Persons and Family Relations

1. Peregrina Macus vda. De avenido vs Tecla Hoybia Avenido, GR No. 173540, 11 January 2014
2. Calimag vs Heirs of Macapaz, GR No. 191936, 01 June 2016
3. Cercado Belison vs Vicente Cercado Jr, GR 185374, 11 March 2015
4. Sps. Fidel vs CA, GR 168263, 21 July 2005
5. Salgado Sps vs Anson, GR 204494, 27 July 2016
6. Raquel G. Kho vs Republic and Veronica B. Kho, GR 187462 01 June 2016
7. Nortberto Vitangcol vs People, GR 207406, 13 January 2016
8. Renato Castillo vs Lea de Leon Castillo, GR 189607, 18 April 2016
9. Leonila Santiago vs People, GR 200233, 15 July 2015
10. Rene Ronulo vs People, GR 182438, 02 July 2014
11. Minoru Fujiki vs Ma Paz Marinay, et al, GR 196049, 26 June 2013
12. David Noveras vs Leticia Noveras, GR 188289, 20 August 2014
13. Edelina Ando vs DFA, GR 195432, 27 August 2014
14. Robert Mallillin vs Luz Jamesolamin and Republic, GR 192718, 18 February 2015
15. Republic vs Maria Fe Espinosa Cantor, GR 184621, 10 December 2013
16. Celerina Santos vs Ricardo Santos, GR 187061, 08 October 2014
17. Republic vs Jose Sarenogon, Jr, GR 199194, 10 February 2016
18. Norma del Socorro, in behalf of her minor child, Rodrigo Norjo van Wilsem vs Ernst Johan Brinkman
van Wilsem, GR 193707, 10 December 2014
19. Berlinda Oribello vs Ca and Remedios Oribello, GR 163504, 05 August 2015
20. Infant Julian Yusa y Caram, etc vs Atty Marijoy Segui and OSG, GR 193652, 06 August 2014
21. Mary Grace Natividad Poe – Llamanzares vs Comelec, Francisco Tatad, Antonio Contreras and
Amado Valdez, GR 221698-700
22. Sheryl Mendez vs Sharia District Court, 5 th Sharia District Court, Cotabato City, et al, GR 201614, 12
January 2016
23. Onde vs Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Las Pinas City, GR No. 197174, 10 September 2014
24. Francisco Lim vs Equitable PCI Ban, GR 183918, 15 January 2014
G.R. No. 173540               January 22, 2014

PEREGRINA MACUA VDA. DE AVENIDO, Petitioner, 

vs.
TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO, Respondent.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.ofthe Rules of Court, assailing the 31
August 2005 Decision  of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 79444, which reversed the
1

25 March 2003 Decision  of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 8 of Davao City, in a complaint
2

for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriage· docketed as Civil Case No. 26, 908-98.

The Facts

This case involves a contest between two women both claiming to have been validly married to the
same man, now deceased.

Respondent Tecla Hoybia Avenido (Tecla) instituted on 11 November 1998, a Complaint for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against Peregrina Macua Vda. de Avenido (Peregrina) on the
ground that she (Tecla), is the lawful wife of the deceased Eustaquio Avenido (Eustaquio). In her
complaint, Tecla alleged that her marriage to Eustaquio was solemnized on 30 September 1942 in
Talibon, Bohol in rites officiated by the Parish Priest of the said town. According to her, the fact of
their marriage is evidenced by a Marriage Certificate recorded with the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar (LCR) of Talibon, Bohol. However, due to World War II, records were destroyed. Thus,
only a Certification  was issued by the LCR.
3

During the existence of Tecla and Eustaquio’s union, they begot four (4) children, namely: Climaco
H. Avenido, born on 30 March 1943; Apolinario H. Avenido, born on 23 August 1948; Editha A.
Ausa, born on 26 July 1950, and Eustaquio H. Avenido, Jr., born on 15 December 1952. Sometime
in 1954, Eustaquio left his family and his whereabouts was not known. In 1958, Tecla and her
children were informed that Eustaquio was in Davao City living with another woman by the name of
Buenaventura Sayson who later died in 1977 without any issue.

In 1979, Tecla learned that her husband Eustaquio got married to another woman by the name of
Peregrina, which marriage she claims must be declared null and void for being bigamous – an action
she sought to protect the rights of her children over the properties acquired by Eustaquio.

On 12 April 1999, Peregrina filed her answer to the complaint with counterclaim,  essentially averring
4

that she is the legal surviving spouse of Eustaquio who died on 22 September 1989 in Davao City,
their marriage having been celebrated on 30 March 1979 at St. Jude Parish in Davao City. She also
contended that the case was instituted to deprive her of the properties she owns in her own right and
as an heir of Eustaquio.

Trial ensued.

Tecla presented testimonial and documentary evidence consisting of:

 1) Testimonies of Adelina Avenido-Ceno (Adelina), Climaco Avenido (Climaco) and Tecla
herself to substantiate her alleged prior existing and valid marriage with (sic) Eustaquio;

2) Documentary evidence such as the following:

a. Certification of Loss/Destruction of Record of Marriage from 1900 to 1944 issued

by the Office of the Civil Registrar, Municipality of Talibon, Bohol;5

b. Certification of Submission of a copy of Certificate of Marriage to the Office of the

Civil Registrar General, National Statistics Office (NSO), R. Magsaysay Blvd., Sta
Mesa, Manila; 6

c. Certification that Civil Registry records of births, deaths and marriages that were
actually filed in the Office of the Civil Registrar General, NSO Manila, started only in
1932; 7

d. Certification that Civil Registry records submitted to the Office of the Civil Registrar
General, NSO, from 1932 to the early part of 1945, were totally destroyed during the
liberation of Manila; 8

e. Certification of Birth of Apolinario Avenido; 9

f. Certification of Birth of Eustaquio Avenido, Jr.; 10

g. Certification of Birth of Editha Avenido; 11

h. Certification of Marriage between Eustaquio Sr., and Tecla issued by the Parish
Priest of Talibon, Bohol on 30 September 1942; 12

i. Certification that record of birth from 1900 to 1944 were destroyed by Second
World War issued by the Office of the Municipal Registrar of Talibon, Bohol, that they
cannot furnish as requested a true transcription from the Register of Birth of Climaco
Avenido; 13

j. Certificate of Baptism of Climaco indicating that he was born on 30 March 1943 to

spouses Eustaquio and Tecla; 14

k. Electronic copy of the Marriage Contract between Eustaquio and Peregrina. 15

On the other hand, Peregrina testified on, among others, her marriage to Eustaquio that took place
in Davao City on 3 March 1979; her life as a wife and how she took care of Eustaquio when he
already had poor health, as well as her knowledge that Tecla is not the legal wife, but was once a
common law wife of Eustaquio.  Peregrina likewise set forth documentary evidence to substantiate
16

her allegations and to prove her claim for damages, to wit:

1) Marriage Contract  between Pregrina and the late Eustaquio showing the date of marriage
17

on 3 March 1979;

2) Affidavit of Eustaquio executed on 22 March 1985 declaring himself as single when he

contracted marriage with the petitioner although he had a common law relation with one
 Tecla Hoybia with whom he had four (4) children namely: Climaco, Tiburcio, Editha and
Eustaquio, Jr., all surnamed Avenido; 18

3) Letter of Atty. Edgardo T. Mata dated 15 April 2002, addressed to the Civil Registrar of the
Municipality of Alegria, Surigao del Norte;  and 19

4) Certification dated 25 April 2002 issued by Colita P. Umipig, in her capacity as the Civil
Registrar of Alegria, Surigao del Norte. 20

In addition, as basis for the counterclaim, Peregrina averred that the case was initiated in bad faith
so as to deprive her of the properties she owns in her own right and as an heir of Eustaquio; hence,
her entitlement to damages and attorney’s fees.

On 25 March 2003, the RTC rendered a Decision  denying Tecla’s petition, as well as Peregrina’s
21

counter-claim. The dispositive portion thereof reads:

For The Foregoing, the petition for the "DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE" filed by
petitioner TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO against respondent PEREGRINA MACUA is hereby DENIED.

The "COUNTERCLAIM" filed by respondent PEREGRINA MACUA against petitioner TECLA

HOYBIA AVENIDO is hereby DISMISSED. 22

Not convinced, Tecla appealed to the CA raising as error the trial court’s alleged disregard of the
evidence on the existence of her marriage to Eustaquio.

In its 31 August 2005 Decision,  the CA ruled in favor of Tecla by declaring the validity of her
23

marriage to Eustaquio, while pronouncing on the other hand, the marriage between Peregrina and
Eustaquio to be bigamous, and thus, null and void. The CA ruled:

The court a quo committed a reversible error when it disregarded (1) the testimonies of [Adelina], the
sister of EUSTAQUIO who testified that she personally witnessed the wedding celebration of her
older brother EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla] on 30 September 1942 at Talibon, Bohol; [Climaco], the
eldest son of EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla], who testified that his mother [Tecla] was married to his
father, EUSTAQUIO, and [Tecla] herself; and (2) the documentary evidence mentioned at the outset.
It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract, both constituting
the condition sine qua non, for the introduction of secondary evidence of its contents, were shown by
the very evidence the trial court has disregarded. 24

Peregrina now questions the said ruling assigning as error, among others, the failure of the CA to
appreciate the validity of her marriage to Eustaquio. For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), in its Memorandum dated 5 June 2008, raises the following legal issues:
25

1. Whether or not the court can validly rely on the "presumption of marriage" to overturn the
validity of a subsequent marriage;

2. Whether or not secondary evidence may be considered and/or taken cognizance of,
without proof of the execution or existence and the cause of the unavailability of the best
evidence, the original document;

and
 3. Whether or not a Certificate of Marriage issued by the church has a probative value to
prove the existence of a valid marriage without the priest who issued the same being
presented to the witness stand. 26

Our Ruling

Essentially, the question before us is whether or not the evidence presented during the trial proves
the existence of the marriage of Tecla to Eustaquio.

The trial court, in ruling against Tecla’s claim of her prior valid marriage to Eustaquio relied on
Tecla’s failure to present her certificate of marriage to Eustaquio. Without such certificate, the trial
court considered as useless the certification of the Office of the Civil Registrar of Talibon, Bohol, that
it has no more records of marriages during the period 1900 to 1944. The same thing was said as
regards the Certification issued by the National Statistics Office of Manila. The trial court observed:

Upon verification from the NSO, Office of the Civil Registrar General, Manila, it, likewise, issued a
Certification (Exhibit "B") stating that:

records from 1932 up to early part of 1945 were totally destroyed during the liberation of Manila on
February 4, 1945. What are presently filed in this office are records from the latter part of 1945 to
date, except for the city of Manila which starts from 1952. Hence, this office has no way of verifying
and could not issue as requested, certified true copy of the records of marriage between [Eustaquio]
and [Tecla], alleged to have been married on 30th September 1942, in Talibon, Bohol. 27

In the absence of the marriage contract, the trial court did not give credence to the testimony of
Tecla and her witnesses as it considered the same as mere self-serving assertions. Superior
significance was given to the fact that Tecla could not even produce her own copy of the said proof
of marriage. Relying on Section 3 (a) and Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the trial court
declared that Tecla failed to prove the existence of the first marriage.

The CA, on the other hand, concluded that there was a presumption of lawful marriage between
Tecla and Eustaquio as they deported themselves as husband and wife and begot four (4) children.
Such presumption, supported by documentary evidence consisting of the same Certifications
disregarded by the trial court, as well as the testimonial evidence especially that of Adelina Avenido-
Ceno, created, according to the CA, sufficient proof of the fact of marriage. Contrary to the trial
court’s ruling, the CA found that its appreciation of the evidence presented by Tecla is well in accord
with Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

We uphold the reversal by the CA of the decision of the trial court. Quite recently, in Añonuevo v.
Intestate Estate of Rodolfo G. Jalandoni,  we said, citing precedents, that:
28

While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is not regarded
as the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage. Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may
be proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate. Hence, even a person’s birth
certificate may be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between his parents.

The error of the trial court in ruling that without the marriage certificate, no other proof of the fact can
be accepted, has been aptly delineated in Vda de Jacob v. Court of Appeals.  Thus:29

It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract, both constituting
the conditio sine qua non for the introduction of secondary evidence of its contents, were shown by
the very evidence they have disregarded. They have thus confused the evidence to show due
execution and loss as "secondary" evidence of the marriage. In Hernaez v. Mcgrath, the Court
clarified this misconception thus:

x x x [T]he court below was entirely mistaken in holding that parol evidence of the execution of the
instrument was barred. The court confounded the execution and the contents of the document. It is
the contents, x x x which may not be proven by secondary evidence when the

instrument itself is accessible. Proofs of the execution are not dependent on the existence or non-
existence of the document, and, as a matter of fact, such proofs of the contents: due execution,
besides the loss, has to be shown as foundation for the inroduction of secondary evidence of the
contents.

xxxx

Evidence of the execution of a document is, in the last analysis, necessarily collateral or primary. It
generally consists of parol testimony or extrinsic papers. Even when the document is actually
produced, its authencity is not necessarily, if at all, determined from its face or recital of its contents
but by parol evidence. At the most, failure to produce the document, when available, to establish its
execution may effect the weight of the evidence presented but not the admissibility of such evidence.

The Court of Appeals, as well as the trial court, tried to justify its stand on this issue by relying on
Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete. But even there, we said that "marriage may be prove[n] by other competent
evidence.

Truly, the execution of a document may be proven by the parties themselves, by the swearing
officer, by witnesses who saw and recognized the signatures of the parties; or even by those to
whom the parties have previously narrated the execution thereof. The Court has also held that "[t]he
loss may be shown by any person who [knows] the fact of its loss, or by any one who ha[s] made, in
the judgment of the court, a sufficient examination in the place or places where the document or
papers of similar character are usually kept by the person in whose custody the document lost was,
and has been unable to find it; or who has made any other investigation which is sufficient to satisfy
the court that the instrument [has] indeed [been] lost."

In the present case, due execution was established by the testimonies of Adela Pilapil, who was
present during the marriage ceremony, and of petitioner herself as a party to the event. The
subsequent loss was shown by the testimony and the affidavit of the officiating priest, Monsignor
Yllana, as relevant, competent and admissible evidence. Since the due execution and the loss of the
marriage contract were clearly shown by the evidence presented, secondary evidence–testimonial
and documentary–may be admitted to prove the fact of marriage. 30

As correctly stated by the appellate court:

In the case at bench, the celebration of marriage between [Tecla] and EUSTAQUIO was established
by the testimonial evidence furnished by [Adelina] who appears to be present during the marriage
ceremony, and by [Tecla] herself as a living witness to the event. The loss was shown by the
certifications issued by the NSO and LCR of Talibon, Bohol. These are relevant, competent and
admissible evidence. Since the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract were clearly
shown by the evidence presented, secondary evidence – testimonial and documentary – may be
admitted to prove the fact of marriage. In PUGEDA v. TRIAS, the
Supreme Court held that "marriage may be proven by any competent and relevant evidence. The
testimony by one of the parties to the marriage or by one of the witnesses to the marriage has been
held to be admissible to prove the fact of marriage. The person who officiated at the solemnization is
also competent to testify as an eyewitness to the fact of marriage."

xxxx

The court a quo committed a reversible error when it disregarded (1) the testimonies of [Adelina], the
sister of EUSTAQUIO who testified that she personally witnessed the wedding celebration of her
older brother EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla] on 30 September 1942 at Talibon, Bohol; [Climaco], the
eldest son of EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla], who testified that his mother [Tecla] was married to his
father, EUSTAQUIO, and [Tecla] herself; and (2) the documentary evidence mentioned at the outset.
It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract, both constituting
the condition sine qua non for the introduction of secondary evidence of its contents, were shown by
the very evidence the trial court has disregarded. 31

The starting point then, is the presumption of marriage.

As early as the case of Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,  this Court has elucidated on the rationale
32

behind the presumption:

The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage.  Marriage in this
1âwphi1

jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of
which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward
legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the
absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The
reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold
themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law. A
presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is that a man and a woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. (Sec. 334, No. 28)
Semper – praesumitur pro matrimonio – Always presume marriage.

In the case at bar, the establishment of the fact of marriage was completed by the testimonies of
Adelina, Climaco and Tecla; the unrebutted the certifications of marriage issued by the parish priest
of the Most Holy Trinity Cathedral of Talibon, Bohol.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 79444 is AFFIRMED. The marriage between petitioner Peregrina Macua Avenido and the
deceased Eustaquio Avenido is hereby declared NULL and VOID. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 191936, June 01, 2016

VIRGINIA D. CALIMAG, Petitioner, v. HEIRS OF SILVESTRA N. MACAPAZ, REPRESENTED BY

ANASTACIO P. MACAPAZ, JR., Respondents.

DECISION

REYES, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) promulgated on
October 20, 2009 in CA-G.R. CV No. 90907 which affirmed with modification the Decision3 dated September
28, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 147, in Civil Case No. 06-173, an action
for annulment of deed of sale and cancellation of title with damages. The CA Resolution4 dated April 5, 2010
denied the motion for reconsideration thereof.

The Facts

Virginia D. Calimag (petitioner) co-owned the property, the subject matter of this case, with Silvestra N.
Macapaz (Silvestra).

On the other hand, Anastacio P. Macapaz, Jr. (Anastacio, Jr.) and Alicia Macapaz-Ritua (Alicia) (respondents)
are the children of Silvestra's brother, Anastacio Macapaz, Sr. (Anastacio, Sr.) and Fidela O. Poblete Vda. de
Macapaz (Fidela).

The subject property, with a total area of 299 square meters, is located at No. 1273 Bo. Visaya Street,
Barangay Guadalupe Nuevo, Makati City, and was duly registered in the names of the petitioner (married to
Demetrio Calimag) and Silvestra under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 183088.5 In said certificate of
title, appearing as Entry No. 02671 is an annotation of an Adverse Claim of Fidela asserting rights and
interests over a portion of the said property measuring 49.5 sq m.6

On November 11, 2002, Silvestra died without issue. On July 7, 2005, TCT No. 183088 was cancelled and a
new certificate of title, TCT No. 221466,7 was issued in the name of the petitioner by virtue of a Deed of
Sale8 dated January 18, 2005 whereby Silvestra allegedly sold her 99-sq-m portion to the petitioner for
P300,000.00. Included among the documents submitted for the purpose of cancelling TCT No. 183088 was
an Affidavit9 dated July 12, 2005 purportedly executed by both the petitioner and Silvestra. It was stated
therein that the affidavit of adverse claim filed by Fidela was not signed by the Deputy Register of Deeds of
Makati City, making the same legally ineffective. On September 16, 2005, Fidela passed away.10

On December 15, 2005, Anastacio, Jr. filed a criminal complaint for two counts of falsification of public
documents under Articles 171 and 172 of the Revised Penal Code against the petitioner.11 However, said
criminal charges were eventually dismissed.

On March 2, 2006, the respondents, asserting that they are the heirs of Silvestra, instituted the action
for Annulment of Deed of Sale and Cancellation of TCT No. 221466 with Damages against the petitioner and
the Register of Deeds of Makati City.12

In her  Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim,13 the petitioner averred that the respondents have no legal
capacity to institute said civil action on the ground that they are illegitimate children of Anastacio, Sr. As
such, they have no right over Silvestra's estate pursuant to Article 992 of the Civil Code which prohibits
illegitimate children from inheriting intestate from the legitimate children and relatives of their father and
mother.

After trial, the RTC found for the respondents and rendered its Decision on September 28,
2007.14 The fallo of the RTC decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is rendered as follows:

1. Declaring the Deed of Sale purportedly executed by [Silvestra] in favor of [the petitioner] on
January 18, 2005 over a parcel of land covered by TCT No. 183088 of the Registry of Deeds of
Makati City, as Null and Void;

2. Ordering the Registrar of Deeds of Makati City to cancel TCT No. 221466 issued in the name of [the
petitioner], the same having been issued on the basis of a fraudulent/falsified Deed of Sale, and
thereafter to reinstate TCT No. 183088 issued in the name of [the petitioner] and [Silvestra] with all
the liens and encumbrances annotated thereon, including the adverse claim of [Fidela]; [and]

3. Ordering [the petitioner] to pay the [respondents] the sum of PI00,000.00 as moral damages and
another P100,000.00 as exemplary damages, P50,000.00 as and by way of attorney's fees, plus
costs of suit.
[The petitioner's] counter-claim is dismissed for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.15

The RTC found that the Deed of Sale dated January 18, 2005 presented for the cancellation of TCT No.
183088 was a forgery considering that Silvestra, who purportedly executed said deed of sale died on
November 11, 2002, about three years before the execution of the said Deed of Sale.16 Respecting the
respondents' legal capacity to sue, the RTC favorably ruled in this wise:

Demetrio Calimag, Jr. sought, but failed, to impugn the personality of the [respondents] to initiate this
action as the alleged heirs of [Silvestra]. The marriage between [Anastacio Sr.J and [FidclaJ is
evidenced by the Certificate of (canonical) Marriage (Exh. "M"). The name 'Fidela Obera Poblete'
is indicated in [the respondents'] respective birth certificates as the mother's maiden name but
Fidela signed the same as the informant as "Fidela P. Macapaz". In both birth certificates,
"Anastacio Nator Macapaz" is indicated as the name of the father. 17(Emphasis ours)

Ruling of the CA

Aggrieved, the petitioner elevated her case to the CA resting on the argument that the respondents are
without legal personality to institute the civil action for cancellation of deed of sale and title on the basis of
their claimed status as legitimate children of Anastacio, Sr., the brother and sole heir of the deceased,
Silvestra.18

On October 20, 2009, the CA rendered its Decision affirming the RTC decision with modification as to the
amount of damages. The fallo of the assailed decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is hereby DISMISSED, for lack of merit. The Decision
dated September 28, 2007 of the [RTC] of Makati City, Branch 147 in Civil Case No. 06-173 is hereby
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the award of moral and exemplary damages is hereby reduced from
PI00,000.00 to P50,000.00, respectively.

