INTRODUCTION

In the old Criminal Procedure Code, there was no limitation for taking cognizance of an offence.
Consequently a prosecution might be launched after the lapse of any period from the date of
occurrence. In certain special Acts, a period of limitation for taking cognizance is already
prescribed e.g. Section 106 of Indian Factories Act. For the first time in India, the Act of 1978 has
enacted some general rules incorporating the law of limitation for taking cognizance of the crimes.
It was generally not considered desirable to extend the law of limitation to criminal cases. For, in a
criminal prosecution, apart from the injured party and the offender, the community as a whole has
an interest in the detection and punishment of the offender and this interest may be defeated if the
mere expiry of time is allowed to operate as a bar to prosecution. But the major considerations for
prescribing limitation for criminal cases are as follows:

1. As the time passes, the testimony of the witnesses becomes weaker and weaker because of
lapse of memory and evidence becomes more and more uncertain with the result that the danger
of error becomes greater.

2. For the purpose of peace and repose, it is necessary that an offender should not be kept
under continuous apprehension that he may be prosecuted at any time particularly because with
the multifarious laws creating new offences may persons at some time or the other commit some
crime or the other. People will have no peace of mind if there is no period of limitation even for
petty offences.

3. The deterrent effect of punishment is impaired if the prosecution is not launched and
punishment is not inflicted before the offence has been wiped off the memory of the person
concerned.

4. The sense of social retribution which is one of the purposes of criminal law loses its edge
after the expiry of a long period.

5. The period of limitation would put a pressure on the organs of the criminal prosecution to
make every effort to ensure the detection and punishment of the crime quickly.1

Also the object of the Criminal Procedure Code in putting a bar of limitation on prosecution was
clearly to prevent the abuses of the process of Court 2. Statuses of limitation shut out belated and

1
K.N. Chandrasekhara Pillai, R. V. Kelkar’s Criminal Procedure, Eastern Book Company, 2011: 5th ed.
Reprint, pp.486-487.

2
State of Punjab v. Sarwan Singh, AIR 1981 SC 1054.
 2
dormant claims in order to save from the accused from unnecessary harassment. The object which
the statutes seek to subserve is clearly in consonance with the concept of fairness of trial as
enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution.

The Code has accepted the principle of limitation in respect of less serious offences i.e. offences
punishable with fine only or with imprisonment up to three years. It is said that the question of
extending the law of limitation to graver offences might be taken up later on in the light of
experience actually gained.

The provisions regarding limitation are contained in Sections 467- 473 and the accused, depending
upon these sections may, in an appropriate case, take the plea that the criminal case against him is
barred by the prescribed period of limitation.

Chapter XXXVI of the Code or Criminal Procedure, comprising of Sections 467 to 473, prescribes
distinct limitation periods for taking cognizance of various offences, depending upon the gravity of
those offences interlinked with the punishments, respectively. The rationale behind the inclusion of
a period of limitation was that the testimony of witnesses becomes weaker with the lapse of time
and memory and consequently the chances of errors in judgments increase, since the evidence
becomes weaker. In addition to this, the period of limitation would put pressure on the system of the
criminal prosecution to ensure that the offender is convicted and punished quickly to ensure speedy
justice. The deterrent effect that the criminal justice system aims at, will stand defeated in case the
punishment has not been granted before the memory of the offence gets washed off from the heads
of those affected by it. This Chapter is clearly in consonance with the concept of fairness of trial, as
enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

The object of the Legislature, while introducing a period of limitation can be ascertained from the
statement of the Joint Committee of the Parliament, where it was stated that:

"These are new clauses prescribing periods of limitation on a graded scale for launching a criminal
prosecution in certain cases. At present there is no period of limitation for criminal prosecution and
a court cannot throw out a complaint or a police report solely on the ground of delay although
inordinate delay may be a ground for entertaining doubts about the truth of the prosecution story.
Periods of limitation have been prescribed for criminal prosecution in the laws of many countries
and the Committee feels that it will be desirable to prescribe such periods in the Code as
recommended by the Law Commission".
 3

BASIC RULE REGARDING LIMITATION

467.Definitions.- 

For the purposes of this Chapter, unless the context otherwise requires, "period of limitation" means
the period specified in section 468 for taking cognizance of an offence.

468.Bar to taking cognizance after lapse of the period of limitation.-

(1) Except as otherwise provided elsewhere in this Code, no Court shall take cognizance of an
offence of the category specified in sub-section (2), after the expiry of the period of limitation.

(2) The period of limitation shall be –

(a) six months, if the offence is punishable with fine only;

(b) one year, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding one
year;

(c) three years, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding one year
but not exceeding three years.

The bar of limitation under the section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it must be clearly
understood, is imposed not on the filing of the complaint but on taking cognizance thereof by the
Court. Sub-section (1) of section 468 provides that a court shall not take cognizance of an offence
after the expiry of limitation. In section 468, limitation is prescribed for the three classes of offences
only-

 Offences punishable with fine only;

 The offences punishable with imprisonment of one year;

 And the offence punishable with imprisonment of three years.

The cognizance can be taken within, six months from the date of commencement specified, if the
offence is punishable with fine only; within one year if the offence is punishable with imprisonment
of one year and within three years if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term
exceeding one year but not exceeding three years.
 4
The object of Sec. 468 is to put pressure on the organs of the prosecution to make every effort to
ensure the detection and punishment of the crime quickly3.

The bar of limitation is an absolute bar. It goes to the root of jurisdiction of the Court. A court of
law cannot take cognizance of an offence, if it is barred by limitation. Delay in filing a complaint
petition therefore has to be condoned if the delay is not condoned, the court will have no
jurisdiction to take cognizance. Similarly unless it is held that a sanction was not required to be
obtained, the court’s jurisdiction will be barred.

Mere filing of complaint, a submitting of a police report within the period of limitation is not
enough.

