1

State and Its Margins

Comparative Ethnographies
Veena Das and Deborah Poole

T h is b o o k is a b o u t m argins, th e places fro m w hich we seek to

u n d e rsta n d w hat co u n ts as th e study o f th e state in anthropology. T h e
c h a p te rs co llected h e re began as p a rt o f a S c h o o l o f A m e ric a n
R esearch advanced sem inar. T h ere w e asked an th ro p o lo g ists w orking
on d ifferen t regions to reflect on w h at w ould c o n stitu te the e th n o g ra ­
phy o f th e state as e m b e d d e d in practices, places, a n d languages c o n ­
sid ered to be at th e m arg in s o f th e nation-state. A lth o u g h we in v ited
an th ro p o lo g ists whose w ork focused o n regions th a t have been d ra m a t­
ically affected by re c e n t political a n d eco n o m ic refo rm s, we w ere in te r­
ested in m oving away fro m the id ea th a t these refo rm s h a d som ehow
p ro d u c e d a w eak en in g o r sh rin k in g o f th e fo rm s o f re g u la tio n a n d
b e lo n g in g th a t su p p o sed ly c o n stitu te th e m o d e rn n atio n -state. O u r
analytical an d d escriptive strategy w as to distance ourselves from th e
e n tre n c h e d im age o f th e state as a rationalized adm inistrative fo rm o f
political o rg an izatio n th a t becom es w eakened o r less fully a rticu lated
along its territo rial o r social m argins. In stead , we ask ed sem inar p a rtic ­
ipants to reflect o n how th e practices a n d politics o f life in these areas
sh ap ed th e political, regulatory, an d disciplinary p ractices that co n sti­
tute, som ehow , th at th in g we call “th e state.”

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 V ee na D as and D eborah P o o le

As a d isc ip lin e th at itself has often b e e n co n sid ered to o ccu p y a

m arginal voice in W estern political theory, an th ro p o lo g y offers an ideal
p o in t o f d e p a rtu re fo r th e ra d ic a l re th in k in g o f th e state th a t a view
from the m arg in s requires. A n th ro p o lo g y is freq u en tly c o n fig u re d as a
discipline th a t speaks for (o r at tim es w ith) th o se p o p u latio n s th a t have
b een m arg in alized |by th e political an d eco n o m ic strictures o f colonial
an d p o stco lo n ial rule. M oreover, e th n o g ra p h y is a m o d e o f k n o w in g
th a t privileges ex p erien ce— o fte n going in to realm s o f th e social th at
are n o t easily d iscern ib le w ith in th e m o re fo rm a l p ro to c o ls u s e d by
m any o th e r disciplines. As su ch , eth n o g rap h y offers a u n iq u e p ersp ec­
tive on th e so rts o f practices th a t seem to u n d o th e state at its te rrito ria l
an d co n cep tu al m argins. T h e reg io n al o r local perspectives o f a n th ro ­
pology are also im p o rta n t h e re , a lth o u g h fo r som ew hat d iffe re n t rea­
sons from th o se usually im plied w hen an th ro p o lo g ists speak o f regional
co m p ariso n s. T h e a n th ro p o lo g ists in this v o lu m e all w ork in states
a n d regions th a t are freq u en d y ch aracterized in com parative political
th eo ry as “new n a tio n s” w ith “fa ile d ,” “w eak,” o r “p artial” states, an d
th e ir w ork sp eak s in m any ways to th e p a rtic u la r m o d alities o f ru le
in Africa, L atin A m erica, a n d S o u th Asia . 1 Yet, th e ir e th n o g ra p h ie s o f
disciplinary, regulatory, an d e n fo rc e m en t p ractices are fram ed , n o t as
studies o f re g io n a l o r failed states, b u t ra th e r as invitations to re th in k
th e b o u n d aries betw een c e n te r a n d periphery, p u b lic and private, legal
a n d illegal, th a t also ru n th ro u g h th e h e a rt o f even the m ost “success­
fu l” E u ro p e a n lib eral state. A n a n th ro p o lo g y o f th e m arg in s o ffers a
u n iq u e p ersp ectiv e to th e u n d e rs ta n d in g o f th e state, n o t b e c a u se it
cap tu res ex o tic practices, b u t becau se it suggests th a t such m arg in s are
a necessary e n ta ilm e n t o f th e state, m u ch as th e ex cep tio n is a n eces­
sary c o m p o n e n t o f the rule.
F or reaso n s having to d o w ith its historical o rig in s as th e stu d y o f
“prim itive” p eo p les, an th ro p o lo g y has trad itio n ally n o t ack n o w led g ed
th e state as a p r o p e r su b ject fo r e th n o g ra p h ic in sp ectio n . W ith few
exceptions, a n th ro p o lo g y ’s subject, until recently, was u n d e rsto o d to be
prim itive o r “n o n -state” societies. S een from this perspective, th e state
seem ed d istan t fro m the e th n o g ra p h ic practices a n d m ethods th a t co n ­
stitu ted the p ro p e r, disciplinary subjects o f an thropology.
At the sam e tim e, however, th e language a n d figure o f th e sta te has
h a u n te d an th ropology. W h eth er we choose to p lace th e origins o f p o lit­

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 T he S t a t e a n d I ts M argins

ical a n th ro p o lo g y w ith M o n te sq u ie u ([1748] 1 9 7 7 ), M aine ([1 8 6 6 ]

2 0 0 2 ), o r E v an s-P ritch ard (1940), th e quest to fin d o rd e r o r re a so n
a m o n g th e prim itives m akes use o f a language o f o rd e r th at is in h e rite d
fro m — an d indeed p a rt o f—the m o d e rn E u ro p ean sta te .2 In this sense,
a n th ro p o lo g y has always been, in m an y unack n o w led g ed ways, “a b o u t ”
th e state— even (a n d p erh ap s especially) when its subjects w ere co n sti­
tu te d as ex clu d ed fro m , o r o p p o se d to, th e fo rm s o f ad m in istrativ e
ratio n ality , political o rd e r, and a u th o rity c o n sig n e d to th e sta te . We
c o n te n d th at it is th ro u g h the lan g u ag e o f the state th a t an th ro p o lo g ists
have trad itio n ally c o n stitu te d th e tro p e s o f so cial o rd er, ratio n ality ,
a u th o rity , an d ev en ex tern ality fo r d efin in g th e ir subject. P ie rre
C lastres (1974), fo r ex am p le, c la im e d som e th irty years ago th a t th e
ratio n ality and form s o f life p ro p e r to o u r n o n m o d e rn e th n o g ra p h ic
su b jects w ere best u n d e rsto o d as expressions o f a collective d e sire to
fen d o ff th e im m in en t em ergence o f th e state. H e re , as in m any o th e r
a n th ro p o lo g ic a l tex ts, th e state was assum ed to b e an in ev itab le o r
ghostly presence th a t sh ap ed the m e a n in g and fo rm th at pow er to o k in
any given society. T h e w ork of the an th ro p o lo g ist, th e n , becam e th a t o f
c o rd o n in g off. the p rim itiv e from th e d o m ain of stately practices. In this
k in d o f a n th ro p o lo g ic a l practice, as in d e e d in th e early tra d itio n s o f
M arxist an d postcolonial w riting, th e prim itive was co n stitu ted as a n o s­
talgic site for the discovery o f the state form as a universal cultural o p e r­
a to r— even w hen n o t p resen t, it was seen as w aiting o n th e th re sh o ld o f
reality, as it w ere .3
A ny effort to re th in k th e state as a n object o f e th n o g ra p h ic in q u iry
m u st start, th en , by co n sid erin g h o w this d o u b le effect o f o rd e r a n d
tra n sc e n d e n c e has b e e n used to track th e presence o f th e state. O n o n e
level, o f course, states seem to be all a b o u t order. T h u s, in m ap p in g th e
effects a n d p resen ce o f “th e state” in local life, an th ro p o lo g ists o fte n
look fo r signs of adm inistrative a n d hierarchical rationalities th a t p ro ­
vide seem ingly o rd e re d links with th e political a n d regulatory a p p a ra ­
tus o f a central b u reau cratic state. T h is ap p ro ach in fo rm s m uch o f th e
re c e n t tu rn to th e sta te in a n th ro p o lo g ic a l w ritin g (for e x a m p le ,
F erg u so n an d G upta 2002; Fuller a n d H arris 2000; H erzfeld 2001:124-
25; H a n se n and S te p p u ta t 2001). S e e n from this perspective, th e task
o f th e a n th ro p o lo g ist becom es th a t o f first sig h tin g in sta n c e s o f
the sta te as it exists o n th e local level an d then analyzing those local

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 V e e n a D as and D eborah P o o l e

m an ifestatio n s o f bureaucracy a n d law as culturally in fo rm ed in te rp re ­

tatio n s o r ap p ro p riatio n s of th e practices and fo rm s th at co n stitu te the
m o d e rn liberal state. T hese p a ro c h ia l sig h tin g s o f the state le a d , in
tu rn , to a m ore spatially and co n cep tu ally d isp ersed picture o f w h at the
state is, albeit o n e th at is still basically identifiable th ro u g h th e sta te ’s
affiliations with p a rtic u la r in stitu tio n al form s .4
O n e aspect o f thinking o f th e state in term s o f o rder-m aking fu n c­
tio n s is th at the spatial and social m argins that so oft'eti co n stitu te the
te rra in o f e th n o g ra p h ic fieldw ork a re seen as sites o f disorder, w h ere
th e state has been u n ab le to im p o se its order .5 W h ile it is true th a t p o lit­
ical an th ro p o lo g y staked its u n iq u e claim for u n d e rsta n d in g th e p o liti­
cal precisely by asking how o rd e r was m ain tain ed in so-called stateless
societies such as th e N u e r (E vans-Pritchard 1940), it did so by b ra c k e t­
in g any referen ce to th e fu n c tio n in g o f the actu al state—th e c o lo n ial
o n e — in th a t very co n tex t. As m a n y critics o f E v an s-P ritch ard have
p o in te d out, the segm entary system as a system o f b alan ced force co u ld
be p re se n te d as em bodying the o rd e re d politics o f N u er life, precisely
becau se th e disorders caused by th e colonial state w ere left o u t o f the
p ic tu re (see C o riat 1993; H u tc h in s o n 1996). A lth o u g h a tte n tio n to
co lo n ial contexts led to increased co n c e rn with th e state as a fa c to r in
th e fo rm atio n o f c e rta in types o f an th ro p o lo g ical subjects (B alan d ier
1951; G luckm an 1963; M eillassoux [1975] 1981), b o th political a n th ro ­
pologists (for exam ple, G ledhill 1994; V incent 1990) an d postcolonial
an d su b altern theorists (see the several volum es o n su b altern stu d ies by
th e S u b a lte rn C ollective) have te n d e d , until re c e n tly , to e m p h a siz e
e ith e r resistance to th e state or th e local form s o f legal, econom ic, an d
cu ltu ral plurality th a t m ark ed an th ro p o lo g ical su b jects as co n tain ed by
o r articu lated with th e state.
G iven th at it is im possible to th in k o f political system s in th e c o n ­
te m p o ra ry w orld as in h a b itin g an y fo rm o f stateless societies, a re we
o b serv in g sim ply in co m p lete— o r fru stra te d — form s o f the state in su ch
situations? O r do th e form s of illegibility, partial b elo n g in g , and d iso r­
d er th a t seem to in h a b it the m argins o f the state c o n stitu te its necessary
c o n d itio n as a th eo retical and political object?
K ey to this asp ect o f th e p ro b le m o f m argins is th e re la tio n sh ip
b etw een violence a n d th e o rd erin g fu n ctio n s of th e state. In fo rm ed as
it is by a particular p ic tu re o T h u m an n atu re, E u ro p ean political th e o l­

