Midterm Cases/ Admin Law/ Digests

MMDA v. CONCERNED RESIDENTS OF MANILA BAY G.R. Nos. 171947-48 December 18, 2008
Mandamus

NOVEMBER 21, 2018

FACTS:

Respondents Concerned Residents of Manila Bay filed a complaint before the RTC in Imus, Cavite against
several government agencies, among them the petitioners, for the cleanup, rehabilitation, and
protection of the Manila Bay.

The complaint alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay had fallen way below the allowable
standards set by law, specifically PD.. 1152 or the Philippine Environment Code.

Respondents, as plaintiffs a quo, prayed that petitioners be ordered to clean the Manila Bay and submit
to the RTC a concerted concrete plan of action for the purpose.

The RTC Ordered Petitioners to Clean Up and Rehabilitate Manila Bay.

The DENR, DPWH, Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA), Philippine Coast Guard , PNP
Maritime Group, and five other executive departments and agencies filed directly with this Court a
petition for review under Rule 45.

Petitioners were one in arguing in the main that the pertinent provisions of the Environment Code
relate only to the cleaning of specific pollution incidents and do not cover cleaning in general. And apart
from raising concerns about the lack of funds appropriated for cleaning purposes, petitioners also
asserted that the cleaning of the Manila Bay is not a ministerial act which can be compelled by
mandamus.

The CA denied petitioners appeal and affirmed the Decision of the RTC in toto, stressing that the trial
courts decision did not require petitioners to do tasks outside of their usual basic functions under
existing laws.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioners can be compelled by mandamus to clean up and rehabilitate the Manila Bay.

RULING:

The Cleaning or Rehabilitation of Manila Bay Can be Compelled by Mandamus.

Generally, the writ of mandamus lies to require the execution of a ministerial duty. A ministerial duty is
one that requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor judgment. It connotes an act in which
nothing is left to the discretion of the person executing it. It is a simple, definite duty arising under
conditions admitted or proved to exist and imposed by law. Mandamus is available to compel action,
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when refused, on matters involving discretion, but not to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion
one way or the other.

First off, we wish to state that petitioners obligation to perform their duties as defined by law, on one
hand, and how they are to carry out such duties, on the other, are two different concepts. While the
implementation of the MMDAs mandated tasks may entail a decision-making process, the enforcement
of the law or the very act of doing what the law exacts to be done is ministerial in nature and may be
compelled by mandamus. We said so in Social Justice Society v. Atienza[11] in which the Court directed
the City of Manila to enforce, as a matter of ministerial duty, its Ordinance No. 8027 directing the three
big local oil players to cease and desist from operating their business in the so-called Pandacan
Terminals within six months from the effectivity of the ordinance. But to illustrate with respect to the
instant case, the MMDA’s duty to put up an adequate and appropriate sanitary landfill and solid waste
and liquid disposal as well as other alternative garbage disposal systems is ministerial, its duty being a
statutory imposition. The MMDA’s duty in this regard is spelled out in Sec. 3(c) of RA 7924 creating the
MMDA.

The MMDA’s duty in the area of solid waste disposal, as may be noted, is set forth not only in the
Environment Code (PD 1152) and RA 9003, but in its charter as well. This duty of putting up a proper
waste disposal system cannot be characterized as discretionary, for, as earlier stated, discretion
presupposes the power or right given by law to public functionaries to act officially according to their
judgment or conscience.

A discretionary duty is one that allows a person to exercise judgment and choose to perform or not to
perform. Any suggestion that the MMDA has the option whether or not to perform its solid waste
disposal-related duties ought to be dismissed for want of legal basis.

A perusal of other petitioners respective charters or like enabling statutes and pertinent laws would
yield this conclusion: these government agencies are enjoined, as a matter of statutory obligation, to
perform certain functions relating directly or indirectly to the cleanup, rehabilitation, protection, and
preservation of the Manila Bay. They are precluded from choosing not to perform these duties.

FERDINAND S. TOPACIO v. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE GREGORY SANTOS ONG

and THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, 541 SCRA 211 (2008)

Petitioner Ferdinand Topacio implored the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to

initiate post-haste a quo warranto proceeding against Gregory Santos Ong. He points
out that natural-born citizenship is also a qualification for appointment as member of
the Sandiganbayan and that Ong has failed to meet the citizenship requirement. Ong, on
the other hand, avers that the RTC already granted his petition and recognized him as a
natural-born citizen. The decision having become final, he caused the corresponding
annotation thereof in his Certificate of Birth. The OSG informed Topacio that it cannot
favorably act on request for the filing of a quo warranto petition until the RTC case shall
have been terminated with finality. Topacio assails this position of the OSG as being
tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
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ISSUE:

Whether or not the OSG committed grave abuse of discretion in deferring the filing of a
petition for quo warranto.

HELD:

The Court appreciates no abuse of discretion, much less, a grave one, on the part of the
OSG in deferring action on the filing of a quo warranto case until after the RTC case has
been terminated with finality. A decision is not deemed tainted with grave abuse of
discretion simply because the affected party disagrees with it. The Solicitor General is
the counsel of the government, its agencies and instrumentalities, and its officials or
agents. In the discharge of its task, the Solicitor General must see to it that the best
interest of the government is upheld within the limits set by law. In the exercise of
sound discretion, the Solicitor General may suspend or turn down the institution of an
action for quo warranto where there are just and valid reasons. Upon receipt of a case
certified to him, the Solicitor General exercises his discretion in the management of the
case. He may start the prosecution of the case by filing the appropriate action in court or
he may opt not to file the case at all. He may do everything within his legal authority but
always conformably with the national interest and the policy of the government on the
matter at hand. It appears that after studying the case, the Solicitor General saw
the folly of re-litigating the same issue of Ong‘s citizenship in the quo warranto case
simultaneously with the RTC case, not to mention the consequent risk of forum-
shopping. In any event, the OSG did not totally write finis to the issue as it merely
advised petitioner to await the outcome of the RTC case.

Office of the Ombudsman, Petitioner vs Ramon Galicia, Respondent. G.R. No. 167711, October 10,
2008
Facts:
Respondent Galicia was a former public school teacher. Based on the academic records which
were part of his 201 file, he graduated from FEU with a degree in civil engineering but failed to pass the
board examinations and has earned 18 units in education, evidenced by a copy of a Transcript of
Records from the Caloocan City Polytechnic College. Likewise, he passed the Teachers Professional
Board Examination (TPBE) given on November 22, 1987.
On December 2001, Reynaldo V. Yamsuan, then Principal of the MBASHS, reviewed the 201
files of his teaching staff and noticed that Galicia’s TOR was not an original copy and required  Galicia and
other teachers with similar records, to secure authenticated copies of their TOR. All of the teachers
complied except Galicia. Yamsuan verified with the school the authenticity of Galicia’s TOR and was
informed that the said school had no record of the said TOR, and more importantly, that they had no
records that Galicia took up 18 units of education in SY 1985-1986. 
Acting on his findings, Yamsuan lodged an affidavit-complaint for falsification, dishonesty, and
grave misconduct against Galicia before the Ombudsman.
  In his Counter-Affidavit, Galicia stated that the complaint was malicious and motivated by
revenge. Galicia stressed that the TOR he submitted was authentic, as shown by the signature of then
College Registrar Rolando Labrador. He argued that the certification from the present college registrar
that CCPC had no record of his TOR did not prove that the document was spurious. Rather, it only proved
that CCPC’s filing system of scholastic records was disorganized. Moreover, Galicia argued that the
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TPBE was a highly specialized type of exam that could only be passed if the examinee acquired
academic units in education. If he did not take up the said 18 units in education, then he could not have
possibly passed the TPBE.
During the preliminary conference, Galicia presented for comparison the original of the TOR and
Certificate of Grades (COG), as well as the original copies of the other documents in his 201
file. A subpoena duces tecum was subsequently served upon Prof. Marilyn T. De Jesus, Registrar of
CCPC, for the purpose of certifying the authenticity of Galicia’s school records. De Jesus declined to
certify the documents because no copies were on file in the school. 
Subsequently, the Ombudsman found Galicia guilty of Dishonesty for which the penalty of
Dismissal From the Service, Forfeiture of Leave Credits and Retirement Benefits and Temporary
Disqualification for Re-employment in the Government Service for a period of One (1) Year was imposed. 
Galicia filed a motion for reconsideration and raised the issue of jurisdiction for the first time. He
argued that it is not the Ombudsman, but the Department of Education, through the School
Superintendent, which has jurisdiction over administrative cases against public school teachers, as
mandated by RA 4670, (Magna Carta for Public School Teachers).
  Galicia further challenged the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman by invoking Section 20 of R.A. No.
6770 or the Ombudsman Act which enumerates the instances when the Ombudsman may not conduct an
administrative investigation:
1.        Complainant has an adequate remedy in another judicial or quasi-judicial body;
2.        The complaint pertains to a matter outside the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman;
3.        The complaint is trivial, frivolous, vexatious or made in bad faith;
4.        Complainant has no sufficient personal interest in the subject matter of the
grievance; or
5.        The complaint was filed after one year from the occurrence of the act or omission
complained of.

