Front. Philos.

China 2018, 13(4): 616–633

DOI 10.3868/s030-007-018-0046-5
 
 
SPECIAL THEME

Tung Tin Wong

He Lin and German Philosophy in the Zhanguoce School:

An Idealist Philosopher on History and Cultural Reform
Abstract The Zhanguoce School emerged in 1940 and actively responded to the
crisis caused by the Sino-Japanese War. The cultural morphology of Oswald
Spengler (1880–1936) inspired most of the leading Zhanguoce scholars to reflect
on the culture, history, and status quo of China. They believed that China was
suffering from a total war with world superpowers and that it was in a new Warring
States epoch; they thus advocated radical cultural reform as a necessary condition
for victory and invoked Nietzschean philosophy to champion heroism and power.
However, He Lin 賀麟 (1902–92), a philosopher in this school, looked to Georg
Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831) and Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762–1814)
for different theories of cultural reform and history. This article examines He’s
integration of the philosophies of Hegel and Fichte into his cultural and historical
thought. Based on the Hegelian notion of Spirit, He rethought the nature of
culture and the relationship between Chinese and Western cultures; he also
interpreted history by comparing the historical theories of Hegel and Wang Fuzhi
王夫之 (1619–92). Furthermore, He investigated individual realization with
reference to Fichte and repudiated radical heroism.

Keywords Hegel, Fichte, spirit, He Lin, history, cultural philosophy

1 Introduction

In the 1930s and the first half of the 1940s, China experienced the crisis of the war
with Japan. Many Chinese intellectuals responded to this critical situation by
endeavoring to articulate their political and cultural theories on a nationalistic
basis. One particular group of scholars, named the Zhanguoce Pai 戰國策派
(School of the Strategies of the Warring States), articulated an alternative way to
 

Tung Tin Wong ( )

Division of Humanities, The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Hong Kong,
China
E-mail: ttwongae@connect.ust.hk
An Idealist Philosopher on History and Cultural Reform 617

save the Chinese nation and proposed unique approaches to winning the war and
reconstructing Chinese culture by introducing and incorporating the thought of
classical and contemporary German philosophers such as Georg Wilhelm
Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831), Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762–1814), and Oswald
Spengler (1880–1931). Predominantly, the Zhanguoce historians adopted the
theory of cultural morphology from Spengler, a German historian and philosopher,
to portray the unique history of Chinese culture. They argued that in the Second
World War, China was once again in an epoch of “Warring States” (zhanguo shidai
戰國時代), albeit in a new modern form. They outlined a plan for a renewal of
national culture. They also advocated for centering the concept of “power” within
the cultural consciousness and asserted that it must be embedded within the
project of Chinese cultural restoration, if China indeed had the will for victory. The
Zhanguoce School has long been criticized for its advocacy of such radical and
nationalistic cultural reforms.
Nevertheless, one philosopher’s interconnections with this school have been
neglected to a large extent, even though he was a renowned figure in
twentieth-century Chinese philosophy and later made crucial efforts in introducing
Hegel’s philosophy and German idealism to the People’s Republic of China. This
philosopher was He Lin 賀麟 (1902–92), who maintained the necessity of
nationalism while fundamentally revising its radical components from within by
integrating national awareness with the notions of cultural, historical, and
individual spirit (Individueller Geist). This paper examines He Lin’s effort to
embed the philosophies of Hegel and Fichte into his cultural and historical thought;
it also argues that He essentially diverged from his colleagues in the Zhanguoce
School with regard to patriotic attitudes, the nature of culture, and the role of the
individual in an epoch of national crisis. He turned to Hegel’s notion of Spirit to
understand cultural issues and rethought traditional Chinese historical theories by
interpreting the historical philosophy of Wang Fuzhi 王夫之 (1619–92) from a
Hegelian perspective—particularly the dialectics (Dialektik) and the Cunning of
Reason (die List der Vernunft). He advocated for cultural reform informed by a
Hegelian-influenced conception of the nature of culture and the self-realization of
the individual, while other intellectuals (in particular, Lin Tongji 林同濟
(1906–80), Lei Haizong 雷海宗 (1902–62), and Chen Quan 陳銓 (1903–69), in
the School proposed militarizing Chinese culture and centered their thought
around an ideology of the heroic individual in order to revive the nationalist spirit
of the Chinese people. In this sense, He can be regarded as a philosopher marked
by a nuanced contemplation of the importance of culture and an implicit
618 Tung Tin Wong

resistance to the radical cultural reform proposed by the “Spenglerists.”1

2 The Spenglerists: Nationalist Culture for a National Crisis

The bimonthly magazine entitled Zhanguoce 戰國策 was first released on 1st
April 1940, and this marked the foundation the Zhanguoce School (Li 2014, 1).
The foreword to the first issue of Zhanguoce was written by Lin Tongji and was
titled “The Recurrence of the Warring States Period” (“Zhanguo Shidai de
Chongyan” 戰國時代的重演). In this article, Lin asserted that the Second World
War had brought China back to the time of Warring States, not as a country
divided from within but as a would-be modern nation under attack by the
“imperialist powers.” In this critical, decisive moment of war, there were but two
options: “the decisive battle among the superpowers” or “the superpowers’
annexation of the weak countries” (Zhang 2013, 11). This reflects Lin’s belief―a
defining belief for the Spenglerists―that a centering of the notion of power
within Chinese national consciousness must be awakened in order for victory to
be possible.
Here, it is important to note that, while the Zhanguoce School owes its name to
the Zhanguoce magazine, to which those in the School contributed their essays,
the focus of this paper not constrained to the magazine itself and includes the
scholars’ other publications on relevant topics. This chapter examines Spenglerism
in the Zhanguoce School and the Spenglerists’ insights into history and culture.

