Symposium | Two Paths to a Science of Politics

Identities, Interests, and the Future

of Political Science
By Rogers M. Smith

O
ne of the central tasks facing any discipline is deciding do rigorous social science in favor of purely thick descriptive
what topics, among a vast range of possibilities, to fea- or subjective accounts. Political scientists who study problems
ture in its research agenda.1 Once a discipline’s practi- of political identity should still be able to develop less abstract
tioners have settled on the agenda, they must then determine theoretical frameworks that can help us to discern and explain
what methods can best illuminate those topics. This essay argues both the origins and transformations of particular political
that political science today needs to give higher priority to identities and near-universal patterns of political conduct. We
studies of the processes, especially the political processes, through may also be able to develop some supra-historical theories about
which conceptions of political membership, allegiance, and the means and mechanisms of consequential historical trans-
identity are formed and transformed. To do this, we need to formations in political affiliations and behavior.
identify, to a greater extent than most political scientists have, Even in our interpretive and contextual characterizations,
the historical contexts of the conflicts and political institutions moreover, we still have to conform as rigorously as we can, as
that have contributed to political identities and commitments, King, Keohane, and Verba have rightly urged, to a unified
and our approaches must provide empathetic interpretive under- “logic of scientific inference,” although we should not equate
standings of human consciousnesses and values. We cannot that logic with the particular statistical techniques, all neces-
rely solely, or even predominantly, on efforts to identify abstract, sarily limited, that are commonly used to approximate it at
ahistorical, and enduring regularities in political behavior such any given time.3 If we are to judge, for example, to what con-
as those that prevailed during the behavioralist era of modern ceptions of their identities and interests particular political
American political science. Nor can we depend primarily on actors are giving priority, we need to form some hypotheses
approaches, ascendant in our discipline’s more recent “rational based on what we think we know about those actors. Then, we
choice” phase, that enhance our formal grasp of instrumental define the different implications of alternative hypotheses.
rationality.2 Those sorts of work can certainly offer important Finally, we look for observable data about their lives that we
contributions, but in general they are most effective as ele- can use to falsify some of the hypotheses. That logic is con-
ments in projects that rest extensively on contextually and stant, though the techniques of falsification will vary with the
historically informed interpretive judgments. types of problems particular data present and with the tools
Despite what some may fear, an increased focus on how currently at our disposal.
political identities are formed and on their behavioral and nor- Yet though the challenge of drawing reliable inferences is
mative significance need not mean abandoning aspirations to universal in social science, the most crucial work in analyzing
political identities must often be done by immersing ourselves
in information about the actors in question, and using both
empathy and imagination to construct credible accounts of
Rogers M. Smith, the Christopher H. Browne Distinguished Pro- identities and interests. In many instances, if that work is done
fessor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania, well, the potential of one interpretation to explain more than
is the author of Stories of Peoplehood: The Politics and others will be reasonably evident even prior to more quantified
Morals of Political Membership (Cambridge University inferential testing. Once James Scott’s concepts of the “hidden
Press, 2003) and Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizen- transcript” and “arts of resistance” had been conceived and
ship in U.S. History (Yale University Press, 1997). E-mail elaborated, for instance, it became clear that we could no lon-
rogerss@sas.upenn.edu. For their feedback on earlier drafts of this ger safely assume that much peasant political behavior was
essay, the author thanks discussants and audience respondents mere acquiescence, even if further work is required to deter-
from the annual meeting of the American Political Science Associ- mine how much “much” is in particular cases.4 Focusing on
ation in September 2002, and the Yale Conference on Problems how political identities are formed and transformed and on
and Methods in Political Science in December 2002. He also thanks the consequences of those identities for political life, then, has
the editorial staff and anonymous reviewers of Perspectives on implications for “how” as well as for “what” political scientists
Politics for many helpful suggestions and corrections. should study.

June 2004 | Vol. 2/No. 2 301

Symposium | Two Paths to a Science of Politics

What Is “Political Identity” and always have been hardier perennials on the political science
Why Study It Now? agenda than they actually have been. In any case, today’s his-
James Fearon has rightly noted that the Oxford English Dic- torical circumstances plainly require political scientists to address
tionary definition of “identity,” as the “quality or condition of these topics more than we have in the past.
being the same in substance, composition, nature, properties, It is understandable that until recently, other questions
or in particular qualities under consideration,” is insufficient loomed larger. The Cold War prompted most American polit-
to capture the range of identity concerns visible in modern ical analysts, in particular, to believe that the big issues were
academic analyses. The American Heritage definitions are more all questions of democratic capitalism versus authoritarian
promising: identity is the “collective aspect of the set of char- socialism—fascism having been crushed after its brief destruc-
acteristics by which a thing is definitively recognizable or tive burgeoning. Political scientists analyzed the many dimen-
known. . . The set of behavioral or personal characteristics by sions of that opposition on the assumption that democratic
which a person is recognizable as a member of a group.” 5 By capitalism and authoritarian socialism were political and eco-
extension, a political identity can be conceived as the collective nomic systems constructed within particular states, usually
label for a set of characteristics by which persons are recog- thought of as nation-states. If questions of political identity
nized by political actors as members of a political group. There were raised at all, therefore, the attention generally focused on
are many sources of such recognition, such as party affiliation, national membership, class status, and ideological camp.
nation-state membership, ethnicity, economic status, lan- But the political world changed during the Cold War years
guage, and others. All these possible sources, however, are only in ways that have pushed new problems onto intellectual as
political identities when political actors treat them as such. We well as political agendas. The era from the end of World War II
can define “political actors” and “political groups,” in turn, as through the 1990s witnessed the dismantling of most Western
those people who determine how governing power will be European empires and the rise of “new nations” in Africa and
created, distributed, exercised, and ended, in ways that partly Asia. The end of empires eventually included the collapse of
decide, among other things, who gets what, when, and how.6 the Soviet Union and, with it, of many other Communist
A person’s political identities—since individuals have many regimes, precipitating a further wave of nation-building and
characteristics and group memberships, they usually possess other, more novel forms of political reconstruction in many
more than one identity—indicate the populations with which parts of the world. The post–Cold War years have also seen the
political actors expect that person to be affiliated in contests proliferation of transnational economic entities, such as the
over governing power and its use. old European Common Market, the North American Free
This definition of political identity is agnostic on the ques- Trade Agreement, and the World Trade Organization; the devel-
tion of whether the characteristics that political actors recog- opment of regional political bodies, notably the European Union
nize as defining a particular political identity result chiefly from and now, perhaps, the African Union; and the development of
some sort of intrinsic affinity among those who share that iden- many transnational corporations as well as movement organi-
tity. In other words, these identities might be seen as somehow zations, such as environmental, labor, and human rights groups.
natural or primordial or as forms of comprehensible but still- All of these have generated new forms of political community
contingent identity constructions. Furthermore, the definition and some have created novel political identities.
also allows political identities to form either when those who The end of formal European imperial rule was, in many
share those identities in ways others recognize voluntarily and regimes, also linked in complex ways to the demise of formal
actively come together, or when outsiders ascribe a common domestic systems of racial hierarchy. Officially renounced sys-
group identity to certain populations, even if many members tems include: Jim Crow segregation and the related legal deni-
of those populations resist. The fact that the definition does als of equal status to Asians, Latinos, and Native Americans in
not predetermine whether particular political identities are pri- the U.S.; many Latin American governmental measures to pro-
mordial or constructed, voluntary or ascribed, is desirable, mote the “whitening” of their societies; the “white Australia”
because the definition does not bias investigations into whether policy and many legal doctrines that denied rights to aborigi-
those things are true. At the same time, this definition does nal peoples there and in other British Commonwealth nations;
imply that political identities are important realities in human and eventually, even South African apartheid. The fall of all
experience. They are labels that indicate how political actors those forms of domestic legal discrimination sparked efforts to
are likely to view various groups of people. This in turn influ- change other unequal statuses. The successes of the civil rights
ences how people think about themselves politically and, even movement in the 1950s and early 1960s, in particular, helped
more importantly, how they act toward each other politically. inspire a range of other liberation movements in the U.S. and
Although it is wise to use a definition of political identities elsewhere: for women; for cultural, linguistic, and ancestral
that does not prejudge their origin, I believe investigation will ethnic groups and national minorities; for gays, lesbians, and
show that such identities are politically constructed to a much others with non-traditional lifestyles; for religious minorities;
greater degree than many scholars in many disciplines now for the disabled. Most readers can continue this list.
acknowledge, and that such constructions are among the most These events have gradually added a great range of previ-
normatively significant and behaviorally consequential aspects ously absent or much more marginal topics to the agenda of
of politics. I therefore think that political identity topics should political science. Such developments wrought fundamental

