G.R. No.

214300

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner

vs.
MANUEL ESCOBAR, Respondent

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

This Rule 45 Petition assails the Court of Appeals Decision to grant the accused's second petition for
bail. Res judicata applies only in a final judgment in a civil case,  not in an interlocutory order in a
1

criminal case.  An order disposing a petition for bail is interlocutory.  This order does not attain finality
2 3

when a new matter warrants a second look on the application for bail.

Respondent Manuel Escobar (Escobar) filed a petition for bail (First Bail Petition), which was denied
by the Regional Trial Court in the Order  dated October 6, 2008 and by the Court of Appeals in the
4

Decision  dated March 8, 2011. A subsequent development in the accused's case  compelled him to
5 6

file a second petition for bail (Second Bail Petition). On April 26, 2012, the Regional Trial Court
denied  this on the ground of res judicata. In the Decision  dated March 24, 2014, the Court of
7 8

Appeals overturned the Regional Trial Court Order and granted the Second Bail Petition.

Escobar was suspected of conspiring in the kidnap for ransom of Mary Grace Cheng-Rosagas (Mary
Grace), daughter of Filipino-Chinese businessman Robert G. Cheng (Robert), and two (2) other
victims.  Robert was the owner of Uratex Foam, Philippines,  a manufacturing company of foams
9 10

and mattresses. 11

On June 18, 2001 at 7:40 a.m., Mary Grace, her bodyguard Valentin B. Torres (Torres), and her
driver Dionisio F. Burca (Burca) were passing by the front of Malcolm Hall, University of the
Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City when a vehicle blocked their way.  Another group of suspects
12

helped as lookouts. 13

Clad in police uniform, four (4) armed men forced Mary Grace, Burca, and Torres inside the
vehicle.  The incident happened in broad daylight.
14

Alleged group leader Rolando Villaver (Villaver) and some of the suspects then travelled and
detained Mary Grace, Burca, and Torres in an undisclosed location in Batangas.  Afterwards, the 15

group headed to Club Solvento, a resort  in Calamba, Laguna owned by Escobar,  who personally
16 17

served them food. 18

Some of the accused  stayed in Club Solvento to rest or sleep while the others, namely, Villaver,
19

Cesar Olimpiada, a certain Cholo, and Biboy Lugnasin, left to negotiate the price for the victims'
release.  Cheng paid the ransom of ₱15,000,000.00.
20 21

At 7:00 p.m. on the same day, Villaver's group returned to Club Solvento,  followed by co-accused
22

brothers Rolando and Harold Fajardo (the Fajardo brothers), who were alleged advisers of
Villaver.  The group then locked themselves in a room where Villaver partitioned the ransom
23

money.  Cancio Cubillas (Cubillas), the group's driver,  confessed to have received a total
24 25

of'₱l,250,000.00 for the kidnapping operation. 26

At 10:30 p.m. on the same day, Mary Grace, Burca, and Torres were finally released.  They were
27

freed somewhere in Alaminos, Laguna, more than 12 hours since they were abducted. 28

Cubillas became a state witness.  On June 3, 2002, he executed an extrajudicial confession and
29

implicated respondent Escobar as an adviser for Villaver.  Cubillas believed that Escobar was
30

involved after he saw Escobar talk to Villaver while they were in Club Solvento.  In his extrajudicial
31

confession, Cubillas also claimed that Escobar received a portion of the ransom money from
Villaver.
32

On February 17, 2004, an Amended Information was filed before the Regional Trial Court charging
Escobar as a co-conspirator  in the kidnapping for ransom.  The charging portion stated:
33 34