2.1 Introducing Spengler: Rethinking History and Crisis

Lin Tongji and Lei Haizong, pioneering Sprenglerists, attempted to reinterpret

Chinese history on the basis of Oswald Spengler’s cultural morphology.2 The

                                                             
1
The term “Spenglerist” in this paper primarily signifies those who introduced Spengler’s
theories, especially that of cultural morphology, but in the Zhanguoce School it is notable in that
Lin Tongji, one of the major Spenglerists, also stressed the importance of power and
Nietzsche’s theory, which was also agreed upon by such other scholars as Chen Quan, He
Yongji 何永佶 (1902–79), and Tao Yunkui 陶雲逵 (1904–44), who seldom talked about
Spengler or cultural morphology. Due to such an overlap and for convenience, “Spenglerist” as
used in the text generally refers to those who introduced Spengler’s theories as well as to
supporters of power who dealt less with Sprengler’s own work.
2
Spengler asserted that each culture of a higher order is a particular organic entity with an
intrinsically unique historical development and with representation in interrelated perspectives
such as customs, art, language, etc., into which its people are all incorporated; each culture has a
life cycle proceeding from birth to decline, and such a process is the transition from culture to
civilization since the “inner possibility” of culture is fulfilled as it “congeals” into civilization
(O’Hagan 2002, 63; Spengler 1972, 3, 43–45).
An Idealist Philosopher on History and Cultural Reform 619

following discussion focuses primarily on Lin and Lei’s reception of this theory
rather than on simply comparing Spengler’s thought with the thinking of Lin or
Lei, since these philosophers obviously did not merely imitate Spengler but also
developed new perspectives on his cultural morphology in order to examine
Chinese history.
Even before the Sino-Japanese War, Spengler’s theory became a critical source
for Lei’s reflections on history and culture in wartime;3 indeed, Lei published
several papers on cultural morphology and Chinese history before 1937.4 Lei
asserted in these papers that the Chinese nation had been demilitarized (wubing 無
兵) since the Qin dynasty and that this had resulted in the impotence of its people
(Lei 2010, 129–62). Lei also made a striking insight into a shift within Chinese
history: The people in the pre-Qin period voluntarily joined the army and
sacrificed themselves for their motherland, but thereafter the people were
forcefully recruited by the centralized state power and—so Lei asserted—merely
lived at the mercy of the government. Nevertheless, there had seldom been
substantial reforms to counter this repression, only intermittent upheavals caused
by the rebellion of the people or stable times maintained by the authority of the
government. Lei asserted that this absence of martial spirit had, in effect,
implicitly prevented the Chinese people from becoming modern citizens (Lei 2010,
102).5
In 1942, Lin further examined Chinese history using cultural morphology;
however, his version of cultural morphology was not simply a reproduction of
Spengler’s. In “Nationalism and the Twentieth Century” (“Minzu Zhuyi yu Ershi
Shiji” 民族主義與二十世紀), a long article published in the Zhanguoce magazine,
he singularly argued that there were three phases in the histories of all cultures: the
feudal period (fengjian shidai 封建時代), the period of states (lieguo shidai 列國
時代), and the period of unity (dayitong shidai 大一統時代). Strikingly, though
Spengler emphasized the importance of Dao in Chinese history, Lin did not echo
this metaphysical consideration. 6 In his theory, both Chinese and Western
histories were destined to undergo the feudal period and the period of Warring
States: the former designates the development of a culture from a primitive state to

                                                             
3
In the early 1930s, Lei started involving Spengler in his history courses at Tsinghua University
and Wuhan University (Li 2007, 286; Hu 2016, 132).
4
These papers were collected in the first half of Lei’s postwar book Chinese Culture and the
Chinese Soldier (Zhongguo Wenhua yu Zhongguo de Bing 中國文化與中國的兵) in 1938.
5
For a detailed explanation of this demilitarization of culture, see Wu 2009, 53–56.
6
Spengler’s comments on China are scattered in Der Untergang des Abendlandes, but his
opinion of the spirit of the Chinese nation stressed Dao; for him, the wakeful awareness
(Wachsein) of the Chinese nation, including its conventions and morals, lies in Dao. He believed
such a concept, which originated from the Zhou period, comprehensively encompassed the
patterns of human life, nature, history, etc. (Spengler 1972, 910–11).
620 Tung Tin Wong

a more advanced one dominated by agriculture and a hierarchical feudal system,

while the latter witnesses the disruption of feudal politics and the rise of commerce.
However, the period of unity was exclusively present in the Chinese empire,
referring to times in which political absolutism, economic regulation, and an
emperor-worshiping religion could be found. Most importantly, Lin also believed
that the Second World War had plunged China and the West back into a period of
disruption (Zhang 2013, 739–41).
This view of Chinese history implied the criticality of a solution to the new
crisis. The perceived weakness and failures of China compelled the Spenglerists to
overcome this sense of impotence, and, in working toward this goal, they turned
to Nietzsche’s texts to defend the necessity of power for the future of the Chinese
nation.