Where there was allegation of offence under Essential Commodities Act prescribing maximum
sentence of two years but cognizance of offence was taken seven years from the date of occurrence,
held that such cognizance was liable to be quashed.4

The basic rule mentioned above is subject to the other provisions relating to limitation contained
elsewhere in the Code. For instance, different periods of limitation have been prescribed for certain
offences by Section 198(6) or Section 199(5) and those will not be affected by the basic mentioned
above.

Section 468 as it stands today might cause some hardship and injustice to a diligent complainant
under certain circumstances. The complainant might have lodged the complaint well in time, but the
magistrate receiving the same, instead of taking cognizance of the offence mentioned therein, might
send it to the police under Section 156(3) for investigation into the case; and by the time the police
report back after the investigation, the period of limitation might have expired or there might be
other reasons (for which complainant is not responsible) for not taking cognizance of the offence
might get time-barred. Probably, section 473 which gives the discretion to court to extend the
period of limitation may, to an extent, be useful to remove the injustice and hardship caused to the
complainant in such situations.

3
G.D. Iyer,1978 Cri.L.J. 1180 (Del)

4
Jay Gobind Prasad v. State of Bihar, 2002 Cri.L.J. 4767 (Pat)
 5
It is interesting to note that the Supreme Court has ruled that the language of Section 468(3) makes
it imperative that the limitation period for taking cognizance in Section 468 is in respect of the
offence charged and not in respect of offence finally proved5.

Where the court takes cognizance of a major offence against an accused person, but finds him guilty
of a minor offence, it is open to the accused to plead that conviction for major offence is bad if the
complaint or challan is filed against him beyond the power of the court to exercise its discretion
under Section 473.6
Section 468 imposes a bar on taking cognizance of an offence after the expiry of the period of
limitation. Here ‘taking cognizance’ is of offence and not offender. Therefore, if during the
pendency of the criminal proceedings, but after the expiry of the period of limitation, the court
decides to proceed against some other person as accused person in accordance with the provisions
of Section 319, the bar of limitation will not apply in respect of such additional accused persons
because even according to the Section 319(4), the case is to proceed against such persons as if they
had been accused persons when the court took cognizance of the offence upon which the inquiry or
trial was commenced. Moreover, Section 468 starts with “Except as otherwise provided elsewhere
in this Code” and Section 319 is one such exception. Therefore, the bar of limitation will not apply
to a case where the magistrate proceeds against a person under Section 319.

The operation of basic rule has been excluded in respect of certain economic offences by a special
law, namely, the Economic Offences (Inapplicability of Limitation) Act, 1974. Section 2 of the Act
provides that nothing contained in Sections 467-473 of the Code shall apply to-

1. Any offence punishable under any of the enactments specified in the Schedule, or

2. Any other offence, which under the provisions of the Code, may be tried along with such
offence.
In addition to the above-mentioned Act, there might be State enactments excluding the operation of
the periods of limitation as prescribed by the Code, in certain cases. Also, Supreme Court has
excluded the operation of limitation in respect of offence under Section 498 A of IPC observing-

“When Section 498 A of the IPC is bought to use in the case cruelty on women, the law of
limitation is not that rigid so as to nonsuit the aggrieved wife. A fair dose of liberalities is

5
State of H.P. v. Tara Dutt, (2000) 1 SCC 230.
6
K. Hanumantha Rao v. K. Narasimha Rao, 1982 Cri.L.J 734. (A.P) 
 6
warranted, so that the law as an instrument comes in aid of the aggrieved due to gender
inequalities”.

It has been decided that if there is a conflict between the periods of limitation prescribed in the code
and a local law, having regard to Section 4(2) of the Code, the limitation prescribed by local law
shall be applicable.7

STATE OF PUNJUB –VS- SARWAN SINGH8 decided on the 2nd April 1981 was a case of
misappropriation of the funds of a Co-operative Society by the accused Sarwan Singh. The charge-
sheet was filed on 13.10.1976 and it showed that embezzlement was committed on 22.08.1972 and
the audit report through which the offence was detected was dated 05.01.1973. On those dates both
the High Court and the Supreme Court held that prosecution was clearly barred by three year period
of limitation within Section 468(2) of the Code. The Supreme Court also held that the object of
enacting a bar of limitation on prosecution is in consonance with the concept of fairness of trial
enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

RASHMI KUMAR (SMT) –Vs- MAHESH KUMAR BHADA,9 decided on the 18th December,

1996 is another Three Judge decision of the Supreme Court dealing with a question of limitation in
a criminal case under Section 406 of the Penal Code filed by a wife against the husband for
committing breach of trust with respect to the “Stridhan” property of the wife. The High Court
quashed the complaint. The Supreme Court dealt with the question of limitation arising in the case
in para 15 of the Judgment thus :-
“It is seen that the appellant has averred in paras 21 and 22 of the complaint that she demanded
from the respondent return of the jewelry and household goods on 05.12.1987 and the respondent
flatly refused The complaint was admittedly filed on 10.09.1990 meaning within three years from
the date of the demand and refusal by the respondent. The learned judge relied upon her evidence
recorded under section 200 of the code. That view of the learned Judge is clearly based on the
evidence torn of the context with reference to the specific averments made in the complaint and the
evidence recorded under Section 200 of the Code.”
Thus on facts the complaint was held to have been filed in time.

7
S. Ramachandra Reddy v. P.N. Ravindra Reddy, 1991 Cri.L.J. 1619 (A.P.)
8
(1981)3 SCC 34
9
(1997)2 SCC 397
 7
Ganesh Pal Singh v. State of U.P.10 it was observed that if the charge-sheet was filed much before
the completion of limitation period (three years in this case) then the case is not barred by the
limitation.
Brief facts of the case are:- Ganesh Pal Singh is the accused and the matter was investigated and
after investigation a Charge-sheet under Section 323, 353, 504 IPC was filed in the court of
Magistrate on 3.1.2002 and Magistrate taking cognizance summoned the accused on the same day.
The incident took place on 20.9.2001. Firstly the applicant challenged the summons-order in the
court of Sessions Judge which was not accepted. Then again matter went to Magistrate and accused
now claimed that the proceedings of the case were barred by time but this plea of accused was
rejected by the Magistrate on 27.11.2007 holding that cognizance had already been taken on
3.1.2002. The revision was filed against this order to Addl. Sessions Judge but it was also rejected.
Then the revision petition was filed before the High Court. It was held that the submission of the
accused that the cognizance was taken on 27.11.2007 was illegal and without jurisdiction was
misconceived. The application has no merits and therefore, deserves to be dismissed.

