1

VII. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION; RIGHT TO ASSEMBLE AND PETITION

4. Disorderly conduct in assemblies not per se punishable
CASE: U.S. v. Apurado, G.R. No. L-1210. February 7, 1907……………………………..2
5. Right to assemble of students in school premises
CASE: Malabanan v. Ramento, G.R. No. L-62270. May 21, 1984………………………..4
Villar v. TIP, G.R. No. L-69198, April 17, 1985………………………………………………7
Non v. Dames, G.R. No. 89317, May 20, 1990.................................................................9
6. Right to assemble of employees of private establishments
CASE: Phil. Blooming Mills Employees Organization v. Philippine
Blooming Mills, G.R. No. L-31195, June 5, 1973…………………………………………..12

THE UNITED STATES vs . APURADO

 2

[G.R. No. L-1210. February 7, 1907.]

Disorderly conduct in assemblies not per se punishable

FACTS:
Appellants were convicted of the crime of sedition as defined in section 5 of Act No. 292 of
the Philippine Commission, which reads as follows:

"All persons who rise publicly and tumultuously in order to attain by force or outside of legal
methods any of the following objects are guilty of sedition:
X X X
"2. To prevent the Insular Government, or any provincial or municipal government or any
public official, from freely exercising its or his duties or the due execution of any judicial or
administrative order."

Before the municipal council of San Carlos, Occidental Negros, entered upon one of its
regular morning sessions, some 500 residents of the municipality assembled near the municipal
building and crowded into the council chamber and the ff happens:

(a) they demanded the dismissal from office of the municipal treasurer, the municipal
secretary, and the chief of police, and the substitution in their places of new officials whose
names were suggested by the spokesman of the party;
(b) that the council acceded to their wishes and drew up a formal document setting out the
reasons for its action, which was signed by the councilors present and by several of the leaders
of the crowd;
(c) that the persons who took part in the movement were wholly unarmed except that a few
carried canes;
(d) that the crowd was fairly orderly and well-behaved except in so far as their pressing into the
council chamber during a session of that body can be called disorder and misbehavior; and
(e) that the movement had its origin in religious differences between the residents of the
municipality.

Petitioners desire the dismissal of the said officials because they believed that they should
not be permitted to hold office in the municipality on account of their outspoken allegiance to
one of the factions into which the town was at that time divided.

ISSUE: Whether or not the acts committed by the members of the crowd are punishable under
the breach of peace.

RULING:
No. The court held that the purpose of the gathering was the mere desire to petition for the
removal of several municipal officials; and in proof of the fact that they had no intention of
committing a breach of the peace, the members of the crowd raised their jackets and camisas to
prove that they were carrying no concealed weapons.

The prosecution emphasizes unduly the fact that a few of those who took in the
demonstration carried canes, but there is nothing in the record to indicate that any usual number
of sticks were in the hands of the petitioners, or that they had been brought to the meeting for
the purpose of using them as weapons of assault. The prosecution also emphasizes the fact
that the spokesmen of the assembly made their demands in an imperative tone but there is
some conflict in the evidence on this point, and in any event it would be going a long way to say
that the use of a more or less "imperative" tone of voice by a petitioner would be sufficient to
 3

convert a lawful and peaceful assembly into an unlawful and seditious uprising. all tend to prove
that the assembly may be described as orderly rather than disorderly and that it could in no
sense be said to have been a tumultuous and seditious rising of the people. there is nothing in
the record to sustain a finding that the crowd itself adopted these threats or had any intention of
carrying them into effect.

It is rather to be expected that more or less disorder will mark the public assembly of the
people to protest against grievances whether real or imaginary, because on such occasions
feeling is always wrought to a high pitch of excitement, and the greater the grievance and the
more intense the feeling, the less perfect, as a rule, will be the disciplinary control of the leaders
over their irresponsible followers. If instances of disorderly conduct occur on such occasions,
the guilty individuals should be sought out and punished therefor, but the utmost discretion must
be exercised in drawing the line between disorderly and seditious conduct and between an
essentially peaceable assembly and a tumultuous uprising.

Hence, accused were acquitted.

MALABANAN V. RAMENTO
[G.R. No. L-62270. May 21, 1984]
Topic: Right to assemble of students in school premises

FACTS:

Petitioners were officers of the Supreme Student Council of respondent University. They
sought and were granted by the school authorities a permit to hold a meeting from 8:00 A.M. to
 4

12:00 P.M. Pursuant to such permit, along with other students, they held a general assembly at
the Veterinary Medicine and Animal Science basketball court (VMAS), the place indicated in
such permit, not in the basketball court as therein stated but at the second floor lobby. At such
gathering they manifested in vehement and vigorous language their opposition to the proposed
merger of the Institute of Animal Science with the Institute of Agriculture. At 10:30 A.M., the
same day, they marched toward the Life Science Building and continued their rally. It was
outside the area covered by their permit. They continued their demonstration, giving utterance
to language severely critical of the University authorities and using megaphones in the process.
There was, as a result, disturbance of the classes being held. Also, the non-academic
employees, within hearing distance, stopped their work because of the noise created. They
were asked to explain on the same day why they should not be held liable for holding an illegal
assembly.

They were placed under preventive suspension for their failure to explain the holding of
an illegal assembly in front of the Life Science Building. The validity thereof was challenged by
petitioners. Respondent Ramento, as Director of the National Capital Region, found petitioners
guilty of the charge of having violated par. 146(c) of the Manual for Private Schools more
specifically their holding of an illegal assembly which was characterized by the violation of the
permit granted resulting in the disturbance of classes and oral defamation. The penalty was
suspension for one academic year. Petitioners filed this petition.

The Supreme Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining all respondents or
any person or persons acting in their place or stead from enforcing the order finding the
petitioners guilty of the charges against them and suspending them for one (1) academic year
with a stern warning that a commission of the same or another offense will be dealt with utmost
severity, effective as of this date and continuing until otherwise ordered by this Court, thus
allowing them to enroll, if so minded.

Respondent prayed for the dismissal of the petition based on the following conclusion:
“Consequently, it is respectfully submitted that respondent Director of the MECS did not commit
any error, much less abused his discretion, when he affirmed the decision of respondent
University finding petitioners guilty of violations of the provisions of the Manual of Regulations
for Private Schools and the Revised Student's Code of Discipline and ordering their suspension
for one (1) academic school year. However, since said suspension has not been enforced
except only briefly, thereby enabling petitioners to finish their courses, and allowing petitioners
to continue their schooling, if they so desire, this proceeding is now moot and academic.”

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a right to assemble of students in school premises.

RULING:

Yes, there is a right to assemble of students in school premises.

The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should inform the licensing authority of
the date, the public place where and the time when it will take place. If it were a private place,
 5

only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required. Petitioners
did seek such consent. It was granted.

Petitioners invoke their rights to peaceable assembly and free speech. They are entitled
to do so. They enjoy like the rest of the citizens the freedom to express their views and
communicate their thoughts to those disposed to listen in gatherings such as was held in this
case. While, therefore, the authority of educational institutions over the conduct of students
must be recognized, it cannot go so far as to be violative of constitutional safeguards. The
principal use to which the schools are dedicated is to accommodate students during prescribed
hours for the purpose of certain types of activities. Among those activities is personal
intercommunication among the students. This is not only an inevitable part of the process of
attending school; it is also an important part of the educational process. A student's rights,
therefore, do not embrace merely the classroom hours. When he is in the cafeteria, or on the
playing field, or on the campus during the authorized hours, he may express his opinions, even
on controversial subjects like the conflict in Vietnam, if he does so without 'materially and
substantially interfering with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the
school' and without colliding with the rights of others. But conduct by the student, in class or out
of it, which for any reason — whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavior — materially
disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others is, of
course, not immunized by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech.

NOTE:

Respect for the constitutional rights of peaceable assembly and free speech calls for the
setting aside of the decision of respondent, the penalty imposed being unduly severe. It is true
that petitioners held the rally at a place other than that specified in the permit and continued it
longer than the time allowed. Undeniably too, they did disturb the classes and caused the work
of the non-academic personnel to be left undone. Such undesirable consequence could have
been avoided by their holding the assembly in the basketball court as indicated in the permit.
Nonetheless, suspending them for one year is out of proportion to their misdeed. The petition
must be granted and the decision of respondent Ramento nullified, a much lesser penalty being
appropriate.

It does not follow, however, that petitioners can be totally absolved for the events that
transpired. Admittedly, there was a violation of the terms of the permit. The rally was held at a
place other than that specified, in the second floor lobby, rather than the basketball court, of the
VMAS building of the University. Moreover, it was continued longer than the period allowed.
According to the decision of respondent, the concerted activity went on until 5:30 p. m. On those
facts, however, an admonition, even a censure-certainly not a suspension-could be the
appropriate penalty. Even then a one-year period of suspension is much too severe. While the
discretion of both respondent University and Ramento is recognized, the rule of reason, the
dictate of fairness calls for a much lesser penalty. If the concept of proportionality between the
offense connoted and the sanction imposed is not followed, an element of arbitrariness intrudes.
That would give rise to a due process question. To avoid this constitutional objection, it is the
holding of this Court that a one-week suspension would be punishment enough. In granting
such permit, there may be conditions as to the time and place of the assembly to avoid
 6

disruption of classes or stoppage of work of the non-academic personnel. Even if, however,
there be violations of its terms, the penalty incurred should not be disproportionate to the
offense.

VILLAR vs.TIP
[G.R. No. L-69198 April 17, 1985]
Topic: Right to assemble of students in school premises

FACTS:
The petitioners invoke the exercise of the freedom of assembly on the part of certain
students of respondent Technological Institute of the Philippines could be a basis for their being
barred from enrollment. In the opposition to the petition for preliminary mandatory injunction,
reference was made to the academic records of petitioners. Two of the petitioners, Rufino G.
Salcon, Jr., and Romeo L. Guilatco, Jr., had only one failing grade each, and the second
having failed in only one subject, having passed in eight other subjects. Petitioner Venecio Villar
failed in two subjects but passed in four subjects in the first semester. Petitioner Inocencio F.
Recitispassed all his subjects in the first semester and had one failing grade during its second
semester. He had two failing grades during the first semester. Petitioner Noverto Barreto, 7had
five failing grades in the first semester six failing grades in the second semester of the same
schoolyear, and six failing grades in the first semester of 1984-1985 school year. Petitioner
 7

Edgardo de Leon, Jr., had three failing grades, one passing grade and one subject dropped in
the first semester of schoolyear 1984-1985. Petitioner Regloben Laxamana 9 had five failing
grades with no passing grade in the first semester of 1984-1985 schoolyear. Petitioners Barreto,
de Leon, Jr. and Laxamana could be denied enrollment in view of such failing grades.
Respondent educational institution is under no obligation to admit them this coming academic
year. The constitutional provision on academic freedom enjoyed by institutions of higher
learning justifies such refusal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the exercise of the freedom of assembly on the part of certain students
of respondent Technological Institute of the Philippines could be a basis for their being barred
from enrollment.
RULING:
No, In the opinion in Reyes v. Bagatsing, the invocation of the right to freedom of
peaceable assembly carries with it the implication that the right to free speech has likewise been
disregarded. Both are embraced in the concept of freedom of expression, which is Identified
with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully, any matter of public interest without censorship
or punishment and which 'is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing ... of a
clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the state has a right to prevent." Petitioners,
therefore, have a valid cause for complaint if the exercise of the constitutional rights to free
speech and peaceable assembly was visited by their expulsion from respondent College. The
constitutional provision as to the State maintaining "a system of free public elementary
education and, in areas where finances permit, establish and maintain a system of free public
education" It is only at the most a reflection of the lack of sufficient funds for such a duty to be
obligatory in the case of students in the colleges and universities. Article 26 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights provides: "Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be
free, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be
compulsory. Technical and professional education shall be made generally available and higher
education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit." The phrase used being
"generally available" and higher education, while being "equally accessible to all should be on
the basis of merit." To that extent, therefore, there is justification for excluding three of the
aforementioned petitioners because of their marked academic deficiency. The academic
freedom enjoyed by "institutions of higher learning" includes the right to set academic standards
to determine under what circumstances failing grades suffice for the expulsion of students.
Once it has done so, however, that standard should be followed meticulously. It cannot be
utilized to discriminate against those students who exercise their constitutional rights to
peaceable assembly and free speech. While the dispositive portion refers only to petitioners of
record, the doctrine announced in this case should apply to all other students similarly situated.
That way, there should not be any need for a party to apply to this Court for the necessary
redress.
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted to petitioners Venecio Villar, Inocencio F. Recitis,
Rufino G. Salcon, Jr. and Romeo Guilatco, Jr. to nullify the action taken by respondents in
violation of their constitutional rights. The writ of prohibition is likewise granted to such
petitioners to enjoin respondents from acts of surveillance, black-listing, suspension and refusal
to allow them to enroll in the coming academic year 1985-1986, if so minded. The petition is
dismissed as to Noverto Barreto, Edgardo de Leon, Jr. and Regloben Laxamana. No costs.
 8

NON V. DAMES
G.R. No. 89317 | May 20, 1990
TOPIC: Right to assemble of students in school premises (modification of Alcuaz doctrine)

FACTS:
Petitioners, students in private respondent Mabini Colleges, Inc., were not allowed to re-
enroll by the school for the academic year 1988-1989 for leading or participating in student
mass actions against the school in the preceding semester. They filed a petition seeking their
readmission or re-enrollment to the school, but Hon. Sancho Danes II, of RTC Camarines Norte,
dismissed the petition, as well as their motion for reconsideration for the reason that the
petitioners failed to deny private respondent's affirmative defenses that "they were given all the
chances to air their grievances” where they were represented by Atty. Jose L. Lapak.
Moreover, on the date of the resumption of classes at Mabini College, petitioners
continued their rally picketing, even though without any renewal permit, and physically coerced
the students not to attend their classes, thereby disrupting the scheduled classes and depriving
a great majority of students of their right to be present in their classes. They also signed a
waiver in their enrollment form for the preceding semester, stating that Mabini College reserves
the right to deny admission of students whose scholarship and attendance are unsatisfactory
and to require withdrawal of students whose conduct discredits the institution and/or whose
activities unduly disrupts or interfere with the efficient operation of the college. In addition, they
 9

executed duly signed pledges, promising to abide and comply with all the rules and regulations
of the school.
Hence, this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Alcuaz doctrine, insofar as it allowed schools to bar the readmission
of students on the ground of termination of contract, should apply in this case.
RULING:
NO.
The Alcuaz doctrine provides that a student once admitted by the school is considered
enrolled for one semester. It is provided in Paragraph 137, Manual of Regulations for Private
Schools, that when a college student registers in a school, it is understood that he is enrolling
for the entire semester.  Likewise, it is provided in the Manual that the "written contracts"
required for college teachers are for "one semester." Thus, after the close of the first semester,
there is no longer any existing contract. The contract having been terminated, there is no more
contract to speak of. The school cannot be compelled to enter into another contract with said
students and teachers.
In Alcuaz, the Second Division of the Court dismissed the petition filed by the students,
who were barred from re-enrolling after they led mass assemblies and put up barricades, but it
added that "in the light of compassionate equity, students who were, in view of the absence of
academic deficiencies, scheduled to graduate during the school year when this petition was
filed, should be allowed to re-enroll and to graduate in due time.” While the students did not
move for a motion for reconsideration, the dismissed teachers did, which was dismissed by the
Court en banc. In its obiter dictum, the Court stated:
…While we value the right of students to complete their education in the school
or university of their choice, and while we fully respect their right to resort to rallies and
demonstrations for the redress of their grievances and as part of their freedom of speech
and their right to assemble, still such rallies, demonstrations, and assemblies must
always be conducted peacefully, and without resort to intimidation, coercion, or violence.
Academic freedom in all its forms, demands the full display of discipline. To hold
otherwise would be to subvert freedom into degenerate license.
Article III, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution provides that:
No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the
press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for
redress of grievances.
This protection to the cognate rights of speech and assembly guaranteed by the
Constitution is similarly available to students. In Malabanan v. Ramento, the Court held that
while the authority of educational institutions over the conduct of students must be recognized, it
cannot go so far as to be violative of constitutional safeguards. In Villar v. Technological
Institute of the Philippines, the Court reiterated that the exercise of the freedom of assembly
could not be a basis for barring students from enrolling but the Court allowed the non-enrollment
of students who clearly incurred marked academic deficiency provided that the academic
freedom enjoyed by the institutions should be followed meticulously and cannot be utilized to
 10

discriminate against those students who exercise their constitutional rights to peaceable
assembly and free speech.
While the highest regard must be afforded the exercise of the rights to free speech and
assembly, this should not be taken to mean that school authorities are virtually powerless to
discipline students. The imposition of disciplinary sanctions requires observance of procedural
due process. Moreover, the penalty imposed must be proportionate to the offense committed.
The case at bar is a case that focuses on the right to speech and assembly as exercised
by students vis-a-vis the right of school officials to discipline them. While respondent judge
believed himself bound by the ruling in Alcuaz, he actually viewed the issue as a conflict
between students' rights and the school's power to discipline them.
The Court, in Alcuaz, anchored its decision on the "termination of contract" theory. But it
must be repeatedly emphasized that the contract between the school and the student is not an
ordinary contract. It is imbued with public interest, considering the high priority given by the
Constitution to education and the grant to the State of supervisory and regulatory powers over
all educational institutions.
The "termination of contract" theory does not find support in the Manual. Paragraph 137
merely clarifies that a college student enrolls for the entire semester. It serves to protect schools
wherein tuition fees are collected and paid on an installment basis as evident from Paragraph
137 being subsumed under Section VII on Tuition and Other Fees. Clearly, in no way may
Paragraph 137 be construed to mean that the student shall be enrolled for only one semester,
and that after that semester is over, his re-enrollment is dependent solely on the sound
discretion of the school. On the contrary, the Manual recognizes the right of the student to be
enrolled in his course for the entire period he is expected to complete it. This "presumption" has
been translated into a right in Batas Pambansa Blg. 232, the "Education Act of 1982."
Moreover, of the 13 petitioners, only 8 of them have incurred failing grades. The 5
students were refused re-enrollment without just cause and, hence, should be allowed to re-
enroll. Of the 8 students, some only have one or two failures, which cannot be considered
marked academic deficiency. Then, as to the students who incurred several failing grades, it is
not clear from respondents' enumeration whether the failures were incurred in only one
semester or through the course of several semesters of study in the school. Neither are the
academic standards of respondent school, from which the Court can gauge whether or not
these students are academically deficient, are clear. Thus, Mabini College is ordered to readmit
the petitioners.
 11

PHIL. BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYEES ORGANIZATION V. PHIL. BLOOMING MILLS

[G.R. No. L-31195 - June 5, 1973]
Topic: FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION; RIGHT TO ASSEMBLE & PETITION (Right to Assemble
of Employees of Private Employees)

FACTS:
Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization and other petitioners claim that on
March 1, 1969, they decided to stage a mass demonstration at Malacañang on March 4, 1969,
in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police, to be participated in by the workers in the
first shift (from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M.) as well as those in the regular second and third shifts (from 7
A.M. to 4 P.M. and from 8 A.M. to 5 P.M., respectively); and that they informed the respondent
Company of their proposed demonstration.

Because the petitioners and their members numbering about 400 proceeded with the
demonstration despite the pleas of the respondent Company that the first shift workers should
not be required to participate in the demonstration and that the workers in the second and third
shifts should be utilized for the demonstration from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M. on March 4, 1969,
respondent Company prior notice of the mass demonstration on March 4, 1969, with the
respondent Court, a charge against petitioners and other employees who composed the first
shift, charging them with a "violation of Section 4(a)-6 in relation to Sections 13 and 14, as well
as Section 15, all of Republic Act No. 875, and of the CBA providing for 'No Strike and No
Lockout.' "

ISSUE: Whether or not the Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc. violated the employees’ right to
assemble.
 12

RULING:
YES, the Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc. violated the employees’ right to assemble.

In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly occupy a
preferred position as they are essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and political
institutions; and such priority "gives these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not permitting
dubious intrusions."

The superiority of these freedoms over property rights is underscored by the fact that a
mere reasonable or rational relation between the means employed by the law and its object or
purpose — that the law is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory nor oppressive — would suffice to
validate a law which restricts or impairs property rights. On the other hand, a constitutional or
valid infringement of human rights requires a more stringent criterion, namely existence of a
grave and immediate danger of a substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent. So it
has been stressed in the main opinion of Mr. Justice Fernando in Gonzales vs. Comelec and
reiterated by the writer of the opinion in Imbong vs. Ferrer. It should be added that Mr. Justice
Barredo in Gonzales vs. Comelec, supra, like Justices Douglas, Black and Goldberg in N.Y.
Times Co. vs. Sullivan, believes that the freedoms of speech and of the press as well as of
peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of grievances are absolute when directed against
public officials or "when exercised in relation to our right to choose the men and women by
whom we shall be governed," even as Mr. Justice Castro relies on the balancing-of-interests
test. Chief Justice Vinson is partial to the improbable danger rule formulated by Chief Judge
Learned Hand, viz. — whether the gravity of the evil, discounted by its improbability, justifies
such invasion of free expression as is necessary to avoid the danger.

As heretofore stated, the primacy of human rights — freedom of expression, of peaceful

assembly and of petition for redress of grievances — over property rights has been sustained.
Emphatic reiteration of this basic tenet as a coveted boon — at once the shield and armor of the
dignity and worth of the human personality, the all-consuming ideal of our enlightened
civilization — becomes Our duty, if freedom and social justice have any meaning at all for him
who toils so that capital can produce economic goods that can generate happiness for all. To
regard the demonstration against police officers, not against the employer, as evidence of bad
faith in collective bargaining and hence a violation of the collective bargaining agreement and a
cause for the dismissal from employment of the demonstrating employees, stretches unduly the
compass of the collective bargaining agreement, is "a potent means of inhibiting speech" and
therefore inflicts a moral as well as mortal wound on the constitutional guarantees of free
expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition.

The collective bargaining agreement which fixes the working shifts of the employees,
according to the respondent Court Industrial Relations, in effect imposes on the workers the
"duty ... to observe regular working hours." The strain construction of the Court of Industrial
Relations that a stipulated working shifts deny the workers the right to stage mass
demonstration against police abuses during working hours, constitutes a virtual tyranny over the
 13

mind and life the workers and deserves severe condemnation. Renunciation of the freedom
should not be predicated on such a slender ground.

The mass demonstration staged by the employees on March 4, 1969 could not have
been legally enjoined by any court, such an injunction would be trenching upon the freedom
expression of the workers, even if it legally appears to be illegal picketing or strike. The
respondent Court of Industrial Relations in the case at bar concedes that the mass
demonstration was not a declaration of a strike "as the same not rooted in any industrial dispute
although there is concerted act and the occurrence of a temporary stoppage work."