With costs against the [petitioner]. 

SO ORDERED.19

The CA sustained the RTC ruling that the cancellation of TCT No. 183088 and the issuance of TCT No.
221466 in the name of the petitioner were obtained through forgery. As to the question of whether the
respondents are legal heirs of Silvestra and thus have the legal capacity to institute the action, the CA ruled
in this wise:

Reviewing the evidence on record, we concur with the trial court in sustaining the appellees' legitimate
filiation to Silvestra's brother [Anastacio, Sr.] The trial court found unsuccessful the attempt of Atty.
Demetrio Calimag, Jr. to assail the validity of marriage between [Anastacio, Sr.] and [Fidela] with a
certification from the NSO that their office has no record of the certificate of marriage of [Anastacio, Sr.] and
[Fidela], and further claiming the absence of a marriage license.

The best proof of marriage between man and wife is a marriage contract. A certificate of marriage issued by
the Most Holy Trinity Parish, Alang[-]alang, Leyte (Exh. "M") as well as a copy of the marriage contract were
duly submitted in evidence by the [respondents].

xxxx

The Marriage Contract (Exh. "U") in this case clearly reflects a marriage license number and in the absence
of a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued, the marriage
between [Anastacio, Sr.] and [Fidela] may not be invalidated on that ground.

x x x.

xxxx

Every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent
matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counterpresumption or evidence special to the case, to be
in fact married. This jurisprudential attitude towards marriage is based on the prima facie presumption that
a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage. The Courts look upon this presumption with great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the
contrary, the presumption is of great weight.

Here, the fact of marriage between [Anastacio, Sr.] and [Fidela] was established by competent and
substantial proof. [The respondents] who were conceived and born during the subsistence of said marriage
are therefore presumed to be legitimate children of [Anastacio, Sr.], in the absence of any contradicting
evidence.20 (Citations omitted)

The petitioner sought reconsideration,21 but her motion was denied in the Resolution22 dated April 5, 2010.

Hence, this petition.

Notably, even before the CA, the petitioner never assailed the factual finding that forgery was indeed
committed to effect the cancellation of TCT No. 183088 and the consequent transfer of title of the property
in her name. Verily, in this petition, the petitioner continues to assail the legal capacity of the respondents
to institute the present action. Invoking the provisions of Article 992 of the Civil Code,23the petitioner insists
that the respondents have no legal right over the estate left by Silvestra for being illegitimate children of
Anastacio, Sr.

While the petitioner does not question that Anastacio, Sr. is the legal heir of Silvestra, she, however, claims
that the respondents failed to establish their legitimate filiation to Anastacio, Sr. considering that the
marriage between Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela was not sufficiently proven. According to the petitioner, the
marriage contract24 presented by the respondents is not admissible under the Best Evidence Rule for being a
mere fax copy or photocopy of an alleged marriage contract, and which is not even authenticated by the
concerned Local Civil Registrar. In addition, there is no mark or stamp showing that said document was ever
received by said office. Further, while the respondents also presented a Certificate of (Canonical)
Marriage,25 the petitioner asserts that the same is not the marriage license required under Articles 3 and 4 of
the Family Code;26 that said Certificate of (Canonical) Marriage only proves that a marriage ceremony
actually transpired between Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela.27 cralawred

Moreover, the petitioner contends that the certificates of live birth of the respondents do not conclusively
prove that they are legitimate children of Anastacio, Sr.

In their Comment,28 the respondents reiterate the finding and ruling of the CA that the petitioner's argument
has no leg to stand on considering that one's legitimacy can only be questioned in a direct action seasonably
filed by a party who is related to the former either by consanguinity or affinity.29

Thereupon, the resolution of this case rests upon this fundamental issue: whether or not the respondents
are legal heirs of Silvestra.

Ruling of the Court

The petition is bereft of merit.

While it is true that a person's legitimacy can only be questioned in a direct action seasonably filed by the
proper party, as held in Spouses Fidel v. Hon. CA, et al.,30 this Court however deems it necessary to pass
upon the respondents' relationship to Silvestra so as to determine their legal rights to the subject property.
Besides, the question of whether the respondents have the legal capacity to sue as alleged heirs of Silvestra
was among the issues agreed upon by the parties in the pre-trial.

At first blush, the documents presented as proof of marriage between Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela, viz: (1) fax
or photo copy of the marriage contract, and (2) the canonical certificate of marriage, cannot be used as
legal basis to establish the fact of marriage without running afoul with the Rules on Evidence of the Revised
Rules of Court. Rule 130, Section 3 of the Rules on Evidence provides that: "When the subject of the inquiry
is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, x x
x." Nevertheless, a reproduction of the original document can still be admitted as secondary evidence
subject to certain requirements specified by law. In Dantis v. Maghinang, Jr.,31 it was held that:

A secondary evidence is admissible only upon compliance with Rule 130, Section 5, which states that: when
the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its
execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its
contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of
witnesses in the order stated. Accordingly, the offeror of the secondary evidence is burdened to satisfactorily
prove the predicates thereof, namely: (1) the execution or existence of the original; (2) the loss and
destruction of the original or its non-production in court; and (3) the unavailability of the original is not due
to bad faith on the part of the proponent/offeror. Proof of the due execution of the document and its
subsequent loss would constitute the basis for the introduction of secondary evidence, x x x.32 (Citation
omitted)

On the other hand, a canonical certificate of marriage is not a public document. As early as in the case
of United States v. Evangelista,33 it has been settled that church registries of births, marriages, and deaths
made subsequent to the promulgation of General Orders No. 68 and the passage of Act No. 190 are no
longer public writings, nor are they kept by duly authorized public officials.34 They are private writings and
their authenticity must therefore be proved as are all other private writings in accordance with the rules of
evidence.35 Accordingly, since there is no showing that the authenticity and due execution of the canonical
certificate of marriage of Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela was duly proven, it cannot be admitted in evidence.

Notwithstanding, it is well settled that other proofs can be offered to establish the fact of a solemnized
marriage.36 Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than
the marriage certificate. Hence, even a person's birth certificate may be recognized as competent evidence
of the marriage between his parents.37

Thus, in order to prove their legitimate filiation, the respondents presented their respective Certificates of
Live Birth issued by the National Statistics Office38 where Fidela signed as the Informant in item no. 17 of
both documents.

A perusal of said documents shows that the respondents were apparently born to the same parents — their
father's name is Anastacio Nator Macapaz, while their mother's maiden name is Fidela Overa Poblete. In
item no. 24 thereof where it asks: "24. DATE AND PLACE OF MARRIAGE OF PARENTS (For legitimate birth)"
it was stated therein that respondents' parents were married on "May 25, 1955 in Alang-alang, Leyte."39

The petitioner asserts that said documents do not conclusively prove the respondents' legitimate filiation,
albeit, without offering any evidence to the contrary. The certificates of live birth contain no entry stating
whether the respondents are of legitimate or illegitimate filiation, making said documents unreliable and
unworthy of weight and value in the determination of the issue at hand.

Moreover, the petitioner states that in the respondents' certificates of live birth, only the signature of Fidela
appears, and that they were not signed by Anastacio, Sr. She argues that the birth certificate must be
signed by the father in order to be competent evidence to establish filiation, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, invoking Roces v. Local Civil Registrar of Manila40 where it was held that a birth certificate not
signed by the alleged father is not competent evidence of paternity.41

The petitioner's contentions are untenable.

"A certificate of live birth is a public document that consists of entries (regarding the facts of birth) in public
records (Civil Registry) made in the performance of a duty by a public officer (Civil Registrar)."42Thus, being
public documents, the respondents' certificates of live birth are presumed valid, and are prima
facie evidence of the truth of the facts stated in them.43

"Prima facie evidence is defined as evidence good and sufficient on its face. Such evidence as, in the
judgment of the law, is sufficient to establish a given fact, or the group or chain of facts constituting the
party's claim or defense and which if not rebutted or contradicted, will remain sufficient."44

The petitioner's assertion that the birth certificate must be signed by the father in order to be a competent
evidence of legitimate filiation does not find support in law and jurisprudence. In fact, the petitioner's
reliance on Roces45 is misplaced considering that what was sought to be proved is the fact of paternity of an
illegitimate child, and not legitimate filiation.

Verily, under Section 5 of Act No. 3753,46 the declaration of either parent of the new-born legitimate child
shall be sufficient for the registration of his birth in the civil register, and only in the registration of birth of
an illegitimate child does the law require that the birth certificate be signed and sworn to jointly by the
parents of the infant, or only by the mother if the father refuses to acknowledge the child.
The pertinent portion of Section 5 of Act No. 3753 reads:

Sec. 5. Registration and Certification of Birth. - The declaration of the physician or midwife in attendance at
the birth or, in default thereof, the declaration of cither parent of the newborn child, shall be
sufficient for the registration of a birth in the civil register. Such declaration shall be exempt from the
documentary stamp tax and shall be sent to the local civil registrar not later than thirty days after the birth,
by the physician, or midwife in attendance at the birth or by either parent of the newly born child.

In such declaration, the persons above mentioned shall certify to the following facts: (a) date and hour of
birth; (b) sex and nationality of infant; (c) names, citizenship, and religion of parents or, in case the father
is not known, of the mother alone; (d) civil status of parents; (e) place where the infant was born; if) and
such other data as may be required in the regulations to be issued.

xxxx

In case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall be signed and sworn to jointly by the
parents of the infant or only the mother if the father refuses. In the latter case, it shall not be
permissible to state or reveal in the document the name of the father who refuses to acknowledge the child,
or to give therein any information by which such father could be identified, x x x (Emphasis Ours)

Forsooth, the Court finds that the respondents' certificates of live birth were duly executed consistent with
the provision of the law respecting the registration of birth of legitimate children. The fact that only the
signatures of Fidela appear on said documents is of no moment because Fidela only signed as
the declarant  or informant of the respondents' fact of birth as legitimate children.

Nonetheless, the respondents' certificates of live birth also intimate that Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela had
openly cohabited as husband and wife for a number of years, as a result of which they had two children —
the second child, Anastacio, Jr. being born more than three years after their first child, Alicia. Verily, such
fact is admissible proof to establish the validity of marriage. Court Resolution dated February 13, 2013 in
GR. No. 183262 entitled Social Security System (SSS) v. Lourdes S. Enobiso47 had the occasion to state:

Sarmiento v. CA is instructive anent the question of what other proofs can be offered to establish the fact of
a solemnized marriage, viz:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

In Trinidad vs. Court of Appeals, et al., this Court ruled that as proof of marriage may be presented:
a) testimony of a witness to the matrimony; b) the couple's public and open cohabitation as husband
and wife after the alleged wedlock; c) the birth and baptismal certificate of children born during such
union; and d) the mention of such nuptial in subsequent documents.48 (Citations omitted and emphasis
ours)
Moreover, in a catena of cases,49 it has been held that, "[p]ersons dwelling together in apparent matrimony
are presumed, in the absence of any counter presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact
married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus
hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law. A
presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is 'that a man and a woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.' Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio  —
Always presume marriage."50

Furthermore, as the established period of cohabitation of Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela transpired way before the
effectivity of the Family Code, the strong presumption accorded by then Article 220 of the Civil Code in favor
of the validity of marriage cannot be disregarded. Thus:

Art. 220. In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity of the family. Thus, every intendment of law
or facts leans toward the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds, the legitimacy of
children, the community of property during marriage, the authority of parents over their children, and the
validity of defense for any member of the family in case of unlawful aggression.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated October 20, 2009
and Resolution dated April 5, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 90907 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 185374, March 11, 2015

SIMPLICIA CERCADO-SIGA AND LIGAYA CERCADO-BELISON, Petitioners, v. VICENTE CERCADO,

JR., MANUELA C. ARABIT, LOLITA C. BASCO, MARIA C. ARALAR AND VIOLETA C.
BINADAS, Respondent.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

Not too long ago, we were called to pass upon the issue of the probative value of a marriage contract issued
by the church to prove the fact of marriage.1 Once again, it behooves upon us to determine whether the
marriage contract or Contrato Matrimonial, as it is denominated in this case, is sufficient to prove the fact of
marriage.

This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the 5 August 2008 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals and its 14
November 2008 Resolution3 in CA-G.R. CV No. 89585 reversing the 30 January 2007 Decision4 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Binangonan, Rizal, Branch 69, which nullified the Extrajudicial Settlement of
Estate of the Deceased Vicente Cercado, Sr. (Vicente) and Leonora Ditablan (Leonora).

In their Complaint against respondents Vicente Cercado, Jr., Manuela C. Arabit, Lolita Basco, Maria C.
Aralar, Violeta C. Binadas and the Registrar of Deeds of Binangonan, Rizal, petitioners Simplicia Cercado-
Siga (Simplicia) and Ligaya Cercado-Belison (Ligaya) claimed that they are the legitimate children of the late
Vicente and Benita Castillo (Benita), who were married last 9 October 1929 in Pililla, Rizal. Petitioners
alleged that during the lifetime of their parents, their father acquired by gratuitous title a parcel of land
identified as Lot No. 7627 Cad 609-D located at Barangay Kinagatan, Binangonan, Rizal with an area of
6,032 square meters and covered by Tax Declaration No. BIP-021-0253. Petitioners claimed that upon the
death of their father Vicente and by virtue of intestate succession, ownership over the subject land pertained
to them as heirs; that upon the death of Benita, her share was acquired by petitioners by operation of law.
Sometime in September 1998, petitioners read from a newspaper a notice that the estate of Vicente and a
certain Leonora Ditablan has been extrajudicially settled by their heirs, respondents herein. Upon
verification, petitioners were furnished a copy of the Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate (Deed) executed
and signed by respondents. Petitioners insist that Vicente and Leonora were not married or if they were so
married, then said marriage was null and void by reason of the subsisting marriage of their parents, Vicente
and Benita. Petitioners prayed for the declaration of the Deed as null and void; for the Office of the Register
of Deeds of Rizal to correct the entry on the marital status of Vicente; and for the payment of damages and
attorney’s fees.5

To prove the marriage between Vicente and Benita, petitioners presented the following documents: 1)
Contrato Matrimonial or the marriage contract;6 2) Certification dated 19 November 2000 issued by Iglesia
Filipina Independiente of its acceptance of original marriage contract;7 3) Certification of non-production of
record of birth of Simplicia issued by the Office of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Pililla, Rizal;8 4) Certificate
of Baptism of Simplicia;9 5) Certification of non-production of record of birth of Ligaya issued by the Office of
the Municipal Civil Registrar of Pililla, Rizal;10 and 6) Joint Affidavit of two disinterested persons attesting
that Ligaya is the child of Vicente and Benita.11

In their Answer, respondents alleged that they are the legitimate heirs of Vicente and Leonora, who were
married on 27 June 1977 as evidenced by a marriage certificate registered with the Local Civil Registrar of
Binangonan, Rizal. They averred that petitioners are not the real-parties-interest to institute the case
because they failed to present their birth certificates to prove their filiation to Vicente; that the marriage
between Vicente and Benita was not valid; that the document showing that Vicente was married to Benita is
not a certified true copy; and that they are now estopped by laches.12

On 30 January 2007, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of petitioners. The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

 1. The Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of the deceased Vicente Cercado, Sr. and Benita
Ditablan is hereby declared null and void and therefore no force and effect;

2. The [petitioners] and the [respondents] are entitled to share pro-indiviso in the subject
property as follows:

a. 2,639 square meters – For [petitioner] Simplicia Cercado-Siga;

b. 2,639 square meters – For [petitioner]Ligaya Cercado-Belison;
c. 150.8 square meters – For [respondent] Vicente Cercado, Jr.;
d. 150.8 square meters – For [respondent] Manuela C. Arabit;
e. 150.8 square meters – For [respondent]Lolita C. Basco;
f. 150.8 square meters – For [respondent]Maria C. Aralar; and
g. 150.8 square meters – For [respondent] Violeta C. Binadas;

3. In the event that the property has already been sold by the [respondents], they are hereby
ordered to pay the [petitioners] the amount equivalent to their share, at the time the
subject property was sold;

4. [respondents] to pay [petitioners] the amount of P30,000.00 attorney’s fees; and

5. To pay the cost of suit.13

The trial court reduced the issues into three: 1) whether the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of the
Deceased Vicente Cercado, Sr. and Leonora Ditablan-Cercado is valid; 2) whether petitioners are entitled to
recover from respondents their share in the property; and 3) whether petitioners are entitled to damages
and attorney’s fees.

In resolving the issues, the trial court relied on the following material findings:

The [petitioners] are the legitimate children of the late Vicente Cercado, Sr. and Benita Castillote/Castillo
who were married on October 9, 1929, as evidenced by a Contrato Matrimonial x x x.14

The trial court first upheld the validity of the marriage between Vicente and Benita and considered the
subsequent marriage between Vicente and Leonora as void and bigamous before it concluded that the
subject property was part of the conjugal property of Vicente and Benita. Consequently, the trial court held
that the Deed is null and void because it deprived Benita of her share of the property as surviving spouse
and impaired the shares and legitimes of petitioners.15 Thus, the trial court ruled that petitioners are entitled
to recover from respondents their share in the property subject of this action.

Respondents appealed from said judgment and assigned the following errors: 1) the trial court erred in
passing upon the validity of the marriage between Vicente and Leonora; 2) the trial court failed to consider
the probative value of the certificate of marriage between Vicente and Benita; 3) the trial court failed to
consider the probative value of the certificate of live birth to prove filiation; and 4) the trial court erred when
it relied on the baptismal certificate to prove filiation.16

The appellate court ruled that the trial court “can pass upon the issue of the validity of marriage of Vicente
and Leonora [because] no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity and the court
may pass upon the validity of a marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same, as long
as it is essential to the determination of the case before it.”17 However, the appellate court found that
the Contrato Matrimonial of Vicente and Benita, being a private document, was not properly authenticated,
hence, not admissible in evidence. Moreover, the appellate court did not consider the baptismal certificate
submitted by petitioners as conclusive proof of filiation. The Joint Affidavit executed by a certain Mario
Casale and Balas Chimlangco attesting to the birth of Ligaya to Vicente and Benita was not given credence
by the appellate court for being a hearsay evidence. For failure of petitioners to prove their cause of action
by preponderance of evidence, the appellate court reversed and set aside the Decision and Resolution of the
RTC.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the Court of Appeals denied it in its Resolution18 dated 14
November 2008.

Hence, the instant petition based on the following grounds:

THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT DID NOT CONSIDER
THE MARRIAGE CONTRACT AS A PUBLIC DOCUMENT – AND SO WITH ITS DUPLICATE ORIGINAL. THE
CONTRATO MATRIMONIAL BUTTRESSED A CERTIFICATION ISSUED BY THE IGLESIA FILIPINA
INDEPENDIENTE IS A PUBLIC DOCUMENT, [IT] BEING REQUIRED BY LAW TO BE KEPT NOT ONLY BY THE
CHURCH CONCERNED BUT BY THE OFFICE OF THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR – AND THE NATIONAL
STATISTIC OFFICE. AND THE DUPLICATE ORIGINAL COPY OF THE SAME IS ALSO CONSIDERED ORIGINAL
(SECTION 4, RULE 130) (AND HENCE ALSO A PUBLIC DOCUMENT UNDER THE RULE) ON EVIDENCE.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS, WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, COMMITTED ANOTHER REVERSIBLE ERROR, WHEN IT
DID NOT CONSIDER THE SAID DUPLICATE ORIGINAL OF THE SUBJECT MARRIAGE CONTRACT AS AN
ANCIENT DOCUMENT, BESIDES, THE SAID DOCUMENT, MORE THAN 30 YEARS IN EXISTENCE IS
CONSIDERED AS AN ANCIENT DOCUMENT, OUTSIDE THE NEEDED REQUIREMENT OF AUTHENTICATION
APPLICABLE TO PRIVATE DOCUMENT.

III

THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT IGNORED THE PROBATIVE VALUE OF A
BAPTISMAL CERTIFICATE AND PETITIONERS’ PARENTS YEARS [OF] COHABITATION. THE BAPTISMAL
CERTIFICATE WHILE NOT ADMISSIBLE AS DIRECT EVIDENCE FOR A MARITAL CONTRACT, THE SAME IS OF
STRONG EVIDEN[T]IARY SUPPORT TO THE EXISTENCE OF MARRIAGE OF [PETITIONERS’] PARENTS,
EVIDENCED BY EXHIBIT “A” AND EXHIBIT “A-1” AND BY THE CERTIFICATE OF ITS DESTRUCTION DURING
WORLD WAR II, ALSO, BY THE OPEN AND PUBLIC COHABITATION OF [PETITIONERS’] PARENTS, ADDED
THE PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF SUCH MARRIAGE, BOLSTERED BY THE OPEN AND PUBLIC COHABITATION.

IV

THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED ANOTHER REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT IGNORED THE WEIGHT AND
PROBATIVE VALUE OF THE JOINT AFFIDAVIT OF TWO (2) DISINTERESTED PERSONS. THE AFFIDAVIT OF
TWO (2) DISINTERESTED PERSONS BEING A REQUIREMENT BY THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR AND/OR THE
NSO TO SUPPORT THE EXISTENCE OF [PETITIONERS’] PARENTS MARRIAGE, AND IN THAT SINCE BECOMES
ALSO A PUBLIC DOCUMENT OR AT THE VERY LEAST, A CIRCUMSTANTIAL DOCUMENTARY PROOF, WHICH IF
ADDED TO THE BAPTISMAL CERTIFICATE EXHIBIT “H-1”, THE CONTRATO MATRIMONIAL AND THE
CERTIFICATION ISSUED BY THE IGLESIA FILIPINA INDEPENDIENTE TAKEN TOGETHER, PLUS THE OPEN
AND PUBLIC COHABITATION OF THE [PETITIONERS’] PARENTS MARRIAGE, AND THE PRESUMPTION OF
MARRIAGE PROVIDED FOR BY LAW, BANDED TOGETHER, ARE STRONG EVIDENCE TO PROVE THE
EXISTENCE OF [PETITIONERS’] PARENTS MARRIAGE.