10
2011 Cri.L.J 3350 (All)
 8

Commencement of period of limitation

The provisions relating to the commencement of the period of limitation are contained in Sections
469 and 472.

469.Commencement of the period of limitation.- 

(1) The period of limitation, in relation to an offender, shall commence, -

(a) on the date of the offence; or

(b) where the commission of the offence was not known to the person aggrieved by the
offence or to any police officer, the first day on which such offence comes to the knowledge
of such person or to any police officer, whichever is earlier; or

(c) where it is not known by whom the offence was committed, the first day on which the
identity of the offender is known to the person aggrieved by the offence or to the police
officer making investigation into the offence, whichever is earlier.

(2) In computing the said period, the day from which such period is to be computed shall be
excluded.

472.Continuing offence.-

In the case of a continuing offence, a fresh period of limitation shall begin to run at every moment
of the time during which the offence continues.

Section 469 fixes the date from which the period of limitation in relation to an offender shall
commence. As a general rule, the period of limitation begins to run from the date of the commission
of the offence and to this general rule, two exceptions are provided by this section. One is where the
aggrieved party or police was not aware of the commission of the offence and the second is where
the identity of the offender was not known. In computing the limitations, the first day shall be
excluded.

The exact purpose of clauses (a) (b) and (c) of Section 469 (1) providing three alternatives dates for
the commencement of the period of limitation is not easy to understand. The sub-section does not
give any specific direction, like “whichever is later” or “whichever is earlier”, for choosing one of
 9
the dates. If the choice is to be given to the accused, he will invariably choose clause (a), as that
would be most advantageous to him in any case; and in that event clauses (b) and (c) will become
superfluous. On the other hand, if the choice is of prosecution, it would always choose clause (c) as
that would give longest time to prosecution and in that case, clauses (a) and (b) become redundant.
In course of time, these problems will come up before the courts for solution.

The term ‘person aggrieved’ has not been defined in the Code. The question whether the term
whether the term ‘person aggrieved by the offence’ should be interpreted in a limited and restricted
sense meaning one who is personally and directly affected by an offence or should be given wider
meaning including any member of the public or even an officer who is charged with the duty of
enforcing the prohibitory regulations under statute. It has been held by the Madras High Court that
the term ‘person aggrieved by an offence’ should be given limited meaning i.e. one who is
personally and directly affected by the offence and not any member of public or even an officer
who is charged with the duty of enforcing the prohibitory regulations under statute.
However, as per Batuk Lal’s Commentary on Code of Criminal Procedure, the reasoning of the
interpretation of the word given in the judgment is not correct. According to General Clauses Act
(Section 42), the term person shall include any company or association or body of individuals,
whether incorporated or not. The term ‘aggrieved’ means injured; having a grievance. The cases
which have been relied upon in Sulochna’s case are cases of seeking legal remedy by individuals on
the breach of public right, they have no application of the cases covered by Section 469.  As a
matter of law every offence is committed against the State and the State is really aggrieved person
in a criminal case. The term person aggrieved includes the Government or an officer who is charged
with the duty of the enforcing prohibitory regulations under the statute.
Two aspects must be borne in mind: first, the period of limitation is to be considered in relation to
an offender; secondly, as held in Tara Dutt11, the limitation period for taking cognizance in Sec. 468
would be in respect of offence charged and not in respect of the offence finally proved. In the
matter of computation of the period of limitation, there are two conflicting views. Not that different
High Court have taken different view, conflicting views came from the same High Court. One view
is that the relevant date for computation of limitation under sec. 468 is the date of filing of the
complaint. The other view is that the relevant date is the date of taking cognizance by the
Magistrate.
As per B.B. Mitra’s Code of Criminal Procedure, the insurmountable difficulty would be caused if
the second view is accepted. The second view may be a legalistic view, but it must fail- and fail it
must, when applied to certain circumstances, the possibility of which cannot be ruled out. There is a
11
AIR 2000 SC 297
 10
third view, holding that for the purpose of sec. 468, the date of filing of complaint is the date of
taking cognizance. This is again, it is submitted, not correct interpretation of ‘taking of cognizance’.

The controversy has been set at rest by the Supreme Court in Japani Sahoo  v.  Chandra Sekhar12,
it has been held that ‘for the purpose of computing the period of limitation, the relevant date must
be considered as the date of filing of complaint or initiating criminal proceedings and not the date of
taking cognizance by the Magistrate or issuance of process by a court’.

STATE OF RAJASTHAN –VS- SANJAY KUMAR AND OTHERS13, decided on 1st May 1998

answers the question as to when does the period of limitation commence in a prosecution under the
Drugs and Cosmetics Act 1940. It was held that the period of limitation commences not on the date
when the sample was taken but commences only on the date of receipt of the Govt. analyst’s Report
within Section 469(1) (b) of the Code.