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 T he State and Its M argins

ogy h as bestow ed th e state with b o th th e quality o f tran scen d en ce a n d a

re la te d m o n o p o ly o v e r violence (see A bram s 1 9 8 8 ).6 M ax W e b e r’s
fam o u s fo rm u latio n o n th e criteria fo r co u n tin g a political o rg an iza­
tion as a state may b e w o rth recalling h e re . In his w ords, “A ‘ru lin g o rg a­
n iz a tio n ’ will be called ‘political’ in so fa r as its ex isten ce and o rd e r is
c o n tin u o u sly sa fe g u a rd e d w ithin a given territorial a re a by th e th re a t
and ap p licatio n o f physical force o n th e p a rt of th e adm inistrative staff.
A co m p u lso ry political organization w ith co n tin u o u s o p eratio n s (politis-
cher Anstaltsbetrieh) will b e called a ‘s ta te ’ in so far as its adm inistrative
staff successfully u p h o ld s the claim to th e monopoly o f th e legitimate use
o f p h y sical force in th e e n fo rc e m e n t o f its o r d e r” (W eber 1978:54;
em phasis in o rig in al). W eber also em phasized th a t use o f force in any
o th e r type o f o rg an izatio n would be co n sid ered leg itim ate only if it was
p e rm itte d by the state o r prescribed by it. Thus, “th e claim o f th e m o d ­
ern sta te to m o n o p o lize th e use o f fo rc e is as essential to it as its ch arac­
te r o f co m p u lso ry ju ris d ic tio n a n d c o n tin u o u s o p e ra tio n ” (5 6 ). In
d e fin in g th e state as th a t w hich re p la c e s private v en g ean ce w ith th e
rule o f law, W eber was, o f course, b u ild in g on earlier trad itio n s o f K ant
an d H eg el, for w hom th e state in m o d ern ity was d e fin e d by clear-cut
b o u n d a rie s betw een th e external realm o f law and th e in tern al realm o f
ethics, a n d also b e tw e e n th e realm o f universalistic reaso n p ro p e r to
the sta te an d p rim o rd ia l relations p ro p e r to the fam ily (for ex am p le,
H egel [1821] 1991; K an t [1797] 1965). In h e re n t in this im ag in atio n o f
the fig u re o f law was th e creation o f b o u n d aries b etw een those p ra c ­
tices a n d spaces th a t w ere seen to fo rm p a rt of th e state an d those th a t
w ere e x clu d ed fro m it. Legitim acy, in tu rn , em erg ed as a fu n ctio n o f
this b o u n d ary -m ark in g effect o f state practices. T h e violence o f w arfare
c o n tra c te d betw een states and police co n tro l of th e diffused violence o f
society by force w ere co n stitu ted as legitim ate becau se they w ere o f th e
state. O th e r form s o f violence th a t seem ed e ith e r to m im ic state
violence o r to ch allen g e its control w ere deem ed illegitim ate.
In th is vision o f p o litical life, th e state is im a g in e d as an always
in c o m p le te p ro je c t th a t m ust c o n sta n tly be sp o k e n o f— a n d im a g ­
in e d — th ro u g h an in v o catio n o f th e w ilderness, law lessness, a n d
savagery th at not on ly lies outside its ju risd ictio n b u t also th reaten s it
from w ithin. Kant, fo r instance, assu m ed th at the en d s o f g o v ern m en t
in te rm s o f m a n a g in g th e e te rn a l w ell-being, civic w ell-being, a n d

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 V ee na D as and D eborah P oole

physical w ell-being o f th e p e o p le were th re a te n e d from w ith in because

it was “n a tu ra l” for p e o p le to p u t th eir physical w ell-being above their
ch ic w ell-being and th e ir civic w ell-being above th e ir e te rn a l well-being.
F or K ant, this “state o f n a tu re ” th at th re a te n s th e civic o rd e r was to be
tran sfo rm ed by ed u catio n (Vries 2002). W eber— with w hom the theory
o f the ratio n alizatio n o f th e state is m ost closely associated— sim ilarly
treated this process as reg rettab ly in co m p lete, since th e form alism of
law h ad to c o n te n d with th e d em an d s o f p o p u la r ju s tic e .7 W e wish to
em p h asize th a t for th e se (a n d o th e r) fo u n d a tio n a l th e o rists o f th e
E u ro p ean state form , th e state itself was seen as always in d a n g e r o f los­
ing its h o ld over the ratio n al organization o f governance by th e force of
th e n atu ral fro m within. T h u s, dem an d s fo r p o p u la r ju stic e wrere in ter­
p re te d as a n ex p ressio n o f facets o f h u m a n n a tu re th a t h a d n o t yet
b een m astered by rationality.
A nd w h at about th e law lessness and w ilderness im ag in ed to reside
outside th e state? Instructive h e re is the c o n c e p t o f the state o f n atu re
as the necessary opposite and origin p o in t fo r the state an d th e law7. T he
fact th a t H o b b e s ([1 6 5 1 ] 1968), L ocke ([1 6 9 0 ] 1988), R ousseau
([1762] 1981), an d o th e r early theorists o f th e state im ag in ed th e state
o f n atu re th ro u g h the im ag e o f A m erica as b o th a real site o f savagery
and an id ealized prim o rd ial p lace suggests th a t we, too, sh o u ld th in k of
th e m argins o f th e state— th e “state o f n a tu re ”— as located in th e space
o f lan g u ag e a n d p ractice w h e re th e real sp aces o r sites th a t provide
im petus to th e idea of th e state o f n atu re m e e t th e m ythical o r philo­
sophical o rig in s o f the state. L ocated always on th e m argins o f w hat is
a c c e p ted as th e te rrito ry o f u n q u e s tio n e d sta te c o n tro l (a n d legiti­
m acy), th e m arg in s we e x p lo re in this b o o k a re sim u ltan eo u sly sites
w here n a tu re can be im ag in ed as wild a n d u n c o n tro lle d a n d w h ere the
state is co n stan tly refo u n d in g its m odes o f o rd e r an d law m aking. T hese
sites are n o t m erely territo rial: they are also, a n d perh ap s m o re im p o r­
tantly, sites o f practice on w hich law an d o th e r state practices a re colo­
nized by o th e r form s o f re g u la tio n th a t e m a n a te from th e p ressin g
needs o f p o p u latio n s to secu re political a n d eco n o m ic survival.
It is im p o rta n t to u n d e rsc o re th at at o u r sem in ar at S a n ta Fe, we
did not start w ith the assu m p tio n th at we h a d a sh ared u n d e rsta n d in g
o f w hat w o u ld c o u n t as th e m argins. A lth o u g h all a u th o rs w an ted to
think b ey o n d a simply spatial m odel o f c e n te r an d periphery; th e dis-

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 T he S tate a n d I ts M argins

cussions in S anta Fe m a d e it e v id e n t th a t the re la tio n betw een sover­

eign a n d disciplinary form s o f pow er, as well as th e specific g en ealo g ies
o f p o litical an d eco n o m ic subjects, in fo rm ed o u r various ideas a b o u t
the m arg in s. O u r conversations led us to fo rm u late these issues a ro u n d
th ree co n cep ts o f m argins.
T h e first ap p ro ach gave prim acy to the idea o f m argins as p e rip h ­
eries se e n to form n a tu ra l c o n ta in e rs fo r p e o p le c o n sid e re d in su ffi­
ciently socialized in to th e law. As eth n o g ra p h e rs, we w ere in te re ste d in
u n d e rsta n d in g the specific tech n o lo g ies o f pow er th ro u g h w hich states
a tte m p t to “m an ag e” o r “pacify” th e se p o p u latio n s th ro u g h b o th fo rce
and a pedagogy o f conversion in te n d e d to tran sfo rm “unruly su b jects”
into law ful subjects o f th e state. In several cases discussed in this b o o k
(G uatem ala, Peru, S o u th A frica), m arg in al p o p u latio n s are fo rm e d o f
“in d ig e n o u s” oiP T iatural” subjects, w ho are at o n c e co n sid ered to be
fo u n d a tio n a l to p articu lar n atio n al identities an d ex clu d ed fro m these
sam e id e n titie s by th e sorts o f disciplinary know ledge th a t m ark th e m as
racially a n d civilizationally “o th e r.” In these cases, ju rid ic a l claim s to
inclusion are u n d e rm in e d in in te re stin g ways by disciplinary fo rm s o f
pow er th a t destabilize th e very d isco u rses o f b e lo n g in g th a t claim to
bind su b jects to the state an d its laws. In o th er cases (C olom bia, C h ad ,
Sierra L eo n e, S ri.L anka), th e p ed ag o g y o f conversion is played o u t in
less se ttle d ways am o n g subjects w h o have been u p ro o te d o r d isp laced
by acts o f war. In these cases, subjects are co n stitu ted juridically as p e r­
m a n e n t in h ab itan ts o f th e sam e fo rm s o f u n c o n tro lle d o r private ju s ­
tice th a t u n d e rg ird so v ereig n p o w e r in th e fo rm o f w ar a n d th e
ex cep tio n .
A se c o n d , re la te d a p p ro a c h to th e c o n c e p t o f th e m a rg in th a t
e m e rg e d fro m o u r p a p e rs an d s e m in a r discu ssio n s h in g es a ro u n d
issues o f legibility an d illegibility. L ike o th e r an th ro p o lo g ists, h e re we
begin by tak in g n o te o f th e w ell-know n fact that so m u c h o f the m o d e rn
state is co n stru cted th ro u g h its w ritin g practices. W e recognize th a t th e
d o c u m e n ta ry an d sta tistic s-g a th e rin g p ractices o f th e state a re all
in te n d e d , in som e sense, to co n so lid ate state co n tro l over subjects, p o p ­
ulations, territories, an d lives. In o u r sem in ar discussions, how ever, we
soon re a liz ed th at o u r e th n o g ra p h ie s w orked ag ain st th e n o tio n th a t
the state is som ehow “a b o u t” its legibility. R ather, o u r papers seem ed to
p o in t in ste a d to th e m an y d iffe re n t spaces, fo rm s, an d p ra c tic e s

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V e e n a D as and D eborah P o o le

th ro u g h w hich th e state is co n tin u ally both ex p e rie n c ed and u n d o n e

th ro u g h th e illegibility o f its ow n p ractices, d o c u m e n ts, an d w ords.
A m o n g th e sorts o f p ractices we c o n sid e r are th e eco n o m ies o f dis­
p la c e m e n t, falsification, an d in te rp re ta tio n s u rro u n d in g th e circu la­
tio n an d use o f p erso n al id en tificatio n papers. P ro m in e n t h e re as well
is th e tension-filled space o f th e ch eck p o in t. As a site w here assu m p ­
tions ab o u t the security o f identity an d rights can b eco m e su d d en ly and
so m etim es vio len tly u n se ttle d , th e c h e c k p o in t led us to th in k also
a b o u t th e d istin ct tem p o ral dynam ics s u rro u n d in g p e o p le ’s in te ra c ­
tions with the state and state d o cu m en ts.
Yet a third ap p ro a c h focuses o n th e m argin as a space betw een b o d ­
ies, law, and discipline. A fter all, sovereign pow er exercised by the state
is n o t only ab o u t territories; it is also ab o u t bodies. In fact, o n e m ay co n ­
te n d th at the p ro d u c tio n of a biopolitical body is th e originary activity
o f sovereign pow er. M any a n th ro p o lo g ists have u sed the n o tio n o f
biopow er to track th e way pow er spreads its tentacles into the capillary
b ran ch es o f th e social. T he privileged site of this process has b een th e
grow ing pow er o f m edicine to d e fin e the “n o rm a l.” Yet, the larg er issue
is th e question o f how politics becom es the d o m a in in w hich “life” is
p u t in question. In th at sense, the m argins provide a particularly in te r­
estin g vantage positio n from w hich to observe th e colonization o f law
by disciplines, as w ell as the p ro d u c tio n o f c a te g o rie s o f p ath o lo g y
th ro u g h tactics th a t are parasitical o n law even as they drawr rep erto ires
o f action from it. O u r sem inar discussions on this set o f issues to o k th e
n o tio n o f the b io p o litic a l state in en tirely u n e x p e c te d d ire c tio n s as
strategies o f citizenship, technological im aginaries, an d new regions o f
lan g u ag e were analyzed as co-constructing the state an d the m argins.
T hese th ree concepts o f th e m argin all suggest different m o d es o f
occupying m argins th an m ight b e to ld by a sim ple story o f exclusion. In
th e rem ain d er o f this in tro d u ctio n , we consider how th e au th o rs in this
boo k trace these d ifferen t senses o f th e m argin in th e ir eth n o g rap h ic
w ork and how in so d o in g they draw on and rearticu late thinking ab o u t
th e state, sovereignty, an d b io p o litics in re c e n t political theory. T h e
c h ap ters are n o t organized a ro u n d o n e or the o th e r concept o f m a r­
gins. T hese th ree n o tio n s are p re se n t b u t have d ifferen t w eights in each
ch ap ter. In the follow ing sections, we ask how th e logic of e x c e p tio n
o p erates in relatio n to the m argins, how eco n o m ic an d political citi­

o
 T h e S ta te and I t s M ar g in s

zenship is claim ed, an d h o w we u n d erstan d th e w orking o f the biopo­

litical state fro m the p ersp ectiv es o f reg io n s w hose e x p e rie n c es have
n o t n o rm ally inform ed this set o f co n cep tu al issues.