That on or about June 18, 2001 at around 7:40 in the morning, at Quezon City, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating
and mutually helping one another and grouping themselves together, with others not present during
the actual kidnapping but performing some other peculiarly contributory roles, did, then and there, by
force and intimidation, with the use of long firearms and clad in police uniform, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously take, carry away and thereafter detain at some undisclosed place, after having
blocked their car in front of Malcolm Hall, Osmena Avenue, UP Campus, Diliman, Quezon City,
MARY GRACE CHENGROSAGAS, her driver DIONISIO F. BURCA and her bodyguard VALENTIN
B. TORRES, against their will and consent thereby depriving them of their liberty for more than
twelve (12) hours for the purpose of extorting ransom for their release in the amount of FIFTEEN
MILLION PESOS (P15,000,000.00), and which amount was in fact paid by Mary Grace's father, Mr.
Robert Cheng, owner of Uratex Foam, Philippines, and have the same delivered at E. Rodriguez
Compound, Calamba, Laguna thereby resulting to the release of the kidnap victims somewhere in
Alaminos, Laguna at about 10:30 p.m. of the same day all to the damage and prejudice of the three
(3) victims and their families in such amount as may be awarded to them and their families under the
provisions of the Civil Code.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 35

Escobar was arrested on February 14, 2008. 36

On June 3, 2008, Escobar filed the First Bail Petition before the Regional Trial Court.  During the
37

hearing on Escobar's bail application, Cubillas testified that Escobar and the Fajardo brothers were
Villaver's advisers. 38

In the Order dated October 6, 2008, the Regional Trial Court denied  Escobar's First Bail
39

Petition.  The dispositive portion read:

1âwphi1

The Petition for Bail filed by accused Manny Escobar is denied for lack of merit considering that
state witness Cancio Cubillas positively identified said accused as the owner of Club Solvento
located in Calamba, Laguna; that he was the one who served food to the group of Rolando Villaver,
Jun Jun Villaver, Ning Ning Villaver, Daimy Velasquez, Cholo, Cesar Olimpiada, Mike, Alan Celebre,
Biboy Lugnasin and witness himself, Cancio Cubillas; that it was also in said Club Solvento where
Cancio Cubillas, Jun Jun Villaver, Ning Ning Villaver, Danny Velasquez, Mike and Alan Celebre
rested and slept after Rolando Villaver, Cholo, Biboy Lugnasin and Cesar Olimpiada left to negotiate
for the ransom of kidnap victim Mary Grace Cheng Rosagas, and that on the night of June 18, 2001,
Cubillas saw accused Rolando Villaver gave part of the ransom money to him.

SO ORDERED. 40
Escobar appealed before the Court of Appeals.  On March 8, 2011, the Court of Appeals
41

affinned  the denial of the First Bail Petition. It recognized that Cubillas' extrajudicial confession was
42

generally incompetent evidence against his co-accused and was admissible against himself only  for 43

being hearsay and for violating the res inter alias acta rule.  Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals
44

invoked an exception to this rule and held that the Regional Trial Court "did not rely solely on the
extrajudicial confession of Cubillas"; rather, the trial court also relied on Cubillas' testimony during
the bail hearing. 45

Escobar moved to reconsider the Court of Appeal March 8, 2011 Decision. 46

Pending the proceedings on Escobar's case, the police arrested one (1) of the co-accused Fajardo
brothers, Rolando Fajardo (Rolando),  who applied for bail before the Regional Trial Court.  As in
47 48

Escobar's bail hearing, the prosecution relied solely on Cubillas' statements to establish the strength
of Fajardo's guilt.  In an Order dated September 13, 2011, the Regional Trial Court denied Rolando's
49

petition for bail. 50

However, in an Order dated October 14, 2011, the Regional Trial Court reversed its previous order
and granted Rolando's bail application.  The Regional Trial Court stated:
51

To summarize, the evidence for the prosecution does not establish that accused Rolando Fajardo
participated during the actual abduction of Rosagas, Burca and Torres or that during the actual
abduction, accused Rolando Fajardo gave advice or instruction to the other accused herein. The
evidence for the prosecution likewise does not establish that accused Rolando Fajardo acted as
adviser to accused Rolando Villaver and his group in connection with the kidnapping of the victims
herein. There is no testimony as to what advice or instructions were made by accused Rolando
Fajardo in connection with the kidnapping of the victims herein. There is thus a paucity of evidence
establishing the participation of accused Rolando Fajardo in the kidnapping of Rosagas, Burca and
Torres.  (Emphasis supplied)
52