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED ANOTHER YET SERIOUS REVERSIBLE ERROR, WHEN IT DID NOT
CONSIDER THE RESPONDENTS’ PARENTS’ MARRIAGE AS BIGAMOUS. THE NULLITY OF THE
[RESPONDENTS’] PARENTS’ MARRIAGE, FOR BEING BIGAMOUS, AND BEING THE INCIDENT NECESSARILY
INTERTWINED IN THE ISSUES PRESENTED, AND IT BEING A BIGAMOUS MARRIAGE, CAN BE COLLATERALLY
ATTACK[ED] OR SLAIN AT SIGHT WHEREVER AND WHENEVER ITS HEAD (THE [RESPONDENTS’] PARENTS
MARRIAGE) IS EXHIBITED.19

Petitioners insist that the Contrato Matrimonial is a public document because it is required by law to be
recorded in the local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office (NSO). Petitioners claim to have in their
possession a duplicate original of the Contrato Matrimonial which should be regarded as original. Petitioners
emphasize that the certification issued by the Iglesia Filipina Independiente Church, the joint affidavit of two
disinterested persons, the baptismal certificate presented by petitioners, and the open and public
cohabitation of petitioners’ parents are sufficient proof of their marriage.
Granting that the Contrato Matrimonial is a private document, petitioners maintain that said document
should be considered an ancient document which should be excluded from the requirement of
authentication.

Petitioners aver that the Court of Appeals should have considered the marriage between Vicente and
Leonora as bigamous.

In their Comment,20 respondents submit that the Contrato Matrimonial  is a private document and the fact
that marriages are required to be registered in the local civil registrar does not ipso facto make it a public
document. Respondents assert that the certificate of baptism is likewise a private document which tends to
prove only the administration of the sacrament of baptism and not the veracity of the declarations therein.
Respondents moreover refute the certification issued by the local civil registry arguing that it does not prove
filiation but only the fact that there is no record of Ligaya on file with said office.

With respect to the joint affidavit attesting to the marriage of Vicente and Benita, respondents assert that it
is inadmissible for being a hearsay evidence because the two affiants were never presented on the witness
stand.

The validity of the Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of Vicente and Leonora hinges on the existence of
the first marriage of Vicente and Benita.

In support of the existence of the alleged first marriage, petitioners presented a copy of the Contrato
Matrimonial.21 There is no dispute that said marriage contract was issued by Iglesia Filipina Independiente
church.

The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that it is a private document. As early as in the case of U.S. v.
Evangelista,22 it has been settled that church registries of births, marriages, and deaths made subsequent to
the promulgation of General Orders No. 6823 and the passage of Act No. 190 are no longer public writings,
nor are they kept by duly authorized public officials. They are private writings and their authenticity must
therefore be proved as are all other private writings in accordance with the rules of evidence.24

Under Section 20, Rule 132, Rules of Court,25 before a private document is admitted in evidence, it must be
authenticated either by the person who executed it, the person before whom its execution was
acknowledged, any person who was present and saw it executed, or who after its execution, saw it and
recognized the signatures, or the person to whom the parties to the instruments had previously confessed
execution thereof.26 As observed by the Court of Appeals, petitioners failed to present any one of such
witnesses. In fact, only Simplicia testified that her mother gave her the marriage contract. Unfortunately
however, she was not present during its execution nor could she identify Benita’s handwriting because
Simplicia admitted that she is illiterate.

Petitioners insist on the admissibility of the marriage contract on the ground that it is a duplicate original,
hence, the original need not be produced. We do not agree. We had previously ruled in Vallarta v. Court of
Appeals27 that “ a signed carbon copy or duplicate of a document executed at the same time as the original
is known as a duplicate original and maybe introduced in evidence without accounting for the non-
production of the original. But, an unsigned and uncertified document purporting to be a carbon copy is not
competent evidence. It is because there is no public officer acknowledging the accuracy of the copy.”28

Next, while petitioners concede that the marriage contract is a private document, they now argue that it is
an ancient document which need not be authenticated. Petitioners’ argument still has no merit. Section 21,
Rule 132 defines an ancient document as one that: 1) is more than 30 years old; 2) is produced from
custody in which it would naturally be found if genuine; and 3) is unblemished by any alteration or by any
circumstance of suspicion. The marriage contract was executed on 9 October 1929, hence it is clearly more
than 30-years old. On its face, there appears to be no evidence of alteration.

The marriage contract however does not meet the second requirement.

Ancient documents are considered from proper custody if they come from a place from which they might
reasonably be expected to be found. Custody is proper if it is proved to have had a legitimate origin or if the
circumstances of the particular case are such as to render such an origin probable. If a document is found
where it would not properly and naturally be, its absence from the proper place must be satisfactorily
accounted for.29
Gibson v. Poor30 cited the reason why it is required that an ancient document shall be produced from the
proper depository:

x x x that thereby credit is given to its genuineness. Were it not for its antiquity, and the presumption that
consequently arises that evidence of its execution cannot be obtained, it would have to be proved. It is not
that any one particular place of deposit can have more virtue in it than another, or make that true which is
false; but the fact of its coming from the natural and proper place, tends to remove presumptions of fraud,
and strengthens the belief in its genuineness. It may be false, and so shown, notwithstanding the
presumptions in its favor. If found where it would not properly and naturally be, its absence from the proper
place must be satisfactorily accounted for; but that being done and all suspicions against its genuineness
removed, we can discover no reason why it may not be read in evidence. The real question which is to affect
its consideration is, whether the instrument offered is genuine, and contains a true statement of what it
purports to. In the Bishop of Meath v. Marquis of Winchester, 2 Bing. 183, Tindal, C. J., speaking of ancient
documents, holds this language. "It is not necessary that they should be found in the best and most proper
place of deposit. If documents continued in such custody, there never would be any question as to their
authenticity; but it is when documents are found in other than their proper place of deposit, that the
investigation commences whether it was reasonable and natural under the circumstances in the particular
case, to expect that they should have been in the place where they are actually found; for it is obvious, that
while there can be only one place of deposit strictly and absolutely proper, there may be many and various
that are reasonable and probable, though differing in degree; some being more so, some less; and in those
cases the proposition to be determined is, whether the actual custody is so reasonably and probably
accounted for, that it impresses the mind with the conviction, that the instrument found in such custody
must be genuine." Some authorities hold, that the antiquity of the document is alone sufficient to entitle it
to be read, and that the other circumstances only go to its effect in evidence.

In Bartolome v. Intermediate Appellate Court,31 the Court ruled that the requirement of proper custody was
met when the ancient document in question was presented in court by the proper custodian thereof who is
an heir of the person who would naturally keep it. In this case however, we find that Simplicia also failed to
prove her filiation to Vicente and Benita. She merely presented a baptismal certificate which has long been
held “as evidence only to prove the administration of the sacrament on the dates therein specified, but not
the veracity of the declarations therein stated with respect to her kinsfolk. “The same is conclusive only of
the baptism administered, according to the rites of the Catholic Church, by the priest who baptized subject
child, but it does not prove the veracity of the declarations and statements contained in the certificate
concerning the relationship of the person baptized.”32 As such, Simplicia cannot be considered as an heir, in
whose custody the marriage contract is expected to be found. It bears reiteration that Simplicia testified
that the marriage contract was given to her by Benita but that Simplicia cannot make out the contents of
said document because she cannot read and write.

On the other hand, the document presented to prove Ligaya’s kinship is a Joint Affidavit executed by two
persons to the effect that she was born to Vicente and Benita. These two affiants were never presented in
court. Thus, their statement is tantamount to hearsay evidence.

Petitioners also presented certifications from the local civil registrar certifying that the records of birth from
1930 to 1946 were destroyed by fire and/or war. In said documents, there contains an advice that
petitioners may make a further verification with the NSO because the local civil registrar submits a copy of
the birth certificate of every registered birth with the NSO. The advice was not heeded. Petitioners failed to
present a certification from NSO whether such records do exist or not.

While we acknowledge the difficulty of obtaining old records, we simply cannot ignore the rules on evidence,
specifically the rule on authentication with respect to private documents which is precisely in place to
prevent the inclusion of spurious documents in the body of evidence that will determine the resolutions of an
issue.

Considering that petitioners failed to prove the validity of the marriage between Vicente and Benita, it
follows that they do not have a cause of action in the case for the declaration of nullity of the Extrajudicial
Settlement of the Estate of Vicente and Leonora.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The 5 August 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 89585 reversing and setting aside the 30 January 2007 Decision and 16 April 2007 Resolution of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 69 of Binangonan, Rizal in Civil Case No. R-98-047 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

SPS. EDGARDO AND G.R. No. 168263

NATIVIDAD FIDEL,  
Petitioners,  
  Present:
   
  QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
- versus - YNARES-SANTIAGO,*
  CARPIO MORALES,
  TINGA, and
  VELASCO, JR., JJ.
HONORABLE COURT OF  
APPEALS, HEIRS OF THE LATE  
PRIMITIVO ESPINELI, namely, Promulgated:
JOSEFINA, PATRICIO and  
LEONARDO, all surnamed July 21, 2008
ESPINELI,  
Respondents.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:

This petition for review seeks to reverse the Decision[1] dated November 22,

2004 and the Resolution[2] dated May 27, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 71996. The appellate court had affirmed with modification the
Decision[3] dated February 20, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 15,
Naic, Cavite in Civil Case No. NC-652-95, annulling the sale in favor of the
petitioners Edgardo and Natividad Fidel of a 150-square meter parcel of
unregistered land located at San Miguel Street, Indang, Cavite and owned by the
late Vicente Espineli.

The facts, culled from the records, are as follows:

On February 21, 1995, respondents filed a Complaint[4] for Annulment of

Sale, Tax Declaration, Reconveyance with Damages against the
petitioners Edgardo and Natividad Fidel and Guadalupe Espineli-Cruz before the
RTC, Branch 15, Naic, Cavite. In their complaint, respondents alleged that they are
compulsory heirs of Primitivo Espineli, the only child of Vicente and his first wife,
Juliana Asas. Respondents further alleged that they discovered that the
abovementioned parcel of land owned by the late Vicente was sold on October 7,
1994 to the petitioners despite the fact that Vicente died intestate on June 4, 1941.
They argue that the sale is void and simulated because Vicentes signature
appearing on the deed of sale is a forgery.

In her Answer,[5] Guadalupe, the only surviving child of Vicente and his

second wife, Pacencia Romea, denied any knowledge of the deed of sale allegedly
signed by Vicente. She, however, admitted selling the property but by virtue of
another deed of sale signed by her as heir of Vicente and in representation of her
nephews and nieces who are children of her deceased siblings, all children of
Vicente and Pacencia. She further denied knowledge of Vicentes alleged first
marriage with Juliana Asas. She argues that the heirs of Primitivo must first
establish their filiation from Vicente, prior to instituting the complaint for
annulment of sale. Guadalupe further stresses that the petitioners Fidel have been
able to register the sale of the property and to obtain Tax Declaration No.
16304[6] in their name.

On February 20, 2001, the RTC ruled in respondents favor. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and
against the defendants as follows:

1.      Ordering the annulment of the sale in favor of the defendants spouses

Edgardo and Natividad Fidel of the property in litigation;

2.      Ordering the Regis[ter] of Deeds and/or the Provincial Assessor of

Cavite to cancel the registration and/or Tax Declaration No. 16304,
Series of 1995;

3.      Ordering the defendants spouses Edgardo and Natividad Fidel to cause

the reconveyance of the property to Vicente Espineli and/or his heirs
for disposition subject to the laws of intestacy;

4.      Ordering the defendants jointly and severally, to pay the plaintiffs the
amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages and P30,000.00 as exemplary
damages;
 5.      Ordering the defendants jointly and severally, to reimburse the
plaintiffs their expenses for litigation in the amount of P50,000.00 as
attorneys fees;

6.      And to pay costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.[7]

On November 22, 2004, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the
RTC Decision as follows:
Accordingly, the subject property should be reconveyed to the Estate of
the late Vicente Espineli but the proper proceedings should be instituted to
determine the latters heirs, and if appropriate, to partition the subject property.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed DECISION is hereby

AFFIRMED subject to the foregoing MODIFICATION. No costs.

SO ORDERED.[8]

Thus, the instant petition by the spouses Edgardo and Natividad Fidel,
alleging that the appellate court:
I.
ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT,
CONSIDERING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HAVE NO LEGAL
PERSONALITY TO INSTITUTE THE ACTION. PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
MUST FIRST ESTABLISH THE SAME IN PROPER ACTION TO PROVE
THEIR FILIATION. LACK OF SUCH DETERMINATION ON THE ISSUE OF
FILIATION ON SEPARATE AND INDEPENDENT ACTION, PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS HAVE NO LEGAL PERSONALITY TO INSTITUTE THE
ACTION FOR ANNULMENT OF SALE, CONVEYANCE AND DAMAGES.

II.
LIKEWISE COMMITTED ERROR IN RECOGNIZING AND/OR ADMITTING
THE BAPTISMAL CERTIFICATE OF PRIMITIVO ESPINELI AS PROOF OF
FILIATION THAT [VICENTE ESPINELI IS HIS FATHER].

III.
ERRED IN AWARDING DAMAGES AND ATTORNEYS FEES,
CONSIDERING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS MUST FIRST INSTITUTE
A SEPARATE ACTION TO PROVE THEIR FILIATION.[9]
 Respondents for their part raise the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ARE SUFFICIENTLY
CLOTHED WITH LEGAL PERSONALITY TO FILE THE PRESENT ACTION
FOR ANNULMENT OF SALE, RECONVEYANCE WITH DAMAGES
WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO INSTITUTING A SEPARATE ACTION TO
ESTABLISH FILIATION AND HEIRSHIP IN A SEPARATE [PROCEEDING].

II.
ASSUMING PETITIONERS HAVE PERSONALITY TO RAISE THE ISSUE
OF FILIATION, WHETHER OR NOT THE BAPTISMAL CERTIFICATE OF
PRIMITIVO ESPINELI IS VALID AND COMPETENT EVIDENCE OF HIS
FILIATION AS CHILD OF VICENTE ESPINELI.

III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE SALE OF SUBJECT PROPERTY BY
GUADALUPE TO PETITIONERS FIDEL IS VALID UNDER THE
PRINCIPLE OF BUYER IN GOOD FAITH.

IV.
WHETHER OR NOT THE AWARD OF DAMAGES AND ATTORNEYS FEES
TO PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HAS NO BASIS SINCE A [SEPARATE]
ACTION TO PROVE THEIR FILIATION SHOULD FIRST BE FILED.[10]

Briefly stated, the issues for our resolution are: (1) Do respondents have the
legal personality to file the complaint for annulment of title? (2) Is the baptismal
certificate of Primitivo valid and competent evidence to prove his filiation by
Vicente? (3) Are petitioners buyers in good faith? and (4) Is the award of attorneys
fees and damages to respondents proper?

At the outset, we entertain no doubt that the first deed of sale, allegedly
signed by Vicente, is void because his signature therein is a patent
forgery. Records show he died in 1941, but the deed of sale was allegedly signed
on October 7, 1994. Article 1409 of the Civil Code of the Philippines states:
Art. 1409. The following contracts are inexistent and void from the
beginning:

(1) Those whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good

customs, public order, or public policy;

(2) Those which are absolutely simulated or fictitious;

 (3) Those whose cause or object did not exist at the time of the
transaction;

(4) Those whose object is outside the commerce of men;

(5) Those which contemplate an impossible service;

(6) Those where the intention of the parties relative to the principal object
of the contract cannot be ascertained;

(7) Those expressly prohibited or declared void by law.

These contracts cannot be ratified. Neither can the right to set up the

defense of illegality be waived. (Emphasis supplied.)

As for the deed of sale signed by Guadalupe as heir of Vicente and in

representation of her nephews and nieces, petitioners insist that the sale is valid
because respondents have no legal personality to file the complaint, the latter not
having established their filiation by Vicente. They argue that respondents first need
to establish their filiation by Vicente prior to instituting a complaint in a separate
action, and not in the present action. On the other hand, respondents contend that
their filiation was established by the baptismal certificate of their father, Primitivo,
showing that Primitivo is the son of Vicente.

On this point we rule in favor of respondents.

While respondents principal action was for the annulment of the sale and not
an action to impugn ones legitimacy and that ones legitimacy can be questioned
only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, it is necessary to pass
upon the relationship of respondents to the deceased Vicente for the purpose of
determining what legal rights respondents have in the property. In fact, the issue of
whether or not respondents are heirs of Vicente was squarely raised by petitioners
in their Pre-Trial Brief[11] filed on April 26, 1995, before the trial court, hence they
are now estopped from assailing the trial courts ruling on respondents status. In the
similar case of Fernandez v. Fernandez,[12]the Supreme Court held:
It must be noted that the respondents principal action was for the
declaration of absolute nullity of two documents, namely: deed of extra-judicial
partition and deed of absolute sale, and not an action to impugn ones
legitimacy. The respondent court ruled on the filiation of petitioner Rodolfo
Fernandez in order to determine Rodolfos right to the deed of extra-judicial
partition as the alleged legitimate heir of the spouses Fernandez. While we are
aware that ones legitimacy can be questioned only in a direct action
 seasonably filed by the proper party, this doctrine has no application in the
instant case considering that respondents claim was that petitioner Rodolfo
was not born to the deceased spouses Jose and Generosa Fernandez; we do
not have a situation wherein they (respondents) deny that Rodolfo was a child of
their uncles wife. . . .

xxxx

Thus, it is necessary to pass upon the relationship of petitioner

Rodolfo Fernandez to the deceased spouses Fernandez for the purpose of
determining what legal right Rodolfo has in the property subject of the extra-
judicial partition. In fact, the issue of whether or not Rodolfo Fernandez was the
son of the deceased spouses Jose Fernandez and Generosa de Venecia was
squarely raised by petitioners in their pre-trial brief filed before the trial court,
hence they are now estopped from assailing the trial courts ruling on Rodolfos
status.[13] (Emphasis supplied.)

Petitioners nonetheless contend that Primitivos baptismal certificate is

neither a public document nor a conclusive proof of the legitimate filiation by
Vicente of Primitivo, the respondents father. We find petitioners contention
lacking in merit, hence we reject it.

Records show that Primitivo was born in 1895. At that time, the only records
of birth are those which appear in parochial records. This Court has held that as to
the nature and character of the entries contained in the parochial books and the
certificates thereof issued by a parish priest, the same have not lost their character
of being public documents for the purpose of proving acts referred to therein,
inasmuch as from the time of the change of sovereignty in the Philippines to the
present day, no law has been enacted abolishing the official and public character of
parochial books and entries made therein. Parish priests continue to be the legal
custodians of the parochial books kept during the former sovereignty, and as such
they may issue certified copies of the entries contained therein in the same manner
as do keepers of archives.[14]

The baptismal certificate of Primitivo is, therefore, a valid and competent

evidence to prove his filiation by Vicente.

Accordingly, we uphold the Court of Appeals ruling that the subject

property should be reconveyed to the Estate of the late Vicente Espineli and proper
proceedings be instituted to determine the latters heirs, and, if appropriate, to
partition the subject property.
 Anent the third issue, can petitioners be considered buyers in good
faith? Our ruling on this point is: no, they cannot be considered buyers in good
faith. For we find that petitioners were only able to register the sale of the property
and Tax Declaration No. 16304 in their name; they did not have
a Torrens title. Unlike a title registered under the Torrens System, a tax declaration
does not constitute constructive notice to the whole world. The issue of good faith
or bad faith of a buyer is relevant only where the subject of the sale is a registered
land but not where the property is an unregistered land.[15]

However, on the issue of actual and moral damages and attorneys fees
awarded by the trial court to respondents, we find the award bereft of factual
basis. A party is entitled to an adequate compensation for such pecuniary loss or
losses actually suffered by him which he has duly proven. Such damages, to be
recoverable, must not only be capable of proof, but must actually be proved with a
reasonable degree of certainty. Courts cannot simply rely on speculation,
conjecture or guesswork in determining the fact and amount of damages. Attorneys
fees should therefore be deleted for lack of factual basis and legal justification.
[16]
 Moral damages should likewise not be awarded since respondents did not show
proof of moral suffering, mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
nor wounded feelings and social humiliation.[17]

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision

dated November 22, 2004 and the Resolution dated May 27, 2005 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71996 are AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that the award of moral and exemplary damages as well as
attorneys fees be DELETED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 204494

JO-ANN DIAZ-SALGADO and husband DR. GERARD C. SALGADO, Petitioners 

vs.
LUIS G. ANSON, Respondent

DECISION

REYES, J.:

Before the Court is the petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing
1

the Decision dated August 6, 2012 and the Resolution  dated November 26, 2012 of the Court of
2 3
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 92989. The CA affirmed the Decision  dated July 23, 2007 of the
4

Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 155, in Civil Case No. 69611.