The respondent company is the one guilty of unfair labor practice. Because the refusal
on the part of the respondent firm to permit all its employees and workers to join the mass
demonstration against alleged police abuses and the subsequent separation of the eight (8)
petitioners from the service constituted an unconstitutional restraint on the freedom of
expression, freedom of assembly and freedom petition for redress of grievances, the
respondent firm committed an unfair labor practice.
VIII. RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION
A. Government workers may not strike
CASE: SSS Employees Association v. CA, G.R. No. 85279, July 28, 1989………………15
B. Right of association and union security clauses
CASES:
Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union, supra…………………………………………17
Villar v. Inciong, G.R. No. L-50283-84, April 20, 1983……………………………………….19
C. Right of association and the ban on intervention of political parties
in barangay election
CASE: Occena v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-60258, January 31, 1984……………………….23
D. Right of association and the integration of the Bar
In re Edillon, A.M. No. 1928, August 3, 1978………………………………………………….25
 14

SSS EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION V. CA

G.R. No. 85279
Topic: Right to Association: government workers may not strike

FACTS:
On June 11, 1987, the SSS filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a
complaint for damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners,
alleging that on June 9, 1987, the officers and members of SSSEA staged an illegal strike and
baricaded the entrances to the SSS Building, preventing non-striking employees from reporting
for work and SSS members from transacting business with the SSS; that the strike was reported
to the Public Sector Labor - Management Council, which ordered the strikers to return to work;
that the strikers refused to return to work; and that the SSS suffered damages as a result of the
strike. The complaint prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to enjoin the strike
and that the strikers be ordered to return to work; that the defendants (petitioners herein) be
ordered to pay damages; and that the strike be declared illegal.
The position of the petitioners is that the Regional Trial Court had no jurisdiction to hear
the case initiated by the SSS and to issue the restraining order and the writ of preliminary
injunction, as jurisdiction lay with the Department of Labor and Employment or the National
Labor Relations Commission, since the case involves a labor dispute.
On the other hand, the SSS advances the contrary view, on the ground that the
employees of the SSS are covered by civil service laws and rules and regulations, not the Labor
Code, therefore they do not have the right to strike. Since neither the DOLE nor the NLRC has
jurisdiction over the dispute, the Regional Trial Court may enjoin the employees from striking.
In dismissing the petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction filed by
petitioners, the Court of Appeals held that since the employees of the SSS, are government
employees, they are not allowed to strike, and may be enjoined by the Regional Trial Court,
which had jurisdiction over the SSS' complaint for damages, from continuing with their strike.
 15

ISSUE: Whether or not employees of the Social Security System (SSS) have the right to strike.

RULING:
No. They do not have the right to strike. Considering that under the 1987 Constitution
"[t]he civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the
Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters" [Art.
IX(B), Sec. .2(l) see also Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 where the employees in the civil service are
denominated as "government employees"] and that the SSS is one such government-controlled
corporation with an original charter, having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees
are part of the civil service [NASECO v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 69870 & 70295, November 24,1988]
and are covered by the Civil Service Commission's memorandum prohibiting strikes. This being
the case, the strike staged by the employees of the SSS was illegal.
The general rule in the past and up to the present is that 'the terms and conditions of
employment in the Government, including any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof are
governed by law" (Section 11, the Industrial Peace Act, R.A. No. 875, as amended and Article
277, the Labor Code, P.D. No. 442, as amended). Since the terms and conditions of
government employment are fixed by law, government workers cannot use the same weapons
employed by workers in the private sector to secure concessions from their employers. The
principle behind labor unionism in private industry is that industrial peace cannot be secured
through compulsion by law. Relations between private employers and their employees rest on
an essentially voluntary basis. Subject to the minimum requirements of wage laws and other
labor and welfare legislation, the terms and conditions of employment in the unionized private
sector are settled through the process of collective bargaining. In government employment,
however, it is the legislature and, where properly given delegated power, the administrative
heads of government which fix the terms and conditions of employment. And this is effected
through statutes or administrative circulars, rules, and regulations, not through collective
bargaining agreements

Government employees may, therefore, through their unions or associations, either

petition the Congress for the betterment of the terms and conditions of employment which are
within the ambit of legislation or negotiate with the appropriate government agencies for the
improvement of those which are not fixed by law. If there be any unresolved grievances, the
dispute may be referred to the Public Sector Labor - Management Council for appropriate
action. But employees in the civil service may not resort to strikes, walk-outs and other
temporary work stoppages, like workers in the private sector, to pressure the Govemment to
accede to their demands. As now provided under Sec. 4, Rule III of the Rules and Regulations
to Govern the Exercise of the Right of Government- Employees to Self- Organization, which
took effect after the instant dispute arose, "[t]he terms and conditions of employment in the
government, including any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof and government-
owned and controlled corporations with original charters are governed by law and employees
therein shall not strike for the purpose of securing changes thereof."
 16

VICTORIANO v. ELIZALDE ROPE WORKER’S UNION

[G.R. No. L-25246 September 12, 1974.]
Topic: Right of Association and Union Security Clauses

FACTS:

Benjamin Victoriano a member of the religious sect known as the "Iglesia ni Cristo", had
as employee of Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc., was also a member of the Elizalde Rope Workers'
Union which had a collective bargaining agreement with the company containing a closed shop
requiring as a condition of employment for all permanent employees covered by the Agreement.

Under Section 4(a), paragraph 4, of Republic Act No. 875, prior to its amendment by
Republic Act No. 3350, the employer was not precluded "from making an agreement with a
labor organization to require as a condition of employment membership therein, if such labor
organization is the representative of the employees."

However, when Republic Act No. 3350 was enacted, introducing an amendment to —
paragraph (4) subsection (a) of section 4 of Republic Act No. 875, as follows: ... "but such
agreement shall not cover members of any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their
members in any such labor organization".

Being a member of a religious sect that prohibits the affiliation of its members with any
labor organization, Victoriano presented his resignation to appellant Union and when no action
was taken thereon, he reiterated his resignation.

Thereupon, the Union wrote a formal letter to the Company asking the latter to separate
Victoriano from the service in view of the fact that he was resigning from the Union as a
member. The management of the Company in turn notified Victoriano and his counsel that
unless he could achieve a satisfactory arrangement with the Union, the Company would be
constrained to dismiss him from the service.

In an action for injunction to enjoin the Company and the Union from dismissing
Victoriano, the Union invoked the "union security clause" of the collective bargaining agreement;
 17

assailed the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 3350; and contended that the Court had no
jurisdiction over the case.

The court then decided to enjoin the defendant Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc. from
dismissing the plaintiff from his present employment. From this decision, the union appealed.

Among its contentions were RA 3550 is unconstitutional for infringing the fundamental
right to form lawful associations by prohibiting all the members of a given religious sect from
joining any labor union if such sect prohibits affiliations of their members.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3350 is unconstitutional for infringing on the fundamental right to
lawful associations

RULING: NO. RA 3350 is constitutional. It does not infringe on the fundamental right to lawful
associations.

Right to join includes the Right to Abstain

… “It is clear, therefore, that the right to join a union includes the right to abstain from
joining any union. Inasmuch as what both the Constitution and the Industrial Peace Act have
recognized, and guaranteed to the employee, is the "right" to join associations of his choice, it
would be absurd to say that the law also imposes, in the same breath, upon the employee the
duty to join associations. The law does not enjoin an employee to sign up with any association.”

Right to refrain from joining not limited

“The right to refrain from joining labor organizations recognized by Section 3 of the
Industrial Peace Act is, however, limited. The legal protection granted to such right to refrain
from joining is withdrawn by operation of law, where a labor union and an employer have agreed
on a closed shop, by virtue of which the employer may employ only member of the collective
bargaining union, and the employees must continue to be members of the union for the duration
of the contract in order to keep their jobs…”

In the case at bar, RA 3350 introduced an exception, when it added to Section 4 (a) (4)
of the Industrial Peace Act the following proviso: "but such agreement shall not cover members
of any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor organization".

Republic Act No. 3350 merely excludes ipso jure from the application and coverage of
the closed shop agreement the employees belonging to any religious sects which prohibit
affiliation of their members with any labor organization. What the exception provides, therefore,
is that members of said religious sects cannot be compelled or coerced to join labor unions
even when said unions have closed shop agreements with the employers; that in spite of any
closed shop agreement, members of said religious sects cannot be refused employment or
dismissed from their jobs on the sole ground that they are not members of the collective
bargaining union.
 18

It is clear, therefore, that the assailed Act, far from infringing the constitutional provision
on freedom of association, upholds and reinforces it. It does not prohibit the members of said
religious sects from affiliating with labor unions. It still leaves to said members the liberty and the
power to affiliate, or not to affiliate, with labor unions. If, notwithstanding their religious beliefs,
the members of said religious sects prefer to sign up with the labor union, they can do so. If in
deference and fealty to their religious faith, they refuse to sign up, they can do so; the law does
not coerce them to join; neither does the law prohibit them from joining; and neither may the
employer or labor union compel them to join.

Republic Act No. 3350, therefore, does not violate the constitutional provision on
freedom of association.

VILLAR V. INCIONG (A bit long since it’s procedural…sorry)

[G.R. Nos. L-50283-84. April 20, 1983.]
Topic: VII. Right of Association; Sec. 8; Right of association and union security clauses

FACTS:
Petitioners were members of the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU, a labor organization which
was the existing bargaining agent of the employees in private respondent Amigo Manufacturing,
Inc.(Company). The Amigo and the Amigo Employees Union PAFLU had a collective bargaining
agreement governing their labor relations.

Upon written authority of at least 30% of the employees in the company, including the
petitioners, the Federation of Unions of Rizal (FUR) filed a petition for certification election with
the Office of Ministry of Labor and Employment. The petition was opposed by the Philippine
Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU) with whom, as stated earlier, the Amigo Employees
Union was at that time affiliated. PAFLU's opposition cited the "Code of Ethics" governing inter-
federation disputes among and between members of the Trade Unions Congress of the
Philippines (TUCP). The Ministry indorsed the case to TUCP for appropriate action but before
any such action could be taken thereon, the petitioners disauthorized FUR from continuing the
petition for certification election for which reason FUR withdrew the petition.

The same employees who had signed the petition filed by FUR signed a joint resolution.

1. TUMIWALAG bilang kasaping PAFLU at kaalinsabay nito, inaalisan namin ang PAFLU ng
kapangyarihan na katawanin kami sa anumang pakikipagkasundo sa Pangasiwaan ng aming
pinapasukan at kung sila man ay nagkasundo o magkakasundo sa kabila ng pagtitiwalag na ito,
ang nasabing kasunduan ay hindi namin pinagtitibay at tahasang aming
itinatakwil/tinatanggihan;
2. BINABAWI namin ang aming pahintulot sa FUR na katawanin kami sa Petition for
Certification Election at sa sama-samang pakikipagkasundo sa aming patrono;
3. PANATILIHIN na nagsasarili ang aming samahan, AMIGO EMPLOYEES' UNION, alinsunod
sa Artikulo 240 ng Labor Code;
4.MAGHAIN KAAGAD ang aming Unyong nagsasarili, sa pamumuno ng aming
pangsamantalang Opisyal na kinatawan, si Ginang DOLORES VILLAR, ng Petition for
Certication Election sa Department of Labor, para kilalanin ang aming Unyong nagsasarili bilang
tanging kinatawan ng mga manggagawa sa samasamang pakikipagkasundo;
 19

5. BIGYAN ng kopya nito ang bawa't kinauukulan at ang mga kapasiyahang ito ay magkakabisa
sa oras na matanggap ng mga kinauukulan ang kani-kanilang sipi nito."

Petitioner Villar, as authorized representative of the Amigo Employees Union, filed a petition for
certification election in the Company. The Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU intervened and
moved for the dismissal of the petition because of the following grounds:
(1) petition lacked the mandatory requisite of at least 30% of the employees in the bargaining
unit;
(2) petitioner had no legal personality to sign the petition since she was not an officer of the
union nor is there factual or legal basis for her claim that she was the authorized representative
of the local union;
(3) there was a pending case for the same subject matter filed by the same individuals;
(4) the petition was barred by the new CBA;
(5) there was no valid disaffiliation from PAFLU; and
(6) the supporting signatures were procured through false pretenses.

TUCP dismissed the petition.

The Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU, in special meeting made a resolution for the investigation
of all of the petitioners and one Felipe, for "continuously maligning, libelling and slandering not
only the incumbent officers but even the union itself and the federation;" spreading 'false
propaganda' that the union officers were 'merely appointees of the management', and for
causing divisiveness in the union.

It formed a Trial Committee to investigate the local union's charges against the petitioners for
acts of disloyalty inimical to the interest of the local union, as well as directing the Trial
Committee to subpoena the complainants (Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU) and the
respondents (petitioners) for investigation. The Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU and the
Company concluded a new CBA which grants additional benefits to the workers and
reincorporated the same provisions of the existing CBA, including the union security clause:
(CLOSED UP SHOP provision)

"ARTICLE III. UNION SECURITY WITH RESPECT TO PRESENT MEMBERS.

“All members of the UNION as of the signing of this Agreement shall remain members thereof in
good standing. Therefore, any members who shall resign, be expelled, or shall in any manner
cease to be a member of the UNION, shall be dismissed from his employment upon written
request of the UNION to the Company."

Petitioners were summoned to appear before the PAFLU Trial Committee for the aforestated
investigation of the charges led against them by the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU. However,
they did not attend but requested for a "Bill of Particulars" of the charges.
The PAFLU trial committee rendered a decision finding the petitioners guilty of the charges.
Petitioners appealed the Decision to the PAFLU, which latter denied.
PAFLU sent a letter to the Company to implement the provision of our CBA on security clause
by terminating the respondents concerned from their employment.
Company reasoned that it will first secure the necessary clearances to terminate petitioners.
 20

PAFLU requested the Company to put petitioners under preventive suspension pending the
application for said clearances to terminate the petitioners, upon a declaration that petitioners'
continued stay within the work premises will "result in the threat to the life and limb of the other
employees of the company."
Company filed the request for clearance to terminate the petitioners before the Department of
Labor, Regional Office. Petitioners were informed regarding the application for clearance to
terminate them, and that each of them were placed under preventive suspension pending the
resolution of the said applications. They were to be refused from entry into the work premises.
The application was granted.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the clearance to terminate the petitioners is unconstitutional as it impairs their
right to self-organization.
2. Whether or not there is illegal dismissal, as contrary to the security clause of the collective
bargaining agreement between Company and Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU.
3. Whether or not petitioners’ disaffiliation from PAFLU and filing a petition for certification
election are not acts of disloyalty but an exercise of their right to self-organization.
4. Whether or not the closed shop provision is a restriction to the right of freedom of association.
HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that petitioners, although entitled to disaffiliate from their union and
form a new organization of their own, must, however, suffer the consequences of their
separation from the union under the security clause of the CBA.
1. No.
The Court ruled that when it is true that disaffiliation from a labor union is not open to legal
objection. It is implicit in the freedom of association ordained by the Constitution. But a closed
shop is a valid form of union security, and such provision in a collective bargaining agreement is
not a restriction of the right of freedom of association guaranteed by the Constitution.
In the case at bar, when the Company and the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU entered into a
Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) with a union security clause provided for in Article XII
thereof which is a reiteration of the same clause in the old CBA. The quoted stipulation for
closed-shop is clear and unequivocal and it leaves no room for doubt that the employer is
bound to dismiss the employees (petitioners) for non-union membership. Petitioners
became non-union members upon their expulsion from the general membership of the Amigo
Employees Union-PAFLU.
2. No.
To expel petitioners from the roll of membership of the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU is clear
under the constitution of the PAFLU to which the local union was affiliated. Pursuant to the
security clause of the new CBA, reiterating the same clause in the old CBA, PAFLU was
justified in applying said security clause.
 21

The principle is that when a labor union affiliates with a mother union, it becomes bound by the
laws and regulations of the parent organization.
The petitioners were members of the Amigo Employees Union at the time that said union
affiliated with PAFLU; hence, under above principle, petitioners are bound by the laws and
regulations of PAFLU.
PAFLU’s act is correct and legal, as pursuant to its Constitution and By-Laws, it conducted the
investigation and found petitioners guilty of acts prejudicial and inimical to the interests of the
Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU.
3. No.
If the petitioners merely disaffiliated from the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU, there could be
no legal objections because it was their right to do so. But what petitioners did by the very clear
terms of their "Sama-Samang Kapasiyahan" was to disaffiliate the Amigo Employees Union-
PAFLU from PAFLU, an act which they could not have done with any effective consequence
because they constituted the minority in the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU.
Petitioners numbering 10, were among 96 who signed the "Sama-Samang Kapasiyahan"
whereas there are 234 union members in the Amigo Employees Union PAFLU. Hence,
petitioners constituted a small minority for which reason they could not have successfully
disaffiliated the local union from PAFLU. Since only 96 wanted disaffiliation, it can be inferred
that the majority wanted the union to remain an affiliate of PAFLU. The action of the majority
must, therefore, prevail over that of the minority members.
4. NO.
A closed-shop is a valid form of union security, and a provision therefor in a collective
bargaining agreement is not a restriction of the right of freedom of association guaranteed by
the Constitution. Where in a closed-shop agreement it is stipulated that union members who
cease to be in good standing shall immediately be dismissed, such dismissal does not
constitute an unfair labor practice exclusively cognizable by the Court of Industrial Relations.

Occeña v. Comelec
G.R. No. L-60258 January 31, 1984
Topic: Right of association and the ban on intervention of political parties in barangay election
FACTS:
 22

This petition for prohibition seeks the declaration as unconstitutional of Sections 4

and 22 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 222, otherwise known as the Barangay Election Act of 1982,
insofar as it prohibits any candidate in the Barangay election of May 17, 1982 "from
representing or allowing himself to be represented as a candidate of any political party ... or
prohibits a political party, political group, political committee ... from intervening in the
nomination of a candidate in the barangay election or in the filing of his certificate of candidacy,
or giving aid or support directly or indirectly, material or otherwise, favorable to or against his
campaign for election." On this basis, it is prayed that judgment be rendered declaring the 1982
Barangay elections NULL AND VOID ab initio, for being UNCONSTITUTIONAL, and directing
the holding of new barangay elections without any ban on the involvement of political parties,
political committees, political organizations and other political group.
The petitioner contends that the ban on the intervention of political parties in the
election of barangay officials is violative of the constitutional guarantee of the right to form
associations arid societies for purposes not contrary to law and that the ban is incompatible with
a democracy and a parliamentary system of government.

ISSUE: Whether or not the ban on the intervention of political parties in the barangay election is
violative of the constitutional guarantee to form associations.

RULING: No, it is not violative. The right to form associations or societies for purposes not
contrary to law is neither absolute nor illimitable; it is always subject to the pervasive and
dominant police power of the state and may constitutionally be regulated or curtailed to serve
appropriate and important public interests. (Gonzales vs. Comelec, 27 SCRA 835: Imbong vs.
Comelec, 35 SCRA 28). Whether a restriction imposed is constitutionally permissible or not
depends upon the circumstances of each case.
Examining Section 4 of the Barangay Election Act of 1982, be it noted that
thereunder, the right to organize is intact. Political parties may freely be formed although there is
a restriction on their activities, i.e., their intervention in the election of barangay officials on May
17, 1982 is prescribed. But the ban is narrow, not total. It operates only on concerted or group
action of political parties. Members of political and kindred organizations, acting individually,
may intervene in the barangay election. As the law says: "Nothing (therein) ... shall be
construed as in any manner affecting or constituting an impairment of the freedom of individuals
to support or oppose any candidate for any barangay office." Moreover, members of the family
of a candidate within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity as well as the personal
campaign staff of a candidate (not more than 1 for every 100 registered voters in Ms barangay)
can engage in individual or group action to promote the election of their candidate.
Barangay officials should be elected without political party or partisan involvement in
the process in order to promote objectivity and lack of partisan bias in the performance of their
duties that are better discharged in the absence of political attachment.
The petitioner’s contention that in a democracy, all elections necessarily must be
partisan. This is not so. For in a representative democracy such as ours, there is merely a
guarantee of participation by the people in the affairs of government thru their chosen
representatives, without assurance that in every instance concerted partisan activity in the
selection of those representatives shall be allowed, unless otherwise mandated expressly or
impliedly by the Constitution.
 23

IN RE EDILLON
A.M. No. 1928, August 3, 1978
Topic: Right of association and the integration of the Bar

FACTS:
The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the
Philippines.
 24

On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short) Board of
Governors unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative Case No. MDD-1 (In
the Matter of the Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to
the Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for "stubborn
refusal to pay his membership dues" to the IBP since the latter's constitution notwithstanding
due notice.

The core of the respondent's arguments is that the above provisions constitute an
invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to
maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the
corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said
organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights
to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes,
the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force
and effect.

The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strike his name from
the Roll of Attorneys, contending that the said matter is not among the justiciable cases triable
by the Court but is rather of an "administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body."

ISSUES:
Whether or not the respondent should be disbarred due to refusal to pay his
membership dues

HELD:
Yes, the respondent should be disbarred due to refusal to pay his membership dues. It is
the unanimous sense of the Court that the respondent Marcial A. Edillon should be as he is
hereby disbarred, and his name is hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys of the
Court.

To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his

constitutional freedom to associate. Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group
of which he is not already a member. He became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar
examinations. 7 All that integration actually does is to provide an official national organization for
the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer is a ready a
member. Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to
attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its
elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual
dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the State's legitimate interest in elevating the
quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in
this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program - the lawyers.

Moreover, there is nothing in the Constitution that prohibits Court, under its constitutional
power and duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and the
 25

integration of the Philippine Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution), from requiring
members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying
the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the
fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the
objectives and purposes of integration.

Also, it clear that under the police power of the State, and under the necessary powers
granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondent's right to practise law before the
courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the
power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize, then a penalty designed to
enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is not void as
unreasonable or arbitrary. It is sufficient to state then that the matters of admission, suspension,
disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and supervision have been and
are indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions and responsibilities, and the
authorities holding such are legion.

Thus, the Court's jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by our 1973 Constitution when it
explicitly granted to the Court the power to "Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice ...
and the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Bar ... (Article X, Sec. 5(5) the
power to pass upon the fitness of the respondent to remain a member of the legal profession is
indeed undoubtedly vested in the Court.

RIGHT TO INFORMATION
A. Meaning and scope of “matters of public concern”
CASES:
Akbayan v. Aquino, G.R. No. 170516, July 16, 2008…………………………………….27
Valmonte v. Belmonte, G.R. No. 74930, February 13 1989…………………………….29
Legazpi v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. L-72119, May 29, 1987……………..33
Echegaray v. Secretary, G.R. No. 132601, October 14, 2008…………………………..35
Chavez v. PCGG, G.R. No. 130716, December 9, 1998 …………………………………37
 26

Province of North Cotabato v. GRP, G.R. No. 183591, October 14, 2008……………39
B. Limitations and allowable restrictions
CASES:
Subido v. Ozaeta, G.R. No. L- 1631, February 27, 1948…………………………………42
Baldoza v. Dimaano, A.M. No. 1120-MJ, May 5, 1976……………………………………44
Chavez v. PCGG, supra……………………………………………………………………….45
C. Right to information may be enforced by mandamus
CASE: Legazpi v. Civil Service Commission, supra…………………………………….47
D. Right to information of the public vs. right to information of Congress
CASE: Senate v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006……………………………...48
E. Right to public information (and freedom of the press) vs. rights of the accused
CASE: Perez v. Estrada, A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC, June 29, 2001…………………………50

AKBAYAN vs. AQUINO

[G.R. NO. 170516 : July 16, 2008]
Meaning and scope of matters of public concern.

