), Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins a judge
from taking part in proceedings where the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned. Respondent ignored said rule,
warranting disciplinary sanction from this Court.
Respondent's averment that prior knowledge of the commission of a crime is not a mandatory ground for the first level court
judge to recuse himself from conducting preliminary investigation, holds no water. As a judge, respondent must keep himself
abreast with the law. He should have known that it is well entrenched in the Code of Judicial Conduct, prevailing at that time,
that personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding disqualifies him from taking part in such pro-
ceeding as the same would necessarily spawn a perception that he is bias and impartial. It is of no moment that the finding of
probable cause was sustained by the provincial prosecutor. What is of paramount importance is the perceived bias and impar-
tiality by the complainant against respondent in his conduct of the preliminary investigation due to respondent's prior knowledge
of the looting at the PLDT Tower, respondent being instrumental in the apprehension of the robbers.
Although respondent should have inhibited himself from conducting the preliminary investigation, it did not render as void the act
of respondent in issuing a warrant of arrest. He acted within the bounds of the then existing Section 6(b), Rule 11210 of the
Rules of Court which provides, inter alia, that without waiting for the conclusion of the investigation, the judge may issue a war-
rant of arrest if he finds after an examination in writing and under oath of the complainant and his witnesses in the form of
searching questions and answers, that a probable cause exists and that there is a necessity of placing the respondent under im-
mediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.
The OCA rightly observed that respondent followed the letter of the existing Rule, when, prior to the issuance of warrant of ar-
rest against complainant, respondent personally conducted preliminary examination in the form of searching questions and an-
swers on witness Credo. The purpose of issuing the warrant of arrest was to place the respondents under immediate custody in
order not to frustrate the ends of justice.11 Whether it is necessary to place the accused in custody is left to the judge’s sound
judgment.12
Moreover, the OCA correctly sustained respondent’s claim that if ever complainant perceived that irregularities attended the is-
suance of warrant of arrest against him, he has all available judicial remedies,13 such as filing a motion to quash warrant of ar-
rest, habeas corpus proceedings, or certiorari, but none was availed of by complainant.
In Lumbos v. Baliguat,14 we held that as a matter of policy, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to discipli-
nary action. He cannot be subjected to liability - civil, criminal, or administrative - for any of his official acts, no matter how erro-
neous, as long as he acts in good faith.15 To hold, otherwise, would be to render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon
to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment.16 An inquiry into the
administrative liability of a judge may be resorted to only after the available remedies have been exhausted and decided with fi-
nality.17 For until there is a final declaration by the appellate court that the challenged order or judgment is manifestly erroneous,
there will be no basis to conclude whether respondent is administratively liable.18 The Court has to be shown acts or conduct of
the judge clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice before the latter can be branded the stigma of being biased and parti-
al.19 Thus, not every error or mistake that a judge commits in the performance of his duties renders him liable, unless he is
shown to have acted in bad faith or with deliberate intent to do an injustice.20 Good faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives
or improper considerations are sufficient defenses in which a judge x x x can find refuge.21
Anent the allegation that respondent is the mastermind behind the treasure hunting activities in Ocampo, Camarines Sur, we
find the allegation to be devoid of merit.
In Español v. Mupas,22 we held that in administrative proceedings, complainants have the burden of proving by substantial evi-
dence the allegations in their complaints. Thus, when the complainant relies mainly on second-hand information to prove the
charges against the respondent, the complaint is reduced into a bare indictment or mere speculation.23 The Court cannot give
credence to charges based on mere suspicion or speculation. In this case, complainant failed to discharge that burden. As aptly
observed by the OCA, complainant has no personal knowledge of the treasure hunting by respondent as he relied only on the
information relayed to him by the relatives of the accused Candelaria in the robbery case.
Furthermore, we find that the affidavits of Myrna Dacer, Daisy Moran, Salvacion Candelaria, Analiza Candelaria, and Mary Ann
Candelaria relate to the incident surrounding the arrest of Dante Dacer, one of the accused in the robbery case. The police blot-
ter which is not even a certified true copy is an alleged threat made by respondent against Mary Ann Candelaria. Nowhere in
the said documents do we find that respondent was being tagged as the mastermind of the treasure hunting. Taken all together,
these documents have no prima facie evidentiary value as to warrant further investigation on the matter.
In Mataga v. Rosete,24 we held that any administrative complaint leveled against a judge must always be examined with a dis-
criminating eye, for its consequential effects are by their nature highly penal, such that the respondent judge stands to face the
sanction of dismissal or disbarment. Mere imputation of judicial misconduct in the absence of sufficient proof to sustain the
same will never be countenanced.25 If a judge should be disciplined for misconduct, the evidence against him should be compe-
tent.26
In fine, we find that respondent is merely guilty of violating the Code of Judicial Conduct in not recusing himself from conducting
preliminary investigation.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Manuel E. Contreras, MTC, Ocampo, Camarines Sur guilty of violation of Rule 3.12(a),
Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and is REPRIMANDED with warning that a repetition of the same or similar act in the
future shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

CANON 4

A.M. No. RTJ-00-1530 March 14, 2001

(Formerly OCA IPI No. 99-725-RTJ)
DR. EDGARDO ALDAY, MERCEDES FAVIS, MARNA VILLAFUERTE, and CHRISTOPHER GARCIA, complainants,
vs.
JUDGE ESCOLASTICO U. CRUZ, JR., Branch 58, Regional Trial Court, Makati City, respondent.
QUISUMBING, J.:
Complainants seek the dismissal of respondent judge allegedly for threatening them with a gun during a traffic incident.
In their verified complaint,1 complainants alleged that on May 6, 1999, the van they were riding was about to exit the Cityland
Condominium at Pioneer St., Mandaluyong City. When they reached the entrance/exit ramp, respondent arrived in his car and
blocked the ramp. As a result, neither vehicle could move. Respondent alighted from his car and went over to the van. He shout-
ed "Putang ina ninyo, anong gusto ninyo mangyari?," while brandishing a gun and pointing it at the occupants of the van.
On June 14, 1999, the OCA required respondent to comment.2 Respondent admitted that there was a traffic altercation. Howev-
er, he claimed that it was complainants' van which blocked the ramp. He said that he merely alighted from his car to vent his ire
at the inept security guard who did not even help them untangle the traffic snarl. He categorically denied any gun-poking inci-
dent.
The complaint was re-docketed as a regular administrative matter and referred to Office of the Court Administrator Consultant,
Justice Romulo S. Quimbo, for investigation, report and recommendation.3
During the hearing, the parties presented conflicting versions of the incident. These are succinctly summarized by the OCA Con-
sultant, and we present both sides for better appreciation of the facts.