LAW, M A R G I N S , A N D E X C E P T I O N
R e c e n t a n th ro p o lo g ic a l w ork has d o n e m u ch to illu m in a te the
co n tex ts in w hich war a n d o th e r form s o f collective violence are exper­
ien ced as e ith e r states o f crisis o r states o f ex cep tio n . T hus, a n th ro p o lo ­
gists h av e reflected on h o w th e contexts o f civil war, g e n e ra l political
v io len ce, a u th o rita ria n ru le , a n d e m erg en cy pow ers sh a p e p e o p le ’s
sense o f com m unity, self, a n d political fu tu re (for exam ple, Das et al.
2000, 2001; Feldm an 1991; F erin e 2001). A t stake h ere as well has been
an e x te n d e d discussion o f th e ways in w hich violence an d w ar shape the
very te rm s in w hich e th n o g ra p h y can tak e place (fo r ex am p le,
N o rd stro m 1995). In this lite ra tu re , the ex cep tio n tends to be treated
as r b o u n d e d entity o r fo rm o f em ergency pow er, acknow ledged as an
increasingly frequent, yet som ehow a b e rra n t face o f the m o d e rn states
in w hich eth n o g rap h ers w ork.
W hile o u r own w ork h as ben efited in m u ltip le ways from these sorts
o f discussions, o u r c o n cep t o f the m argin goes well beyond th e sense of
“e x c e p tio n ” as an ev en t th a t can be c o n fin e d to p a rtic u la r kinds o f
spaces o r p erio d s in tim e, o r a co n d itio n th a t stands o p p o se d , som e­
how, to “n o rm a l” form s o f state power. R ather, we draw on th e very dif­
feren t a p p ro a c h to the e x c e p tio n articulated by W alter B enjam in, Carl
S chm itt, a n d , m ost recently, G iorgio A gam ben, whose w ork has been
en g ag ed by an th ro p o lo g ists in terested in q u estio n s o f sovereignty and
biopow er.
In his reth in k in g o f th e p ro b le m of sovereignty and th e exception,
A gam ben (1998) has resu scitated the figure o f homo sacer, an obscure
figure o f a rc h a ic R o m an law, as th e e m b o d im e n t of “b a re life,” in
o rd e r to re th in k sovereignty as exercised, n o t over territo ries, b u t over
life a n d d e a th . F urther, th is life is “b a re ” b ecau se it can be tak en by
an y o n e w ith o u t any m e d ia tio n fro m law a n d w ith o u t in c u rrin g the
guilt o f h o m icid e. H o m o sacer, th en , is th e p erso n w ho can be killed
but not sacrificed. A gam ben q u o te s the w ords o f P om peius Festus: “T he
sacred m a n is th e one w h o m th e people have judged on a c c o u n t of a
crim e. It is n o t p erm itted to sacrifice this m an , vet he w ho kills him will
V eena D as and D eborah P oole

n o t be c o n d e m n e d for h o m ic id e ” (71). B are life, then, tu rn s o u t to be

so m e th in g c o n stitu ted in so m e senses as “b e fo re th e law .” B ecause
hom o sacer, th is.e m b o d im e n t o f bare life, c a n n o t be sacrificed , h e is
outside th e purview of divine law, and becau se o ne who kills him cannot
be accused o f hom icide, h e is also outside th e purview o f h u m a n law.
We will n o t go into th e questions o f h isto rical accuracy h e re — there
are p laces in w hich A g a m b e n ’s text is in d e e d bare. E x a m p le s are
offered in a cryptic fashion, b u t they are n o t elaborated. F o r instance,
in sev en teen th -cen tu ry tex ts o n sovereignty, it was the f a th e r ’s pow er
over the life an d death o f th e son that re p re se n te d legal n o tio n s o f sov-.
ereignty (see F ilm er 1949), a n d A gam ben rightly draws a tte n tio n to this
idea. B ut h e does not discuss w hether th e fa th e r’s exercise o f sovereign
pow er is an exam ple o f p o w e r over bare life, o r w h eth er in ste a d th e son
is to be se e n as a legally co n stitu ted subject. Similarly, A g a m b e n ’s dis­
cussion o f th e H abeas C o rp u s Act of 1679 begs the q u e stio n w hether
th e p e rso n w hose “b o d y ” is su p p o sed to b e p ro d u c e d in c o u rt is a
legally c o n stitu te d subject o r a bare body strip p e d of all social an d legal
m arks (F itzp atrick 2001). All o f these a re in tric a te q u estio n s. F or the
m om ent, w h a t we want to take from A g a m b e n ’s theory is th e im plica­
tion that law produces c e rta in bodies as “k illab le” because th ey are posi­
tioned by th e law itself as p rio r to the in stitu tio n o f law.
For A g am b en , the fig u re o f hom o sacer holds the key to an u n d er­
standing o f sovereignty a n d m o d ern p o litical an d legal co d es because
o f what it reveals o f the so v ereig n ’s pow er to reso rt to a b o u n d less state
o f ex cep tio n . H ere, A g am b en draws on th e w ork of B en jam in ([1978]
1986) an d S ch m itt ([1922] 1988) to a rg u e th a t the state o f exception
provides a th e o ry o f so v ereig n ty th at is b o th inside a n d o u tsid e law.
B ecause th e sovereign c a n n o t by d efin itio n b e b o u n d to th e law, the
political c o m m u n ity itse lf beco m es sp lit a lo n g th e d iffe re n t axes of
m em b ersh ip an d inclusion th a t may run a lo n g given fault lines o f race,
g en d er, a n d eth n icity o r m ay p ro d u c e new categ o ries o f p eo p le
included in th e political com m unity b u t d e n ie d m em b ersh ip in politi­
cal term s. T h e issue is n o t th a t m em bership is sim ply d e n ie d b u t rath er
th a t individuals are re co n stitu ted th ro u g h special laws as p o p u latio n s
on w hom n ew form s o f reg u latio n can be exercised. A lth o u g h th e split
betw een in clu sio n and m e m b e rsh ip may b e clear-cut— as, fo r instance,
in the ex clu sio n of certain races o r e th n ic itie s from citizen sh ip — it is
 T h e State and I t s M argins

w ell to re m e m b e r th a t states o f ex cep tio n , o f w hich w ar is th e classic

ex am p le, can red raw b o u n d aries so that those w ho w ere secu re in their
citizenship can b e expelled o r reco n stitu ted as d ifferen t k in d s o f bod­
ies. T h e p arad ig m atic ex am p le o f this for A g am b en is th e c o n c e n tra ­
tio n cam p, w h ere Jew s were first stripped o f th e ir citizenship a n d then
c o n fin ed to th e cam p and su b je c te d to its atrocities. O th er ex am p les of
su ch exceptions fro m “inside” in clu d e the in te rn m e n t o f A m erican cit­
iz e n s o f J a p a n e se d escen t d u r in g th e S e c o n d W orld W ar, o r m ore
re c e n t legislation co n cern in g su ch categories as “terro rist.”
T hus, a lth o u g h A gam ben p resen ts the fig u re o f hom o sacer at least
in som e instances as if it in h a b ite d som e kind o f presocial life, it would
a p p e a r th at k illab le bodies a re , in fact, p ro d u c e d through a com plex
legal process o f ren d erin g th em as bare life (Fitzpatrick 2001). T his may
explain why o n e can detect two d ifferen t m odalities o f rule in A g am b en ’s
co n cep tio n o f b a re life. In so m e places, he assigns it to specific spaces
(th e c o n c e n tra tio n cam p) a n d figures o f m o d e rn life (re fu g e es), as
instantiations o f how bare life is em bodied a n d acted u p o n in m odern
fo rm s o f sta te h o o d ; in o th e r in stan ces, he seem s to see b a re life as a
th re a t held in abeyance and a state into which any citizen could fall. This
latter u n d erstan d in g o f bare life as the exception invites a tte n tio n to one
sense o f m argins th a t we em ploy h ere, as sites th a t d o n o t so m u ch lie out­
side the state b u t rather, like rivers, ru n th ro u g h its body.
O n one p o in t, however, w e d iffer from A gam ben, for w e feel that
states o f ex cep tio n , differences betw een m em b ersh ip and in clu sio n , or
figures that resid e b o th inside a n d outside th e law, do n o t m ak e their
a p p e a ra n c e as g h o sd y sp ectral p resen ces fro m th e past b u t ra th e r as
p ra c tic e s e m b e d d e d in everyday life in th e p re se n t. In th is volum e,
th e n , we su g g est two ways in w h ich A g a m b e n ’s n o tio n o f e x c e p tio n
fram es o u r e th n o g ra p h ic e x p lo ratio n s o f th e m argins. First, o u r search
fo r th e m argins o ften settles o n those practices th a t seem to b e about
th e continual re fo u n d in g of law th ro u g h form s o f violence a n d a u th o r­
ity th a t can be c o n stru e d as b o th extrajudicial a n d outside, o r p rio r to,
th e state. This re fo u n d in g h a p p e n s bo th th ro u g h th e p ro d u c tio n o f kil­
lab le bodies, as p o sited by A g am b en , and th ro u g h the sorts o f pow er
em b o d ie d by fig u res such as th e policem an o r local “boss.” L ike hom o
sacer, these fig u res enjoy a c e rta in im m unity to law precisely because
they are co n fig u red as existing o u tsid e or p rio r to th e law.