The Facts

On September 5, 2003, Luis Anson (Luis) filed a Complaint  docketed as Civil Case No. 69611
5

against Jo-Ann Diaz-Salgado (Jo-Ann) and Gerard Salgado (Gerard) (Spouses Salgado) along with
Maria Luisa Anson-Maya (Maria Luisa) and Gaston Maya (Spouses Maya), seeking the annulment
of the three Unilateral Deeds of Sale  dated January 23, 2002 and the Deed of Extra-Judicial
6

Settlement of Estate of the Deceased Severina De Asis dated October 25, 2002. 7

Luis alleged in his complaint that he is the surv1vmg spouse of the late Severina de Asis-Anson
(Severina). They were married in a civil ceremony on December 28, 1966. Prior to the celebration of
their marriage, Severina gave birth to their daughter, Maria Luisa on December 30, 1965 while Jo-
Ann is Severina's daughter from a previous relationship. 8

During his marital union with Severina, they acquired several real properties located in San Juan,
Metro Manila, covered by the following Transfer Certificate of Title/s (TCT/s):

1. TCT No. 20618/T-104 (now TCT No. 11105-R),

2. TCTNo. 60069/T-301(nowTCTNo. 11106-R),

3. TCTNo. 5109/T-26 (nowTCTNo. 11107),

4. TCT No. 8478-R/T-43 (now TCT No. 11076-R),

5. TCT No. 44637/T-224-II (now TCT No. 11078-R), and

6. TCT No. 8003/T-41 (now TCT No. 11077-R). 9

According to Luis, because there was no marriage settlement between him and Severina, the above-
listed properties pertain to their conjugal partnership. But without his knowledge and consent,
Severina executed three separate Unilateral Deeds of Sale on January 23, 2002 transferring the
properties covered by TCT Nos. 20618, 60069 and 5109 in favor of Jo-Ann, who secured new
certificates of title over the said properties.  When Severina died on September 21, 2002,  Maria
10 11

Luisa executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of Deceased Severina de Asis on

October 25, 2002, adjudicating herself as Severina's sole heir. She secured new TCTs over the
properties covered by TCT Nos. 8478-R, 44637 and 8003. 12

Luis claimed that because of the preceding acts, he was divested of his lawful share in the conjugal
properties and of his inheritance as a compulsory heir of Severina. 13

In Jo-Ann's Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim,  which the trial court considered as the Answer
14

of her husband, Gerard,  Jo-Ann countered that she was unaware of any marriage contracted by her
15

mother with Luis. She knew however that Luis and Severina had a common-law relationship which
they both acknowledged and formally terminated through a Partition Agreement  executed in
16

November 1980. This was implemented through another Partition Agreement  executed in April
17

1981. Thus, Luis had already received the properties apportioned to him by virtue of the said
agreement while the properties subject of the Unilateral Deeds of Sale were acquired exclusively by
Severina. The TCTs covering Severina's properties were under Severina's name only and she was
described therein as single without reference to any husband. 18

Meanwhile, the Spouses Maya corroborated the Spouses Salgado's stance in their Answer,  stating 19

that Maria Luisa is also not aware that Luis and Severina were married. She is cognizant of the fact
that Luis and Severina lived together as common-law husband and wife - a relationship which was
terminated upon execution of a Partition Agreement. In the Partition Agreement, Luis and Severina
were described as single and they acknowledged that they were living together as common-law
spouses. They also mutually agreed to the partition of the properties they owned in common. Hence,
Luis already received his share in the properties  and is estopped from denying the same.  After the
20 21

termination of their cohabitation in 1980, Luis went to United States of America (USA), married one
Teresita Anson and had a son with her; while Maria Luisa was left under the guardianship and
custody of Severina.  It was after the death of Severina that Maria Luisa executed a Deed of Extra-
22

Judicial Settlement of the Estate of the Deceased Severina de Asis on October 25, 2002. The
Spouses Maya were also able to obtain a Certificate of No Record of Marriage  (between Luis and
23

Severina) from the Office the Civil Registrar General of the National Statistics Office. 24

Trial ensued thereafter. After Luis gave his testimony and presented documentary evidence which
included a certified true copy of his marriage contract with Severina,  the Spouses Salgado and
25

Spouses Maya filed their respective Demurrers to Evidence.  The Spouses Salgado disputed the
26

validity of Luis and Severina's marriage on the ground of lack of marriage license as borne out by the
marriage contract. They further claimed that Luis himself disclosed on cross-examination that he did
not procure a marriage license prior to the alleged marriage.  Luis had also admitted the existence,
27

due execution and authenticity of the Partition Agreement.  The logical conclusion therefore is that
28

the properties disposed in favor of Jo-Ann were owned by Severina as her own, separate and
exclusive properties, which she had all the right to dispose of, without the conformity of Luis. 29

On February 16, 2006, the trial court denied both demurrers, explaining that the sufficiency of
evidence presented by Luis is evidentiary in nature and may only be controverted by evidence to the
contrary.  The Spouses Salgado and Spouses Maya filed their separate motions for
30

reconsideration,  which the trial court denied.  Consequently, both the Spouses Salgado and
31 32

Spouses ·Maya filed their respective petitions for certiorari with the CA.  Meanwhile, the Spouses
33

Salgado were deemed to have waived their presentation of evidence when they failed to attend the
scheduled hearings before the trial court. 34

Resolving the petition for certiorari on the demurrer to evidence filed by the Spouses Salgado, the
CA Second Division directed the trial court "to properly resolve with deliberate dispatch the demurrer
to evidence in accordance with Section 3, Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure by stating
clearly and distinctly the reason therefor on the basis of [the Spouses Salgado's] proffered
evidence[,]"  whereas the CA Ninth Division dismissed the petition of the Spouses Maya and
35

ordered the trial court to decide the case with deliberate dispatch. 36

In an Order  dated July 16, 2007, the RTC, in compliance with the order of the CA to resolve the
37

demurrer to evidence in more specific terms, denied the twin demurrers to evidence for lack of merit
and held that the totality of evidence presented by Luis has sufficiently established his right to obtain
the reliefs prayed for in his complaint.

Ruling of the RTC

On July 23, 2007, the RTC rendered its Decision  in favor of Luis, holding that the marriage between
38

Luis and Severina was valid. It noted that the marriage contract, being a public document, enjoys the
presumption of regularity in its execution and is conclusive as to the fact of marriage.  The trial court
39
also based its ruling in Geronimo v. CA where the validity of marriage was upheld despite the
40

absence of the marriage license number on the marriage contract.  The trial court thus declared that
41

the properties covered by the Unilateral Deeds of Sale were considered conjugal which cannot be
disposed of by Severina without the consent of her husband, Luis. 42

The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of [Luis] and against [the
Spouses Salgado] ordering as follows:

1. ANNULMENT, VOIDING, SETTING ASIDE and DECLARING OF NO FORCE AND EFFECT of

the three (3) Unilateral Deeds of Sale, all dated January 23, 2002 executed by [Severina] in favor of
[Jo-Ann];

2. ANNULMENT, VOIDING, SETTING ASIDE and DECLARING OF NO FORCE AND EFFECT of

the three (3) [TCT] Nos. 11107-R, 11105-R and 11106-R covering the subject properties, all issued
in the name of [Jo-Ann] by the Registry of Deeds for San Juan, Metro Manila;

3. RESTITUTION of all properties covered by TCT Nos. 11107-R, 11105-R and 11106-R (formerly
TCT Nos. 5109, 20618 and 60069, respectively) to the conjugal community of properties between
[Luis] and [Severina].

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED. 43

On November 17, 2008, the RTC rendered another Decision  which ordered the "ANNULMENT,
44

VOIDING, SETTING ASIDE and DECLARING OF NO FORCE AND EFFECT the Deed of Extra-
Judicial Settlement of Estate of the Deceased Severina De Asis executed by [Maria Luisa] dated
October 25, 2002 x x x."  The RTC also ordered the cancellation of new TCTs issued by virtue of the
45

said Deeds. 46

The Spouses Salgado and the Spouses Maya filed their respective motions for reconsideration on
September 11, 2007  and August 28, 2007,  respectively, which the RTC denied in the Omnibus
47 48

Order  dated October 30, 2007 for lack of merit. This prompted the Spouses Salgado and Spouses
49

Maya to file their separate notices of appeal before the CA on December 13, 2007  and April 24,
50

2009,  respectively.
51

Ruling of the CA

The Spouses Maya and Luis thereafter entered into a Compromise Agreement  which was approved
52

by the CA in its Decision  dated October 26, 2011. This resulted in the termination of the Spouses
53

Maya's appeal. 54

On August 6, 2012, the CA rendered a Decision,  dismissing the appeal of the Spouses Salgado.
55

The fallo reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the appeal interposed by [the Spouses Salgado] is DISMISSED. The Decision dated

July 23, 2007 of the [RTC] of Pasig is AFFIRMED IN TOTO.

SO ORDERED. 56
The CA sustained the ruling of the RTC for the simple reason that the Spouses Salgado did not
present and formally offer any testimonial and documentary evidence to controvert the evidence
presented by Luis.  The CA further explained that "the best evidence to establish the absence of a
57

marriage license is a certification from the Local Civil Registrar that the parties to the Marriage
Contract did not secure a marriage license or at the very least a certification from the said office that
despite diligent search, no record of application for or a marriage license was issued on or before
December 28, 1966 in favor of Luis and Severina. Again, Spouses Salgado failed to prove the same
by their failure to secure the said certification and present evidence during the trial." 58

The Spouses Salgado and Spouses Maya filed a motion for reconsideration  which the CA denied
59

through its Resolution  dated November 26, 2012.

60

The Spouses Salgado elevated the matter before the Court raising the core issue of whether the CA
committed reversible error in affirming the RTC decision which declared the marriage between Luis
and Severina valid and the subject lands as conjugal properties.

Ruling of the Court

The Spouses Salgado argue that the marriage between Luis and Severina is null and void for want
of marriage license based on the Marriage Contract  presented by Luis which has adequately
61

established its absence. 62

Luis, in his Comment,  opposes the filing of the present petition on the ground that it raises a
63

question of fact, which cannot be raised in a petition for review on certiorari. He also countered that
the Spouses Salgado did not present any evidence to support their theory.  If the existence of the
64

marriage license is in issue, it is incumbent upon the Spouses Salgado to show the lack of marriage
license by clear and convincing evidence. 65

Before proceeding to the substantive issues brought in this petition, the Court shall first tackle the
procedural issue raised by Luis which pertains to the propriety of the filing of this petition for review
on certiorari.

Contrary to Luis' contention, the present petition raises a question of law, mainly, whether the
absence of a marriage license may be proven on the basis of a marriage contract which states that
no marriage license was exhibited to the solemnizing officer on account of the marriage being of an
exceptional character.

In any event, while the jurisdiction of the Court in cases brought before it from the appellate court is,
as a general rule, limited to reviewing errors of law, there are exceptions  recognized by the Court,
66

such as when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which,
if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. 67

Since the marriage between Luis and Severina was solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code, the applicable law to determine its validity is the Civil Code, the law in effect at the time of its
celebration  on December 28, 1966.
68

A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53  of the Civil Code, and the
69

absence thereof, save for marriages of exceptional character,  renders the marriage void ab
70

initio pursuant to Article 80(3 ). It sets forth:

Art. 80. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
 xxxx

(3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of exceptional character;

x x x x. (Emphasis ours)

"Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are covered by Chapter 2, Title III,
comprising Articles 72 to 79. To wit, these marriages are: (1) marriages in articulo mortis or at the
point of death during peace or war, (2) marriages in remote places, (3) consular marriages, (4)
ratification of marital cohabitation, (5) religious ratification of a civil marriage, (6) Mohammedan or
pagan marriages, and (7) mixed marriages."  To reiterate, in any of the aforementioned marriages of
71

exceptional character, the requirement of a valid marriage license is dispensed with.

The marriage is not of an

exceptional character

A cursory examination of the marriage contract of Luis and Severina reveals that no marriage
license number was indicated therein. It also appears therein that no marriage license was exhibited
to the solemnizing officer with Article 77 of Republic Act No. 386 (Civil Code) being cited as the
reason therefor. The pertinent portion of the marriage contract is quoted as follows:

[A]nd I further certify that Marriage License No. x x x issued at x x x on x x x, 19 x x x in favor of, said
parties, was exhibited to me or no marriage license was exhibited to me, this marriage being of an
exceptional character performed under Art. 77 of Rep. Act 386; x x x. 72

The reference to Article 77 of the Civil Code in the marriage contract is not dismissible. Being a
public document, the marriage contract is not only a prima facie proof of marriage, but is also
a prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. This is pursuant to Section 44, Rule 130 of the
1997 Rules of Court, which reads:

Sec. 44. Entries in official records. - Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by
a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by
law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.

Consequently, the entries made in Luis and Severina's marriage contract are prima facie proof that
at the time of their marriage, no marriage license was exhibited to the solemnizing officer for the
reason that their marriage is of an exceptional character under Article 77 of the Civil Code.

Article 77 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 77. In case two persons married in accordance with law desire to ratify their union in conformity
with the regulations, rites, or practices of any church, sect, or religion, it shall no longer be necessary
to comply with the requirements of Chapter 1 of this Title and any ratification made shall merely be
considered as a purely religious ceremony.

The foregoing provision pertains to a religious ceremony performed with the purpose of ratifying a
marriage which was solemnized civilly. In the eyes of the law, the marriage already exists; the
subsequent ceremony is undertaken merely to conform to religious practices. Thus, the parties are
exempted from complying with the required issuance of marriage license insofar as the subsequent
religious ceremony is concerned. For this exemption to be applicable, it is sine qua non that: (1) the
parties to the religious ceremony must already be married to each other in accordance with law
(civil marriage); and (2) the ratifying ceremony is purely religious in nature.

Applied to the present case however, it is clear that Luis and Severina were not married to each
other prior to the civil ceremony officiated on December 28, 1966 - the only date of marriage
appearing on the records. This was also consistently affirmed by Luis in open court:

Atty. Francisco:

Q- You testified that you have a Marriage Contract marked as Exhibit A certifying that you were
married to the late [Severina].

A- Yes, sir.

Q- Do you recall when this marriage took place?

A- As far as I can recall it was sometime two (2) days before my daughter get (sic) one (1) year
old. That was 1966 December something like 28, because she was born December 30, the death
of Jose Rizal. I can remember 1965. So, before she turned one (1) year old two (2) days before
we got married here in San Juan.

Q- So, when was she born if you can recall?

A- Maria Luisa was born on December 30, 1965.

Q- If it is two (2) days before, it should be 1966?

A- Yes, sir.

Q- If you can recall who solemnized the marriage?

A- It was the late Mayor Ebona of San Juan. 73

xxxx

[Atty. Valenton:] x x x You alleged during your direct examination that you were married to
[Severina]?

A: Yes sir.

Q: When do you say you marr[ied] her?

A: Two (2) days before our daughter turned one year old, so that is December 28,
1966. (Emphasis ours)
74

Being that the ceremony held on December 28, 1966 was the only marriage ceremony between the
parties and this was not solemnized pursuant to any ratifying religious rite, practice or regulation but
a civil one officiated by the mayor, this marriage does not fall under the purview of Article 77 of the
Civil Code. It is evident that the twin requirements of the provision, which are: prior civil marriage
between the parties and a ratifying religious ceremony, were not complied with. There is no prior
ceremony to ratify. Thus, this marriage is not of an exceptional character and a marriage license is
required for Luis and Severina's marriage to be valid.

Absence of marriage license

The next issue to be resolved is: who has the burden of proving the existence or non-existence of
the marriage license?

Since there was an unequivocal declaration on the marriage contract itself that no marriage license
was exhibited to the solemnizing officer at the time of marriage owing to Article 77 of the Civil Code,
when in truth, the said exception does not obtain in their case, it is the burden of Luis to prove that
they secured the required marriage license.

However, instead of proving that a marriage license was indeed issued to them at the time of their
marriage, Luis relied mainly on the presumption of validity of marriage. This presumption does not
hold water vis-a-vis a prima facie evidence (marriage contract), which on its face has established
that no marriage license was presented to the solemnizing officer. If there was a marriage license
issued to Luis and Severina, its absence on the marriage contract was not explained at all. Neither
the original nor a copy of the marriage license was presented. No other witness also testified to
prove its existence, whereas Luis is not the best witness to testify regarding its issuance. He
admitted that he did not apply for one, and is uncertain about the documents they purportedly
submitted in the Municipal Hall. As he revealed in his testimony:

ATTY. VALENTON:

Q- How did you prepare for the alleged wedding that took place between you and [Severina]?

A TTY. FRANCISCO: May I know the materiality, Your Honor?

ATTY. VALENTON: We are exploring as to whether there was really a wedding that took place, Your
Honor.

COURT: Answer.

What preparations were done?

A- There was no preparation because we were just visitors of the Mayor during that time and
the Mayor is a close friend of ours.  So, when he knew that we are traveling, we are going to
1âwphi1

Thailand with the invitation of a friend to work with him in Thailand, he told us you better get
married first before you travel because your daughter will be illegitimate. 75

xxxx

ATTY. VALENTON:

Q- Do you remember having applied for a marriage license?

A- We did not.

Q- So, you are telling us that there is no marriage license?

A- No.

CLARIFICATORY QUESTIONS BY THE COURT TO THE WITNESS

[Q-] There was no marriage license?

A- Well, when you get married you have to get a marriage license.

COURT:

Not necessarily.

A- But, I don't know whether there was an application for the license because it was at the house of
the Mayor.

COURT:

But in this particular case before you went to the house of the Mayor for the solemnization of
your marriage, did you apply for a marriage license?

A- No.  76

x x xx

RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION OF

[LUIS]:

Q- Mr. Anson, a while ago during your cross-examination you were asked by counsel as well
as a question was raised by the Honorable Court whether or not you applied for a marriage
license when you got married on December 28, 1966 allegedly with [Severina]. Can you tell
the Court what you meant by that?

COURT:

By what?

ATTY. FRANCISCO:

When he was asked, Your Honor, by the Honorable Court.

COURT:

Whether he applied?

ATTY. FRANCISCO:

Whether he applied for a marriage license prior to the solemnization of the marriage, you answered
No.
WITNESS:

I did not apply for such, all what I know is to sign something affidavit or application before we
went to the house of the Mayor to get marry (sic) but that was about - - I cannot recall if that
past (sic) a week or 2 days or 3 days ago.

ATTY. FRANCISCO:

Q- You mentioned, we signed an affidavit or application, when you used we, whom are you referring
to?

A- [Severina].

Q- And, yourself?

A- Yes.

Q- In your recollection, where did you file those affidavits with [Severina] before the
solemnization of the marriage?

A- It was in the Municipal Hall. I do not know whether that was the Registrar, Office of the
[M]ayor or Office of the Chief of Police.  I cannot recall. It is inside the Munisipyo of San
1awp++i1

Juan.

Q- Who made you sign that Affidavit?

A- The Chief of Police whom we get (sic) to be (sic) witness for our marriage. They let us signed
(sic) an application or affidavit. I cannot recall what it is.  (Emphasis ours)
77

In upholding the supposed validity of the marriage, the RTC and the CA failed to consider the glaring
statements in the marriage contract that no marriage license was exhibited to the solemnizing officer
and that the marriage is of an exceptional character under Article 77 of the Civil Code, the latter
statement being fallacious. Both the RTC and CA upheld the fact of marriage based on the marriage
contract but simply glossed over the part stating that the marriage is of an exceptional character. It is
inevitable to deduce that this is not a case of mere non-recording of the marriage license number on
the marriage contract, as was in Geronimo. 78

The factual antecedents in Geronimo are not on all fours with the case under review, hence,
inapplicable. In Geronimo, despite the absence of the marriage license number on the marriage
contract presented by therein petitioner (brother of the deceased), there was no statement therein
that the marriage is of an exceptional character. Various witnesses also testified that the deceased
and her husband were indeed married. More importantly, the husband of the deceased was able to
produce a copy of the marriage contract on file with the National Archives and Records Section
where the marriage license number appears.

"[T]o be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the law requires that the
absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very
least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was
issued to the parties."  Considering that the absence of the marriage license is apparent on the
79

marriage contract itself, with a false statement therein that the marriage is of an exceptional
character, and no proof to the contrary was presented, there is no other plausible conclusion other
than that the marriage between Luis and Severina was celebrated without a valid marriage license
and is thus, void ab initio.

In Republic of the Philippines v. Dayot, the Court similarly declared that a marriage solemnized
80

without a marriage license based on a fabricated claim of exceptional character, is void. In lieu of a
marriage license, therein parties to the marriage executed a false affidavit of marital cohabitation. In
declaring the marriage void, the Court rejected the notion that all the formal and essential requisites
of marriage were complied with. The Court held that to permit a false affidavit to take the place of a
marriage license is to allow an abject circumvention of the law. It was further explained:

We cannot accept the insistence of the Republic that the falsity of the statements in the parties'
affidavit will not affect the validity of marriage, since all the essential and formal requisites were
complied with. The argument deserves scant merit. Patently, it cannot be denied that the marriage
between Jose and Felisa was celebrated without the formal requisite of a marriage license. Neither
did Jose and Felisa meet the explicit legal requirement in Article 76, that they should have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years, so as to be excepted from the requirement of a
marriage license.

xxxx

Similarly, we are not impressed by the ratiocination of the Republic that as a marriage under a
license is not invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not
be invalidated by a fabricated statement that the parties have cohabited for at least five years as
required by law. The contrast is flagrant. The former is with reference to an irregularity of the
marriage license, and not to the absence of one. Here, there is no marriage license at all.
Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose and
Felisa's cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as an exception to the requirement
for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the law
precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties under oath. If the essential matter in
the sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is but a mere scrap of paper, without force and effect. Hence, it is
as if there was no affidavit at all.
81

The Court cannot turn a blind eye to the statements made in the marriage contract because these
refer to the absence of a formal requisite of marriage. "The parties should not be afforded any
excuse to not comply with every single requirement and later use the same missing element as a
pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption from securing
a marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the exception."  "The
82

requirement and issuance of marriage license is the State's demonstration of its involvement and
participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is interested. This
interest proceeds from the constitutional mandate that the State recognizes the sanctity of family life
and of affording protection to the family as a basic 'autonomous social institution."'83

Partition Agreement is Valid

Relative to the properties they amassed during the period of their cohabitation, Luis and Severina
executed a notarized Partition Agreement  in November 1980, which divided their properties
84

between them without court intervention. Luis sought to annul such agreement on the ground that
"the separation of property is not effected by the mere execution of the contract or agreement of the
parties, but by the decree of the court approving the same. It, therefore, becomes effective only upon
judicial approval, without which it is void."85

The Court does not subscribe to Luis' posture.