On one hand, complainants testified as follows:
1. Dr. Edgardo S. Alday, 67 years old, a physician by profession, identified and affirmed the truth of the sworn statement (Exhib-
it A, Rollo, pp. 5-6) he executed at the Eastern Police District Headquarters on May 7, 1999. Said statement was submitted as
part of his direct testimony. In said statement, Dr. Alday declared that on May 6, 1999, and he and several companions were
aboard his Mercedes Benz van. As they were leaving the parking area of the Cityland Condominium (Cityland for brevity) at Pio-
neer St., Mandaluyong City, shortly after noon, a car with Plate No. 16 NCR 58 met them blocking their way out. At this juncture,
the security guard motioned to them to back up so that the incoming vehicle could enter. While the van was slowly backing up,
the respondent who was driving his car was going forward almost pushing the van and at the same time pointing a gun at them
through the car's windshield. Upon respondent's car coming alongside and parallel to the van, respondent stopped his car,
alighted and with his gun pointed at the occupants of the van, shouted three times saying "Putang ina ninyo, anong gusto ninyo
mangyari". Examined further by his counsel, Dr. Alday declared that prior to the incident, he did not know the respondent not
having ever met him.
On cross-examination by respondent's counsel, Dr. Alday insisted that what he related in his statement was what actually hap-
pened. He gave a more detailed description of the happening. Asked to specify the firearm respondent allegedly used to point at
them, Dr. Alday insisted that it was black automatic pistol not a chrome-plated revolver which the cross-examiner suggested.
2. Ms. Marna Villafuerte-Judan, 32 years old, businesswoman, was the second complainant to testify. She identified and af-
firmed Exhibit "B" (Rollo, pp. 9-10) as the sworn statement she gave at the Eastern Police Headquarters on May 7, 1999. The
same was offered as her direct testimony. She declared that shortly after noon on May 6, 1999, she was in a Mercedes Benz
van with Dr. Edgardo Alday and his wife, Dr. Mercedes Favis. The said van was being operated by Dr. Alday's driver. As the ve-
hicle was about to leave the parking area of Cityland on Pioneer St., Mandaluyong City, a red car driven by a man in a business
suit who they later found out was respondent Judge Escolastico Cruz, blocked their way. The security guard on duty motioned
Dr. Alday's driver to back up. As they were backing up, the respondent was advancing and almost pushing the van. She saw Dr.
Alday, who was seated in front next to the driver, open his window and inform the respondent, who was inside his car, that we
were just going out but the respondent berated (nagmura) Dr. Alday saying that he did not care but he was coming in. When re-
spondent's car came alongside their van, she saw the respondent point his firearm at them. After that the respondent went his
way. She saw that respondent's car had Plate No. 16 NCR. Asked additional questions by their counsel, Ms. Judan declared
that she had not met respondent before the incident which occurred on May 6, 1999. She only found out his identity at the police
station when she learned that Plate No. 16 is issued only to judges.
Answering the undersigned, Ms. Judan stated that she was a resident at Cityland. She admitted that although she is not related
to either Dr. Alday or his wife, she is close to them and she addresses them "tito" and "tita".
Cross examined by respondent's counsel, complainant Judan admitted that after she boarded the van next to Dr. Favis, she
was engrossed in conversation with her that she did not notice the arrival of respondent's car near the "tali", which she descri-
bed as the rope slung across the driveway. She first noticed the respondent after he had already crossed the "tali". She said
she did not notice respondent alight from his car as she only became aware of the incident when the red car was already in front
of her. She stated further that there was an exchange of words between Dr. Alday and respondent and that immediately after
they left the area, they had proceeded directly to the police. Although there was a police station nearer Cityland than the one to
which they had repaired, it was a spot choice they made at that moment to go to the Eastern Police District Headquarters on
Meralco Avenue.
3. The third and last complainant to testify was Dr. Mercedes A. Favis, 66 years old, also a physician. She identified and af-
firmed the truth of the sworn statement (Exhibit C, Rollo, pp. 7-8) she executed on May 7, 1999, at the Eastern Police District
Headquarters. Answering additional questions posed by their counsel, she stated that she did not know nor had she ever en-
countered the respondent before May 6, 1999. In Exhibit "C" which was submitted as her direct testimony, Dr. Favis declared
that they had gone to the police headquarters to file a complaint against Judge Escolastico Cruz who was identified to them by
the security guard. In the same statement she declared that on May 6, 1999, between 12:10 and 12:15 in the afternoon, she, to-
gether with her husband, a guest and their driver were engressing from the parking area of the Cityland, at Pioneer St., Pasig
City, aboard their Mercedes Benz van when they were suddenly confronted by a red automobile driven by a man dressed in a
dark business suit. The driver of this automobile was repeatedly shouting curses saying "Putang ina ninyong lahat, ano ba ang
gusto ninyong mangyari", at the same time pointing a firearm towards the passengers of the van. The driver of the red car
alighted and confronted her husband and their driver with a gun which he pointed at them. After the driver of the red car had fin-
ished bad mouthing them, he drove away. They, in turn, left and immediately went to a police station to make a report. Their
guest was able to get the plate number of the red car which was 16 NCR 58 which she knew was issued to a judge.
On cross examination, Dr. Favis admitted that Exhibit "C" was made the day after the incident because after they went to report
to the police on the day of the incident, the latter accompanied them to the Cityland Condominium and later they had gone to
the IBP and it was already late in the afternoon when they returned to the police station. The investigators suggested that they
return the next day to have their statements taken. She further testified that while they were backing up, the red car driven by
the respondent was jerkily pushing them. She described how respondent was pointing the gun at them in a swaying motion and
that the weapon being brandished by the respondent was not a revolver.4
On the other hand, respondent did not testify but presented his witnesses who testified as follows:
1. Atty. Alex Tan identified and affirmed the truth of the statement he executed before Ass't. Provincial Prosecutor Rizalina T.
Capco-Umali of Rizal (Exhibit 1, Rollo, pp. 58-59). The same was submitted by respondent as an annex to his comment in this
administrative matter. This sworn statement was submitted as his direct testimony. In said statement, Atty. Tan relates that on
May 6, 1999, he had invited respondent (his classmate at San Beda College) and his wife to lunch at the Kamayan Restaurant
at EDSA. He had gone to respondent's office at Makati City at half past 11:00 o'clock. They proceeded to Cityland in Manda-
luyong City with Judge Cruz driving his Honda Civic while he followed aboard his white Corolla. When respondent judge turned
right towards the parking lot, he had to stop because his way was blocked by a Mercedes Benz van which was parked in the
middle of the driveway. Respondent sounded his horn but the van's driver instead moved forward until the van was only a meter
away from the hood of respondent's car. An old man seating beside the driver of the van signaled to respondent to move back
but respondent responded that he could not because Atty. Tan's car was right behind his and following Atty. Tan's car was a
taxicab. He saw Judge Cruz alight from his car and immediately go to the security guard on duty berating the latter saying, "Ano
ba ang ginagawa mo dito, bakit hindi ka mag traffic? Ano ka dito, dekorasyon? Kung hindi mo kayang mag traffic, mag resign ka
na".
Atty. Tan continued saying that he saw the security guard approach the driver of the Mercedes Benz van and signaled the latter
to move back so respondent was able to proceed to the parking area. He further testified that he "never saw Judge Cruz point a
gun to anyone that noon of May 6, 1999, much less alight from his car carrying any handgun." He finally stated that had he seen
the respondent point a gun at anyone, he would have been the first to prevent and/or stop him.