3
V ee na D as an d D e b o r a h P oole

F or K ant, Hegel,, a n d o th er liberal theorists, th e origins of law are

traced to th e fo u n d a tio n a l and u ltim ately private (o r “n atu ral’') form s
o f law th at p reced ed th e state (see A sad 2003). In o u r eth n o g rap h ies,
this q u estio n of the o rig in s of law em erg es, n o t as th e m yth of the state,
but ra th e r in the fo rm o f m en w hose abilities to re p re se n t the state o r
to en fo rce its laws a re them selves p re m ise d on th e m e n 's reco g n ized
ability to m ove with im pun ity betw een appeals to th e form of law a n d
forms o f extrajudicial practice that are clearly construed as lying outside,
o r p rio r to, th e state. E xam ples o f su c h figures in c lu d e the P eruvian
gamonal, o r local stro n g m an , who rep resen ts the state th ro u g h both p a r­
ticular form s of incivility and m odes o f violence th at are m arked as ille­
gal (P o o le ); C o lo m b ia n p aram ilitary forces th a t a c t b o th as an
extension o f the arm y an d as conduits fo r the flow o f arm s to drug lo rd s
o r p lan tatio n s (S an fo rd ); and brokers w ho inhabit th e econom ic fro n ­
tiers d escrib ed by R o itm an . Such fig u res o f local a u th o rity re p re se n t
bo th h ig h ly p e rso n a liz e d form s o f p riv ate pow er a n d th e supposedly
im personal o r n e u tra l authority of th e state. It is precisely because they
also act as re p re se n ta tiv e s o f th e sta te th at they a re able to m ove
across— an d thus m u d d y — the seem ingly clear divide separating legal
and extralegal form s o f p u n ish m en t a n d en fo rcem en t. In m any ways,
these local figures w ho build their ch arism a and p o w er through idiom s
o f rudeness, incivility, a n d threat are sim ilar to the “big m e n ” described
by G o d elier and S tra th e rn (1991). L ike the “big m e n ,” they do n o t so
m uch e m b o d y “tra d itio n a l” a u th o rity as a m u ta tio n o f tra d itio n a l
authority m ade possible by the in te rm itte n t pow er o f th e state. Such fig­
ures, w ho ap p ear in d iffe re n t guises in th e different eth n o g rap h ic c o n ­
texts o f th e chapters in this volum e— as brokers, w heeler-dealers, local
big m en, param ilitary— rep resen t at o n c e the fading o f th e state’s ju ris­
diction a n d its c o n tin u a l re fo u n d in g th ro u g h its (n o t so m y th ic)
a p p ro p riatio n o f p riv ate ju stice and violence. In this sense, they are th e
public secret th ro u g h w hich the p erso n s w ho em body law, bureaucracy,
and violence that to g e th e r constitute th e state m ove beyond the realm
o f m yth to becom e jo in e d in the reality o f everyday life.
C o n sid e ra tio n o f th ese p e rso n a e help s us u n d e rs ta n d how th e
fro n tier betw een th e legal and extralegal runs rig h t w ithin the offices
an d in stitu tio n s th a t em b o d y the state. D as,-for in sta n c e , offers an
exam ple o f a p o licem an , known for his fierce integrity, w ho com es u p

4
 T h e S t a te and I ts M a r g i n s

against a pow erful m afia-like o p eratio n an d nearly loses his life. D espite
the fact th a t he is a fu n ctio n ary o f th e state, he, too, is convinced th a t
the ju d ic ia l process is in cap ab le of p in n in g the crim e o n th e p ersons
re sp o n sib le , an d th u s h e p ro ceed s to v io late the p ro c e d u ra l law in
o rd e r to h an d o u t w hat h e considers to be substantive ju stice. T he sam e
p olice officer, w hen involved in th e s ta te ’s co u n te rin su rg e n c y o p e ra ­
tions ag ain st w hat a re d e fin e d as m ilitan t o r terro rist organizations, is
killed by his own tru sted deputy, becau se w hen police p en e tra te these
m ilitan t o r terrorist organizations to fight them , th e lin es betw een the
te rro ris t a n d the p o lic e m a n b e c o m e b lu rre d . As in J e g a n a th a n ’s
d escrip tio n , so in D as, state practices in em ergency zones, o r states o f
ex cep tio n , can n o t b e u n d e rsto o d in term s o f law and transgression, b u t
ra th e r in term s o f p ractices th at lie sim ultaneously o u tsid e and inside
th e law. As a n e m b o d im e n t o f th e state o f ex c e p tio n , th e p o licem an
c h a lle n g e s, n o t this o r th a t law, b u t th e very p o ssib ility o f law itself
(B enjam in [1978] 1986; D errid a 1992; Taussig 1997). By engaging this
p h ilo so p h ical d ilem m a at th e origin o f th e state a n d law as an e th n o ­
grap h ic p roblem , th e a u th o rs in this b o o k m ake clear th a t this p ro b lem .
o f th e o rig in o f law is n o t a ghostly sp e c te r from th e past, as in, fo r
ex am p le, A g am b en ’s a p p ro p ria tio n o f th e figure o f h o m o sacer from
R om an law, b u t ra th e r th e result o f th e co n crete p ractices in w hich life
and la b o r are en g ag ed (see R abinow 2002).
A seco n d area in w hich o u r w ork addresses th eo ries o f sovereignty
and th e exception co n c e rn s practices th a t have to d o w ith the securing
and u n d o in g o f id en tities. H ere, a p a rtic u la r area o f in te re st concerns
the d o c u m e n ta tio n th ro u g h w hich th e state claim s to secu re identities,
b u t w h ich in p ra c tic e o fte n circu lates in ways th a t u n d e rm in e th ese
sam e id en tities an d assurances. A m ong th e various k in d s o f d o cu m en ts
issued by g o vernm ents a n d supposed to act as g u aran tees o f belo n g in g ­
ness, passports are th e m ost elite. T h e m ajority o f th e p o p u latio n , how ­
ever, e n c o u n te rs th e sta te th ro u g h d o c u m e n ts su ch as ratio n card s,
id en tity cards, crim inal com plaints, c o u rt papers, b irth an d death cer­
tificates, an d First In fo rm a tio n R ep o rts filed in p o lice stations. T h ese
d o cu m en ts b ear th e d o u b le sign o f th e sta te ’s distance a n d its p e n e tra ­
tion in to th e life o f th e everyday. In d e e d , several scholars have recently
a rg u e d th a t it is th ro u g h these d o c u m e n ta ry p ractices th a t th e state
m akes th e p o p u latio n legible to itself, creatin g w hat has b een referred

*5
V e e n a D as and D e b o r a h P oole

to as a legibility effect (J. Scott 1998). T ro u illo t (2001:126), for exam ­

ple, suggests that th e legibility effect is th e “p ro d u c tio n o f bo th a lan­
g u ag e a n d a k n o w led g e for g o v e rn a n c e and o f th e o re tic a l an d
em pirical tools that classify and reg u late collectivities.” T h e re is indeed
a vast literatu re on th e classificatory a n d carto g rap h ic p ractices o f the
state th a t points to th e k n o w led g e/p o w er alliance in th e new m odels o f
g o v ern an ce th at arise w ith the co n stru ctio n o f the id e a o f population
(see A p p ad u rai 1996; D irks 2001; F o u cau lt 1979; M itchell 1988; P errot
and W o o lf 1984; J. S co tt 1998; R. S m ith 1996).
W h a t in terests us h e re , how ever, is n o t how th e sta te m akes the
p o p u la tio n legible to itself b u t how th ese docu m en ts b e c o m e em bod­
ied in form s o f life th ro u g h w hich ideas o f subjects a n d citizens com e to
circulate am o n g those w ho use these d o cu m en ts. F or ex am p le, in h er
c h a p te r in this b o o k , M arian e F e rin e n o tes how sta te d o cu m en ts
shadow a n d co n strict m ig ran ts, trav elers, an d refu g ees as they m ove
across d ifferen t sorts o f b o rd ers and checkpoints. As a n exam ple, she
tells o f a m an whose o rig in al, and now invalid, Sierra L e o n e a n identity
card was based on a false identity and b irth date. To claim deterritorial-
ized citizen sh ip as a S ierra L eonean w ar refugee— an d th u s to gain cer­
tain rig h ts w ithin o th e r, h o st states— th e m an m u st e m b ra c e th at
id en tity as th e only o n e o n w hich his n ew status as a re fu g e e can be
fo rg ed . H is identity as a S ierra L e o n e a n citizen, th e n , exists in an
inverse re la tio n to th e S ierra L e o n e a n sta te ’s ability to secu re that
identity .8 In o th er sto ries told by Sierra L eo n ean travelers a n d m igrants,
F erm e le a rn s how p a ssp o rts issued by th e British d u rin g th e colonial
reg im e b e c a m e in v alid o n in d e p e n d e n c e , thus fo rc in g citizens w ho
were traveling to scram b le to acquire n ew docum ents w ith in im possibly
short tim e fram es, fro m consulates th a t d id n o t yet exist. O f particular
im p o rta n c e h ere is th e tem p o ral e x p e rie n c e o f the state. T hus, w hen
the state in terv en es to rev o k e identity p a p e rs for seem in g ly arbitrary
reaso n s, F e rm e ’s in fo rm a n t feels p o w erless as h e is fo rc e d to wait
m o n th s a n d to p o stp o n e scholarships, w ork, and travel p lan s in a des­
p e ra te a tte m p t to a c q u ire new id e n tity p ap ers an d c o n fo rm to the
new a n d seem ingly a rb itra ry dem an d s o f th e state. In su ch cases, the
law is e x p e rie n c e d as a largely arb itrary im position w h o se effects are
felt as w h at Ferm e d escrib es as conflicting “sp atio tem p o ralities.”

6
 T h e S tate and I t s M argins

P oole’s c h a p te r describes sim ilar tem p o ral disruptions in th e ways

Peruvian p easan ts engage th e state through th e endless ancTseem ingly
arbitrary flow o f p ap erw o rk th a t constitutes th e ir ex p erien ces o f “ju s­
tice.” In th e areas she describes, legal cases rarely reach co n clu sio n , and
“ju stice” itself is m o re com m only spoken of, n o t as so m eth in g th at can
b e obtained, b u t ra th e r as th e ep h em eral lin k th a t binds peasan ts to a
state w hose p ro m ise o f ju stic e takes th e form o f endless p ro c e d u re s and
th e always inconclusive p ap erw o rk th at drifts a m o n g d ifferen t instances
o f the ju d icial system. T he p ed ag o g ic aspects o f th e state are m anifested
h ere, not th ro u g h school tex tb o o k s on citizenship, but ra th e r through
th e practices by w hich subjects a re m ade to le a rn th e gap b etw een m em ­
bership an d belonging. P oole shows that th e re is som e su b stan ce to the
idea that th e spaces these p easan ts inhabit a re m arginal spaces, with an
absence o f ro ad s, schools, o r o th e r signs o f th e presence o f th e state.
W hat allows th e state never to b e h eld responsible to its ow n prom ises,
however, is th e co m b in atio n o f this physical lo catio n an d o th e r ideas
ab o u t the “n a tu ra l” m argiriality o f indigenous peasants.
T he te m p o ra l c o n fig u ra tio n an d e x p e rie n c e o f such e n c o u n te rs
w ith the arb itrary pow er o f th e state can also b e th o u g h t o f as the highly
m obile spaces th a t P rad eep J e g a n a th a n aptly describes in his c h a p te r as
“m aps o f a n tic ip a tio n .” T h e se a re spaces w h e re th e p ed ag o g ic claim s
an d assurances o f law an d th e n a tio n beco m e u n settled by state prac­
tices. For Je g a n a th a n , as fo r o th e r authors in th e volum e, th e m ilitary
o r police c h e c k p o in t e m e rg e s as a site fro m w h ich this tro u b lin g of
expectations a n d legibilities ru b s u p against th e norm alcy o f th e every­
day. Je g a n a th a n evokes th e m o st ordinary o f events in the p ro cess o f a
daily c o m m u te in th e city o f C o lo m b o in Sri L anka: a c o m m u te r is
sto p p ed at a c h eck p o in t fo r h is identity card. W h a t could this m ean in a
co untry th a t u n til recendy w as in th e m idst o f a civil war? W h e re terro r­
ists, insurgents, m ilitants, o r fre e d o m fighters (th e ap p ellatio n dep en d s
u p o n how o n e read s the co n flict) use tech n iq u es o f te rro r/m a rty rd o m
such as suicide bom bings a n d w h ere security forces, in tu rn , u se sim ilar
tech n iq u es o f te rro r co u n terin su rg en cy , th e q u estio n , w h e re a re the
b o rd ers o f th e state? is fra u g h t w ith u n c e rta in ty a n d risk, fo r b o rd e r­
m ak in g p ra c tic e s ru n w ithin th e political a n d social te rrito ry ra th e r
th a n outside it.