According to Galicia, all of the above conditions were present in the case filed against him.  An
adequate remedy existed in the Office of the Secretary of Education; the matter was outside the
jurisdiction of the Ombudsman; the complaint was made in bad faith; and complainant Yamsuan had no
sufficient personal interest in the matter.
Lastly, Galicia claimed that the Ombudsman lacked jurisdiction since the complaint was filed only
in 2002, thirteen (13) years from the time he allegedly committed the dishonest act in 1989. According to
him, this violated Section 20(5) of R.A. No. 6770, which mandated that all complaints must be filed within
one year from the occurrence of the act charged.
The Ombudsman denied Galicia’s motion for reconsideration. It declared that the Ombudsman’s
disciplining authority extended the School Superintendent over administrative cases against public school
teachers. Galicia elevated the case to the CA. 
On January 20, 2005, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the Ombudsman holding that
jurisdiction over public school teachers belonged to the School Superintendent as mandated by R.A. No.
4670.
Issue:
WON the CA erred in nullifying the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman on alleged
jurisdictional infirmity? 
Ruling:
Section 12 of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution states that the “Ombudsman and his Deputies
shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees of the
Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations, xxx”. Under Section 13, Article XI, the Ombudsman is empowered to conduct
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investigations on its own or upon complaint by any person when such act appears to be

illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient. He is also given broad powers to take the appropriate disciplinary
actions against erring public officials and employees.
And Section 15 of the Ombudsman Act grants the ombudsman the power to “Investigate and
prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or
employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or
inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of
this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the
investigation of such cases.” While Section 19 of the Act enumerates the types of acts covered by the
authority granted to the Ombudsman. In the exercise of its duties, the Ombudsman is given full
administrative disciplinary authority. His power is not limited merely to receiving, processing complaints,
or recommending penalties. He is to conduct investigations, hold hearings, summon witnesses and
require production of evidence and place respondents under preventive suspension. This includes the
power to impose the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine, or censure of a public officer or
employee.
A review of the Ombudsman Act and the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers reveals an
apparent overlapping of jurisdiction over administrative cases against public school teachers.
Section 9 of the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers grants jurisdiction over erring public
school teachers to an Investigating Committee headed by the Division School Superintendent which
reads: “SEC. 9. Administrative Charges. Administrative charges against a teacher shall be heard
initially by a committee composed of the corresponding School Superintendent of the Division or
a duly authorized representative x x x”.
Galicia argues that jurisdiction exclusively belongs to the investigating committee on the main
thesis that the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers is a special law which should take precedence
over the Ombudsman Act, a general law. The Ombudsman maintains that jurisdiction among the two
bodies is concurrent since there is no express repeal in either of the laws that would oust the
Ombudsman from its authority over public school teachers.
By virtue of the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, original jurisdiction belongs to
the school superintendent. The intention of the law, which is to impose a separate standard and
procedural requirement for administrative cases involving public school teachers, must be given
consideration. Hence, the Ombudsman must yield to this committee of the Division School
Superintendent. Even in the earlier case of Alcala v. Villar, the Court held that:
Republic Act No. 6770, the Ombudsman Act of 1989, provides that the
Ombudsman shall have disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of
the Government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including members
of the Cabinet, local government, government-owned or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries except over officials who may be removed by impeachment or over
Members of Congress, and the Judiciary. However, in Fabella v. Court of Appeals, it was
held that R.A. No. 4670, the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, specifically
covers and governs administrative proceedings involving public school teachers. x
x x (Emphasis supplied)
Be that as it may, We hold here that the Ombudsman’s exercise of jurisdiction was proper.
  The CA was in error in relying on Alcala, without taking into consideration the cases full
import. In Alcala, the Court, while recognizing the jurisdiction of the School Superintendent, nonetheless
upheld the decision of the Ombudsman on the rationale that the parties were afforded their right to due
process during the investigation proceedings. Respondent in the Alcala case was given sufficient
opportunity to be heard and submit his defenses to the charges made against him. Thus, he is estopped
from questioning the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman after an adverse decision was promulgated.
In the same manner, the recent Estandarte case recognized similar circumstances cited in Emin
v. De Leon. In De Leon, it was found that the parties were afforded their right to due process when both
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fully participated in the proceedings before the Civil Service Commission (CSC). The Court ruled that
while jurisdiction lies with the School Superintendent, respondent is estopped from attacking the
proceedings before the CSC.
In the present case, records show that Galicia was given the right to due process in the
investigation of the charges against him. He participated in the proceedings by making known his
defenses in the pleadings that he submitted. It was only when a decision adverse to him was rendered did
he question the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman.
Under the principles of estoppel and laches, We rule that it is now too late for  Galicia to assail the
administrative investigation conducted and the decision rendered against him.

Azarcon v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 116033 February 26, 1997
Panganiban, J.

FACTS:
Alfredo Azarcon owned and operated a hauling business. Occasionally, he engaged
the services of sub-contractors like Jaime Ancla whose trucks were left at the former’s
premises A Warrant of Distraint of Personal Property was issued by the Main Office of the BIR
addressed to the Regional Director or his authorized representative of Revenue Region 10,
Butuan City commanding the latter to distraint the goods, chattels or effects and other
personal property of Ancla, a sub-contractor of accused Azarcon and, a delinquent taxpayer.
The Warrant of Garnishment was issued to Azarcon ordering him to transfer, surrender,
transmit and/or remit to BIR the property in his possession owned by taxpayer Ancla.
Azarcon, in signing the “Receipt for Goods, Articles, and Things Seized Under Authority of
the National Internal Revenue,” assumed the undertakings specified in the receipt.
Subsequently, however, Ancla took out the distrained truck from Azarcon’s custody. For this
reason, Azarcon was charged before the Sandiganbayan with the crime of malversation of
public funds or property under Article 217 in relation to Article 222 of the Revised Penal
Code. Can Azarcon be considered a public officer by reason of his being designated by the
BIR as a depositary of distrained property?

HELD:
Article 223 of the RPC defines a public officer as “any person who, by direct
provision of the law, popular election, or appointment by competent authority,
shall take part in the performance of public functions in the Government of the Philippine
Islands, or shall perform in said Government or in any of its branches public duties as an
employee, agent, or subordinate official, of any rank or classes”. Azarcon obviously may not
be deemed authorized by popular election. Neither can his designation by the BIR as a
custodian of distrained property qualifies as appointment by direct provision of law, or by
competent authority. While it is true that Sec. 206 of the NIRC, as pointed out by the
prosecution, authorizes the BIR to effect a constructive distraint by requiring “any person” to
preserve a distrained property there is no provision in the NIRC constituting such person a
public officer by reason of such requirement. The BIR’s power authorizing a private
individual to act as a depositary cannot be stretched to include the power to appoint him as
a public officer. The charge against Azarcon should forthwith be dismissed.
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LAUREL vs. HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO 

G.R. No. 145368. July 1, 2002

FACTS: Petitioner Salvador H. Laurel moves for a reconsideration of this Court’s decision declaring him,
as Chair of the National Centennial Commission (NCC), a public officer. Petitioner also prays that the
case be referred to the Court En Banc. 

ISSUE: Whether or not Laurel is a public officer as Chair of the NCC 

RULING: The issue in this case is whether petitioner, as Chair of the NCC, is a public officer under the
jurisdiction of the Ombudsman. Assuming, as petitioner proposes, that the designation of other members
to the NCC runs counter to the Constitution, it does not make petitioner, as NCC Chair, less a public
officer. Such “serious constitutional repercussions” do not reduce the force of the rationale behind this
Court’s decision. 

Second, petitioner invokes estoppel. He claims that the official acts of the President, the Senate
President, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and the Supreme Court, in designating Cabinet
members, Senators, Congressmen and Justices to the NCC, led him to believe that the NCC is not a
public office. 

The contention has no merit. In estoppel, the party representing material facts must have the intention
that the other party would act upon the representation. It is preposterous to suppose that the President,
the Senate President, the Speaker and the Supreme Court, by the designation of such officials to the
NCC, intended to mislead petitioner just so he would accept the position of NCC Chair. Estoppel must be
unequivocal and intentional. Moreover, petitioner himself admits that the principle of estoppel does not
operate against the Government in the exercise of its sovereign powers. 

Third, as ground for the referral of the case to the Court En Banc, petitioner submits that our decision in
this case modified or reversed doctrines rendered by this Court, which can only be done by the Court En
Banc.It is argued that by designating three of its then incumbent members to the NCC, the Court took the
position that the NCC was not a public office. The argument is a bit of a stretch. Section 4 (3), Article VIII
of the Constitution provides that “no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a decision
rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc.” In
designating three of its incumbent members to the NCC, the Court did not render a “decision,” in the
context of said constitutional provision, which contemplates an actual case. Much less did the Court, by
such designation, articulate any “doctrine or principle of law.” Invoking the same provision, petitioner
asserts that the decision in this case reversed or modified Macalino vs. Sandiganbayan, holding that the
Assistant Manager of the Treasury Division and the Head of the Loans Administration & Insurance
Section of the Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC) is not a public officer under Republic
Act No. 3019. This contention also has no merit. The rationale for the ruling in Macalino is that “the PNCC
has no original charter as it was incorporated under the general law on corporations.” However, as we
pointed out in our decision, a conclusion that EXPOCORP is a government-owned or controlled
corporation would not alter the outcome of this case because petitioner’s position and functions as Chief
Executive Officer of EXPOCORP are by virtue of his being Chairman of the NCC. The other issues raised
by petitioner are mere reiterations of his earlier arguments. The Court, however, remains unswayed
thereby.