BHARAT DAMODAR KALE AND ANOTHER –VS- STATE OF A.P.14 decided on the

8th October 2003 marks yet another watershed in the development of the law of limitation in
criminal cases. The case arose out of a complaint by the Drugs Inspector for an offence under the
Drugs and Magic Remedies (Objectionable Advertisements) Act 1954. Competence of the
concerned Drug Inspector to file the complaint and the bar of limitation are the two points argued
before the High Court in a petition under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal
proceedings. Both the points were answered against the accused petitioners by the High Court as
well as the Supreme Court. On the question of limitation in para 10 and 11 of the Judgment relying
on the statutory indication available from the provisions of Section 469 and 470 of the Code and
applying the legal maxim “actus curiae neminem gravabit” (an act of the court shall prejudice no
man) the Supreme Court laid down the law that the provision of chapter XXXVI of the Code
“clearly indicates that the limitation prescribed therein is only for the filing of the complaint or
initiation of the prosecution and not for taking cognizance.” The Judgment also drew support from
the Three Judge decision in RASHMI KUMAR case. In the case offence was detected on
05.03.1999 and the complaint was filed on 03.03.2000 well within the one year period of limitation.
The cognizance, however, was taken on 25.03.2000 about 25 days after it was filed. On these facts
applying the law as above the complaint was held not to be barred by limitation.

According to sec. 472, in case of a continuing offence, a fresh period of limitation shall begin to run
every moment of the time during which the offence continues. If the offence is continuing one and
12
(2007) 7 SCC 394.
13
AIR 1998 S.C. 1919,
14
AIR 2003 SC 4560, (2003) 8 SCC 559
 11
continuous at the moment of taking cognizance thereof, then, in view of Section 472, the
cognizance will be within limitation irrespective of when the offence came to be committed for the
first time or when it first came to the knowledge of the person aggrieved or when the complaint was
lodged15.

A continuing offence is one which is susceptible of continuance and is distinguishable from the one
which is committed once and for all. It is one of those offences which arise out of failure to obey or
comply with a rule or its requirement and which involves a penalty, the liability for which continues
until the rule or its requirement is obeyed or complied with. On every occasion that such
disobedience or non-compliance occurs and re-occurs, there is the offence committed. It has been
opined that it is not the continuing liability for punishment but the liability for continuing
punishment which makes an offence a continuing offence.

Continuing offence means an offence that continues from a moment to moment without interruption
or break. It is an offence that must continue without requiring any act on the part of the offender to
keep it in existence. It is an offence which would come to an end only when the accused does an act
to terminate it.

Where the breach of statutory duty was an offence then as long as such breach continues, the
offence has to be treated to be continues, the offence has to be treated to be continuing. In Bhagirat
Kanoria  v.  State of M.P.16,  the Supreme Court held that non-payment of the employer’s
contribution to the Provident Fund before the due date, is a continuing offence and therefore, the
period of limitation prescribed in sec. 468 cannot have any application. Also, it was held in Balram
Singh  v.  Sukhwant Kaur17 that the entrustment of stridhan and the refusal to return it despite
repeated requests and persuasions amounts to the offence of criminal breach of trust and is a
continuing offence until the return of property to the wife.
Moreover, it was also observed that offences for violation of the provisions of Sections 159 and 220
of the Companies Act are continuing in nature and until and unless the legal requirements contained
in the above provisions of the Companies Act are compiled with the persons in charge of the
company are liable to be prosecuted. Fresh period of limitation starts on each day until the
requirements of the provisions are complied with.

15
Oriental Bank of Commerce v. DDA, 1982 Cri.L.J. 2230 at 2233 (Del)
16
AIR 1980 SC 1688
17
1992 Cri.L.J. 792 (P&H)
 12
Further, the offence of kidnapping for ransom was held to be not abrogated upon the death of
victim. There was continuation of ransom calls by the accused even after the death. The offence
becomes a continuing offence. The date of last ransom call constitutes the date of offence. By then
the accused had attained the age of 18 years. The Juvenile Justice Act ceased to be applicable.18

Exclusion of time in certain cases

The provisions relating to exclusion of time in computing the period of limitation are contained in
Sections 470 and 471. 

470.Exclusion of time in certain cases.- 

(1) In computing the period of limitation, the time during which any person has been prosecuting
with due diligence another prosecution, whether in a Court of first instance or in a Court of appeal
or revision, against the offender, shall be excluded:

Provided that no such exclusion shall be made unless the prosecution relates to the same facts and is
prosecuted in good faith in a Court which from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature,
is unable to entertain it.

(2) Where the institution of the prosecution in respect of an offence has been stayed by an
injunction or order, then, in computing the period of limitation, the period of the continuance of the
injunction or order, the day on which it was issued or made, and the day on which it was withdrawn,
shall be excluded.

(3) Where notice of prosecution for an offence has been given, or where, under any law for the time
being in force, the previous consent or sanction of the Government or any other authority is
required for the institution of any prosecution for an offence, then, in computing the period of
limitation, the period of such notice or, as the case may be, the time required for obtaining such
consent or sanction shall be excluded.

Explanation.- In computing the time required for obtaining the consent or sanction of the
Government or any other authority, the date on which the application was made for obtaining the
18
Vikas Chaudhary v. State of NCT, Delhi, AIR 2010 SC 3380
 13
consent or sanction and the date of receipt of the order of the Government or other authority shall
both the excluded.

(4) In computing the period of limitation, the time during which the offender:-

(a) has been absent from India or from any territory outside India which is under the
administration of he Central Government, or

(b) has avoided arrest by absconding or concealing himself, shall be excluded.

471.Exclusion of date on which Court is closed.-

Where the period of limitation expires on a day when the Court is closed, the Court may take
cognizance on the day on which the Court reopens.

Explanation.- A Court shall be deemed to be closed on any day within the meaning of this section,
if, during its normal working hours, it remains closed on that day.

The principle behind this section 470 is the protection against the bar of limitation person honestly
doing his best to get his case tried on merits but failing through, the Court being unable to give him
such a trial and this principle is applicable not only to cases the person files his case in the wrong
Court, but also where he files his case in his case in the right Court but is nevertheless, prevented
from getting a trial on merits by something which, though not a defect in jurisdiction is analogous to
that defect.