302 Perspectives on Politics

changes in existing forms of political membership, status, and right, of scholarly turns to identity politics.11 Most such critics
identity that are tremendously important for billions of human contend that these turns are at best intellectually and politi-
beings. They transformed the basic economic and political cally undesirable, at worst deeply immoral.
opportunities, resources, and statuses available to many polit- Though I too worry about many aspects of scholarship on
ical groups, and they also often fostered new senses of who the politics of identity, I believe the events of the latter part of
people were politically and what their political identities sig- the twentieth century show that greater focus on both empir-
nified for their lives. And they have set in motion sweeping ical and normative questions about the politics of member-
changes that are far from complete. ships and identities is inescapable today. The problem is not
Stirred by these historic events, popular writers, political that political scientists are turning to such issues; it is that we
activists, and scholars in many disciplines, eventually includ- as a profession still have not taken them seriously enough. We
ing our own, have in the last two decades devoted increased have long devoted scholarship to nation-building and nation-
attention, both normative and empirical, to issues that are alism, never more so than in the past two decades.12 Post-
widely termed identity politics or (if that suggests purely expres- World War II political science also revived “group theory,”
sive rather than constitutive processes) the politics of identity. giving some attention to group formation. The political upheav-
Works on racial and ethnic politics; women’s politics; politics als of the 1960s similarly generated valuable and varied analy-
and religion; immigrant politics; indigenous peoples’ politics; ses of the construction of gender, racial, and ethnic identities
gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender (GLBT) politics; along and social movements, far more than I canvass here.
with globalization; cosmopolitan citizenship; transnational social But much of the latter work has followed paths laid by other
movements; and so on, were not entirely absent before recent disciplines—sociology, social psychology, anthropology, eco-
decades. Moreover, most such work is still remote from the nomics, as well as literary, linguistic, and postmodernist philo-
pinnacle of prestigious political science endeavors today. Nev- sophic theorizing—and has stressed the social construction of
ertheless, most of these topics have become far more visible identities, rather than advancing explicitly political accounts of
since the 1980s than they were before.7 However one assesses political identity formation.13 Many of the best political scien-
their place now, the scholarly attention they receive clearly has tists studying identity, such as Henry E. Brady and Cynthia
been and almost certainly still is increasing.8 Kaplan, follow the great social psychologist Henri Tajfel and
Increasing, but still neither central nor secure. Though schol- his student John C. Turner. They argue that “ethnicity is a
ars from across our ideological and methodological spectra social phenomenon that at the group level is a product of indi-
now engage in such work, an equally varied group is deeply vidual choices influenced by contextual actors such as elite influ-
disturbed by these developments. Two scholars whom one might ence, available information, contact between individuals,
have considered sympathetic to identity studies, sociologist and socialization. At the level of the individual, ethnicity also
Rogers Brubaker and historian Frederick Cooper, have instead reflects psychological processes described by social identity and
called for scholars to abandon the term as too ambiguous to be self-categorization theories.” 14 Once ethnic identities are formed,
useful.9 To some critics, concerns about identity are merely a these authors argue, they go on to shape political attitudes
politically fashionable academic fad, one that scholars too often and choices. This is a framework that certainly has room for
pursue with humanities-derived methods that lack the rigor of political factors such as the impact of political elites and social-
true social science. Many also worry that attention to such ization by political institutions. Yet unless those factors are
“faddish” topics can distract attention from earlier sets of polit- explicitly highlighted and their special importance considered,
ical, economic, and social issues that remain extremely impor- these formulations, typical of much political science literature,
tant. After all, topics of democratic and authoritarian systems, are likely to suggest instead that a whole range of social elites
economic regulation and distribution, and international con- and institutions are equal to or more important than anything
flict matter today as much as ever. distinctively political in constructing ethnic identities. Those
In political science, as in other disciplines, a number of basically social identities may then seem to determine what
lively debates are therefore underway over whether, for exam- political actors merely recognize as political identities, as well as
ple, globalization and transnationalism are, as recent writers the political outlooks and conduct those identities promote.
aver, really making nation-states less central to political life, Though some such social determinism may in fact exist, polit-
including political identities, or whether they are only chang- ical scientists should question, not presume, such a possibility.
ing the contexts within which nations and nationalism still Furthermore, while some cross-fertilization has occurred, most
play dominant roles.10 Probably even more scholars are con- of these social constructivist accounts of identity have been
cerned that, analytically, an undue focus on racial, ethnic, reli- identity-specific. There have been few comprehensive efforts to
gious, cultural and gender identities misses deeper, often unify theories of national identity formation with accounts of
economic causes of political action. Some argue normatively group creation, social movements, and gender, ethnic, racial,
that concentration on political identities deflects attention from cultural, and religious identities, though there have been many
persistent material inequalities that need to be addressed. Many persuasive arguments for specific linkages of one sort or another.
more fear that such work strengthens false and politically divi- That may be sensible. The many kinds of political identities
sive essentialist notions of the character of political actors. Hence may be so different from one another that trying to generalize
one can find many sharp critiques, on the left as well as the across them could represent a hopeless apples and oranges