In Valdes v. RTC, Branch 102, Quezon City, the Court held that "[i]n a void marriage, regardless of
86

the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed
by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may be, of the Family Code. Article
147 is a remake of Article 144 of the Civil Code x x x."  It provides:
87

Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively
with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void
marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property
acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-
ownership.

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be
presumed to have been obtained by their .ioint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned
by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the
acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in
the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the
family and of the household.

Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property
acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until
after the termination of their cohabitation.

When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in
the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver
by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the
respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the
innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the
cohabitation.  (Emphasis ours)
88

As there is no showing that Luis and Severina were incapacitated to marry each other at the time of
their cohabitation and considering that their marriage is void from the beginning for lack of a valid
marriage license, Article 144 of the Civil Code,  in relation to Article 147 of the Family Code, are the
89

pertinent provisions of law governing their property relations. Article 147 of the Family Code "applies
to union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract
marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void for other reasons, like absence of a marriage
license."  "Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through
90

their work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property

acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts.
A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall still be considered as having
contributed thereto jointly if said party's 'efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family
household."' 91

Accordingly, the provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code shall apply in the partition of the
properties co-owned by Luis and Severina. It is stated under Article 1079 of the Civil Code that
"partition, in general, is the separation, division and assignment of a thing held in common among
those to whom it may belong. The thing itself may be divided, or its value." As to how partition may
be validly done, Article 496 of the Civil Code is precise that "partition may be made by agreement
between the parties or by judicial proceedings x x x." The law does not impose a judicial approval
for the agreement to be valid. Hence, even without the same, the partition was validly done by Luis
and Severina through the execution of the Partition Agreement.
Moreover, Luis admitted the existence, due execution and authenticity of the Partition Agreement.  It 92

also remains uncontroverted that he already received his share as stipulated in the Partition
Agreement. As such, the Court finds no reason to have the said agreement declared null and void or
annulled, in the absence of any circumstance which renders such contract invalid or at least,
voidable.

All things considered, the Court holds that although a certification of no record of marriage license or
certification of "due search and inability to find" a record or entry issued by the local civil registrar is
adequate to prove the non-issuance of the license,  such certification is not the only proof that could
93

validate the absence of a marriage license.

In this case, the categorical statement on Luis and Severina's marriage contract that no marriage
license was exhibited to the solemnizing officer, coupled with a contrived averment therein that the
marriage is of an exceptional character under Article 77 of the Civil Code, are circumstances which
cannot be disregarded. Incidentally, it may be well to note that Luis' failure to assert his marriage to
Severina during the latter's lifetime is suspect. Luis left for the USA in 1981, and until Severina' s
death in 2002, he never saw, much less reconciled with her.  All those years, he never presented
94

himself to be the husband of Severina. Not even their daughter, Maria Luisa, knew of the marriage.
During trial, he never presented any other witness to the marriage. He contends that his marriage to
Severina was valid and subsisting, yet he knowingly contracted a subsequent marriage abroad.
Verily, Luis failed to prove the validity of their marriage based on the evidence he himself had
presented.

"The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law and would lead
or could be used, at least, for the perpetration of fraud against innocent and unwary parties, which
was one of the evils that the law sought to prevent by making a prior license a prerequisite for a valid
marriage. The protection of marriage as a sacred institution requires not just the defense of a true
and genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one as well." 95

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated August 6, 2012 and the Resolution
dated November 26, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 92989 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Complaint filed in Civil Case No. 69611 is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 187462, June 01, 2016

RAQUEL G. KHO, Petitioner, v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND VERONICA B.

KHO, Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Challenged in the present petition for review on certiorari are the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA), Cebu City dated March 30, 2006 and January 14, 2009, respectively, in CA-GR. CV No. 69218.
The assailed CA Decision reversed and set aside the Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Borongan,
Eastern Samar, Branch 2, in Civil Case No. 464, which ruled in petitioner's favor in an action he filed for
declaration of nullity of his marriage with private respondent, while the CA Resolution denied petitioners'
motion for reconsideration.

The present petition arose from a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage filed by herein petitioner with
the RTC of Oras, Eastern Samar. Pertinent portions of the Petition allege as follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
xxxx

3. Sometime in the afternoon of May 31, 1972, petitioner's parents summoned one Eusebio Colongon, now
deceased, then clerk in the office of the municipal treasurer, instructing said clerk to arrange and prepare
whatever necessary papers were required for the intended marriage between petitioner and respondent
supposedly to take place at around midnight of June 1, 1972 so as to exclude the public from witnessing the
marriage ceremony;

4. Petitioner and Respondent thereafter exchanged marital vows in a marriage ceremony which actually took
place at around 3:00 o'clock before dawn of June 1, 1972, on account that there was a public dance held in
the town plaza which is just situated adjacent to the church whereas the venue of the wedding, and the
dance only finished at around 2:00 o'clock of same early morning of June 1, 1972;

5. Petitioner has never gone to the office of the Local Civil Registrar to apply for marriage license and had
not seen much less signed any papers or documents in connection with the procurement of a marriage
license;

6. Considering the shortness of period from the time the aforenamed clerk of the treasurer's office was told
to obtain the pertinent papers in the afternoon of May 31, 1972 so required for the purpose of the
forthcoming marriage up to the moment the actual marriage was celebrated before dawn of June 1, 1972,
no marriage license therefore could have been validly issued, thereby rendering the marriage solemnized on
even date null and void for want of the most essential requisite;

7. For all intents and purposes, thus, Petitioner's and Respondent's marriage aforestated was solemnized
sans the required marriage license, hence, null and void from the beginning and neither was it performed
under circumstances exempting the requirement of such marriage license;

xxxx

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that after due
notice and hearing, judgment be rendered:

1. Declaring the contract of marriage between petitioner and respondent held on June 1, 1972, at Arteche,
Eastern Samar, null and void ab initio and of no legal effect;

x x x x4 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Among the pieces of evidence presented by petitioner is a Certification5 issued by the Municipal Civil
Registrar of Arteche, Eastern Samar which attested to the fact that the Office of the Local Civil Registrar has
neither record nor copy of a marriage license issued to petitioner and respondent with respect to their
marriage celebrated on June 1, 1972.

Respondent filed her Answer6 praying that the petition be outrightly dismissed for lack of cause of action
because there is no evidence to prove petitioner's allegation that their marriage was celebrated without the
requisite marriage license and that, on the contrary, both petitioner and respondent personally appeared
before the local civil registrar and secured a marriage license which they presented before their marriage
was solemnized.

Upon petitioner's request, the venue of the action was subsequently transferred to the RTC of Borongan,
Eastern Samar, Branch 2, where the parties submitted their respective pleadings as well as affidavits of
witnesses.

On September 25, 2000, the RTC rendered its Decision granting the petition. The dispositive portion of the
said Decision reads:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby declares the marriage contracted between Raquel
G. Kho and Veronica Borata on June 1, 1972 null and void ab initio, pursuant to Article 80 of the Civil Code
and Articles 4 and 5 of the Family Code. The foregoing is without prejudice to the application of Articles 50
and 51 of the Family Code.

Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Municipal Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern Samar for proper
registration of this decree of nullity of marriage.

SO ORDERED.7 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The RTC found that petitioner's evidence sufficiently established the absence of the requisite marriage
license when the marriage between petitioner and respondent was celebrated. As such, the RTC ruled that
based on Articles 53(4), 58 and 80(3) of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the absence of the said marriage
license rendered the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void ab initio.

Respondent then filed an appeal with the CA in Cebu City. On March 30, 2006, the CA promulgated its
assailed Decision, disposing thus:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision dated 25 September 2000 of Branch 2 of the Regional
Trial Court of Borongan, Eastern Samar, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage between the
petitioner-appellee Raquel Kho and Veronica Kho is declared valid and subsisting for all intents and
purposes.

SO ORDERED.8 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The CA held that since a marriage was, in fact, solemnized between the contending parties, there is a
presumption that a marriage license was issued for that purpose and that petitioner failed to overcome such
presumption. The CA also ruled that the absence of any indication in the marriage certificate that a marriage
license was issued is a mere defect in the formal requisites of the law which does not invalidate the parties'
marriage.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,9 but the CA denied it in its Resolution dated January 14, 2009.

Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues, to wit:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

1. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ASCRIBING A SO-CALLED "ETHICAL
DIMENSION" TO PETITIONER'S CAUSE, ALLUDING TO AN ALLEGED LIAISON WITH ANOTHER WOMAN AS A
FACTOR IN REVERSING THE JUDGMENT OF THE LOWER COURT WHICH VOIDED HIS MARRIAGE IN
QUESTION WITH RESPONDENT;

2. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPRECIATING AGAINST PETITIONER
THE FACT THAT DESPITE THE LAPSE OF 25 YEARS HE DID NOTHING TO ATTACK, EVEN COLLATERALLY, HIS
APPARENTLY VOID MARRIAGE WITH RESPONDENT;

3. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ALTOGETHER DISREGARDING

PETITIONER'S OBVIOUSLY OVERWHELMING DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCES OF LACK OF MARRIAGE LICENSE
AND GIVING WEIGHT INSTEAD TO UNSUPPORTED PRESUMPTIONS IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT, IN ITS
ASSAILED DECISION; and

4 WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SETTING ASIDE OR REVERSING THE
LOWER COURT'S JUDGMENT DECLARING THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT A
NULLITY FOR ABSENCE OF THE REQUISITE MARRIAGE LICENSE.10 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Petitioner's basic contention in the present petition centers on the alleged failure of the CA to give due
credence to petitioner's evidence which established the absence or lack of marriage license at the time that
petitioner and respondent's marriage was solemnized. Petitioner argues that the CA erred in deciding the
case not on the basis of law and evidence but rather on the ground of what the appellate court calls as
ethical considerations as well as on the perceived motive of petitioner in seeking the declaration of nullity of
his marriage with respondent.

The Court finds for the petitioner.

At the outset, the State, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), raises a procedural question by
arguing that the issues presented by petitioner in the present petition are factual in nature and it is not
proper for this Court to delve into these issues in a petition for review on certiorari.

The Court does not agree.

The issues in the instant petition involve a determination and application of existing law and prevailing
jurisprudence. However, intertwined with these issues is the question of the existence of the subject
marriage license, which is a question of fact and one which is not appropriate for a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. This rule, nonetheless, is not without exceptions, viz.:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures;

(2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;

(3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion;

(4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;

(5) When the findings of fact are conflicting;

(6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is
contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;

(7) When the findings arc contrary to those of the trial court;

(8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;

(9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners' main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondents; and

(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of evidence
and contradicted by the evidence on record.11 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

In the present case, the findings of the RTC and the CA, on whether or not there was indeed a marriage
license obtained by petitioner and respondent, are conflicting. Hence, it is but proper for this Court to review
these findings.

The marriage of petitioner and respondent was celebrated on June 1, 1972, prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code.12 Hence, the Civil Code governs their union. Accordingly, Article 53 of the Civil Code spells out
the essential requisites of marriage as a contract, to wit:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

ART 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:

(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;

(2) Their consent, freely given;

(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and

(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.13 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Article 58 of the Civil Code makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first being
issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either contracting party habitually resides, save
marriages of an exceptional character authorized by the Civil Code, but not those under Article 75.14 Under
the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are covered by Chapter 2, Title 111, comprising Articles
72 to 79. These marriages are: (1) marriages in articulo mortis or at the point of death during peace or war;
(2) marriages in remote places; (3) consular marriages; (4) ratification of marital cohabitation; (5) religious
ratification of a civil marriage; (6) Mohammedan or pagan marriages; and (7) mixed marriages. Petitioner's
and respondent's marriage does not fall under any of these exceptions.

Article 80(3) of the Civil Code also makes it clear that a marriage performed without the corresponding
marriage license is void, this being nothing more than the legitimate consequence flowing from the fact that
the license is the essence of the marriage contract.15 The rationale for the compulsory character of a
marriage license under the Civil Code is that it is the authority granted by the State to the contracting
parties, after the proper government official has inquired into their capacity to contract marriage.16Stated
differently, the requirement and issuance of a marriage license is the State's demonstration of its
involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is
interested.17

In the instant case, respondent claims that she and petitioner were able to secure a marriage license which
they presented to the solemnizing officer before the marriage was performed.

The OSG, on its part, contends that the presumption is always in favor of the validity of marriage and that
any doubt should be resolved to sustain such validity. Indeed, this Court is mindful of this principle as well
as of the Constitutional policy which protects and strengthens the family as the basic autonomous social
institution and marriage as the foundation of the family.

On the other hand, petitioner insists that the Certification issued by the Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern
Samar, coupled with the testimony of the former Civil Registrar, is sufficient evidence to prove the absence
of the subject marriage license.

The Court agrees with petitioner and finds no doubt to be resolved as the evidence is clearly in his favor.

Apropos is the case of Nicdao Cariño v. Yee Cariño.18 There, it was held that the certification of the Local
Civil Registrar, that their office had no record of a marriage license, was adequate to prove the non-issuance
of said license.19 It was further held that the presumed validity of the marriage of the parties had been
overcome, and that it became the burden of the party alleging a valid marriage to prove that the marriage
was valid, and that the required marriage license had been secured.20

As stated above, petitioner was able to present a Certification issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Arteche, Eastern Samar attesting that the Office of the Local Civil Registrar "has no record nor copy of any
marriage license ever issued in favor of Raquel G. Kho [petitioner] and Veronica M. Borata [respondent]
whose marriage was celebrated on June 1, 1972."21 Thus, on the basis of such Certification, the presumed
validity of the marriage of petitioner and respondent has been overcome and it becomes the burden of
respondent to prove that their marriage is valid as it is she who alleges such validity. As found by the RTC,
respondent was not able to discharge that burden.

It is telling that respondent failed to present their alleged marriage license or a copy thereof to the court. In
addition, the Certificate of Marriage22 issued by the officiating priest does not contain any entry regarding
the said marriage license. Respondent could have obtained a copy of their marriage contract from the
National Archives and Records Section, where information regarding the marriage license, i.e., date of
issuance and license number, could be obtained. However, she also failed to do so. The Court also notes,
with approval, the RTC's agreement with petitioner's observation that the statements of the witnesses for
respondent, as well as respondent herself, all attest to the fact that a marriage ceremony was conducted but
neither one of them testified that a marriage license was issued in favor of petitioner and respondent.
Indeed, despite respondent's categorical claim that she and petitioner were able to obtain a marriage
license, she failed to present evidence to prove such allegation. It is a settled rule that one who alleges a
fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not evidence.23

Based on the Certification issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern Samar, coupled with
respondent's failure to produce a copy of the alleged marriage license or of any evidence to show that such
license was ever issued, the only conclusion that can be reached is that no valid marriage license was, in
fact, issued. Contrary to the ruling of the CA, it cannot be said that there was a simple defect, not a total
absence, in the requirements of the law which would not affect the validity of the marriage. The fact remains
that respondent failed to prove that the subject marriage license was issued and the law is clear that a
marriage which is performed without the corresponding marriage license is null and void.

As to the sufficiency of petitioner's evidence, the OSG further argues that, on the basis of this Court's ruling
in Sevilla v. Cardenas,24 the certification issued by the local civil registrar, which attests to the absence in its
records of a marriage license, must categorically state that the document does not exist in the said office
despite diligent search.

However, in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,25 this Court considered the certification issued by
the Local Civil Registrar as a certification of due search and inability to find the record or entry sought by the
parties despite the absence of a categorical statement that "such document does not exist in their records
despite diligent search." The Court, citing Section 28,26 Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, held that the
certification of due search and inability to find a record or entry as to the purported marriage license, issued
by the civil registrar, enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of
all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license. Based on said certification, the Court held that there
is absence of a marriage license that would render the marriage void ab initio.

Moreover, as discussed in the abovestated case of Nicdao Cariño v. Yee Cariño,27 this Court considered the
marriage of the petitioner and her deceased husband as void ab initio as the records reveal that the
marriage contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage license number and, as certified by the
local civil registrar, their office has no record of such marriage license. The court held that the certification
issued by the local civil registrar is adequate to prove the non-issuance of the marriage license. Their
marriage having been solemnized without the necessary marriage license and not being one of the
marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, the marriage of the petitioner and the deceased is
undoubtedly void ab initio. This ruling was reiterated in the more recent case of Go-Bangayan v. Bangayan,
Jr.28
Furthermore, in the fairly recent case of Abbas v. Abbas,29 this Court echoed the ruling in Republic v.
CA30 that, in sustaining the finding of the lower court that a marriage license was lacking, this Court relied
on the Certification issued by the local civil registrar, which stated that the alleged marriage license could
not be located as the same did not appear in their records. Contrary to petitioner's asseveration, nowhere in
the Certification was it categorically stated that the officer involved conducted a diligent search. In this
respect, this Court held that Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court does not require a categorical
statement to this effect. Moreover, in the said case, this Court ruled that:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a disputable presumption that an official duty has
been regularly performed, absent contradiction or other evidence to the contrary. We held, "The
presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to
perform a duty." No such affirmative evidence was shown that the Municipal Civil Registrar was lax in
performing her duty of checking the records of their office, thus the presumption must stand. x x x31 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

In all the abovementioned cases, there was clear and unequivocal finding of the absence of the subject
marriage license which rendered the marriage void.

From these cases, it can be deduced that to be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage
license, the law requires that the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage
contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage
license was issued to the parties.32

Indeed, all the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony was conducted and a marriage
contract was signed does not operate to cure the absence of a valid marriage license.33 As cited above,
Article 80(3) of the Civil Code clearly provides that a marriage solemnized without a license is void from the
beginning, except marriages of exceptional character under Articles 72 to 79 of the same Code. As earlier
stated, petitioner's and respondent's marriage cannot be characterized as among the exceptions.

As to the motive of petitioner in seeking to annul his marriage to respondent, it may well be that his motives
are less than pure - that he seeks a way out of his marriage to legitimize his alleged illicit affair with another
woman. Be that as it may, the same does not make up for the failure of the respondent to prove that they
had a valid marriage license, given the weight of evidence presented by petitioner. The law must be applied.
As the marriage license, an essential requisite under the Civil Code, is clearly absent, the marriage of
petitioner and respondent is void ab initio. chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, Cebu
City, dated March 30, 2006 and January 14, 2009, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 69218,
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Borongan, Eastern Samar,
Branch 2, dated September 25, 2000, in Civil Case No. 464 is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED. cralawlawlibrary

G.R. No. 207406

NORBERTO A. VITANGCOL, Petitioner, 
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

Persons intending to contract a second marriage must first secure a judicial declaration of nullity of
their first marriage. If they proceed with the second marriage without the judicial declaration, they are
guilty of bigamy regardless of evidence of the nullity of the first marriage.

This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari  assailing the Court of Appeals Decision  dated July
1 2

18, 2012 and Resolution  dated June 3, 2013. The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the
3
Decision  of Branch 25 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila convicting petitioner Norberto Abella
4

Vitangcol (Norberto) of bigamy punished under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.  Norberto
5

was sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of two (2) years and four (4) months of prision
correccional as minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum. 6

In the Information dated April 29, 2008, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila charged Norberto
with bigamy. The accusatory portion of the Information reads:
7

That on or about December 4, 1994, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, being then
legally married to GINA M. GAERLAN, and without such marriage having been legally dissolved, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second or subsequent marriage with
ALICE G. EDUARDO-VITANGCOL which second marriage has all the legal requisites for its validity
with the said accused NORBERTO ABELLA VITANGCOL knowing fully well prior to and at the time
of the celebration of the second marriage he was already married to the said GINA M. GAERLAN.

Contrary to law. 8

Norberto was arraigned, pleading not guilty to the charge. Trial then ensued. 9

According to the prosecution, on December 4, 1994, Norberto married Alice G. Eduardo (Alice) at
the Manila Cathedral in Intramuros. Born into their union were three (3) children. 10

After some time, Alice "began hearing rumors that [her husband] was previously married to another
woman[.]"  She eventually discovered that Norberto was previously married to a certain Gina M.
11

Gaerlan (Gina) on July 17, 1987, as evidenced by a marriage contract registered with the National
Statistics Office. Alice subsequently filed a criminal Complaint for bigamy against Norberto. 12

On the other hand, Norberto alleged that he and Alice became romantically involved sometime in
1987.  "After much prodding by their friends and relatives, [he and Alice] decided to get married in
13

1994." 14

Before finalizing their marriage plans, however, Norberto revealed to Alice that he had a "fake
marriage"  with his college girlfriend, a certain Gina Gaerlan.  Nevertheless, despite Norberto’s
15 16

revelation, Alice convinced him that they proceed with the wedding. Thus, Norberto and Alice were
married on December 4, 1994 and, thereafter, had three children. 17

Sometime in 2007, Norberto heard rumors from their household workers that Alice was having an
affair with a married man. He was able to confirm the affair after hearing Alice in a phone
conversation with her paramour. 18

Norberto then sought advice from his business lawyer who later on convinced Alice to end the affair.
The lawyer also warned Alice of the possible criminal liability she may incur if she continued seeing
her paramour. 19

Allegedly in retaliation to the threat of criminal action against her, Alice filed the criminal Complaint
for bigamy against Norberto. 20

Finding that Norberto contracted a second marriage with Alice despite his subsisting valid marriage
with Gina, Branch 25 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila convicted Norberto of bigamy. The
dispositive portion of the Decision dated September 1, 2010 reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby finds accused Norberto Abella Vitangcol
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of BIGAMY defined and penalized under Article 349
of the Revised Penal Code. Accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum imprisonment to twelve (12) years of prision mayor as
maximum imprisonment.