The reversal came about after the trial court considered that, according to Cubillas, "[Rolando] was
not present before, during and after the kidnapping."  There was paucity of evidence on Rolando's
53

alleged participation. 54

Meanwhile, on October 27, 2011, the Court of Appeals denied Escobar's motion for
reconsideration.  He no longer appealed before this Court.
55 56

By January 2012, only Escobar was left in detention pending the final judgment on the merits of the
case as all the other accused who had active participation in the kidnapping had been granted
bail.  Escobar saw Rolando's release on bail as a new "development which warrant[ed] a different
57

view" on his own bail application. 58

Thus, on January 27, 2012, Escobar filed another petition for bail (Second Bail Petition) before the
Regional Trial Court.  He noted that Cubillas could not explain how either Rolando or Escobar
59

advised Villaver and that both Rolando and Escobar were absent before, during, and after the
kidnapping.  Hence, if Rolando's petition for bail was granted based on the unreliability of Cubillas'
60

testimony, Escobar reasoned that the trial court should likewise grant him provisional release. 61

On April 26, 2012, the Regional Trial Court denied  Escobar's Second Bail Petition on the ground
62

of res judicata, reasoning thus: "[i]n deference to the Decision of the Court of Appeals which has
63

already attained finality, accused's Petition for Bail which is actually a second petition for bail[,] must
be necessarily denied." 64
Escobar moved for reconsideration but this was denied by the Regional Trial Court.  On January 14,
65

2013, he appealed before the Court of Appeals via Rule 65, arguing that the trial court committed
grave abuse of discretion in denying his Second Bail Petition. 66

In the Decision dated March 24, 2014, the Court of Appeals granted  the petition for certiorari and
67

ordered the Regional Trial Court to determine the appropriate bail for Escobar's provisional liberty.
The dispositive portion read:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The April 26, 2012,September 14, 2012, September 17,
2012 and November 6, 2012 Ordersare SET ASIDE. The trial court is directed to determine the
appropriate bail for the provisional liberty of the petitioner, Manuel Escobar, with dispatch.

SO ORDERED. 68

The Court of Appeals denied the prosecution's Motion for Reconsideration.  According to the Court
69

of Appeals, Escobar's Second Bail Petition was not barred by res judicata, which applies only if the
former judgment is a final order or judgment and not an interlocutory order.  An order denying a
70

petition for bail is interlocutory in nature.

71

On April 4, 2014, the Regional Trial Court fixed  Escobar's bail at ₱300,000.00. The dispositive
72

portion read:

In view of the Decision rendered by the Court of Appeals on 24 March 2014, the bail for the
provisional liberty of accused Manuel Escobar is hereby fixed at Three Hundred Thousand Pesos
(Php300,000.00).

SO ORDERED. 73

In the Resolution dated September 11, 2014, the Court of Appeals denied  the prosecution's Motion
74

for Reconsideration.

On November 6, 2014, the prosecution, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed a Petition for
Review  via Rule 45 before this Court. In its Petition, the prosecution does not pray for the issuance
75

of a temporary restraining order of the Court of Appeals Decision;  rather, in assailing the grant of
76

Escobar 's Second Bail Petition, the prosecution avers that the doctrine of res judicata must be
respected. 77

On October 19, 2015, Escobar filed his Comment,  arguing that res judicata did not apply here,  that
78 79

there was no strong evidence of his guilt,  and that the Court of Appeals could rectify errors of
80

judgment in the greater interest of justice.  According to Escobar:

81

13. Due to this sudden development of the grant of bail to his co-accused, [Rolando], and
considering that both [Rolando] and [Escobar ]'s alleged participation in the crime are based on the
same court-declared unreliable "speculations" of the state witness Cubillas, who even admitted he
was lying when questioned during [Escobar]'s own bail hearings, it was in the interest of justice and
fairness to re-open the matter of bail with respect to [Escobar] and thereby grant the same. And the
Honorable Court of Appeals agreed. 82

This Court's program to decongest holding jails led City Jail Warden Randel H. Latoza (City Jail
Warden Latoza) to review Escobar's case.  In his manifestation dated August 18, 2016, City Jail
83

Warden Latoza informed this Court that there was no temporary restraining order against the
Regional trial Court April 4, 2014 Order, which fixed Escobar's provisional liberty at ₱300,000.00. He
also acknowledged the Court of Appeals March 24, 2014 Decision granting Escobar the right to
bail.  He mentioned that Escobar had posted the ₱300,000.00 bail, as ordered by the trial
84

court.  Thus, he moved to allow Escobar's provisional release on bail.