June 2004 | Vol. 2/No. 2 303

Symposium | Two Paths to a Science of Politics

exercise. A more general theory of political identity formation senses of membership become salient political identities that
may be too general to be useful.15 And if we are talking about command allegiance and shape values.16 Certainly, political
a general theory of phenomena that should not centrally occupy scientists ought to explore political explanations for such iden-
our attention in the first place, we might well conclude that tities thoroughly before concluding that their origins lie out-
the discipline’s priorities should not shift at all. side our disciplinary domain.
On the contrary, I believe that the breakdown of older Some say the dearth of attempts to generate a unified field
imperial systems, the waves of new nation-making, the vari- theory of political identities, which would explain their cre-
ous movements of identity politics, and the emergence of ation and transformations, is due to the impossibility of achiev-
new international and transnational political associations show ing such a grand theory. I take that objection seriously. Any
that nationalism and class cannot be our only or even our all-encompassing account of such diverse phenomena may be
primary identity themes. These events have brought to the so abstract and thin as to be useless. It may turn out that what
surface a whole dimension of political life that should have we need is a set of explanations of different sorts of political
been a basic concern of political analysis all along—as basic identities that cannot be tightly connected to one another.
as whether people should see themselves as governed by God This is more or less what we are now developing. Even if this is
and his deputies or by themselves; whether rule should be by so, I still contend that we ought to treat the development of
the one, the few, or the many; whether economic interests such explanations as one of the most valuable endeavors in
drive politics; and whether governance should favor the rich, contemporary political science, and give it much more empha-
the middle class, or the poor, those who control capital or sis than we now do.
those who provide labor. How human beings acquire certain And, we should not give up too easily. Different political
political identities is just as foundational because these iden- identities are undoubtedly crafted through contrasting pro-
tities often generate and usually substantially affect issues over cesses in some cases, but there may also be illuminating com-
governing power. monalities. Political scientists have an intellectual duty to take
Probably the most politically important of such identities that possibility seriously. For if it is true, and if political iden-
are those that define a person’s trumping allegiances in cases tities do play the seminal roles many now assign to them, then
where the demands of some memberships conflict with those these elements are surely fundamental for both empirical and
of others (whether those memberships are in territorial nations, normative political analyses.17
regions, provinces, or cities; religious bodies; racial For though the relationship of political identities to human
or ethnic communities; corporate, worker, or other class interests is complex, we have reason to think that it is
organizations; or other groups). People’s beliefs that they reciprocal—that just as economic interests influence our affil-
owe primary allegiance to some political memberships, iations, for instance, so do those affiliations shape our senses
along with the conviction of others that they are likely of economic interests. The same person might conceive of
to hold such beliefs, have her most politically salient
major consequences for how identity as a worker, or as a
people understand their polit- People’s beliefs that they owe primary allegiance white worker, or as a female
ical interests, how they act, worker, or as an American
and how others act toward to some political memberships, along with the worker, or as a global work
them on a range of politi- force member. She is likely to
cally significant matters. It is conviction of others that they are likely to hold define her economic interests
doubtful that those under- differently and to pursue dis-
standings and conduct can be such beliefs, have major consequences for how tinct political courses depend-
explained or predicted unless ing on which conception she
such senses of political iden- people understand their political interests, how favors. The same sort of list
tity are understood. could obviously be compiled
And though it may prove to they act, and how others act toward them for capitalists and many other
be the case that such identities socio-economic identities.18
actually do emerge seamlessly on a range of politically significant matters. And it is equally plausible to
from extra-political social think that our memberships
sources—perhaps inherited reflect but also help define our
languages, ancestral and kinship groups, geographical clusters, interests in personal physical security and political power.
initially apolitical religious and cultural associations, or eco- The same person might seek protection and representation
nomic structures—it is unlikely that any realm of human col- primarily as a Jew, or as a Brooklyn resident, or as a member
lective life operates so automatically. It seems more plausible to of a radical socialist party. Again, these conceptions have very
assume that, out of the multiple possible identities that human different implications for political conduct. If it is credible to
existence presents to most people, political activities of various think that political identities can play such decisive roles,
sorts play important roles first in creating many of those iden- then issues of their making and remaking cannot be margin-
tities, and then subsequently in determining which established alized in any defensible political science.

304 Perspectives on Politics

The Limited Utility of Formal Theory and Not only must the means through which concepts are gen-
Ahistorical Behavioralism erated be to some degree contextually and historically sensitive,
If we are to make questions of political identity formation and but so must all the methods used to formalize, operationalize,
transformation as central to our discipline as issues such as and test them. Because the political identities that prevail in one
constitutional design, electoral representation, legislative behav- location in one era may well be very different than in another
ior, global security, and political economy long have been, place and time, they can prompt local patterns of political behav-
such an expansion of our agenda has implications for the meth- ior that we can only understand by grasping the substantive char-
ods we employ. Many important aspects of the politics of iden- acteristics and distinctions among ways of life in those contrasting
tity cannot be adequately probed without richly interpretive contexts. A large team of anthropologists and economists has
methods that involve discursively grasping the consciousnesses recently provided support for this claim. In a set of field exper-
and senses of value and meaning that identities give to people. iments, they asked members of many different societies on sev-
And especially if political identities are socially, indeed politi- eral continents to participate in rational-choice games involving
cally, constructed, we need to attend to the historical and con- decisions either to offer or to accept cash drawn from a researcher-
textual processes through which identities are constructed provided pie.These researchers contend that the behavior of most
differently among different groups in different times and places. of these societies did not match standard economic models of
We cannot fully understand the sources and character of wealth-maximization, and that the sorts of rationality the soci-
changes in political identities by looking only at timeless behav- eties displayed varied widely. Both to conduct the games suc-
ioral constants. Similarly, more formal methods that reduce cessfully and to explain these variations, the research team relied
identity choices to points on hypothetical preference functions heavily on ethnographic studies of the social and economic prac-
are also proving valuable for many kinds of empirical identity tices of each society, and they argued that these distinctive pat-
studies. Yet abstract connotations of identity preferences can- terns of group behavior greatly explained individual choices.21
not go very far in helping us comprehend the substantive appeal Their work shows how essential such ethnographic analysis is to
and normative significance of particular identities, both of which insightful investigation of how distinct identities and values are
are important to understanding how those identities are likely formed and maintained. But like most research in the other social
to shape conduct. Both behavioral and formal models that sciences, their study does not much explore whether political
treat senses of identity and interest as exogenously given, more- struggles, and the social policies and practices thus established,
over, simply do not seek to shed any light on how identities are played a substantial role in constructing the different group behav-
formed and changed. iors and identities that characterized the different societies. Nor
We are likely to gain more insight on these topics through should such scholars have to do so. Analyzing the contributions
interpretive textual analyses; ethnographic fieldwork; biograph- of politics is our job.
ical studies; in-depth interviews; individual and comparative case But are we not doing it well enough? Let me consider two
studies, both historical and contemporary; participant observa- prime counter-examples. First, David Laitin’s justly celebrated
tion research; narrative historical institutional analyses; and other Identity in Formation: The Russian-Speaking Populations in the
methods rather crudely termed “qualitative.” Though I cannot Near Abroad offers a theory of political identities centered on
summarize what all these varied methods involve, each has a grow- an abstract rational choice “tipping model.” 22 Laitin suggests
ing literature analyzing their distinctive ways and means, and that this tipping model is the key to illuminating the question
their strengths and weaknesses.19 No method, however, pro- of whether Russian-speaking people in ex–Soviet Union states
vides an infallible cook book for grasping the phenomena of polit- will learn the dominant language of those newly independent
ical identities. As I suggested above, a combination of contextual nations or remain Russian, at least linguistically.23
immersion, psychological empathy, and creative imagination, Though his theory features rational choice, Laitin’s book is
in a variety of research techniques, enables researchers like James an impressive example of multi-method analysis. He presents
Scott, Cathy J. Cohen, Claire Kim, and Courtney Jung to offer an informative, analytical recounting of historical and institu-
alternative conceptions of the identities they study, whether their tional developments that help explain why so many areas never
subjects have previously been conceived as passive peasants, polit- became Russian-speaking under either centralizedTsarist or Soviet
ically homogeneous African Americans, irrational racial nation- rule. Laitin draws as well on four ethnographies conducted in
alists, or ethnic tribespeople.20 Again, I think even the partly the newly independent republics he studies, and on his own expe-
ineffable process of concept formation always involves at least a riences living in Estonia for seven months, to dissect recent trends.
rough method of inference testing. Researchers like these invari- He and his colleagues also conducted an extensive large-n sur-
ably check preliminary hypotheses formed on the basis of a few vey of Russian and “native language” speakers in those repub-
observations against many others made in the course of their lics, and he uses the survey in various quantitative analyses.
fieldwork before elaborating positive arguments. Researchers can, Additionally, Laitin adds both interviews and documentary
in turn, use such conceptions to construct better large-n surveys accounts to identify pertinent state policies in each republic, along
that are more easily subjected to systematic, if always imperfect, with a Russian-language discourse analysis based on articles in
statistical analyses to test particular claims. That work is valu- the Russian press and the presses of the republics.
able, but it depends on the strength of concepts that are gener- When all is said and done, Laitin’s rational choice model
ally formed by other means. of identity formation contributes surprisingly little to