SO ORDERED. 21

On appeal, the Court of Appeals sustained the guilty verdict against Norberto but modified the
penalty imposed in accordance with the Indeterminate Sentence Law. The dispositive portion of the
Court of Appeals Decision dated July 18, 2012 reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila, Branch 25, dated September 1, 2010 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION of the
penalty to which appellant is previously sentenced. Accordingly, he is now meted to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to
eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.

SO ORDERED. 22

Norberto filed a Motion for Reconsideration,  which the Court of Appeals denied in the Resolution
23

dated June 3, 2013. 24

Norberto filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari before this court. The People of the Philippines,
through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed a Comment  to which Norberto filed a Reply.
25 26

Norberto argues that the first element of bigamy is absent in this case.  He presents as evidence a
27

Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Imus, Cavite, which states that the Office has no
28

record of the marriage license allegedly issued in his favor and his first wife, Gina. He argues that
with no proof of existence of an essential requisite of marriage—the marriage license—the
prosecution fails to establish the legality of his first marriage. 29

In addition, Norberto claims that the legal dissolution of the first marriage is not an element of the
crime of bigamy. According to Norberto, nothing in Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code that
punishes bigamy mentions that requirement.  Stating that "[a]ny reasonable doubt must be resolved
30

in favor of the accused[,]"  Norberto prays for his acquittal.

31 32

The prosecution counters that it has proven the existence of Norberto’s prior valid marriage with
Gina as evidenced by the marriage contract they had executed. The prosecution likewise proved
that the first marriage of Norberto with Gina was not legally dissolved; that while his first marriage
was subsisting, Norberto contracted a second marriage with Alice; and that the second marriage
would have been valid had it not been for the existence of the first. Norberto, therefore, should be
convicted of bigamy. 33

The issue for our resolution is whether the Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar that it
has no record of the marriage license issued to petitioner Norberto A. Vitangcol and his first wife
Gina proves the nullity of petitioner’s first marriage and exculpates him from the bigamy charge.

The Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar that it has no record of the marriage license is
suspect. Assuming that it is true, it does not categorically prove that there was no marriage license.
Furthermore, marriages are not dissolved through mere certifications by the civil registrar. For more
than seven (7) years before his second marriage, petitioner did nothing to have his alleged spurious
first marriage declared a nullity. Even when this case was pending, he did not present any decision
from any trial court nullifying his first marriage.

Bigamy is punished under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code:

ARTICLE 349. Bigamy. – The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall
contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or
before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered
in the proper proceedings.

For an accused to be convicted of this crime, the prosecution must prove all of the following
elements:

[first,] that the offender has been legally married;

[second,] that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is
absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;

[third,] that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and

[lastly,] that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. 34

The prosecution allegedly fails to prove the validity of his first marriage with Gina because the civil
registrar of the municipality where they were married had no record of the marriage license allegedly
issued in their favor.

Contrary to petitioner’s claim, all the elements of bigamy are present in this case. Petitioner was still
legally married to Gina when he married Alice. Thus, the trial court correctly convicted him of the
crime charged.

Based on the marriage contract presented in evidence, petitioner’s first marriage was solemnized on
July 17, 1987. This was before the Family Code of the Philippines became effective on August
3,1988.  Consequently, provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines  govern the validity of his first
35 36

marriage.

Article 53 of the Civil Code enumerates the requisites of marriage, the absence of any of which
renders the marriage void from the beginning: 37

Article 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:

(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;

(2) Their consent, freely given;

(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and

(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.

The fourth requisite—the marriage license—is issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality
where either contracting party habitually resides.  The marriage license represents the state’s
38

"involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is
interested." 39

To prove that a marriage was solemnized without a marriage license, "the law requires that the
absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least,
supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to
the parties." 40

Petitioner presents a Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Imus, Cavite, which states:

[A]fter a diligent search on the files of Registry Book on Application for Marriage License and
License Issuance available in this office, no record could be found on the alleged issuance of this
office of Marriage License No. 8683519 in favor of MR. NORBERTO A. VITANGCOL and MS. GINA
M. GAERLAN dated July 17, 1987. 41

This Certification does not prove that petitioner’s first marriage was solemnized without a marriage
license. It does not categorically state that Marriage License No. 8683519 does not exist. 42

Moreover, petitioner admitted the authenticity of his signature appearing on the marriage contract
between him and his first wife, Gina.  The marriage contract between petitioner and Gina is a
43

positive piece of evidence as to the existence of petitioner’s first marriage. This "should be given
44

greater credence than documents testifying merely as to [the] absence of any record of the
marriage[.]" 45

Republic v. Court of Appeals and Castro  was originally an action for the declaration of nullity of a
46

marriage.  As part of its evidence, the plaintiff presented a certification that states that the marriage
47

license "cannot be located as said license . . . does not appear from [the local civil registrar’s]
records." 48

This court held that "[t]he certification . . . enjoys probative value, [the local civil registrar] being the
officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage
license."49

This court further said that "[u]naccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion and pursuant to
Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, a certificate of ‘due search and inability to find’
sufficiently proved that [the local civil registrar] did not issue [a] marriage license . . . to the
contracting parties." 50

The circumstances in Castro and in this case are different. Castro involved a civil case for
declaration of nullity of marriage that does not involve the possible loss of liberty. The certification
in Castro was unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion, there being no prosecution for
bigamy involved. On the other hand, the present case involves a criminal prosecution for bigamy. To
our mind, this is a circumstance of suspicion, the Certification having been issued to Norberto for
him to evade conviction for bigamy.

The appreciation of the probative value of the certification cannot be divorced from the purpose of its
presentation, the cause of action in the case, and the context of the presentation of the certification
in relation to the other evidence presented in the case. We are not prepared to establish a doctrine
that a certification that a marriage license cannot be found may substitute for a definite statement
that no such license existed or was issued. Definitely, the Office of the Civil Registrar of Imus, Cavite
should be fully aware of the repercussions of those words. That the license now cannot be found is
not basis per se to say that it could not have been issued.

A different view would undermine the stability of our legal order insofar as marriages are concerned.
Marriage licenses may be conveniently lost due to negligence or consideration. The motivation to do
this becomes greatest when the benefit is to evade prosecution.

This case is likewise different from Nicdao Cariño v. Yee Cariño.  In Cariño, the marriage contract
51

between Santiago Cariño and his first wife, Susan Nicdao, bore no marriage license number.  In 52

addition, the local civil registrar certified that it has no record of any marriage license issued to
Santiago Cariño and Susan Nicdao.  This court declared Santiago Cariño’s first marriage void for
53

having been solemnized without a marriage license. 54

In this case, there is a marriage contract indicating the presence of a marriage license number freely
and voluntarily signed and attested to by the parties to the marriage as well as by their solemnizing
officer. The first marriage was celebrated on July 17, 1987. The second marriage was entered into
on December 4, 1994. Within a span of seven (7) years, four (4) months, and 17 (seventeen) days,
petitioner did not procure a judicial declaration of the nullity of his first marriage. Even while the
bigamy case was pending, no decision declaring the first marriage as spurious was presented. In
other words, petitioner’s belief that there was no marriage license is rendered untrue by his own
actuations.

This factual context makes the use and issuance of the Certification from the Office of the Civil
Registrar suspect. The prosecution has to prove that despite the existence of a valid first marriage,
petitioner nevertheless contracted a second or subsequent marriage. The admission of a marriage
contract with proof of its authenticity and due execution suffices to discharge the burden of proving
beyond reasonable doubt that a prior marriage exists. The burden of evidence will, thus, pass on to
the defense. Mere presentation of a certification from the civil registrar that the marriage license
cannot be found is not enough to discharge the burden of proving that no such marriage license was
issued.

The parties clearly identified Marriage License No. 8683519 in the marriage contract.  There is no
55

evidence to show that the number series of that license is spurious or is not likely to have been
issued from its source. There is no proof as to whether the licenses issued before or after the
document in question still exists in the custody of the civil registrar. There is no evidence that relates
to the procedures for safekeeping of these vital documents. This would have shown whether there
was unfettered access to the originals of the license and, therefore, would have contributed to the
proper judicial conclusion of what the manifestation by the civil registrar implies.

This court cannot grant the presumption of good faith and regularity in the performance of official
functions to the civil registrar for the purposes sought by petitioner. In other words, the presumption
of regularity in the performance of official functions is too remotely detached to the conclusion that
there is no marriage license.

At best, the presumption of regularity in the performance of the civil registrar’s function without the
context just discussed can lead to the conclusion that he in good faith could not find the marriage
license in his office. This presumption does not mean that the marriage license did not exist. Nor
does it mean that the marriage license was issued.

However, even the conclusion of good faith is difficult to accept. There was a marriage contract duly
executed by petitioner and his first spouse as well as by the solemnizing officer. The marriage
contract is in the custody of the civil registrar. The presumption of regularity in the performance of
official functions by a public officer should likewise be applicable to infer a conclusion that the
marriage license mentioned in that contract exists.

Conviction in a charge of bigamy will result to a legitimate imposition of a penalty amounting to a

deprivation of liberty. It is not a far-fetched conclusion—although this is not always the case—that a
well-connected accused will use all means, fair or foul, to achieve an acquittal. Many criminal cases
can turn on documentary evidence the issuance of which is within the discretion of a government
employee. The temptations for the employee to issue a document, which may be accurate but which
he knows the accused will be able to use for a different purpose, can easily be created by an
accused. Much of the bases of this conclusion will depend on how the trial court judge evaluates the
demeanor of the witnesses. We can defer to that discretion as much as to make our own judgment
based on evidence conclusively admitted and weighed by the trial court. Using both, we have no
reason to disturb the conclusions of the trial court.

II

Assuming without conceding that petitioner’s first marriage was solemnized without a marriage
license, petitioner remains liable for bigamy. Petitioner’s first marriage was not judicially
declared void. Nor was his first wife Gina judicially declared presumptively dead under the Civil
Code.  The second element of the crime of bigamy is, therefore, present in this case.
56

As early as 1968, this court held in Landicho v. Relova, et al.  that

57

parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, only competent
courts having such authority. Prior to such declaration of nullity, the validity of the first marriage is
beyond question. A party who contracts a second marriage then assumes the risk of being
prosecuted for bigamy. 58

The commission that drafted the Family Code considered the Landicho ruling in wording Article 40 of
the Family Code: 59

Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on
the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. 1avvphi1

Should the requirement of judicial declaration of nullity be removed as an element of the crime of
bigamy, Article 349 of Revised Penal Code becomes useless. "[A]ll that an adventurous bigamist
has to do is to . . . contract a subsequent marriage and escape a bigamy charge by simply claiming
that the first marriage is void and that the subsequent marriage is equally void for lack of a prior
judicial declaration of nullity of the first."  Further, "[a] party may even enter into a marriage aware of
60

the absence of a requisite—usually the marriage license—and thereafter contract a subsequent

marriage without obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of the first on the assumption that the first
marriage is void."61

For these reasons, the Landicho ruling remains good law. It need not be revisited by this court En
Banc as petitioner insists. 62

The third element of bigamy is likewise present in this case. Petitioner admitted that he subsequently
married Alice G. Eduardo on December 4, 1994.  As for the last element of bigamy, that the
63

subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity, it is presumed. The crime of bigamy
was consummated when petitioner subsequently married Alice without his first marriage to Gina
having been judicially declared void.64

With all the elements of bigamy present in this case, petitioner was correctly convicted of the crime
charged. 1âwphi1

III

Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the penalty that may be imposed on
petitioner is that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the
Revised Penal Code. On the other hand, the minimum term of the penalty shall be within the range
of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the offense. The court
then has the discretion to impose a minimum penalty within the range of the penalty next lower to
the prescribed penalty. As for the maximum penalty, the attending circumstances are considered. 65

The imposable penalty for bigamy is prision mayor.  The penalty next lower to that is prision
66

correccional. Prision correccional ranges from six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6)
years;  hence, the minimum penalty can be any period within this range.
67

As for the maximum penalty, it should be within the range of prision mayor in its medium period,
there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances. Prision mayor in its medium period ranges
from eight (8) years and one (1) day to 10 years.

Petitioner was sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of two (2) years and four (4) months
of prision correccional as minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum.
The ranges of the minimum and maximum penalties are within the ranges as previously computed.
The indeterminate penalty imposed was proper.

Nevertheless, "[k]eeping in mind the basic purpose of the Indeterminate Sentence Law ‘to uplift and
redeem valuable human material, and prevent unnecessary and excessive deprivation of personal
liberty and economic usefulness[,]’"  we lower the minimum of the indeterminate penalty to six (6)
68

months and one (1) day of prision correccional. Petitioner is, thus, sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to eight
(8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision

dated July 18, 2012 and Resolution dated June 3, 2013 in CA-G.R. CR No. 33936 are AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION. Petitioner Norberto A. Vitangcol is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to eight (8) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 189607

RENATO A. CASTILLO, Petitioner, 
vs.
LEA P. DE LEON CASTILLO, Respondent.

DECISION
SERENO, CJ:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing
the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision   in CA-GR. CV No. 90153 and the Resolution  that affirmed the
1 2

same. The CA reversed the Decision  dated 23 March 2007 issued by the Regional Trial Court
3

(RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 84.

The RTC had granted the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage between the parties on the
ground that respondent had a previous valid marriage before she married petitioner. The CA
believes on the other hand, that respondent was not prevented from contracting a second marriage if
the first one was an absolutely nullity, and for this purpose she did not have to await a final decree of
nullity of the first marriage.

The only issue that must be resolved by the Court is whether the CA was correct in holding thus and
consequentially reversing the RTC's declaration of nullity of the second marriage.

FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS

On 25 May 1972, respondent Lea P. De Leon Castillo (Lea) married Benjamin Bautista (Bautista).
On 6 January 1979, respondent married herein petitioner Renato A. Castillo (Renato).

On 28 May 2001, Renato filed before the RTC a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage,  praying that his marriage to Lea be declared void due to her subsisting marriage to
4

Bautista and her psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The CA states in its
Decision that petitioner did not pursue the ground of psychological incapacity in the RTC. The
reason for this finding by the CA while unclear, is irrelevant in this Petition.

Respondent opposed the Petition, and contended among others that her marriage to Bautista was
null and void as they had not secured any license therefor, and neither of them was a member of the
denomination to which the solemnizing officer belonged. 5

On 3 January 2002, respondent filed an action to declare her first marriage to Baustista void. On 22
January 2003, the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City, Branch 260 rendered its
Decision  declaring that Lea's first marriage to Bautista was indeed null and void ab
6

initio. Thereafter, the same court issued a Certificate of Finality saying that the Decision dated 22
January 2003 had become final and executory.  7

On 12 August 2004, respondent filed a Demurrer to Evidence  claiming that the proof adduced by
8

petitioner was insufficient to warrant a declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground that it
was bigamous. In his Opposition,   petitioner countered that whether or not the first marriage of
9

respondent was valid, and regardless of the fact that she had belatedly managed to obtain a judicial
declaration of nullity, she still could not deny that at the time she entered into marriage with him, her
previous marriage was valid and subsisting. The RTC thereafter denied respondent's demurrer in its
Order   dated 8 March 2005.
10

In a Decision   dated 23 March 2007, the RTC declared the marriage between petitioner and
11

respondent null and void ab initio on the ground that it was a bigamous marriage under Article 41 of
the Family Code.   The dispositive portion reads:
12

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the Court hereby declares the marriage
between RENATO A. CASTILLO and LEA P. DE LEON-CASTILLO contracted on January 6, 1979,
at the Mary the Queen Parish Church, San Juan, Metro Manila, is hereby declared NULL AND VOID
AB INITIO based on bigamous marriage, under Article 41 of the Family Code.  13

The RTC said that the fact that Lea's marriage to Bautista was subsisting when she married Renato
on 6 January 1979, makes her marriage to Renato bigamous, thus rendering it void ab initio. The
lower court dismissed Lea's argument that she need not obtain a judicial decree of nullity and could
presume the nullity of a prior subsisting marriage. The RTC stressed that so long as no judicial
declaration exists, the prior marriage is valid and existing. Lastly, it also said that even if respondent
eventually had her first marriage judicially declared void, the fact remains that the first and second
marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled, since Lea failed to obtain a judicial
decree of nullity for her first marriage to Bautista before contracting her second marriage with
Renato.  14

Petitioner moved for reconsideration insofar as the distribution of their properties were
concerned.   His motion, however, was denied by the RTC in its Order  dated 6 September 2007.
15 16

Thereafter, both petitioner  and Respondent  filed their respective Notices of Appeal.
17 18

In a Decision  dated 20 April 2009, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC's Decision and Order
19

and upheld the validity of the parties' marriage. In reversing the RTC, the CA said that since Lea's
marriages were solemnized in 1972 and in 1979, or prior to the effectivity of the Family Code on 3
August 1988, the Civil Code is the applicable law since it is the law in effect at the time the
marriages were celebrated, and not the Family Code.  Furthermore, the CA ruled that the Civil Code
20

does not state that a judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a marriage. 21

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the CA's Decision was likewise denied in the questioned
CA Resolution dated 16 September 2009.
22

Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.

Respondent filed her Comment  praying that the CA Decision finding her marriage to petitioner valid
23

be affirmed in toto, and that all properties acquired by the spouses during their marriage be declared
conjugal. In his Reply to the Comment,  petitioner reiterated the allegations in his Petition.
24

OUR RULING

We deny the Petition.

The validity of a marriage and all its incidents must be determined in accordance with the law in
effect at the time of its celebration.  In this case, the law in force at the time Lea contracted both
25

marriages was the Civil Code. The children of the parties were also born while the Civil Code was in
effect i.e. in 1979, 1981, and 1985. Hence, the Court must resolve this case using the provisions
under the Civil Code on void marriages, in particular, Articles 80, 81,  82,  and 83 (first
26 27 28

paragraph);  and those on voidable marriages are Articles 83 (second paragraph),  85 and 86.
29 30 31 32

Under the Civil Code, a void marriage differs from a voidable marriage in the following ways: (1) a
void marriage is nonexistent - i.e., there was no marriage from the beginning - while in a voidable
marriage, the marriage is valid until annulled by a competent court; (2) a void marriage cannot be
ratified, while a voidable marriage can be ratified by cohabitation; (3) being nonexistent, a void
marriage can be collaterally attacked, while a voidable marriage cannot be collaterally attacked; (4)
in a void marriage, there is no conjugal partnership and the offspring are natural children by legal
fiction, while in voidable marriage there is conjugal partnership and the children conceived before the
decree of annulment are considered legitimate; and (5) "in a void marriage no judicial decree to
establish the invalidity is necessary," while in a voidable marriage there must be a judicial decree. 33

Emphasizing the fifth difference, this Court has held in the cases
of People v. Mendoza,   People v. Aragon,   and Odayat v. Amante,   that the Civil Code contains
34 35 36

no express provision on the necessity of a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage. 

37

In Mendoza (1954), appellant contracted three marriages in 1936, 1941, and 1949. The second
marriage was contracted in the belief that the first wife was already dead, while the third marriage
was contracted after the death of the second wife. The Court ruled that the first marriage was
deemed valid until annulled, which made the second marriage null and void for being bigamous.
Thus, the third marriage was valid, as the second marriage was void from its performance, hence,
nonexistent without the need of a judicial decree declaring it to be so.

This doctrine was reiterated in Aragon (1957), which involved substantially the same factual
antecedents. In Odayat ( 1977), citing Mendoza and Aragon, the Court likewise ruled that no judicial
decree was necessary to establish the invalidity of void marriages under Article 80 of the Civil Code.

It must be emphasized that the enactment of the Family Code rendered the rulings in Odayat,
Mendoza, and Aragon inapplicable to marriages celebrated after 3 August 1988. A judicial
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is now expressly required where the nullity of a previous
marriage is invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage.   A second marriage contracted
38

prior to the issuance of this declaration of nullity is thus considered bigamous and
void.   In Domingo v. Court of Appeals, we explained the policy behind the institution of this
39

requirement:

Marriage, a sacrosanct institution, declared by the Constitution as an "inviolable social institution, is

the foundation of the family;" as such, it "shall be protected by the State." In more explicit terms, the
Family Code characterizes it as "a special contract of permanent union between a man and a
woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life." So
crucial are marriage and the family to the stability and peace of the nation that their "nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation." As a matter of
policy, therefore, the nullification of a marriage for the purpose of contracting another cannot
be accomplished merely on the basis of the perception of both parties or of one that their
union is so defective with respect to the essential requisites of a contract of marriage as to
render it void ipso jure and with no legal effect - and nothing more. Were this so, this
inviolable social institution would be reduced to a mockery and would rest on very shaky
foundations indeed. And the grounds for nullifying marriage would be as diverse and far-ranging as
human ingenuity and fancy could conceive. For such a socially significant institution, an official
state pronouncement through the courts, and nothing less, will satisfy the exacting norms of
society. Not only would such an open and public declaration by the courts definitively
confirm the nullity of the contract of marriage, but the same would be easily verifiable
through records accessible to everyone. (Emphases supplied)
40
1âwphi1

However, as this Court clarified in Apiag v. Cantero  and Ty v. Court of Appeals,   the requirement

41 42

of a judicial decree of nullity does not apply to marriages that were celebrated before the effectivity
of the Family Code, particularly if the children of the parties were born while the Civil Code was in
force. In Ty, this Court clarified that those cases continue to be governed by Odayat, Mendoza, and
Aragon, which embodied the then-prevailing rule:

x x x. In Apiag v. Cantero, (1997) the first wife charged a municipal trial judge of immorality for
entering into a second marriage. The judge claimed that his first marriage was void since he was
merely forced into marrying his first wife whom he got pregnant. On the issue of nullity of the first
marriage, we applied Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. We held that since the second marriage took
place and all the children thereunder were born before the promulgation of Wiegel and the effectivity
of the Family Code, there is no need for a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage pursuant
to prevailing jurisprudence at that time.