2.2 The Hero, Power, and Nietzsche

The Spengleristic reinterpretation of cultural morphology and Chinese history

highlighted the urgency of winning the war. Many scholars within this school of
thought—particularly Lin Tongji and Chen Quan—advocated a centering of the
notion of power as the most feasible means of securing victory, and turned to the
works of Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900) as a foundation for their arguments.
Lin proposed the concept of power (li 力) as a corrective to the perceived frailty
of China in war (Lin 2004, 113–19). In an essay “Power!” (“Li!” 力 !), Lin
attributed an absence of power in Chinese culture to Confucianism and held that
morals (de 德) had superseded power, leading to the stagnation of Chinese culture
(Lin 2004, 115, 118). In addition, in “Thus Spoke Zarathustra! To Chinese Youths”
(“Salatusida Ruci Shuo! Jigei Zhongguo Qingnian” 薩拉圖斯達如此說！――寄給
7
中國青年), using after the style of Nietzsche’s “Thus Spoke Zarathustra,” Lin set
out to stir up Chinese youngsters and encourage them to go to war:

The Anti-Japanese War is your first understanding of the meaning of life. The
Anti-Japanese War is your striving for the qualification of being a human—a
modern human.

Brothers, be great to fight the war and be brave to be great. The key to being
great, do you understand? That is, to do something you have never dared in your
life. (Lin 2004, 124–25).

                                                             
7
Lin likely echoed Thus Spoke Zarathustra’s chapter “On War and People of War” (Vom Krieg
und Kriegsvolke) (see Nietzsche 1925, 55–57).
An Idealist Philosopher on History and Cultural Reform 621

Lin’s affinity for Nietzsche was related to his focus upon the notion of power, as
was the case for the literary critic Chen Quan as well, another Nietzschean
Zhanguoce School scholar. Chen also highlighted the ideas of heroism and power
based on Nietzschean philosophy. In “On the Worship of the Hero” (“Lun
Yingxiong Chongbai” 論 英 雄 崇 拜 ), Chen displays a distinctly Nietzschean
historical understanding, rejecting the importance of material in history, and
prioritizing, instead, the role of will.8 Furthermore, he pointed out that the heroic
spirit in the tradition of Chinese culture had been overridden by contemporary
education, which was one of the fundamental causes of the failures in the war.9
The Spenglerism and Nietzscheanism in the Zhanguoce School were consistent
in championing power, though some Nietzscheans, such as Chen, did not
explicitly address cultural morphology. In a certain sense, Nietzschean power can
be viewed as the favored solution of the Spengleristic project aiming at China’s
victory; however, such a project neglected the possible incompatibility of culture
and power and brought to light an inherent and ultimately fatal tension between
these notions.

2.3 The Tension within the Spengleristic Project

In reviewing Lei and Lin’s introspection concerning the reform of Chinese culture
and the Nietzschean scholars’ concept of power, a certain inherent tension between
power and culture becomes apparent. Nevertheless, the Spenglerists did not
manage to reconcile this tension or to raise any feasible solution for the postwar
reconstruction of Chinese culture. The essential stimulus for the Spenglerists’
cultural reflection was the crisis caused by the war. They attributed successive
failures to the loss of the role of power within Chinese culture and believed that the
most feasible solution was to revive it, which was the reason behind their focus on
Nietzsche.
As has been discussed, the Spenglerists did not desire cultural reform simply for
the sake of culture itself but above all for practical reasons. In other words, culture
was treated by the Spenglerists as an instrument for winning the war: For such
thinkers, it was imperative that any reforms to Chinese culture give rise to power.
However, cultural reform subordinate to power could not possibly be long-lasting,
since power might stimulate passionate elements in Chinese culture, whereas
culture for the most part requires prudence and sobriety. The Spenglerists’ impulse
for victory stood as an obstacle to resolving this tension.
                                                             
8
Chen wrote, “[t]he will of the human centers in historical development; all the people who
explain everything with materialism, who believe the power of the human is overwhelmingly
victorious, just see one side of the phenomena and fail to discover the whole truth. Neither the
material nor the human is omnipotent, and the will of the human in its effort really renders all of
history” (Zhang 2013, 122).
9
For the Nietzscheanism of Chen Quan, see Fung 2009, 809–11.
622 Tung Tin Wong