FACTS:

The JPEPA (Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement), which will be the first
bilateral free trade agreement to be entered into by the Philippines with another country in the
event the Senate grants its consent to it, covers a broad range of topics which respondents
enumerate as follows: trade in goods, rules of origin, customs procedures, paperless trading,
trade in services, investment, intellectual property rights, government procurement, movement
of natural persons, cooperation, competition policy, mutual recognition, dispute avoidance and
settlement, improvement of the business environment, and general and final provisions.
 27

Prior to President’s signing, petitioners - non-government organizations, Congresspersons,

citizens and taxpayers - seek via the present petition for mandamus and prohibition to obtain
from respondents the full text of the JPEPA including the Philippine and Japanese offers
submitted during the negotiation process and all pertinent attachments and annexes thereto.

Different actions were done but were not pursued.

The present petition was filed on Dec. 9, 2005 while the agreement was to be later signed
on Sept. 9, 2006 by Pres. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro
Koizumi in Helsinki, in Finland, following which the President endorsed it to the Senate for its
concurrence pursuant to Art. VII, Sec. 21 of the Constitution.

Final text of the JPEPA has been made accessible to the public since September 11, 2006.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is sufficient public interest to overcome the claim of privilege such as
requesting documents and information in relation to JPEPA.

RULING:

No. The deliberative process privilege is a qualified privilege and can be overcome by a
sufficient showing of need. This need determination is to be made flexibly on a case-by-case,
ad hoc basis. "[E]ach time [the deliberative process privilege] is asserted the district court must
undertake a fresh balancing of the competing interests," taking into account factors such as "the
relevance of the evidence," "the availability of other evidence," "the seriousness of the litigation,"
"the role of the government," and the "possibility of future timidity by government employees.

To be covered by the right to information, the information sought must meet the threshold
requirement that it be a matter of public concern. Apropos is the teaching of Legaspi v. Civil
Service Commission:

In determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern there is no rigid

test which can be applied. 'Public concern' like 'public interest' is a term that eludes exact
definition. Both terms embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to
know, either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally
arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine on
a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or
affects the public.

The Court concluded that it is a matter of public concern, not on the basis of any specific
need shown by the petitioners, but from the very nature of the JPEPA as an international
agreement.

As with the deliberative process privilege, the privilege accorded to diplomatic negotiations
arises, not on account of the content of the information per se, but because the information is
part of a process of deliberation which, in pursuit of the public interest, must be presumed
confidential. Negotiations between two countries to draft a treaty represent a true example of a
deliberative process.
 28

In this case, petitioners have failed to present the strong and "sufficient showing of need"
referred to in the immediately cited cases. The arguments they proffer to establish their
entitlement to the subject documents fall short of this standard as stated in the decided cases
beforehand.

The text of the JPEPA having been published, petitioners have failed to convince this Court
that they will not be able to meaningfully exercise their right to participate in decision-making
unless the initial offers are also published.

Diplomatic negotiations have, since the Court promulgated its Resolution in PMPF v.
Manglapus, been recognized as privileged in this jurisdiction and the reasons proffered by
petitioners against the application of the ruling therein to the present case have not persuaded
the Court. As for their demand for copies of the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during
the JPEPA negotiations, the same must be denied, respondents' claim of executive privilege
being valid.

The President, being the head of state, is regarded as the sole organ and authority in
external relations and is the country's sole representative with foreign nations. This is not to say,
of course, that the President's power to enter into treaties is unlimited but for the requirement of
Senate concurrence, since the President must still ensure that all treaties will substantively
conform to all the relevant provisions of the Constitution.

It follows from the above discussion that Congress, while possessing vast legislative
powers, may not interfere in the field of treaty negotiations. While Article VII, Section 21
provides for Senate concurrence, such pertains only to the validity of the treaty under
consideration, not to the conduct of negotiations attendant to its conclusion. Moreover, it is not
even Congress as a whole that has been given the authority to concur as a means of checking
the treaty-making power of the President, but only the Senate.

Thus, as in the case of petitioners suing in their capacity as private citizens, petitioners-
members of the House of Representatives fail to present a "sufficient showing of need" that the
information sought is critical to the performance of the functions of Congress, functions that do
not include treaty-negotiation.

VALMONTE V. BELMONTE
[G.R. No. 74930. February 13, 1989]
Topic: Meaning & scope of “matters of public concern”

FACTS:

Petitioner Valmonte, a practitioner in media, wrote respondent Belmonte requesting to

be furnished with the list of names of the opposition members of the Batasang Pambansa who
were able to secure a clean loan of Php 2 million each on guarranty of Mrs. Imelda Marcos. The
Deputy General Counsel of the GSIS replied that they cannot respond positively as furnishing
the list would be a violation of confidentiality that may mar the image of the GSIS as a reputable
financial institution.
 29

Petitioner wrote respondent another letter, saying that for failure to receive a reply, "we
are now considering ourselves free to do whatever action necessary within the premises to
pursue our desired objective in pursuance of public interest." Valmonte, joined by the other
petitioners, filed the instant suit.

Respondent claims that actions of the GSIS General Manager are reviewable by the
Board of Trustees of the GSIS. Petitioners, however, did not seek relief from the GSIS Board of
Trustees. It is therefore asserted that since administrative remedies were not exhausted, then
petitioners have no cause of action.

Petitioners invoke their right to information and pray that respondent be directed:

(a) to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members
belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean loans
immediately before the February 7 election thru the intercession/marginal note of the
then First Lady Imelda Marcos; and/or
(b) to furnish petitioners with certified true copies of the documents evidencing their
respective loans; and/or
(c) to allow petitioners access to the public records for the subject information.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioners are entitled to the documents sought, by virtue of their
constitutional right to information.

RULING:

Yes, petitioners are entitled to the documents sought, by virtue of their constitutional
right to information.

The Court upheld the people's constitutional right to be informed of matters of public
interest and ordered the government agencies concerned to act as prayed for by the petitioners.
The pertinent provision under the 1987 Constitution is Art. 111, Sec. 7 which states: The right of
the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official
records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as
well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the
citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

An informed citizenry with access to the diverse currents in political, moral and artistic
thought and data relative to them, and the free exchange of ideas and discussion of issues
thereon, is vital to the democratic government envisioned under our Constitution. The
cornerstone of this republican system of government is delegation of power by the people to the
State. In this system, governmental agencies and institutions operate within the limits of the
authority conferred by the people. Denied access to information on the inner workings of
government, the citizenry can become prey to the whims and caprices of those to whom the
power had been delegated. The postulate of public office as a public trust, institutionalized in the
Constitution (in Art. XI, Sec. 1) to protect the people from abuse of governmental power, would
 30

certainly be were empty words if access to such information of public concern is denied, except
under limitations prescribed by implementing legislation adopted pursuant to the Constitution.

Petitioners are practitioners in media. As such, they have both the right to gather and the
obligation to check the accuracy of information the disseminate. The freedom of the press and
of speech is not only critical, but vital to the exercise of their professions. The right of access to
information ensures that these freedoms are not rendered nugatory by the government's
monopolizing pertinent information. For an essential element of these freedoms is to keep open
a continuing dialogue or process of communication between the government and the people. It
is in the interest of the State that the channels for free political discussion be maintained to the
end that the government may perceive and be responsive to the people's will. Yet, this open
dialogue can be effective only to the extent that the citizenry is informed and thus able to
formulate its will intelligently. Only when the participants in the discussion are aware of the
issues and have access to information relating thereto can such bear fruit. The right to
information is an essential premise of a meaningful right to speech and expression. But this is
not to say that the right to information is merely an adjunct of and therefore restricted in
application by the exercise of the freedoms of speech and of the press. Far from it. The right to
information goes hand-in-hand with the constitutional policies of full public disclosure and
honesty in the public service. It is meant to enhance the widening role of the citizenry in
governmental decision-making as well as in checking abuse in government.

Yet, like all the constitutional guarantees, the right to information is not absolute. The
people's right to information is limited to "matters of public concern," and is further "subject to
such limitations as may be provided by law." Similarly, the State's policy of full disclosure is
limited to "transactions involving public interest," and is "subject to reasonable conditions
prescribed by law." Hence, before mandamus may issue, it must be clear that the information
sought is of "public interest" or "public concern," and is not exempted by law from the operation
of the constitutional guarantee

In determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern there is no

rigid test which can be applied. "Public concern" like "public interest" is a term that eludes exact
definition. Both terms embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to
know, either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally
arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine on
a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or
affects the public.

The information sought by petitioners in this case is the truth of reports that certain
Members of the Batasang Pambansa belonging to the opposition were able to secure "clean"
loans from the GSIS immediately before the February 7, 1986 election through the intercession
of the former First Lady, Mrs. Imelda Marcos. The GSIS is a trustee of contributions from the
government and its employees and the administrator of various insurance programs for the
benefit of the latter. Undeniably, its funds assume a public character. More particularly, Secs.
5(b) and 46 of P.D. 1146, as amended (the Revised Government Service Insurance Act of
1977), provide for annual appropriations to pay the contributions, premiums, interest and other
amounts payable to GSIS by the government, as employer, as well as the obligations which the
 31

Republic of the Philippines assumes or guarantees to pay. Considering the nature of its funds,
the GSIS is expected to manage its resources with utmost prudence and in strict compliance
with the pertinent laws or rules and regulations. Thus, one of the reasons that prompted the
revision of the old GSIS law was the necessity "to preserve at all times the actuarial solvency of
the funds administered by the System" Consequently, as respondent himself admits, the GSIS
"is not supposed to grant 'clean loans.'" It is therefore the legitimate concern of the public to
ensure that these funds are managed properly with the end in view of maximizing the benefits
that accrue to the insured government employees. Moreover, the supposed borrowers were
Members of the defunct Batasang Pambansa who themselves appropriated funds for the GSIS
and were therefore expected to be the first to see to it that the GSIS performed its tasks with the
greatest degree of fidelity and that an its transactions were above board. In sum, the public
nature of the loanable funds of the GSIS and the public office held by the alleged borrowers
make the information sought clearly a matter of public interest and concern.

NOTE: [Respondent invoked right to privacy]

Respondent maintains that a confidential relationship exists between the GSIS and its
borrowers. It is argued that a policy of confidentiality restricts the indiscriminate dissemination of
information. Yet, respondent has failed to cite any law granting the GSIS the privilege of
confidentiality as regards the documents subject of this petition. His position is apparently based
merely on considerations of policy. The judiciary does not settle policy issues. The Court can
only declare what the law is, and not what the law should be. Under our system of government,
policy issues are within the domain of the political branches of the government, and of the
people themselves as the repository of all State power. Respondent however contends that in
view of the right to privacy which is equally protected by the Constitution and by existing laws,
the documents evidencing loan transactions of the GSIS must be deemed outside the ambit of
the right to information. There can be no doubt that right to privacy is constitutionally protected.

The right to privacy belongs to the individual in his private capacity, and not to public
and governmental agencies like the GSIS. Moreover, the right cannot be invoked by juridical
entities like the GSIS. A corporation has no right of privacy in its name since the entire basis of
the right to privacy is an injury to the feelings and sensibilities of the party and a corporation
would have no such ground for relief. Neither can the GSIS through its General Manager, the
respondent, invoke the right to privacy of its borrowers. The right is purely personal in nature,
and hence may be invoked only by the person whose privacy is claimed to be violated.

However, the same cannot be said with regard to the first act sought by petitioners, i.e.,
"to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members belonging to
the UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean loans immediately before the
February 7 election thru the intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos."
Although citizens are afforded the right to information and, pursuant thereto, are entitled to
"access to official records," the Constitution does not accord them a right to compel custodians
of official records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to acquire
information on matters of public concern.
 32

G.R. No. L-72119 May 29, 1987

VALENTIN L. LEGASPI, vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION.
Topic: Meaning & scope of “matters of public concern”
FACTS:
The fundamental right of the people to information on matters of public concern is
invoked in this special civil action for mandamus instituted by petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi
against the Civil Service Commission. The respondent had earlier denied Legaspi's request for
information on the civil service eligibilities of certain persons employed as sanitarians in the
Health Department of Cebu City. These government employees, Julian Sibonghanoy and
Mariano Agas, had allegedly represented themselves as civil service eligibles who passed the
civil service examinations for sanitarians.Claiming that his right to be informed of the eligibilities
of Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, is guaranteed by the Constitution, and that he has no
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy to acquire the information, petitioner prays for the
issuance of the extraordinary writ of mandamus to compel the respondent Commission to
disclose said information.
The Solicitor General interposes procedural objections to Our giving due course to this
Petition. He challenges the petitioner's standing to sue upon the ground that the latter does not
possess any clear legal right to be informed of the civil service eligibilities of the government
employees concerned. He calls attention to the alleged failure of the petitioner to show his
actual interest in securing this particular information. He further argues that there is no
ministerial duty on the part of the Commission to furnish the petitioner with the information he
seeks.
ISSUE: Whether or not the information sought is of public interest or public concern.
 33

RULING:
YES, while the manner of examining public records may be subject to reasonable
regulation by the government agency in custody thereof, the duty to disclose the information of
public concern, and to afford access to public records cannot be discretionary on the part of said
agencies. The incorporation in the Constitution of a guarantee of access to information of public
concern is a recognition of the essentiality of the free flow of ideas and information in a
democracy. But the constitutional guarantee to information on matters of public concern is not
absolute. It does not open every door to any and all information. Under the Constitution, access
to official records, papers, etc., are "subject to limitations as may be provided by law" . The law
may therefore exempt certain types of information from public scrutiny, such as those affecting
national security. It follows that, in every case, the availability of access to a particular public
record must be circumscribed by the nature of the information sought, i.e., (a) being of public
concern or one that involves public interest, and, (b) not being exempted by law from the
operation of the constitutional guarantee.
This question is first addressed to the government agency having custody of the desired
information. However, as already discussed, this does not give the agency concerned any
discretion to grant or deny access. In case of denial of access, the government agency has the
burden of showing that the information requested is not of public concern, or, if it is of public
concern, that the same has been exempted by law from the operation of the guarantee. To
safeguard the constitutional right, every denial of access by the government agency concerned
is subject to review by the courts, and in the proper case, access may be compelled by a writ of
Mandamus.
In determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern there is no
rigid test which can be applied. "Public concern" like "public interest" is a term that eludes exact
definition. Both terms embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to
know, either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally
arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine in
a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or
affects the public.The public concern invoked in the case of Tanada v. Tuvera, supra, was the
need for adequate notice to the public of the various laws which are to regulate the actions and
conduct of citizens. In Subido vs. Ozaeta, supra, the public concern deemed covered by the
statutory right was the knowledge of those real estate transactions which some believed to have
been registered in violation of the Constitution.
The information sought by the petitioner in this case is the truth of the claim of certain
government employees that they are civil service eligibles for the positions to which they were
appointed. Public office being a public trust, [Const. Art. XI, Sec. 1] it is the legitimate concern of
citizens to ensure that government positions requiring civil service eligibility are occupied only
by persons who are eligibles. Public officers are at all times accountable to the people even as
to their eligibilities for their respective positions.
But then, it is not enough that the information sought is of public interest. For mandamus
to lie in a given case, the information must not be among the species exempted by law from the
operation of the constitutional guarantee.In the instant, case while refusing to confirm or deny
the claims of eligibility, the respondent has failed to cite any provision in the Civil Service Law
which would limit the petitioner's right to know who are, and who are not, civil service eligibles.
We take judicial notice of the fact that the names of those who pass the civil service
examinations, as in bar examinations and licensure examinations for various professions, are
released to the public. Hence, there is nothing secret about one's civil service eligibility, if
actually possessed. Petitioner's request is, therefore, neither unusual nor unreasonable. And
 34

when, as in this case, the government employees concerned claim to be civil service eligibles,
the public, through any citizen, has a right to verify their professed eligibilities from the Civil
Service Commission. The civil service eligibility of a sanitarian being of public concern, and in
the absence of express limitations under the law upon access to the register of civil service
eligibles for said position, the duty of the respondent Commission to confirm or deny the civil
service eligibility of any person occupying the position becomes imperative. Mandamus,
therefore lies.
WHEREFORE, the Civil Service Commission is ordered to open its register of eligibles for the
position of sanitarian, and to confirm or deny, the civil service eligibility of Julian Sibonghanoy
and Mariano Agas, for said position in the Health Department of Cebu City, as requested by the
petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi.

ECHEGARAY V. SECRETARY
G.R. No. 132601 | October 12, 1998
TOPIC: Meaning & scope of “matters of public concern”

FACTS:
On June 25, 1996, the Court affirmed the conviction of petitioner Leo Echegaray y Pilo
for the crime of rape of the 10 year-old daughter of his common-law spouse and the imposition
upon him of the death penalty for the said crime. He filed a Motion for Reconsideration raising
mainly factual issues and a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration raising for the first time
the issue of the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7659 (the death penalty law) and the
imposition of the death penalty for the crime of rape, which the Court eventually denied with a
finding that Congress duly complied with the requirements for the reimposition of the death
penalty and is therefore not unconstitutional.
In the meantime, Congress had seen it fit to change the mode of execution of the death
penalty from electrocution to lethal injection, and passed Republic Act No. 8177 to that effect.
Pursuant to the provisions of said law, the Secretary of Justice promulgated the Rules and
Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177 and directed the Director of the Bureau of
Corrections to prepare the Lethal Injection Manual.
The petitioner filed a petition for prohibition enjoining respondents from carrying out the
execution by lethal injection of petitioner under R.A. No. 8177 and its implementing rules for
being unconstitutional and void. After deliberating on the various pleadings from the petitioner,
the OSG, and the CHR as amicus curiae, the Court gave due course to the petition, which it
now resolves on the merits.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 19 of the Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No.
8177 is unconstitutional for requiring confidentiality of a manual containing matters of public
concern.
RULING:
 35

YES.
Public concern is one "which the public may want to know, either because these
directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an
ordinary citizen." Section 7 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:
"SEC. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall
be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to
official acts, transaction, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as a
basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitation as
may be provided by law."
The incorporation in the Constitution of a guarantee of access to information of public
concern is a recognition of the essentiality of the free flow of ideas and information in a
democracy. In the same way that free discussion enables members of society to cope with the
exigencies of their time, access to information of general interest aids the people in democratic
decision-making by giving them a better perspective of the vital issues confronting the nation.
In the case at bar, the Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177 suffer
serious flaws that could not be overlooked. Section 19 of the implementing rules provide:
SEC. 19. EXECUTION PROCEDURE. - Details of the procedure prior to, during
and after administering the lethal injection shall be set forth in a manual to be prepared
by the Director. The manual shall contain details of, among others, the sequence of
events before and after execution; procedures in setting up the intravenous line; the
administration of the lethal drugs; the pronouncement of death; and the removal of the
intravenous system.
Said manual shall be confidential and its distribution shall be limited to authorized
prison personnel.
The second paragraph of section 19, which states the requirement of confidentiality of
the contents of the manual even with respect to the convict, is unduly suppressive. It sees no
legal impediment for the convict, should he so desire, to obtain a copy of the manual. The
contents of the manual are matters of public concern and thus, provision as to its confidentiality
should be stricken as unconstitutional.
 36

CHAVEZ V. PCGG
[G.R. No. 130716 - December 9, 1998]
Topic: Right to Information - Meaning and Scope of Matters of Public Concern

FACTS:
Chavez alleges that what impelled him to bring this action were several news reports
bannered in a number of broadsheets sometime in September 1997. These news items referred
to (1) the alleged discovery of billions of dollars of Marcos assets deposited in various coded
accounts in Swiss banks; and (2) the reported execution of a compromise, between the
government (through PCGG) and the Marcos heirs, on how to split or share these assets.

Petitioner, invoking his constitutional right to information and the correlative duty of the
state to disclose publicly all its transactions involving the national interest, demands that
respondents make public any and all negotiations and agreements pertaining to PCGG's task of
recovering the Marcoses' ill-gotten wealth. He claims that any compromise on the alleged
billions of ill-gotten wealth involves an issue of "paramount public interest," since it has a
"debilitating effect on the country's economy" that would be greatly prejudicial to the national
interest of the Filipino people. Hence, the people in general have a right to know the
transactions or deals being contrived and effected by the government.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court could require the PCGG to disclose to the public the details of
any agreement, perfected or not, with the Marcoses.

RULING:
YES, the Court can require the PCGG to disclose to the public the details of any
agreement, perfected or not, with the Marcoses.

In seeking the public disclosure of negotiations and agreements pertaining to a

compromise settlement with the Marcoses as regards their alleged ill-gotten wealth, petitioner
invokes the following provisions of the Constitution:

Sec. 7 [Article III]. The right of the people to information on matters

of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to
documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
 37

decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy

development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as
may be provided by law.

Sec. 28 [Article II]. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by

law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of
all its transactions involving public interest.

In Valmonte v. Belmonte Jr., 34 the Court emphasized that the information sought must
be "matters of public concern," access to which may be limited by law. Similarly, the state policy
of full public disclosure extends only to "transactions involving public interest" and may also be
"subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law." As to the meanings of the terms "public
interest" and "public concern," the Court, in Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, elucidated:

In determining whether or not a particular information is of public

concern there is no rigid test which can be applied. "Public concern" like
"public interest" is a term that eludes exact definition. Both terms embrace
a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either
because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters
naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it
is for the courts to determine on a case by case basis whether the matter
at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public.

Considered a public concern in the above-mentioned case was the "legitimate concern
of citizens to ensure that government positions requiring civil service eligibility are occupied only
by persons who are eligibles." So was the need to give the general public adequate notification
of various laws that regulate and affect the actions and conduct of citizens, as held in Tañada.
Likewise did the "public nature of the loanable funds of the GSIS and the public office held by
the alleged borrowers (members of the defunct Batasang Pambansa)" qualify the information
sought in Valmonte as matters of public interest and concern. In Aquino-Sarmiento v. Morato,
the Court also held that official acts of public officers done in pursuit if their official functions are
public in character; hence, the records pertaining to such official acts and decisions are within
the ambit of the constitutional right of access to public records.

In general, writings coming into the hands of public officers in connection with their
official functions must be accessible to the public, consistent with the policy of transparency of
governmental affairs. This principle is aimed at affording the people an opportunity to determine
whether those to whom they have entrusted the affairs of the government are honesty, faithfully
and competently performing their functions as public servants.
 38

PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO V. GRP

G.R. No 183591
Topic: Right to Information: Meaning and scope of matters of public concern

FACTS:

This is about the Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD)

entered into between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the MILF.
The purpose of the agreement, inter alia, is the commitment of the parties to pursue peace
negotiations, protect and respect of human rights, and refrain from the use of threat or force to
attain undue advantage while the peace negotiations on the substantive agenda are ongoing.
Formal peace talks between the parties are held in Tripoli Libya with President Gloria Arroyo
representing the Republic of the Philippines.
On July 23, 2008, the petitioners pray that the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional.
They invoke the right to information on matters of public concern.