Similarly, in the present case, the second marriage of private respondent was entered into in 1979,
before Wiegel. At that time, the prevailing rule was found in Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. The first
marriage of private respondent being void for lack of license and consent, there was no need for
judicial declaration of its nullity before he could contract a second marriage. In this case, therefore,
we conclude that private respondent's second marriage to petitioner is valid.

Moreover, we find that the provisions of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied to the
present case, for to do so would prejudice the vested rights of petitioner and of her children. As held
in Jison v. Court of Appeals, the Family Code has retroactive effect unless there be impairment of
vested rights. In the present case, that impairment of vested rights of petitioner and the children is
patent x x x. (Citations omitted)

As earlier explained, the rule in Odayat, Mendoza, and Aragon is applicable to this case. The Court
thus concludes that the subsequent marriage of Lea to Renato is valid in view of the invalidity of her
first marriage to Bautista because of the absence of a marriage license. That there was no judicial
declaration that the first marriage was void ab initio before the second marriage was contracted is
immaterial as this is not a requirement under the Civil Code. Nonetheless, the subsequent Decision
of the RTC of Parañaque City declaring the nullity of Lea's first marriage only serves to strengthen
the conclusion that her subsequent marriage to Renato is valid.

In view of the foregoing, it is evident that the CA did not err in upholding the validity of the marriage
between petitioner and respondent. Hence, we find no reason to disturb its ruling.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated

20 April 2009 and Resolution dated 16 September 2009 in CA-G.R. CV No. 90153 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 200233               JULY 15, 2015

LEONILA G. SANTIAGO, Petitioner, 
vs.
PEOPLEOF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

SERENO, CJ:

We resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Leonila G. Santiago from the
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 33566.  The CA affirmed
1

the Decision and Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Criminal Case No. 7232   convicting her
2

of bigamy.

THE FACTS
Four months after the solemnization of their marriage on 29 July 1997,   Leonila G. Santiago and
3

Nicanor F. Santos faced an Information   for bigamy. Petitioner pleaded "not guilty," while her
4

putative husband escaped the criminal suit.  5

The prosecution adduced evidence that Santos, who had been married to Estela Galang since 2
June 1974,   asked petitioner to marry him. Petitioner, who 'was a 43-year-old widow then, married
6

Santos on 29 July 1997 despite the advice of her brother-in-law and parents-in-law that if she
wanted to remarry, she should choose someone who was "without responsibility."  7

Petitioner asserted her affirmative defense that she could not be included as an accused in the crime
of bigamy, because she had been under the belief that Santos was still single when they got
married. She also averred that for there to be a conviction for bigamy, his second marriage to her
should be proven valid by the prosecution; but in this case, she argued that their marriage was void
due to the lack of a marriage license.

Eleven years after the inception of this criminal case, the first wife, Estela Galang, testified for the
prosecution.  She alleged that she had met petitioner as early as March and April 1997, on which
1âwphi1

occasions the former introduced herself as the legal wife of Santos. Petitioner denied this allegation
and averred that she met Galang only in August and September 1997, or after she had already
married Santos.

THE RTC RULING

The RTC appreciated the undisputed fact that petitioner married Santos during the subsistence of
his marriage to Galang. Based on the more credible account of Galang that she had already
introduced herself as the legal wife of Santos in March and April 1997, the trial court rejected the
affirmative defense of petitioner that she had not known of the first marriage. It also held that it was
incredible for a learned person like petitioner to be easily duped by a person like Santos.  8

The RTC declared that as indicated in the Certificate of Marriage, "her marriage was celebrated
without a need for a marriage license in accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code, which is an
admission that she cohabited with Santos long before the celebration of their marriage."  Thus, the
9

trial court convicted petitioner as follows:  10

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds the accused Leonila G. Santiago GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy, defined and penalized under Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code and imposes against her the indeterminate penalty of six ( 6) months and one
(1) day of Prision Correctional as minimum to six ( 6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as
maximum.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration. She contended that her marriage to Santos was void ab initio
for having been celebrated without complying with Article 34 of the Family Code, which provides an
exemption from the requirement of a marriage license if the parties have actually lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years prior to the celebration of their marriage. In her case,
petitioner asserted that she and Santos had not lived together as husband and wife for five years
prior to their marriage. Hence, she argued that the absence of a marriage license effectively
rendered their marriage null and void, justifying her acquittal from bigamy.
The RTC refused to reverse her conviction and held thus:  11

Accused Santiago submits that it is her marriage to her co-accused that is null and void as it was
celebrated without a valid marriage license x x x. In advancing that theory, accused wants this court
to pass judgment on the validity of her marriage to accused Santos, something this court cannot do.
The best support to her argument would have been the submission of a judicial decree of annulment
of their marriage. Absent such proof, this court cannot declare their marriage null and void in these
proceedings.

THE CA RULING

On appeal before the CA, petitioner claimed that her conviction was not based on proof beyond
reasonable doubt. She attacked the credibility of Galang and insisted that the former had not known
of the previous marriage of Santos.

Similar to the RTC, the CA gave more weight to the prosecution witnesses' narration. It likewise
disbelieved the testimony of Santos. Anent the lack of a marriage license, the appellate court simply
stated that the claim was a vain attempt to put the validity of her marriage to Santos in question.
Consequently, the CA affirmed her conviction for bigamy.  12

THE ISSUES

Before this Court, petitioner reiterates that she cannot be a co-accused in the instant case, because
she was not aware of Santos's previous marriage. But in the main, she argues that for there to be a
conviction for bigamy, a valid second marriage must be proven by the prosecution beyond
reasonable doubt.

Citing People v. De Lara,   she contends that her marriage to Santos is void because of the absence
13

of a marriage license. She elaborates that their marriage does not fall under any of those marriages
exempt from a marriage license, because they have not previously lived together exclusively as
husband and wife for at least five years. She alleges that it is extant in the records that she married
Santos in 1997, or only four years since she met him in 1993. Without completing the five-year
requirement, she posits that their marriage without a license is void.

In the Comment   filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), respondent advances the
14

argument that the instant Rule 45 petition should be denied for raising factual issues as regards her
husband's subsequent marriage. As regards petitioner's denial of any knowledge of Santos' s first
marriage, respondent reiterates that credible testimonial evidence supports the conclusion of the
courts a quo that petitioner knew about the subsisting marriage.

The crime of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent
spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings.

In Montanez v. Cipriano,   this Court enumerated the elements of bigamy as follows:

15

The elements of the crime of bigamy are: (a) the offender has been legally married; (b) the marriage
has not been legally dissolved x x x; (c) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (d)
the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. The felony is
consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or subsequent marriage. It is essential in
the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all the essential requirements,
would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage. (Emphasis supplied)

For the second spouse to be indicted as a co-accused in the crime, People v. Nepomuceno,
Jr.   instructs that she should have had knowledge of the previous subsisting marriage. People v.
16

Archilla   likewise states that the knowledge of the second wife of the fact of her spouse's existing
17

prior marriage constitutes an indispensable cooperation in the commission of bigamy, which makes
her responsible as an accomplice.

THE RULING OF THE COURT

The penalty for bigamy and petitioner's knowledge of Santos's first marriage

The crime of bigamy does not necessary entail the joint liability of two persons who marry each other
while the previous marriage of one of them is valid and subsisting. As explained in Nepomuceno:  18

In the crime of bigamy, both the first and second spouses may be the offended parties depending on
the circumstances, as when the second spouse married the accused without being aware of his
previous marriage. Only if the second spouse had knowledge of the previous undissolved marriage
of the accused could she be included in the information as a co-accused. (Emphasis supplied)

Therefore, the lower courts correctly ascertained petitioner's knowledge of Santos's marriage to
Galang. Both courts consistently found that she knew of the first marriage as shown by the totality of
the following circumstances:   (1) when Santos was courting and visiting petitioner in the house of
19

her in-laws, they openly showed their disapproval of him; (2) it was incredible for a learned person
like petitioner to not know of his true civil status; and (3) Galang, who was the more credible witness
compared with petitioner who had various inconsistent testimonies, straightforwardly testified that
she had already told petitioner on two occasions that the former was the legal wife of Santos.

After a careful review of the records, we see no reason to reverse or modify the factual findings of
the R TC, less so in the present case in which its findings were affirmed by the CA. Indeed, the trial
court's assessment of the credibility of witnesses deserves great respect, since it had the important
opportunity to observe firsthand the expression and demeanor of the witnesses during the trial.  20

Given that petitioner knew of the first marriage, this Court concurs with the ruling that she was validly
charged with bigamy. However, we disagree with the lower courts' imposition of the principal penalty
on her. To recall, the RTC, which the CA affirmed, meted out to her the penalty within the range of
prision correctional as minimum to prision mayor as maximum.

Her punishment as a principal to the crime is wrong. Archilla   holds that the second spouse, if
21

indicted in the crime of bigamy, is liable only as an accomplice. In referring to Viada, Justice Luis B.
Reyes, an eminent authority in criminal law, writes that "a person, whether man or woman, who
knowingly consents or agrees to be married to another already bound in lawful wedlock is guilty as
an accomplice in the crime of bigamy."   Therefore, her conviction should only be that for an
22

accomplice to the crime.

Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the penalty for a principal in the crime of
bigamy is prision mayor, which has a duration of six years and one day to twelve years. Since the
criminal participation of petitioner is that of an accomplice, the sentence imposable on her is the
penalty next lower in degree,   prision correctional, which has a duration of six months and one day
23

to six years. There being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, this penalty shall be
imposed in its medium period consisting of two years, four months and one day to four years and
two months of imprisonment. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,   petitioner shall be entitled
24

to a minimum term, to be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, arresto mayor, which has a
duration of one month and one day to six months imprisonment.

The criminal liability of petitioner resulting from her marriage to Santos

Jurisprudence clearly requires that for the accused to be convicted of bigamy, the second or
subsequent marriage must have all the essential requisites for validity.   If the accused wants to
25

raise the nullity of the marriage, he or she can do it as a matter of defense during the presentation of
evidence in the trial proper of the criminal case.   In this case, petitioner has
26

consistently  questioned below the validity of her marriage to Santos on the ground that marriages
27

celebrated without the essential requisite of a marriage license are void ab initio.  28

Unfortunately, the lower courts merely brushed aside the issue. The RTC stated that it could not
pass judgment on the validity of the marriage.  The CA held that the attempt of petitioner to attack
1âwphi1

her union with Santos was in vain.

On the basis that the lower courts have manifestly overlooked certain issues and facts,   and given
29

that an appeal in a criminal case throws the whole case open for review,   this Court now resolves to
30

correct the error of the courts a quo.

After a perusal of the records, it is clear that the marriage between petitioner and Santos took place
without a marriage license. The absence of this requirement is purportedly explained in their
Certificate of Marriage, which reveals that their union was celebrated under Article 34 of the Family
Code. The provision reads as follows:

No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The
contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law
to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the
qualifications of the contracting parties are found no legal impediment to the marriage. 31

Here, respondent did not dispute that petitioner knew Santos in more or less in February 1996   and 32

that after six months of courtship,  she married him on 29 July 1997. Without any objection from the
33

prosecution, petitioner testified that Santos had frequently visited her in Castellano, Nueva Ecija,
prior to their marriage. However, he never cohabited with her, as she was residing in the house of
her in-laws,  and her children from her previous marriage disliked him.  On cross examination,
34 35

respondent did not question the claim of petitioner that sometime in 1993, she first met Santos as an
agent who sold her piglets. 36

All told, the evidence on record shows that petitioner and Santos had only known each other for only
less than four years. Thus, it follows that the two of them could not have cohabited for at least five
years prior to their marriage.

Santiago and Santos, however, reflected the exact opposite of this demonstrable fact. Although the
records do not show that they submitted an affidavit of cohabitation as required by Article 34 of the
Family Code, it appears that the two of them lied before the solemnizing officer and misrepresented
that they had actually cohabited for at least five years before they married each other. Unfortunately,
subsequent to this lie was the issuance of the Certificate of Marriage,   in which the solemnizing
37
officer stated under oath that no marriage license was necessary, because the marriage was
solemnized under Article 34 of the Family Code.

The legal effects in a criminal case of a deliberate act to put a flaw in the marriage

The Certificate of Marriage, signed by Santos and Santiago, contained the misrepresentation
perpetrated by them that they were eligible to contract marriage without a license. We thus face an
anomalous situation wherein petitioner seeks to be acquitted of bigamy based on her illegal actions
of (1) marrying Santos without a marriage license despite knowing that they had not satisfied the
cohabitation requirement under the law; and (2) falsely making claims in no less than her marriage
contract.

We chastise this deceptive scheme that hides what is basically a bigamous and illicit marriage in an
effort to escape criminal prosecution. Our penal laws on marriage, such as bigamy, punish an
individual's deliberate disregard of the permanent and sacrosanct character of this special bond
between spouses.  In Tenebro v. Court of Appeals,  we had the occasion to emphasize that the
38 39

State's penal laws on bigamy should not be rendered nugatory by allowing individuals "to
deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the
consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the
promise of futurity and commitment."

Thus, in the case at bar, we cannot countenance petitioner's illegal acts of feigning a marriage and,
in the same breath, adjudge her innocent of the crime. For us, to do so would only make a mockery
of the sanctity of marriage. 
40

Furthermore, it is a basic concept of justice that no court will "lend its aid to x x x one who has
consciously and voluntarily become a party to an illegal act upon which the cause of action is
founded."   If the cause of action appears to arise ex turpi causa or that which involves a
41

transgression of positive law, parties shall be left unassisted by the courts.   As a result, litigants
42

shall be denied relief on the ground that their conduct has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest or
fraudulent, or deceitful as to the controversy in issue.  43

Here, the cause of action of petitioner, meaning her affirmative defense in this criminal case of
bigamy, is that her marriage with Santos was void for having been secured without a marriage
license. But as elucidated earlier, they themselves perpetrated a false Certificate of Marriage by
misrepresenting that they were exempted from the license requirement based on their fabricated
claim that they had already cohabited as husband and wife for at least five years prior their marriage.
In violation of our law against illegal marriages,  petitioner married Santos while knowing full well
44

that they had not yet complied with the five-year cohabitation requirement under Article 34 of the
Family Code. Consequently, it will be the height of absurdity for this Court to allow petitioner to use
her illegal act to escape criminal conviction.

The applicability of People v. De Lara

Petitioner cites De Lara as the relevant jurisprudence involving an acquittal for bigamy on the ground
that the second marriage lacked the requisite marriage license. In that case, the Court found that
when Domingo de Lara married his second wife, Josefa Rosales, on 18 August 1951, the local Civil
Registrar had yet to issue their marriage license on 19 August 1951. Thus, since the marriage was
celebrated one day before the issuance of the marriage license, the Court acquitted him of bigamy.

Noticeably, Domingo de Lara did not cause the falsification of public documents in order to contract
a second marriage. In contrast, petitioner and Santos fraudulently secured a Certificate of Marriage,
and petitioner later used this blatantly illicit act as basis for seeking her exculpation. Therefore,
unlike our treatment of the accused in De Lara, this Court cannot regard petitioner herein as
innocent of the crime.

No less than the present Constitution provides that "marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is
the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State."   It must be safeguarded from the
45

whims and caprices of the contracting parties.   in keeping therefore with this fundamental policy,
46

this Court affirms the conviction of petitioner for bigamy

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Leonila G. Santiago is
DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 33566 is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. As modified, petitioner Leonila G. Santiago is hereby found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy as an accomplice. She is sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of six months of arresto mayor as minimum to four years of prision
correctional as maximum plus accessory penalties provided by law.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 182438, July 02, 2014

RENE RONULO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 filed by petitioner Fr. Rene Ronulo challenging the
April 3, 2008 decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR. No. 31028 which affirmed the decision of
the Regional Trial Court, (RTC) Branch 18, Batac, Ilocos Norte.

The Factual Antecedents

The presented evidence showed that3 Joey Umadac and Claire Bingayen were scheduled to marry each other
on March 29, 2003 at the Sta. Rosa Catholic Parish Church of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte. However, on the
day of the wedding, the supposed officiating priest, Fr. Mario Ragaza, refused to solemnize the marriage
upon learning that the couple failed to secure a marriage license. As a recourse, Joey, who was then dressed
in barong tagalong, and Claire, clad in a wedding gown, together with their parents, sponsors and guests,
proceeded to the Independent Church of Filipino Christians, also known as the Aglipayan Church. They
requested the petitioner, an Aglipayan priest, to perform a ceremony to which the latter agreed despite
having been informed by the couple that they had no marriage certificate.

The petitioner prepared his choir and scheduled a mass for the couple on the same date. He conducted the
ceremony in the presence of the groom, the bride, their parents, the principal and secondary sponsors and
the rest of their invited guests.4

An information for violation of Article 352 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, was filed against
the petitioner before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Batac, Ilocos Norte for allegedly performing an illegal
marriage ceremony.5

The petitioner entered the plea of “not guilty” to the crime charged on arraignment.

The prosecution’s witnesses, Joseph and Mary Anne Yere, testified on the incidents of the ceremony. Joseph
was the veil sponsor while Mary Anne was the cord sponsor in the wedding. Mary Anne testified that she saw
the bride walk down the aisle. She also saw the couple exchange their wedding rings, kiss each other, and
sign a document.6 She heard the petitioner instructing the principal sponsors to sign the marriage contract.
Thereafter, they went to the reception, had lunch and took pictures. She saw the petitioner there. She also
identified the wedding invitation given to her by Joey.7
Florida Umadac, the mother of Joey, testified that she heard the couple declare during the ceremony that
they take each other as husband and wife. 8 Days after the wedding, she went to the municipal local civil
registrar of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte with Atty. Mariano R. Nalupta Jr. where she was given a certificate that
no marriage license was issued to the couple.9

The petitioner, while admitting that he conducted a ceremony, denied that his act of blessing the couple was
tantamount to a solemnization of the marriage as contemplated by law.10

The MTC Judgment

The MTC found the petitioner guilty of violation of Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, and imposed on him
a P200.00 fine pursuant to Section 44 of Act No. 3613. It held that the petitioner’s act of giving a blessing
constitutes a marriage ceremony as he made an official church recognition of the cohabitation of the couple
as husband and wife.11 It further ruled that in performing a marriage ceremony without the couple’s
marriage license, the petitioner violated Article 352 of the RPC which imposes the penalty provided under
Act No. 3613 or the Marriage Law. The MTC applied Section 44 of the Marriage Law which pertinently states
that a violation of any of its provisions that is not specifically penalized or of the regulations to be
promulgated, shall be punished by a fine of not more than two hundred pesos or by imprisonment of not
more than one month, or both, in the discretion of the court.

The RPC is a law subsequent to the Marriage Law, and provides the penalty for violation of the latter law.
Applying these laws, the MTC imposed the penalty of a fine in the amount of P200.00.12

The RTC Ruling

The RTC affirmed the findings of the MTC and added that the circumstances surrounding the act of the
petitioner in “blessing” the couple unmistakably show that a marriage ceremony had transpired. It further
ruled that the positive declarations of the prosecution witnesses deserve more credence than the petitioner’s
negative statements.13 The RTC, however, ruled that the basis of the fine should be Section 39, instead of
Section 44, of the Marriage Law.

The CA Decision

On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC’s ruling. The CA observed that although there is no prescribed form or
religious rite for the solemnization of marriage, the law provides minimum standards in determining whether
a marriage ceremony has been conducted, viz.: (1) the contracting parties must appear personally before
the solemnizing officer; and (2) they should declare that they take each other as husband and wife in the
presence of at least two witnesses of legal age.14 According to the CA, the prosecution duly proved these
requirements. It added that the presence of a marriage certificate is not a requirement in a marriage
ceremony.15

The CA additionally ruled that the petitioner’s criminal liability under Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, is
not dependent on whether Joey or Claire were charged or found guilty under Article 350 of the same Code.16

The CA agreed with the MTC that the legal basis for the imposition of the fine is Section 44 of the Marriage
Law since it covers violation of regulations to be promulgated by the proper authorities such as the RPC.

The Petition

The petitioner argues that the CA erred on the following grounds:

First, Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, is vague and does not define what constitutes “an illegal marriage
ceremony.” Assuming that a marriage ceremony principally constitutes those enunciated in Article 55 of the
Civil Code and Article 6 of the Family Code, these provisions require the verbal declaration that the couple
take each other as husband and wife, and a marriage certificate containing the declaration in writing which
is duly signed by the contracting parties and attested to by the solemnizing officer.17 The petitioner likewise
maintains that the prosecution failed to prove that the contracting parties personally declared that they take
each other as husband and wife.18

Second, under the principle of separation of church and State, the State cannot interfere in ecclesiastical
affairs such as the administration of matrimony. Therefore, the State cannot convert the “blessing” into a
“marriage ceremony.”19

Third, the petitioner had no criminal intent as he conducted the “blessing” in good faith for purposes of
giving moral guidance to the couple.20

Fourth, the non-filing of a criminal case against the couple in violating Article 350 of the RPC, as amended,
should preclude the filing of the present case against him.21

Finally, Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not provide for a penalty. The present case is not covered
by Section 44 of the Marriage Law as the petitioner was not found violating its provisions nor a regulation
promulgated thereafter. 22

THE COURT’S RULING:

We find the petition unmeritorious.