17
 V eena D as and D ebo ra h P oole

T his m obility in h e re n t to the spaces an d settings in w hich b o rd e r­

m aking p ractices e m e rg e destabilizes th e in h e re n tly te rrito ria l la n ­
guages o f co n tain m en t a n d sovereignty th a t seem to b in d th e nation to
the state. W riting a b o u t ch eck p o in ts in co n tested te rrito rie s in
C olom bia, fo r exam ple, V ictoria S anford describes how different m ili­
tary forces com pete fo r co n tro l of c o n c re te territories. In these territo ­
ries th a t have becom e in som e ways tru ly “m arginal” to th e state, th e
u n certain ties o f o n e’s ow n position w ith respect to th e guaran tees an d
pro tectio n o f state law a re fu rth er co m p licated by the deliberately illeg­
ible id e n titie s an d lo c a tio n s of the p aram ilitaries w h o are sim u l­
taneously o f an d n o t o f th e state. In h e r reflectio n s o n P eruvian
checkpoints, D eborah P o o le describes how th e in ten tio n s and even th e
existence o f th e state b e c o m e su d d en ly illegible d u rin g the ten se
m o m en ts w hen id e n tity cards are s u rre n d e re d to sta te officials.
A lthough su ch spaces a re often fleeting a n d u n p red ictab le— as w hen
som eone in a position o f authority su d d en ly stops so m eo n e to request
do cu m en ts in the street— they can also b eco m e in a sense routinized in
the p e rm a n e n c v and visibility of phvsical checkpoints. As Jeg a n a th a n
points o u t in his chapter, it is through th ese “m aps of an ticip atio n ” th at
residents o f a city or w ar zone com e to an ticip ate an d in tern alize th e
u n p re d ic ta b ility o f v io le n c e precisely th ro u g h the p re d ic ta b ility o f
physical sites w here th e state exerts its ow n seem ingly arbitrary 7 claim s
to sovereignty over territo ries that it clearly can n o t co n tro l.
T h e m arg in s so ev id en t in the ch eck p o in t can also p re se n t th em ­
selves in th e b u re a u c ra tic ro u tin es o f m o d e rn daily life. L aw rence
C ohen p ro v id es an e x a m p le o f such a sp ace in his c h a p te r on th e
tech n o -scien tific im ag in ary o f the o p e ra tio n fu n ctio n s in India. H e
describes th e fu n ctio n in g o f a trade in o rg an s that, like th e space o f th e
ex cep tio n , effectively b lu rs the line b etw een the leg al an d illegal.
Because b o th the sale a n d donation o f o rg an s by non-kin w ere legally
b an n ed in 1994 in In d ia , surgeons a n d o th e rs who o p e ra te d in th e
national a n d in tern atio n al organ m ark et p u t pressure o n th e state to
define p ro c e d u re s for au th o rizin g perm issible form s o f o rg a n d o n atio n
outside legally defined d eg rees of kinship. T h e resulting au th o rizatio n
com m ittees w ere assigned th e task of co n sid erin g ex cep tio n al cases in
which o rg a n s could b e d o n a te d o u tsid e th e sa n c tio n e d d eg rees o f
kinship. C o h e n gives a su b tle analysis o f th e wavs th e se co m m ittees

8
 T h e S tat e and I ts M argins

operate to create fictions o f overw helm ing affection betw een u n related
p eo p le in o rd e r to allow o rg a n “d o n a tio n s .” T h e p u b lic secret, o f
course, is th a t th e fictions o f relatedness an d overw helm ing affection
betw een re c ip ie n t an d d o n o r are c re a ted to cover th e illegal sale of
organs. Effectively, the stru c tu re of ex cep tio n s operates to draw a line
betw een m em b ersh ip an d inclusion th at identifies those citizens who
are “b io av ailab le” and th u s co u ld b e c o m e fictitious “d o n o rs ” in an
u n d e rg ro u n d econom y .9 M oreover, it en ab les certain discursive form s
to em erge in w hich citizenship is claim ed th ro u g h acts o f “sacrifice” on
the part o f th e p o o r— a p o in t we explore in g reater detail later in this
in tro d u ctio n .

MARGINS ARE N O T IN E R T
In th e p reced in g section, we tried to show the intim ate co n n ectio n
betw een law an d states o f exception. We a rg u e d that instead o f privileg­
in g m etaphysical form s o f re a so n in g in u n d e rs ta n d in g sovereignty,
a n th ro p o lo g y focuses o n th e w orkings o f th e everyday. It is in these
processes o f everyday life th a t we see how th e state is reco n fig u red at
the m argins. M argins are n o t simply p e rip h e ra l spaces. Som etim es, as
in the case o f th e b o rd ers o f a n atio n ’s states, they d eterm in e w hat lies
inside an d w7h a t lies outside. O th e r tim es, as in the case o f checkpoints,
they ru n th ro u g h th e p o litical body o f th e state. B orders an d check­
points, as we saw, are spaces in which sovereignty, as th e rig h t over life
an d d eath , is ex p erien ced in the m ode o f potentiality— th u s creatin g
affects o f p a n ic an d a sen se o f d a n g e r ev en if “n o th in g h a p p e n s .”
Paradoxically, these spaces o f exception are also those in w hich th e cre­
ativity o f th e m argins is visible, as altern ativ e form s o f eco n o m ic an d
political actio n are instituted. To suggest th a t m argins are spaces o f cre­
ativity is n o t to say that form s o f politics a n d econom ics o n th e m argins,
often fash io n ed o u t of th e n e e d to survive, are n o t frau g h t w ith terrible
dangers. It is, however, to draw attention to th e fact that th o u g h certain
pop u latio n s are p ath o lo g ized thro u g h various kinds o f pow er/know l-
edge practices, they do n o t subm it to these conditions passively. W hile
th e w ork o f su b a lte rn h isto ria n s has d o n e m u ch to em p h asize the
agency o f su b a lte rn g ro u p s in im p o rta n t h isto rical ju n c tu re s , the
can o n ical statu s o f resistan ce in these stu d ie s ob scu res th e relatio n
betw een th ese critical m o m e n ts and everyday life (D as 1989). Even

J9
V eena D as and D eborah P oo le _

w hen everyday life b eco m es th e focus o f analysis, as in th e w ork o f

Jam es Scott (1985) on everyday form s o f p e a sa n t resistance, it appears
th a t agency is seen p rim arily in acts o f resistan ce. O u r em phasis,
instead, is o n th e ways in w hich the co n cep tu al b o u n d aries o f th e state
are ex ten d ed an d rem ade in securing survival o r seek in g ju stice in the
everyday. T h is does n o t m ean th at we c o n sid e r all kinds o f m argins to
be som ehow h o m o g en eo u s, w ith categories o f m inorities, refugees, o r
im m igrants essentially sim ilar. Rather, we tak e th e in d eterm in ate char­
acter of m arg in s to break o p e n the solidity o ften attributed to the state.
Take R o itm a n ’s d e sc rip tio n o f e c o n o m ic strategies follow ed by
m arginalized youths as they deal with various regulatory’ processes o f
th e state. W ith the d e c lin e o f tra d itio n a l m ark ets in C h a d , it is the
em erg en t m arkets in drugs, sm all arm s, c o n trab an d , and m ercenaries
th at provide o p p o rtu n itie s fo r secu rin g liv elih o o d s in re g io n s devas­
tated by o n g o in g wars, d ro u g h ts, and o th e r eco n o m ic disasters. For
obvious re a so n s, these m ark ets flo u rish o n th e b o rd e rs betw een
nations. R efu sin g to n am e th ese eco n o m ic o p p o rtu n itie s as parts of
“inform al” o r “black” econom ies, R oitm an conceptualizes th e youths’
strategies as border-m aking practices in w hich we witness, n o t so m uch
th e collapse o f regulation, b u t th e p lu ralizatio n o f regulatory au th o ri­
ties. Such p lu ralizatio n leads to an in stitu tio n alizatio n o f re n t extrac­
tion by the state, even w hen this process o ccu rs outside its fo rm al legal
procedures. T h e form s o f sociality dev elo p ed on these b o rd e rs are, o f
course, ex trem ely dangerous. B ut they show th at m argins, as th e literal
b o u n d aries o f the state, a re also the spaces o n wiiich th e co n cep tu al
b o u n d aries o f th e econom y are crafted a n d ex ten d ed . M uch political
rhetoric w ould characterize such form s o f eco n o m ic activity as “co rru p ­
tio n ” an d in te rp re t it as ev id en ce o f th e w eak en in g o f th e state.
H ow ever, fro m th e p ersp ectiv e o f th e y o u th s R oitm an stu d ie s, such
strategies o f securing livelihood by utilizing th e in d e te rm in a te charac­
ter o f the b o rd e rs provide a m eans o f c la im in g eco n o m ic rights. At
stake is th e ch allen g e to state m onopoly o v er taxation o r com m ercial
licenses an d th e effort to ap p ro p riate som e o f these practices to secure
econom ic survival. T he pluralization o f reg u latio n does n o t create sim­
ply a binary opposition betw een the state a n d m argins, n o r can we say
th at the state is unable to have its writ over th e m argins, for it, too, m an­
ages to e x tra c t re n t th ro u g h this p lu ralizatio n and ex ten sio n o f con­

20
 T h e S tate and I t s M argins

ceptual b o u n d a rie s o f the econom y. W hat th e co n sid eratio n o f m argins

enables us to see is how eco n o m ic citizenship, re n t ex traction, an d m ul­
tip le regulatory regim es are necessary p arts o f th e fu n c tio n in g o f the
state, m uch as th e exception is necessary fo r th e u n d e rsta n d in g o f law.
In F erm e’s c h a p te r we g e t fu rth e r evidence o f the “arb itrarin ess at
th e heart o f commandement ” w hich she shows to be characteristic o f the
colonial state. H ow ever, th is a rb itra rin ess b eco m es a re so u rc e , as
F erm e’s in fo rm a n t reveals, fo r it has facilitated alternative citizenship
o p tio n s fo r S ie rra L eo n ean s. M igrants e x p lo it em erg en cy m easu res
taken to p ro te c t th em as w ar refugees, an d in som e cases they are suc­
cessful in u sin g o p p o rtu n ities provided by th e capricious an d arbitrary
laws, forging n ew form s o f eco n o m ic a n d p o litical c itiz e n sh ip th at
som etim es go well beyond th e territorial b o u n d a rie s o f th e states. For
others, such asT efugees w ho are refused asylum o r w ho die in transit,
th e outcom es are terrible— attestin g to th e d an g ers o f w ork at th e bor­
d ers (see M alkki 1995). T hus, fo rR o itm a n a n d Ferine, th e possibilities
an d limits o f th ese new b o rd er-b en d in g p ractices p ro rid e an im p o rtan t
vantage p o in t fo r u n d e rsta n d in g translocal processes th ro u g h w hich
th e state is ex p erien ced .
Sim ilar ev id e n c e o f th e creativity o f th e m arg in s at th e political
level m aybe seen in the w ork o f Peace C o m m u n ities set u p by displaced
populations in C olum bia. S an fo rd describes how p o p u latio n s displaced
by the actions o f th e p aram ilitary have trie d to create zones o f safety,
off-lim its to b o th g u errillas a n d arm ed p e rs o n n e l a u th o riz e d by th e
state. W ith in c re a sin g s u p p o rt from h u m a n -rig h ts g ro u p s at the
national an d in tern atio n al level, such co m m u n ities (again fu n ctio n in g
at th e literal m arg in s o f th e state) have re c o n fig u re d th e ir spaces to
reflect th e ir ow n im peratives. T h e ir form s o f political a ctio n use the
global rh e to ric o f h u m an rig h ts. H ow ever, in stead o f m a k in g claim s
th ro u g h co u rts o f law or in tern atio n al tribunals, they give u rg en cy to the
n eed to secu re safety at th e com m unity ra th e r th an the individual level.
A shforth’s c h a p te r offers a n o th e r ex am p le o f the specific local ways
in which ideas o f justice o p e ra te . H e arg u es th a t an increase in witch­
craft accusations am ong b lack pop u latio n s in S outh A frica ravaged by
intolerably h ig h AIDS p re v a le n c e and m o rtality rates is ex p ressed in
dem ands th a t th e p o st-ap arth eid state show its responsiveness to the
suffering by d o in g so m eth in g ab o u t b o th AIDS and w itchcraft. But as
 V ee na D as an d D eborah P oole

