CAMID v.

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

G.R. 161414, 17 January 2005

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS:

The factual antecedents derive from the promulgation of our ruling in Pelaez v.
Auditor General in 1965. As discussed, former President Diosdado Macapagal issued
several Executive Orders creating thirty-three (33) municipalities in Mindanao. Among
those municipalities was Andong in Lanao del Sur which was created by virtue of
Executive Order No. 107.

These executive orders were issued after legislative bills for the creation of
municipalities involved in that case had failed to pass Congress. President Diosdado
Macapagal justified the creation of these municipalities citing his powers under Section
68 of the Revised Administrative Code. Then Vice-President Emmanuel Pelaez filed a
special civil action for a writ of prohibition, alleging in main that the Executive Orders
were null and void, Section 68 having been repealed by Republic Act No. 2370, and
said orders constituting an undue delegation of legislative power.

After deliberation, the Court held that the challenge Executive Orders were null
and void and majority of five justices ruled that Section 68 of the Revised Administrative
Code did not meet the well-settled requirements for a valid delegation of legislative
power to the executive branch, the three justices opined that the nullity of the issuances
was the consequence of the enactment of the 1935 Constitution which reduced the
power of the Chief Executive over the local governments.

Petitioner Camid represents himself as a current resident of Andong, suing as a

private citizen and taxpayer whose locus standi is of public and paramount interest
especially to the people of the Municipality of Andong, Province of Lanao del Sur. He
alleges that although no person has been appointed, elected or qualified to serve any of
the elective local government positions in Andong, has metamorphosed into a full-blown
municipality with a complete set of officials appointed to handle essential services for
the municipality and its constituents. It has a high school, Bureau of Posts, a
Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) office, and 17 “barangay units”
with respective chairmen. Furthermore, its land area was recognized by the CENRO to
have been created through the voided EO 107 as well included in the as a municipality
by the Provincial Statistics Office of Marawi City. In Nov. 21, 2003, the DILG issued a
certification which enumerates 18 municipalities as “existing” municipalities” even
though its creation was voided in the same ruling that voided Andong’s creation as a
municipality.

Camid imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part of DILG in not classifying
Andong as a regular existing municipality and in not including said municipality in its
records and official database as an existing regular municipality.He also alleges that
said certification results in an unequal treatment to the detriment of Andong as similarly
situated municipalities were recognized by DILG. He insists on the continuing validity of
Executive Order No. 107. He argues that Pelaez has already been modified by
supervening events consisting of subsequent laws and jurisprudence. He particularly
cited the Decision in Municipality of San Narciso v. Hon. Mendez, wherein the Court
affirmed the unique status of the municipality of San Andres in Quezon as a “de facto
municipal corporation. Similar to Andong, the municipality of San Andres was created
by way of Executive Order precisely the manner in which the Court in Pelaez had
declared as unconstitutional. Furthermore, he alleges that Andong is covered by
Section 442(d) of the LGC of 1991 which states that “Existing municipal districts
organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their
respective sets of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity
of (the) Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities.”

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

The petition for Certiorari presents this Court with the prospect of our own
Brigadoon‒the municipality of Andong, Lanao del Sur‒which like its counterpart in
filmdom, is a town that is not supposed to exist yet is anyway insisted by some as
actually alive and thriving. Yet unlike in the movies, there is nothing mystical, ghostly, or
anything even remotely charming about the purported existence of Andong. The
creation of the putative municipality was declared void ab initio by this Court four
decades ago, but the present petition insists that in spite of this insurmountable obstacle
Andong thrives on, and, hence, its legal personality should be given judicial affirmation.
The court disagree.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not Andong is already a “de facto municipal corporation”.

2.
2. Whether a municipality whose creation by executive fiat was previously voided by this
Court may attain recognition in the absence of any curative or reimplementing statute.

RULING:

1. Whether or not Andong is already a “de facto municipal corporation”.

No. The Supreme Court held that where a municipality created as such by
executive order is later impliedly recognized and its acts are accorded legal validity,
its creation can no longer be questioned. In Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon v.
Mendez, Sr., the Court considered the following factors as having validated the
creation of the municipal corporation: (1) the fact that for nearly 30 years, the validity
of the creation of the municipality had never been challenged; (2) the fact that
following the ruling in Pelaez, no quo warranto suit was filed to question the validity
of the executive order creating such municipality; and () the fact that the municipality
was later classified as a fifth class municipality, organized as part of a Municipal
Circuit Court and considered part of a legislative district in the Constitution
apportioning the seats in the House of Representatives. Above all, it was held that
whatever doubt there might be as to the de jure character of the municipality must
be deemed to have been put to rest by the Local Government Code of 1991, Section
442 (d) of which provides that “municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential
issuances or executive orders and which have their respective sets of elective
officials holding office at the time of the effectively of this Code shall be henceforth
be considered as regular municipalities.”