During his testimony, Atty. Tan identified another sworn statement (Exhibit 1-C) where he described what happened in the after-
noon of June 7, 1999, at the Hall of Justice in Mandaluyong City where he was accosted, threatened and cursed by three peo-
ple, namely: complainant Dr. Edgardo Alday, a certain Bong Villafuerte and their driver, Christopher Garcia. He speculated that
he was mistaken by these three people for the respondent Judge Cruz.
On cross examination, Atty. Tan admitted that he was a classmate of the respondent in the San Beda College of Liberal Arts;
that he had known the respondent since 1968; that he was a name partner in the law firm of A. Tan, Zoleta and Associates; that
his firm was counsel for the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 98-3064 entitled "SAAG Philippines, Inc. versus Hexagon Realty Corp., et
al" which was pending before Branch 58 of the Makati Regional Trial Court presided by the present respondent; that exhibit "D"
is a copy of the complaint in said case; that on December 24, 1998, the respondent issued a temporary restraining order (Exhib-
it E) in the said case as prayed for by them; and that the case was terminated in January 1999.
2. Respondent's second witness was Aida F. Alba, of age, married and a resident of Cupang, Muntinglupa. She identified and
affirmed the truth of the statement (Exhibit 2, Rollo, pp. 64-65) which she jointly executed with Jose Ignacio before Rizalina T.
Capco-Umali, Rizal Ass't Provincial Prosecutor. The same statement was among those annexed to respondent's comment in
this administrative matter. The same statement was offered as the direct testimony of this witness.
In Exhibit "2", Ms. Alba declared that on May 6, 1999, she had arranged a "tripping" with Anna B. Dianito to see certain units of
the Cityland located on Pioneer St., Mandaluyong City. She, together with Jose Ignacio, Anna Dianito and one Jackielyn Sawit,
arrived at the said place at past 11:00 o'clock. After making a tour of the condominium, she had seen a man dressed in a coat
and tie alight from the red Honda, walk to the security guard and berate him. The guard then approached the Mercedes van and
directed its driver to move the van back. After the latter had done so, the Honda was able to continue on its way towards the
parking lot. She further stated that during the standstill of the cars, she saw no person holding a gun or pointing the same at
anyone. She and her companions were right on the landing pad and had a clear and unobstructed view of the scene.
On cross-examination, she admitted that respondent Judge Cruz contacted Anna Dianito and the latter called her to inform her
that she was needed to make an affidavit regarding the incident. She had gone to the office of a lawyer whose name she could
not remember where she was interviewed. The lawyer then prepared the statement which she and Jose Ignacio jointly swore to
before the investigating prosecutor.
3. Respondent's third witness was Annaliza L. Dianito, a thirty-year old real estate broker. She identified and affirmed the truth
of the statement (Exhibit 4, Rollo, pp. 62-63) which she executed before the Ass't. Provincial Prosecutor investigating the com-
plaint of Dr. Alday.
In the said statement, the witness declared that she is a real estate broker and that she had arranged a "tripping" with some of
her clients on May 6, 1999; that she had met with them at the Goldilocks Bake Shop on Shaw Blvd. and they arrived at Cityland
on Pioneer Street at 11:10 o'clock in the morning; that she had shown her clients four units in the building and as it was almost
noon, she showed them the several eateries and convenience stores among which was Unit UG 16 which is located nearest the
stairway leading either to the driveway or the exit towards Pioneer Street; that as they approached the landing pad leading to
the stairs, their attention was called by the honking of horns from vehicles; that she saw a red Honda Civic, a white Toyota Cor-
olla and a taxicab in that order; that their way was blocked by a parked Mercedes van; that they saw a man in coat and tie who
turned out be respondent Judge Cruz, alight and approach the security guard on duty and directed the latter to ease out the traf-
fic snarl; that the security guard approached the Mercedes van and motioned to its driver to move back; that the red Honda Civ-
ic of the judge was finally able to proceed to its parking area; that during all the few minutes of traffic along the driveway, she
never saw Judge Cruz or any person for that matter, point a gun at anyone; that it was just an ordinary day-to-day scene along
the driveway of the condominium; that at about 12:30 o'clock, she parted ways with Ms. Cawit, Ms. Alba and Mr. Ignacio.
On cross examination, the witness admitted that when she and her companions arrived at the stair landing the four vehicles – a
red Honda Civic, a white Toyota Corolla, a taxicab and the Mercedes Benz van were already on the driveway. She further ad-
mitted that she did not leave her name or address with anybody after the incident and that she had been interviewed by Atty.
Cabangon at an office on Panay Avenue in Quezon City. She had been brought to Atty. Cabangon's office by Atty. Tan. She de-
clared that she had been acquainted with Judge Cruz since 1998 when the latter wanted to buy a 3 bedroom unit; that after the
incident of May 6, 1999, Judge Cruz had called her and asked her to go to his place at Cityland; that she had gone to him and
found Atty. Tan with him; that because he had seen her at the landing pad on May 6, 1999, Judge Cruz mentioned to her that
he remembered having seen her with some companions; that she took it upon herself to notify her three companions – Jose Ig-
nacio, Aida Alba and Jacklyn Cawit – and bring them to the Judge; that after being interviewed by the Judge, Atty. Tan brought
the four of them to Atty. Cabangon upon the request of Judge Cruz and that they were interviewed and their affidavits were
made.
4. Respondent's fourth and last witness in chief was Segundino Ellazo, the security guard on duty at the Cityland on May 6,
1999. He identified his sworn statement (Exhibit 5 and also marked Exhibit G for complainants, Rollo, pp. 33-34), as well as his
signature (Exhibit 5-A). In said statement, Ellazo stated that he was, on May 6, 1999, a member of the Airborne Security Serv-
ice, Inc. and was on duty at the Cityland from 8:00 o'clock in the morning until evening; that at about 12:10 o'clock in the after-
noon of May 6, 1999, he saw Judge Cruz, owner of a unit in the Cityland, arrive aboard his car with Plate No. "16 NCR 58"; that
respondent judge was unable to immediately proceed to his parking slot because a Mercedes Benz van was blocking the drive-
way; that the van backed up slowly because there were cars parked on the side; that respondent was forcing his way as the
van was backing up; that suddenly he saw respondent judge pull out a gun and point the same through his windshield at the
van; that when the vehicles were already parallel to each other, respondent Judge Cruz alighted from his car and told Ellazo to
assist in untangling the traffic snarl and respondent immediately boarded his car and proceeded to his parking slot and the van
went out. He concluded his statement saying that he was not threatened by Judge Cruz nor did he have any grudge against
him.
Mr. Ellazo also identified a second statement dated July 31, 1999 (Exhibit 6) as well as his signature (Exhibit 6-A) thereon. (The
statement appears to have been subscribed and sworn to before a Notary Public on July 31, 1999 and resubscribed before the
Assistant City Prosecutor on August 2, 1999). Ellazo declared that he had to correct what he had stated in his statement before
the police. In Exhibit "6", the witness stated that on May 6, 1999, at about 4:18 o'clock in the afternoon, he had gone to the East-
ern Police District Headquarters at Meralco Ave., Pasig City where he executed Exhibit "5" (also marked Exhibit G); that when
Judge Cruz alighted from his car, he was not carrying any firearm and that he did not see him point the gun at anyone because
if he did, it is not possible he could not have seen it; that immediately after Judge Cruz approached the witness and told him to
arrange the traffic, he forthwith boarded his car and proceeded to his parking slot; that at no time did Judge Cruz approach the
van when it was in front of his car.