A shforth notes, p u n ish in g offenders for p erfo rm in g w itch craft would

re in stitu te colonial a n d ap arth eid -reg im e prejudices a g a in st p o p u lar
practices o f black p o p u la tio n s and w ould crim inalize th ese practices.
T hus, w itch craft accu satio n s have to b e re fo rm u la te d as so m eth in g
else— kid n ap p in g , ab d u ctio n , or m urder. T h e point is th a t pressure to
reconfigure state systems tow ard different notions o fju stice is generated
from th e everyday c o n c e rn s o f those in h a b itin g a d iffe re n t m o d e of
sociality from that im ag in ed in the ratio n al bu reau cratic ap p aratu s of
the state. It is interesting to recall here th at even in the classic W eberian
notion o f rationality, law includes lay ju stice w ithin its processes through
the role o f the jury, for W eber saw the ju ry as having taken over the role
of the oracle. (“Because o f th e jury, som e prim itive irratio n ality o f the
tech n iq u e o f decision an d , therefore, o f the law itself, has th u s contin­
ued to survive in E nglish p ro c e d u re even up to the p re s e n t tim e”
[W eber 1978:763].) Since th e “prim itive irrationality” th a t so irritated
W eber functions at the h e a rt o f state law, o n e could treat the state, for
certain purposes, as lying on the m argins o f th e citizen-body.
Several o th e r au th o rs in this volum e arg u e that a d iffe re n t picture
o fju stic e o r com m on g o o d anirnates*activities that take p lace on the
m argins o f th e state. T his is n o t simply a m a tte r o f “folk” n o tio n s o f law
and ju stic e versus state-san ctio n ed ideas o fju stic e . R ath er, w hat is at
stake in these sites is fo rm ed through th e experiences o f local w orlds—
although we m ust be clear that local w orlds an d the state d o n o t stand
as binary opposites. Even th o u g h they are locked in u n e q u a l relations,
they are en m esh ed in o n e another. T hus, on the one h a n d , law is seen
as a sign o f a distant b u t overw helm ing pow er. O n the o th e r h an d , it is
also seen as close at h a n d — so m eth in g to w hich local d e sire s can be
addressed. T hus, Poole shows how peasants in Peru invest th e ir desire
for ju stice in the state, even as the illegibility' o f the state a n d its proce­
dures fru strates these d esires, in that d o c u m e n ts necessary to secure
justice te n d to drift endlessly betw een d iffe re n t ju risd ic tio n s. We are
not saving th at pop u latio n s at the m argins are always successful in m ak­
ing the state responsiv e to th e ir notions o f justice or the c o m m o n good,
and we d o n o t wish to rom anticize the creativity' of the m argins. In fact,
as N elso n ’s ch ap ter dem onstrates, the sam e state identified as th e per­
p etrato r o f te rro r and scorched-earth policies in G uatem ala cam e to be
invested with the desire fo r justice. W hat m ight have b e e n fixed posi-
 T he S t a t e a n d I ts M argins

d ons, such as victim s an d p erp etrato rs, cam e to b e highly m obile. T h e

p o in t is not w h eth er the desires, fears, and hopes n o u rish ed in th e m ar­
gins an d then p ro je c te d onto the state are som ehow m ore ethical, ju st,
o r p u re. R ather, th e com plexity o f lived ex p erien ce inflects n o tio n s o f
ju stic e an d law w ith d ifferent kinds o f im aginaries from those available
in th e official sites an d rep resen tatio n s o f justice a n d law.1"
T h e c h a p te rs by Das and N elso n provide a d d itio n a l e x a m p le s
o f how state law is colonized by o th e r form s o f le g a l/ju rid ic a l ideas.
D as cites th e p o ig n a n t case o f w idow s from th e S iglikar c o m m u n ity
in D elhi w hose h u sb a n d s w ere killed in the 1984 riots. They trie d to
claim co m p en satio n m oney aw arded to them by th e governm ent. T h e
Siglikars lived o n th e p erip h ery o f th e city. But m o re im portantly, th eir
n o tio n s o f co m m u n ity an d ju stice w ere g ro u n d ed in different n o tio n s
o f sociality. T h e g o v ern m en t tre a te d the widows as the p ro p e r recip i­
en ts o f the co m p en satio n , b u t th e d o m in an t o p in io n in the c o m m u ­
nity was th at th e fa th e rs o f th e d e a d m en sh o u ld have receiv ed the
m oney. T h e co n flict was finally resolved by the caste Panchayat o f the
Siglikars, and th e m oney was divided equally b etw een the d isp u tan ts.
W h at is in te re stin g is th at th e a g re e m e n t was se e n as a co m p ro m ise
a n d was ex ecu ted o n stam ped c o u rt paper, as if th a t would m ak e the
a g re e m e n t valid in th e eyes o f th e law. T hus, legitim acy was so u g h t
th ro u g h state law; this com prom ise was n eith er a ttrib u te d to custom ary
law7 n o r treated as a private a g re e m e n t betw een th e concerned parties.
T h e m im icry o f th e state to give legitim acy to a n ag reem en t th a t wTas
co ercive in m any resp ects m ig h t be read as in stitu tin g the sta te as a
fetish, b u t it also attests to co m m u n ity allegiance to the idea o f state-
in stitu ted law a n d thus m anages to claim citizenship for these co m m u ­
nities. Such m arg in s w7h ere a d iffe re n t picture o f th e com m on g o o d is
p u t in to play are n o t ju st spaces th e state has yet to p en etrate: rather,
they m ay be seen as sites on w hich th e state is continually fo rm e d in
th e recesses o f everyday life.11
In N elson’s ch ap ter, we see how the illusory, trickster-like quality7of
th e state allows it to escape its prom issory notes in m akingjustice o u t of
re a c h fo r p e a sa n t subjects. In h e r acco u n t o f postw ar G u atem ala,
N elson describes how the counterinsurgency state deployed im ages of
th e d u p licito u s o r “tw o-faced’’ In d ia n to d e fe n d m ilitary in c u rsio n s
in to in d ig en o u s areas, re se ttle m e n t o f in d ig en o u s co m m u n ities into
V e e n a D as and D eborah P oole

ham lets, and d eclaratio n o f em erg en cy pow ers in larg e sectors o f th e

country. However, N elson turns this p ictu re o f the In d ia n back to th e
p ictu re o f the state a n d asks the q u estio n , why is it th a t the state is also
u n d e rsto o d to be tw o-faced, b am b o o zlin g , d e sira b le , deceptive, a n d
dangerous? T hus tu rn in g the stereotypical im age o f th e m asked m im - *
icrv o f th e state by c u n n in g tw o-faced natives o n its h ead , N e lso n ’s
eth n o g rap h y o f th e state puts it o n a highly m obile trajectory in w hich
th e state is bo th feared an d desired.
N elso n ’s a c co u n t w ould m ake us highly skeptical o f the idea th at
th e state is legible w hile the p o p u latio n s are illegible. Yet m uch a n th ro ­
pological theory has c o n c e n tra ted o n th e ways th e state deploys tech ­
n o lo g ies o f k n o w led g e an d p o w e r to m ake p o p u la tio n s leg ib le
(A p p ad u rai 1996; C o h n 1987; T ro u illo t 2001). H ow ever, as we say in
earlier sections, th e very d o cu m en ts th ro u g h w hich id en tity is sou g h t to
be fixed them selves acq u ire a d ifferen t kind of life as b o th fu n ctio n ar­
ies o f th e state an d o rd in ary citizens m an ip u late th e m tow ard d ifferen t
ends. As Poole so effectively d em o n strates in h er ch ap ter, the possibili­
ties o f forgeries an d c o u n te rfe it d o cu m en ts lead to a suspension o f citi­
zens betw een th e p o les o f th re a t a n d g u a ra n te e . In tu rn , o n e o f th e
m o d alities in w hich th e state is p re s e n t in the m arg in s is cap tu red in
reg io n s o f language th a t com e in to existence w hen access to c o n te x t
becom es fragile. T h u s, th e re is a flo u rish in g o f ru m o r: th e state h o ld s
th a t illiterate an d p o o rly e d u c a te d p o p u la tio n s a re easily m isled. As
N elson argues, th e state is seen as tw o-faced, unknow able, an d in m any
ways th e space at w hich the u n can n y is ex p erien ced . Yet th e state a ttrib ­
utes passion (and we m ig h t add credulity) to its subjects, thereby co n ­
stru ctin g itself as “ra tio n a l,” as a rg u e d by both Das a n d C ohen in this
volum e. In A sh fo rth ’s ch ap ter, we fin d th a t m easu res to control H IV
transm ission are in te rp re te d am ong black subjects o f th e S outh A frican
state as m easu res to b lo c k re p ro d u c tio n o f black p o p u la tio n s. T h is
in te rp re ta tio n seem s to be the legacy o f th e a p a rth e id regim e a n d its
p o litics o f d eath . T h u s, ru m o rs a n d th e au ra o f su sp icio n ab o u t th e
sta te ’s “re a l” in ten tio n s in instituting policies that involve the body, sex­
uality, a n d re p ro d u c tio n n e e d to b e u n d e rsto o d in th e specific local
histories o f this society. T h e fact th at w itchcraft accusations share m any
characteristics with ru m o r— its lack o f sig n atu re (B h a b h a 1994a; Das
1998; G eschiere 1997), its p erlo cu tio n ary force— weaves th em into the
u n c e rta in ty o f re la tio n s w ithin w h ich th e d ev astatin g effects o f th e

24
 T h e S tate and I ts M argins

AIDS e p id e m ic are e x p erien ced . T h e q u e stio n is not th a t ru m o r is a

specifically “su b altern ” form o f com m unication^'as suggested by G uha
(1983), b u t ra th e r that th e sta te ’s own m o d e o f re p re se n ta tio n o f its
subjects as given to passion ra th e r th an reaso n is tu rn e d b ack on the
state, as it w ere. (See also N elso n ’s c h a p te r o n this p o in t.) T h e lethal
ex p erien ce o f AIDS an d its e n ta n g le m e n t w ith accu satio n s o f w itch­
craft, ru m o r, an d panic takes us back to th e question o f th e state as the
site on w hich biopolitics an d thanatopolitics are instituted together. We
co n ten d th a t this relation, w hich is at th e h e a rt o f the m o d e rn state, is
m uch m o re visible on th e m argins th an at th e center. W e now turn to
these considerations.

B IO P O L IT IC S AND TH E MARGINS
Earlier, we argued th at sovereignty is b est d efined in term s o f pow er
over life a n d d eath . It is im p o rta n t to u n d ersco re that the figure o f life is
not a piece o f anim al n atu re w ithout any relatio n to law, b u t is p roduced
bv law. As b o th A gam ben (1998, 2000) an d Foucault (1976, 2003) have
argued in d ifferen t ways, th e state is co n stitu ted in m o d ern ity through
the inclusion o f m an ’s n atu ral life into th e m echanism s a n d calculations
o f power. D espite this a g re e m e n t ab o u t biopolitics, how ever, th ere are
pro fo u n d differences in th e way these two au th o rs conceive o f the rela­
tion b etw een biopolitics a n d thanatopolitics. T h e negative re fe ren t of
the new b io p o litical sovereignty for A g am b en is the fig u re o f hom o
sacer— life th a t may be killed b u t n o t sacrificed— and th e paradigm atic
exam ple o f th a t in m odernity is the c o n cen tratio n cam p. F o r Foucault,
the negative referen t o f biopolitics seem s to be the p o in t at w hich a cut
is m ade b etw een those w hose lives a re m a n a g e d an d e n h a n c e d and
those w hose lives are ju d g e d as n o t w orth living and w ho are thus “let
die.” B oth a u th o rs seem equally co n c e rn e d w ith a seem in g co n trad ic­
tion in th e conception o f th e biopolitical state— namely, how can a state
co m m itted to m an ag in g life p ro d u ce a categ o ry o f p e o p le w ho are
deem ed killable. For A gam ben, w hat jo in s biopolitics w ith th e politics of
death is th e endless reso rt th a t the state has to the state o f exception,
while fo r F o u cau lt, the c o n c e rn is m u ch m o re with p o w er in the rou­
tines of th e ord in ary an d th u s the p ro d u c tio n o f the “n o rm a l.” This is
not the p lace to engage these differences in d e p th — rather, we use them
to direct a tte n tio n to the way in w hich th e eth n o g rap h ic m e th o d allows
us to o p en u p these questions.
 V ee na D as and D eborah P o o l e