3 He Lin on History and Culture

Unlike the Spenglerists, who argued for radical cultural reform, He Lin gave a
philosophical proposal for cultural restoration which more deeply considered the
nature of culture. He turned to Hegel and Fichte—Hegel being the primary
inspiration—for the philosophical foundation of his conceptualization of cultural
reconstruction and his historical theory. The following discussion concentrates on
He’s Hegelian insight into culture and history. A natural starting point for this
investigation is He’s commentary on patriotism, published in 1931, which
indicates his primary opinion regarding the relationship between patriotism and
culture. Next, He’s integration of Hegelian philosophy into his own cultural theory
will be examined. This essay’s third point of focus is He’s further contemplation
of Hegel’s philosophy of history, the most important concepts of which were, for
He, dialectics (Dialektik) and the Cunning of Reason (List der Vernunft). Finally,
He’s insight into individual self-realization, with reference to Fichte, will be
explored. It should be noted that during the 1930s and the first half of the 1940s
(that is, before the end of the Second World War), He was reading and translating
Hegel’s Science of Logic (Wissenschaft der Logik) and Phenomenology of Spirit
(Phänomenologie des Geistes) (He 2006, 507–09); hence, He’s understanding of
Hegelian philosophy was still emerging, and, in this sense, a direct comparative
analysis of He and Hegel is not essential for understanding He’s unique thought on
culture at that time.

3.1 He Lin on the Patriotism of Hegel and Fichte

He’s opinion on the relationship between culture and patriotism is demonstrated in

his essay “Three Great Germans’ Attitudes toward National Crisis” (“Deguo
Sanda Weiren Chu Guonan shi de Taidu” 德國三大偉人處國難時的態度), which
examines the proposals of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749–1832), Hegel, and
Fichte for saving the German nation. This essay was written on occasion of an
invitation from Wu Mi 吳宓 (1894–1978), the editor of the supplement to the Ta
Kung Pao 大公報, who requested that He comment on patriotism following the
escalation of the Japanese invasion of Northeast China after the Manchurian
Event in 1931(Wang & Li 1995, 31).10
He wrote about Hegel’s thoughts regarding the failure of Prussia in the
                                                             
10
This essay was later published in 1934 as a book with the title Three Great German
Philosophers’ Attitudes toward National Crisis (Deguo San Da Zheren Chu Guonan shi de Taidu
德國三大哲人處國難時的態度) (Zhang 1992, 25–28), and reissued in 1989 with a new title, The
Patriotism of Three Great German Philosophers (Deguo San Da Zheren Gede, Heige’er, Feixite
de Aiguo Zhuyi” 德國三大哲人歌德、黑格爾、費希特的愛國主義).
An Idealist Philosopher on History and Cultural Reform 623

Franco-Prussian War, which Hegel personally witnessed: Hegel complained about

the oppressive control of the French occupiers but still admired Napoleon for his
“worldly spirit on the horse” (Weltgeist auf dem Pferde). Nonetheless, He believed
that Hegel’s project of reviving the fallen Prussia could be seen from his theory.
Hegel not only stressed aesthetics and morals but also emphasized rationality and
liberty, as well as the study of science and the humanities, since these were all
fundamental to the national spirit (He 1989, 20).
Also covered in He’s essay was Fichte’s “Addresses to the German Nation”
(“Reden an die deutsche Nation”), a series of speeches the author delivered
publicly after the French army took Berlin. In He’s view, Fichte aimed amid such a
crisis at enlivening the spirit of the German nation and developing the German
culture (He 1989, 41). Fichte also praised the particular national identity of the
German people, since, in his view, “the German nation bore a capacity for
restoration in its ‘Germanness’” (He 1989, 42). In Fichte’s theory, the German
nation is marked by Geistesursprung-lichkeit (“spiritual originality,” translated
into Chinese by He as yuanqi 元气), representing the innate capacity for German
restoration (He 1989, 42); 11 this would, however, only be possible with the
freedom and self-consciousness of the people, which must be found in the
recovery of morals and religion. To revitalize “spiritual originality,” Fichte
emphasized the indispensability of education, including emotional education,
epistemological training, physical training, and education of dignity (He 1989,
43).
He’s essay on the patriotism of the philosophers reflects his thought regarding
the realization of nationalism with an eye to the nature and importance of culture:
even in wartime, nationalism could be encouraged and realized with prudence and
moderation. In contrast to this, it is noticeable that in the war with Japan, Chinese
nationalism was generally exuberant, as the whole nation was in crisis, and
therefore victory was the top priority for anyone with concern for the country.
While, for the Sprenglerists, power was primary in its importance―a call to arms
was seen as a necessary precondition for the renewal of Chinese culture―He saw
that culture could not be perpetuated by arms.

3.2 The Hegelian Spirit: He Lin on Culture

He Lin’s commentary on the patriotism of German philosophers amid national

crisis, particularly that of Hegel and Fichte, reflects his own views on the

                                                             
11
The term Geistesursprung-lichkeit seems not to appear in the original German text of Fichte’s
Addresses, but the term Ursprunglichkeit (originality) is often used. Therefore, He might have
referred to secondary literature for the term Geistesursprung-lichkeit. The seventh address
concerns this terminology and “Germanness” (die Deutschheit) (see Fichte (1846, 359–77).
624 Tung Tin Wong

necessity of prioritizing culture when the spiritual and individual enlightenment