June 2004 | Vol. 2/No. 2 305

Symposium | Two Paths to a Science of Politics

understanding the processes of identity formation. Most of the tern of inverse correlation, either. They do not have much
work’s explanatory power comes from features he treats as theo- explanatory power at all.
retically less significant, especially his analysis of historical insti- What works best is a sense of social distance. In republics where
tutional patterns and current state policies, as well as from his Russians share a similar language and religion with the domi-
evidence of group attitudes, for which he gives no real theo- nant group, as in Latvia (Indo-European language and Chris-
retical account. In the end, the book does more to demon- tianity), the Russians are most open to change. Where that social
strate the limitations of purely formal rational choice models distance is greatest, as in Kazakhstan (non-Indo-European lan-
as responses to the questions he addresses than to show the guage and Islam), they are least open. But how do we judge
strengths of such models. whether a language or religion is distant or close to another? We
Laitin seeks to build on Thomas Schelling’s renowned “tip- can do so only by learning about the particularities of the dif-
ping model” analysis, which clarified, among other things, why ferent languages and religions in question and determining how
discriminatory real estate practices do not have to be massive to far, on the whole, they resemble each other in decisive respects.
produce sharply segregated residential patterns. I strongly affirm We must make those determinations prior to constructing a data
the usefulness of Schelling’s formal model for depicting the con- set measuring social distance and they must be persuasive if any
sequences of racially inflected (rather than strictly wealth- argument from that data set is to be convincing. On Laitin’s own
maximizing) economic choices. Laitin, however, uses his “tipping evidence, then, what we grasp by interpretively characterizing
model” to support a more obvious claim. Russian speakers in the identities in question—our judgments of substantive reli-
societies where Russian is not the dominant language will learn gious and linguistic similarities and differences—is far more cru-
the native language, he suggests, when they find it advanta- cial to explaining change than the tipping model is.
geous to do so. But when is that? The “tipping model” suggests Laitin says this evidence applies only to conditions during
that one important element is their perception that most other the Soviet era, when there were few reasons to learn the regional
Russian speakers in the region are shifting to the local language. language other than personal preference. He argues that now,
If this is true, then presumably it will be increasingly harder to “Russian-speakers need to calculate more consciously the poten-
remain one of the last few monolingual Russian speakers.24 We tial payoffs for learning” the local language, and so the tipping
thus need to know what factors cause first some, then many, to model will work better in the future.28 Laitin has to promise
decide to pay the costs of learning the local language, the initial future vindication, because his other data do not provide much
impetus that eventually creates a cascade in which it becomes corroboration for the tipping model, either. For example, Rus-
understandable why most of those remaining take that step. We sian speakers in Kazakhstan who learn the dominant language
also want to know why Russian speakers in some republics make face low friendship losses among their in-group, and also have
the shift more readily and massively than in others. the best prospects for friendships among the Kazakh out-
To answer, Laitin elaborates his choice model. People might group (though the prospects are still negative). Nevertheless,
learn a new language under three conditions—when it is eco- they are the least open to doing so.29
nomically advantageous to do so, when members of their own The few rather weak results that do conform to the model,
“in-group” do not punish, but even encourage, such adapta- moreover, do little to explain either the power of in-group and
tion, and when speakers of the dominant language do not out-group identities or the reasons for their variations in disap-
punish, but even reward, learning their language.25 Though proval and receptivity. For those questions, Laitin turns in part
Laitin presents these elaborations in abstract terms, they quickly to the politically shaped historical patterns he identifies in the
move the bulk of his analysis to non-formal, extra-model ele- first part of his book, and in part to current state policies to
ments. If choices are greatly shaped by the attitudes and behav- which those patterns may have contributed. His analysis sug-
ior of “in-group” and “out-group” members, then we need to gests that in those republics whose local elites had wide oppor-
know how those group identities formed, and why those groups tunities for mobility within the Soviet Union, such as Ukraine,
punish or encourage members and outsiders as they do. The the rewards Russians receive for learning the local language are
tipping model says nothing about those key issues. not so high, partly because those elites are long accustomed to
The model might seem more useful if economic calcula- intermingling with Russian speakers and often speak Russian
tions told most of the story in explaining personal choices, as themselves. Conversely, in republics such as Kazakhstan, where
in Schelling’s real estate example.26 But when Laitin tests his the Soviets governed on a more colonial model and local elites
model against data gathered in his surveys of the four repub- held relatively little power, many Russians remain hostile to
lics, he concludes that if “the tipping model relied solely on embracing what they still see as an inferior Kazakh identity.
economic returns and probabilities for occupational mobility, The rewards for learning the local language are not great there
these data present an insurmountable challenge.” 27 The expected either, perhaps because resentment toward Russian assimilation
economic returns for language acquisition in the four repub- and mobility remain strong (though the data do not clearly sup-
lics just do not match the willingness to learn that Russian port that claim). In countries like Latvia and Estonia, where local
speakers in the different regions expressed. The economic returns elites had real internal power but not many prospects to rise in
of change are, for example, worst in Latvia, yet that is where the larger Soviet Union, there tend to be more benefits to learn-
Russian speakers are most eager to undertake linguistic assim- ing the dominant language and otherwise assimilating. Elites
ilation. Sadly, the economic results do not display a nice pat- are relatively receptive to Russians who do so, and they expect