As is well know n, F o u cau lt’s work on bio p o w er replaces th e privi­

lege o f law a n d prohibition-w ith an em phasis o n tactical efficacy within
a m ultiple a n d m obile field o f forces. He shows that the effects are far-
reaching b u t n ev er stable. H is m eticulous description of th e im pact of
statistics a n d th e invention o'f p o p u latio n as an object of know ledge and
reg u latio n o n ch an g in g n o tio n s o f sovereignty has led to im p o rta n t
ways o f reco n cep tu alizin g th e state, especially in shifting the em phasis
from territo rial jurisdictions to th e m an ag em en t o f life (see also Perrot
an d W oolf 1984). Thus, in re c e n t literature we see a p ro life ra tio n of
adjectives u sed to characterize th e state— th e hygienic state, th e immu-
nizing state, th e therapeutic sta te — each p o in tin g to a d ifferen t m odality
fo r m anaging life. Sim ultaneously, the prefix bio has becom e detached
from pow er to signal other k in d s o f sociality, su ch as the biosocial, as well
as o th er kinds o f capabilities, such as biocapital, an d to refer to new wavs
o f engaging p o w er— for ex a m p le , patient g ro u p s o rganizing to influ­
en ce allo catio n o f resources a n d direction o f research fo r m itigating
certain biological conditions. T h is heterogeneity o f ways in w hich the
state is e n g a g e d in a d m in iste rin g life (and th e c o n c o m ita n t lettin g
d ie), as well as claim s that can b e m ade on the state in the reg io n s o f life
an d death by claim ing new categ o ries of citizenship, provides a rich ter­
rain in w hich anthropology can engage the e m e rg e n t form s o f biopoli­
tics (Petryna 2002).
O f co u rse, the locus classicus for exam ining the pow er o f th e state
with referen ce to control over populations is fo u n d in the lite ra tu re on
epidem ics a n d state fo rm atio n . As P eter B aldw in (2001) h as recently
arg u ed , th e p a rtic u la r strateg ies o f control d ev elo p ed by th e state in
E u ro p e in th e late n in e te e n th an d early tw en tieth c e n tu rie s were
closely tied to th e issue of m a n a g e m e n t of co n tag io n . F u rth er, concern
with reg u latin g th e health o f populations im m ediately takes us to con­
nections betw een m etro p o litan centers and colonies, for c o n tro l o f epi­
dem ics was a necessary c o n d itio n o f overcom ing barriers to E u ro p ean
exploitation o f colonies. T h u s, a p reo ccu p atio n with the h e a lth condi­
tions of co lo n ies and tech n iq u es o f m anaging disease becam e p art of
state rep erto ires o f action. As exam ples, we m ig h t think o f th e vast leg­
islative c h a n g e s effected th ro u g h such acts as the C o m p u lso ry
V accinations Acts, Vagrant L e p e r Acts, Lunacy AcLs, C a n to n m e n t Acts,
an d various form s o f C ontagious Diseases Acts en acted in this p erio d bv

26
 T he S t a t e an d I ts M argins

E u ro p e a n states, b o th in m etro p o litan centers an d in colonies. W hat is

im p o rta n t fro m th e p ersp ectiv e o f th e co lo n ies is th at b o th p u b lic
d eb ates on these issues and th e scientific rationales given for th em co n ­
stru c te d the in h ab itan ts of th e colonies as credulous, unhygienic, irra­
tio n al, and in n e e d o f discipline. It was F oucault’s g reat achievem ent to
show n o t only th a t biopow er was a b o u t pathologization of p o p u latio n s
b u t also that w hat was applicable to m argins co u ld b ecom e g eneralized
a n d n o rm alized fo r w hole populations'. N evertheless, the c o n tin u o u s
p ro d u c tio n o f p ath o lo g y is an im p o rta n t te c h n iq u e o f pow er— fo r in
this realm , as in those ex p lo red earlier, it invites us to look at th e in ti­
m ate co n n ectio n s betw een sovereign pow er an d disciplinary pow er.
T h e m an a g e m e n t o f p o p u latio n s in spaces th a t C ohen in his ch ap ­
te r calls “just-so m o d ern ity ” show s th a t we can n o t assum e an in ex o rab le
logic in the m an ag em en t of life th a t unfolds in the sam e m an n er across
all societies. P ostcolonial societies such as In d ia a n d South A frica have
specific histories in w hich th e g ra m m a r of relationships shapes th e way
biopolitics is in stitu ted . Thus, th e story o f m odernity' becom es co m p li­
c a te d in this as in all o th e r sp h e re s (G eschire 1997; G ilroy 1993;
M itchell 2000). P o p u latio n s, as we arg u ed in th e p reced in g sectio n ,
m ay exist only as en tities to be ad m in istered in th e state im aginary, b u t
th e in h ab itan ts o f these m argins are n o t inert objects: form s o f gover­
n a n c e , social relatio n sh ip s a ro u n d d ifferen t zones o f experience, and
th e cultural g e n re s w ithin w hich language acq u ires life gen erate ways
o f en g ag in g th e b io p o litical state th a t c a n n o t b e arrived at th ro u g h
m etaphysical speculation. T h e ch ap ters by C o h en , A shforth, Das, an d
S an fo rd show th a t although th e biopolitical state w orks with n o tio n s of
m ass bodies in o n e form or an o th e r, techniques o f m an ag em en t across
th e se contexTs a re q u ite d iffe re n t. Even m o re im p o rta n t, th e ways
“m a n ag ed ” p o p u latio n s work w ith strategies o f c o n tro l to claim citizen­
sh ip are deeply in fo rm e d by sp ecific e x p erien ces o f the state. T h u s,
w hile categories o f “refu g ee” a n d “displaced p e rso n s” exist as special
legal categories in in te rn a tio n a l in stru m e n ts th a t b o th co n tro l th em
an d give them rights, the n eg o tiatio n s effected by Peace C om m unities
to keep both state and guerilla w arriors outside th e ir territories surely
b e a r the stam p o f th e ir p articu lar ex p erien ce o f violence. Similarly, the
m a n a g e m e n t o f th e AIDS e p id e m ic in South A frica m ust necessarily
ad d ress w itchcraft accusations as a problem for th e state. In th e case o f

27
V e e n a D as and D ebo ra h P oole

In d ia , th e politics o f m ass bodies was in stitu ted th ro u g h fam ily-

p la n n in g program s th a t included cam ps for mass sterilization but w ere
also p a rt o f a re p e rto ire o f ch aritab le a n d state in stitu tio n s for o th e r
conditions, such as m ass h ealth cam ps o r eye cam ps fo r cataract o p era­
tions. T h u s, how m a n a g e m e n t o f life b ecam e an o b je c t o f politics
in d e e d defines th e b io p o litical state, b u t th e specific histories are
d iffe re n t enough to w arran t the o b serv atio n that this is n o t a lo ad ed
m atrix. Perhaps we can illustrate this p o in t with C o h e n ’s specific exam ­
ples a b o u t ways o f claim in g citizenship th ro u g h the tro p e o f the o p e ra ­
tion in India.
C o h e n argues in his c h a p te r th a t th re e c o n c e p ts— operability,
bioavailability, and su pplem entability— explain the p a rtic u la r form in
w hich th e biopolitical state is e n c o u n te re d in India. D iverse p o p u la­
tions a t th e m argins, su ch as the hijras (intersexed, tran sg en d ered sub­
je c ts com m only k n o w n as th e third sex ); bodies tre a te d as a mass in
fam ily-planning o p e ra tio n s done in m edical camps; a n d sellers of kid­
neys in th e organ tra d e — all are d e fin e d by p a rtic u la r in te rse c tio n s
betw een these th ree concepts. As C o h e n says, the o p e ra tio n s becom e
n o t only a technique a n d a site in stan tiatin g the state b u t also a form —
m ark in g the possibilities an d limits o f b elo n g in g for p erso n s hailed as a
mass body— endow ed w ith passions b u t n o t reason in th e state im agi­
nary'. T hus, the pedagogy o f converting thd inhabitants o f mass bodies
in to ascetic m o d ern izers in possession o f reason is specific to the cul­
tural g ram m ar o f In d ia w ithin w hich d ev elo p m en tal p arad ig m s have
taken shape. T he m ost in terestin g p a rt o f this arg u m en t is th at th ro u g h
a logic o f exception, th e generic body o f the masses is converted in to
specific kinds o f b o d ies from w hom o rg a n s can be retriev ed th ro u g h
sale, d esp ite the b an o n th e sale o f organs. T h e logic o f ex cep tio n helps
c re a te th e fiction o f “overw h elm in g a ffe c tio n ” b e tw e e n buyer a n d
seller, as we stated earlier, despite th e p u b lic secret th a t this fiction is
created to provide cover to the sale o f o rg an s thro u g h th e m ythic form
of th e gift. T he o p eratio n itself is seen by m arginalized p o p u latio n s as a
way o f claim ing citizenship through th e tro p es o f gift a n d sacrifice. It is
n o t th a t th e in cid en ce o f kidney sales is very high in In d ia , for these
sellers are co n cen trated in specific locales and regions. T h e possibility
of transplantation, how ever, has en ab led discursive form s an d netw orks
of talks to em erge at every level, fro m th e dom estic to th e n atio n al.
 T h e S t a te and I t s M a r g in s

B rothers talk o f selling kidneys to raise dow ries for their sisters; wives,
to redeem th e fam ily from d eb ts. T he m ost m arginal o f citizens claim
th a t they w ould d o n ate kid n ey s to save th e lives o f ailing n atio n al or
regional leaders.
T he c o n c e p t o f bioavailability, in tro d u ced by C ohen, deviates quite
sharply from th e notion o f killable bodies th ro u g h the sc e p te r o f hom o
sacer— for th ese are the p o o r w ho are not so m u ch killed as allow ed to
die. Indeed, th e rhetorical fo rm used by th o se w ho advocate sales is to
m ake these b o d ies available fo r m edical in terv en tio n , b u t they cast this
id ea in term s o f individual au to n o m y and care fo r the poor. T h is exam ­
ple provides a stu n n in g d em o n stratio n of how to move away fro m m eta­
physical co n cep tio n s of how th e exception “o p erates”— to th e task of
m aking the biopolitical state a n object of e th n o g ra p h ic investigation. If
F o u cau lt’s'c o n c ep t of the d a n g e ro u s individual showed us how law was
colonized by disciplines in F re n c h forensic psychiatry (F o u cau lt 2003),
th e concepts o ffered by C o h e n show how g ift an d sacrifice have not
b e e n displaced by com m odity form s but ra th e r allow th e com m odity
form to fu n ctio n in tandem w ith othe^w ays o f claim ing citizenship.