Section 470 (1) provides in reckoning the period of limitation, the time spent in prosecuting another
prosecution whether in Court of first instance or appeal or revision shall be excluded provided-

1. The first prosecution was prosecuted with due diligence;

2. It was against the same accused;

3. The prosecution relates to the same fact;

4. The prosecution was in good faith;

5. And the Court in which the prior case was prosecuted from the defect of the jurisdiction or
other case of like nature was unable to entertain it
 14
It was held in the case of S.M. Vikal  v.  A.L. Chopra19, the time under this section can be extended
when the complainant himself was prosecuting another prosecution. If he himself was prosecuted,
the section does not apply.
The question whether or not due care and attention was exercised has to be determined with the
reference to the facts of each case. The standard of proof required to adjudge this point cannot be
higher than what is laid down in section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act. The real question material for
the purpose of section 470 is not whether the complainant was dishonest or that his acts or
omissions in this connection were malafide and on the other hand, the question is whether given due
care and attention, the complaint could have discovered the mistake earlier.
In order that the section 470(1) may apply, it is essential that the Court in which the prior case was
prosecuted must have been unable to entertain it due to the defect of jurisdiction or other cause of
the like natures. In excluding the time during which former prosecution was pending the day on
which that prosecution was instituted and the day on which ended shall both be counted towards the
period to be excluded.

Section 470(2) in effect says that in computing the period of limitation where the institution of
prosecution has been stayed by an order of injunction or by an order staying the institution of the
prosecution. The sub-section (2) requires an order or an injunction which stays the institution of
prosecution. If an express order or injunction is produced by a party that clearly meets the
requirements of section 470(2) whether the requirements of the sub-section would be satisfied by
the production of an order or injunction which is by necessary implications stays the institution of
the prosecution is open to argument.

Section 470(3) says that where notice of prosecution for an offence has to be given in computing
the period of limitation the period of such notice shall be excluded and where in any law the
previous consent or sanction of Government or any other authority is required for the prosecution of
a person then in computing the period of limitation the time required for consent or sanction
including the date on which the application was made and the date of receipt of the order shall be
excluded.

It has application only to instances in which notice of prosecution for an offence has been given in
accordance with the requirements of any enactment for the time being in force. The law nowhere
says to person that when he is under no disability but erroneously imagines himself to be under a
disability he will obtain any relaxation of the ordinary law of limitation.
19
1978 Cri.L.J 764 (SC)
 15
Under sub-section (3) where sanction for institution of a prosecution is necessary, the period for
obtaining sanction has to be excluded in computing the period of limitation. For instance, for an
offence under section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 the previous sanction of the State
Government or of such officer of the State Government as may be specified as essential. Therefore,
the time spent in obtaining the sanction is to be excluded.

Section 470(4) provides that the period during which the offender is absent from India or any
territory outside India which is under the administration of the Central Government or has avoided
arrest by absconding or concealing himself shall be excluded from the period of limitation under
section 470(4). The burden of proof is upon the person who seeks extension to prove both that the
offender has been absent from India and from territories under the administration of Government of
India.

Section 471 provides that when on the last date of the limitation the Court is closed the cognizance
may be taken on the day when the Court reopens. Under the explanation to the section a Court shall
be deemed to be closed if during any part of its normal working hours it remains closed on that day.
The question whether in any particular case the Court is closed is one of fact which must depend
upon the practice which prevails in particular Court.
 16

Extension of period of limitation in certain cases

Section 473 provides that notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing provisions of this
Chapter, any Court may take cognizance of an offence after the expiry of facts and in the
circumstances of the case that the delay has been properly explained or that it is necessary so to do
in the interests of justice.

The words ‘this chapter’ refer to the Chapter 36 of the Code containing sections 467-473.
The section begins with non-obstante clause and if section 468 is read with this section, it would be
obvious that while section 468 prohibits the court from taking cognizance of an offence beyond the
prescribed period of limitation, section 473 enables the Court to take cognizance after the expiry of
the period of limitation in case the court is satisfied that the delay has been properly explained or it
is necessary to do so in the interest of justice.

The discretion given to the Court in this connection by section 473 is very wide though it has to be
exercised judicially after considering the facts and circumstances of the case20. There cannot be any
hard and fast rule as to what constitutes sufficient cause to ‘properly explain’ the delay occasioned
or what is ‘necessary in the interest of justice’. It must be determined by a reference to the facts and
circumstances of the case, and it is impossible to encase judicial discretion of the straitjacket.

It has been held that the provisions of section 473 should be liberally construed so as to advance
substantial justice when no negligence or inaction or want of bonafide is imputable to the
prosecutor, but cannot be construed too liberally because the Government is the prosecutor or
prosecution is upon the police report21.
It should also be remembered that the salutary purpose of the law of limitation should not be
allowed to be circumvented by taking recourse to the magic words of ‘interests of justice’ unless
there is manifestation of compelling and justifiable reasons. Also, when an application is filed by
the complainant for the extension of the period of limitation, the principles of natural justice
demand that the accused persons must be heard before passing as order on the application as such
an order is bound to affect a valuable right which accrues to the accused.

SRINIVAS PAL –VS- UNION TERRITORY OF ARUNACHAL PRADESH,22 1729 decided

on the 1st of August, 1988 was a decision dealing with rash and negligent driving. The offence took
20
K. Hanumantha Rao v. K. Narasimha Rao, 1982 Cri.L.J. 734

21
Krishna Sanghi v. State of M.P., 1977 Cri.L.J. 90 (MP)
22
AIR 1988 S.C
 17
place in November 1976 and till the court’s order of August 1987 no investigation had taken place.
On those dates though the High Court remitted the matter on the holding that since taking
cognizance without first condoning the delay was bad and without jurisdiction the Supreme Court
short- circuited the entire matter by quashing the prosecution on the ground of enormous delay in
prosecution without deciding the contention urged relating to the prescription of Section 473 of the
Code.