G.R. No. 162059, January 22, 2008

HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA, Petitioner,
vs
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SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondents.
Facts:
Hannah Serana was appointed by former President Estrada as a student
regent of UP Cebu, to serve a one-year term. President Estrada gave
P15,000,000.00 to the Office of the Student Regent Foundation, Inc as
financial assistance for the proposed renovation. The renovation of Vinzons
Hall Annex failed to materialize. The Ombudsman filed estafa case against
her before the Sandiganbayan. She moved to quash the information. She
claimed that the Sandiganbayan does not have any jurisdiction over the
offense charged or over her person, in her capacity as UP student regent
because the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over estafa; the petitioner is
not a public officer with Salary Grade 27; the offense charged was not
committed in relation to her office; and the funds in question personally came
from President Estrada, not from the government. As to jurisdiction over her
person, she contends that as a UP student regent, she is not a public officer
who held the position in an ex officio capacity.
The Sandiganbayan denied her motion for lack of merit.
Issue:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over Serana’s case.
Held:
No, Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over this case. In Geduspan v. People,
the SC held that while the first part of Sec. 4(A) covers only officials with
Salary grade 27 and higher but who are by express provisions of law placed
under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as she is placed there by express
provisions of law. Sec. 4(A)(1)(g) of PD No. 1606 explicitly vested the
Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over Presidents, directors and trustees, or
manager of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities,
or educational foundations. Petitioner falls under this category. As the
Sandiganbayan pointed out, the Board of Regents performs functions similar
to those of a board of trustee of a non-stock corporation. By express mandate
of law, petitioner is, indeed, a public officer as contemplated by PD No. 1606.
Thus, her position as a board of regent (UP student regent) is among those
enumerated and the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over her.

CASE DIGEST: DENNIS A.B. FUNA, Petitioner, v . ACTING

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE ALBERTO C. AGRA, IN HIS OFFICIAL
CONCURRENT CAPACITIES AS ACTING SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND AS ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL,
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EXECUTIVE SECRETARY LEANDRO R. MENDOZA, OFFICE OF THE

PRESIDENT, Respondents. (G.R. No. 191644; February 19, 2013).

FACTS: The petitioner alleges that on March 1, 2010, President Gloria M.

Macapagal-Arroyo appointed Agra as the Acting Secretary of Justice following
the resignation of Secretary Agnes VST Devanadera in order to vie for a
congressional seat in Quezon Province; that on March 5, 2010, President Arroyo
designated Agra as the Acting Solicitor General in a concurrent capacity;that on
April 7, 2010, the petitioner, in his capacity as a taxpayer, a concerned citizen and
a lawyer, commenced this suit to challenge the constitutionality of Agra
concurrent appointments or designations, claiming it to be prohibited under
Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution; that during the pendency of the
suit, President Benigno S. Aquino III appointed Atty. Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz as
the Solicitor General; and that Cadiz assumed as the Solicitor General and
commenced his duties as such on August 5, 2010.

Agra renders a different version of the antecedents. He represents that on

January 12, 2010, he was then the Government Corporate Counsel when
President Arroyo designated him as the Acting Solicitor General in place of
Solicitor General Devanadera who had been appointed as the Secretary of
Justice;that on March 5, 2010, President Arroyo designated him also as the
Acting Secretary of Justice vice Secretary Devanadera who had meanwhile
tendered her resignation in order to run for Congress representing a district in
Quezon Province in the May 2010 elections; that he then relinquished his
position as the Government Corporate Counsel; and that pending the
appointment of his successor, Agra continued to perform his duties as the Acting
Solicitor General.

Notwithstanding the conflict in the versions of the parties, the fact that Agra has
admitted to holding the two offices concurrently in acting capacities is settled,
which is sufficient for purposes of resolving the constitutional question that
petitioner raises herein.

The appointments being hereby challenged were in acting or temporary

capacities. Still, the petitioner submits that the prohibition under Section 13,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution does not distinguish between an appointment
or designation of a Member of the Cabinet in an acting or temporary capacity, on
the one hand, and one in a permanent capacity, on the other hand; and that
Acting Secretaries, being nonetheless Members of the Cabinet, are not exempt
from the constitutional ban. He emphasizes that the position of the Solicitor
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General is not an ex officio position in relation to the position of the Secretary of

Justice, considering that the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) is an
independent and autonomous office attached to the Department of Justice
(DOJ). He insists that the fact that Agra was extended an appointment as the
Acting Solicitor General shows that he did not occupy that office in an ex officio
capacity because an ex officio position does not require any further warrant or
appointment.

Respondents contend, in contrast, that Agra concurrent designations as the

Acting Secretary of Justice and Acting Solicitor General were only in a temporary
capacity, the only effect of which was to confer additional duties to him. Thus, as
the Acting Solicitor General and Acting Secretary of Justice, Agra was not
"holding" both offices in the strict constitutional sense. They argue that an
appointment, to be covered by the constitutional prohibition, must be regular
and permanent, instead of a mere designation.

Respondents further contend that, even on the assumption that Agra concurrent
designation constituted "holding of multiple offices," his continued service as the
Acting Solicitor General was akin to a hold-over; that upon Agra designation as
the Acting Secretary of Justice, his term as the Acting Solicitor General expired in
view of the constitutional prohibition against holding of multiple offices by the
Members of the Cabinet; that under the principle of hold-over, Agra continued
his service as the Acting Solicitor General "until his successor is elected and
qualified" to "prevent a hiatus in the government pending the time when a
successor may be chosen and inducted into office;" and that during his continued
service as the Acting Solicitor General, he did not receive any salaries and
emoluments from the OSG after becoming the Acting Secretary of Justice on
March 5, 2010.

ISSUE: Did the designation of Agra as the Acting Secretary of Justice,

concurrently with his position of Acting Solicitor General, violate the
constitutional prohibition against dual or multiple offices?

HELD: The evident purpose of the framers of the 1987 Constitution is to impose

a stricter prohibition on the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet,
their deputies and assistants with respect to holding multiple offices or
employment in the government during their tenure, the exception to this
prohibition must be read with equal severity. On its face, the language of Section
13, Article VII is prohibitory so that it must be understood as intended to be a
positive and unequivocal negation of the privilege of holding multiple
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government offices or employment. Verily, wherever the language used in the

constitution is prohibitory, it is to be understood as intended to be a positive and
unequivocal negation. The phrase "unless otherwise provided in this
Constitution" must be given a literal interpretation to refer only to those
particular instances cited in the Constitution itself, to wit: the Vice-
President being appointed as a member of the Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2),
Article VII; or acting as President in those instances provided under Section 7,
pars. (2)and (3), Article VII; and, the Secretary of Justice being ex-officio
member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII.
Being designated as the Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently with his
position of Acting Solicitor General, therefore, Agra was undoubtedly
covered by Section 13, Article VII, supra, whose text and spirit were too clear to
be differently read. Hence, Agra could not validly hold any other office or
employment during his tenure as the Acting Solicitor General, because the
Constitution has not otherwise so provided.

It was of no moment that Agra designation was in an acting or

temporary capacity. The text of Section 13,supra, plainly indicates that the
intent of the Framers of the Constitution was to impose a stricter prohibition on
the President and the Members of his Cabinet in so far as holding other offices or
employments in the Government or in government-owned or government
controlled-corporations was concerned. In this regard,to hold an office means to
possess or to occupy the office, or to be in possession and administration of the
office, which implies nothing less than the actual discharge of the functions and
duties of the office. Indeed, in the language of Section 13 itself, supra, the
Constitution makes no reference to the nature of the appointment or designation.
The prohibition against dual or multiple offices being held by one official must be
construed as to apply to all appointments or designations, whether permanent or
temporary, for it is without question that the avowed objective of Section 13,
supra, is to prevent the concentration of powers in the Executive Department
officials. To construe differently is to "open the veritable floodgates of
circumvention of an important constitutional disqualification of officials in the
Executive Department and of limitations on the President power of appointment
in the guise of temporary designations of Cabinet Members, undersecretaries and
assistant secretaries as officers-in-charge of government agencies,
instrumentalities, or government-owned or controlled corporations."
According to Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Elma, the only two exceptions against
the holding of multiple offices are: (1) those provided for under the
Constitution, such as Section 3, Article VII, authorizing the Vice President to
Midterm Cases/ Admin Law/ Digests

become a member of the Cabinet; and (2) posts occupied by Executive officials
specified in Section 13, Article VII without additional compensation in
ex officio capacities as provided by law and as required by the primary
functions of the officials offices. In this regard, the decision in Public Interest
Center, Inc. v. Elma adverted to the resolution issued on August 1, 1991 in Civil
Liberties Union v. The Executive Secretary, whereby the Court held that the
phrase "the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants" found in
Section 13, supra, referred only to the heads of the various executive
departments, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries, and did not extend
to other public officials given the rank of Secretary, Undersecretary or Assistant
Secretary.

It is equally remarkable, therefore, that Agra designation as the Acting Secretary

of Justice was not in an ex officio capacity, by which he would have been validly
authorized to concurrently hold the two positions due to the holding of one office
being the consequence of holding the other. Being included in the stricter
prohibition embodied in Section 13, supra, Agra cannot liberally apply in his
favor the broad exceptions provided in Section 7, paragraph 2, Article IX-B of the
Constitution to justify his designation as Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently
with his designation as Acting Solicitor General, or vice versa.

To underscore the obvious, it is not sufficient for Agra to show that his holding of
the other office was "allowed by law or the primary functions of his position." To
claim the exemption of his concurrent designations from the coverage of the
stricter prohibition under Section 13, supra, he needed to establish herein that his
concurrent designation was expressly allowed by the Constitution. But, alas, he
did not do so.