Section 7, Article III on the Bill of Rights:

The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be

recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as
basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as
may be provided by law.

They seek to compel respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and official
copies of the MOA-AD including its attachments, and to prohibit the slated signing of the MOA-
AD, pending the disclosure of the contents of the MOA-AD and the holding of a public
consultation thereon.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the MOA-Ad is subject to disclosure on matters of public concern

RULING:
Yes. The right of access to public documents, as enshrined in both the 1973 Constitution
and the 1987 Constitution, has been recognized as a self-executory constitutional right.

In the 1976 case of Baldoza v. Hon. Judge Dimaano, 110 the Court ruled that access to
public records is predicated on the right of the people to acquire information on matters of public
 39

concern since, undoubtedly, in a democracy, the public has a legitimate interest in matters of
social and political significance.

. . . The incorporation of this right in the Constitution is a recognition of the

fundamental role of free exchange of information in a democracy. There can be no
realistic perception by the public of the nation's problems, nor a meaningful democratic
decision-making if they are denied access to information of general interest. Information
is needed to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of the times. As
has been aptly observed: "Maintaining the flow of such information depends on
protection for both its acquisition and its dissemination since, if either process is
interrupted, the flow inevitably ceases." . . . In the same way that free discussion enables
members of society to cope with the exigencies of their time, access to information of
general interest aids the people in democratic decision-making by giving them a better
perspective of the vital issues confronting the nation so that they may be able to criticize
and participate in the affairs of the government in a responsible, reasonable and
effective manner. It is by ensuring an unfettered and uninhibited exchange of ideas
among a well-informed public that a government remains responsive to the changes
desired by the people.”

In fact, respondents admit that the MOA-AD is indeed of public concern. In previous
cases, the Court found that the regularity of real estate transactions entered in the Register of
Deeds, the need for adequate notice to the public of the various laws, the civil service eligibility
of a public employee, the proper management of GSIS funds allegedly used to grant loans to
public officials, the recovery of the Marcoses' alleged ill-gotten wealth, and the identity of party-
list nominees, among others, are matters of public concern. Undoubtedly, the MOA ADsubject
of the present cases is of public concern, involving as it does the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of the State, which directly affects the lives of the public at large.

Matters of public concern covered by the right to information include steps and negotiations
leading to the consummation of the contract. . . . The SC ruled:

[T]he right to information "contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the

consummation of the transaction ". Certainly, a consummated contract is not a requirement for
the exercise of the right to information. Otherwise, the people can never exercise the right if no
contract is consummated, and if one is consummated, it may be too late for the public to expose
its defects. Requiring a consummated contract will keep the public in the dark until the contract,
which may be grossly disadvantageous to the government or even illegal, becomes fait
accompli. This negates the State policy of full transparency on matters of public concern, a
situation which the framers of the Constitution could not have intended. Such a requirement will
prevent the citizenry from participating in the public discussion of any proposed contract,
effectively truncating a basic right enshrined in the Bill of Rights. We can allow neither an
emasculation of a constitutional right, nor a retreat by the State of its avowed "policy of full
disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest."

Intended as a "splendid symmetry" to the right to information under the Bill of Rights is the
policy of public disclosure under Section 28, Article II of the Constitution reading:

Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts
and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public
interest.
 40

The policy of full public disclosure enunciated in above-quoted Section 28 complements

the right of access to information on matters of public concern found in the Bill of Rights. The
right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand information, while Section 28
recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody demands. The policy of
public disclosure establishes a concrete ethical principle for the conduct of public affairs in a
genuinely open democracy, with the people's right to know as the centerpiece. It is a mandate
of the State to be accountable by following such policy. These provisions are vital to the
exercise of the freedom of expression and essential to hold public officials at all times
accountable to the people.

Notes:
The effectivity of the policy of public disclosure need not await the passing of a statute.
Respondents cannot thus point to the absence of an implementing legislation as an excuse in
not effecting such policy. An essential element of these freedoms is to keep open a continuing
dialogue or process of communication between the government and the people. It is in the
interest of the State that the channels for free political discussion be maintained to the end that
the government may perceive and be responsive to the people's will. 131 Envisioned to be
corollary to the twin rights to information and disclosure is the design for feedback mechanisms.
 41

SUBIDO V. OZAETA
[G.R. No. L-1631 February 27, 1948]
Topic: Right to Information: Limitations & allowable restrictions

FACTS:
The petitioner, editor of the Manila Post, a morning daily, prays that an order issue
"commanding the respondents to furnish (petitioner) the list of real estates sold to aliens and
registered with the Register of Deeds of Manila since the promulgation of the Department of
Justice Circular No. 128 or to allow the petitioner or his duly accredited representatives (to)
examine all records in the respondents' custody relative to the (said) transactions.

The first alternative of the petition was denied by the Register of Deeds and later, on
appeal, by the Secretary of Justice. No request to inspect the records seems to have ever been
made, but the Solicitor General, answering for the respondents, gives to understand that not
even this would the petitioner or his representatives be allowed to do if they tried.

The Solicitor General contends that "the examination or inspection of the records in the
office of the register of deeds may be made only by those having special interest therein and
subject to such reasonable regulations as may be prescribed by the Chief of the Land
Registration Office, and that the Secretary of Justice has reasonably ruled, to safeguard the
public interest and the interest of those directly concerned in the records, that records may not
be disclosed for publication."

ISSUE: Whether or not newspaper publications are restricted from examining records of sales
of real properties under the custody of the Register of Deeds

RULING:

NO. Newspaper publications are not restricted from examining records of sales of real
properties under the custody of the Register of Deeds.

The right of inspection of title records is a subject of express statutory regulation in the
Philippines. Section 56 of Act No. 496, as amended by Act No. 3300, provides that "All records
relating to registered lands in the office of the Register of Deeds shall be open to the public
subject to such reasonable regulations as may be prescribed by the Chief of the General Land
Registration Office with the approval of the Secretary of Justice." The Chief of the General Land
Registration Office does not seem to have adopted any regulations in pursuance of this
provision. Nevertheless, we do not believe this omission relevant. The Register of Deeds has
inherent power to control his office and the records under his custody and has some discretion
to exercise as to the manner in which persons desiring to inspect, examine, or copy the records
may exercise their rights. The question at issue boils down to a determination of the scope of
this discretion.
 42

Independently of statutes the petitioner, as editor of a newspaper, has the requisite

interest in land records even under the common law theory entitling him to the writ of
mandamus. Newspapers have a better-established right of access to records of titles by reason
of their relations to the public than abstracters or insurers of title. Whether by design or
otherwise, newspapers perform a mission which does not enter into the calculation of the
business of abstracting titles conducted purely for private gain. Newspapers publish information
for the benefit of the public while abstracters do so for the benefit of a limited class of investors
and purchasers of real estate only. It is through the medium of newspapers that the public is
informed of how public servants conduct their business. The public through newspapers have
the legitimate right to know the transaction in real estate which they believe, correctly or
erroneously, have been registered in violation of the constitution. The publication of these
matters is certainly not only legitimate and lawful but necessary in a country where, under the
constitution, the people should rule.

Hence, mandamus is the appropriate remedy, and the petition will be granted
commanding the respondents to allow the petitioner or his accredited representatives to
examine, extract, abstract or make memoranda of the records of sales of real properties to
aliens subject to such restriction and limitation as may be deemed necessary not incompatible
with his decision.

BALDOZA V. DIMAANO
[A.M. No. 1120-MJ. May 5, 1976.]
 43

Topic: IX. Right to Information; Limitations and allowable restrictions

FACTS:
Respondent Municipal Judge was administratively charged with abuse of authority in
refusing to allow the employees of the Municipal Mayor of Taal to examine the criminal docket
records of the Municipal Court to secure data in connection with their contemplated report on
the peace and order situation of the municipality. In his answer, respondent claimed that he
merely imposed restrictions on the matter of examination, inspection, or copying of his court
records for fear that the right might be abused and the dirty hands of partisan politics might
again be at play.
During the preliminary hearing of the case, the Municipality Mayor moved to dismiss the
complaint to preserve the harmony and cooperation among the officials of the municipality but
the inquest Judge denied the motion. After the formal investigation, the investigating Judge
recommended respondent's exoneration.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent judge violated the right to information when it imposed
rules and conditions, by reason to prevent civil insurrection, upon the request of court
documents by complainant.
HELD:
NO.
The Court ruled that the respondent did not act arbitrarily. Respondent allowed the
complainant to open and view the docket books of respondent under certain conditions and
under his command and supervision. It has not been shown that the rules and conditions
imposed by the respondent were unreasonable. The access to public records is predicated on
the right of the people to acquire information on matters of public concern. Undoubtedly in a
democracy, the public has a legitimate interest in matters of social and political significance. In
an earlier case, this Court held that mandamus would lie to compel the Secretary of Justice and
the Register of Deeds to examine the records of the latter office. Predicating the right to
examine the records on statutory provisions, and to a certain degree by general principles of
democratic institutions, this Court stated that while the Register of Deeds has discretion to
exercise as to the manner in which persons desiring to inspect, examine or copy the records in
his office may exercise their rights, such power does not carry with it authority to prohibit.
The New Constitution now expressly recognizes that the people are entitled to
information on matters of public concern and thus are expressly granted access to official
records, as well as documents of official acts, or transactions, or decisions, subject to such
limitations imposed by law. The incorporation of this right in the Constitution is a recognition of
the fundamental role of free exchange of information in a democracy. There can be no realistic
perception by the public of the nation's problems, nor a meaningful democratic decision-making
if they are denied access to information of general interest. Information is needed to enable the
members of society to cope with the exigencies of the times. As has been aptly observed:
"Maintaining the ow of such information depends on protection for both its acquisition and its
dissemination since, if either process is interrupted, the ow inevitably ceases." However,
restrictions on access to certain records may be imposed by law. Thus, access restrictions
imposed to control civil insurrection have been permitted upon a showing of immediate and
impending danger that renders ordinary means of control inadequate to maintain order.
 44

Chavez vs. PCGG

G.R. No. 130716 December 9, 1998
Topic: Meaning & scope of “matters of public concern”

FACTS:
Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, as "taxpayer, citizen and former government official who
initiated the prosecution of the Marcoses and their cronies who committed unmitigated plunder
of the public treasury and the systematic subjugation of the country's economy," alleges that
what impelled him to bring this action were several news reports bannered in a number of
broadsheets sometime in September 1997. These news items referred to (1) the alleged
discovery of billions of dollars of Marcos assets deposited in various coded accounts in Swiss
banks; and (2) the reported execution of a compromise, between the government (through
PCGG) and the Marcos heirs, on how to split or share these assets.

Petitioner, invoking his constitutional right to information and the correlative duty of the
state to disclose publicly all its transactions involving the national interest demands that
respondents make public any and all negotiations and agreements pertaining to PCGG's task of
recovering the Marcoses' ill-gotten wealth. He claims that any compromise on the alleged
billions of ill-gotten wealth involves an issue of "paramount public interest," since it has a
"debilitating effect on the country's economy" that would be greatly prejudicial to the national
interest of the Filipino people. Hence, the people in general have a right to know the
transactions or deals being contrived and effected by the government.

ISSUE: Whether or not the alleged ill-gotten wealth of Marcoses falls under the meaning of
“matters of public concern”

RULING: Yes, the alleged ill-gotten wealth is a matter of public concern.

In determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern there is no

rigid test which can be applied. "Public concern" like "public interest" is a term that eludes exact
definition. Both terms embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to
know, either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally
arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine on
a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or
affects the public concern
Executive Order No. 1, promulgated on February 28, 1986, only two (2) days after the
Marcoses fled the country, created the PCGG which was primarily tasked to assist the President
in the recovery of vast government resources allegedly amassed by former President Marcos,
his immediate family, relatives and close associates both here and abroad. Under Executive
Order No. 2, issued twelve (12) days later, all persons and entities who had knowledge or
possession of ill-gotten assets and properties were warned and, under pain of penalties
prescribed by law, prohibited from concealing, transferring or dissipating them or from otherwise
frustrating or obstructing the recovery efforts of the government. On May 7, 1986, another
directive (EO No. 14) was issued giving additional powers to the PCGG which, taking into
account the overriding considerations of national interest and national survival, required it to
achieve expeditiously and effectively its vital task of recovering ill-gotten wealth.
With such pronouncements of our government, whose authority emanates from the
people, there is no doubt that the recovery of the Marcoses' alleged ill-gotten wealth is a matter
of public concern and imbued with public interest. The "ill-gotten wealth," by its very nature,
 45

assumes a public character. Based on the aforementioned Executive Orders, "ill-gotten wealth"
refers to assets and properties purportedly acquired, directly or indirectly, by former President
Marcos, his immediate family, relatives and close associates through or as a result of their
improper or illegal use of government funds or properties; or their having taken undue
advantage of their public office; or their use of powers, influences or relationships, "resulting in
their unjust enrichment and causing grave damage and prejudice to the Filipino people and the
Republic of the Philippines." Clearly, the assets and properties referred to supposedly originated
from the government itself. To all intents and purposes, therefore, they belong to the people. As
such, upon reconveyance they will be returned to the public treasury.

LEGAZPI V. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

G.R. No. L-72119, May 29, 1987
Topic: Right to information may be enforced by mandamus

FACTS:
The fundamental right of the people to information on matters of public concern is
invoked in this special civil action for mandamus instituted by petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi
against the Civil Service Commission. The respondent had earlier denied Legaspi's request for
 46

information on the civil service eligibilities of certain persons employed as sanitarians in the
Health Department of Cebu City.

Claiming that his right to be informed of the eligibilities of Julian Sibonghanoy and
Mariano Agas, is guaranteed by the Constitution, and that he has no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy to acquire the information, petitioner prays for the issuance of the
extraordinary writ of mandamus to compel the respondent Commission to disclose said
information.

The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized.
Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions,
or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis. for policy development,
shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such stations as may be provided by law.

These constitutional provisions are self-executing. They supply the rules by means of
which the right to information may be enjoyed (Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional
Limitations 167 [1927]) by guaranteeing the right and mandating the duty to afford access to
sources of information. Hence, the fundamental right therein recognized may be asserted by the
people upon the ratification of the constitution without need for any ancillary act of the
Legislature. What may be provided for by the Legislature are reasonable conditions and
limitations upon the access to be afforded.

However, it cannot be overemphasized that whatever limitation may be prescribed by

the Legislature, the right and the duty under Art. III Sec. 7 have become operative and
enforceable by virtue of the adoption of the New Charter. Therefore, the right may be properly
invoked in a mandamus proceeding such as this one.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the right may be properly invoked in a mandamus proceeding.

HELD:
Yes, the right may be properly invoked in a mandamus proceeding.

The petitioner has firmly anchored his case upon the right of the people to information on
matters of public concern, which, by its very nature, is a public right. It has been held that: when
the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement
of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at whose
instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest
in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the
execution of the laws.

From the foregoing, it becomes apparent that when a mandamus proceeding involves
the assertion of a public right, the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact
that the petitioner is a citizen, and therefore, part of the general "public" which possesses the
 47

right. The petitioner, being a citizen who, as such is clothed with personality to seek redress for
the alleged obstruction of the exercise of the public right. We find no cogent reason to deny his
standing to bring the present suit.

In recognizing the people's right to be informed, both the 1973 Constitution and the New
Charter expressly mandate the duty of the State and its agents to afford access to official
records, documents, papers and in addition, government research data used as basis for policy
development, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. The guarantee has been
further enhanced in the New Constitution with the adoption of a policy of full public disclosure,
this time "subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law,"

If it be wrong to publish the contents of the records, it is the legislature and not the
officials having custody thereof which is called upon to devise a remedy. It is clear from the
foregoing pronouncements of this Court that government agencies are without discretion in
refusing disclosure of, or access to, information of public concern. We were emphatic in Our
statement that the authority to regulate the manner of examining public records does not carry
with it the power to prohibit. Thus, while the manner of examining public records may be subject
to reasonable regulation by the government agency in custody thereof, the duty to disclose the
information of public concern, and to afford access to public records cannot be discretionary on
the part of said agencies.

But the constitutional guarantee to information on matters of public concern is not

absolute. It does not open every door to any and all information. Under the Constitution, access
to official records, papers, etc., are "subject to limitations as may be provided by law" (Art. III,
Sec. 7, second sentence). The law may therefore exempt certain types of information from
public scrutiny, such as those affecting national security.

But then, it is not enough that the information sought is of public interest. For mandamus
to lie in a given case, the information must not be among the species exempted by law from the
operation of the constitutional guarantee. In the instant case, while refusing to confirm or deny
the claims of eligibility, the respondent has failed to cite any provision in the Civil Service Law
which would limit the petitioner's right to know who are, and who are not, civil service eligibles.
We take judicial notice of the fact that the names of those who pass the civil service
examinations, as in bar examinations and licensure examinations for various professions, are
released to the public. The civil service eligibility of a sanitarian being of public concern, and in
the absence of express limitations under the law upon access to the register of civil service
eligibles for said position, the duty of the respondent Commission to confirm or deny the civil
service eligibility of any person occupying the position becomes imperative. Mandamus,
therefore lies.
 48

SENATE vs. ERMITA

[G.R. No. 169777. April 20, 2006.]
Right to formation of the public v. Right to information of Congress

FACTS:

The present consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President
has abused such power by issuing Executive Order No. 464 "ENSURING OBSERVANCE OF
THE PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS, ADHERENCE TO THE RULE ON
EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE AND RESPECT FOR THE RIGHTS OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS
APPEARING IN LEGISLATIVE INQUIRIES IN AID OF LEGISLATION UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES”. Petitioners pray for its declaration as null
and void for being unconstitutional.
 49

The Committee of the Senate as a whole issued invitations to various officials of the
Executive Department for them to appear in a public hearing on the railway project of the North
Luzon Railways Corporation with the China National Machinery and Equipment Group. The
public hearing was sparked by a privilege speech of Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile urging the Senate
to investigate the alleged overpricing and other unlawful provisions of the contract covering the
North Rail Project. The Senate Committee on National Defense and Security likewise issued
invitations to the following particular officials of the AFP - to Conduct an Inquiry, in Aid of
Legislation, and in the National Interest, on the Role of the Military in the So-called "Gloriagate
Scandal". Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent from the President as
provided by EO No. 464, Sec. 3 which requires all public officials enumerated in Section 2 (b)
hereof shall secure prior consent of the President prior to appearing before either House of
Congress.

ISSUE: Whether or not EO No. 464 arises concerns with the demands of both the Congress
and of citizens pursuant to their right to information.

RULING:
No. E.O 464 is concerned only with the demands of Congress for the appearance of
executive officials in the hearings conducted by it, and not with the demands of citizens for
information pursuant to their right to information on matters of public concern.

There are clear distinctions between the right of Congress to information which underlies
the power of inquiry and the right of the people to information on matters of public concern. For
one, the demand of a citizen for the production of documents pursuant to his right to information
does not have the same obligatory force as a subpoena duces tecum issued by Congress.
Neither does the right to information grant a citizen the power to exact testimony from
government officials. These powers belong only to Congress and not to an individual citizen.

While Congress is composed of representatives elected by the people, it does not follow,
except in a highly qualified sense, that in every exercise of its power of inquiry, the people are
exercising their right to information.

To the extent that investigations in aid of legislation are generally conducted in public,
however, any executive issuance tending to unduly limit disclosures of information in such
investigations necessarily deprives the people of information which, being presumed to be in aid
of legislation, is presumed to be a matter of public concern. The citizens are thereby denied
access to information which they can use in formulating their own opinions on the matter before
Congress — opinions which they can then communicate to their representatives and other
government officials through the various legal means allowed by their freedom of expression.

Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is
sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the ground
that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefor and why it must be
respected.
 50

PEREZ V. ESTRADA
[A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC. June 29, 2001]
Topic: Right to public information (and freedom of the press) vs. rights of the accused

FACTS:

The Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas (KBP), an association representing duly

franchised and authorized television and radio networks throughout the country, sent a letter
requesting the Supreme Court to allow live media coverage of the anticipated trial of the plunder
and other criminal cases filed against former President Joseph E. Estrada before the
Sandiganbayan in order "to assure the public of full transparency in the proceedings of an
unprecedented case in our history."

Public interest, the petition further averred, should be evident bearing in mind the right of
the public to vital information affecting the nation. Courts do not discriminate against radio and
television media by forbidding the broadcasting or televising of a trial while permitting the
newspaper reporter access to the courtroom, since a television or news reporter has the same
privilege, as the news reporter is not permitted to bring his typewriter or printing press into the
courtroom.

The propriety of granting or denying the instant petition involve the weighing out of the
constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and the right to public information, on the one
 51

hand, and the fundamental rights of the accused, on the other hand, along with the
constitutional power of a court to control its proceedings in ensuring a fair and impartial trial. 

ISSUE:

Whether or not the right to information supersedes the accused’s right to privacy.

RULING:

No, the right to information does not supersede the accused’s right to privacy.

Accordingly, in order to protect the parties’ right to due process, to prevent the
distraction of the participants in the proceedings and in the last analysis, to avoid miscarriage of
justice, the Court resolved to PROHIBIT live radio and television coverage of court proceedings.
Video footages of court hearings for news purposes shall be limited and restricted as above
indicated. When these rights race against one another, jurisprudence tells us that the right of
the accused must be preferred to win.

With the possibility of losing not only the precious liberty but also the very life of an
accused, it behooves all to make absolutely certain that an accused receives a verdict solely on
the basis of a just and dispassionate judgment, a verdict that would come only after the
presentation of credible evidence testified to by unbiased witnesses unswayed by any kind of
pressure, whether open or subtle, in proceedings that are devoid of histrionics that might detract
from its basic aim to ferret veritable facts free from improper influence, and decreed by a judge
with an unprejudiced mind, unbridled by running emotions or passions.

An accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs to him, more than
anyone else, where his life or liberty can be held critically in balance. A public trial aims to
ensure that he is fairly dealt with and would not be unjustly condemned and that his rights are
not compromised in secrete conclaves of long ago. A public trial is not synonymous with
publicized trial; it only implies that the court doors must be open to those who wish to come, sit
in the available seats, conduct themselves with decorum and observe the trial process. In the
constitutional sense, a courtroom should have enough facilities for a reasonable number of the
public to observe the proceedings, not too small as to render the openness negligible and not
too large as to distract the trial participants from their proper functions, who shall then be totally
free to report what they have observed during the proceedings. 

The courts recognize the constitutionally embodied freedom of the press and the right to
public information. It also approves of media’s exalted power to provide the most accurate and
comprehensive means of conveying the proceedings to the public and in acquainting the public
with the judicial process in action; nevertheless, within the courthouse, the overriding
consideration is still the paramount right of the accused to due process which must never be
allowed to suffer diminution in its constitutional proportions. 