of a country is at stake. I will now examine He’s cultural thought and the ways in
which he integrated Hegel into his own cultural theory.
He’s cultural thought and the solution he proposes for the revival of Chinese
culture are expressed in his essay “The Essence and Practicality of Culture”
(“Wenhua de Ti yu Yong” 文化的體與用), in which he rejects the paradigmatic
separation between essence (ti 体 ) and practicality (yong 用 ) in culture—i.e.
“Chinese Essence and Western Practicality” (Zhongti Xiyong 中體西用), which
was proposed by Zhang Zhidong 張之洞 (1837–1909), a renowned supporter of
reform in the late Qing dynasty. This theory supported introducing useful
scientific theories or technologies from the West, but held that China’s moral
conventions, cultural values, and political system must remain unsullied (Jing &
Elman 2014, 100). He considered this division to be crude and problematic, since
the differentiation between essence and practicality in culture could not be defined
once and for all, but only inconsistently. Instead, He opted to treat the relation
between essence and practicality as analogous to that between form and matter
in Aristotelian or Platonic thought—or, similarly, li 理 and qi 氣 in Zhu Xi’s
朱 熹 (1130–1200) work, insofar as, within these relations, both dualistic
components are indivisible (He 1947, 29–30).
In these reflections He turned, as well, to the notion of Dao, designating it as a
culture carrier (Kulturträger) as understood within the study of Western culture.
Here, He also made reference to Zhu Xi’s assertion that the presentation of Dao is
called culture (wen 文) (dao zhi xianzhe wei zhi wen 道之顯者謂之文). Thus, He
contended that these definitions together imply that Dao is the essence of culture
and culture is the practicality of Dao. However, Dao could also be presented into
nature, a dimension which allowed He to render more precisely the relationship
between Dao and culture by integrating the notion of spirit: “Dao is presented
through human spiritual activities and it would become culture,” and contrarily, “if
not through human spiritual activities, Dao is presented naturally, implicitly, and
unconsciously, and it would become nature” (He 1947, 31).
He further asserted that spirit is the agreement of mind and truth—or, stated
differently, that “spirit is mind inspired by truth.” Spirit can also be mirrored in life,
education, and customs; in other words, “spirit is the concretized (jutihua 具体化),
realized (shilihua 實力化), and socialized truth.” In this sense, Dao is only a
norm or a paradigm, and it is the spirit of the agent that produces culture in
accordance with Dao. The spirit of a person can be reflected in his words, deeds,
and intellectual performance; the spirit of a nation is manifested in its culture; and
most importantly, the whole absolute spirit is presented as worldly culture (He
1947, 32).
He stated that the above illustration served his intent to introduce a Hegelian
understanding of culture, believing the core idea of Hegel’s philosophy of culture
An Idealist Philosopher on History and Cultural Reform 625

can be explained as follows:

Culture (and nature) is the presentation of spirit, or put it this way, culture is a
substance of value (not a natural substance) presented by Dao through human
spiritual activities. In other words, and culture is not only either Dao or
heart-mind but also the harmonious agreement of both. Culture is a spirit with a
unity of consciousness and truth. (He 1947, 32)

To some extent, this version of spirit approximates the subjective spirit in Hegel’s
work, for it acts as a conscious agent which relates between the Dao and culture.
The structure of culture in his theory can be regarded as a triple system—a
Dao-spirit-culture system—which implies that the paradigmatic Dao is presented
as culture through spirit, which often mirrors Hegel’s pattern of thought in his
spiritual philosophy, which features subjective spirit, objective spirit, and absolute
spirit. However, although Dao corresponds with absolute spirit, He’s notions did
not always perfectly reflect those of Hegel, since, in He’s theory, Dao might not
represent the synthesis of spirit and culture.
Based on this understanding of Hegel’s cultural philosophy, He further asserted
three principles with which to understand Chinese culture and handle its relation
to Western cultures: (1) The essence and the practicality of culture cannot be
separated. Song Neo-Confucianism, which he took as exemplifying Chinese
culture, regarded li 理 as essence and accordingly constructed different practical
theories for nature, society, history, etc.; likewise, He asserted that, while modern
Western culture had a solid advantage in materials, its spiritual values also could
not be ignored. Both cultures had an indivisible unity of essence and practicality
and therefore the Western one should be understood and presented as existing
within this same unity. (2) The sequence of essence and practicality cannot be
reversed: the former is intrinsic and normative, whereas the latter is phenomenal
and material. Thus, Western religions and philosophies, as essential, would not
become practical after being introduced into China; likewise, the introduced
technology would not be essential. (3) The elements of culture are organically
consistent (youji tongyi 有機統一), and all elements, in their interrelatedness,
form a singular culture (He 1947, 33).
Based on the principles outlined above, He proposed three approaches to
cultural reform: (1) The introduction of foreign cultures should take essence and
practicality into consideration together, rather than as paradigmatically opposed;
(2) provided that the essence and practicality of a culture are equally important, the
defective principle of “Chinese Content, Western Practicality” should be
abandoned; and (3) since the spirit is the productive agent of culture, the spirit or
reason can be treated as essence, while cultures can be regarded as practicality.
Most importantly, He refused to give Chinese culture a proveleged position in
626 Tung Tin Wong

cultural communication, since he believed that equal status should be allocated to