VANKA RADHAMANOHARI (SMT) –VS- VANKA VENKATA REDDY AND OTHERS,23

decided on the 20th April 1993 was a case where the Magistrate took cognizance of the offences
under Section 498-A and 494 of the Penal Code. The High Court quashed the criminal proceedings
on the ground of the bar under Section 468 of the Code since Section 498- A I.P.C prescribes
punishment only upto three years imprisonment. The High Court did not notice that for offence
under Section 494 I.P.C. punishable with imprisonment upto seven years no bar of limitation is
applicable. The Supreme Court referred to SARWAN SINGH (Supra) and BHAGIRATH
KANORIA (Supra) and held that the High Court should have considered the provisions of Section
473 of the Code, specially in a case of cruelty against women. The crux of the judgment is the
highlighting of the difference between the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and
those of Section 473 of the Code covering the same ground but with considerable difference in
application. The Supreme Court applied Section 473 and condoned the delay. The order of the
Magistrate was restored.

SUKHDEV RAJ –Vs- STATE OF PUNJUB,24 decided on the 28th of September, 1993 was a

case where Sukhdev Raj was convicted and sentenced for an offence under Section 9 of the Opium
Act, 1878. In the High Court the only point urged was that on the undisputed date of occurrence on
31.05.1974 and that of filing of the charge-sheet more than three years elapsed and thereafter on
29.08.1977 cognizance could not have been taken in view of Section 468 of the Code. An
application under Section 473 of the Code filed almost at the close of the trial was held sufficient by
the Supreme Court to condone the delay.

23
(1993)3 SCC 4
24
1994 Supp (2) SCC 398
 18

LATEST CASE: Sarah Mathew V. Institute of Cardio

Vascular Diseases25

The five judges' bench of the Supreme Court of India, consisting of P. Sathasivam CJ,
Dr.B.S.Chauhan, Ranjana P.Desai, Ranjan Gogoi and S.A.Bobde, JJ, in the case titled as " Sarah
Mathew Vs. Institute of Cardio Vascular Diseases & Ors." sought to ensure justice to the citizens of
the country, by striking a balance between the legal maxim "nullum tempus aut locus occurit regi',
and the legal maxim 'vigilantibus et non dormientibus, jura subveniunt'.

This aforesaid decision of the Apex Court delivered and penned down by Justice Ranjana. P. Desai
puts a rest to the conflicting views expressed by the court in the following authorities:-

 Krishna Pillai Vs. T.A. Rajendran and Anr26; where the Court stated that no court shall
take cognizance of any offence under the Child Marriage Restraint Act, 1929 after the
expiry of one year from the date on which the offence is alleged to have been committed.
 Bharat Damodar kale Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh27; where it was held that for the
purpose of computing the period of limitation , the relevant date if the date of filing of
complaint or initiating criminal proceedings and not the date of taking cognizance by a
Magistrate or issuance of a process by court. The aforesaid "Bharat Kale", was further
referred and relied upon in the judgment titled as "Japani Sahoo Vs. Chandra Sekhar
Mohanty;28, where the Court upheld the decision given by it in the "Bharat Kale" case and
stated that mere delay in approaching a Court of Law would not by itself afford a ground for
dismissing the case though it may be a relevant circumstance in reaching a final verdict.

In the aforesaid "Sarah Mathew" case, reliance has been placed upon the Law Commission's Report
and the report of the Joint Parliamentary Committee, which made it clear that Chapter XXXVI,
dealing with the limitation for taking Cognizance of certain offences had been inserted into the
Code of Criminal Procedure to make the prosecution of complaints a quick process and
consequently make the criminal justice system more orderly, efficient and just. The Court states that
the object of putting a bar of limitation, in light of Article 21 of the Constitution, was to prevent the
parties from filing a case after a long time, which many times, results in the disappearance of
material evidence and filing of vexatious and belated prosecutions long after the date of the offence.

25
2014(2) SCC 62
26
(1990) supp. SCC 121
27
(2003) 8 SCC 559
28
(2007) 7 SCC 394
 19
However, Chapter XXXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not undermine the right of the
accused. It aims to strike a balance between the interest of the complainant and the interest of the
accused. While this limitation encourages diligence by providing for limitation, it does not intend to
throw out all prosecutions on the ground of delay. It has further been stated that where the
legislature wanted to treat certain offences differently, it provided for limitation in the section itself,
for instance, Section 198(6) and 199(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

The Supreme Court, in "Sarah Mathew" case, laid down the meaning and the scope of term 'taking
cognizance' When on a petition or complaint being filed before a Magistrate, he applies his mind or
takes judicial notice of an offence, with a view to initiate proceedings in respect of an offence which
is said to have taken place, the Magistrate is said to have taken cognizance of the offence. The
Court states that Section 473, which provides for the extension of the period of limitation in certain
cases, is a non-obstante clause, which has an overriding effect on Section 468 of the Criminal
Procedure Code. Reliance has been placed on the decision of the Court in Vanka Radhamanohari
vs. Vanka Vankata Reddy and Ors.29, where the Court observed that the basic difference between
section 5 of the Limitation Act and Section 473 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is that, in order
to exercise the power under Section 5 of the Limitation act, the onus is on the applicant to satisfy
the court that there was sufficient cause for condonation of delay, whereas, Section 473 enjoins a
duty on the court to examine not only whether such delay has been explained, but as to whether it is
the requirement of justice to ignore such delay.

The Court, while dealing with the two contradicting maxims, 'vigililantibus et non dormientibus,
jura subveniunt' and 'nullum tempus aut locus occurrit regi', states that Chapter XXXVI of the Code
of Criminal Procedure which provides the limitation period for certain types of offences for which
lesser sentence is provided, draws support from the maxim 'vigilantibus et non dormientibus jura
subveniunt" and that even certain offences such as section 384 or 465 of the Indian Penal Code,
which have lesser punishment, may have serious social consequences and hence, the provision for
the condonation of delay was made. The Court was thus, of the opinion that Chapter XXXVI is a
part of the Code of Criminal procedure, which is a procedural law and it is a well settled principle
that procedural laws must be liberally construed to serve as handmaid of justice and not as its
mistresses.