 Finally, we cannot ignore the impact of courtroom television on the defendant. Its
presence is a form of mental — if not physical — harassment, resembling a police line-up or the
third degree. The inevitable close-up of his gestures and expressions during the ordeal of his
trial might well transgress his personal sensibilities, his dignity, and his ability to concentrate on
 52

the proceedings before him — sometimes the difference between life and death —
dispassionately, freely and without the distraction of wide public surveillance. A defendant on
trial for a specific crime is entitled to his day in court, not in a stadium, or a city or nationwide
arena. The heightened public clamor resulting from radio and television coverage will inevitably
result in prejudice.

PUNO, J., dissenting:

Courts do not discriminate against radio and television media by forbidding the
broadcasting or televising of a trial while permitting the newspaper reporter access to the
courtroom, since a television or news reporter has the same privilege, as the news reporter is
not permitted to bring his typewriter or printing press into the courtroom.

I respectfully submit that the 1991 resolution of this Court absolutely banning live radio
and television coverage of criminal proceedings should be re-examined to re-adjust the balance
between a free press and a fair trial in light of the continuing progress in communications
technology and to expand the right of access of the press and the public to information without,
however, impairing the right of an accused to due process.

An absolute constitutional ban on broadcast coverage of trials cannot be justified simply

because there is a danger that, in some cases, prejudicial broadcast accounts of pre-trial and
trial events may impair the ability of jurors to decide the issue of guilt or innocence uninfluenced
by extraneous matter. The risk of juror prejudice in some cases does not justify an absolute ban
on news coverage of trials by the printed media; so also the risk of such prejudice does not
warrant an absolute constitutional ban on all broadcast coverage. The appropriate safeguard
against such prejudice is the defendant’s right to demonstrate that the media’s coverage of his
case — be it printed or broadcast — compromised the ability of the particular jury that heard the
case to adjudicate fairly.

An overwhelming majority of the states now allow radio-TV coverage of criminal trials.
The absolute ban against radio-TV coverage of criminal trial has now been lifted in majority of
the states in the United States. I respectfully submit that the absolute ban on televising criminal
trials be lifted and to televise the trial of the plunder cases against former President Joseph E.
Estrada.
 53

X. THE NON-IMPAIRMENT CLAUSE

A. Meaning of contract
CASE: Pedro v. Provincial Board, G.R. No. 34163,
September 18, 1931………………………………………………………………………….54
B. Meaning of impairment
CASE: Tiro v. Hontanosas, G.R. No. L-32312, November 25, 1983…………………57
C. Police power v. impairment clause
CASES: Rutter v. Esteban, G.R. No. L-3708, May 18, 1953………………………….59
Ilusorio v. CAR, G.R. No. L-20344, May 16, 1966 ……………………………………...61
Ortigas & Co. v. Feati Bank, G.R. No. L-24670, December 14, 1979 ……………….62
Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc., G.R. No. 167614,
March 24, 2009……………………………………………………………………………… 64
D. Free exercise of religion vs. impairment clause
CASE: Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union, supra ………………………...68
 54

G.R. No. 34163 September 18, 1931

GREGORIO PEDRO, vs. THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF RIZAL, ET AL.,
Topic: Meaning of contract
FACTS:
On May 8, 1926, there was organized in the municipality of Caloocan, Province of Rizal,
an association for the construction and exploitation of cockpits, called "La Sociedad Bighani."
On May 22, 1926, Eugenio Tansioco, the president of the association, applied to the municipal
president of Caloocan and obtain a permit to construct a building of strong materials at Galas, in
said municipality, to be used as cockpit, upon payment of the proper fees. While the
construction was under way, Pablo, then president of Caloocan, addressed a communication to
Eugenio Tansioco on June 15, 1926, warning him that the site of the building was not the one
designated by the chief of police, and that it was within the radius of 1,500 meters from the
hospital of the Philippine Antituberculosis Society in Santol, in direct contravention of Ordinance
No. 15, series of 1926, enacted on May, 1926. The permit having been annulled, and the
payments theretofore made forfeited, the "Sociedad Bighani" filed civil case No. 30537 in the
Court of First Instance of Manila on September 21, 1926, against said Pablo Pablo, as
municipal president of Caloocan, et al., requiring them to refrain from impeding or obstructing
the operation and exploitation of the Bighani cockpit, which at that time was completed and
ready to be thrown open to the public. On September 18, 1927, the municipal council of
Caloocan enacted Ordinance No. 34, providing in the first section, among other things, that
outside the barrios of Loma, Talipapa, and Novaliches, where only one cockpit might be
established, cockpits might be established at a distance of not less than 1,500 meters from
another licensed cockpit, public schoolhouse, or any hospital or charitable institution existing
within the municipal radius. As a result of the general election held on June 5, 1928, in the
municipality of Caloocan, Rizal, the municipal council, was substituted by another comprising
the newly elected councilors, who were inducted into office on October 16th of that year. On
December 21, 1928, the plaintiff herein, Gregorio Pedro, acquired by absolute sale all the rights
and interests of the "Sociedad Bighani" in the cockpit bearing its name.
On the same date, December 21, 1928, said plaintiff, Gregorio Pedro, addressed a
communication to the municipal council of Caloocan soliciting a permit to open, operate,
maintain, and exploit said cockpit for a period of four years. On December 26, 1928, the
 55

municipal council of Caloocan passed resolution No. 202 approving Ordinance No. 35, series of
1928, amending section 1 of Ordinance No. 34, series of 1927. On the same date, December
26, 1928, the municipal councilors of Caloocan, Blas Bernardino, Flaviano de Jesus, and Pedro
Galang, signed and forwarded to the provincial governor of Rizal an accusation against
Dominador Aquino, the municipal president, and the other councilors who approved Ordinance
No. 35, series of 1928, alleging that they had been bribed to vote in favor of that ordinance. On
December 28, 1928, the appellant Gregorio Pedro paid into the municipal treasury the sum of
P2,050 as a license fee on his cockpit for the first quarter of the year 1929, and the proper
receipt, and the permit, were issued to him authorizing him to operate, maintain, exploit, and
open to the public a day cockpit in the barrio of Galas, Caloocan, Rizal, for a period of four
years. On December 29, 1928, the municipal council ad interim in Caloocan, passed resolution
No. 9, series of 1928, approving Ordinance No. 36, series of 1928, suspending the effects of
resolution No. 202 of the suspended council, approving Ordinance No. 35, series of 1928, while
a special committee created by the same ordinance investigated the expediency of permitting
the exploitation and opening of the Galas cockpit at the site applied for by the proprietor,
Gregorio Pedro.
The first question to decide in this appeal is that raised in the first assignment of error, to wit,
whether Ordinance No. 36, series of 1928, approved by the temporary councilors, is valid.
The appellant argues for the nullity of Ordinance No. 36, series of 1928, approved on December
29, 1928, by the temporary councilors appointed by the provincial governor of Rizal, Eligio
Naval, on the ground that (1) it impairs the acquired rights of said appellant; (2) it was enacted
on account of prejudice, because it was intended for a special and not a general purpose,
namely to prevent, at any cost, the opening, maintenance, and exploitation of the cockpit of the
said petitioner-appellant; and (3) it provides for special committee composed of persons who
are not members of the council, vested them with powers which of their very nature, cannot be
delegated by said council to that committee.
The petitioner-appellant contends that, having obtained the proper permit to maintain, exploit,
and open to the public the cockpit in question, having paid the license fee and fulfilled all the
requirements provided by Ordinance No. 35, series of 1928, he has acquired a right which
cannot be taken away from him by Ordinance No. 36, series of 1928, which was subsequently
approved. This court has already held that an ordinance regulating the functioning of cockpits
does not create irrevocable rights and may be abrogated by another ordinance.
The petitioner-appellant also contends that said Ordinance No. 36 was passed due to prejudice
"because it was intended for a special and not a general purpose, namely to prevent, at any
cost, the opening, maintenance, and exploitation of the cockpit of the said petitioner." The
aforesaid Ordinance No. 36 was not approved for the purpose of injuring the petitioner, but to
correct an irregularity consisting in the passage of Ordinance No. 35, which had been enacted
to favor the said petitioner-appellant. The "Sociedad Bighani," from which the herein petitioner-
appellant acquired the ownership of the cockpit here in question, was denied a license to
operate it, because it had been constructed in violation of Ordinance No. 15, series of 1926,
later amended by Ordinance No. 34, series of 1927. The "Sociedad Bighani" instituted
proceedings against the president and municipal council of Caloocan, Rizal, in civil case No.
30537 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, to prevent said defendants from impeding the
operation and exploitation of the Bighani cockpit, and the court decided in favor of said
defendants, absolving them from the complaint on the ground among other reasons, that the
 56

Bighani cockpit had been constructed within the prohibited distance from the Antitubercular
Sanatorium of Santol, and that decision was affirmed by this court on appeal. (Company
"Bighani" vs. Pablo, supra.) The cockpit in question now is the former Bighani cockpit mentioned
above; it occupies the same site; and the same hygienic reasons which prompted the
enactment of Ordinance No. 15, amended by Ordinance No. 34, cited above, exist now;
therefore, when this was amended by Ordinance No. 35, reducing the distance between a
cockpit and any hospital, so that the Bighani cockpit would be beyond said distance, the
municipal council which amended it acted with partiality towards a certain person, namely, the
petitioner-appellant, to the prejudice of the patients in the aforesaid sanatorium. According to
Elliot in his work "Municipal Corporations," cited by said petitioner-appellant himself, said
Ordinance No. 35 is void because it is partial.
ISSUE: Whether or not an ordinance, approved by a municipal council duly constituted, which
suspends the effects of another which had been enacted to favor the grantee of a cockpit
license, is valid and legal.
RULING:
YES, Ordinance No. 36, which seeks to correct said irregularity, suspended the effects
of said Ordinance No. 35, impliedly reestablishing Ordinance No. 34, is therefore valid. The
other reason given by the petitioner-appellant to show that Ordinance No. 36, is void is that the
municipal council in approving it delegated its legislative powers to a special sanitary committee.
Section 2 of Ordinance No. 36, series of 1928, provides as follows:
SEC. 2. A committee is hereby provided for, to be composed of the president of the third
sanitary division of Caloocan, Rizal, a practising physician residing in this municipality, and a
member of the municipal council, whose duty it shall be to make the necessary investigation to
determine whether or not the exploitation of the cockpit in the barrio of Galas for which Gregorio
Pedro has applied for a permit, would be injurious to any public or private interest. This special
committee shall make such investigation and submit a report in due form to this municipal
council within the shortest time possible for its definite action.
The municipal council of Caloocan pro tempore therefore does not delegate by that
ordinance to the special committee thereby created any legislative function, but only entrusts to
it the study of the effect of the operation and exploitation of the cockpit under consideration
upon public and private interests, in order to determine whether or not the license should issue.
Informational work of this nature, owing to its technical character, may be entrusted to technical
committees. (12 Corpus Juris, 846.) . Having arrived at the conclusion that Ordinance No. 36 is
valid and that the petitioner-appellant has acquired no irrevocable right by virtue of the license
granted him under Ordinance No. 35, approved to favor him, which is therefore void, we need
not discuss the other assignments of error by the petitioner-appellant.
Wherefore, we are of opinion and so hold: (1) That a license authorizing the operation
and exploitation of a cockpit is not property of which the holder may not be deprived without due
process of law, but a mere privilege which may be revoked when the public interests so require;
(2) that the work entrusted by a municipal council to a special sanitary committee to make a
study of the sanitary effects upon the neighborhood of the establishment of a cockpit, is not
legislative in character, but only informational, and may be delegated; and (3) that an ordinance,
approved by a municipal council duly constituted, which suspends the effects of another which
had been enacted to favor the grantee of a cockpit license, is valid and legal. By virtue whereof,
 57

finding no error in the judgment appealed from, it is hereby affirmed, with costs against the
appellant. So ordered.

TIRO V. HONTANOSAS
G.R. No. L-32312 | November 25, 1983
TOPIC: Meaning of impairment

FACTS:
In Civil Case No. 11616, Zafra Financing Enterprise sued Aurelio Tiro in his official
capacity as Superintendent of Schools in Cebu City. It appears that Zafra had extended loans to
public school teachers in Cebu City and the teachers concerned executed promissory notes and
special powers of attorney in favor of Zafra to take and collect their salary checks from the
Division Office in Cebu City of the Bureau of Public Schools. However, Tiro forbade the
collection of the checks on the basis of Circular No. 21, of the Director of Public Schools, which
prohibited the payment of salary to persons other than the employee concerned, pursuant to
Memorandum Order No. 93 of the Executive Office.
The said order discouraged the practice in view of its adverse effects on the efficiency
and morale of employees whose incentive to work is necessarily impaired, since their salary or
a portion thereof goes to other persons. As such, cashiers or disbursing offices are prohibited
from giving payments to attorneys-in-fact or those authorized to collect the salary of an
employee, except when the person is an immediate member of the family of the employee
concerned, and in all other cases, except upon proper authorization of the Assistant Executive
Secretary for Legal and Administrative Matters, with the recommendation of the Financial
Assistant.
Zafra sought to compel Tiro to honor the special powers of attorney; to declare Circular
No. 21 to be illegal; and to make Tiro pay attorney's fees and damages. The trial court granted
the prayer of Zafra but the claim for money was disallowed on the ground that he acted in good
faith in implementing Circular No. 21.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Circular No. 21 is invalid and unenforceable for impairing the obligation
of contracts.
RULING:
NO.
The salary check of a government officer or employee such as a teacher does not
belong to him before it is physically delivered to him. Until that time the check belongs to the
Government. Accordingly, before there is actual delivery of the check, the payee has no power
 58

over it; he cannot assign it without the consent of the Government. On this basis Circular No. 21
stands on firm legal footing.
The Circular in question is also authorized by relevant statutes. Section 79(b) of the
Revised Administrative Code provides that:
SEC. 79(b). Power to regulate. — The Department Head shall have power to
promulgate, whoever he may see fit to do so, all rules, regulations, orders, circular,
memorandums, not contrary to law, necessary to regulate the proper working and
harmonious and efficient administration of each and all of the offices and dependencies
of his Department, and for the strict enforcement and proper execution of the laws
relative to matters under the jurisdiction of said Department; but none of said rules or
orders shall prescribe penalties. All rules, regulations, orders or instructions of a general
and permanent character promulgated in conformity with this section shall be numbered
by each Department consecutively each year, and shall be duly published.
Chiefs of Bureaus or offices may, however, be authorized to promulgate circulars
of information or instructions for the government of the officers and employees in the
interior administration of the business of each Bureau or office, and in such case said
circulars shall not be required to be published.
The Magna Carta for Teachers or RA No. 4670 also provides in Section 21 that:
SEC. 21. Deductions Prohibited. — No person shall make any deduction
whatsoever from the salaries of teachers except under specific authority of law
authorizing such deductions: Provided, however, that upon written authority executed by
the teacher concerned, (1) lawful dues and fees owing to the Philippine Public School
Teachers Association, and (2) premiums properly due on insurance policies, shall be
deductible.
In this case, Zafra's claim that the Circular impairs the obligation of contracts with the
teachers is baseless. For the Circular does not prevent Zafra from collecting the loans. The
Circular merely makes the Government a non-participant in their collection which is within its
competence to do.

RUTTER V. ESTEBAN
 59

[G.R. No. L-3708 - May 18, 1953]

Topic: NON-IMPAIRMENT CLAUSE Police Power v. Impairment Clause

FACTS:
On August 20, 1941, Royal L. Rutter sold Esteban two parcels of land situated in the city
of Manila for the sum of P9,600 of which P4,800 were paid outright, and the balance of P4,800
was made payable as follows: P2,400 on or before August 7, 1942, and P2,400 on or before
August 27, 1943, with interest at the rate of 7 percent per annum.

To secure the payment of said balance of P4,800, a first mortgage over the same
parcels of land has been constituted in favor of the plaintiff. The deed of sale having been
registered, a new title was issued in favor of Placido J.Esteban with a mortgage duly annotated
on the back thereof. Placido J. Esteban failed to pay the two installments as agreed upon, as
well as the interest that had accrued there-on, and so on August 2, 1949, Royal L. Rutter
instituted this action in the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover the balance due, the
interest due thereon, and the attorney's fees stipulated in the contract. The complaint also
contains a prayer for sale of the properties mortgaged in accordance with law.

Placido J. Esteban admitted the averments of the complaint, but set up a defense the
moratorium clause embodied in Republic Act No. 342. He claims that this is a prewar obligation
contracted on August 20, 1941; that he is a war sufferer, having filed his claim with the
Philippine War Damage Commission for the losses he had suffered as a consequence of the
last war; and that under section 2 of said Republic Act No. 342, payment of his obligation cannot
be enforced until after the lapse of eight years from the settlement of his claim by the Philippine
War Damage Commission, and this period has not yet expired.

ISSUE: Whether or not Republic Act No. 342 can be used by Esteban as a defense for his
failure to pay his installments.

RULING:
NO, Republic Act No. 342 cannot be used by Esteban as a defense for his failure to pay
his installments.

. It must be noted that the application of the reserved power of the State to protect the
integrity of the government and the security of the people should be limited to its proper bounds
and must be addressed to a legitimate purpose. If these bounds are transgressed, there is no
room for the exercise of the power, for the constitutional inhibition against the impairment of
contracts would assert itself. We can cite instances by which these bounds may be
transgressed. One of them is that the impairment should only refer to the remedy and not to a
substantive right. The State may postpone the enforcement of the obligation but cannot destroy
it by making the remedy futile (W.B. Worthen Co. vs. Kavanaugh, 79 L.ed. 1298, 1301-1303).

Another limitation refers to the propriety of the remedy. The rule requires that the
alteration or change that the new legislation desires to write into an existing contract must not
be burdened with restrictions and conditions that would make the remedy hardly pursuing
 60

(Bronson vs. Kinziel, I How, 311, 317; 46 Har. Law Review, p. 1070). In other words, the
Blaisdell case postulates that the protective power of the State, the police power, may only be
invoked and justified by an emergency, temporary in nature, and can only be exercised upon
reasonable conditions in order that it may not infringe the constitutional provision against
impairment of contracts (First Trust Co. of Lincoln vs. Smith 277 N.W., pp. 762, 769). As justice
Cardozo aptly said, "A different situation is presented when extensions are so piled up as to
make the remedy a shadow . . . The changes of remedy now challenged as invalid are to be
viewed in combination, with the cumulative significance that each imparts to all. So viewed they
are seen to be an oppressive and unnecessary destruction of nearly all the incidents that give
attractiveness and value to collateral security (W.B. Worthen vs. Kavanaugh, 295 U.S. 56, 62).
In fine, the decision in the Blaisdell case is predicated on the ground that the laws altering
existing contracts will constitute an impairment of the contract clause of the Constitution only if
they are unreasonable in the light of the circumstances occasioning their enactment (47 Harvard
Law Review, p. 660).

In the face of the foregoing observations, and consistent with what we believe to be as
the only course dictated by justice, fairness and righteousness, we feel that the only way open
to us under the present circumstances is to declare that the continued operation and
enforcement of Republic Act No. 342 at the present time is unreasonable and oppressive, and
should not be prolonged a minute longer, and, therefore, the same should be declared null and
void and without effect. And what we say here with respect to said Act also holds true as
regards Executive Orders Nos. 25 and 32, perhaps with greater force and reason as to the
latter, considering that said Orders contain no limitation whatsoever in point of time as regards
the suspension of the enforcement and effectivity of monetary obligations. And there is need to
make this pronouncement in view of the revival clause embodied in said Act if and when it is
declared unconstitutional or invalid.

ILLUSORIO V. CAR
G.R. No. L-20344
Topic: Police Power v. Impairment clause

FACTS:
 61

Petitioners herein, Potenciano Ilusorio and Teresa Ilusorio, are co-owners of a parcel of
land found in the province of Bulacan. The respondents worked on said land under the share
tenancy system. The respondent wanted to change their tenancy contract from the share
tenancy system to leasehold tenancy in conformity with Sec 14 of R.A. No. 1199 as amended.
The petitioners argued that the said act was unconstitutional on the ground that it violates the
freedom of contract and impairs property rights and obligation of contracts.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the said act violates the freedom of contract and impairs property rights.

RULING:

No. The constitutional prohibition against impairing the obligation of contracts is not an
absolute one and is not to be read literally. Such provisions are restricted to contracts with
respect to property and have no application to statute relating to public subjects within the
domain of the general legislative powers of the State and involving the public right and public
welfare of the entire community affected by it. They do not prevent proper exercise by the State
of its police powers. By enacting regulations reasonably necessary to secure the health, safety,
morals, comfort, or general welfare of the community, even the contracts may thereby be
affected; for such matter cannot be placed by contract beyond the power of the State to regulate
and control them. (Ongsiako vs. Gamboa, et al., 86 Phil. 50.)

ORTIGAS & CO., LIMITED PARTNERSHIP vs. FEATI BANK AND TRUST CO
[G.R. No. L-24670. December 14, 1979.]
Topic: Police Power vs. Impairment Clause

FACTS:

Plaintiff, Ortigas & Co., Limited Partnership is engaged in real estate business, developing and
selling lots to the public, particularly the Highway Hills Subdivision along Epifanio de los Santos
Avenue (EDSA), Mandaluyong, Rizal. In 1952, plaintiff, as vendor, and Augusto Padilla y
 62

Angeles and Natividad Angeles, as vendees, entered into separate agreements of sale on
installments over two parcels of land, known as Lots Nos. 5 and 6, Block 31, of the Highway
Hills Subdivision, situated at Mandaluyong, Rizal. The said vendees transferred their rights and
interests over the aforesaid lots in favor of one Emma Chavez. Among the stipulations or
restrictions in the agreements with Chavez is that, the properties shall be used by the buyer
exclusively for residential purposes.

Eventually, defendant-appellee, Feati Bank and Trust Co. acquired Lots Nos. 5 and 6 and
bought Lot No. 5 directly from Emma Chavez, "free from all liens and encumbrances” while Lot
No. 6
was acquired from Republic Flour Mills through a "Deed of Exchange.”

Ortigas & Co., Limited Partnership claims that the restrictions in the subject properties were
imposed as part of its general building scheme designed for the beautification and development
of the Highway Hills Subdivision which forms part of the big landed estate of plaintiff-appellant
where commercial and industrial sites are also designated or established.

Feati Bank and Trust Co., upon the other hand, maintains that the area along the western part
of EDSA, has been declared a commercial and industrial zone, per Resolution No. 27 of the
Municipal Council of Mandaluyong, Rizal. It alleges that plaintiff-appellant "completely sold and
transferred to third persons all lots in said subdivision facing Epifanio de los Santos Avenue"
and the subject lots thereunder were acquired by it "only on July 23, 1962 or more than two (2)
years after the area . . . had been declared a commercial and industrial zone.

Defendant then commenced the construction of a building on Lots Nos. 5 and 6, to be devoted
to banking purposes, but which defendant-appellee claims could also be devoted to, and used
exclusively for, residential purposes. The following day, plaintiff-appellant demanded in writing
that defendant-appellee stop the construction of the commercial building on the said lots. The
latter refused to comply with the demand, contending that the building was being constructed in
accordance with the zoning regulations, defendant-appellee having filed building and planning
permit applications with the Municipality of Mandaluyong, and it had accordingly obtained
building and planning permits to proceed with the construction.