CONCLUDING TH O UG H TS
We can d o n o b etter in th ese concluding thoughts th an to refer the
re a d e r to c h a p te r 11, in w h ich Talal A sad provides a su c c in c t and
provocative co m m en tary on th e theoretical issues relating to th e state
a n d th e m argins. Two points o f im p o rtan ce m ay be stressed h ere. First,
A sad argues th a t th e n o tio n o f th e state in c o n te m p o ra ry th o u g h t
invests it with a life o f its ow n, d istin ct from b o th governors a n d th e gov­
e rn e d . Because o f this ab stractio n , the state can claim allegiance from
b o th sides. W h e n th e re la tio n betw een th e state and th e p o p u la tio n
th a t is governed is im agined as o n e in w hich th e state em b o d ies sover­
eig n ty in d e p e n d e n tly o f th e p o p u la tio n , it becom es a u th o riz e d to
m aintain certain spaces an d p o p u latio n s as m arg in s th ro u g h its adm in­
istrative p ractices. C onversely, an im ag in atio n o f the sta te as th a t to
w hich pow er is d eleg ated , r a th e r than a lie n a te d from th e subjects,
w ould allow th e state itself to be im agined as th e m argins o f th e citizen-
body. T he p o in t is n o t to sh o w th at the state has a fetishist ch aracter
b u t rath er to show th at the im ag in atio n o f sovereignty can sh ift th e rel-
aiive position o f th e c e n te r a n d the p erip h ery : m argins m ove, then.
V eena D as an d D eborah P oole

both w ithin an d o u tsid e th e state. O f co u rse, this m o v em en t is w hat

m akes th e m argins so c e n tra l to the u n d e rsta n d in g o f th e state. T h e
in d eterm in acy of the m arg in s not only allows form s o f resistance b u t
m ore im p o rtan tly enables strategies o f en g ag in g the state as som e kind
o f m argin to the body o f citizens.
S econd, Asad in tro d u ces the im p o rta n t idea that the form al equal­
ity and substitutability7o f citizens in liberal theory, in fact, rest on u n cer­
tainties in h e re n t in the process of ab stractin g from o n e given category
to another. H e gives a b eau tifu l description o f how suspicion com es to
occupy th e space betw een law and its ap p licatio n , a process th at all the
ch ap ters en g ag e in, o n e way o r an o th er. T h is discussion invites us to
think o f th e categories o f potentiality, an ticip atio n , and shadow s— cate­
gories tHat cap tu re the ex p erien ce o f m arg in s actualized in th e spaces
of exception. O u r im ag in atio n o f the m arg in s shows th em n o t as in ert
spaces a n d p o p u latio n s th a t sim ply have to be m anaged b u t rath er as
bristling with life that is certainly m anaged an d controlled b u t that also
flows ou tsid e this control. T hus, while we have m uch to learn from the
brilliant co n trib u tio n s o f A gam ben an d F o u cau lt on how n atu ral life
com es to be treated as an object of politics, an th ro p o lo g ical form s o f
know ledge do not sim ply take these categories and apply th em to d if­
ferent situations. Rather, in the particular genealogies an d histories o f
the m odes o f sociality they studv, an th ro p o lo g ists show how d ifferen t
desires, hopes, and fears sh ap e the ex p erien ce o f the biopolitical state.
T he au th o rs in this volum e are fully aw are o f th e precariousness o f lives
on th e m arg in s, b u t th ey a re equally c o n c e rn e d w ith sh o w in g how
form s o f econom ic an d political action, a n d ideas o f gift an d sacrifice
that have b een relegated to th e m argins, may, in som e m om ents, also
reconfigure th e state as a m arg in to the citizen-body. In o n e o f his polit­
ical reflections, A gam ben says that only by breaking th e nexus, at any
point betw een th e “vicious entan g lin g o f language, p eo p le, an d state,"
will th o u g h t an d praxis be equal to th e en o rm o u s task “at h a n d ”
(A gam ben 2000:67-69). T h e task “at h a n d ,” we hope, is th at the work
done on th e m argins will be recognized fo r w hat it is. It m ay n o t be able
to break such a nexus o n ce an d for all, b u t it does show th a t th e defeats
an d victories o f everyday life have th e ability to re tu rn us from th e
m etaphysical to the ordinary. This, at any rate, is how we see th e eth n o ­
graphic objective reco n stitu ted .

o
 T h e S ta te and I ts M a r g i n s

N otes
1. T he literature o n the failed-state thesis is extensive. For critical reviews on
this thesis, see, for instan ce, Bose a n d ja la l (1997), D unn (1995), Kohli (1990),
M bem be (2000, 2001), an d Pantham ^2003). C om m enting on the state of theory
in relatio n to the failed-state thesis in A frica, C elestine M onga has this to say: ‘'In
re c e n t years the c o n tin e n t has becom e th e El D orado of wild tho u g h t, the best
place for daring intellectu al safaris, the u n reg u lated space on w hich to engage in
theoretical incest, to violate the fundam entals oflog ic. to transgress disciplinary
prohibitions; in .short, to give oneself over to intellectual d eb au ch ery ’' (M onga
1996:39).
2. R ecent co m m en tato rs have n o ted th at anthropology has traditionally
n eg lected the study o f th e state, but they have failed to noLice how the problem s
of political anthropology w ere defined w ithin the fram ew ork o f the state (see, for
instance, Fuller an d H arris 2000).
3. This im m in en t o r spectral quality o f the state was p erh ap s m ost clearly
articu lated by C lastres (1974). Its genealogy, however, can be traced through evo­
lutionist and d evelopm ental approaches in an throp o lo gy w here such early fo u n ­
d atio n al theorists as M organ (1877), M aine ([1866] 2002), a n d Engels ([1884]
1972) h eld out the em erg en ce of the state as a decisive m o m en t in the progres­
sion o f cultures tow ard a condition of civilization m arked by w riting, private p ro p ­
erty, an d the em erg en ce of the state. L ater theorists of “political evolution”
ex p an d ed on this u n d e rstan d in g of historical progression to posit the state as an
e n d p o in t in the d ev elo p m en t of “com plex societies” defined as such based on
considerations of social stratification, p ro d u c tio n , and the division o f labor (see,
for exam ple, B anton 1966; Fried 1967). In these approaches, as in earlier evolu­
tionist m odels, the state was seen sim ultaneously as im m an en t in th e logic of
social evolution an d as a lim it condition fo r the constitution o f the an thropologi­
cal subject. At the sam e tim e, em phasis o n econom ic m odels o f social evolution
(for exam ple, W olf 1982) m eant that th e state p er se was n o t often taken as a sub­
ject fo r anthropological theory. M ore re c e n t theoretical w ork has again relied on
co n stru cts o f the prim itive drawn from C lastres (De)euze an d G uattari [ 1972]
1983:145-85) and B ataille (Taussig 1997) to explore the m obility and im m anent
ch arac ter of the state as a “basic form ation [that is] on the ho rizon throughout
history.” In these theories, the spectral state is envisioned, n o t as th e en dpoint o f
an evolutionary process, as in earlier an throp o lo gies, but ra th e r as a transhistoi i-
cal “prim ordial U rstaab the eternal m odel o f everything the State wants to be and
desires” (Dele’Uze an d G uattari 1987:217).

3
V e e n a D as an d D eborah P oole

4. O n the reg io nal o r cultural specificity of m o d ern state practices and

effects, see, am ong o th ers, Abele (1990); C h atteijee (1997); C oronil (1997); Das
(1995); H eym an (1999); H um phrey (2003); Lornnitz (2000); M aurer (1997);
M essick (1993); M itchell (1988); O ng (1999b); Pantham (2003); Sanders an d
West (2002); G. Sm ith (1999:195-227); an d H ansen and S tep p u tat (2001). O n
anthropological ap p ro ach es to the state as a “tran slo car o r d ecen tered institu­
tional landscape, see G u p ta (1995); O n g (1999a); and T ro u illot (2001). For a
com parative perspective on state terror, see Sluka (2000).
5. O n disorder an d m arginality in anthropology, see especially Tsing (1993).
T he idea of a disorderly m argin is n o t p ecu liar to W estern theories o f the state,
p'or instance, in M uqadam m ah, a fo u rteen th -cen tu ry A rabic text, Ibn K haldun
argued that B edouins practiced a form o f w eakened Islam as co m p ared to u rb an
Muslims because th eir nom adic ch aracter m ade them d istan t fro m regulatory
'authorities (Rosetwhal 1969). T here was a m ark ed suspicion o f nom ads in the
adm inistrative practices o f colonial rulers, an d it continues in postcolonial polities
(for a review o f these practices, see Rao an d Casim ir 2002).
6. T hough the state was conceptualized as haring a m on o p o ly over legiti­
m ate violence, it stood in a problem atic relatio n to o th er kinds o f violence, esp e­
cially sacrificial violence. F o r exam ple, D um ezil (1956) show ed the close co n n ec­
tion between the logic o f sacrifice an d th a t o f p u n ish m en t in his exam ination o f
Indo-European m ythology’. In anthropology, Taussig has discussed the fetishistic
character of the state in relation to its quality o f harnessing th e pow er o f th e d ead
in the ‘exchange betw een the absurd a n d th e official" (Taussig 1997:119). T his
monopoly over violence contributes to th e n o tio n of the tran scen d en t ch aracter
of the state in the p o litical/th eo retical discourse of liberalism .
7. “M odern social developm ent, aside from the already m en tio n ed political
and internal professional motives, has given rise to certain o th e r factors by w hich
formal legal rationalism is being w eakened. Irrational kadi ju stic e is exercised
today in criminal cases clearly and extensively in the ‘p o p u la r’ju stice of the jury.
It appeals to the sen tim en t o f the laym an, w ho feels ann o yed w henever he m eets
with formalism in co n crete cases, and it satisfies the em otional d em and s o f these
under-privileged classes w hich clam or for substantive ju stice” (W eber 1978:892).
8. For a discussion o f how the process o f acquiring a new n am e legally is
tinged with the faint tain t o f criminality, even in the m ost o rd in ary o f circum ­
stances, see Cavell (1994:27—28). H ere is a passage ab out his ex p erien ce with a
name change at age sixteen: “Probably I d id n o t sufficiently ap p reciate the irony
in thinking what debts the law im agined a sixteen-year-old m ig h t have reason to

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 T h e S tate and I ts M a r g i n s

flee from , b u t 1 began to know o r know that 1 knew, that the deed of declaring a
nam e or m akin g a nam e, or any questioning of y o u r identity, was being linked
with crim inality, forged to g eth er w ith it. Q uite as if th e reasons for b eing singled
o u t with a n a m e w ere n o t ju st to be traceable in case o f w rongdoing, but before
that as its g ro u n d , to serve n o tice that identifiable actions, deeds, the work of
hum an beings, are the so u rce o f identity, and consequently constitute identity by
accusation” (26). C avell’s reflectio ns on the relation betw een m argins, nam es, and
accusations an ticip ate the ex p erien ce of checkpoints, which we discuss in m ore
detail below, an d show clearly th a t this experience is not a m atter of physical
m argins alone.
9. It is im p o rtan t to ap p reciate that the sale co u ld only be possible w ithin a
larger co n tex t in w hich there w ere rich people w ho o p erated in an econom y with
large undisclosed incom es.
JO. For a subtle arg u m e n t o n the role of alternative rationalities practiced
on the m argins in in terp re tin g state terror, see H u m p h rey ’s (2003) accou n t of
the B uddhist m yths o f re in carn atio n used by B uddhists in M ongolia to explain
Stalin's reg im e o f terror. In this form ulation, th e theory of karm a is deployed
m etaphoricallv to acknow ledge th e inevitable com plicity of the subjects of totali­
tarian states in regim es o f te rro r— a subtle p o in t th a t is som ew hat sim ilar to
Nelson's a rg u m e n t in h e r chapter. Earlier, Tsing (1993) analysed the im portance
o f m argins as a wav o f relatin g disciplinary creativity with form s o f life lived at the
m argins in th e co n text o f the state in Indonesia. However, Tsing’s idea o f m argins
is strongly in flu en ce by spatial m odels— thus, she defines the m argin as a place
w here state au tho rity is m ost u n reliab le and the gap betw een the state’s goals and
their local realization is the largest. She contrasts this situation with the project of
rule at the cen ter, w here state au tho rity is strongest. This way o f looking at state
and m argins, o f course, assum es th at state goals an d au tho rin ' are tran sparen t in
the center, o r th at the state itself is n o t invested in m aintaining the m argins as
“unruly spaces”— a p o in t o f view critiqued by all th e authors in this volum e.
l l . l t m ay be relevant to p o in t o u t that w hile u n derstan d in g of process was
always co n sid ered central to th e anthropology o f law, the em phasis was alwavs on
arriving at th e rules th o u g h t to be im plicit in d isp u te settlem ent (see Gluckm .m
1965; N ader 1969; am ong m any o th ers). A sharp distinction betw een W estern and
non-W estern form s o f law o b scu red the way in w hich legal concepts traveled
betw een th e different sites o n w hich law was evoked in the same societv.