Ellazo executed a third statement (Exhibit 7) which he signed (Exhibit 7-A) and swore to before a Notary Public on September 9,
1999. In the latter statement he declared that on May 6, 1999, he was forced to go to the Eastern Police District at Meralco
Ave., Pasig City in order to give a statement which was against his will only because he was threatened by Col. Antonio B. Agui-
lar, Jr., through the Cityland Administrator that he would be charged with "obstruction of justice" if he did not testify for Dr. Edg-
ardo S. Alday and he was given only up to 4:00 P.M. that day to comply; that because of his fear, as he was informed that the
Pasig police were looking for him, he gave a statement which was involuntary because it was made under the fear that he might
be arrested, charged and confined; that so everyone may know and for the sake of the truth, he declared that it was not true
that Judge Cruz had drawn a gun as he did not have a gun on that day; that his description of the gun being small and black
was based only on what Dr. Alday had said; that as a matter of fact, Dr. Alday kept calling and calling the office where he was
working in order to convince him to testify against Judge Cruz; that he had sought advice from his family and his relatives and
he was advised to come out and tell the truth so that his conscience would not bother him; that because of the pressure of the
office where he was working, he had to look for another job and to transfer his residence. Ellazo further declared that on May 6,
1999, at about 12:10 o'clock P.M., when Judge Cruz entered the driveway of the Cityland he was followed by the white car of
Atty. Alex Tan; that he did note in his blotter this fact because after Judge Cruz proceeded to the parking area, he did not allow
Atty. Tan to follow because the area was already full; that during that time there were many persons present among whom were
real estate broker Anna Liza Dianito who was in company with some prospective buyers/tenants; that as a matter of fact, he
was embarrassed when he was berated by Judge Cruz in the presence of Atty. Tan and Ms. Dianito.
Continuing his direct testimony, Ellazo was asked to explain the discrepancy between his first statement (Exhibit 5) and his sec-
ond and third statements (Exhibits 6 and 7). He declared that on May 6, 1999, he had just relieved the other security guard who
had gone to eat when Judge Cruz entered driving his red car and found his way was blocked by a Mercedes Benz van; that El-
lazo had signaled the driver of the van to move back but said driver was hardheaded and did not immediately comply; that
Judge Cruz and Dr. Alday, the passenger of the van exchanged shouts; that Judge Cruz alighted, approached and berated him
(Ellazo); that since he was outside his guard house at the time, he approached the van and assisted its driver to move back so
that Judge Cruz was able to proceed to his parking slot; that there were many people at the top of the stairs one of them was
Anna Dianito and companions whose names he did not know.
On cross examination Ellazo was confronted with his answers to questions propounded by the police investigator contained in
his statement marked Exhibit "5" (also marked Exhibit G). His attention was called to Question No. 5 (Exhibit G-2) in Exhibit "5"
where he was asked to describe what had happened and his answer was that he had seen Judge Cruz pointing his gun at the
Mercedes Benz van with Plate No. WBF 991. Ellazo stated that he did not give that answer but the same was only put there
(gawa gawa lang) by the police.
Ellazo was also asked about the answer he gave to Question No. 15 (Exhibit G-3) in Exhibit "5" where he stated that when
Judge Cruz arrived in his car with Plate No. 16 NCR 58 he could not immediately proceed to his parking slot because his way
was blocked by a van with Plate No. WBF 991 so that he (Ellazo) signalled the driver of the van to back up; that Judge Cruz im-
mediately followed the van as the latter was backing up and at that moment he saw Judge Cruz pull out a gun which he pointed
through his windshield at the van; that when the two vehicles were side by side, Judge Cruz alighted from his vehicle and told
him to assist in arranging the flow of the traffic and after that Judge Cruz proceeded to his parking slot. Ellazo explained that
part of what was supposed to be his answer was actually his but the rest was just told to him by the police.
Asked by the undersigned to indicate what part of Exhibit "5-B" was his and what was not, Ellazo stated that he never said that
Judge Cruz pulled out a gun and pointed it at the Mercedes van (Exhibit 5-B-1) although the rest of the answer was his.
On further cross examination, Ellazo admitted that he had Exhibit "6" made by neighbor who was a lawyer, a certain Atty. Mabu-
ti. The same affidavit was submitted at the preliminary investigation in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong at the
instance of Atty. Alex Tan and Judge Cruz. He stated that a few weeks after the happening, he had gone to Judge Cruz to apol-
ogize for what he had said in his first statement which was taken by the police. He also told Judge Cruz that he was willing to ex-
ecute another affidavit in his favor. After that he had voluntarily gone to Atty. Mabuti to have his second affidavit (Exhibit 6)
made and after this was made, he was accompanied by Atty. Alex Tan to the prosecutor's office in Mandaluyong to submit Ex-
hibit "6".
The witness further admitted that besides his going to the residence of Judge Cruz to see him, he had seen respondent several
times while he was on duty at Cityland; that it was Atty. Tan who picked him up at his house and brought him to Mandaluyong
City to submit the second affidavit (Exhibit 6) to the prosecutor handling the preliminary investigation.
Anent his third affidavit (Exhibit 7), Ellazo admitted that he was told by Atty. Tan to go to the office of Atty. Gayos to make the
third affidavit in order to clarify certain matters contained in Exhibit "6". He insisted that the respondent had no gun on that date.
Answering questions of the undersigned, Ellazo insisted that Question No. 5 (Exhibit G-2) as well as Question No. 6 (Exhibits 5-
B-2 & G-3) were never asked of him and neither did he give the answers found in said exhibits.5
On June 19, 2000, respondent formally offered his evidence6 and rested his case. Thereafter, complainants formally offered
their evidence.7
However, considering the apparent turnaround of Security Guard Segundino Ellazo, Justice Quimbo allowed complainants to
present rebuttal evidence. On June 19, 2000, complainants presented Police Superintendent Antonio V. Aguilar, Jr. and SPO1
Joseph Amuyo, whose testimonies are as follows:
Police Superintendent Antonio V. Aguilar, Jr. declared that on May 6, 1999, he was already the Chief of the District Criminal In-
vestigation Group, Eastern Police District, National Capital Region. He identified the statement (Exhibit 5) which Segundino Ella-
zo made at the Eastern Police District Headquarters on May 6, 1999. He further said that he had asked Ellazo whether he had
executed it voluntarily and of his own free will and whether he swore to its truth. It was only after Ellazo had answered affirma-
tively to his questions that he administered his oath. He admitted that he had no personal knowledge of the answers given by El-
lazo to the investigator, but he insists that he would not have allowed any one of his investigators to manufacture testimony.