306 Perspectives on Politics

business to be conducted in the local tongue. These different relations with Russia that are held by ethnic Estonians or eth-
patterns of receptivity, traceable to identity-inflected power struc- nic Slavs (overwhelmingly Russians) in Estonia.33 The authors
tures under Soviet and Tsarist rule, help explain why in some find that in the case of ethnic Estonians, for whom they say
places enough Russians learn the local language to launch a cas- ethnic identity has long been and remains highly salient, nom-
cade (though Laitin has no data showing any actual cascades).30 inal measures of ethnic identity predict political attitudes about
Whatever weight we give such explanations—again, social dis- as well as do graded ones; that is, ethnic Estonians who inter-
tance variables fare best—any real explanatory power they pos- act extensively with Slavs view discrimination, civil rights, and
sess does not come from the tipping model or any other formal Russian relations in roughly the same way as do ethnic Estonians
theory. Rather, it rests on different historically shaped patterns who live far more insular lives. The political attitudes of ethnic
of political institutions and state policies, patterns that have both Slavs, however, vary greatly depending on whether their social
expressed and reinforced distinctive senses of political identity worlds are exclusively Slav or more intermingled with those of
and allegiance. Reasoning from these patterns, given supportive ethnic Estonians. Brady and Kaplan maintain that this is because
empirical evidence, scholars could explain the prevailing pat- their Slav or Russian ethnic identity has long been much less
terns of linguistic assimilation without any tipping model. If salient to such Estonian residents. Hence they conclude gen-
state institutions and policies and the behavior they foster make erally, as a law-like regularity in political behavior, that the
it sensible for most people to change, then most people will salience of ethnic identities determines whether nominal or
change. The intervening variable—how many others are graded measures of ethnic identity are most appropriate when
changing—will probably prove more intercorrelated than inde- we use such identities to explain political attitudes.34
pendently causal. Laitin’s invocation of a rational choice model That claim is convincing, and I do not denigrate its impor-
does not in the end, provide much “value added” to his rich his- tance. Yet though this work advances the science of measuring
torically, institutionally, ethnographically and survey-based identities, it glides lightly over some of the identity issues that
analysis.31 I think political scientists most need to stress—questions of
Laitin’s landmark study thus suggests that grasping identity whether and how political identities are politically con-
formation and change requires interpretive understandings of structed. The authors might justly respond that these are not
different identities, which enable us to comprehend phenom- the questions they wished to address. But problems remain,
ena like “social distance.” In addition, analyses of identity for- because their analysis can easily be read as implying answers
mation may also advance by understanding the historical that point away from politics.
processes of institution-building and power-structuring that It is likely, in the first place, that Estonian and Slav/Russian
have strengthened and modified certain identities, fostered new ethnic identities can best be viewed as historical products of past
ones, and played strong roles defining the relationships of those political struggles, though exploring that history would admit-
identities to others. tedly be beyond Brady and Kaplan’s scope. It is fairer to fault the
Similar lessons can be drawn from an excellent recent exam- authors for failing to highlight how their evidence shows that
ple of behavioral political science, Brady and Kaplan’s quanti- politics determines the role of these ethnic identities in political
tative analysis of ethnic identities. Though they agree with attitudes and conduct today. As they present it, their study cul-
other analysts that such identities have great explanatory power minates in a rather apolitical lesson about how best to do social
for political attitudes, behavior, and change, they contend that science—when to use nominal and graded measures—grounded
it is a “categorical” mistake always to measure ethnic identity on what they suggest is a general behavioral regularity: the salience
in nominal terms, as either present or absent. Sometimes eth- of ethnicity always determines which measure should be used.
nicity should be measured as graded, varying depending on how They do not go on to explore the logical next question: what
strictly confined to co-ethnics are a person’s social contacts, expo- determines whether ethnic identity is salient to certain groups?
sure to media, and positive group evaluations. Brady and Instead, they leave that issue to be handled by “social identity
Kaplan maintain that nominal measures of ethnic identity are and self-categorization theories” that give no special promi-
fine when such identities are highly salient to those who possess nence or attention to political factors.35
them. Such consciousness tends to homogenize their political Yet their essay includes ample support, consonant with
attitudes, at least on issues related to ethnic identity. Gradations Laitin’s, for the view that, at least in the former Soviet territo-
in the degree to which these ethnic group members are immersed ries, one can often trace the salience of ethnicity to historical
in their ethnic communities are then not associated with any and contemporary governmental policies, institutions, and polit-
significant variance in their political attitudes, so nothing is lost ical struggles. They note that the two ethnic groups they study
if ethnicity is measured nominally. But when many members of in Estonia long “experienced the Soviet policies of ethnic engi-
an ethnic community do not find their ethnic identity espe- neering,” but in very different ways. For decades, the Soviet
cially salient, then gradations in how extensively their social worlds Union sought “to subvert ethnic identification,” replacing Esto-
are confined to co-ethnics correlate strongly with variations in nian identity with the supra-national political identity of Soviet
political attitudes. In those circumstances a graded measure of Socialist Republican citizenship. In fact, these efforts were simul-
ethnic identity should be used.32 taneously a hypocritical program of Russification that privi-
Brady and Kaplan support these claims with surveys of polit- leged Russians above other ethnicities, like Estonians. The result
ical attitudes toward discrimination, civil rights, and Estonia’s was that for Russians, ethnicity did not appear salient because

June 2004 | Vol. 2/No. 2 307

Symposium | Two Paths to a Science of Politics

it quietly blended with socialist and Soviet Union political tities. These works show that focusing on topics in politics of
identities. For ethnic Estonians, however, it was overwhelm- identity need not be limited to ethnographies or narrative his-
ingly salient, due to the concerted, long-term, discriminatory tories.38 Cathy Cohen’s Boundaries of Blackness, for example,
“attack upon Estonian ethnic identification” that limited their uses a variety of research methods, including participant obser-
opportunities in the regime as a whole.36 These experiences vation research, to develop a novel theory of how modern pol-
were far from forgotten when the Soviet Union fell. itics has reconstructed the identities of African-Americans.
One can therefore imagine counterfactually that if the Soviet Other researchers are finding her theory applicable to different
Union had adhered rigorously to its socialist ideology and not long-suppressed groups. She argues that in the wake of victories
simultaneously promoted Russification and discrimination in the civil rights era, black Americans find themselves in a
against other ethnic groups, many Estonians might have come position of advanced marginalization: they are included as
to identify more fully with their Soviet citizenship, instead of civic equals more than ever before, yet are still confronted by a
becoming ripe for “ethnopolitics.” 37 Their ethnic identity might variety of more subtle forms of discrimination. Those circum-
have become as little salient to them as Russian (or Slav) eth- stances create lamentable incentives for more prosperous and
nicity was to its bearers. Admittedly, this may be too counter- socially conforming members of African-American communi-
factual to be conceivable: it is unclear that the Soviet political ties to distance themselves from blacks who, because of their
project could have been as successful as it was without its poverty, drug use, sexual orientation, or other traits, are seen as
alliance with Russian nationalism. Either way, however, we threats to the still-fragile civic status of African-Americans gen-
must conclude that prior politically constructed identities, erally. The better off still define themselves as black Americans,
including ethnic and national, often shape people’s senses of but as ones who are now closer to being normal middle-class
interest and allegiance in ways that political actors and state Americans. The latter identity heightens pressure to limit the
policies must take into account to be effective. Furthermore, inclusiveness of the former. Such attention to the complex pro-
those state policies and institutions in turn frequently play cesses of political identity construction enacted both upon and
leading roles in determining whether ethnic or other identities by different groups of black Americans remains an infant enter-
become and remain salient in political outlooks and choices. prise in political science, but it is essential if we are to under-
In sum, by focusing only on the relationship between dif- stand central dynamics in contemporary American politics.39
ferent senses of ethnicity and political attitudes, and by relying Although Cohen’s advanced marginalization theory may well
on relatively apolitical social psychological accounts of the ori- illuminate processes affecting many groups in the U.S. and else-
gins and salience of those ethnic identities, Brady and Kaplan where, it is still focused on those who have long faced official
do not fully illuminate how the different political roles of eth- discrimination. I suggest that we seek to do even more. Grandi-
nic identities are themselves products of politics. And in this ose as the notion of a “unified field theory of political identities”
case too, the most reliable illumination they do provide comes may be, it seems worth exploring whether we can in fact generate
not from their quantitative analyses of degrees of ethnic iden- such a theory or, better yet, rival theories that we can test against
tity, although those are valuable, but rather from the historical each other and then improve. I make this recommendation
institutional dimensions of their argument. because my own studies of the power of racism and nativism in
At this point, my fellow interpretivists and historical insti- American history have moved me to higher levels of theoretical
tutionalists may cheer, but all political scientists may also feel generality in the quest for satisfying explanations of that power.40
anxious. We may not excel at such qualitative work. Sociological A sketch of the framework I now use to think about political
and anthropological ethnographers, literary critics, and narra- identities may help to clarify not the “right” theoretical approach
tive historians may do it better. And even doing it as well as pos- to such questions, but rather the sorts of theoretical endeavors I
sible may not satisfy our aspirations to social scientific explanatory urge. In various writings, I contend that senses of membership
theories. Those theories are supposed to be, if not universal, at in a political community, a political people, to which one is com-
least falsifiable, replicable, and generalizable over some middle monly understood to owe allegiance, are indeed political cre-
range of cases. They should not be simply thickly descriptive ations. They do not emerge semi-automatically from economic,
case studies or more literary narrative accounts of unique histor- demographic, sociological, geographic, linguistic, ancestral, bio-
ical events. Although I believe such works are valuable sources of logical, religious, or cultural characteristics. Rather, drawing on
insight, I do not in fact think that political scientists need to and constrained by such features of human life, aspiring elites
despair the loss of their social scientific theoretical ambitions. craft many forms of political peoplehood by winning the sup-
port of a critical mass of constituents for their visions of political
The Role of Social Science Explanatory identities and memberships.
Theories Such crafting of senses of political identity takes place through
Let me reiterate that, though questions of political identity were coercive force and persuasive stories. Many Native Americans
not central to the American political science profession’s agenda are Americans because some of their ancestors were conquered,
through much of the twentieth century, they have come to the many African Americans are Americans because some of their
fore much more in recent decades. We have valuable political ancestors were enslaved, and all Americans are Americans because
analyses of the formation of nations, races, ethnic social move- a critical mass of colonists exercised sufficient force to make the
ments, gender identities, religious affiliations, and other iden- more powerful British imperial authorities decide that it was