Hence, the Court, in this matter, held that the decision given by the Court in the "Krishna Pillai",
matter would not be the authority for deciding as to what is the relevant date for computing the
period of limitation under Section 468 of the Code of Criminal procedure since in that case, the

29
(1993) 3 SCC 4
 20
Court was dealing Section 9 of the Child Marriage Restraint Act, 1929, which is a special Act and
there is no reference to Section 468 or 473 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in that judgment.
Also, the Hon'ble Supreme observed that the said judgment is restricted to its own facts and
constitution bench does not endorse the view taken in "Krishna Pillai", which was by 3 Judges
Bench. Finally, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in "Sarah Mathew", held that "Bharat Kale" (which is
followed in "Japani Sahoo" lays down the correct law.

In the light of the same, the Court held that the relevant date, for the purpose of computing the
period of limitation under Section 468 of the Criminal Procedure Code is the date of filing of the
complaint or the date of institution of prosecution and not the date on which a Magistrate takes
Cognizance.
 21

NEED TO CONDONE THE DELAY IN INTEREST

OF JUSTICE
While laws are to be complied with, the time by which actions need to be taken should be
mentioned. Failure to do so makes actions time-barred to the prejudice of the parties concerned.
However, powers to condone delays vest in the authorities concerned, which must be exercised in a
liberal and pragmatic manner. Courts have said that pedantic views should not be taken in such
matters.

Law of Limitation is based on the legal maxim “Interest Reipublicae Ut Sit Finis Litium” that
means it is for the general rule of the welfare that a period be put to litigation. It is a general
principle of law that law is made to protect only diligent and vigilant people but not the indolent.
Law will not protect those people who are careless about their rights. The Law of Limitation
prescribes the time -limit for different suits within which an aggrieved person can approach the
court for redress or justice. The suit, if filed after the exploration of time-limit, is struck by the law
of limitation. The concept is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed
period of time. While condoning the delay, the court should not forget the opposite party altogether.
It must be borne in mind that he is a loser and he too would have incurred quite large litigation
expenses.
The mandate of Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1963 is that if a Court is satisfied about the
applicant having sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or any other application, the delay
may be condoned. 

Section 5 of the Limitation Act reads as hereunder:- 

“5 Extension of prescribed period in certain cases–Any appeal or any application, other than an
application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of
1908), may be admitted after the prescribed period, if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the
court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such
period. 
Explanation–The fact that the appellant or the applicant was misled by any order, practice or
judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may be sufficient
cause within the meaning of this section.” 

The law of limitation, is based on the legal maxim “Interest Reipubulicae Ut Sit Finis Litium”
which means that it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation. 
 22

If legal remedy is kept alive beyond the legislatively fixed period of time, it only generates
dissatisfaction. The parties cannot be allowed to have an unbridled and unfettered free play in
matters of timing of approaching the Court. The Courts, as held by the Supreme Court, must keep in
mind, while dealing with the limitation petition, that there is a distinction between the delay for a
plausible reason and delay because of inaction or negligence which deprives a party of the
protection of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. 

Important aspects of law of limitation 

The Supreme Court has, on number of occasions opined that the expression “sufficient cause” ought
to be interpreted in a manner which subserves the cause of justice for which the institutions of
justicing stand for. 
When a case with arguable points is shut out on prescriptions of limitation, it results in throwing out
a good case at the threshold with the only necessary implication of injustice being perpetuated and
justice being defeated. 
The expression “sufficient cause” cannot be interpreted in an iron frame. The expression “sufficient
cause”, in the words of the Supreme Court, is sufficiently elastic for the purposes of a meaningful
interpretation. 
A serious note of caution has been sounded by Supreme Court against any pedantic or hyper
technical approach in dealing with limitation petitions, more so, when stakes are high and there is
availability of arguable points of law. A Court cannot turn away its gaze from the fact that no
litigant benefits by approaching the Court late. 
Without any good reason, nobody would like to have his claim extinguished and more often than
not, any good reason would dovetail into sufficient reason for approaching the Court after the
period of limitation. 

1. Ramlal vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd.,30

The Supreme Court, while interpreting Section 5 of the Limitation Act, laid down the following
proposition: In construing Section 5 (of the Limitation Act), it is relevant to bear in mind two
important considerations. The first consideration is that the expiration of the period of limitation
prescribed for making an appeal gives rise to a right in favour of the decree-holder to treat the
decree as binding between the parties. In other words, when the period of limitation prescribed has
expired, the decree-holder has obtained a benefit under the law of limitation to treat the decree as

30
AIR 1962 SC 361 
 23
beyond challenge, and this legal right which has accrued to the decree- holder by lapse of time
should not be light-heartedly disturbed. The other consideration which cannot be ignored is that if
sufficient cause for excusing delay is shown, discretion is given to the court to condone delay and
admit the appeal. This discretion has been deliberately conferred on the court in order that judicial
power and discretion in that behalf should be exercised to advance substantial justice. 

2. Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji31, The Supreme Court made a significant
departure from the earlier judgments and observed: The legislature has conferred the power to
condone delay by enacting Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the
courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on “merits”. The expression
“sufficient cause” employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the
law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice-that being the life-purpose for the
existence of the institution of courts. 
It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters
instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other
courts in the hierarchy. 
And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that:
1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.
2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very
threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest
that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 
3. “Every day’s delay must be explained” does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made.
Why not every hour’s delay, every second’s delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational
common sense pragmatic manner. 
4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of
substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in
injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 
5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable
negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In
fact he runs a serious risk. 
6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on
technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. 