The magnitude of the scope of work of the Solicitor General, if added to the
equally demanding tasks of the Secretary of Justice, is obviously too much for any
one official to bear. Apart from the sure peril of political pressure, the
concurrent holding of the two positions, even if they are not entirely
incompatible, may affect sound government operations and the proper
performance of duties. GRANTED.
Laurel v. CSC

October 28, 1991

G.R. No. 71562

(The Law on Public Officers, Civil Service Laws, Election Laws)

Midterm Cases/ Admin Law/ Digests

Petitioner: Laurel V (provincial governor of Batangas)

Respondent: CSC; Sangalang

Ponente: Davide

FACTS:

 Laurel V (governor of Batangas) did the following:

1. Appointed his brother Benjamin as “Senior Executive Assistant in the Office of the Governor” (non-
career service position which belongs to the personal and confidential staff of an elective official).
2. Designated his brother as “Acting Provincial Administrator”
3. Promoted his brother to “Civil Security Officer” (CSC classified as primarily confidential)
 Sangalang wrote to CSC:
1. Provincial Admin is a career position.
2. Appointment violates CSC
 Defense of Laurel:
1. No violation of nepotism rule on Senior Exec Assistant and Civil Service Officer since both are
confidential.
2. Re: position of Provincial Admin, no violation also since it was a mere designation, not appointment.
 CSC: The designation of Benjamin as “Acting Provincial Admin” is nepotic.

ISSUE:

(1) Is the position of Provincial Administrator primarily confidential? NO!

(2) Does the rule on nepotism apply to designation? YES!

(3) May a private citizen who does not claim any better right to a position file a verified complaint with the Civil
Service Commission to denounce a violation by an appointing authority of the Civil Service Law and rules? YES!

RATIO:

 (Note this case said that if a position is primarily confidential, Sec 49 of PD 807 on Nepotic appointments does
not apply).

(1) Provincial Admin is NOT PRIMARILY CONFIDENTIAL.

 In his letter to CSC, he said that the position is not primarily confidential since it belongs to career service (note:
seems like primarily confidential is automatically non-career).
 Even assuming there is no estoppel, the position of provincial admin is CAREER SERVICE.
 QUALIFICATIONS:
1. Bachelors degree in Law or Public/Business admin
2. 6 yeas of responsible experience in planning, of government operations.
3. Eligibility exam RA 1080 (BAR)/Personnel Management Officer/Career Service (Professional)/First
Grade/Supervisor).
 DEFINITION: responsible for the overall coordination of the activities of the various national and local
agencies in the province; and general planning, direction and control of the personnel functions and the
administrative services of the Governor's Office.
Midterm Cases/ Admin Law/ Digests

 It is an OPEN CAREER POSITION for appointment to it requires prior qualification in an appropriate

examination.
 It is SECOND LEVEL (shall include professional, technical, and scientific positions which involve
professional, technical, or scientific work in a nonsupervisory or supervisory capacity requiring at least
four years of college work up to Division Chief level)
 Not being primarily confidential, appointment thereto must, inter alia, be subject to the rule on nepotism.
 Also, Laurel cannot designate his brother as Acting Provincial Admin (a career position) since at that time,
Benjamin was “Senior Exec Ass” and “Civil Security Officer” both primarily confidential positions in non-career
service. Section 24(f) of R.A. No. 2260 provides that no person appointed to a position in the non competitive
service (now noncareer) shall perform the duties properly belonging to any position in the competitive service
(now career service).

(2)

 His specious and tenuous distinction between appointment and designation is nothing more than either a ploy
ingeniously conceived to circumvent the rigid rule on nepotism or a lastditch maneuver to cushion the impact
of its violation. The rule admits of no distinction between appointment and designation. Designation is also
defined as "an appointment or assignment to a particular office"; and "to designate" means "to indicate, select,
appoint or set apart for a purpose or duty.
 Section 49 of P.D. No. 807 does not suggest that designation should be differentiated from appointment.
Reading this section with Section 25 of said decree, career service positions may be filled up only by
appointment, either permanent or temporary; hence a designation of a person to fill it up because it is vacant,
is necessarily included in the term appointment, for it precisely accomplishes the same purpose. Moreover, if a
designation is not to be deemed included in the term appointment under Section 49 of P.D. No. 807, then the
prohibition on nepotism would be meaningless and toothless. Any appointing authority may circumvent it by
merely designating, and not appointing, a relative within the prohibited degree to a vacant position in the
career service

(3)

The lettercomplaint of Sangalang was validly given due course by public respondent. Undoubtedly, as shown
above, there was a violation of law committed by petitioner in designating his brother as Acting Provincial
Administrator. Any citizen of the Philippines may bring that matter to the attention of the Civil Service Commission
for appropriate action conformably with its role as the central personnel agency to set standards and to enforce
the laws and rules governing the selection, utilization, training and discipline of civil servants, with the power and
function to administer and enforce the Constitutional and statutory provisions on the merit system. Moreover,
Section 37 of the decree expressly allows a private citizen to directly file with the Civil Service Commission a
complaint against a government official or employee, in which case it may hear and decide the case or may
deputize any department or agency or official or group of officials to conduct an investigation. The results of the
investigation shall be submitted to the Commission with recommendation as to the penalty to be imposed or other
action to be taken. This provision gives teeth to the Constitutional exhortation that a public office is a public trust
and public officers and employees must at all times be, inter alia, accountable to the people. An ordinary citizen
who brings to the attention of the appropriate office any act or conduct of a government official or employee
which betrays the public interest deserves nothing less than the praises, support and encouragement of society.
The vigilance of the citizenry is vital in a democracy.

GLORIA V. COURT OF APPEALS 

Gr 131012
Midterm Cases/ Admin Law/ Digests

April 12, 1999

FACTS

Abad, Bandigas, Somebang and Margallo, private respondents, are public

school teachers. Some time in September and October 1990, during the teacher’s strikes,
they did not report for work. For this reason they were administratively charged with 1)
grave misconduct; 2) gross violation of Civil Service Rules; 3) gross neglect of duty; 4)
refusal to perform official duty; 5) gross insubordination; 6) conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of service and; 7) AWOL. They were placed under preventive suspension.
Investigation ended before the lapse of the 90 day period. Margallo was dismissed from
the service. The three others were suspended for 6 months. On appeal to the CA, the
court mitigated the punishment to reprimand only. Hence their reinstatement. Now the
reinstated teachers are asking for back wages during the period of their suspension and
pending appeal (before the CA exonerated them).

ISSUE

Whether the teachers are entitled to backwages for the period pending their appeal if
they are subsequently exonerated.

HELD

YES, they are entitled to full pay pending their appeal. To justify the award of back
wages, the respondent must be exonerated from the charges and his suspension be
unjust. Preventive suspension pending appeal is actually punitive, and it is actually
considered illegal if the respondent is exonerated and the administrative decision
finding him guilty is reversed. Hence he should be reinstated with full pay for the period
of the suspension. Section 47 (4) of the Civil Service Decree states that the respondent
“shall be considered as under preventive suspension during the pendency of the
appeal in the event he wins.” On the other hand if his conviction is affirmed the period
of his suspension becomes part of the final penalty of suspension or dismissal. In the
case at bar the respondents won in their appeal, therefore the period of suspension
pending their appeal would be considered as part of the preventive suspension, entitling
them to full pay because they were eventually exonerated and their suspension was
unjustified.
They are still entitled to back salaries even if they were still reprimanded.

OMBUDSMAN Carpio-Morales v. CA
and Jejomar Binay G.R. Nos. 217126-27,
November 10, 2015 Doctrine of
Condonation Abandoned
Midterm Cases/ Admin Law/ Digests

APRIL 1, 2019

FACTS:

A complaint/affidavit was filed before the Office of the Ombudsman against Binay, Jr. and other
public officers and employees of the City Government of Makati (Binay, Jr., et al), accusing
them of Plunder and violation of RA 3019, otherwise known as “The Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act,” in connection with the five phases of the procurement and construction of the
Makati City Hall Parking Building.

Before Binay, Jr.,  et al.’s filing of their counter-affidavits, the Ombudsman issued the order
placing Binay, Jr., et al. under preventive suspension for not more than six months without pay,
during the pendency of the OMB Cases.

The Ombudsman ruled that the requisites for the preventive suspension of a public officer are
present, and that their continued stay in office may prejudice the investigation relative to the
OMB Cases filed against them.

Binay, Jr. filed a petition for certiorari before the CA seeking the nullification of the preventive
suspension order, and praying for the issuance of a TRO and/or WPI to enjoin its
implementation.

Primarily, Binay, Jr. argued that he could not be held administratively liable for any anomalous
activity attending any of the five phases of the Makati Parking Building project since: (a) Phases
I and II were undertaken before he was elected Mayor of Makati in 2010; and (b) Phases III to V
transpired during his first term and that his re-election as City Mayor of Makati for a second
term effectively condoned his administrative liability therefor, if any, thus rendering the
administrative cases against him moot and academic.

Prior to the hearing of the oral arguments before the CA, the Ombudsman filed the present
petition before this Court, assailing the CA’s Resolution, which granted Binay, Jr.’s prayer for
TRO.

The Ombudsman claims that the CA had no jurisdiction to grant Binay, Jr.’s prayer for a TRO.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the doctrine of condonation should apply in Binay’s case.

RULING:
Midterm Cases/ Admin Law/ Digests

The petition is partly meritorious.

This Court simply finds no legal authority to sustain the condonation doctrine in this jurisdiction.
It was a doctrine adopted from one class of US rulings way back in 1959 and thus, out of touch
from – and now rendered obsolete by – the current legal regime. In consequence, it is high time
for this Court to abandon the condonation doctrine that originated from Pascual, and affirmed in
the cases following the same, such as Aguinaldo, Salalima, Mayor Garcia, and Governor
Garcia, Jr.  which were all relied upon by the CA.

It should, however, be clarified that this Court’s abandonment of the condonation doctrine
should be prospective in application for the reason that judicial decisions applying or interpreting
the laws or the Constitution, until reversed, shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines.