ISSUE: Whether or not the contractual obligations of the subject properties can prevail over a
municipal resolution.

RULING:

No. The contractual obligations of the subject properties cannot prevail over a municipal
resolution.

While non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not absolute, since
it has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power, i.e., "the power to prescribe
regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general
 63

welfare of the people." Invariably described as "the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of
powers" and "in a sense, the greatest and most powerful attribute of government," the exercise
of the power may be judicially inquired into and corrected only if it is capricious, whimsical,
unjust or unreasonable, there having been a denial of due process or a violation of any other
applicable constitutional guarantee.

In the case at bar, Resolution No. 27, s-1960 declaring the western part of Highway 54, now E.
de los Santos Avenue (EDSA, for short) from Shaw Boulevard to the Pasig River as an
industrial and commercial zone, was obviously passed by the Municipal Council of
Mandaluyong, Rizal in the exercise of police power to safeguard or promote the health, safety,
peace, good order and general welfare of the people in the locality. Judicial notice may be taken
of the conditions prevailing in the area, especially where Lots Nos. 5 and 6 are located.

The lots themselves not only front the highway; industrial and commercial complexes have
flourished about the place. EDSA, a main traffic artery which runs through several cities and
municipalities in the Metro Manila area, supports an endless stream of traffic and the resulting
activity, noise and pollution are hardly conducive to the health, safety or welfare of the residents
in its route. Having been expressly granted the power to adopt zoning and subdivision
ordinances or regulations, the municipality of Mandaluyong, through its Municipal Council, was
reasonably, if not perfectly, justified under the circumstances, in passing the subject resolution.

Thus, the state, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with personal liberty, with
property, and with business and occupations. Persons may be subjected to all kinds of
restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort health and prosperity of the state
and to this fundamental aim of our Government, the rights of the individual are subordinated.

SERRANO V. GALLANT MARITIME SERVICES, INC.

[G.R. No. 167614. March 24, 2009.]
Topic: Police Power vs. Impairment clause
FACTS:
Petitioner Serrano, Filipino seafarer, was hired by respondents, Gallant Maritime Services, Inc.
and Marlow Navigation Co., Ltd. under a Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA)-approved Contract of Employment.

On his departure, petitioner was constrained to accept a downgraded employment contract for
the position of Second Officer with a monthly salary of US$1,000.00, upon the assurance and
representation of respondents that he would be made Chief Officer by the end of April 1998.

Respondents did not deliver on their promise. Petitioner refused to stay on as Second Officer
and was repatriated to the Philippines on May 26, 1998.
 64

Petitioner's employment contract was for a period of 12 months (March 19, 1998 to March 19,
1999), but at the time of his repatriation on May 26, 1998, he had served only two (2) months
and seven (7) days of his contract, leaving an unexpired portion of nine (9) months and
twenty-three (23) days. Petitioner filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint against respondents
for constructive dismissal and for payment of his money claims in the total amount of
US$26,442.73.
The LA rendered a Decision dated July 15, 1999, declaring the dismissal of petitioner illegal and
awarding him monetary benefits--- Eight thousand seven hundred seventy US Dollars
($8,770.00) representing the complainant’s salary for 3 months of the unexpired portion of the
contract of employment.
In awarding a lump-sum salary of US$8,770.00, the LA based his computation on the salary
period of three months only — rather than the entire unexpired portion of nine months and 23
days of petitioner's employment contract — applying the subject clause. However, the LA
applied the salary rate of US$2,590.00, consisting of petitioner's "basic salary,
US$1,400.00/month + US$700.00/month, fixed overtime pay, + US$490.00/month, vacation
leave pay = US$2,590.00/compensation per month."
Respondents appealed NLRC to question the finding of the LA that petitioner was illegally
dismissed.
Petitioner also appealed to the NLRC to apply the ruling of the Court in Triple Integrated
Services, Inc. v. NLRC---that in case of illegal dismissal, OFWs are entitled to their salaries for
the unexpired portion of their contracts.
The NLRC corrected the LA's computation of the lump-sum salary awarded to petitioner by
reducing the applicable salary rate from US$2,590.00 to US$1,400.00 because R.A. No. 8042
"does not provide for the award of overtime pay, which should be proven to have been actually
performed, and for vacation leave pay."
Petitioner led a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, but this time he questioned the
constitutionality of the subject clause.
After the petition reached the CA which the latter denied, petitioner seeks to withdraw his
petition as he is already old and sickly, and he intends to make use of the monetary award for
his medical treatment and medication. The counsel for petitioner filed a motion, urging the court
to allow partial execution of the undisputed monetary award and, at the same time, praying that
the constitutional question be resolved.
The last clause of Section 10, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042:
Sec. 10. Money Claims--- In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or
authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the workers shall be entitled to the full
reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his
salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every
year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the last clause (Money claim provision) is unconstitutional as it violates the
OFWs' constitutional rights that it:
 65

(a) impairs the terms of their contract;

(b)deprives them of equal protection; and
(c) denies them due process.

HELD:

(a) It unduly impairs the freedom of OFWs to negotiate for and stipulate in their overseas
employment contracts a determinate employment period and a fixed salary package.

a. NO. Section 10, Article III of the Constitution provides: No law impairing the obligation of
contracts shall be passed.
The prohibition is aligned with the general principle that laws newly enacted have only a
prospective operation, and cannot affect acts or contracts already perfected; however, as to
laws already in existence, their provisions are read into contracts and deemed a part thereof.
Thus, the non-impairment clause under Section 10, Article II is limited in application to laws
about to be enacted that would in any way derogate from existing acts or contracts by enlarging,
abridging or in any manner changing the intention of the parties thereto.
The enactment of R.A. No. 8042 in 1995 preceded the execution of the employment contract
between petitioner and respondents in 1998. Hence, it cannot be argued that R.A. No. 8042,
particularly the subject clause, impaired the employment contract of the parties. Rather, when
the parties executed their 1998 employment contract, they were deemed to have incorporated
into it all the provisions of R.A. No. 8042.
But even if the Court were to disregard the timeline, the subject clause may not be declared
unconstitutional on the ground that it impinges on the impairment clause, for the law was
enacted in the exercise of the police power of the State to regulate a business, profession or
calling, particularly the recruitment and deployment of OFWs, with the noble end in view of
ensuring respect for the dignity and well-being of OFWs wherever they may be employed.
Police power legislations adopted by the State to promote the health, morals, peace, education,
good order, safety, and general welfare of the people are generally applicable not only to future
contracts but even to those already in existence, for all private contracts must yield to the
superior and legitimate measures taken by the State to promote public welfare.
FOR NOTES only:
(b) It also impinges on the equal protection clause, for it treats OFWs differently from local
Filipino workers (local workers) by putting a cap on the amount of lump-sum salary to which
OFWs are entitled in case of illegal dismissal, while setting no limit to the same monetary award
for local workers when their dismissal is declared illegal; that the disparate treatment is not
reasonable as there is no substantial distinction between the two groups.
(c) it defeats Section 18, Article II of the Constitution which guarantees the protection of the
rights and welfare of all Filipino workers, whether deployed locally or overseas.

FOR NOTES ONLY:

 66

(Issues b & c) Yes.

Section 1, Article III of the Constitution guarantees: No person shall be deprived of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of
the law.
Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article XIII accord all members of the labor sector, without
distinction as to place of deployment, full protection of their rights and welfare.
Such rights are not absolute but subject to the inherent power of Congress to incorporate, when
it sees to, a system of classification into its legislation; to be valid, must comply requirements:
1) it is based on substantial distinctions;
2) it is germane to the purposes of the law;
3) it is not limited to existing conditions only; and
4) it applies equally to all members of the class.

There are three levels of scrutiny at which the Court reviews the constitutionality of a
classification embodied in a law:
a) the deferential or rational basis scrutiny in which the challenged classification needs only be
shown to be rationally related to serving a legitimate state interest;
b) the middle-tier or intermediate scrutiny in which the government must show that the
challenged classification serves an important state interest and that the classification is at least
substantially related to serving that interest; and
c) strict judicial scrutiny in which a legislative classification which impermissibly interferes with
the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class
is presumed unconstitutional, and the burden is upon the government to prove that the
classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and that is a least restrictive
means to protect such interest.

Imbued with the same sense of "obligation to afford protection to labor", the Court in the present
case also employs the standard of strict judicial scrutiny, for it perceives in the subject clause a
suspect classification prejudicial to OFWs.
Upon cursory reading, the subject clause appears facially neutral, for it applies to all OFWs.
However, a closer examination reveals that the subject clause has a discriminatory intent
against, and an invidious impact on, OFWs at two levels:
First, OFWs with employment contracts of less than one year vis-à-vis OFWs with employment
contracts of one year or more;
Second, among OFWs with employment contracts of more than one year; and
Third, OFWs vis-à-vis local workers with fixed-period employment; OFWs with employment
contracts of less than one year less than one year vis-a-vis OFWs with employment contracts of
one year or employment contracts of one year or more.
It is unconstitutional as it violates equal protection clause.
Resort to these administrative measures is undoubtedly the less restrictive means of aiding
local placement agencies in enforcing the solidary liability of their foreign principals.
 67

Thus, the subject clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 is violative of the
right of petitioner and other OFWs to equal protection. Further, there would be certain
misgivings if one is to approach the declaration of the unconstitutionality of the subject clause
from the lone perspective that the clause directly violates state policy on labor under Section 3,
Article XIII of the Constitution.
The subject clause does not state or imply any definitive governmental purpose; and it is for that
precise reason that the clause violates not just petitioner's right to equal protection, but also her
right to substantive due process under Section 1, Article III of the Constitution.
The subject clause being unconstitutional, petitioner is entitled to his salaries for the entire
unexpired period of nine months and 23 days of his employment contract, pursuant to law and
jurisprudence prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 8042.

Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union

G.R. No. L-25246 September 12, 1974
Topic: Freedom of Religion – The establishment clause

FACTS: Benjamin Victoriano, a member of the religious sect known as the "Iglesia ni Cristo",
had been in the employ of the Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Company)
since 1958. As such employee, he was a member of the Elizalde Rope Workers' Union which
had with the Company a collective bargaining agreement containing a closed shop provision
which reads as follows: “Membership in the Union shall be required as a condition of
employment for all permanent employees workers covered by this Agreement.”
Under Section 4(a), paragraph 4, of Republic Act No. 875, prior to its amendment by
Republic Act No. 3350, the employer was not precluded from making an agreement with a labor
organization to require as a condition of employment membership therein, if such labor
organization is the representative of the employees. Republic Act No. 875 provides that such
agreement shall not cover members of any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their
members in any such labor organization. Being a member of a religious sect that prohibits the
affiliation of its members with any labor organization, Appellee presented his resignation to
appellant Union. Thereupon, the Union wrote a formal letter to the Company asking the latter to
separate Appellee from the service in view of the fact that he was resigning from the Union as a
member. The management of the Company in turn notified Appellee and his counsel that unless
the Appellee could achieve a satisfactory arrangement with the Union, the Company would be
constrained to dismiss him from the service.
Judgment is rendered enjoining the defendant Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc. from
dismissing the plaintiff from his present employment and sentencing the defendant Elizalde
Rope Workers' Union to pay the plaintiff P500 for attorney's fees and the costs of this action.
From this decision, the Union appealed directly to this Court on purely questions of law.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3350 is unconstitutional on the ground that it banned membership in
labor organization to all those belonging to such religious sect prohibiting affiliation with any
labor organization
 68

RULING: No, it is not unconstitutional. The "establishment clause" (of religion) does not ban
regulation on conduct whose reason or effect merely happens to coincide or harmonize with the
tenets of some or all religions. The free exercise clause of the Constitution has been interpreted
to require that religious exercise be preferentially aided. The Court believes that in enacting
Republic Act No. 3350, Congress acted consistently with the spirit of the constitutional
provision. It acted merely to relieve the exercise of religion, by certain persons, of a burden that
is imposed by union security agreements.
The primary effects of the exemption from closed shop agreements in favor of
members of religious sects that prohibit their members from affiliating with a labor organization,
is the protection of said employees against the aggregate force of the collective bargaining
agreement, and relieving certain citizens of a burden on their religious beliefs; and by
eliminating to a certain extent economic insecurity due to unemployment, which is a serious
menace to the health, morals, and welfare of the people of the State, the Act also promotes the
well-being of society. It is our view that the exemption from the effects of closed shop
agreement does not directly advance, or diminish, the interests of any particular religion.
Although the exemption may benefit those who are members of religious sects that prohibit their
members from joining labor unions, the benefit upon the religious sects is merely incidental and
indirect. The purpose of Republic Act No. 3350 is secular, worldly, and temporal, not spiritual or
religious or holy and eternal. It was intended to serve the secular purpose of advancing the
constitutional right to the free exercise of religion, by averting that certain persons be refused
work, or be dismissed from work, or be dispossessed of their right to work and of being impeded
to pursue a modest means of livelihood, by reason of union security agreements.
 69

XI. HABEAS CORPUS

Section 15. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of
invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it.

A. Related provision: Section 7, Article VII

B. Procedural aspect: Rule 102 of the Rules of Court
C. Habeas corpus when there is constructive deprivation of liberty
CASES:
Villavicencio v. Lukban, G.R. No. L-14639, March 25, 1919 ………………………………70
Caunca v. Salazar, G.R. No. L-2690, January 1, 1949………………………………………71

D. Habeas corpus when penalty imposed is excessive

CASE: Gumabon v. Director of Prisons, G.R. No. L-30026, January 30, 1971………..73

E. Habeas corpus when constitutional right is violated

CASES: Conde v. Rivera, G.R. No. L-21741, January 25, 1924…………………………. 75
Ilagan v. Enrile, G.R. No. 70748, October 21, 1985 ………………………………………...76
(Read also the dissent of J. Teehankee)

F. Judicial review (Read: Section 7, Article VII)

CASE: Lansang v. Garcia, G.R. No. L-33964, December 11, 1971………………………78
(reversing Barcelon & Montenegro)
Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile, G.R. No. L-61388, April 20, 1983 ……………………………….81
(reversing Lansang, reverting to Barcelon & Montenegro)
Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017 …………………………………….82
(read also the separate opinions)
Padilla v. Congress, G.R. No. 231671, July 25, 2017……………………………………...85
(joint voting vs. joint session)
Lagman v. Pimentel, G.R. No. 235935, February 6, 2018…………………………………93
(re 2nd extension)

G. Suspension of privilege does not affect right to bail (Section 13, Article III)
CASES: Zafra v. City Warden, G.R. No. L-49602 & L-49938, May 17, 1980……………95
 70

ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO et al., vs. JUSTO LUKBAN et al.

(G.R. No. L-14639; 39 Phil 778, March 25, 1919)
Topic: Habeas corpus when there is constructive deprivation of liberty

FACTS:
The Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban ordered the segregated district for women
of ill repute, which had been permitted for a number of years in the city of Manila, closed.
Between October 16 and October 25, 1918, the women were kept confined to their houses in
the district by the police. Presumably, during this period, the city authorities quietly perfected
arrangements with the Bureau of Labor for sending the women to Davao, Mindanao, as
laborers; with some government office for the use of the coastguard cutters Corregidor and
Negros, and with the Constabulary for a guard of soldiers. At any rate, about midnight of
October 25, the police, acting pursuant to orders from the chief of police, Anton Hohmann and
the Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, descended upon the houses, hustled some 170
inmates into patrol wagons, and placed them aboard the steamers that awaited their arrival.

The women were given no opportunity to collect their belongings, and apparently were
under the impression that they were being taken to a police station for an investigation. They
had no knowledge that they were destined for a life in Mindanao. They had not been asked if
they wished to depart from that region and had neither directly nor indirectly given their consent
to the deportation. The involuntary guests were received on board the steamers by a
representative of the Bureau of Labor and a detachment of Constabulary soldiers. The two
steamers with their unwilling passengers sailed for Davao during the night of October 25.

The vessels reached their destination at Davao on October 29. The women were landed and
receipted for as laborers by Francisco Sales, provincial governor of Davao, and by Feliciano Yñigo
and Rafael Castillo. The governor and the hacendero Yñigo, who appear as parties in the case,
had no previous notification that the women were prostitutes who had been expelled from the
city of Manila. The further happenings to these women and the serious charges growing out of
alleged ill-treatment are of public interest, but are not essential to the disposition of this case.
Suffice it to say, generally, that some of the women married, others assumed more or less
clandestine relations with men, others went to work in different capacities, others assumed a life
unknown and disappeared, and a goodly portion found means to return to Manila.

The attorney for the relatives & friends of the deportees presented an application for
habeas corpus to a member of the SC, alleging that Justo Lukban, along with Anton Hohmann
(the police chief), & others illegally restrained the women of their liberty.
 71

The court awarded the writ of habeas corpus in an order of November 4 that directed
Lukban, Hohmann, Sales, Yñigo to bring before the court the persons alleged to be deprived of
their liberty on December 2, 1918. On the day named in the order, none of the persons in whose
behalf the writ was issued were produced in court by the respondents.

The court issued a second order directing that those of the women not in Manila be
brought before the Court by respondents Lukban, Hohmann, Sales, Yñigo on January 13, 1919
unless the women should, in written statements voluntarily made before the judge of first
instance of Davao or the clerk of that court, renounce that right, or unless respondents
demonstrate other legal motives that made compliance impossible.

On January 13, 1919, respondents had succeeded in bringing from Davao 8 women.
They allege that 81 women were found in Davao who, on notice that if they desired they could
return to Manila, transportation free, renounced the right through sworn statements; 59 had
already returned to Manila by other means, and despite all efforts 26 could not be located. The
counsel for petitioners asked the Court to find the respondents in contempt of court. The
respondents challenged the contempt proceeding and the issuance of the writ.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the petitioners had standing to file the petition for habeas corpus
2. Whether or not the Supreme Court erred in assuming jurisdiction over the petition
for habeas corpus
3. Whether or not the women were illegally restrained of their liberty
4. Whether or not the respondents were guilty of contempt

HELD:
1. Yes, the petitioners had standing to file the petition for habeas corpus.

The petitioners were relatives and friends of the deportees. The way the expulsion was
conducted by the city officials made it impossible for the women to sign a petition for habeas
corpus. It was consequently proper for the writ to be submitted by persons in their behalf. (Code
of Criminal Procedure, sec. 78; Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 527.) The law, in its zealous
regard for personal liberty, even makes it the duty of a court or judge to grant a writ of habeas
corpus if there is evidence that within the court's jurisdiction a person is unjustly imprisoned or
restrained of his liberty, though no application be made therefor. (Code of Criminal Procedure,
sec. 93.) Petitioners had standing in court.

2. No, the Supreme Court did not err in assuming jurisdiction over the petition for habeas
corpus.

It is a general rule of good practice that, to avoid unnecessary expense and inconvenience,
petitions for habeas corpus should be presented to the nearest judge of the court of first
instance. But this is not a hard and fast rule. The writ of habeas corpus may be granted by the
Supreme Court or any judge thereof enforcible anywhere in the Philippine Islands. (Code of
 72

Criminal Procedure, sec. 79; Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 526.) Whether the writ shall be made
returnable before the Supreme Court or before an inferior court rests in the discretion of the
Supreme Court and is dependent on the particular circumstances. In this instance it was not
shown that the Court of First Instance of Davao was in session, or that the women had any
means by which to advance their plea before that court. On the other hand, it was shown that
the petitioners with their attorneys, and the two original respondents with their attorney, were in
Manila; it was shown that the case involved parties situated in different parts of the Islands; it
was shown that the women might still be imprisoned or restrained of their liberty; and it was
shown that if the writ was to accomplish its purpose, it must be taken cognizance of and decided
immediately by the appellate court. The failure of the superior court to consider the application
and then to grant the writ would have amounted to a denial of the benefits of the writ.

3. Yes, the women were illegally restrained of their liberty.

The forcible taking of the women from Manila by officials of that city, who handed them
over to other parties, who deposited them in a distant region, deprived these women of their
liberty & their freedom of locomotion just as effectively as if they had been imprisoned. In this
case, there was no law, order, or regulation which justified the action of the respondents in
restraining the petitioners of their liberty. There was no showing of any law or order which
authorized or conferred upon the Mayor of the city or the Chief of Police the right to force the
women to change their domicile from Manila to another locality. On the contrary, Phil. penal law
during that time specifically punishes any public officer who, not being expressly authorized by
law or regulation, compels any person to change his residence.

4. No, the respondents were not guilty of contempt.

Only Mayor Lukban is guilty of contempt. He was primarily responsible for setting forth
this whole chain of events and had under his power as head of the city government to facilitate
the return of the women to Manila but failed. The rest of the respondents are not guilty of
contempt. Some were merely following the orders of their superiors or merely fulfilling a duty.
Another was merely drawn into the case through miscommunication. An officer’s failure to
produce the body of a person in obedience to a writ of habeas corpus, when he has power to do
so, is contempt committed in the face of the court.
Dispositive: In resume- as before stated, no further action on the writ of habeas corpus is
necessary. The respondents Hohmann, Rodriguez, Ordax, Joaquin, Yñigo, and Diaz are not
found to be in contempt of court. Respondent Lukban is found in contempt of court and shall
pay into the office of the clerk of the Supreme Court within five days the sum of one hundred
pesos.
 73

BARTOLOME CAUNCA v. JULIA SALAZAR

[GR No. L-2690, Jan 01, 1949]
Habeas Corpus when there is constructive deprivation of liberty.

FACTS:
Estelita Flores, 21, orphan, illiterate, was brought from her native torni, Capiz, by Estrella
Justo, maid recruiter, to Manila. She arrived on December 24, 1948 and stayed in Julia
Salazar’s house.

On December 26, Bartolome Caunca, her cousin, went to pay her a visit. Estelita
manifested her earnest desire to go along with him, but was prevented by Julia and Estrella,
both demanding the condition that the sum of P83.85 advanced for the fare and other
transportation expenses of Estelita from Capiz to Manila be paid first before she could leave the
house of Julia.

Estelita failed to leave and there is no evidence that any physical force has been used to
prevent her from leaving. Bartolome testified that, although Estelita was embracing him in her
desire to go with him, he was unable to take her with him because of respondents' opposition
and of the many peoolo in the house. Considering the crass ignorance of Estelita, her low
mentality, her apparent undernoursihment and weak vitality, her pusillanimous character, she is
so timid that she hardly dared to speak during her testimony, given in Hiligaynon, the only
language she knows,--there should not be any doubt that by sheer mental and social
superiority. Julia is an able and very intelligent businesswoman. Respondents exerted moral
compulsion strong enough to have effectively deprived Estelita of her personal liberty and of the
freedom to go along with her cousin.

Bartolome promised Estelita to take steps to seek her release and filed the petition giving
rise to this proceeding for a writ of habeas corpus.

At the scheduled hearing, both Estelita and respondent Julia Salasar failed to appear. The
latter, according to Estrella, brought Estelita that morning to Silang, Cavite, and would not return
until the evening. Hearing was then rescheduled.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Estelita is restrained of her personal liberty although there was no physical
force has been exerted to keep her in the house of Julia.