308 Perspectives on Politics

easier to let them go than to coerce them into continued sub- cannot do as well. Ethically constitutive stories are best equipped
jectship. Political science equips us well to grasp the role of coer- to confer an aura of moral worth on memberships, and they are
cive force in crafting political identities: that seems solid, also harder to discredit via empirical evidence than economic or
measurable stuff. So I have concentrated instead on stories of power stories. These features enable them to sustain loyalty in
peoplehood and the role they play in winning voluntary con- materially bad times more effectively than the others can. For
stituent allegiances.41 That role is inescapable, because no lead- me, the framework helps explain why racial and nativist con-
ers have enough force to make all members of their community ceptions have so often been politically potent in the U.S., even
subscribe to their vision through coercion alone. when they were not helping to rationalize economic exploita-
What kinds of stories inspire people to embrace member- tion and were costly to enforce. It is appalling yet true that tra-
ship in a particular political community? Like so many in ditional American racial and ethnic stories have long supplied
social science, my model has three components. Economic many native-born whites with a sense of superior moral worth
stories offer material benefits for membership to current and/or that no evidence could dispel, but that racial equality and easy
future generations—both capitalist and socialist ideologies are immigration could threaten. In so arguing, I generalize one view
stories of this sort.42 Political power stories promise personal of W. E. B. DuBois’s famous assertion of the existence of a
protection and a share in great collective power—both repub- “public and psychological wage” for whiteness.44
licanism and fascism are instances. Ethically constitutive sto- This simple framework for analyzing the politics of people-
ries claim that membership in a particular people is somehow making is a kind of general, trans-historical theory about some
inherent in who the members truly are, in ways that are ethi- important dimensions of political identity formation. Because
cally valuable. Most racial, religious, ethnic, cultural, linguis- it has more specific substantive content, because it promises to
tic, historical, and gendered senses of community membership, help us understand the distinct roles of different types of politi-
among others, are ethically constitutive accounts. cal identity, and because it can spark ideas about their strengths
On this basis I first hypothesize an empirically falsifiable and limitations, both politically and normatively, it seems to me
behavioral regularity: all “real world” visions of political mem- to do more work than purely formal models. It also represents an
bership capable of attracting significant support, from Amer- effort to develop a theory of political identities that is more thor-
icanism to radical Islam to those offered by leaders of communal oughly political than many prevalent in the quantitative empir-
eco-villages, always blend together versions of all three types of ical literature. But it remains limited in its contribution to full
stories.43 The emphases differ—some are more economic, some understandings of the politics of identity making and remaking.
more ethically constitutive, et cetera—and the substantive par- On its own terms, this framework requires us to engage in
ticulars vary, but the three types are always present. Addition- historical, empirical, and often ethnographic and interpretive
ally, a political actor, party, or movement rarely succeeds in work to grasp the kinds of economic arrangements that render
institutionalizing their pure vision of peoplehood without mak- certain sorts of economic stories more probable; the contextual
ing concessions to opposing views. Instead, political societies traditions and structures of power that make specific political
are always composed through the compromised, aggregated power stories capable of inspiring allegiance; and the existing
results of contests among proponents of different societal visions, array of demographic, cultural, linguistic and other identities
each vision offering accounts that include all three story types, that make the formulation of certain sorts of resonant ethically
in ways that are always being contested and changed. This, in constitutive stories, and not others, possible. Like the similarly
a nutshell, is the politics of political identity formation. Or so ethnographically-informed work of the researchers on game-
I claim. playing, and like the historically- and institutionally-informed
My aim here is not to demonstrate that this framework is arguments of Laitin, Brady, and Kaplan, these investigations are
correct or even helpful, though I hope it is. Rather, I am sug- often likely to confirm the belief that people conceive of their
gesting the sort of theory building regarding political identities economic interests, political power interests, and ethically con-
that now seems advisable for scholars to undertake. This is a stitutive interests very differently in different times and places,
framework or theory that meets social science aspirations both and that different populations do so in the same times and places.
to heuristically useful simplification, since it involves elabora- That means, again, that though the same general underlying pro-
tion of only a few basic ideas, and also to universality, since it cesses may be operating, the specific explanations for and pre-
purports to identify basic ingredients with which political iden- dictions about political conduct that work in those contexts will
tities are constructed in all times and places. It is necessarily vary from one to another. No general theory is likely to enable
abstract, but not as abstract as models of pure instrumental us to eschew many kinds of detailed contextual investigations.
rationality. Rather, it presumes that all people do have basic, Such theories can only aid that work.
recognizable types of substantive interests: material well being, In short, we need to study processes of political identity
some forms of political protection and political power, and formation largely through interpretive, ethnographic, and his-
senses of ethically constitutive identity. It also presumes that torical methods. Yet we can also hope to develop theoretical
these needs can be met in a great many ways. frameworks that will enable us to knit those studies together to
In other writings, I elaborate why my category of ethically a greater degree than we are now doing. A final example: my
constitutive stories in particular highlights discourses that play colleague Ian Lustick has been exploring agent-based model-
vital roles in political life in ways that the other types of stories ing, which seeks to wed the logical precision of formal models