a range of cultures, and that discrimination against any culture would finally be
unhelpful for the reform of Chinese culture (He 1947, 34–37). As He summarizes,
such a project of cultural reform should not be called Westernization (Xihua 西化),
but, rather, the assimilation of Western culture (hua Xi 化西 ), an natural and
fundamental assimilation enacted on the basis of a comprehensive cultural
understanding.
Though Hegel’s attitude toward Chinese culture cannot be seen as affirmative in
the Sprengleristic sense, He still provided a proposal for cultural restoration,
simply one that was Hegelian in nature. Hegel’s notion of spirit dominated the
train of He’s cultural thought, as the latter’s classification of Dao, spirit, and
culture can correspond to the ternary structure of Hegel’s spiritual philosophy,
though there are some differences between them. The most obvious example of
such a difference is that, while, the absolute spirit, subjective spirit, and objective
spirit follow the thesis-antithesis-synthesis pattern in Hegel’s spiritual philosophy,
such a pattern does not have real presence in He’s cultural thought. However, He’s
cultural insights were informed in large part by Hegel’s ideas, and thus presented
a clear contrast with the radical cultural reforms advocated by the Spenglerists,
proposing that culture must be renewed for its own sake instead of for any other
purpose.

3.3 Between Wang Fuzhi and Hegel: He Lin on Philosophy of History

In wartime, He’s investigation also extended to the philosophy of history. The

Spenglerists applied Spengler’s cultural morphology to their analysis of the
historical development of Chinese society, but He attempted to observe history
from a different perspective. A summary essay by He, “The Philosophy of
History of Wang Chuanshan” (“Wang Chuanshan de Lishi Zhexue” 王船山的歷
史哲學), illustrates his own insights into history via a comparison of Wang Fuzhi
王夫之 and Hegel, wherein he introduced two important factors of Hegel’s
historical philosophy—the cunning of reason (List der Vernunft) and
dialectics—into his own cultural theory. This essay is included in Culture and Life
(Wenhua yu Rensheng 文化與人生), a collection of He’s wartime writings; as
such, it can be regarded as reflective of his thought during the war.
In his article on Wang Fuzhi, He first returned to the tradition of Chinese
historical philosophy stemming from Sima Qian 司馬遷 (145–86 BCE) and
further developed by Sima Guang 司馬光 (1019–86). These historiographers did
not record the mere facts of history, but also drew regular patterns from within it,
and therefore had their own philosophies of history (He 1947, 115–16). He further
asserted that Wang had inherited traditional historical beliefs and furthered them in
a critical. As summarized by He, there are three main features of Wang’s
An Idealist Philosopher on History and Cultural Reform 627

philosophy of history: (1) Wang had his own philosophy for understanding history,
the main notions of which were heavenly law (tiandao 天道), benevolence (ren
仁), and the unity of essence and practice (tiyong heyi 體用合一); (2) He used
phenomenological methodology, so that “the essence can be seen from practice,
the laws from things, the whole from the parts, and the general from the
particulars,” which also means that “historical research has to investigate the
phenomena and deeds of the ancients, thereby comprehending the unseen minds
and laws”; and (3) Wang also “experienced” history with sympathetic
understanding (tongqing liaojie 同情瞭解) (He 1947, 116–17). In addition, He
believed that unities existed between law and use (daoqi 道器), mind and thing
(xinwu 心物), knowledge and action (zhixing 知行), and things and the “I”
(wuwo 物我) in Wang’s philosophy of history. He also asserted that the heavenly
law in Wang’s interpretation was in agreement with Hegel’s reason: The
heavenly law is logical (lizexing 理則性), moral (daodexing 道德性), natural
(ziranxing 自然性), immanent (neizaixing 内在性), and inevitable (biranxing
必然性); most importantly, he believed it undergoes dialectical development and is
in agreement with the Cunning of Reason in a Hegelian sense (He 1947, 120).
With regard to dialectical development in Wang’s philosophy of history, He
referred to volume twenty-eight of Wang’s On Reading Zizhi Tongjian (Du
Tongjian Lun 讀通鑒論):

Life and death, success and failure, are all in the tendency of law and
unpredictable and immeasurable. If the body has been rested on the earth, then
death or not is not accidental. The vibrancy of life is in the plan of inevitability.
A living one knows he himself may die, and the dying one also knows to live,
probably; the failing knows he himself may succeed, and the successful also
knows failure may come… (He 1947, 122)

On the basis of the paragraph above, He believed that Wang applied dialectics in
understanding history and spelled out the contradiction between hero’s individual
excellence and his essential futility facing the history (He 1947, 122). He Lin also
argued that Wang makes use of the notion of the Cunning of Reason, as seen in
his use of the example of Qin Shi Huang 秦始皇 (259–210 BCE), where Wang
argues that “Qin, with the ambition of ruling the whole country, abolished the
states and established the counties. However, Heaven (tian 天) uses the private
(lives) to achieve the public good. This is heavenly and unpredictable” (He 1947,
124). On the basis of this passage, He saw that heavenliness and unpredictability
in Wang’s philosophy of history are identical with the cunning and dialectics of
heavenly law; on the other hand, such a notion of heavenly law is Hegelian in
some respects.
He’s analysis makes visible the relationship between Wang’s heavenly law and
628 Tung Tin Wong

relevant concepts in Hegelian philosophy. Primarily, He observes that heavenly

law encompasses the whole of the ancient and the current, and that this such a
scope is also characteristic of Hegel’s holistic truth. As for Wang’s emphasis on
the historical importance of heroes and his compassion of the tragic heroism, He
concludes that in Wang’s philosophy of history the hero is nothing but an
instrument chosen by Heaven to accomplish a historical mission and deliver
reason, and that this, in its essence, mirrors Hegelian thought. In making this
argument, He cites Hegel’s philosophy of history:

The destination of heroes is to satisfy themselves and others. But they satisfy the
potential need of other people. The vocation of the heroes is to be the agent of
the World-Spirit—we shall find it to have been no happy one. They attain no
calm enjoyment; their whole life is labor and trouble; their whole nature is
nothing else but their master-passion. When their object is attained, they fall off
like empty hulls from the kernel. They die early like Alexander; they are
murdered like Caesar, or transported to St. Helena, like Napoleon. They all
become instruments of the World-Spirit.12

In addition, He points out the concurrence of Wang’s notion of heavenly law to

the role of God in Hegelian philosophy, as both heavenly law and the God of
Hegelian philosophy correspond with the minds of people and have personality.
He integrates Hegel’s philosophy of history into Wang’s thought on history,
highlighting the uncertainty of a heroic individual’s fate in history as well as his
destined sacrifice for a grander prospect. Therefore, He might hold the view that
the individual’s value should be realized within the context of a larger purpose or
with an eye towards a balance between the self and others. He further elaborates
his understanding of the self-realization of the individual with reference to Fichte.

3.4 Individual, Morals, and Freedom

The Spenglerists critiqued conventional morals for their depression of the will of
the individual and centered the notion of heroism as a means of overcoming this
deficit. Though He did not seek to undermine traditional culture, he still critiqued
moral conventions for a number of reasons; however, such critiques did not
advocate any radical approach aimed at training an individual to be a hero. Instead,
he gave a more nuanced option for individual realization.
He’s consideration of the issue of individual realization had two main guiding
                                                             
12
The text given here, slightly adjusted, combines the translations of He and Sibree (see Sibree
1914, 32). He also referred to Hegel’s Wissenschaft der Logik, c.f., He 1947, 123 and Hegel 1989,
365.
An Idealist Philosopher on History and Cultural Reform 629

premises. The first was that the hero would be destined to be powerless and
manipulated by the Cunning of Reason in the Hegelian sense, as explained in the
previous discussion of the philosophy of history. He also reiterated this opinion in
another essay, titled “On Sacrificing the Private for the Public” (“Lun Jiasi Jigong”
論假私濟公) (He 1947, 129). The second premise stemmed from his reflection on
the flaws in moral conventions. In “A New Criticism of the Five Cardinal
Relationships” (“Wulun Guannian de Xin Jiantao” 五倫觀念的新檢討), He argues
that the five cardinal relationships and relevant moral requirements of traditional
Chinese culture had been essential ethical values in maintaining interpersonal
relationships, with a constraint on the free will of individuals (Zhang 2013,
111–12).13 In this sense, He intended to rethink the relationship between moral
norms and free will. He had earlier discussed relevant matters in his address upon
taking the position of Associate Professor at Peking University in 1932, in which
he focused on the relationship between free will and morality; in this address, He
asserted that free will in a moral sense “immanently stems from the mind and the
characteristics, and it is obtained self-consciously, rationally, and spontaneously,
instead of being bestowed blindly or coincidentally from outside” (He 2011, 187).
The necessary premise for realizing free will is that one choose the available
“moral I” (daodewo 道德我) without the loss of the original mind (benxin 本心),
and “such a choice can realize the moral ideal and moral law” (He 2011, 189).
Therefore, he noticed the importance of morals in free will. He thus also
provided three approaches to free will: (1) the mind is capable to form a real self
and thereby obtains authentic knowledge; (2) insight is needed to perceive the
most minute and subtle things for the judgment of one’s self, rather than being
subject to the will of others; and (3) personality is to be fully developed to nourish
all-around self-understanding.
In the above discussion of free will, He regarded the individual as the subject of
morals; such subjectivization of the individual undermines exterior constraints
from conventional moral doctrines. However, he also rejected the Spengleristic
heroic subjectivization, as can be read from his response to Chen Quan. As He
wrote in “The Worship of Hero and Personality Education” (“Yingxiong Chongbai
yu Renge Jiaoyu” 英雄崇拜與人格教育), published in the Zhanguoce magazine,
although he held that heroism was vitally important for cultural reform, He did not
agree that there was, as Chen assumed, an opposition between intelligence and
heroism. Instead, he believed that “to worship heroes requires intelligence to some
extent, and it is the intelligent who are able to appreciate heroes; intelligence is not
                                                             