RULING:

Yes. there is no question that Estelita is restrained of her personal liberty and not free to go
with her cousin at her will. The fact that no physical force has been exerted to keep her in the
house of Julia, or to stay in the house of Julia’s cousin, a place that Estelita could not identify
better than just describing it as a place very far from Manila, does not make less real the
deprivation of Estelita's personal freedom which includes the freedom of movement, freedom to
transfer from one place to another, freedom to choose one's residence. Freedom may be lost
due to external moral compulsion, to founded or groundless fear, to erroneous belief in the
existence of an imaginary power of an impostor to cause harm if not blindly obeyed, to any other
 74

psychological element that may curtail the mental faculty of choice or the unhampered exercise
of the will. If the actual effect of such psychological spell is to place a person at the mercy of
another, the victim is entitled to the protection of courts of justice as much as the individual who
is illegally deprived of liberty by duress or physical coercion.

On the hypothesis that Estelita is really indebted in the amount of P83.85, such is not a
valid reason for the respondents to obstruct, impede or interfere with Estelita's desire to leave
the house of Julia Salazar and to live in the residence of Bartolome.
An employment agency, regardless of the amount it may advance to a prospective
employee has absolutely no power to curtail the freedom of movement of said employee. The
fact that power to control said freedom may be an effective means of avoiding monetary losses
to the agency is no reason for jeopardizing a fundamental human right. The fortunes of business
can not be controlled by controlling a fundamental human freedom. Human dignity is not a
merchandise appropriate for commercial barters or business bargains. Fundamental freedoms
are beyond the province of commerce or any other business enterprise.

Hence, Estelita Flores was allowed to go with her cousin Bartolome Caunca or to any place of
her choice.
 75

GUMABON V. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS

[G.R. No. L-30026. January 30, 1971]
Topic: Habeas corpus when penalty imposed is excessive

FACTS:

Petitioner Gumabon, after pleading guilty, was sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua for
the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, robbery, arson and kidnapping. Petitioners
Agapito, Palmares and Padua, likewise pleaded guilty to the complex crime of rebellion with
multiple murder and other offenses, and were similarly made to suffer the same penalty. The
last petitioner, Bagolbagol, stood trial also for the complex crime of rebellion with multiple
murder and other offenses and penalized with reclusion perpetua. Each of the petitioners has
been since then imprisoned by virtue of the above convictions. Each of them has served more
than 13 years.

Habeas corpus, the great writ of liberty, is relied upon by petitioners for their release
from imprisonment. Meted out life terms for the complex crime of rebellion with murder and
other crimes, they would invoke the People v. Hernandez doctrine, negating the existence of
such an offense, a ruling that unfortunately for them was not handed down until after their
convictions had become final.

Petitioners plead for a new look on the matter. They would premise their stand on the
denial of equal protection if their plea would not be granted. Moreover they did invoke the codal
provision that judicial decisions shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines, necessarily
resulting in the conclusion that the Hernandez decision once promulgated calls for a retroactive
effect under the explicit mandate of the Revised Penal Code as to penal laws having such
character even if at the time of their application a final sentence has been rendered "and the
convict is serving the same."

ISSUE:

Whether or not habeas corpus may apply in this case.

RULING:

Yes, habeas corpus may apply in this case.

The fundamental issue, to repeat, is the availability of the writ of habeas corpus under
the circumstances disclosed. Its latitudinarian scope to assure that illegality of restraint and
detention be avoided is one of the truisms of the law. It is not known as the writ of liberty for
nothing. The writ imposes on judges the grave responsibility of ascertaining whether there is
any legal justification for a deprivation of physical freedom. Unless there be such a showing, the
confinement must thereby cease. If there be a valid sentence it cannot, even for a moment, be
extended beyond the period provided for by law. Any deviation from the legal norms call for the
termination of the imprisonment.

Where, however, the detention complained of finds its origin in what has been judicially
ordained, the range of inquiry in a habeas corpus proceeding is considerably narrowed. For if
 76

"the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process
issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the
court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order," the
writ does not lie. That principle dates back to 1902, when this Court announced that habeas
corpus was unavailing where the person detained was in the custody of an officer under
process issued by a court or magistrate. This is understandable, as during the time the
Philippines was under American rule, there was necessarily an adherence to authoritative
doctrines of constitutional law there followed. One such principle is the requirement that there
be a finding of jurisdictional defect. The only ground on which this court, or any court, without
some special statute authorizing it, will give relief on habeas corpus to a prisoner under
conviction and sentence of another court is the want of jurisdiction in such court over the person
or the cause, or some other matter rendering its proceedings void." There is the fundamental
exception though, that must ever be kept in mind. Once a deprivation of a constitutional right is
shown to exist, the court that rendered the judgment is deemed ousted of jurisdiction and
habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy to assail the legality of the detention.

It being undeniable that if the Hernandez ruling were to be given a retroactive effect,
petitioners had served the full term for which they could have been legally committed. Is habeas
corpus the appropriate remedy? The answer cannot be in doubt. As far back as 1910 the
prevailing doctrine was announced in Cruz v. Director of Prisons. Thus: "The courts uniformly
hold that where a sentence imposes punishment in excess of the power of the court to impose,
such sentence is void as to the excess, and some of the courts hold that the sentence is void in
toto; but the weight of authority sustains the proposition that such a sentence is void only as to
the excess imposed in case the parts are separable, the rule being that the petitioner is not
entitled to his discharge on a writ of habeas corpus unless he has served out so much of the
sentence as was valid." The only means of giving retroactive effect to a penal provision
favorable to the accused is the writ of habeas corpus. Petitioners clearly have thus successfully
sustained the burden of justifying their release. The petition for habeas corpus is granted, and it
is ordered that petitioners be forthwith set at liberty.

G.R. No. L-21741 January 25, 1924

AURELIA CONDE vs.PABLO RIVERA andFEDERICO M. UNSON
Topic: Habeas Corpus when constitutional right is violated
FACTS:
 77

Aurelia Conde, formerly a municipal midwife in Lucena, Tayabas, has been forced to
respond to no less than five informations for various crimes and misdemeanors, has appeared
with her witnesses and counsel at hearings no less than on eight different occasions only to see
the cause postponed, has twice been required to come to the Supreme Court for protection, and
now, after the passage of more than one year from the time when the first information was filed,
seems as far away from a definite resolution of her troubles as she was when originally
charged.
Philippine organic and statutory law expressly guarantee that in all criminal prosecutions the
accused shall enjoy the right to have a speedy trial. Dismissed from her humble position, and
compelled to dance attendance on courts while investigations and trials are arbitrarily
postponed without her consent, is palpably and openly unjust to her and a detriment to the
public. By the use of reasonable diligence, the prosecution could have settled upon the
appropriate information, could have attended to the formal preliminary examination, and could
have prepared the case for a trial free from vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays.
ISSUE: Whether or not Conde was denied of the constitutional right to have a speedy and
impartial trial.
RULING:
YES, We lay down the legal proposition that, where a prosecuting officer, without good
cause, secures postponements of the trial of a defendant against his protest beyond a
reasonable period of time, as in this instance for more than a year, the accused is entitled to
relief by a proceeding in mandamus to compel a dismissal of the information, or if he be
restrained of his liberty, by habeas corpus to obtain his freedom. We append to our order the
observation that, without doubt, the Attorney-General, being fully cognizant of the facts of
record, will take such administrative action as to him seems proper to the end that incidents of
this character may not recur.

ILAGAN V. ENRILE
G.R. No. 70748 | October 21, 1985
TOPIC: Habeas corpus when constitutional right is violated

FACTS:
Attorney Laurente C. Ilagan was arrested in Davao City by elements of the PC-INP and
detained at Camp Catitipan on the basis of a Mission Order allegedly issued by the Ministry of
 78

National Defense. On that same day, fifteen lawyers from the IBP Davao Chapter visited Atty.
Ilagan. One of the visiting lawyers, Atty. Antonio Arellano, was also arrested and detained on
the basis of an unsigned Mission Order. On May 13, 1985, the military sent word to the IBP
Davao Chapter that Attorney Marcos Risonar would likewise be arrested. The latter went to
Camp Catitipan to verify his arrest papers and was detained on the basis of a Mission Order
signed by General Echavarria, Regional Unified Commander.
This petition for habeas corpus was then filed by and on behalf of the three arrested
lawyers on the ground that their arrests were illegal and violative of the Constitution, since
arrests cannot be made on the basis of Mission Orders and that there appears to be a military
campaign to harass lawyers involved in national security cases.
The Court issued the Writ, required a Return, and set the petition for hearing. The
respondents contended that the detained attorneys were arrested on the basis of a PDA issued
by the President and that the Writ of habeas corpus is suspended as to them by virtue of
Proclamation No. 2045-A. Respondents further expounded on the state of rebellion in Davao
City on the basis of seized subversive documents, implying that the detained attorneys played
active roles in organizing mass actions of the Communist Party of the Philippines and the
National Democratic Front.
The Court resolved to order the temporary release of the detained attorneys due to lack
of evidence linking the detained attorneys with the alleged subversive activities. However, they
were still not released the following day. The respondents stated that while there is a Court
Order directing release, they, too, are under orders, pursuant to the PDA, to hold in custody the
detained attorneys until ordered released by the President or by his duly authorized
representative, and that the PDA, when issued, constitutes authority to preventively detain them
for a period not exceeding one year. They also attached classified documents consisting of the
Report of respondent Brig. Gen. Tan-Gatue stating that the detained attorneys "were arrested
not on the basis of their 'lawyering' but for specific acts of rebellion and economic sabotage as
well as for their leadership in the CPP" ... "even to the extent of attending CPP and NPA rites
and using their profession as lawyers as cover-up for their activities in furtherance of CPP goals
and objectives;" and that the detained attorneys were involved in the Welgang Bayan in Davao
City, a mass action "with demands for the armed overthrow of the government." 
The respondents manifested that an Information for Rebellion was filed against the
detained attorneys before the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, with a Warrant of Arrest
issued against them, rendering the petition moot and academic.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the petition for habeas corpus is moot and academic.
2. Whether or not the remedy of the petitioners for alleged illegal detention, improper
arrest, and absence of preliminary investigation, is a petition for habeas corpus.
RULING:
1. YES.
The function of the special proceeding of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of
one's detention. Here, the petition has been rendered moot and academic by virtue of the filing
of an Information against them for Rebellion before the Regional Trial Court of Davao City and
 79

the issuance of a Warrant of Arrest against them. Now that the detained attorneys' incarceration
is by virtue of a judicial order in relation to criminal cases subsequently filed against them before
the Regional Trial Couravao City, the remedy of habeas corpus no longer lies. The Writ had
served its purpose.
2. NO.
Section 4, Rule 102 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that:
SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized.- If it appears the person
alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued
by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment, or order of a court of record, and that the
court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the
order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed,
the person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process,
judgment or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize to discharge of a
person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person
suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment. (Rule 102)
If the detained attorneys question their detention because of improper arrest, or that no
preliminary investigation has been conducted, the remedy is not a petition for a Writ of Habeas
Corpus but a Motion before the trial court to quash the Warrant of Arrest, and /or the
Information on grounds provided by the Rules or to ask for an investigation / reinvestigation of
the case.  Habeas corpus would not lie (not proper) after the Warrant of commitment was
issued by the Court on the basis of the Information filed against the accused. 
TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting
The majority decision holds that under section 4, Rule 102 the writ of habeas corpus has
served its purpose because of the judicial warrant of arrest issued by the Regional Trial Court.
This is based on an erroneous premise that the trial court had such jurisdiction to issue the
warrant of arrest, and that the denial of a preliminary investigation of petitioners-lawyers was a
mere informality or defect. The trial court was totally devoid and ousted of jurisdiction to issue a
warrant of arrest because of the gross denial to petitioners-lawyers of their constitutional right to
due process.
I vote to grant the petition for habeas corpus and to set the petitioners immediately at
liberty.

LANSANG V. GARCIA
[G.R. No. L-33964 - December 11, 1971]
Topic: Habeas Corpus - Judicial Review

FACTS:
In the evening of August 21, 1971, at about 9 p.m., while the Liberal Party of the
Philippines was holding a public meeting at Plaza Miranda, Manila, for the presentation of its
candidates in the general elections scheduled for November 8, 1971, two (2) hand grenades
 80

were thrown, one after the other, at the platform where said candidates and other persons were.
As a consequence, eight (8) persons were killed and many more injured, including practically all
of the aforementioned candidates, some of whom sustained extensive, as well as serious,
injuries which could have been fatal had it not been for the timely medical assistance given to
them.

On August 23, soon after noontime, the President of the Philippines announced the
issuance of Proclamation No. 889, suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, for the
persons presently detained, as well as others who may be hereafter similarly detained for the
crimes of insurrection or rebellion, and all other crimes and offenses committed by them in
furtherance or on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith. Soon
thereafter, or on September 18, 1971, Proclamation No. 889 was further amended by
Proclamation No. 889-B, lifting the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
several provinces, sub-provinces and cities of the Philippines.

Thirteen (13) petitions for writ of habeas corpus were filed, in the above-entitled cases,
by the following persons, who, having been arrested without a warrant therefor and then
detained, upon the authority of said proclamation, assail its validity, as well as that of their
detention.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court has the jurisdiction to conduct a judicial review on the
presidential proclamation to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

RULING:
YES, the Court has the jurisdiction to conduct a judicial review on the presidential
proclamation to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

Two (2) conditions must concur for the valid exercise of the authority to suspend the
privilege to the writ, to wit: (a) there must be "invasion, insurrection, or rebellion" or — pursuant
to paragraph (2), section 10 of Art. VII of the Constitution — "imminent danger thereof," and (b)
"public safety" must require the suspension of the privilege. The Presidential Proclamation
under consideration declares that there has been and there is actually a state of rebellion and
that "public safety requires that immediate and effective action be taken in order to maintain
peace and order, secure the safety of the people and preserve the authority of the State."

In our resolution of October 5, 1971, We stated that "a majority of the Court" had
"tentatively arrived at a consensus that it may inquire in order to satisfy itself of the existence of
the factual bases for the issuance of Presidential Proclamations Nos. 889 and 889-A ... and thus
determine the constitutional sufficiency of such bases in the light of the requirements of Article
III, sec. 1, par. 14, and Article VII, sec. 10, par 2, of the Philippine Constitution...." Upon further
deliberation, the members of the Court are now unanimous in the conviction that it has the
authority to inquire into the existence of said factual bases in order to determine the
constitutional sufficiency thereof.
 81

Indeed, the grant of power to suspend the privilege is neither absolute nor unqualified.
The authority conferred by the Constitution, both under the Bill of Rights and under the
Executive Department, is limited and conditional. The precept in the Bill of Rights establishes a
general rule, as well as an exception thereto. What is more, it postulates the former in the
negative, evidently to stress its importance, by providing that "(t)he privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus shall not be suspended ...." It is only by way of exception that it permits the
suspension of the privilege "in cases of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion" — or, under Art VII of
the Constitution, "imminent danger thereof" — "when the public safety requires it, in any of
which events the same may be suspended wherever during such period the necessity for such
suspension shall exist." For from being full and plenary, the authority to suspend the privilege of
the writ is thus circumscribed, confined and restricted, not only by the prescribed setting or the
conditions essential to its existence, but, also, as regards the time when and the place where it
may be exercised. These factors and the aforementioned setting or conditions mark, establish
and define the extent, the confines and the limits of said power, beyond which it does not exist.
And, like the limitations and restrictions imposed by the Fundamental Law upon the legislative
department, adherence thereto and compliance therewith may, within proper bounds, be
inquired into by courts of justice. Otherwise, the explicit constitutional provisions thereon would
be meaningless. Surely, the framers of our Constitution could not have intended to engage in
such a wasteful exercise in futility.

As heretofore adverted to, for the valid suspension of the privilege of the writ: (a) there
must be "invasion, insurrection or rebellion" or — pursuant to paragraph (2), section 10 of Art.
VII of the Constitution — "imminent danger thereof"; and (b) public safety must require the
aforementioned suspension. The President declared in Proclamation No. 889, as amended, that
both conditions are present.

Article VII of the Constitution vests in the Executive the power to suspend the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus under specified conditions. Pursuant to the principle of separation of
powers underlying our system of government, the Executive is supreme within his own sphere.
However, the separation of powers, under the Constitution, is not absolute. What is more, it
goes hand in hand with the system of checks and balances, under which the Executive is
supreme, as regards the suspension of the privilege, but only if and when he acts within the
sphere allotted to him by the Basic Law, and the authority to determine whether or not he has so
acted is vested in the Judicial Department, which, in this respect, is, in turn, constitutionally
supreme.

In the exercise of such authority, the function of the Court is merely to check — not to
supplant — the Executive, or to ascertain merely whether he had gone beyond the constitutional
limits of his jurisdiction, not to exercise the power vested in him or to determine the wisdom of
his act. To be sure, the power of the Court to determine the validity of the contested
proclamation is far from being identical to, or even comparable with, its power over ordinary civil
or criminal cases elevated thereto by ordinary appeal from inferior courts, in which cases the
appellate court has all of the powers of the court of origin.
 82

Under the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances, the
judicial authority to review decisions of administrative bodies or agencies is much more limited,
as regards findings of fact made in said decisions. Under the English law, the reviewing court
determines only whether there is some evidentiary basis for the contested administrative
findings; no quantitative examination of the supporting evidence is undertaken. The
administrative findings can be interfered with only if there is no evidence whatsoever in support
thereof, and said finding is, accordingly, arbitrary, capricious and obviously unauthorized. This
view has been adopted by some American courts. It has, likewise, been adhered to in a number
of Philippine cases. Other cases, in both jurisdictions, have applied the "substantial evidence"
rule, which has been construed to mean "more than a mere scintilla" or "relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion," even if other minds equally
reasonable might conceivably opine otherwise.

Manifestly, however, this approach refers to the review of administrative determinations

involving the exercise of quasi-judicial functions calling for or entailing the reception of evidence.
It does not and cannot be applied, in its aforesaid form, in testing the validity of an act of
Congress or of the Executive, such as the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, for, as a general rule, neither body takes evidence — in the sense in which the term is
used in judicial proceedings — before enacting a legislation or suspending the writ.

Reversal of Barcelon and Montenegro (as mentioned by J. Fernando):

The doctrine announced in Montenegro v. Castañeda 19 that such a question is political
has thus been laid to rest. It is about time too. It owed its existence to the compulsion exerted by
Barcelon v. Baker, a 1905 decision. 20 This Court was partly misled by an undue reliance in the
latter case on what it considered to be authoritative pronouncements from such illustrious
American jurists as Marshall, Story, and Taney. That is to misread what was said by them. This
is most evidence in the case of Chief Justice Marshall, whose epochal Marbury v. Madison 21
was cited. Why that was so is difficult to understand. For it speaks to the contrary. It was by
virtue of this decision that the function of judicial review owes its origin notwithstanding the
absence of any explicit provision in the American Constitution empowering the courts to do so.

GARCIA-PADILLA V. ENRILE
G.R. No. L-61388
Topic: Judicial Review

FACTS:
 83

In July 1982, Sabino Padilla, together w/ 8 others who were having a conference in a
house in Bayombong, NV, were arrested by members of the Philippine Constabulary. The raid
of the house was authorized by a search warrant issued by Judge Sayo. Josefina, mother of
Sabino, opposed the arrest averring that no warrant of arrest was issued hence the arrest of her
son and the others was w/o just cause. Sabino and companions together with 4 others were
later transferred to a facility only the PCs know. Josefina petitioned the court for the issuance of
the writ of habeas corpus.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the arrests done against Sabino et al were valid.
RULING:

Yes. In a complete about face, the SC decision in the Lansang Case was reversed and
the ruling in the Barcelon Case & the Montenegro Case was again reinstated. The questioned
power of the president to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus was once again
held as discretionary in the president. The SC again reiterated that the suspension of the writ
was a political question to be resolved solely by the president. It was also noted that the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus must, indeed, carry with it the
suspension of the right to bail, if the government’s campaign to suppress the rebellion is to be
enhanced and rendered effective. If the right to bail may be demanded during the continuance
of the rebellion, and those arrested, captured and detained in the course thereof will be
released, they would, without the least doubt, rejoin their comrades in the field thereby
jeopardizing the success of government efforts to bring to an end the invasion, rebellion or
insurrection.

NOTES: This ruling was abrogated by Sec 18, Art 7 of the 1987 Constitution which expressly
constitutionalized the Lansang Doctrine. Note as well that under Art 3 (Sec 13) of the
Constitution it is stated that “the right to bail shall not be impaired even if the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus is suspended.”

LAGMAN v. MEDIALDEA
[G.R. No. 231658. July 4, 2017.]
Topic: Judicial Review
 84

FACTS:

Declaration of Martial Law

President Rodrigo Roa Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216 declaring a state of martial
law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao. In a
written report on the factual basis of Proclamation No. 216 submitted to Congress, it was
pointed out that for decades, Mindanao has been plagued with rebellion and lawless violence
which only escalated and worsened with the passing of time. The President went on to explain
that a government operation to capture the high-ranking officers of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)
and the Maute Group was conducted. These groups, which have been unleashing havoc in
Mindanao, however, confronted the government operation by intensifying their efforts at sowing
violence aimed not only against the government authorities and its facilities but likewise against
civilians and their properties.

In addition to the Report, representatives from the Executive Department, the military
and police authorities conducted briefings with the Senate and the House of Representatives
relative to the declaration of martial law. Both the Senate and the House of Representatives
repressed their full support to the proclamation, finding it satisfactory, constitutional and in
accordance with law.

The Lagman Petition

Representatives Lagman, et. al, filed a Petition Under the Third Paragraph of Section 18
of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.

First, the Lagman Petition claims that the declaration of martial law has no sufficient
factual basis because there is no rebellion or invasion in Marawi City or in any part of Mindanao.
It argues that acts of terrorism in Mindanao do not constitute rebellion since there is no proof
that its purpose is to remove Mindanao or any part thereof from allegiance to the Philippines, its
laws, or its territory.

…” It then posits that if at all, there is only a threat of rebellion in Marawi City which is akin to
"imminent danger" of rebellion, which is no longer a valid ground for the declaration of martial
law.”

Second, the Lagman Petition claims that the declaration of martial law has no sufficient
factual basis because the President's Report contained "false, inaccurate, contrived and
hyperbolic accounts."

Third, the Lagman Petition claims that the declaration of martial law has no sufficient
factual basis since the President's Report mistakenly included the attack on the military outpost
in Butig Lanao del Sur in February 2016, the mass jail break in Marawi City in August 2016, the
Zamboanga siege, the Davao market bombing, the Mamasapano carnage and other bombing
incidents in Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, and Basilan, as additional factual bases for the
proclamation of martial law. It contends that these events either took place long before the
 85

conflict in Marawi City began, had long been resolved, or with the culprits having already been
arrested.