SPO1 Joseph Amuyo, after taking oath, declared that on May 6, 1999, he was a police investigator at the Eastern Police Dis-
trict. He was the one who took the sworn statement of Segundino Ellazo on that date. He further declared that the statement giv-
en to him at the investigation room of the Eastern Police District was free and voluntary; that he was asking the questions and
Ellazo was supplying the answers which he typewrote; that all the answers written on Exhibit "5" were of Ellazo; that as a matter
of fact, Ellazo corrected the Plate No. of the van as found in Questions No. 5 and 6; that the answer to Question No. 15 is also
Ellazo's.
Cross examined by respondent's counsel, Amuyo declared that Dr. Alday had reported an alleged grave threats against him;
that in company with Dr. Alday, SPO2 Emerito Escobido, PO1 Joseph Engero and PO1 Efren Tejada, he had proceeded to the
place where the alleged threats were made; that upon reaching Cityland, they had encountered OIC Dominador Novencio; that
he had told Novencio to request Ellazo to report to their office for questioning; that he did not make any threats against Ellazo
nor did any member of the PNP; that when Ellazo reported to them, he had taken his statement; that he took the statements of
the complainants the next day; that Ellazo gave his statement voluntarily and that it is not true that Ellazo was at first reluctant to
testify for as a matter of fact, he had gone to the headquarters with Dr. Alday.8
On June 26, 1999, respondent offered the same Security Guard Segundino Ellazo as sur-rebuttal witness, who merely repeated
his testimony in chief. After the sur-rebuttal evidence had been submitted, the parties filed their respective memoranda.
On July 19, 2000, Justice Quimbo rendered his report. He found the version of complainants more credible, considering that
they had no possible motive to make a false accusation against respondent. He gave credence to the positive testimonies of
complainants over the negative testimonies of respondent's witnesses, particularly on whether respondent judge brandished a
gun pointed at complainants. Justice Quimbo explained that -
"…True they (Annaliza Dianito and Aida Alba) may not have seen respondent's actual pointing of his gun at the complainants
but it is certainly possible that when their attention was called to the incident, it was too late for them to catch the gun poking epi-
sode as described by the complainants. Or perhaps they were not at such a vantage point as to be able to see the entire hap-
pening. The fact, however, that the three witnesses (Alex Tan, Annaliza Dianito and Aida Alba) did not see the gun toting inci-
dent, is not conclusive proof that it did not actually occur."9
Justice Quimbo further found Atty. Alex Tan a biased witness, being respondent's classmate at San Beda College, and having
represented plaintiffs in a civil case before respondent's sala wherein Tan managed to obtain a TRO on their behalf. He also
found the testimony of Security Guard Ellazo unreliable because he recanted his original statement that he saw respondent
poke a gun at complainants. Hence, citing cases of gun-poking incidents,10 Judge Quimbo recommended the dismissal of re-
spondent judge with forfeiture of all benefits due him and with prejudice to reinstatement in any branch of the government or in
any government-owned or controlled corporation.
The crucial issue herein pertains to the assessment of credibility of witnesses. What exactly transpired on May 6, 1999, at the
Cityland Condominium, Pioneer St., Mandaluyong City?
Well-settled is the rule that positive testimony prevails over negative testimony. This is particularly true where complainants
have no ill-motive in testifying against respondent.11 Complainants had never met respondent prior to the incident. They had no
pending cases before him. Yet they pursued this case with tenacity. They strongly believed they had been unjustly wronged and
sought redress therefor.
Brandishing a firearm in public imperils the lives of people. The fact that this was done by a judge outside the courtroom and
during a traffic altercation does not justify respondent's gross misconduct. Judicial office circumscribes the personal conduct of
a judge. It imposes a number of restrictions thereon. It is but a small sacrifice to pay for accepting and occupying an exalted po-
sition in the administration of justice.12 Irresponsible or improper conduct of a judge, needless to say, erodes public confidence
in the judiciary.13
In Marcelino v. Singson,14 respondent judge was similarly involved in a traffic accident with the complainant, a fish vendor.
While complainant was slowly "backing" his passenger jeepney, respondent's car suddenly crossed his path, resulting in a mi-
nor impact. Respondent alighted from the car, approached complainant and boxed him twice on the face. Respondent returned
to his car, got a gun, poked it at the face of complainant, and shouted "Hayop Ka!". Respondent then tucked the gun on his
waist and delivered another blow on complainant's face. He thereupon left the premises, taking with him complainant's license.
Complainant filed criminal cases for Grave Oral Defamation and Damage to Property through Reckless Imprudence against re-
spondent. He also filed an administrative case against respondent. The criminal cases were dismissed when complainant de-
sisted, having apparently patched up things with respondent. Complainant likewise desisted in the administrative case, but the
Court nevertheless admonished respondent and ordered him to pay a fine of P1,000.00.
Based on the facts of the present case, we find respondent's acts of confronting complainants and threatening them with a gun
during a traffic altercation constitutive of conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Conduct grossly prejudi-
cial to the best interest of the service is a grave offense under Section 46, No. 27, Chapter 6, Subtitle A, Title I of Book V of the
Administrative Code of 1987 (E.O. No. 292), Section 23 (t), Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of E.O. No.
292, and Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 49-89, as incorporated in the Personnel Manual of the Supreme Court. The penal-
ty for conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service is suspension for six (6) months, one (1) day to one (1) year,
for the first offense, and the penalty of dismissal for the second offense. This being respondent's first offense for which we find
him liable, we deem it proper to impose upon him the penalty of suspension for one (1) year without pay, and a fine of
P50,000.00.
The Canons of Judicial Ethics provides that " [t]he assumption of office of judges casts upon the incumbent duties in respect to
his personal conduct which concerns his relations to the State and its inhabitants, the litigants before him, the principles of law,
the practitioners of law in his court, and the witnesses and attendants who aid him in the administration of its functions." A
judge's personal behavior, not only while in the performance of official duties but also outside the court, must be beyond re-
proach, for he is, as he so aptly is perceived to be, the visible personification of law and of justice.15
Finally, it is not amiss to remind members of the judiciary that the Constitution exhorts that "public office is a public trust. Public
officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty
and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives."16
WHEREFORE, we hereby find respondent judge GUILTY of conduct grossly prejudicial to the service, and impose upon him the
penalty of SUSPENSION without pay for one (1) year and to pay a fine of P50,000.00, to take effect immediately, with a warning
that a commission of a similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

CANON 5

A.M. No. RTJ-10-2242 August 6, 2010

[Formerly OCA IPI No. 09-3149-RTJ]
ATTY. RAUL L. CORREA, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE MEDEL ARNALDO B. BELEN, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 36, CALAMBA CITY, LAGUNA, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
NACHURA, J.:
Before us is a Verified-Complaint dated February 20, 2009 filed by complainant Atty. Raul L. Correa charging respondent Judge
Medel Arnaldo B. Belen of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 36, Calamba City, Laguna of Misconduct.