June 2004 | Vol. 2/No. 2 309

Symposium | Two Paths to a Science of Politics

with more contextual knowledge to illuminate processes of 6 These definitions are drawn from the American Heritage Dic-
identity change in much the way I am urging. He seeks to tionary definition of political as “of, relating to, or dealing
show, for example, how political actors draw on repertoires of with the structure or affairs of government, politics or
identity available to them in particular contexts to remake the state,” and the classic title of Lasswell 1936.
themselves in more circumstantially optimal ways.45 Here, too, 7 See, for example, Walton et al. 1995 and Walton and
I doubt that most of the work is being done by the formal McCormick 1997, documenting how from the jour-
elements of the analysis. It is instead accomplished by docu- nals’ inceptions until 1990, only about 2 percent of the arti-
menting the available identities and the circumstances that cles published in the American Political Science Review
make embracing some new sense of self attractive. But this and Political Science Quarterly addressed the experiences of
work is a clear instance of the somewhat less thin but still African Americans.
theoretically ambitious endeavors that seem appropriate today. 8 Scholars at Harvard, largely political scientists, are cur-
It remains to be seen how much trans-historical insight and rently collaborating on a Harvard Identity Project that
explanatory theorizing can be developed from such efforts. includes several papers documenting the growth of iden-
Perhaps we will be able to generate plausible trans-historical tity research in the discipline. These include Horowitz 2002
theories of patterns in the historical evolution of all political on identity concepts in international relations, Bruland
identities. Perhaps we will only be able to make sense of polit- and Horowitz 2003 on identity concepts in comparative pol-
ical identity formation at more middle-range theoretical levels. itics, and Abdelal et al. 2003 on identity as a variable (all
But through such work we will, I think, advance significantly online at www.wcfia.harvard.edu/misc/initiative/identity).
our insights into these key features of political life. 9 Brubaker and Cooper 2000. They do not, however, con-
If, that is, we try to do so. My aim here has been to provide sider the definition of identity defended here, and in any
some ideas that may aid those already predisposed to work in case, despite their efforts to assert the contrary, their alter-
these directions and that may move some who are not as dis- natives seem vulnerable to the same objections.
posed a bit closer toward thinking that these tasks are worth- 10 See, for example, Held 1995; Newman 2000; Slaughter
while. If I have had any success in modifying anyone’s sense of and Mattli 1995; Garrett 1995.
professional identity and purpose, then I further contend that 11 See, for example, Bloom 1987; D’Souza 1991; Bromwich
this essay is actually part of an admittedly non-randomized 1992; Gitlin 1995; Rorty 1998; Reed 2000; Barry 2001.
field experiment—one that has, through the impact of its pro- 12 See, for example, Smith 1983; Turner 1986; Brubaker
fessional story on its readers, in contrast to unaltered masses of 1992.
non-readers, transformed some identities and not others and 13 For a similar critique, see Schnapper 1998. There are
thereby provided empirical support for its claims. outstanding exceptions to these generalizations. For
And if it turns out that no one is persuaded in the least by example, Armstrong 1982 stresses the political origins of eth-
any of this, then, in the even more identity-reconstituting words nic and national identities, though it is unclear how far,
of the late Gilda Radner, never mind. as he explicitly eschews much general theory-building. Polit-
ical scientists’ resistance to portraying identities as deeply
Notes politically constructed may have reflected the wariness
1 Some of the arguments in this article will also appear in of many post–World War II western liberal scholars toward
The Politics of Identities and the Tasks of Political Sci- perspectives that appeared to dismiss individual auton-
ence,” in Problems and Methods in the Study of Politics, ed. omy, such as those associated with both fascist and Com-
Ian Shapiro, Rogers Smith, and Tarek Masoud (Cam- munist abuses. In the years of Marxism’s greatest prestige,
bridge University Press, 2004). moreover, many writers on the left generally considered eco-
2 Though they have some quarrels with these characteriza- nomically determined class identities most important
tions, Ira Katznelson and Helen Milner have recently and treated other identities as epiphenomenal. Many social
noted that it is “typical” in “standard disciplinary histo- scientists influenced by liberal forms of political econ-
ries” to distinguish an “early” period of “legal-formal omy have done likewise. Thus no theory of political iden-
constitutionally oriented” scholarship, a “middle” epoch tity formation seemed necessary beyond Marxism or
dominated by “more scientific, behavioral” studies, economic theory more broadly. If so, it is not surprising
and the “latest era” which is more heterogeneous but char- that theoretical explorations of the politics of identity have
acterized “most notably” by “studies of choice” such as proliferated since the fall of Communism.
works on “game theory and strategic interaction.” Katznel- In one such effort, Wendt 1999 offers an insightful
son and Milner 2002, 6–7. “general, evolutionary” model of collective identity forma-
3 King et al. 1994. tion from which I have benefited. Wendt does so, how-
4 Scott 1985; Scott 1990. ever, out of recognition that we scholars with constructivist
5 Fearon 1999, 3–8. The OED definition can also be views of social identities do not clearly possess a general
found online at dictionary.oed.com. The American Heri- theory of their creation, and his effort, too, is a partial one.
tage definition is from the American Heritage Dictio- He is specifically concerned with the formation of state
nary of the English Language, 3d ed. identities, not all political identities.

310 Perspectives on Politics

14 Brady and Kaplan, 2000, 59. 35 Ibid., 58–9.
15 For a historian’s sharp critique of the sort of general theo- 36 Ibid., 63, 65.
rizing I propose here, see Breuilly 1982. Yet in an attempt 37 Ibid., 63.
to avoid too general an approach, Breuilly and others 38 See, in addition to sources cited at notes 8 and 12 works
have to define their topics, in his case nationalism, in plau- such as Armstrong 1982; Pateman 1988; Marx 1998; Mar-
sibly but contestable ways that generate lengthy, often quez 2001; Abdelal 2001.
unfruitful debates over what nationalism (or ethnicity, or 39 Cohen 1999.
class, or some other category) “really” is. 40 Smith 2001; Smith 2003.
16 Brady and Kaplan note that many factors, such as “histor- 41 For related analyses of political narratives and stories in pub-
ical experiences, age cohort, citizenship status, language, lic policy debates, see, for example, Stone 1989; Schram
occupation, religion or education,” may serve as a basis and Neisser 1997.
for “group formation” and a sense of “ethnic identity.” 42 I am grateful to Rawi Abdelal for calling my attention to
Brady and Kaplan 2000, 61. the role of promises of future economic benefits.
17 Brady and Kaplan go so far as to assert that “Ethnic dif- 43 On eco-villages, see Jackson 2000.
ferences appear to be at the bottom of major political dis- 44 DuBois 1992, 700.
agreements and political conflict.” My claim is that, at 45 Lustick and Miodwinik 2000.
a minimum, we cannot understand disagreements, con-
flict, and change without grasping how political iden- References
tities of many sorts are formed and transformed. Brady Abdelal, Rawi. 2001. National Purpose in the World Economy:
and Kaplan 2000, 82. Post-Soviet States in Comparative Perspective. Ithaca: Cor-
18 For similar claims, see Wendt 1999; Brady and Kaplan nell University Press.
2000. Abdelal, Rawi, Yoshiko M. Herrera, Alastair Iain Johnston,
19 The Consortium for Qualitative Research Methods, head- and Rose McDermott. 2003. Identity as a variable. Unpub-
quartered at Arizona State University, maintains a web- lished manuscript, Weatherhead Center for Inter-
site with an impressive collection of syllabi providing a national Affairs, Harvard University. Available at
wide range of “qualitative methods” readings. The URL www.wcfia.harvard.edu/misc/initiative/identity/images/
is www.asu.edu/clas/polisci/cqrm/. ID051103.pdf. Accessed 27 February 2004.
20 See Scott 1985; Cohen 1999; Kim 2000; Jung 2000. Armstrong, John A. 1982. Nations before Nationalism. Chapel
21 Henrich et al. 2003. I am grateful to the editorial staff of Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
Perspectives on Politics and to epidemiologist James Rob- Barry, Brian. 2001. Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Cri-
ins for independently calling this body of work to my tique of Multiculturalism. Cambridge: Harvard University
attention. Press.
22 Laitin 1998. Bloom, Allan. 1987. The Closing of the American Mind. New
23 Ibid. York: Simon and Schuster, Inc.
24 Ibid. Brady, Henry E., and Cynthia S. Kaplan. 2000. Categori-
25 Ibid., 28–9. cally wrong? Nominal versus group measures of ethnic
26 Yet even in the case of racially discriminatory real estate deci- identity. Studies in Comparative International Development
sions, we need a sense of how and why people define 35:3, 56–91.
their economic interests as they do. Breuilly, John. 1982. Nationalism and the State. Manchester:
27 Laitin 1998, 254. Manchester University Press.
28 Ibid., 253. Bromwich, David. 1992. Politics by Other Means: Higher Edu-
29 Ibid. cation and Group Thinking. New Haven: Yale University
30 Ibid. Press.
31 For a related critique from which I have benefited, see Brubaker, W. Rogers. 1992. Citizenship and Nationhood
Motyl 2002. I am grateful to Yitzhak Brudny for call- in France and Germany. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
ing my attention to this article. Brubaker, W. Rogers, and Frederick Cooper. 2000. Beyond
32 Brady and Kaplan 2000. “identity.” Theory and Society 29:1, 1–47.
33 Brady and Kaplan initially assign nominal ethnicity Bruland, Peter, and Michael Horowitz. 2003. Research
based on self-identification and on the types of internal report on the use of identity concepts in comparative pol-
nationality passports people possessed under Soviet itics. Unpublished manuscript, Weatherhead Center for
rule, two criteria that correlate 96 percent of the time. International Affairs, Harvard University. Available at
Then they develop graded measures of ethnicity based on www.wcfia.harvard.edu/misc/initiative/identity/images/
the extent to which respondents’ social contacts, expo- ComparativeReport.pdf. Accessed 27 February 2004.
sure to media, and positive group evaluations are restricted Cohen, Cathy J. 1999. The Boundaries of Blackness: AIDS
to co-ethnics. Brady and Kaplan 2000. and the Breakdown of Black Politics. Chicago: Univer-
34 Ibid., 76–80. sity of Chicago Press.