The condonation doctrine was first enunciated in Pascual v. Hon. Provincial Board of Nueva
Ecija, There is no truth in Pascual’s postulation that the courts would be depriving the electorate
of their right to elect their officers if condonation were not to be sanctioned. In political law,
election pertains to the process by which a particular constituency chooses an individual to hold
a public office.

In this jurisdiction, there is, again, no legal basis to conclude that election automatically implies
condonation. Neither is there any legal basis to say that every democratic and republican state
has an inherent regime of condonation. If condonation of an elective official’s administrative
liability would perhaps, be allowed in this jurisdiction, then the same should have been provided
by law under our governing legal mechanisms. May it be at the time of Pascual or at present, by
no means has it been shown that such a law, whether in a constitutional or statutory provision,
exists.

Therefore, inferring from this manifest absence, it cannot be said that the electorate’s will has been
abdicated

REPUBLIC of the PHILIPPINES, represented by SOLICITOR GENERAL JOSE C. CALIDA

v. MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO,

G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018 [J. Tijam, En Banc]

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE:

Quo warranto as a remedy to oust an ineligible public official may be availed of when the subject act
or omission was committed prior to or at the time of appointment or election relating to an official’s
qualifications to hold office as to render such appointment or election invalid. Acts or omissions,
even if it relates to the qualification of integrity being a continuing requirement but nonetheless
committed during the incumbency of a validly appointed and/or validly elected official cannot be the
subject of a quo warranto proceeding, but of impeachment if the public official concerned is
Midterm Cases/ Admin Law/ Digests

impeachable and the act or omission constitutes an impeachable offense, or to disciplinary,

administrative or criminal action, if otherwise.

FACTS:

From 1986 to 2006, Sereno served as a member of the faculty of the University of the Philippines-
College of Law. While being employed at the UP Law, or from October 2003 to 2006, Sereno was
concurrently employed as legal counsel of the Republic in two international arbitrations known as the
PIATCO cases, and a Deputy Commissioner of the Commissioner on Human Rights.

The Human Resources Development Office of UP (UP HRDO) certified that there was no record on
Sereno’s file of any permission to engage in limited practice of profession. Moreover, out of her 20
years of employment, only nine (9) Statement of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth (SALN) were on
the records of UP HRDO. In a manifestation, she attached a copy of a tenth SALN, which she
supposedly sourced from the “filing cabinets” or “drawers of UP”. The Ombudsman likewise had no
record of any SALN filed by Sereno. The JBC has certified to the existence of one SALN. In sum,
for 20 years of service, 11 SALNs were recovered.

On August 2010, Sereno was appointed as Associate Justice. On 2012, the position of Chief Justice
was declared vacant, and the JBC directed the applicants to submit documents, among which are “all
previous SALNs up to December 31, 2011” for those in the government and “SALN as of December
31, 2011” for those from the private sector. The JBC announcement further provided that “applicants
with incomplete or out-of-date documentary requirements will not be interviewed or considered for
nomination.” Sereno expressed in a letter to JBC that since she resigned from UP Law on 2006 and
became a private practitioner, she was treated as coming from the private sector and only submitted
three (3) SALNs or her SALNs from the time she became an Associate Justice. Sereno likewise
added that “considering that most of her government records in the academe are more than 15 years
old, it is reasonable to consider it infeasible to retrieve all of those files,” and that the clearance
issued by UP HRDO and CSC should be taken in her favor. There was no record that the letter was
deliberated upon. Despite this, on a report to the JBC, Sereno was said to have “complete
requirements.” On August 2012, Sereno was appointed Chief Justice.

On August 2017, an impeachment complaint was filed by Atty. Larry Gadon against Sereno, alleging
that Sereno failed to make truthful declarations in her SALNs. The House of Representatives
proceeded to hear the case for determination of probable cause, and it was said that Justice Peralta,
the chairman of the JBC then, was not made aware of the incomplete SALNs of Sereno. Other
findings were made: such as pieces of jewelry amounting to P15,000, that were not declared on her
1990 SALN, but was declared in prior years’ and subsequent years’ SALNs, failure of her husband to
sign one SALN, execution of the 1998 SALN only in 2003

On February 2018, Atty. Eligio Mallari wrote to the OSG, requesting that the latter, in representation
of the Republic, initiate a quo warranto proceeding against Sereno. The OSG, invoking the Court’s
original jurisdiction under Section 5(1), Article VIII of the Constitution in relation to the special civil
action under Rule 66, the Republic, through the OSG filed the petition for the issuance of the
extraordinary writ of quo warranto to declare as void Sereno’s appointment as CJ of the SC and to
oust and altogether exclude Sereno therefrom. [yourlawyersays]
Midterm Cases/ Admin Law/ Digests

Capistrano, Sen. De Lima, Sen. Trillianes, et. al., intervened. Sereno then filed a Motion for
Inhibition against AJ Bersamin, Peralta, Jardeleza, Tijam, and Leonardo-De Castro, imputing actual
bias for having testified against her on the impeachment hearing before the House of Representatives.

Contentions:

Office of the Solicitor General (petitioner):

OSG argues that the quo warranto is an available remedy because what is being sought is to question
the validity of her appointment, while the impeachment complaint accuses her of committing
culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust while in office, citing Funa v.
Chairman Villar, Estrada v. Desierto and Nacionalista Party v. De Vera. OSG maintains that the
phrase “may be removed from office” in Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution means that
Members of the SC may be removed through modes other than impeachment.

OSG contends that it is seasonably filed within the one-year reglementary period under Section 11,
Rule 66 since Sereno’s transgressions only came to light during the impeachment proceedings.
Moreover, OSG claims that it has an imprescriptible right to bring a quo warranto petition under the
maxim nullum tempus occurit regi (“no time runs against the king”) or prescription does not operate
against the government. The State has a continuous interest in ensuring that those who partake of its
sovereign powers are qualified. Even assuming that the one-year period is applicable to the OSG,
considering that SALNs are not published, the OSG will have no other means by which to know the
disqualification.

Moreover, OSG maintains that the SC has jurisdiction, citing A.M. No. 10-4-20-SC which created a
permanent Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards, tasked to investigate complaints involving
graft and corruption and ethical violations against members of the SC and contending that this is not
a political question because such issue may be resolved through the interpretation of the provisions of
the Constitution, laws, JBC rules, and Canons of Judicial Ethics.

OSG seeks to oust Sereno from her position as CJ on the ground that Sereno failed to show that she
is a person of proven integrity which is an indispensable qualification for membership in the
Judiciary under Section 7(3), Article VIII of the Constitution. According to the OSG, because OSG
failed to fulfill the JBC requirement of filing the complete SALNs, her integrity remains unproven.
The failure to submit her SALN, which is a legal obligation, should have disqualified Sereno from
being a candidate; therefore, she has no right to hold the office. Good faith cannot be considered as a
defense since the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA No. 3019) and Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (RA No. 6713) are special laws and are thus
governed by the concept of malum prohibitum, wherein malice or criminal intent is completely
immaterial.

Sereno (respondent):

Sereno contends that an impeachable officer may only be ousted through impeachment, citing
Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution, and Mayor Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan, Cuenca v. Hon.
Midterm Cases/ Admin Law/ Digests

Fernan, In Re: First lndorsement from Hon. Gonzales, and Re: Complaint-Affidavit for Disbarment
Against SAJ Antonio T. Carpio. Sereno contends that the clear intention of the framers of the
Constitution was to create an exclusive category of public officers who can be removed only by
impeachment and not otherwise. Impeachment was chosen as the method of removing certain high-
ranking government officers to shield them from harassment suits that will prevent them from
performing their functions which are vital to the continued operations of government. Sereno further
argues that the word “may” on Section 2 of Article XI only qualifies the penalty imposable after the
impeachment trial, i.e., removal from office. Sereno contends that the since the mode is wrong, the
SC has no jurisdiction.

Sereno likewise argues that the cases cited by OSG is not in all fours with the present case because
the President and the Vice President may, in fact, be removed by means other than impeachment on
the basis of Section 4, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution vesting in the Court the power to be the
“sole judge” of all contests relating to the qualifications of the President and the Vice-President.
There is no such provision for other impeachable officers. Moreover, on the rest of the cases cited by
the OSG, there is no mention that quo warranto may be allowed.

Sereno also argues that since a petition for quo warranto may be filed before the RTC, such would
result to a conundrum because a judge of lower court would have effectively exercised disciplinary
power and administrative supervision over an official of the Judiciary much higher in rank and is
contrary to Sections 6 and 11, Article VIII of the Constitution which vests upon the SC disciplinary
and administrative power over all courts and the personnel thereof.

Sereno likewise posits that if a Member of the SC can be ousted through quo warranto initiated by
the OSG, the Congress’ “check” on the SC through impeachment would be rendered inutile.

Furthermore, Sereno argues that it is already time-barred. Section 11, Rule 66 provides that a petition
for quo warranto must be filed within one (1) year from the “cause of ouster” and not from the
“discovery” of the disqualification.

Moreover, Sereno contends that the Court cannot presume that she failed to file her SALNs because
as a public officer, she enjoys the presumption that her appointment to office was regular. OSG failed
to overcome the presumption created by the certifications from UP HRDO that she had been cleared
of all administrative responsibilities and charges. Her integrity is a political question which can only
be decided by the JBC and the President.

Regarding her missing SALNs, Sereno contends that the fact that SALNs are missing cannot give
rise to the inference that they are not filed. The fact that 11 SALNs were filed should give an
inference to a pattern of filing, not of non-filing.