Complainant narrated that he was one of the Co-Administrators appointed by the court in Special Proceedings No. 660-01C, en-
titled "Intestate Estate of Hector Tan." He revealed that during the hearing of the case, respondent Judge Belen disagreed with
various items in the Administrator’s Report, including the audited Financial Report covering the said estate, and immediately
ruled that they should be disallowed. Complainant added that respondent Judge Belen scolded their accountant, branded her as
an incompetent, and threatened to sue her before the regulatory body overseeing all certified public accountants.
Complainant further claimed that, in the course of the proceedings, he was asked by respondent Judge Belen to stand up while
the latter dictated his order on their Administrator’s Report. Respondent Judge Belen even rebuked him for some mistakes in
managing the affairs of the estate, adding that it is regrettable "because Atty. Raul Correa is a U.P. Law Graduate and a Bar
Topnotcher at that." Complainant regrets the actuations and statements of respondent Judge Belen, especially because the re-
mark was uncalled for, a left-handed compliment, and a grave insult to his Alma Mater. Worse, respondent Judge Belen ousted
complainant as co-administrator of the estate of Hector Tan.
On June 18, 2008, respondent Judge Belen issued an Order citing complainant for indirect contempt, allegedly with administra-
tor Rose Ang Tee, for surreptitiously and unlawfully withdrawing from and emptying the account of the estate of Hector Tan. The
June 18, 2008 Order contained snide remarks, viz—
x x x. The action of Rose Tee and Atty. Raul Correa is contumacious and direct challenge to lawful orders, and judicial process
of this [c]ourt and malicious assault to the orderly administration of justice, more specifically abhorrent the act and deed of Atty.
Raul Correa, a U.P. Law alumnus and Bar Topnotcher, who as a lawyer knows very well and fully understands that such action
violates his oath of office which the Court cannot countenance. x x x
Lastly, complainant insisted that he should not have been cited for indirect contempt because he had fully explained to the court
that he had done his part as co-administrator in good faith, and that, through his efforts, the estate was able to meet the dead-
line for the latest Tax Amnesty Program of the government, consequently saving the estate the amount of no less than ₱35 Mil-
lion.
In his Comment dated August 18, 2009, respondent Judge Belen argued that a judge, having the heavy burden to always con-
duct himself in accordance with the ethical tenets of honesty, probity and integrity, is duty bound to remind counsel of their du-
ties to the court, to their clients, to the adverse party, and to the opposing counsel.
Respondent Judge Belen claimed that the conduct of complainant in handling the settlement of the estate of Hector Tan violated
and breached the tenets and standards of the legal profession and of the Lawyer’s Oath. He alleged that, despite the clear tenor
of a lawyer-client relationship, complainant associated himself as corresponding counsel and member of the Ongkiko Law Of-
fice, the counsel of the opposing party in the settlement proceedings.
Respondent Judge Belen further alleged that complainant, in connivance with Rose Ang Tee, surreptitiously released millions of
pesos for the now deceased Purification Tee Tan and to themselves, in clear violation of complainant’s legal and fiduciary rela-
tionship and responsibilities as court-appointed co-administrator.
Both the Verified-Complaint and the Comment were referred to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for evaluation, re-
port, and recommendation.
In its Report dated March 10, 2010, the OCA found respondent Judge Belen guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge for his use
of intemperate language and inappropriate actions in dealing with counsels, such as complainant, appearing in his sala. The
OCA said that respondent Judge Belen should have just ruled on the motion filed by complainant instead of opting for a conceit-
ed display of arrogance. The OCA also noted that the incidents subject of this administrative matter were not the first time that
respondent Judge Belen had uttered intemperate remarks towards lawyers appearing before him. It noted that in Mane v. Be-
len,1 the Court found respondent Judge Belen guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge and was reprimanded for engaging in a
supercilious legal and personal discourse.
Based on its evaluation, the OCA recommended that (a) the administrative case against respondent Judge Belen be re-docket-
ed as a regular administrative matter; and (b) respondent Judge Belen be fined in the amount of ₱10,000.00 for conduct unbe-
coming of a judge, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
The findings and the recommendations of the OCA are well taken and, thus, should be upheld.
Indeed, the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary exhorts members of the judiciary, in the discharge of their
duties, to be models of propriety at all times. Canon 4 mandates –
CANON 4
PROPRIETY
Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of a judge.
SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.
xxx
SEC. 6. Judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression, belief, association and assembly, but in exercising
such rights, they shall always conduct themselves in such a manner as to preserve the dignity of the judicial office and the im-
partiality and independence of the judiciary.
The Code also calls upon judges to ensure equality of treatment to all before the courts. More specifically, Section 3, Canon 5
on Equality provides –
SEC. 3. Judges shall carry out judicial duties with appropriate consideration for all persons, such as the parties, witnesses, law-
yers, court staff and judicial colleagues, without differentiation on any irrelevant ground, immaterial to the proper performance of
such duties.
We join the OCA in noting that the incidents narrated by complainant were never denied by respondent Judge Belen, who mere-
ly offered his justification and asserted counter accusations against complainant.
Verily, we hold that respondent Judge Belen should be more circumspect in his language in the discharge of his duties. A judge
is the visible representation of the law. Thus, he must behave, at all times, in such a manner that his conduct, official or other-
wise, can withstand the most searching public scrutiny. The ethical principles and sense of propriety of a judge are essential to
the preservation of the people’s faith in the judicial system.2
A judge must consistently be temperate in words and in actions. Respondent Judge Belen’s insulting statements, tending to
project complainant’s ignorance of the laws and procedure, coming from his inconsiderate belief that the latter mishandled the
cause of his client is obviously and clearly insensitive, distasteful, and inexcusable. Such abuse of power and authority could on-
ly invite disrespect from counsels and from the public. Patience is one virtue that members of the bench should practice at all
times, and courtesy to everyone is always called for.1avvphi1
Conduct unbecoming of a judge is classified as a light offense under Section 10, Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, penal-
ized under Section 11 (c) thereof by any of the following: (1) a Fine of not less than ₱1,000.00 but not exceeding ₱10,000.00;
(2) Censure; (3) Reprimand; and (4) Admonition with warning. Inasmuch as this is not respondent Judge Belen’s first offense,
the penalty of fine of ₱10,000.00 is deemed appropriate.
WHEREFORE, we find Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Calamba City, Branch 36,
GUILTY of Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge, and FINE him ₱10,000.00, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or
similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

CANON 6

A.M. No. RTJ-06-2015 December 15, 2010

(Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 05-2348-RTJ)
ATTY. NORLINDA R. AMANTE-DESCALLAR, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. REINERIO (ABRAHAM) B. RAMAS, Respondent.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This case stemmed from Administrative Case No. 05-222-P instituted by Judge Reinerio (Abraham) B. Ramas (Judge Ramas)
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18 (RTC-Branch 18) of Pagadian City, Zamboanga del Sur, against Atty. Norlinda R.
Amante-Descallar (Atty. Descallar), Clerk of Court of the same court, for Grave Misconduct. Atty. Descallar allegedly showed
the unopened ballot boxes inside Judge Ramas’ chambers to a certain Allan Singedas (Singedas). The ballot boxes were in
Judge Ramas’ custody in relation to Election Protest Case No. 0001-2K4 pending before his court.