June 2004 | Vol. 2/No. 2 311

Symposium | Two Paths to a Science of Politics

D’Souza, Dinesh. 1991. Illiberal Education: The Politics of Marx, Anthony W. 1998. Making Race and Nation: A Com-
Race and Sex on Campus. New York: Free Press. parison of South Africa, the United States, and Brazil. New
DuBois, W. E. B. 1992 [1935]. Black Reconstruction in Amer- York: Cambridge University Press.
ica. New York: Atheneum. Motyl, Alexander. J. 2002. Imagined communities, rational
Fearon, James. 1999. What is identity (as we now use the choosers, invented ethnies. Comparative Politics 34:2,
word)? Unpublished manuscript, Stanford University. Avail- 233–50.
able at www.wcfia.harvard.edu/misc/initiative/identity/ Newman, Saul. 2000. Nationalism in post-industrial societies:
activities/confpapers/fearon2.pdf. Accessed 27 February 2004. Why states still matter. Comparative Politics 33:1, 21–41.
Garrett, Geoffrey. 1995. The politics of legal integration in the Pateman, Carole. 1988. The Sexual Contract. Stanford: Stan-
European Union. International Organization 49:1, 171–81. ford University Press.
Gitlin,Todd. 1995. TheTwilight of Common Dreams:Why Amer- Reed, Adolph, Jr. 2000. Class Notes: Posing as Politics and Other
ica Is Wracked by Culture Wars. New York: Henry Holt. Thoughts on the American Scene. New York: New Press.
Held, David. 1995. Democracy and the Global Order: From Rorty, Richard. 1998. Achieving Our Country: Leftist Thought
the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance. Stanford: in Twentieth-Century America. Cambridge: Harvard Univer-
Stanford University Press. sity Press.
Henrich, Joseph, Robert Boyd, Samuel Bowles, Colin Cam- Schnapper, Dominique. 1998. Community of Citizens: On
erer, Ernst Fehr, Herbert Gintis, Richard McElreath, the Modern Idea of Nationality, trans. Séverine Rosée.
Michael Alvard, Abigail Barr, Jean Ensminger, Kim Hill, New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers.
Francisco Gil-White, Michael Gurven, Frank Marlowe, John Schram, Sanford F., and Philip T. Neisser, eds. 1997. Tales of
Q. Patton, Natalie Smith, and David Tracer. 2003. “Eco- the State: Narrative in U.S. and Public Policy. Lanham,
nomic man” in cross-cultural perspective: Behavior exper- Md.: Rowman and Littlefield.
iments in 15 small-scale societies. Available at Scott, James. C. 1985. Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms
www.hss.caltech.edu/;camerer/overviewpaper.pdf. Accessed of Peasant Resistance. New Haven: Yale University Press.
27 February 2004. _. 1990. Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Tran-
Horowitz, Michael. 2002. Research report on the use of iden- scripts. New Haven: Yale University Press.
tity concepts in international relations. Unpublished manu- Slaughter, Anne-Marie, and Walter Mattli. 1995. Law and pol-
script, Harvard Identity Project. Available at www.wcfia. itics in the European Union: A reply to Garrett. Inter-
harvard.edu/misc/initiative/identity/images/ national Organizations 49:1, 183–90.
horowitz1.pdf. Accessed 27 February 2004. Smith, Anthony D. 1983. Theories of Nationalism. 2d ed.
Jackson, J. T. Ross. 2000. And We Are Doing It: Building an Eco- New York: Holmes and Meier.
village Future. San Francisco: Robert D. Reed. Smith, Rogers M. 2001. Citizenship and the politics of people-
Jung, Courtney. 2000. Then I Was Black: South African Politi- building. International Journal of Citizenship Studies 5:1,
cal Identities in Transition. New Haven: Yale University 73–96.
Press. _. 2003. Stories of Peoplehood: The Politics and Morals of
Katznelson, Ira, and Helen V. Milner. 2002. American politi- Political Membership. Cambridge: Cambridge University
cal science: The discipline’s state and the state of the disci- Press.
pline. In Political Science: The State of the Discipline, ed. Stone, Deborah A. 1989. Causal stories and the formation of
Ira Katznelson and Helen Milner. New York: W. W. Norton. policy agendas. Political Science Quarterly 104:2, 281–300.
Kim, Claire Jean. 2000. Bitter Fruit: The Politics of Black- Turner, Bryan S. 1986. Citizenship and Capitalism: The Debate
Korean Conflict in New York City. New Haven: Yale Univer- over Reformism. Boston: Allen and Unwin.
sity Press. Walton, Hanes, Jr., and Joseph P. McCormick II. 1997. The
King, Gary, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba. 1994. study of African American politics as social danger: Clues
Designing Social Inquiry Scientific Inference in Qualita- from disciplinary journals. In National Political Science
tive Research. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Review 6, ed. Georgia A. Persons. New Brunswick, N.J.:
Laitin, David. 1998. Identity in Formation: The Russian- Transaction Publishers.
Speaking Populations in the Near Abroad. Ithaca: Cornell Uni- Walton, Hanes, Jr., Cheryl M. Miller, and Joseph McCor-
versity Press. mick II. 1995. Race and political science: The dual tra-
Lasswell, Harold D. 1936. Politics: Who Gets What, When, ditions of race relations and African-American politics. In
How. New York: McGraw-Hill. Political Science in History: Research Programs and Politi-
Lustick, Ian, and Dan Miodwinik. 2000. Deliberative democ- cal Traditions, ed. James Farr, John S. Dryzek, and Ste-
racy and public discourse: The agent based argument rep- phen T. Leonard. Cambridge: Cambridge University
ertoire model. Complexity 5:4, 13–30. Press.
Marquez, Benjamin. 2001. Choosing issues, choosing sides: Con- Wendt, Alexander. 1999. Social Theory of International Poli-
structing identities in Mexican-American social movement tics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
organizations. Ethnic and Racial Studies 24:2, 218–35.

312 Perspectives on Politics