Intervenors’ arguments:

The intervenors argue that it is not incumbent upon Sereno to prove to the JBC that she possessed the
integrity required by the Constitution; rather, the onus of determining whether or not she qualified for
the post fell upon the JBC. Moreover, submission of SALNs is not a constitutional requirement; what
 Midterm Cases/ Admin Law/ Digests

is only required is the imprimatur of the JBC. The intervenors likewise contend that “qualifications”
such as citizenship, age, and experience are enforceable while “characteristics” such as competence,
integrity, probity, and independence are mere subjective considerations.

ISSUES:

Preliminary issues:

1. Whether the Court should entertain the motion for intervention

2. Whether the Court should grant the motion for the inhibition of Sereno against five Justices

Main Issues:

3. Whether the Court can assume jurisdiction and give due course to the instant petition for quo
warranto.
4. Whether Sereno may be the respondent in a quo warranto proceeding notwithstanding the
fact that an impeachment complaint has already been filed with the House of Representatives.
5. Whether Sereno, who is an impeachable officer, can be the respondent in a quo
warranto proceeding, i.e., whether the only way to remove an impeachable officer is impeachment.
6. Whether to take cognizance of the quo warranto proceeding is violative of the principle of
separation of powers
7. Whether the petition is outrightly dismissible on the ground of prescription
8. Whether the determination of a candidate’s eligibility for nomination is the sole and
exclusive function of the JBC and whether such determination. partakes of the character of a political
question outside the Court’s supervisory and review powers;
9. Whether the filing of SALN is a constitutional and statutory requirement for the position of
Chief Justice.
10. If answer to ninth issue is in the affirmative, whether Sereno failed to file her SALNs as
mandated by the Constitution and required by the law and its implementing rules and regulations
11. If answer to ninth issue is in the affirmative, whether Sereno filed SALNs are not filed
properly and promptly.
12. Whether Sereno failed to comply with the submission of SALNs as required by the JBC
13. If answer to the twelfth issue is in the affirmative, whether the failure to submit SALNs to the
JBC voids the nomination and appointment of Sereno as Chief Justice;
14. In case of a finding that Sereno is ineligible to hold the position of Chief Justice, whether the
subsequent nomination by the JBC and the appointment by the President cured such ineligibility.
15. Whether Sereno is a de jure or a de facto officer.

[READ: Justice Leonen’s dissenting opinion: Q&A Format]

HELD:

Anent the first issue: The intervention is improper.

Midterm Cases/ Admin Law/ Digests

Intervention is a remedy by which a third party, not originally impleaded in the proceedings,
becomes a litigant therein for a certain purpose: to enable the third party to protect or preserve a right
or interest that may be affected by those proceedings. The remedy of intervention is not a matter of
right but rests on the sound discretion of the court upon compliance with the first requirement
on legal interest and the second requirement that no delay and prejudice should result. The
justification of one’s “sense of patriotism and their common desire to protect and uphold the
Philippine Constitution”, and that of the Senator De Lima’s and Trillanes’ intervention that their
would-be participation in the impeachment trial as Senators-judges if the articles of impeachment
will be filed before the Senate as the impeachment court will be taken away is not sufficient. The
interest contemplated by law must be actual, substantial, material, direct and immediate, and not
simply contingent or expectant. Moreover, the petition of quo warranto is brought in the name of the
Republic. It is vested in the people, and not in any private individual or group, because disputes over
title to public office are viewed as a public question of governmental legitimacy and not merely a
private quarrel among rival claimants.

Anent the second issue: There is no basis for the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court to inhibit
in the case.

It is true that a judge has both the duty of rendering a just decision and the duty of doing it in a
manner completely free from suspicion as to its fairness and as to his integrity. However, the right of
a party to seek the inhibition or disqualification of a judge who does not appear to be wholly free,
disinterested, impartial and independent in handling the case must be balanced with the latter’s
sacred duty to decide cases without fear of repression. Bias must be proven with clear and convincing
evidence. Those justices who were present at the impeachment proceedings were armed with the
requisite imprimatur of the Court En Banc, given that the Members are to testify only on matters
within their personal knowledge. The mere imputation of bias or partiality is not enough ground for
inhibition, especially when the charge is without basis. There must be acts or conduct clearly
indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice before it can brand them with the stigma of bias or partiality.
Sereno’s call for inhibition has been based on speculations, or on distortions of the language, context
and meaning of the answers the Justices may have given as sworn witnesses in the proceedings
before the House.

Moreover, insinuations that the Justices of the SC are towing the line of President Duterte in
entertaining the quo warranto petition must be struck for being unfounded and for sowing seeds of
mistrust and discordance between the Court and the public. The Members of the Court are beholden
to no one, except to the sovereign Filipino people who ordained and promulgated the Constitution. It
is thus inappropriate to misrepresent that the SolGen who has supposedly met consistent litigation
success before the SG shall likewise automatically and positively be received in the present quo
warranto action. As a collegial body, the Supreme Court adjudicates without fear or favor. The best
person to determine the propriety of sitting in a case rests with the magistrate sought to be
disqualified. [yourlawyersays]

Anent the third issue: A quo warranto petition is allowed against impeachable officials and SC has
jurisdiction.
Midterm Cases/ Admin Law/ Digests

The SC have concurrent jurisdiction with the CA and RTC to issue the extraordinary writs,
including quo warranto. A direct invocation of the SC’s original jurisdiction to issue such writs is
allowed when there are special and important reasons therefor, and in this case, direct resort to SC is
justified considering that the action is directed against the Chief Justice. Granting that the petition is
likewise of transcendental importance and has far-reaching implications, the Court is empowered to
exercise its power of judicial review. To exercise restraint in reviewing an impeachable officer’s
appointment is a clear renunciation of a judicial duty. an outright dismissal of the petition based on
speculation that Sereno will eventually be tried on impeachment is a clear abdication of the Court’s
duty to settle actual controversy squarely presented before it. Quo warranto proceedings are
essentially judicial in character – it calls for the exercise of the Supreme Court’s constitutional duty
and power to decide cases and settle actual controversies. This constitutional duty cannot be
abdicated or transferred in favor of, or in deference to, any other branch of the government including
the Congress, even as it acts as an impeachment court through the Senate.

To differentiate from impeachment, quo warranto involves a judicial determination of the eligibility

or validity of the election or appointment of a public official based on predetermined rules while
impeachment is a political process to vindicate the violation of the public’s trust. In quo
warranto proceedings referring to offices filled by appointment, what is determined is the legality of
the appointment. The title to a public office may not be contested collaterally but only directly,
by quo warranto proceedings. usurpation of a public office is treated as a public wrong and carries
with it public interest, and as such, it shall be commenced by a verified petition brought in the name
of the Republic of the Philippines through the Solicitor General or a public prosecutor. The SolGen is
given permissible latitude within his legal authority in actions for quo warranto, circumscribed only
by the national interest and the government policy on the matter at hand.

Anent the fourth issue: Simultaneous quo warranto proceeding and impeachment proceeding is not
forum shopping and is allowed.

Quo warranto and impeachment may proceed independently of each other as these remedies are
distinct as to (1) jurisdiction (2) grounds, (3) applicable rules pertaining to initiation, filing and
dismissal, and (4) limitations. Forum shopping is the act of a litigant who repetitively availed of
several judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded
on the same transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially
the same issues, either pending in or already resolved adversely by some other court, to increase his
chances of obtaining a favorable decision if not in one court, then in another. The test for determining
forum shopping is whether in the two (or more) cases pending, there is identity of parties, rights or
causes of action, and reliefs sought. The crux of the controversy in this quo warranto proceedings is
the determination of whether or not Sereno legally holds the Chief Justice position to be considered
as an impeachable officer in the first place. On the other hand, impeachment is for respondent’s
prosecution for certain impeachable offenses. Simply put, while Sereno’s title to hold a public office
is the issue in quo warranto proceedings, impeachment necessarily presupposes that Sereno legally
holds the public office and thus, is an impeachable officer, the only issue being whether or not she
committed impeachable offenses to warrant her removal from office.

Moreover, the reliefs sought are different. respondent in a quo warranto proceeding shall be
adjudged to cease from holding a public office, which he/she is ineligible to hold. Moreover,
impeachment, a conviction for the charges of impeachable offenses shall result to the removal of the
Midterm Cases/ Admin Law/ Digests

respondent from the public office that he/she is legally holding. It is not legally possible to impeach
or remove a person from an office that he/she, in the first place, does not and cannot legally hold or
occupy.

Lastly, there can be no forum shopping because the impeachment proceedings before the House is
not the impeachment case proper, since it is only a determination of probable cause. The
impeachment case is yet to be initiated by the filing of the Articles of Impeachment before the
Senate. Thus, at the moment, there is no pending impeachment case against Sereno. The process
before the House is merely inquisitorial and is merely a means of discovering if a person may be
reasonably charged with a crime.

Anent the fifth issue: Impeachment is not an exclusive remedy by which an invalidly appointed or
invalidly elected impeachable official may be removed from office.

The language of Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution does not foreclose a quo warranto action
against impeachable officers: “Section 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the
Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be
removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution,
treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust.” The provision
uses the permissive term “may” which denote discretion and cannot be construed as having a
mandatory effect, indicative of a mere possibility, an opportunity, or an option. In American
jurisprudence, it has been held that “the express provision for removal by impeachment ought not to
be taken as a tacit prohibition of removal by other methods when there are other adequate reasons to
account for this express provision.”