In a Verified Comment/Counter-Complaint1 dated August 11, 2005, Atty. Descallar vehemently denied the accusations against
her and countercharged Judge Ramas of bringing home a complete set of computer, which was submitted as evidence in Crimi-
nal Case Nos. 5294 and 5295, entitled People v. Tesoro, Jr., for Theft. She also accused Judge Ramas of dishonesty when the
latter did not reflect in his Certificates of Service for May and June 2005 his absences on May 12 and 13, 2005; for several
more days after promulgation of the decision in Election Protest Case No. 0001-2K4 on May 16, 2005; and from June 1 to 21,
2005.
On June 13, 2006, the Court Administrator submitted the following recommendations to this Court:
Respectfully submitted for the consideration of the Honorable Court is our recommendation:
1. that the instant administrative complaint be REDOCKETED as a regular administrative matter;
2. that respondent judge be found guilty of SIMPLE MISCONDUCT for using and bringing a piece of evidence to his residence,
and should be FINED in the amount of Eleven Thousand (₱11,000.00) Pesos with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the
same or a similar offense in the future will be dealt with more severely; and
3. that the charges of absenteeism and falsification of certificate of service for the months of May and June 2005 be REFER-
RED to a Justice of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report and recommendation.2
In a Resolution3 dated August 14, 2006, the Second Division of this Court adopted the foregoing recommendations of the Court
Administrator. It referred the charges of absenteeism and falsification of certificates of service against Judge Ramas to Justice
Renato C. Dacudao (Justice Dacudao) of the Court of Appeals, Manila, for investigation, report, and recommendation, to be
completed within 60 days from receipt of the record.
On October 2, 2006, Justice Dacudao set4 the case for hearing at his chambers on October 12 and 13, 2006, for the reception
of Atty. Descallar’s evidence; and on October 23 and 24, 2006, for the reception of Judge Ramas’ evidence.
Atty. Descallar, along with her counsel and husband Atty. Romeo Y. Descallar, and witness Atty. Vicente Madarang Cerilles (At-
ty. Cerilles), testified during the hearings held on October 12 and 13, 2006. Judge Ramas failed to appear on said dates. In-
stead, he filed a Motion to Admit Memorandum with his Memorandum appended thereto.
In his testimony,5 Atty. Cerilles claimed to know Judge Ramas very well since the latter is his godfather and wedding sponsor.
Atty. Cerilles admitted that he had many pending cases before Judge Ramas’ sala, including Criminal Case No. 04-7003, enti-
tled People v. Dizon, for Slight Illegal Detention, which involved his grandnephews. On May 12, 2005, Atty. Cerilles went to the
RTC-Branch 18 to find out if his grandnephews’ Urgent Motion for Reinvestigation could be heard. However, upon inquiry, he
was told that Judge Ramas was not around because his estranged wife arrived. When Atty. Cerilles returned to the RTC-Branch
18 the following day, May 13, 2005, he was informed that Judge Ramas was still absent.
Atty. Descallar testified6 that Judge Ramas failed to indicate his absences on May 12, 13, 24, and 27 to 30, 2005, and June 1 to
21, 2005 in his Certificates of Service for the months of May and June 2005. The absence of Judge Ramas can be gleaned
from the court calendar of hearings and his failure to attend the raffle of cases done every Thursday of the week. Also, the Om-
nibus Order7 dated May 23, 2005 issued by Judge Ramas manifested his momentary desistance from performing judicial func-
tions from May 24, 2005 onwards, to wit:
In view of the precarious situation with which the undersigned presiding judge has been despicably subjected to, which inciden-
tally has been caused by a detestable betrayal, his continued active participation in the administration of justice would be far too
risky - for him, for the Court and for the entire judiciary.
Upon such ground, he has to momentarily cease from performing judicial functions until after the present and real threat on his
own life shall have been properly resolved.
Atty. Descallar was not able to finish her testimony on October 12, 2006, and she asked for continuance as her testimony would
still cover several documents.
Judge Ramas refuted the charges against him in his Memorandum,8 in which he averred that:
On May 12, 2005, he was late in coming to the office because he has to make the draft decision of the much awaited election
protest case at home. It was very lengthly as it involved several precincts. In fact, on the same date, May 12, 2005, he was still
able to officiate a marriage.
On May 13, 2005, the undersigned did go to the office and issued an order setting the promulgation of the decision to May 16,
2005. Such order is a part of the record of Election Protest Case No. 0001-2K4.
If her only evidence of my absences on those days (May 12 & 13, 2005) was the Affidavit of Atty. Vicente M. Cerilles then sure-
ly it would not be sufficient. Atty. Cerilles has no knowledge whether or not I reported to office after he left.
My good complainant should have extended her understanding that making a decision, especially of a much controversial case,
entails a very careful evaluation of all evidences at hand. She knows that volumes upon volumes of records have to be seriously
scrutinized. The 8-12 and 1-5 official office hours would not be enough, hence, the Judge even has to utilize all his waking hours
just to comply with the mandate of the law that Election Protest Case should be disposed of in the earliest possible time as it
partakes the nature more important than a criminal case.
The undersigned submits that he has rendered services for the month of May 2005, in accordance with law.
On May 16, 2005, the decision in Election Protest Case No. 0001-2K4 was promulgated. The undersigned wore a bullet proof
vest when the decision was read. Threats in Pagadian City and Zamboanga del Sur could just not be taken lightly. Under tight
security escorts, the undersigned had to stay in a safehouse. Meanwhile, masked riders passed by his residence even in the
wee hours of the night.
It was not cowardice to shy away from imminent danger [;] it was the best thing to do under the circumstances. He was be-
trayed by his own Clerk of Court. Such betrayal is the subject of the Administrative Complaint ( AM No. P-06-2149, for Gross
Misconduct). x x x.
xxxx
On May 23, 2005, the undersigned issued an Omnibus Order expressing his intention to momentarily cease hearing cases until
after the threat on his life is resolved. Every now and then he reports to the office and continued to exercise administrative func-
tions. Fortunately, the person hired to execute him was discovered to be a distant relative, a hatchet man of the dreaded Kura-
tong Baleleng Gang, and after negotiations, the contract was called off. He then continued his usual judicial and administrative
functions.
To prove that the threats to the life of the herein respondent was indeed real, on November 19, 2005, the brother of the protes-
tant, Sultan Abdul Marcaban, the strongest supporter of the protestant, together with five (5) of his escorts were ambushed and
brutally killed.
Clearly, it is not difficult to see that the complainant was motivated with the desire to get even with your respondent after the fil-
ing of the administrative case against her. Such spite and anger only serve as factors that work against her.
Under his oath as a judge, he has rendered service for the month of June 2005. The self-serving and ill-motivated declaration of
the Clerk of Court cannot be made basis to find him absent.
In a letter dated October 16, 2006,9 Atty. Descallar requested for the transfer of the investigation to the Court of Appeals, Ca-
gayan de Oro City, because of financial constraints. She was not financially prepared to attend the hearings in Manila, and she
had to resort to borrowing money from her relatives to defray her expenses. Cagayan de Oro City is more accessible to the par-
ties and the travel thereto more economical.