13
The five cardinal relationships exist between emperor and subject, father and son, elder and
younger brothers, husband and wife, and among friends. Each relationship also has particular
moral requirements: loyalty (zhong 忠), filial piety (xiao 孝), brotherly love (ti 悌), moderate
tolerance (ren 忍), and benevolence (shan 善). 
630 Tung Tin Wong

a barrier for understanding the hero, but a necessary condition. To worship the
hero does not mean to reject intelligence and rationality or to revert to a primitive
natural state.” Furthermore, in another article on the historical fatality of the hero,
He also defended individual’s right to pursue reasonable self-interest (He 1947,
134).
Therefore, He differed from the Spenglerists with regard to his understanding of
the self-realization of an individual, since he believed that the realization of an
individual and his/her life could be achieved in other ways (say, by cultivating
personality and rationality) than merely being completely sacrificed for the grand
mission. Such a vision was illustrated in “The Vocation of Man” (“Lun Ren de
Shiming” 論人的使命 ), an essay echoing Fichte’s similarly titled work Die
Bestimmung des Menschen. In this book, Fichte covered the human capacity for
skepticism, knowledge, and faith, and aimed to enable humanity to transcend
reason and reach a level beyond reason. However, He was realistic in
understanding the vocation of the human: he not only accepted Fichte’s
transcendental ideal of mankind and human nature, but he also shows more
concern for how human nature can be realized in practice. This attention to the
practical is manifested in his suggestions for young people confused about the
meaning of life and eager to overcome its perplexities, in which he pointed out
that the meaning of life relies on a balance between one’s self and the exterior
world:

Precisely, personal vocation is a permanent career or permanent work. Such a

permanent work, on the one hand, is considered, chosen, and shouldered by
oneself, and on the other hand, it is granted by the times, reminded of by
mentors and friends. In the effort of accomplishing the vocation and eternal
deeds, the nature of one’s self can be realized, and one can contribute to country
and society. (He 1947, 147)

The personal vocation thus implied the balance between individuality and
commitment to a greater community, without the necessity of being a hero for a
grand purpose.
From Hegel’s Cunning of Reason and a reflection on moral conventions, He’s
insight bridged the notions of the individual, free will, and morals rather than
creating a polar opposition between conventional morals and unconventional
heroism. Fichte was another source of inspiration for him in rethinking the role of
the individual within a community, since stable cultural development must be
compatible with the individual, and the spirit of the individual features the culture
of the era.
An Idealist Philosopher on History and Cultural Reform 631

3.5 He Lin Contra the Spenglerists

From the analysis above, a moderate form of cultural reform can be seen in He’s
thought. To some extent, he repudiated the Spengleristic project. Hegel and Fichte
were He’s the main sources for his construction of a new solution to cultural
reform. Even though the Zhanguoce scholars reflected on Chinese culture, He was
singular because, in his theory, Chinese culture was not to be reformed merely for
the case of winning the war, but also, and indeed primarily, for its own sake and
future. With regard to cultural issues, three major points mark the divergences
between He Lin and the others in the School.
The primary divergence concerned the question of whether the free will of the
individual should be dignified. While He displayed an affirmative response in his
discussion of Fichte, the Spenglerists held an ambiguous attitude. For Lin and Lei,
as well as for other Spenglerists, the notion of power as a nation outweighed any
issues of the individual. Lei mentioned modern citizens in his work, but but only
insofar as these citizens are part of the state’s power.
The second conflict between He and the Spenglerists concerned cultural reform.
The Spenglerists agreed on reviving the martial spirit of Chinese culture according
to the paradigm of the Warring States period, whereas He delved into the nature of
culture itself and the significance of the individual spirit in order to reform culture
on a moderate basis.
The third disparity can be seen in the attitudes of the scholars’ toward foreign
cultures: in particular, how Western cultural elements can be integrated into
existing Chinese culture. The Spenglerists did not resist foreign cultures, but their
introductions were purposeful because their final destination was merely the
modernization and victory of Chinese culture, whereas He intended to create a
balance between Western and Chinese cultures, without rendering either
dominant.

4 Conclusion

The turmoil and warfare of the late 1930s and the first half of the 1940s created a
huge crisis for the Chinese nation and culture and led scholars to reflect on a wide
range of issues. The Zhanguoce School gives a telling example of this rethinking
of Chinese culture and history: the Spenglerists were inspired by the cultural
morphology of Oswald Spengler in investigating the historical development of
Chinese society, while certain other Zhanguoce literary critics defended the
notions of power and heroism for a Nietzschean perspective. Meanwhile, He Lin
presented a more restrained, nuanced plan for cultural renewal by exploring the
characteristics of history and culture, as well as the free will of the individual, with
632 Tung Tin Wong

a scope drawn from Hegelian and Fichtean philosophies.

He united the essence and practicality of culture through Hegel’s conception of
spirit and asserted that the introduction of Western cultural elements must be
comprehensive and rational. He also integrated Hegel’s dialectics and the Cunning
of Reason into Wang Fuzhi’s historical theory by interpreting history as patterned
according to heavenly law and illustrated the tragic hero thereby refuting the
morphological theory and heroism of the Spenglerists. In such a context, He
echoed Fichte by stressing the free will and equilibrium between individual and
community. He thus overcame the inherent tension between culture and power in
the Spenlgeristic project and created an approach for cultural reform on the basis
of spirit and human nature. Though He discussed many philosophers, Hegel was
predominant in his thought on history and culture. These two topics were
elaborated with Hegelian notions of dialectics and spirit, with the Hegelian spirit
characterized by dialectics; moreover, He’s defense of the free will of the
individual was rooted in a criticism of heroism based on the Cunning of Reason.

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