85 86

City Jail Warden Latoza alleged that Escobar had paid the necessary surety bond  and attached a
87

copy of Traveller's Insurance Surety Corporation's surety bond undertaking to his

manifestation.  However, the attached surety bond undertaking was neither notarized nor approved
88

by the Regional Trial Court judge. 89

In a Letter dated May 15, 2017, the Commission on Human Rights wrote to Associate Justice
Antonio T. Carpio to ask for the speedy resolution of the case as Escobar was already 78 years old. 90

For resolution are the following issues:

First, whether Manuel Escobar's second petition for bail is barred by res judicata; and

Finally, whether respondent should be granted bail.

Bail is the security given for the temporary release of a person who has been arrested and detained
but "whose guilt has not yet been proven" in court beyond reasonable doubt.  The right to bail is
91

cognate to the fundamental right to be presumed innocent. In People v. Fitzgerald: 92

The right to bail emanates from the [accused's constitutional] right to be presumed innocent. It is
accorded to a person in the custody of the law who may, by reason of the presumption of innocence
he [or she] enjoys, be allowed provisional liberty upon filing of a security to guarantee his [or her]
appearance before any court, as required under specified conditions.  (Citations omitted)
93

Bail may be a matter of right or judicial discretion. The accused has the right to bail if the offense
charged is "not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment" before conviction by
the Regional Trial Court.  However, if the accused is charged with an offense the penalty of which is
94

death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment-"regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution"-

and when evidence of one's guilt is not strong, then the accused's prayer for bail is subject to the
discretion of the trial court. 95

In this case, the imposable penalty for kidnapping for ransom is death,  reduced to reclusion
96

perpetua. Escobar's bail is, thus, a matter of judicial discretion, provided that the evidence of his
97

guilt is not strong. 98

Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure states:

Section 4. Bail, a matter of right; exception. - All persons in custody shall be admitted to bail as a
matter of right, with sufficient sureties, or released on recognizance as prescribed by law or this Rule
(a) before or after conviction by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial
Court in Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court, and (b) before conviction by the Regional Trial Court
of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment.

....
Section 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not
bailable. - No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless
of the stage of the criminal prosecution.

The Regional Trial Court denied  Escobar's Second Bail Petition on the ground of res judicata. The
99

Court of Appeals overtumed  this and correctly ruled that his Second Bail Petition was not barred
100

by res judicata.

In its literal meaning, res judicata refers to "a matter adjudged."  This doctrine bars the re-litigation
101

of the same claim between the parties, also known as claim preclusion or bar by former
judgment.  It likewise bars the re-litigation of the same issue on a different claim between the same
102

parties, also known as issue preclusion or conclusiveness of judgement.  It "exists as an obvious
103

rule of reason, justice, fairness, expediency, practical necessity, and public tranquillity."
104

Degayo v. Magbanua-Dinglasan held that "[t]he doctrine of res judicata is set forth in Section 47 of
105

Rule 39"  of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, thus:

106

Sec. 47. Effect of Judgments or Final Orders. - The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a
court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as
follows:

....

(b) [T]he judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other
matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their
successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special proceeding,
litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity; and

(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that only is
deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears upon its face to
have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary
thereto.

Escobar' s Second Bail Petition is not barred by res judicata as this doctrine is not recognized in
criminal proceedings. 107

Expressly applicable in civil cases, res judicata settles with finality the dispute between the parties or
their successors-in-interest.  Trinidad v. Marcelo declares that res judicata, as found in Rule 39 of
108 109

the Rules of Civil Procedure, is a principle in civil law and "has no bearing on criminal
proceedings."  Rule 124, Section 18 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure states:
110

Section 18. Application of certain rules in civil procedure to criminal cases. - The provisions of Rules
42, 44 to 46 and 48 to 56 relating to procedure in the Court of Appeals and in the Supreme Court in
original and appealed civil cases shall be applied to criminal cases insofar as they are applicable
and not inconsistent with the provisions of this Rule.