The Supreme Court did not rule on this issue as Camid failed to make a
factual demonstration of the continuous exercise by the municipal corporation of its
corporate powers, as well as the acquiescence thereto by the other instrumentalities
of the state. Proper factual ascertainment is important in the determination if a
municipality is a de facto municipal corporation. It has been opined that municipal
corporations may exist by prescription where it is shown that the community has
claimed and exercised corporate functions, with the knowledge and acquiescence of
the legislature, and without interruption or objection for period long enough to afford
title by prescription. These municipal corporations have exercised their powers for a
long period without objection on the part of the government that although no charter
is in existence, it is presumed that they were duly incorporated in the first place and
that their charters had been lost.

2. Whether a municipality whose creation by executive fiat was previously

voided by this Court may attain recognition in the absence of any curative
or reimplementing statute.

No. The power to create political subdivisions is a function of the legislature. It

can legislate curative laws, which in essence are retrospective, and aimed at giving
"validity to acts done that would have been invalid under existing laws, as if existing
laws have been complied with," are validly accepted in this jurisdiction, subject to the
usual qualification against impairment of vested rights. Thus Pelaez and its offspring
cases ruled that the President has no power to create municipalities, yet limited its
nullificatory effects to the particular municipalities challenged in actual cases before
this Court. However, with the promulgation of the Local Government Code in 1991,
the legal cloud was lifted over the municipalities similarly created by executive order
but not judicially annulled. The de facto status of such municipalities as San Andres,
Alicia and Sinacaban was recognized by this Court, and Section 442(b) of the Local
Government Code deemed curative whatever legal defects to title these
municipalities had labored under.

Furthermore, the Municipality of Andong never existed as Executive Order

No. 107 establishing Andong was declared void ab ignition (from inception) by the
court in the case of Pelaez v. Auditor General. Moreover, the Pelaez case was never
reversed by the court bu was rather affirmed in many cases. Finally, no subsequent
legislation has been passed since 1965 creating a Municipality of Andong. Based on
these facts alone, there is hardly any reason to elaborate why Andon does not exist
as a duly constituted municipality.
 DOCTRINE:

1. Existence of Municipal Corporations by Prescription

Municipal corporations may exist by prescription where it is shown that the

community has claimed and exercised corporate functions, with the knowledge and
acquiescence of the legislature, and without interruption or objection
for period long enough to afford title by prescription.

2. Recognition of De Facto Municipal Corporations

The importance of proper factual ascertainment cannot be gainsaid, especially in

light of the legal principles governing the recognition of de facto municipal
corporations. It has been opined that municipal corporations may exist by
prescription where it is shown that the community has claimed and exercised
corporate functions, with the knowledge and acquiescence of the legislature, and
without interruption or objection for period long enough to afford title by
prescription. These municipal corporations have exercised their powers for a long
period without objection on the part of the government that although no charter is in
existence, it is presumed that they were duly incorporated in the first place and that
their charters had been lost. They are especially common in England, which, as well-
worth noting, has existed as a state for over a thousand years. The reason for the
development of that rule in England is understandable, since that country was
settled long before the Roman conquest by nomadic Celtic tribes, which could have
hardly been expected to obtain a municipal charter in the absence of a national legal
authority.

What is clearly essential is a factual demonstration of the continuous exercise by

the municipal corporation of its corporate powers, as well as the acquiescence
thereto by the other instrumentalities of the state.

3. Requisites for Creation of Municipality (Section. 442 d)

Section 442(d) of the LGC does not serve to affirm or reconstitute the judicially-
dissolved municipalities such as Andong, which had been previously created by
presidential issuances or executive orders. On the other hand, the municipalities
judicially-dissolved in cases such as Pelaez, San Joaquin, and Malabang, remain
inexistent, unless recreated through specific legislative enactments, as done with the
eighteen (18) municipalities certified by the DILG.

4. The power to create political subdivisions is a function of the legislature.

Congress did just that when it has incorporated Section 442(d) in the Code.
Curative laws, which in essence are retrospective, and aimed at giving "validity to
 acts done that would have been invalid under existing laws, as if existing laws
have been complied with," are validly accepted in this jurisdiction, subject to the
usual qualification against impairment of vested rights.

5. In Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon v. Mendez, Sr., this Court considered the
following factors as having validated the creation of a municipal
corporation, which, like the Municipality of Sinacaban, was created by executive
order of the President before the ruling in Pelaez v. Auditor General: (1) the fact
that for nearly 30 years the validity of the creation of the municipality had never
been challenged; (2) the fact that following the ruling in Pelaez no  quo
warranto suit was filed to question the validity of the executive order creating
such municipality; and (3) the fact that the municipality was later classified as a
fifth class municipality, organized as part of a municipal circuit court and
considered part of a legislative district in the Constitution apportioning the seats
in the House of Representatives. Above all, it was held that whatever doubt there
might be as to the de jure character of the municipality must be deemed to have
been put to rest by the Local Government Code of 1991 (R. A. No. 7160),
§442(d) of which provides that "municipal districts organized pursuant to
presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective sets
of elective officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of this Code shall
henceforth be considered as regular municipalities."