The request was granted by then Court Administrator Christopher O. Lock (Court Administrator Lock) in a Memorandum10 dated
November 16, 2006. Court Administrator Lock believed that the administration of justice would be better served by the transfer
since it would minimize Judge Ramas’ absence from his regular station considering the proximity of Pagadian City to Cagayan
de Oro City. Thus, Court Administrator Lock recommended:
In view of the foregoing, respectfully submitted for the consideration of the Honorable Court recommending that:
a) The letter dated October 16, 2006 of Atty. Norlinda R. Amante-Descallar be NOTED;
b) The Justice Renato C. Dacudao be RELIEVED of his authority to conduct an investigation on the instant matter; and
c) The subject administrative matter be REFERRED to the Executive Justice of the Court of Appeals, Cagayan de Oro Station,
for raffling among the justices thereat, for investigation, report and recommendation on the charges of absenteeism and falsifica-
tion of the certificate of service for the months of May and June 2005 against respondent within sixty (60) days from receipt of
the records.
The Court approved Court Administrator Lock’s recommendation in a Resolution dated February 28, 2007. Per raffle dated
March 22, 2007, the case was assigned to Justice Mario Lopez (Justice Lopez) of the Court of Appeals, Cagayan de Oro City.
Upon receipt of the records of the case, Justice Lopez set the case for continuance of hearing and reception of evidence on
May 7, 8, and 22, 2007 at 2:00 p.m. at the Hearing Room, Court of Appeals, YMCA Building, Cagayan de Oro City.
Only Atty. Descallar and her counsel appeared at the hearing held on May 7, 2007. During said hearing, Justice Lopez denied
Judge Ramas’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings since the investigation is an administrative matter and not an action gov-
erned by the Rules of Court. Justice Lopez also noted Judge Ramas’ manifestation, in which the latter waived his rights to
cross-examine Atty. Descallar and to present evidence in his defense.
The hearings for the reception of Atty. Descallar’s evidence proceeded. Atty. Descallar submitted several documents to prove
that Judge Ramas was absent on May 12, 13, 24, and 27 to 30, 2005, and June 1 to 21, 2005, including documents that were
not acted upon due to the absence of Judge Ramas.
On July 31, 2007, Justice Lopez submitted his Report,11 with the following findings and recommendation –
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the undersigned Investigating Justice finds respondent Judge Reinerio (Abraham) Ramas of
Branch 18, Regional Trial Court, Pagadian City GUILTY of untruthful statements in his Certificate of Service, and recommends
that respondent judge be FINED in the amount of Fifteen Thousand Pesos (₱15,000.00) with a WARNING that a repetition of
the same offense shall be dealt with more severely.12
Justice Lopez’s Report was noted by the Court in a Resolution dated October 1, 2007.
After reviewing the Report, the Court agrees with Justice Lopez’s conclusion that Judge Ramas is guilty of declaring untruthful
statements in his Certificates of Service for May and June 2005. As Justice Lopez detailed in his Report:
By his own admission, beginning 23 May 2005, when respondent Judge issued an Order that "he has to momentarily cease
from performing judicial functions until after the present and real threat on his own life shall have been properly resolved", he re-
ported for work intermittently or did not report at all. x x x
xxxx
Based on records, he only reported for work on May 12, 2005 to solemnize marriage; May 13, 2005 to issue an Order setting
the date of promulgation of the Election Protest No. 0001-2K4 on 16 May 2005; and June 8, 2005 to sign his Certificate of Serv-
ice for the month of May. For the period of May 24, 27 until June 7 and 9 until 20, there is no showing that he reported for duty
and performed his judicial functions. There were no evidence, documentary or otherwise, adduced by the respondent judge to
prove that he had rendered services for the said period in compliance with his Certification of Service for the months of May and
June.13
Judge Ramas cannot escape liability by raising the defense of threat to his life to justify his absences on May 24, May 27 to
June 7, and June 9 to June 20, 2005. The Court quotes with approval Justice Lopez’s commentary on this regard:
Indeed, there may be threats to his life as alleged and indicated in his Order, and which claim was not refuted by the complai-
nant. But such threats do not justify his cessation from performing judicial functions. Threats are concomitant peril in public of-
fice especially in the judiciary, where magistrates decide and determine sensitive issues that normally generate or provoke repri-
sals from losing litigants. This is a consequence that judges should be prepared of. Their exalted position entails a great respon-
sibility unyielding to one’s personal convenience.
To be sure, "it was not cowardice to shy away from imminent danger [;] it was the best thing to do under the circumstances." But
then, the most prudent thing that respondent judge should have done was to secure protection from local police force or from
the Supreme Court. Respondent judge may had also requested from the Supreme Court to hold office elsewhere, or change of
venue, whichever is appropriate under the circumstances, but not motu proprio issue an Order for him to desist temporarily from
performing judicial functions. At the very least, he could have filed a leave of absence informing the Supreme Court of his pre-
dicament, thereby not subjecting his actions in serious doubts for dereliction of duty. It must be stressed that judges should be
imbued with a lofty sense of responsibility in the discharge of their duties for the proper administration of justice. One who occu-
pies an exalted position in the administration of justice must pay a high price for the honor bestowed upon him, for his private as
well as his official conduct which must at all times be free from the appearance of propriety. Respondent judge was oblivious of
the demands of his official duties which require sacrifice of one’s personal interest and convenience for the public good.141aw-
phi1
All told, the Court views Judge Ramas’ conduct as inexcusable.
Judge Ramas is presumed to be aware of his duties and responsibilities under the Code of Judicial Conduct. Canon 3 generally
mandates that a judge should perform official duties honestly, and with impartiality and diligence. Rule 3.01 requires that a judge
be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence, while Rule 3.09 commands a judge to observe high standards of
public service and fidelity at all times. Judge Ramas irrefragably failed to observe these standards by making untruthful state-
ments in his Certificates of Service to cover up his absences.
The Court has previously held that a judge’s submission of false certificates of service seriously undermines and reflects on the
honesty and integrity expected of an officer of the court. This is so because a certificate of service is not merely a means to
one's paycheck but is an instrument by which the Court can fulfill the constitutional mandate of the people ' s right to a speedy
disposition of cases.151awphil
Under A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, amending Rule 140 on the Discipline of Justices and Judges, making untruthful statements in the
certificate of service is categorized as a less serious offense and punishable by suspension without salary and other benefits for
not less than one month nor more than three months or a fine of more than ₱10,000.00 but not exceeding ₱20,000.00. Consid-
ering that this is Judge Ramas’ second offense in his almost 12 years in the Judiciary, the Court adopts Justice Lopez’s recom-
mendation of imposing on the erring judge a fine in the amount of Fifteen Thousand Pesos (₱15,000.00).
WHEREFORE, Judge Reinerio (Abraham) B. Ramas is hereby found GUILTY of making untruthful statements in his Certificates
of Service for the months of May and June 2005 and is hereby FINED in the amount of Fifteen Thousand Pesos (₱15,000.00),
with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar infraction shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.