Making a justice-oriented approach from this perspective, there was sufficient cause for condoning

31
(1987) SCC 107
 24
the delay in the institution of the appeal. State and Condonation of Day, The fact that it was the
“State” which was seeking condonation and not a private party was altogether irrelevant. The
doctrine of equality before law demands that all litigants, including the State as a litigant, are
accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even- handed manner. There is no
warrant for according a step-motherly treatment when the “State” is the applicant praying for
condonation of delay. In fact experience shows that on account of an impersonal machinery (no one
in charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by the judgment sought to be subjected to appeal) and
the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note- making, file-pushing and passing-on-
the-buck ethos, delay on its part is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve. In
any event, the State which represents the collective cause of the community, does not deserve a
litigant-non-grata status. The courts therefore have to be informed with the spirit and philosophy of
the provision in the course of the interpretation of the expression “sufficient cause”. 

3. N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy,32 The Supreme Court expanded the scope and ambit of
law of limitation and elucidated as follows: It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of
discretion of the court. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be
exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. 
Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay
of the shortest range may be uncondonable due to a want of acceptable explanation whereas in
certain other cases, delay of a very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is
satisfactory. Once the court accepts the explanation as sufficient, it is the result of positive exercise
of discretion and normally the superior court should not disturb such finding, much less in
revisional jurisdiction, unless the exercise of discretion was on wholly untenable grounds or
arbitrary or perverse. But it is a different matter when the first court refuses to condone the delay. In
such cases, the superior court would be free to consider the cause shown for the delay afresh and it
is open to such superior court to come to its own finding even untrammelled by the conclusion of
the lower court. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to
see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. 
The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. The
law of limitation fixes a lifespan for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so
suffered. Time is precious and wasted time would never revisit. During the efflux of time, newer
causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts.
So a lifespan must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to
unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The law of limitation is thus founded on public

32
(1998) 7 SCC 123
 25
policy. It is enshrined in the maxim interest reipublicae up sit finis litium (it is for the general
welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of
the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy
promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of
time. It must be remembered that in every case of delay, there can be some lapse on the part of the
litigant concerned. That alone is not enough to turn down his plea and to shut the door against him. 
If the explanation does not smack of mala fides or it is not put forth as part of a dilatory strategy, the
court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. But when there is reasonable ground to think
that the delay was occasioned by the party deliberately to gain time, then the court should lean
against acceptance of the explanation. While condoning the delay, the court should not forget the
opposite party altogether. It must be borne in mind that he is a loser and he too would have incurred
quite large litigation expenses. It would be a salutary guideline that when courts condone the delay
due to latches on the part of the applicant, the court shall compensate the opposite party for his
loss. 

4. P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala,33

The Supreme Court while reversing the order passed by High Court which had condoned 565 days
delay in filing an appeal by the State against the decree of the Sub- Court in an arbitration
application, observed that the law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be
applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes and the Courts have no power to extend the
period of limitation on equitable grounds. 

5. State of Nagaland v. Lipok AO,34

The Supreme Court has observed that justice-oriented approach should be adopted. Unless a
pragmatic view is taken, injustice is bound to occur. 
Delay in Land Acquisition Matters 
In matters of land acquisition where the land is compulsorily acquired, different approach has to be
taken. The land losers cannot be deprived of the reasonable compensation for their lands. If other
situated land owners are given the higher compensating, there is no reason to pay lesser amount to a
land loser under any circumstance. 

33
(1997) 7 SCC 556 
34
AIR 2005 SC 2191 
 26
6. Imrant Lal vs. Collector (LA)35:
In this context, it would be relevant to quote the following observations from the above judgment: 
We can take judicial notice of the fact that villagers in our country are by and large illiterate and are
not conversant with the intricacies of law. They are usually guided by their co-villagers, who are
familiar with the proceedings in the courts or the advocates with whom they get in touch for
redressal of their grievance. Affidavits filed in support of the applications for condonation of delay
are usually drafted by the advocates on the basis of half-baked information made available by the
affected persons. 

Therefore, in the acquisition matters involving claim for award of just compensation, the court
should adopt a liberal approach and either grant time to the party to file better affidavit to explain
delay or suo motu take cognizance of the fact that large number of other similarly situated persons
who were affected by the determination of compensation by the Land Acquisition Officer or the
Reference Court have been granted relief. 

7. Samiyathal v. Tahsildar36
Apex Court took cognizance of the fact that many landowners may not have been able to seek
intervention of the Court for grant of enhanced compensation due to illiteracy, poverty and
ignorance and issued direction that those who have not filed special leave petition should be given
enhanced compensation. Time has come today where no unnecessary indulgence is required to be
shown to any litigant in general. It only delays of the conclusion of the proceedings between two set
of parties and validates and ratifies the inaction or want of bonafide or negligence on the part of the
litigant in approaching the court late. 

8. Basawaraj & Anr vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, 37

The Supreme Court has gone on to state that equity is not a ground to extend the limitation period
by condoning the delay if there is no “sufficient cause”. The reason assigned by the Supreme Court
is that an unlimited period of litigation would have an impact of rendering a sense of insecurity and
uncertainty, depriving a successful party of enjoying the fruits of litigation as finality to a judgment
is postponed. 

35
(2014) 14 SCC 133 
36
C.A. No. 5335 of 2013, Dated 5-7-2013 (SC)]
37
AIR 2014 SC 746
 27

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Websites

 https://lawschoolnotes.wordpress.com/2016/07/25/limitation-under-code-of-criminal-
procedure-cr-p-c/

 http://www.mondaq.com/india/x/407104/Crime/Crime+Never+Dies

 http://jaassam.gov.in/pdf/article/Article-58.pdf

 http://www.livelaw.in/in-criminal-cases-period-of-limitation-starts-from-the-date-of-
complaint-not-from-date-of-cognizance-constitution-bench/

 https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=period%20of%20limitation%20crpc%20

BOOKS

 K.N. Chandrasekhara Pillai, R. V. Kelkar’s Criminal Procedure, Eastern Book Company,

2016: 6th ed. Reprint

 B.B. Mitra, Code of Criminal Procedure, Kamal Law House (Vol. 2), 2011: 21st ed.

 S.N. Mishra, The Code of Criminal Procedure,1973, Central Law Publications, 2016: 12 th
edition.