The principle in case law is that during their incumbency, impeachable officers cannot be criminally
prosecuted for an offense that carries with it the penalty of removal, and if they are required to be
members of the Philippine Bar to qualify for their positions, they cannot be charged with disbarment.
The proscription does not extend to actions assailing the public officer’s title or right to the office he
or she occupies. Even the PET Rules expressly provide for the remedy of either an election protest or
a petition for quo warranto to question the eligibility of the President and the Vice-President, both of
whom are impeachable officers.

Further, that the enumeration of “impeachable offenses” is made absolute, that is, only those
enumerated offenses are treated as grounds for impeachment, is not equivalent to saying that the
enumeration likewise purport to be a complete statement of the causes of removal from office. If
other causes of removal are available, then other modes of ouster can likewise be availed. To
subscribe to the view that appointments or election of impeachable officers are outside judicial
review is to cleanse their appointments or election of any possible defect pertaining to the
Constitutionally-prescribed qualifications which cannot otherwise be raised in an impeachment
proceeding. To hold otherwise is to allow an absurd situation where the appointment of an
impeachable officer cannot be questioned even when, for instance, he or she has been determined to
be of foreign nationality or, in offices where Bar membership is a qualification, when he or she
fraudulently represented to be a member of the Bar.
Midterm Cases/ Admin Law/ Digests

Anent the sixth issue: The Supreme Court’s exercise of its jurisdiction over a quo warranto petition
is not violative of the doctrine of separation of powers.

The Court’s assumption of jurisdiction over an action for quo warranto involving a person who
would otherwise be an impeachable official had it not been for a disqualification, is not violative of
the core constitutional provision that impeachment cases shall be exclusively tried and decided by the
Senate. Again, the difference between quo warranto and impeachment must be emphasized. An
action for quo warranto does not try a person’s culpability of an impeachment offense, neither does a
writ of quo warranto conclusively pronounce such culpability. The Court’s exercise of its
jurisdiction over quo warranto proceedings does not preclude Congress from enforcing its own
prerogative of determining probable cause for impeachment, to craft and transmit the Articles of
Impeachment, nor will it preclude Senate from exercising its constitutionally committed power of
impeachment.

However, logic, common sense, reason, practicality and even principles of plain arithmetic bear out
the conclusion that an unqualified public official should be removed from the position immediately if
indeed Constitutional and legal requirements were not met or breached. To abdicate from resolving a
legal controversy simply because of perceived availability of another remedy, in this case
impeachment, would be to sanction the initiation of a process specifically intended to be long and
arduous and compel the entire membership of the Legislative branch to momentarily abandon their
legislative duties to focus on impeachment proceedings for the possible removal of a public official,
who at the outset, may clearly be unqualified under existing laws and case law.

For guidance, the Court demarcates that an act or omission committed prior to or at the time of
appointment or election relating to an official’s qualifications to hold office as to render such
appointment or election invalid is properly the subject of a quo warranto petition, provided that the
requisites for the commencement thereof are present. Contrariwise, acts or omissions, even if it
relates to the qualification of integrity, being a continuing requirement but nonetheless committed
during the incumbency of a validly appointed and/or validly elected official, cannot be the subject of
a quo warranto proceeding, but of something else, which may either be impeachment if the public
official concerned is impeachable and the act or omission constitutes an impeachable offense, or
disciplinary, administrative or criminal action, if otherwise.

Anent the seventh issue: Prescription does not lie against the State.

The rules on quo warranto provides that “nothing contained in this Rule shall be construed to
authorize an action against a public officer or employee for his ouster from office unless the same be
commenced within one (1) year after the cause of such ouster, or the right of the petitioner to hold
such office or position, arose”. Previously, the one-year prescriptive period has been applied in cases
where private individuals asserting their right of office, unlike the instant case where no private
individual claims title to the Office of the Chief Justice. Instead, it is the government itself which
commenced the present petition for quo warranto and puts in issue the qualification of the person
holding the highest position in the Judiciary.

Section 2 of Rule 66 provides that “the Solicitor General or a public prosecutor, when directed by the
President of the Philippines, or when upon complaint or otherwise he has good reason to believe that
Midterm Cases/ Admin Law/ Digests

any case specified in the preceding section can be established by proof must commence such action.”
It may be stated that ordinary statutes of limitation, civil or penal, have no application to quo
warranto proceeding brought to enforce a public right. There is no limitation or prescription of action
in an action for quo warranto, neither could there be, for the reason that it was an action by the
Government and prescription could not be plead as a defense to an action by the Government.

That prescription does not lie in this case can also be deduced from the very purpose of an action
for quo warranto. Because quo warranto serves to end a continuous usurpation, no statute of
limitations applies to the action. Needless to say, no prudent and just court would allow an
unqualified person to hold public office, much more the highest position in the Judiciary. Moreover,
the Republic cannot be faulted for questioning Sereno’s qualification· for office only upon discovery
of the cause of ouster because even up to the present, Sereno has not been candid on whether she
filed the required SALNs or not. The defect on Sereno’s appointment was therefore not discernible,
but was, on the contrary, deliberately rendered obscure.

Anent the eighth issue: The Court has supervisory authority over the JBC includes ensuring that the
JBC complies with its own rules.

Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution provides that “A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby
created under the supervision of the Supreme Court.” The power of supervision means “overseeing
or the authority of an officer to see to it that the subordinate officers perform their duties.” JBC’s
absolute autonomy from the Court as to place its non-action or improper· actions beyond the latter’s
reach is therefore not what the Constitution contemplates. What is more, the JBC’s duty to
recommend or nominate, although calling for the exercise of discretion, is neither absolute nor
unlimited, and is not automatically equivalent to an exercise of policy decision as to place, in
wholesale, the JBC process beyond the scope of the Court’s supervisory and corrective powers.
While a certain leeway must be given to the JBC in screening aspiring magistrates, the same does not
give it an unbridled discretion to ignore Constitutional and legal requirements. Thus, the nomination
by the JBC is not accurately an exercise of policy or wisdom as to place the JBC’s actions in the
same category as political questions that the Court is barred from resolving. [yourlawyersays]

[READ: Justice Leonen’s dissenting opinion: Q&A Format]

With this, it must be emphasized that qualifications under the Constitution cannot be waived or
bargained by the JBC, and one of which is that “a Member of the Judiciary must be a person
of proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence. “Integrity” is closely related to, or if
not, approximately equated to an applicant’s good reputation for honesty, incorruptibility,
irreproachable conduct, and fidelity to sound moral and ethical standards.” Integrity is likewise
imposed by the New Code of Judicial Conduct and the Code of Professional Responsibility. The
Court has always viewed integrity with a goal of preserving the confidence of the litigants in the
Judiciary. Hence, the JBC was created in order to ensure that a member of the Supreme Court must
be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence.

Anent the ninth issue: The filing of SALN is a constitutional and statutory requirement.
Midterm Cases/ Admin Law/ Digests

Section 17, Article XI of the Constitution states that “A public officer or employee shall, upon
assumption of office and as often thereafter as may be required by law, submit a declaration under
oath of his assets, liabilities, and net worth.” This has likewise been required by RA 3019 and RA
6713. “Failure to comply” with the law is a violation of law, a “prima facie evidence of unexplained
wealth, which may result in the dismissal from service of the public officer.” It is a clear breach of
the ethical standards set for public officials and employees. The filing of the SALN is so important
for purposes of transparency and accountability that failure to comply with such requirement may
result not only in dismissal from the public service but also in criminal liability. Section 11 of R.A.
No. 6713 even provides that  non-compliance with this requirement is not only punishable by
imprisonment and/or a fine, it may also result in disqualification to hold public office.

Because the Chief Justice is a public officer, she is constitutionally and statutorily mandated to
perform a positive duty to disclose all of his assets and liabilities. According to Sereno herself in her
dissenting opinion in one case, those who accept a public office do so cum onere, or with a burden,
and are considered as accepting its burdens and obligations, together with its benefits. They thereby
subject themselves to all constitutional and legislative provisions relating thereto, and undertake to
perform all the duties of their office. The public has the right to demand the performance of those
duties. More importantly, while every office in the government service is a public trust, no position
exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the
Judiciary.

Noncompliance with the SALN requirement indubitably·reflects on a person’s integrity. It is not

merely a trivial or a formal requirement. The contention that the mere non-filing does not affect
Sereno’s integrity does not persuade considering that RA 6713 and RA 3019 are malum
prohibitum and not malum in se. Thus, it is the omission or commission of that act as defined by the
law, and not the character or effect thereof, that determines whether or not the provision has been
violated. Malice or criminal intent is completely immaterial.

Anent the tenth issue: Sereno chronically failed to file her SALNs and thus violated the Constitution,
the law, and the Code of Judicial Conduct.

In Sereno’s 20 years of government service in UP Law, only 11 SALNs have been filed. Sereno
could have easily dispelled doubts as to the filing or nonfiling of the unaccounted SALNs by
presenting them before the Court. Yet, Sereno opted to withhold such information or such evidence,
if at all, for no clear reason. The Doblada case, invoked by Sereno, cannot be applied, because in the
Doblada case, there was a letter of the head of the personnel of the branch of the court that the
missing SALN exists and was duly transmitted and received by the OCA as the repository agency. In
Sereno’s case, the missing SALNs are neither proven to be in the records of nor was proven to have
been sent to and duly received by the Ombudsman as the repository agency. The existence of these
SALNs and the fact of filing thereof were neither established by direct proof constituting substantial
evidence nor by mere inference. Moreover, the statement of the Ombudsman is categorical: “based
on records on file, there is no SALN filed by [Sereno] for calendar years 1999 to 2009 except SALN
ending December 1998.” This leads the Court to conclude that Sereno did not indeed file her SALN.