Indeed, while certain provisions of the Rules of Civil Procedure may be applied in criminal
cases,  Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil Procedure is excluded from the enumeration under Rule 124 of
111

the Rules of Criminal Procedure. In Trinidad: 112

Petitioner's arguments - that res judicata applies since the Office of the Ombudsman twice found no
sufficient basis to indict him in similar cases earlier filed against him, and that the Agan cases cannot
be a supervening event or evidence per se to warrant a reinvestigation on the same set of facts and
circumstances - do not lie.

Res judicata is a doctrine of civil law and thus has no bearing on criminal proceedings.

But even if petitioner's argument[s] were to be expanded to contemplate "res judicata in prison grey"
or the criminal law concept of double jeopardy, this Court still finds it inapplicable to bar the
reinvestigation conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman.  (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted).
113

An interlocutory order denying an application for bail, in this case being criminal in nature, does not
give rise to res judicata. As in Trinidad, even if we are to expand the argument of the prosecution in
this case to contemplate "res judicata in prison grey" or double jeopardy, the same will still not
apply.  Double jeopardy requires that the accused has been convicted or acquitted or that the case
114

against him or her has been dismissed or terminated without his express consent.  Here, while
115

there was an initial ruling on Escobar's First Bail Petition, Escobar has not been convicted, acquitted,
or has had his case dismissed or terminated.

Even assuming that this case allows for res judicata as applied in civil cases, Escobar’s Second Bail
Petition cannot be barred as there is no final judgment on the merits.

Res judicata requires the concurrence of the following elements:

1. The judgment sought to bar the new action must be final;

2. The decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the parties and the
subject matter;

3. The disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits; and

4. There must be between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter, and of
causes of action. 116

In deciding on a matter before it, a court issues either a final judgment or an interlocutory order.  A
1âwphi1

final judgment "leaves nothing else to be done" because the period to appeal has expired or the
highest tribunal has already ruled on the case.  In contrast, an order is considered interlocutory if,
117

between the beginning and the termination of a case, the court decides on a point or matter that is
not yet a final judgment on the entire controversy. 118

An interlocutory order "settles only some incidental, subsidiary or collateral matter arising in an
action";  in other words, something else still needs to be done in the primary case-the rendition of
119

the final judgment.  Res judicata applies only when there is a final judgment on the merits of a case;
120

it cannot be availed of in an interlocutory order even if this order is not appealed.  In Macahilig v.
121

Heirs of Magalit:122

Citing Section 49 of Rule 39, Rules of Court, petitioner insists that the September 17, 1997
[interlocutory] Order of the trial court in Civil Case No. 3517 bars it from rehearing questions on the
ownership of Lot 4417. She insists that said Order has become final and executory, because Dr.
Magalit did not appeal it.
We disagree. Final, in the phrase judgments or final orders found in Section 49 of Rule 39, has two
accepted interpretations. In the first sense, it is an order that one can no longer appeal because the
period to do so has expired, or because the order has been affirmed by the highest possible tribunal
involved. The second sense connotes that it is an order that leaves nothing else to be done, as
distinguished from one that is interlocutory. The phrase refers to aflnal determination as opposed to
a judgment or an order that settles only some incidental, subsidiary or collateral matter arising in an
action; for example, an order postponing a trial, denying a motion to dismiss or allowing
intervention. Orders that give rise to res judicata and conclusiveness of judgment apply only to those
falling under the second category.

....