Fourth, the Lagman Petition claims that the declaration of martial law has no sufficient
factual basis considering that the President acted alone and did not consult the military
establishment or any ranking official before making the proclamation.

Finally, the Lagman Petition claims that the President's proclamation of martial law lacks
sufficient factual basis owing to the fact that during the presentation before the Committee of the
whole of the House of Representatives, it was shown that the military was even successful in
preempting the ASG and the Maute Group's plan to take over Marawi City and other parts of
Mindanao; there was absence of any hostile plan by the Moro Islamic Liberation Front; and the
number of foreign fighters allied with ISIS was "undetermined" which indicates that there are
only a meager number of foreign fighters who can lend support to the Maute Group.

The OSG acknowledges that Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution vests the Court
with the authority or power to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration of
martial law. The OSG, however, posits that although Section 18, Article VII lays the basis for the
exercise of such authority or power, the same constitutional provision failed to specify the
vehicle, mode or remedy through which the "appropriate proceeding" mentioned therein may be
resorted to.

The OSG suggests that the "appropriate proceeding" referred to in Section 18, Article VII
may be availed of using the vehicle, mode or remedy of a certiorari petition, either under Section
1 or 5, of Article VIII. Corollary, the OSG maintains that the review power is not mandatory, but
discretionary only, on the part of the Court. The Court has the discretion not to give due course
to the petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the constitutional power of the President to suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus is subject to judicial inquiry

RULING:

YES. The constitutional power of the President to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is subject to judicial inquiry.

Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution is meant to provide additional safeguard
against possible abuse by the President in the exercise of his power to declare martial law or
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Reeling from the aftermath of the Marcos
martial law, the framers of the Constitution deemed it wise to insert the now third paragraph of
Section 18 of Article VII.

To give more teeth to this additional safeguard, the framers of the 1987 Constitution not
only placed the President's proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ
 86

of habeas corpus within the ambit of judicial review, it also relaxed the rule on standing by
allowing any citizen to question before this Court the sufficiency of the factual basis of such
proclamation or suspension.

Moreover, the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII veritably conferred upon any
citizen a demandable right to challenge the sufficiency of the factual basis of said proclamation
or suspension. It further designated the Supreme Court as the reviewing tribunal to examine, in
an appropriate proceeding, the sufficiency of the factual basis and to render its decision thereon
within a limited period of 30 days.

Hence, the President's extraordinary powers of suspending the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus and imposing martial law are subject to the veto powers of the Court and
Congress.

Additional Notes: The judicial power to review versus the congressional power to revoke

The Court may strike down the presidential proclamation in an appropriate proceeding
led by any citizen on the ground of lack of sufficient factual basis. On the other hand, Congress
may revoke the proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the
President.

In reviewing the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension, the
Court considers only the information and data available to the President prior to or at the time of
the declaration; it is not allowed to "undertake an independent investigation beyond the
pleadings."

On the other hand, Congress may take into consideration not only data available prior to,
but likewise events supervening the declaration. Unlike the Court which does not look into the
absolute correctness of the factual basis as will be discussed below, Congress could probe
deeper and further; it can delve into the accuracy of the facts presented before it.

In addition, the Court's review power is passive; it is only initiated by the ling of a petition
"in an appropriate proceeding" by a citizen. On the other hand, Congress' review mechanism is
automatic in the sense that it may be activated by Congress itself at any time after the
proclamation or suspension was made.

Thus, the power to review by the Court and the power to revoke by Congress are not
only totally different but likewise independent from each other although concededly, they have
the same trajectory, which is, the nullification of the presidential proclamation. Needless to say,
the power of the Court to review can be exercised independently from the power of revocation
of Congress.

PADILLA V. CONGRESS
[G.R. No. 231671. July 25, 2017.]
 87

Topic: Habeas Corpus; Judicial Review

FACTS:

These consolidated petitions assail the failure and/or refusal of respondent Congress to
convene in joint session and therein deliberate on Proclamation No. 216 issued on May 23,
2017 by President Duterte. Through Proclamation No. 216, President Duterte declared a state
of martial law and suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of
Mindanao for a period not exceeding sixty (60) days effective from the date of the
proclamation's issuance.

In the first petition for Mandamus, petitioners seek a ruling from the Court directing the
Congress to convene in joint session to deliberate on Presidential Proclamation No. 216, and to
vote thereon.
In the second petition for Mandamus, entreat the Court to: (a) declare the refusal of the
Congress to convene in joint session for the purpose of considering Proclamation No. 216 to be
in grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (b) issue a writ of
mandamus directing the Congress to convene in joint session for the aforementioned purpose.
On May 23, 2017, President Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216, declaring a state of martial
law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the Mindanao group of islands
on the grounds of rebellion and necessity of public safety pursuant to Article VII, Section 18 of
the 1987 Constitution.
Within forty-eight (48) hours after the proclamation (May 25), and while the Congress was in
session, President Duterte transmitted his Report to the Senate.
According to President Duterte's Proclamation No. 216 and his Report to the Congress, the
declaration of a state of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus in the whole of Mindanao ensued from the series of armed attacks, violent acts, and
atrocities directed against civilians and government authorities, institutions, and establishments
perpetrated by the Abu Sayyaf and Maute terrorist groups, in complicity with other local and
foreign armed affiliates, who have pledged allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
(ISIS), to sow lawless violence, terror, and political disorder over the said region for the ultimate
purpose of establishing a DAESH wilayah or Islamic Province in Mindanao.
(May 29, 2017) Briefing before Senate was conducted, lasted 4 hours, by Secretary of National
Defense, National Security Adviser and Director General of the National Security Council, and
Chief of Staff of the AFP.
(May 30, 2017) Senate deliberated on these proposed resolutions: (a) Proposed Senate (P .S.)
Resolution No. 388, which expressed support for President Duterte's Proclamation No. 216; and
(b) P .S. Resolution No. 390, which called for the convening in joint session of the Senate and
the House of Representatives to deliberate on President Duterte's Proclamation No. 216.
P .S. Resolution No. 388 was approved and was adopted as Senate Resolution No. 49 entitled "
Resolution Expressing the Sense of the Senate not Revoke Proclaimation No. 216…
P .S. Resolution No. 390, on the other hand, garnered only 9 votes from the senators who were
in favor of it as opposed to 12 votes from the senators who were against its approval and
adoption.
 88

HR, as a Committee of the Whole House, was briefed by Exec. Sec Medialdea, Sec.
Lorenzana, and other security officials for about six (6) hours. After the closed-door briefing, HR
resumed its regular meeting and deliberated on House Resolution No. 1050 entitled "Resolution
Expressing the Full Support of HR to Pres Duterte as it Finds No Reason to Revoke
Proclaimation No. 216
HR proceeded to divide its members on the matter of approving said resolution through voting.
The result shows that the members who were in favor of passing the subject resolution secured
the majority vote. HR discussed the proposal calling for a joint session of the Congress to
deliberate and vote on President Duterte's Proclamation No. 216. After debates, the proposal
was rejected.
Hence, this consolidated petitions.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not under Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution, it is mandatory for the
Congress to automatically convene in joint session in the event that the President proclaims a
state of martial law and/or suspends the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the Philippines
or any part thereof.
2. Whether or not the Court has the power of judicial review in the case at bar.
HELD:
Petitions are both dismissed.
1. NO.
The Congress is not constitutionally mandated to convene in joint session except to vote jointly
to revoke the President's declaration or suspension.

By the language of Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution, the Congress is only
required to vote jointly to revoke the President's proclamation of martial law and/or suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus:

Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution fully reads:

Sec. 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines
and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety
requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within 48 hours
from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The
Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special
session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension which revocation shall not be set aside
by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner,
extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the
invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within 24 hours following such proclamation or
suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call.
 89

The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding led by any citizen, the
suciency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege
of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days
from its filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant
the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of
jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function,
nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged
for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained
shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released. (Emphasis
supplied.)

Outside explicit constitutional limitations, the Commander-in-Chief clause in Article VII,

Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution vests on the President, as Commander-in-Chief, absolute
authority over the persons and actions of the members of the armed forces, in recognition that
the President, as Chief Executive, has the general responsibility to promote public peace, and
as Commander-in-Chief, the more specific duty to prevent and suppress rebellion and lawless
violence. However, to safeguard against possible abuse by the President of the exercise of his
power to proclaim martial law and/or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the
1987 Constitution, through the same provision, institutionalized checks and balances on the
President's power through the two other co-equal and independent branches of government,
i.e., the Congress and the Judiciary. In particular, Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution
requires the President to submit a report to the Congress after his proclamation of martial law
and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and grants the Congress the
power to revoke, as well as extend, the proclamation and/or suspension; and vests upon the
Judiciary the power to review the sufficiency of the factual basis for such proclamation and/or
suspension.

There are four provisions in Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution specifically
pertaining to the role of the Congress when the President proclaims martial law and/or
suspends the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, viz. :

a. Within forty-eight (48) hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in
writing to the Congress;
b. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in
regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall
not be set aside by the President;
c. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend
such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion
or rebellion shall persist; and d. The Congress, if not in session, shall within twenty-four hours
(24) following such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without
need of call.
In the case at bar, the first provision was complied with, as within forty-eight (48) hours
from the issuance on May 23, 2017 by President Duterte of Proclamation No. 216, declaring a
state of martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of h a b e a s c o r p u s in
Mindanao, copies of President Duterte's Report relative to Proclamation No. 216 was
transmitted to and received by the Senate and the House of Representatives on May 25, 2017.
 90

The Court will not touch upon the third and fourth provisions as these concern factual
circumstances which are not availing in the instant petitions. The petitions at bar involve the
initial proclamation of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of h a b e a s c o r p
u s , and not their extension; and the 17th Congress was still in session when President Duterte
issued Proclamation No. 216 on May 23, 2017.

The issue here is the second: "The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a
majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or
suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President."

A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law is clear and free from any
doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation. There is only room for
application. According to the plain-meaning rule or verba legis , when the statute is clear, plain,
and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation. It is expressed in the maxims index animi sermo or "speech is the index of
intention[,]" and verba legis non estrecedendum or "from the words of a statute there should be
no departure."
The provision in question is clear, plain, and unambiguous. In its literal and ordinary
meaning, the provision grants the Congress the power to revoke the President's proclamation of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of h a b e a s c o r p u s and prescribes
how the Congress may exercise such power, i.e., by a vote of at least a majority of all its
Members, voting jointly, in a regular or special session. The use of the word "may" in the
provision — such that "[t]he Congress x x x may may revoke such proclamation or suspension x
x x" — is to be construed as permissive and operating to confer discretion on the Congress on
whether or not to revoke, but in order to revoke, the same provision sets the requirement that at
least a majority of the Members of the Congress, voting jointly, favor revocation.
It is worthy to stress that the provision does not actually refer to a "joint session." While it
may be conceded, subject to the discussions below, that the phrase "voting jointly" shall already
be understood to mean that the joint voting will be done "in joint session," notwithstanding the
absence of clear language in the Constitution, still, the requirement that "[t]he Congress, voting
jointly voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special
session, x x x" explicitly applies only to the situation when the Congress revokes the President's
proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of h a b e a s c o r p u s
. Simply put, the provision only requires Congress to vote jointly on the revocation of the
President's proclamation and/or suspension.
Hence, the plain language of the subject constitutional provision does not support the
petitioners' argument that it is obligatory for the Congress to convene in joint session following
the President's proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, under all circumstances.
The provision in Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution requiring the Congress to
vote jointly in a joint session is specifically for the purpose of revocation of the President's
proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. In
the petitions at bar, the Senate and House of Representatives already separately adopted
resolutions expressing support for President Duterte's Proclamation No. 216. Given the express
support of both Houses of the Congress for Proclamation No. 216, and their already evident
lack of intent to revoke the same, the provision in Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution
on revocation did not even come into operation and, therefore, there is no obligation on the part
of the Congress to convene in joint session.
With neither Senate nor the House of Representatives adopting a concurrent resolution,
no joint session by the two Houses of the Congress can be had in the present cases.
 91

Petitioners reason that if the Congress is not in session, it is constitutionally mandated to

convene within twenty-four (24) hours from the President's proclamation of martial law and/or
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, then it is with all the more reason
required to convene immediately if in session.
1. The provision specially addresses the situation when the President proclaims martial
law and/or suspends the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus while the Congress is in recess.
To ensure that the Congress will be able to act swiftly on the proclamation and/or suspension,
the 1987 Constitution provides that it should convene within twenty-four (24) hours without need
for call. It is a whole different situation when the Congress is still in session as it can readily take
up the proclamation and/or suspension in the course of its regular sessions, as what happened
in these cases.
2. The provision only requires that the Congress convene without call, but it does not
explicitly state that the Congress shall already convene in joint session. In fact, the provision
actually states that the Congress "convene in accordance with its rules," which can only mean
the respective rules of each House as there are no standing rules for joint sessions.
3. It cannot be said herein that the Congress failed to convene immediately to act on
Proclamation No. 216. Both Houses of the Congress promptly took action on Proclamation No.
216, with the Senate already issuing invitations to executive officials even prior to receiving
President Duterte's Report, except that the two Houses of the Congress acted separately. By
initially undertaking separate actions on President Duterte's Proclamation No. 216 and making
their respective determination of whether to support or revoke said Proclamation, the Senate
and the House of Representatives were only acting in accordance with their own rules of
procedure and were not in any way remiss in their constitutional duty to guard against a
baseless or unjustied proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus by the President.
There is no basis for petitioners' assertion that without a joint session, the public cannot
hold the Senators and Representatives accountable for their respective positions on President
Duterte's Proclamation No. 216. Senate records completely chronicled the deliberations and the
voting by the Senators on Senate Resolution No. 49 (formerly P.S. Resolution No. 388) and
P .S. Resolution No. 390. While it is true that the House of Representatives voted on House
Resolution No. 1050, this is only in accordance with its rules.

FOR NOTES ONLY:

2. YES.
Essential requisites for Court to exercise its power of judicial review:
(1) an actual case or controversy exists;
(2) they possess the standing to le this case;
(3) the constitutionality of a governmental act has been raised at the earliest possible
opportunity; and
(4) the constitutionality of the said act is the very lis mota of the petition.

The principle of separation of powers The separation of powers doctrine is the backbone of our
tripartite system of government. It is implicit in the manner that our Constitution lays out in
separate and distinct Articles the powers and prerogatives of each co-equal branch of
government.
Political question doctrine Corollary to respondents' invocation of the principle of separation of
powers, they argue that these petitions involve a political question in which the Court may not
interfere. It is true that the Court continues to recognize questions of policy as a bar to its
 92

exercise of the power of judicial review. However, in a long line of cases, we have given a
limited application to the political question doctrine.
1. As to Legal Standing:
YES. The Court ruled that legislators have legal standing to ensure that the constitutional
prerogatives, powers, and privileges of the Members of the Congress remain inviolate. Thus,
they are allowed to question the validity of any official action — or in these cases, inaction —
which, to their mind to their mind, infringes on their prerogatives as legislators
Petitioners in first case/petition; allege they are suing in the following capacities:
(1) Padilla as a member of the legal profession representing victims of human rights violations,
and a taxpayer;
(2) Saguisag as a human rights lawyer, former member of the Philippine Senate, and a
taxpayer; (3) Monsod as a framer of the Philippine Constitution and member of the 1986
ConCom, and a taxpayer;
(4) Rosales as a victim of human rights violations committed under martial law declared by then
President Ferdinand E. Marcos, and a taxpayer;
(5) Gorospe as a lawyer and a taxpayer; and
(6) Senator De Lima as an incumbent Member of the Philippine Senate, a human rights
advocate, a former Secretary of Justice, Chairperson of the Commission on Human Rights, and
a taxpayer.

Petitioners in second case, Tañada sues in his capacity as a Filipino citizen and former
legislator, his co-petitioners (Bishop Iñiguez, Bishop Pabillo, Bishop Tobias, Mo. Ygrubay,
Bulangis, and Deluria) all sue in their capacity as Filipino citizens.
Respondents insists that none of the petitioners have legal standing, whether as a citizen,
taxpayer, or legislator, to file the present cases.
The Court held that locus standi is a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the
party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged governmental act.
The question is whether the challenging party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy so as to assure the existence of concrete adverseness that would sharpen the
presentation of issues and illuminate the court in ruling on the constitutional question posed.
The Court has recognized that every citizen has the right, if not the duty, to interfere and see
that a public offense be properly pursued and punished, and that a public grievance be
remedied. When a citizen exercises this "public right" and challenges a supposedly illegal or
unconstitutional executive or legislative action, he represents the public at large, thus, clothing
him with the requisite locus standi. He may not sustain an injury as direct and adverse as
compared to others but it is enough that he sufficiently demonstrates in his petition that he is
entitled to protection or relief from the Court in the vindication of a public right.
A citizen's personal interest in a case challenging an allegedly unconstitutional act lies in his
interest and duty to uphold and ensure the proper execution of the law.
In this case, the Senate and the House of Representatives have breached an allegedly
constitutional duty to convene in joint session to deliberate on Presidential Proclamation No.
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216. The citizen-petitioners' challenge of a purportedly unconstitutional act in violation of a

public right, done in behalf of the general public, gives them legal standing.
As to Actual case or controversy
YES. Inasmuch as the present petitions raise issues concerning the Congress' role in our
government's system of checks and balances, these are matters of paramount public interest or
issues of transcendental importance deserving the attention of the Court in view of their
seriousness, novelty, and weight as precedents.
It is long established that the power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversies.
There is an actual case or controversy where there is a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of
opposite legal claims, where the contradiction of the rights can be interpreted and enforced on
the basis of existing law and jurisprudence.
Two conflicting claims:
1. By petitioners: that the Congress has the mandatory mandatory duty to convene in joint
session to deliberate on Proclamation No. 216;
2. By the respondents: that so convening in joint session is discretionary on the part of the
Congress.
Mandamus v. Certiorari
Mandamus is a remedy granted by law when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty
resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use or
enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled.
Certiorari, as a special civil action, is available only if:
(1) it is directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions;
(2) the tribunal, board, or officer acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and
(3) there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law.

With respect to the Court, however, certiorari is broader in scope and reach, and it may be
issued to correct errors of jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board, or
officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions, but also to set right, undo, and
restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any
branch or instrumentality of the Government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-
judicial or ministerial functions.
In this case, an omission on the part of the Congress that constitutes neglect of their
constitutional duties, the petitions make a prima facie case for mandamus, and an actual case
or controversy ripe for adjudication exists. When an act or omission of a branch of government
is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but, in fact,
the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute.
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There is no merit to respondents' position. For the Court to exercise its power of judicial review
and give due course to the petitions, it is sufficient that the petitioners set forth their material
allegations to make out a prima case for mandamus or certiorari. Whether the petitioners are
actually and ultimately entitled to the reliefs prayed for is exactly what is to be determined by the
Court after careful consideration of the parties' pleadings and submissions.
Moot and Academic Case:
NO. Not Moot since it cannot be gainsaid that there are compelling and weighty reasons for the
Court to proceed with the resolution of these consolidated petitions on the merits. As explained
in the preceding discussion, these cases involve a constitutional issue of transcendental
signicance and novelty. A denitive ruling from this Court is imperative not only to guide the
Bench, the Bar, and the public but, more importantly, to clarify the parameters of congressional
conduct required by the 1987 Constitution, in the event of a repetition of the factual precedents
that gave rise to these cases.
In David v. Macapagal Arroyo:
A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of
supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value.
Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on ground of mootness.
The "moot and academic" principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the
courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if:
1. there is a grave violation of the Constitution;
2. the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved;
3. when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the
bench, the bar, and the public;
4. the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.

Lagman vs. Pimentel

G.R. No. 235935, February 6, 2018

Topic: Habeas Corpus: Judicial Review

FACTS: These are consolidated petitions, filed under the third paragraph, Section 18 of Article
VII of the Constitution, assailing the constitutionality of the extension of the proclamation of
martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao
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for one year from January 1 to December 31, 2018. Petitioners in G.R. No. 235935 alternatively,
but not mandatorily, invoke the Court's expanded jurisdiction under Section 1 of Article VIII of
the Constitution. Petitioners in G.R. Nos. 235935, 236061 and 236155 pray for a temporary
restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin respondents from
implementing the one-year extension.
On May 23, 2017, President Rodrigo Roa Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216,2 declaring a
state of martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of
Mindanao for a period not exceeding sixty (60) days, to address the rebellion mounted by
members of the Maute Group and Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). On May 25, 2017, within the 48-
hour period set in Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the President submitted to the
Senate and the House of Representatives his written Report, citing the events and reasons that
impelled him to issue Proclamation No. 216. Thereafter, the Senate adopted P.S. Resolution
No. 3883 while the House of Representatives issued House Resolution No. 1050,4 both
expressing full support to the Proclamation and finding no cause to revoke the same.
Three separate petitions were subsequently filed before the Court, challenging the
sufficiency of the factual basis of Proclamation No. 216. In a Decision rendered on July 4, 2017,
the Court found sufficient factual bases for the Proclamation and declared it constitutional.
On July 18, 2017, the President requested the Congress to extend the effectivity of
Proclamation No. 216. In a Special Joint Session on July 22, 2017, the Congress adopted
Resolution of Both Houses No. 26 extending Proclamation No. 216 until December 31, 2017.
On December 13, 2017, the Senate and the House of Representatives, in a joint session,
adopted Resolution of Both Houses No. 413 further extending the period of martial law and
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao for one year,
from January 1, 2018 to December 31, 2018.
Petitioners question the manner that the Congress approved the extension of martial law
in Mindanao and characterized the same as done with undue haste. Petitioners premised their
argument on the fact that the Joint Rules adopted by both Houses, in regard to the President's
request for further extension, provided for an inordinately short period for interpellation of
resource persons and for explanation by each Member after the voting is concluded.
ISSUE: Whether or not the manner in which Congress deliberated on the President’s request
for extension of martial law is subject to judicial review.

RULING: No, it is not subject to judicial review. No less than the Constitution, under Section 16
of Article VI, grants the Congress the right to promulgate its own rules to govern its proceedings,
to wit: Section 16. (3) ) Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its
Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members,
suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty
days. In Pimentel, Jr., et. al. v. Senate Committee of the Whole, this constitutionally-vested
authority is recognized as a grant of full discretionary authority to each House of Congress in
the formulation, adoption and promulgation of its own rules. As such, the exercise of this power
is generally exempt from judicial supervision and interference, except on a clear showing of
such arbitrary and improvident use of the power as will constitute a denial of due process. This
freedom from judicial interference was explained in the 1997 case of Arroyo v. De Venecia,
wherein the Court declared that: “But the cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of
expression, all deny to the courts the power to inquire into allegations that, in enacting a law, a
House of Congress failed to comply with its own rules, in the absence of showing that there was
a violation of a constitutional provision or the rights of private individuals.” In other words, the
Court cannot review the rules promulgated by Congress in the absence of any constitutional
violation. Petitioners have not shown that the above-quoted rules of the Joint Session violated
any provision or right under the Constitution.
 96

ZAFRA V. CITY WARDEN (BACLAYON)