For this reason, the Republic was able to discharge its burden of proof with the certification from UP
HRDO and Ombudsman, and thus it becomes incumbent upon Sereno to discharge her burden of
Midterm Cases/ Admin Law/ Digests

evidence. Further, the burden of proof in a quo warranto proceeding is different when it is filed by
the State in that the burden rests upon the respondent.

In addition, contrary to what Sereno contends, being on leave does not exempt her from filing her
SALN because it is not tantamount to separation from government service. The fact that Sereno did
not receive any pay for the periods she was on leave does not make her a government worker
“serving in an honorary capacity” to be exempted from the SALN laws on RA
6713. [yourlawyersays]

Neither can the clearance and certification of UP HRDO be taken in favor of Sereno. During the
period when Sereno was a professor in UP, concerned authorized official/s of the Office of the
President or the Ombudsman had not yet established compliance procedures for the review of
SALNs filed by officials and employees of State Colleges and Universities, like U.P. The ministerial
duty of the head of office to issue compliance order came about only on 2006 from the CSC. As
such, the U.P. HRDO could not have been expected to perform its ministerial duty of issuing
compliance orders to Sereno when such rule was not yet in existence at that time. Moreover, the
clearance are not substitutes for SALNs. The import of said clearance is limited only to clearing
Sereno of her academic and administrative responsibilities, money and property accountabilities and
from administrative charges as of the date of her resignation.

Neither can Sereno’s inclusion in the matrix of candidates with complete requirements and in the
shortlist nominated by the JBC confirm or ratify her compliance with the SALN requirement. Her
inclusion in the shortlist of candidates for the position of Chief Justice does not negate, nor supply
her with the requisite proof of integrity. She should have been disqualified at the outset. Moreover,
the JBC En Banc cannot be deemed to have considered Sereno eligible because it does not appear
that Sereno’s failure to submit her SALNs was squarely addressed by the body. Her inclusion in the
shortlist of nominees and subsequent appointment to the position do not estop the Republic or this
Court from looking into her qualifications. Verily, no estoppel arises where the representation or
conduct of the party sought to be estopped is due to ignorance founded upon an innocent mistake

Anent the eleventh issue: Sereno failed to properly and promptly file her SALNs, again in violation
of the Constitutional and statutory requirements    .

Failure to file a truthful, complete and accurate SALN would likewise amount to dishonesty if the
same is attended by malicious intent to conceal the truth or to make false statements. The suspicious
circumstances include: 1996 SALN being accomplished only in 1998; 1998 SALN only filed in
2003; 1997 SALN only notarized in 1993; 2004-2006 SALNs were not filed which were the years
when she received the bulk of her fees from PIATCO cases, 2006 SALN was later on intended to be
for 2010, gross amount from PIATCO cases were not reflected, suspicious increase of P2,700,000 in
personal properties were seen in her first five months as Associate Justice. It is therefore clear as day
that Sereno failed not only in complying with the physical act of filing, but also committed
dishonesty betraying her lack of integrity, honesty and probity. The Court does not hesitate to impose
the supreme penalty of dismissal against public officials whose SALNs were found to have contained
discrepancies, inconsistencies and non-disclosures.
Midterm Cases/ Admin Law/ Digests

Anent the twelfth issue: Sereno failed to submit the required SALNs as to qualify for nomination
pursuant to the JBC rules.

The JBC required the submission of at least ten SALNs from those applicants who are incumbent
Associate Justices, absent which, the applicant ought not to have been interviewed, much less been
considered for nomination. From the minutes of the meeting of the JBC, it appeared that Sereno was
singled out from the rest of the applicants for having failed to submit a single piece of SALN for her
years of service in UP Law. It is clear that JBC did not do away with the SALN requirement, but still
required substantial compliance. Subsequently, it appeared that it was only Sereno who was not able
to substantially comply with the SALN requirement, and instead of complying, Sereno wrote a letter
containing justifications why she should no longer be required to file the SALNs: that she resigned
from U.P. in 2006 and then resumed government service only in 2009, thus her government service is
not continuous; that her government records are more than 15 years old and thus infeasible to
retrieve; and that U.P. cleared her of all academic and administrative responsibilities and charges.

These justifications, however, did not obliterate the simple fact that Sereno submitted only 3 SALNs
to the JBC in her 20-year service in U.P., and that there was nary an attempt on Sereno’s part to
comply. Moreover, Sereno curiously failed to mention that she did not file several SALNs during the
course of her employment in U.P. Such failure to disclose a material fact and the concealment thereof
from the JBC betrays any claim of integrity especially from a Member of the Supreme
Court. [yourlawyersays]

Indubitably, Sereno not only failed to substantially comply with the submission of the SALNs but
there was no compliance at all. Dishonesty is classified as a grave offense the penalty of which is
dismissal from the service at the first infraction. A person aspiring to public office must observe
honesty, candor and faithful compliance with the law. Nothing less is expected. Dishonesty is a
malevolent act that puts serious doubt upon one’s ability to perform his duties with the integrity and
uprightness demanded of a public officer or employee. For these reasons, the JBC should no longer
have considered Sereno for interview.

Moreover, the fact that Sereno had no permit to engage in private practice while in UP, her false
representations that she was in private practice after resigning from UP when in fact she was counsel
for the government, her false claims that the clearance from UP HRDO is proof of her compliance
with SALNs requirement, her commission of tax fraud for failure to truthfully declare her income in
her ITRs for the years 2007-2009, procured a brand new Toyota Land Cruiser worth at least
P5,000,000, caused the hiring of Ms. Macasaet without requisite public bidding, misused P3,000,000
of government funds for hotel accommodation at Shangri-La Boracay as the venue of the 3 rd ASEAN
Chief Justices meeting, issued a TRO in Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the
Philippines v. COMELEC contrary to the Supreme Court’s internal rules, manipulated the disposition
of the DOJ request to transfer the venue of the Maute cases outside of Mindanao, ignored rulings of
the Supreme Court with respect to the grant of survivorship benefits which caused undue delay to the
release of survivorship benefits to spouses of deceased judges and Justices, manipulated the
processes of the JBC to exclude then SolGen, now AJ Francis Jardeleza, by using highly confidential
document involving national security against the latter among others, all belie the fact that Sereno
has integrity.
Midterm Cases/ Admin Law/ Digests

Anent the thirteenth issue: Sereno’s failure to submit to the JBC her SALNs for several years means
that her integrity was not established at the time of her application

The requirement to submit SALNs is made more emphatic when the applicant is eyeing the position
of Chief Justice. On the June 4, 2012, JBC En Banc meeting, Senator Escudero proposed the addition
of the requirement of SALN in order for the next Chief Justice to avoid what CJ Corona had gone
through. Further, the failure to submit the required SALNs means that the JBC and the public are
divested of the opportunity to consider the applicant’s fitness or propensity to commit corruption or
dishonesty. In Sereno’s case, for example, the waiver of the confidentiality of bank deposits would
be practically useless for the years that she failed to submit her SALN since the JBC cannot verify
whether the same matches the entries indicated in the SALN.

Anent the fourteenth issue: Sereno’s ineligibility for lack of proven integrity cannot be cured by her
nomination and subsequent appointment as Chief Justice.

Well-settled is the rule that qualifications for public office must be possessed at the time of
appointment and assumption of office and also during the officer’s entire tenure as a continuing
requirement. The voidance of the JBC nomination as a necessary consequence of the Court’s finding
that Sereno is ineligible, in the first place, to be a candidate for the position of Chief Justice and to be
nominated for said position follows as a matter of course. The Court has ample jurisdiction to do so
without the necessity of impleading the JBC as the Court can take judicial notice of the explanations
from the JBC members and the OEO. he Court, in a quo warranto proceeding, maintains the power to
issue such further judgment determining the respective rights in and to the public office, position or
franchise of all the parties to the action as justice requires.

Neither will the President’s act of appointment cause to qualify Sereno. Although the JBC is an
office constitutionally created, the participation of the President in the selection and nomination
process is evident from the composition of the JBC itself.

An appointment is essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested, subject to

the only condition that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. While the
Court surrenders discretionary appointing power to the President, the exercise of such discretion is
subject to the non-negotiable requirements that the appointee is qualified and all other legal
requirements are satisfied, in the absence of which, the appointment is susceptible to attack.

Anent the fifteenth issue: Sereno is a de facto officer removable through quo warranto

The effect of a finding that a person appointed to an office is ineligible therefor is that his
presumably valid appointment will give him color of title that confers on him the status of a de facto
officer. For lack of a Constitutional qualification, Sereno is ineligible to hold the position of Chief
Justice and is merely holding a colorable right or title thereto. As such, Sereno has never attained the
status of an impeachable official and her removal from the office, other than by impeachment, is
justified. The remedy, therefore, of a quo warranto at the instance of the State is proper to oust
Sereno from the appointive position of Chief Justice. [yourlawyersays]
Midterm Cases/ Admin Law/ Digests

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Quo Warranto is GRANTED.

Sereno is found DISQUALIFIED from and is hereby adjudged GUILTY of UNLAWFULLY

HOLDING and EXERCISING the OFFICE OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE. Accordingly, Sereno
is OUSTED and EXCLUDED therefrom.

The position of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court is declared vacant and the Judicial and Bar
Council is directed to commence the application and nomination process.

This Decision is immediately executory without need of further action from the Court.

Sereno is ordered to SHOW CAUSE within ten (10) days from receipt hereof why she should not be
sanctioned for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Code of Judicial Conduct for
transgressing the sub judice rule and for casting aspersions and ill motives to the Members of the
Supreme Court.