For example, an Order overruling a motion to dismiss does not give rise to res adjudicata [sic] that
will bar a subsequent action, because such order is merely interlocutory and is subject to
amendments until the rendition of the final judgment.  (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
123

A decision denying a petition for bail settles only a collateral matter -whether accused is entitled to
124

provisional liberty-and is not a final judgment on accused's guilt or innocence. Unlike in a full-blown
trial, a hearing for bail is summary in nature: it deliberately "avoid[s] unnecessary thoroughness" and
does not try the merits of the case.  Thus:
125

Summary hearing means such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the evidence
of guilt as is practicable and consistent with the purpose of the hearing which is merely to determine
the weight of the evidence for purposes of bail. The course of the inquiry may be left to the discretion
of the court which may confine itself to receiving such evidence as has reference to substantial
matters avoiding unnecessary thoroughness in the examination and cross-examination of witnesses
and reducing to a reasonable minimum the amount of corroboration particularly on details that are
not essential to the purpose of the hearing.  (Emphasis in the original)
126

Here, the prosecution itself has acknowledged that "the first order denying bail is an interlocutory
order."  The merits of the case for kidnapping must still be threshed out in a full-blown proceeding.
127

Being an interlocutory order, the March 8, 2011 Court of Appeals Decision denying Escobar's First
Bail Petition did not have the effect of res judicata. The kidnapping case itself has not attained
finality. Since res judicata has not attached to the March 8, 2011 Court of Appeals Decision, the
Regional Trial Court should have taken cognizance of Escobar's Second Bail Petition and weighed
the strength of the evidence of guilt against him.

In any case, the Court of Appeals may still reverse its Decision, notwithstanding its denial of the First
Bail Petition on March 8, 2011.

Rules of procedure should not be interpreted as to disadvantage a party and deprive him or her of
fundamental rights and liberties. A judgment or order may be modified where executing it in its
present form is impossible or unjust in view of intervening facts or circumstances: 128

[W]here facts and circumstances transpire which render [the] execution [of a judgment] impossible
or unjust and it therefore becomes necessary, "in the interest of justice, to direct its modification in
order to harmonize the disposition with the prevailing circumstances." (Emphasis supplied, citation
129

omitted)
Appellate courts may correct "errors of judgment if blind and stubborn adherence to the doctrine of
immutability of final judgments would involve the sacrifice of justice for technicality."  Thus, an
130

accused may file a second petition for bail, particularly if there are sudden developments or a "new
matter or fact which warrants a different view." 131

Rolando's release on bail is a new development in Escobar's case.  The Court of Appeals has
132

pointed out that the other alleged co-conspirators are already out on bail: Rolando, in particular, was
granted bail because Cubillas' testimony against him was weak. "[Escobar] and [Rolando]
133

participated in the same way, but [Escobar]'s bail was denied."  Escobar's fundamental rights and
134

liberty are being deprived in the meantime.

Article III, Section 13 of the 1987 Constitution states:

Section 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable ... (Emphasis supplied)

The same evidence used by the trial court to grant bail to Rolando was not used similarly in
Escobar's favor. As the Court of Appeals found: 135

We cannot ignore the allegation of conspiracy and that the other accused were all granted bail
except him. Specifically, [Rolando] was granted bail due to the weakness of Cubillas' testimony
against him. 136

In light of the circumstances after the denial of Escobar's First Bail Petition, his Second Bail Petition
should have been given due course. It should not be denied on the technical ground of res judicata.

II

The Court of Appeals already approved Escobar's bail petition. Meanwhile, City Jail Warden Latoza
has informed this Court of the absence of any temporary restraining order against the Court of
Appeals Decision granting the Second Bail Petition, as well as the Regional Trial Court Order fixing
his bail at ₱300,000.00.  Thus, the Court of Appeals March 24, 2014 Decision granting Escobar's
137

provisional liberty can be executed upon the approval of his bail bond, if he has indeed paid the
surety bond.

In closing, no part of this Decision should prejudice the submission of additional evidence for the
prosecution to prove Escobar's guilt in the main case. "[A] grant of bail does not prevent the trier of
facts ... from making a final assessment of the evidence after full trial on the merits."  As the Court
138

of Appeals correctly ruled:

[T]his determination is only for the purpose of bail[;] it is without prejudice for the prosecution to
submit additional evidence to prove [Escobar]'s guilt in the course of the proceedings in the primary
case.139

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated March 24, 2014 in CA-
G.R. SP No. 128189 is AFFIRMED.

Escobar may be provisionally released if he indeed has paid the surety bond that must be contained
in a public document and approved by the Regional Trial Court judge. Otherwise, he is directed to
post bail.
SO ORDERED