ARTICLE 1195
Anything paid or delivered before the arrival of the period, the obligor being unaware of the period
or believing that the obligation has become due and demandable, may be recovered, with the fruits
and interests.
Payment before arrival of period.
Article 1195 applies only to obligations to give. It is similar toArticle 1188, paragraph 2, which
allows the recovery of what has been paid by mistake before the fulfillment of a suspensive
condition. The creditor cannot unjustly enrich himself by retaining the thing or money received
before the arrival of the period. Under the former provision, the debtor could recover only the fruits
or interests but not the thing or sum given or paid in advance. This rule was deemed unjust and
“contrary to the manifest intention of the parties.’’ (See Report of the Code Commission, pp. 130-
131.)
Debtor presumed aware of period.
The presumption, however, is that the debtor knew that the debt was not yet due. He has the
burden of proving that he was unaware of the period. Where the duration of the period depends
upon the will of the debtor (see Art. 1197, par. 3.), payment by him amounts, in effect, to his
determination of the arrival of the
period. The obligor may no longer recover the thing or money once theperiod has arrived but he
can recover the fruits or interests thereof from the date of premature performance to the date of
maturity of the obligation.
No recovery in personal obligations.
Article 1195 has no application to obligations to do or not to do because as to the former, it is physi
cally impossible to recover theservice rendered, and as to the latter, as the obligor performs by not
doing, he cannot, of course, recover what he has not done. (See 8Manresa 166.)
ARTICLE 1196
Whenever in an obligation a period is designated, it is presumed to have been established for the
benefit of both the creditor and the debtor, unless from the tenor of the same or other
circumstances it should appear that the period has been established in favor of one or of the other.
(1127)
Presumption as to benefit of period.
In an obligation subject to a period fixed by the parties, the periodis presumed to have been
established for the benefit of both the creditor and the debtor. This means that before the
expiration of the period, the debtor may not fulfill the obligation and neither may the creditor
demand its fulfillment without the consent of the other especially if the latter would be prejudiced
or inconvenienced thereby.
Exceptions to the general rule.
The tenor of the obligation or the circumstances may, however, show that it was the intention of
the parties to constitute the period for the benefit of either the debtor or the creditor. The benefit of
the period may be the subject of express stipulation of the parties.
(1) Term is for the benefit of the debtor alone.
— He cannot be compelled to pay prematurely, but he can, if he desires, do so.
Computation of term or period.
“When the law speaks of years, months, days or nights, it shall be understood that years are
of three hundred sixty-five (365) days each; months of thirty (30) days; days of twenty-four (24)
hours: and nights from sunset to
sunrise. If months are designated by their name, they shall be computed by the number of days
which they respectively have. In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last day
included.” (Art. 13 thereof.) If the last day is a Sunday or a legal holiday, the time shall not run until
the end of the next day which is neither Sunday nor a holiday.
ARTICLE 1197
If the obligation does not fix a period, but from its nature and the circumstances it can be inferred
that a period was intended, the courts may fix the duration
thereof. The courts shall also fix the duration of the period when itdepends upon the will of the
debtor. In every case, the courts shall determine such period asmay under the circumstances have
been probably contemplated by the parties. Once fixed by the courts, the period cannot be changed
by them.
Court generally without power to fix a period.
The period mentioned in the above provision refers to a judicial period as distinguished from the
period fixed by the parties in their contract which is known as
Contractual period. If the obligation does not state a period and no period is intended, the court is
not authorized to fix a period. The courts have no right to make contracts for the parties. (Tolentino
vs. Gonzales, 50 Phil. 577[1927].)
Exceptions to the general rule.
Under Article 1197, there are two cases when the court is authorized to fix the duration of the
period. Article 1197 is part and parcel of all obligations contemplatedtherein. Hence, whenever the
court fixes the term of an obligation, it does not thereby amend or modify the same. It merely
enforces or carries out the intention of the parties. It cannot arbitrarily fix a period out of thin air.
- No period is fixed but a period was intended.
The obligation does not fix a period but it can be inferred from its nature and the circumstances
that a period was intended.
- Duration of period depends upon the will of the debtor. (For examples, see comments under
Article 1180.)
In the two cases provided in Article 1197, the court must fix theduration of the period to forestall
the possibility that the obligation may never be fulfilled or to cure a defect in a contract whereby it
is made to depend solely upon the will of one of the parties. In fixing the term, the court is merely
enforcing the implied stipulation of the parties. In every case, the court shall determine such period
as may under the circumstances have been probably contemplated by the parties.
Legal effect where suspensive period/ condition depends upon will of debtor.
(1) The existence of the obligation is not affected although theperiod depends upon the sole will of
the debtor. It is only the performance with respect to time that is left to the will of the debtor.
(2) If the obligation is subject to a condition which depends uponthe will of the debtor, the
conditional obligation is void (Art. 1182.) because in such case, it is actually the fulfillment of the
obligation that depends upon the will of the debtor. (See Art. 1308.)
Period fixed cannot be changed by the courts.
(1) If there is a period agreed upon by the parties and it has alreadylapsed or expired, the court
cannot fix another period. (Gonzales vs. Jose, 66 Phil. 369; Millar vs. Nadres, 74 Phil. 30)
(2) From the very moment the parties give their acceptance and consent to the period fixed by
the court, said period acquires the nature of a covenant, because the effect of such acceptance and
consent by the parties is exactly the same as if they had expressly agreed upon it, and having been
agreed upon by them, it becomes a law governing their contract. (Barretto vs. City of Manila, 11
Phil. 624 [1908].) However, the parties may modify the term by a new agreement.
ARTICLE 1198
The debtor shall lose every right to make use of the period:
(1) When after the obligation has been contracted, he be-comes insolvent, unless he gives
a guaranty or security for the debt;
(2) When he does not furnish to the creditor the guaranties or securities which he has promised;
(3) When by his own acts he has impaired said guaranties or securities after their establishment,
and when through a fortuitous event they disappear, unless he immediately gives new ones
equally satisfactory;
(4) When the debtor violates any undertaking, in consideration of which the creditor agreed to the
period;
(5) When the debtor attempts to abscond. (1129a)
When obligation can be demanded before lapse of period.
The general rule is that the obligation is not demandable before thelapse of the period. However, in
any of the five (5) cases mentioned in Article 1198, the debtor shall lose every right to make use
of the period, that is, the period is disregarded and the obligation becomes pure and,
therefore, immediately
demandable. The exceptions are based on the fact that the debtor might not beable to comply with
his obligation.
1. When the debtor becomes insolvent.
2. When debtor does not furnish guaranties or securities promised.
3. When guaranties or securities given have been impaired or have disappeared.
4. When debtor violates an undertaking.
5. When debtor attempts to abscond.