The elements of the crime

punishable under Article 352 of the
RPC, as amended, were proven by
the prosecution

Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, penalizes an authorized solemnizing officer who shall perform or
authorize any illegal marriage ceremony. The elements of this crime are as follows: (1) authority of the
solemnizing officer; and (2) his performance of an illegal marriage ceremony.

In the present case, the petitioner admitted that he has authority to solemnize a marriage. Hence,
the only issue to be resolved is whether the alleged “blessing” by the petitioner is tantamount to the
performance of an “illegal marriage ceremony” which is punishable under Article 352 of the RPC, as
amended.

While Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not specifically define a “marriage ceremony” and what
constitutes its “illegal” performance, Articles 3(3) and 6 of the Family Code are clear on these matters.
These provisions were taken from Article 5523 of the New Civil Code which, in turn, was copied from Section
324 of the Marriage Law with no substantial amendments.

Article 625 of the Family Code provides that “[n]o prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of
the marriage is required. It shall be necessary, however, for the contracting parties to appear personally
before the solemnizing officer and declare in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal
age that they take each other as husband and wife.”26

Pertinently, Article 3(3)27 mirrors Article 6 of the Family Code and particularly defines a marriage ceremony
as that which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and
their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than
two witnesses of legal age.

Even prior to the date of the enactment of Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, the rule was clear that no
prescribed form of religious rite for the solemnization of the marriage is required. However, as correctly
found by the CA, the law sets the minimum requirements constituting a marriage ceremony: first, there
should be the personal appearance of the contracting parties before a solemnizing officer; and second, their
declaration in the presence of not less than two witnesses that they take each other as husband and wife.

As to the first requirement, the petitioner admitted that the parties appeared before him and this fact was
testified to by witnesses. On the second requirement, we find that, contrary to the petitioner’s allegation,
the prosecution has proven, through the testimony of Florida, that the contracting parties personally
declared that they take each other as husband and wife.

The petitioner’s allegation that the court asked insinuating and leading questions to Florida fails to persuade
us. A judge may examine or cross-examine a witness. He may propound clarificatory questions to test the
credibility of the witness and to extract the truth. He may seek to draw out relevant and material testimony
though that testimony may tend to support or rebut the position taken by one or the other party. It cannot
be taken against him if the clarificatory questions he propounds happen to reveal certain truths that tend to
destroy the theory of one party.28

At any rate, if the defense found the line of questioning of the judge objectionable, its failure to timely
register this bars it from belatedly invoking any irregularity.

In addition, the testimonies of Joseph and Mary Anne, and even the petitioner’s admission regarding the
circumstances of the ceremony, support Florida’s testimony that there had indeed been the declaration by
the couple that they take each other as husband and wife. The testimony of Joey disowning their declaration
as husband and wife cannot overcome these clear and convincing pieces of evidence. Notably, the defense
failed to show that the prosecution witnesses, Joseph and Mary Anne, had any ill-motive to testify against
the petitioner.

We also do not agree with the petitioner that the principle of separation of church and State precludes the
State from qualifying the church “blessing” into a marriage ceremony. Contrary to the petitioner’s allegation,
this principle has been duly preserved by Article 6 of the Family Code when it provides that no prescribed
form or religious rite for the solemnization of marriage is required. This pronouncement gives any religion or
sect the freedom or latitude in conducting its respective marital rites, subject only to the requirement that
the core requirements of law be observed.

We emphasize at this point that Article 1529 of the Constitution recognizes marriage as an inviolable social
institution and that our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social
institution in which the State is vitally interested. The State has paramount interest in the enforcement of its
constitutional policies and the preservation of the sanctity of marriage. To this end, it is within its power to
enact laws and regulations, such as Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, which penalize the commission of
acts resulting in the disintegration and mockery of marriage.

From these perspectives, we find it clear that what the petitioner conducted was a marriage ceremony, as
the minimum requirements set by law were complied with. While the petitioner may view this merely as a
“blessing,” the presence of the requirements of the law constitutive of a marriage ceremony qualified this
“blessing” into a “marriage ceremony” as contemplated by Article 3(3) of the Family Code and Article 352 of
the RPC, as amended.

We come now to the issue of whether the solemnization by the petitioner of this marriage ceremony was
illegal.

Under Article 3(3) of the Family Code, one of the essential requisites of marriage is the presence of a valid
marriage certificate. In the present case, the petitioner admitted that he knew that the couple had no
marriage license, yet he conducted the “blessing” of their relationship.

Undoubtedly, the petitioner conducted the marriage ceremony despite knowledge that the essential and
formal requirements of marriage set by law were lacking. The marriage ceremony, therefore, was
illegal. The petitioner’s knowledge of the absence of these requirements negates his defense of good faith.

We also do not agree with the petitioner that the lack of a marriage certificate negates his criminal liability
in the present case. For purposes of determining if a marriage ceremony has been conducted, a marriage
certificate is not included in the requirements provided by Article 3(3) of the Family Code, as discussed
above.

Neither does the non-filing of a criminal complaint against the couple negate criminal liability of the
petitioner. Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not make this an element of the crime.

The penalty imposed is proper

On the issue on the penalty for violation of Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, this provision clearly
provides that it shall be imposed in accordance with the provision of the Marriage Law. The penalty
provisions of the Marriage Law are Sections 39 and 44 which provide as follows:

Section 39 of the Marriage Law provides that: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Section 39. Illegal Solemnization of Marriage – Any priest or minister solemnizing marriage without being
authorized by the Director of the Philippine National Library or who, upon solemnizing marriage, refuses to
exhibit the authorization in force when called upon to do so by the parties or parents, grandparents,
guardians, or persons having charge and any bishop or officer, priest, or minister of any church, religion or
sect the regulations and practices whereof require banns or publications previous to the solemnization of a
marriage in accordance with section ten, who authorized the immediate solemnization of a marriage that is
subsequently declared illegal; or any officer, priest or minister solemnizing marriage in violation of
this act, shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one month nor more than two years, or by a
fine of not less than two hundred pesos nor more than two thousand pesos. [emphasis ours]

On the other hand, Section 44 of the Marriage Law states that: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Section 44. General Penal Clause – Any violation of any provision of this Act not specifically penalized, or of
the regulations to be promulgated by the proper authorities, shall be punished by a fine of not more
than two hundred pesos or by imprisonment for not more than one month, or both, in the discretion of the
court. [emphasis ours]

From a reading of the provisions cited above, we find merit in the ruling of the CA and the MTC that the
penalty imposable in the present case is that covered under Section 44, and not Section 39, of the Marriage
Law.

The penalized acts under Section 39 of Act No. 3613 do not include the present case. As correctly found by
the MTC, the petitioner was not found violating the provisions of the Marriage Law but Article 352 of the
RPC, as amended. It is only the imposition of the penalty for the violation of this provision which is referred
to the Marriage Law. On this point, Article 352 falls squarely under the provision of Section 44 of Act No.
3613 which provides for the penalty for any violation of the regulations to be promulgated by the proper
authorities; Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, which was enacted after the Marriage Law, is one of such
regulations.

Therefore, the CA did not err in imposing the penalty of fine of P200.00 pursuant to Section 44 of the
Marriage Law.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 3, 2008 in
CA-G.R. CR. No. 31028.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 196049               June 26, 2013

MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER, 
vs.
MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON
CITY, AND THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL
STATISTICS OFFICE,RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a direct recourse to this Court from the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 107, Quezon City,
through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court on a pure question of
law. The petition assails the Order1 dated 31 January 2011 of the RTC in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582
and its Resolution dated 2 March 2011 denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC
dismissed the petition for "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of
Marriage)" based on improper venue and the lack of personality of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file the
petition.
 The Facts

Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz Galela
Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines2 on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with
petitioner’s parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they
lost contact with each other.

In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first marriage
being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines.
Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from
Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.3

Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki
helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the marriage between
Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy.4 On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in
the RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of
Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized; (2) that the
bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab initiounder Articles 35(4)
and 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines;5 and (3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar
of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment on the Certificate of Marriage
between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the Office of the Administrator
and Civil Registrar General in the National Statistics Office (NSO).6

The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC immediately issued an Order dismissing the
petition and withdrawing the case from its active civil docket.7 The RTC cited the following provisions
of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC):

Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. –

(a) Who may file. – A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely
by the husband or the wife.

xxxx

Sec. 4. Venue. – The petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or city where the
petitioner or the respondent has been residing for at least six months prior to the date of filing, or in
the case of a non-resident respondent, where he may be found in the Philippines, at the election of
the petitioner. x x x

The RTC ruled, without further explanation, that the petition was in "gross violation" of the above
provisions. The trial court based its dismissal on Section 5(4) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which
provides that "[f]ailure to comply with any of the preceding requirements may be a ground for
immediate dismissal of the petition."8 Apparently, the RTC took the view that only "the husband or
the wife," in this case either Maekara or Marinay, can file the petition to declare their marriage void,
and not Fujiki.

Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered. He argued that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC contemplated
ordinary civil actions for declaration of nullity and annulment of marriage. Thus, A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC does not apply. A petition for recognition of foreign judgment is a special proceeding, which
"seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact,"9 and not a civil action which is "for the
enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong."10 In other words, the
petition in the RTC sought to establish (1) the status and concomitant rights of Fujiki and Marinay as
husband and wife and (2) the fact of the rendition of the Japanese Family Court judgment declaring
the marriage between Marinay and Maekara as void on the ground of bigamy. The petitioner
contended that the Japanese judgment was consistent with Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the
Philippines11 on bigamy and was therefore entitled to recognition by Philippine courts.12

In any case, it was also Fujiki’s view that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applied only to void marriages under
Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.13 Thus, Section 2(a) of A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC provides that "a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages may be
filed solely by the husband or the wife." To apply Section 2(a) in bigamy would be absurd because
only the guilty parties would be permitted to sue. In the words of Fujiki, "[i]t is not, of course, difficult
to realize that the party interested in having a bigamous marriage declared a nullity would be the
husband in the prior, pre-existing marriage."14 Fujiki had material interest and therefore the
personality to nullify a bigamous marriage.

Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of
Court is applicable. Rule 108 is the "procedural implementation" of the Civil Register Law (Act No.
3753)15 in relation to Article 413 of the Civil Code.16 The Civil Register Law imposes a duty on the
"successful petitioner for divorce or annulment of marriage to send a copy of the final decree of the
court to the local registrar of the municipality where the dissolved or annulled marriage was
solemnized."17 Section 2 of Rule 108 provides that entries in the civil registry relating to "marriages,"
"judgments of annulments of marriage" and "judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning"
are subject to cancellation or correction.18 The petition in the RTC sought (among others) to annotate
the judgment of the Japanese Family Court on the certificate of marriage between Marinay and
Maekara.

Fujiki’s motion for reconsideration in the RTC also asserted that the trial court "gravely erred" when,
on its own, it dismissed the petition based on improper venue. Fujiki stated that the RTC may be
confusing the concept of venue with the concept of jurisdiction, because it is lack of jurisdiction
which allows a court to dismiss a case on its own. Fujiki cited Dacoycoy v. Intermediate Appellate
Court19 which held that the "trial court cannot pre-empt the defendant’s prerogative to object to the
improper laying of the venue by motu proprio dismissing the case."20Moreover, petitioner alleged that
the trial court should not have "immediately dismissed" the petition under Section 5 of A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC because he substantially complied with the provision.

On 2 March 2011, the RTC resolved to deny petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. In its Resolution,
the RTC stated that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies because the petitioner, in effect, prays for a
decree of absolute nullity of marriage.21 The trial court reiterated its two grounds for dismissal, i.e.
lack of personality to sue and improper venue under Sections 2(a) and 4 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
The RTC considered Fujiki as a "third person"22 in the proceeding because he "is not the husband in
the decree of divorce issued by the Japanese Family Court, which he now seeks to be judicially
recognized, x x x."23 On the other hand, the RTC did not explain its ground of impropriety of venue. It
only said that "[a]lthough the Court cited Sec. 4 (Venue) x x x as a ground for dismissal of this case[,]
it should be taken together with the other ground cited by the Court x x x which is Sec. 2(a) x x x."24

The RTC further justified its motu proprio dismissal of the petition based on Braza v. The City Civil
Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental.25 The Court in Braza ruled that "[i]n a special
proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the
Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages x x x."26 Braza emphasized
that the "validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct
action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through a collateral attack such as [a] petition
[for correction of entry] x x x."27

The RTC considered the petition as a collateral attack on the validity of marriage between Marinay
and Maekara. The trial court held that this is a "jurisdictional ground" to dismiss the
petition.28 Moreover, the verification and certification against forum shopping of the petition was not
authenticated as required under Section 529 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. Hence, this also warranted the
"immediate dismissal" of the petition under the same provision.

The Manifestation and Motion of the Office of the Solicitor General and the Letters of Marinay
and Maekara

On 30 May 2011, the Court required respondents to file their comment on the petition for
review.30 The public respondents, the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and the Administrator and
Civil Registrar General of the NSO, participated through the Office of the Solicitor General. Instead
of a comment, the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion.31

The Solicitor General agreed with the petition. He prayed that the RTC’s "pronouncement that the
petitioner failed to comply with x x x A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC x x x be set aside" and that the case be
reinstated in the trial court for further proceedings.32 The Solicitor General argued that Fujiki, as the
spouse of the first marriage, is an injured party who can sue to declare the bigamous marriage
between Marinay and Maekara void. The Solicitor General cited Juliano-Llave v. Republic33 which
held that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in cases of bigamy. In Juliano-Llave,
this Court explained:

[t]he subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or she had only discovered
during the connubial period that the marriage was bigamous, and especially if the conjugal bliss had
already vanished. Should parties in a subsequent marriage benefit from the bigamous marriage, it
would not be expected that they would file an action to declare the marriage void and thus, in such
circumstance, the "injured spouse" who should be given a legal remedy is the one in a subsisting
previous marriage. The latter is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only
threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it
causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse. The subsequent marriage will always be a reminder
of the infidelity of the spouse and the disregard of the prior marriage which sanctity is protected by
the Constitution.34

The Solicitor General contended that the petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment
may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding.35 In Corpuz v. Santo Tomas,36 this Court held that "[t]he
recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object
of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the
status or right of a party or a particular fact."37 While Corpuzconcerned a foreign divorce decree, in
the present case the Japanese Family Court judgment also affected the civil status of the parties,
especially Marinay, who is a Filipino citizen.

The Solicitor General asserted that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is the procedure to record "[a]cts,
events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons" in the civil registry as required by
Article 407 of the Civil Code. In other words, "[t]he law requires the entry in the civil registry of
judicial decrees that produce legal consequences upon a person’s legal capacity and status x x
x."38 The Japanese Family Court judgment directly bears on the civil status of a Filipino citizen and
should therefore be proven as a fact in a Rule 108 proceeding.
Moreover, the Solicitor General argued that there is no jurisdictional infirmity in assailing a void
marriage under Rule 108, citing De Castro v. De Castro39 and Niñal v. Bayadog40 which declared that
"[t]he validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked."41

Marinay and Maekara individually sent letters to the Court to comply with the directive for them to
comment on the petition.42 Maekara wrote that Marinay concealed from him the fact that she was
previously married to Fujiki.43Maekara also denied that he inflicted any form of violence on
Marinay.44 On the other hand, Marinay wrote that she had no reason to oppose the petition.45 She
would like to maintain her silence for fear that anything she say might cause misunderstanding
between her and Fujiki.46

The Issues

Petitioner raises the following legal issues:

(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.

(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign
judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen
on the ground of bigamy.

(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding for
cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court.

The Ruling of the Court

We grant the petition.

The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages
(A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the
status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-
Llave v. Republic,47 this Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the husband or
wife can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage "does not apply if the reason behind the
petition is bigamy."48

I.

For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one
of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign judgment
as a fact under the Rules of Court. To be more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment may be
admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule
39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.49 Petitioner may prove the Japanese Family Court judgment
through (1) an official publication or (2) a certification or copy attested by the officer who has custody
of the judgment. If the office which has custody is in a foreign country such as Japan, the
certification may be made by the proper diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine foreign
service in Japan and authenticated by the seal of office.50

To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of foreign judgment would
mean that the trial court and the parties should follow its provisions, including the form and contents
of the petition,51 the service of summons,52 the investigation of the public prosecutor,53 the setting of
pre-trial,54 the trial55 and the judgment of the trial court.56 This is absurd because it will litigate the
case anew. It will defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign judgments, which is "to limit repetitive
litigation on claims and issues."57 The interpretation of the RTC is tantamount to relitigating the case
on the merits. In Mijares v. Rañada,58 this Court explained that "[i]f every judgment of a foreign court
were reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff would be forced back on his/her original cause of action,
rendering immaterial the previously concluded litigation."59

A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status, condition and legal
capacity of its parties. However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the
effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts must determine if the foreign
judgment is consistent with domestic public policy and other mandatory laws.60 Article 15 of the Civil
Code provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad." This is
the rule of lex nationalii in private international law. Thus, the Philippine State may require, for
effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign judgment affecting its
citizen, over whom it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status, condition and legal
capacity of such citizen.

A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not require relitigation
under a Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.
Philippine courts cannot presume to know the foreign laws under which the foreign judgment was
rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment on the status, condition and legal capacity of the
foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine courts can only
recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according to the rules of evidence.

Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign judgment or final order against a
person creates a "presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in
interest by a subsequent title." Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules of Court states that "the judgment
or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." Thus, Philippine courts exercise limited review on
foreign judgments. Courts are not allowed to delve into the merits of a foreign judgment. Once a
foreign judgment is admitted and proven in a Philippine court, it can only be repelled on grounds
external to its merits, i.e. , "want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact." The rule on limited review embodies the policy of efficiency and the
protection of party expectations,61 as well as respecting the jurisdiction of other states.62

Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,63 Philippine courts have recognized foreign divorce
decrees between a Filipino and a foreign citizen if they are successfully proven under the rules of
evidence.64 Divorce involves the dissolution of a marriage, but the recognition of a foreign divorce
decree does not involve the extended procedure under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the rules of
ordinary trial. While the Philippines does not have a divorce law, Philippine courts may, however,
recognize a foreign divorce decree under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, to
capacitate a Filipino citizen to remarry when his or her foreign spouse obtained a divorce decree
abroad.65

There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the Japanese Family Court
judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While the
Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is fully consistent with
Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void from the beginning under Article
35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus,
Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court judgment in accordance with Rule 132,
Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.

II.

Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the judgment, it may be
made in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule
108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that "[a] special
proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact."
Rule 108 creates a remedy to rectify facts of a person’s life which are recorded by the State
pursuant to the Civil Register Law or Act No. 3753. These are facts of public consequence such as
birth, death or marriage,66 which the State has an interest in recording. As noted by the Solicitor
General, in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas this Court declared that "[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce
decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as
that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a
particular fact."67

Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:

Sec. 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested in any act, event, order or
decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil
register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto,
with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located.
(Emphasis supplied)

Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying
the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the judgment
concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For the same reason he has the personality to file a
petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil
registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.

There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the
integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property relations arising from it. There is also no
doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil registry,
which compromises the public record of his marriage. The interest derives from the substantive right
of the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances68) his most intimate human
relation, but also to protect his property interests that arise by operation of law the moment he
contracts marriage.69 These property interests in marriage include the right to be supported "in
keeping with the financial capacity of the family"70 and preserving the property regime of the
marriage.71

Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution,72 but a spouse’s right in a
marriage extends further to relational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights and Obligations
between Husband and Wife") of the Family Code.73 A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC cannot "diminish,
increase, or modify" the substantive right of the spouse to maintain the integrity of his marriage.74 In
any case, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC preserves this substantive right by limiting the
personality to sue to the husband or the wife of the union recognized by law.

Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a subsisting marriage to
question the validity of a subsequent marriage on the ground of bigamy. On the contrary, when
Section 2(a) states that "[a] petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be
filed solely by the husband or the wife"75—it refers to the husband or the wife of the subsisting
marriage. Under Article 35(4) of the Family Code, bigamous marriages are void from the beginning.
Thus, the parties in a bigamous marriage are neither the husband nor the wife under the law. The
husband or the wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the one who has the personality to file a
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage under Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC.

Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous marriages void from the beginning, is the
civil aspect of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code,76 which penalizes bigamy. Bigamy is a public
crime. Thus, anyone can initiate prosecution for bigamy because any citizen has an interest in the
prosecution and prevention of crimes.77 If anyone can file a criminal action which leads to the
declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage,78 there is more reason to confer personality to sue on
the husband or the wife of a subsisting marriage. The prior spouse does not only share in the public
interest of prosecuting and preventing crimes, he is also personally interested in the purely civil
aspect of protecting his marriage.

When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the spouse is clearly an injured party
and is therefore interested in the judgment of the suit.79 Juliano-Llave ruled that the prior spouse "is
clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and the
property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the
prior spouse."80 Being a real party in interest, the prior spouse is entitled to sue in order to declare a
bigamous marriage void. For this purpose, he can petition a court to recognize a foreign judgment
nullifying the bigamous marriage and judicially declare as a fact that such judgment is effective in the
Philippines. Once established, there should be no more impediment to cancel the entry of the
bigamous marriage in the civil registry.

III.

In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, this Court held that a
"trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages" in a special proceeding for cancellation or
correction of entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.81 Thus, the "validity of marriage[] x x x can
be questioned only in a direct action" to nullify the marriage.82 The RTC relied on Braza in dismissing
the petition for recognition of foreign judgment as a collateral attack on the marriage between
Marinay and Maekara.

Braza is not applicable because Braza does not involve a recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying
a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country.

To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute
for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the
substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
and other related laws. Among these safeguards are the requirement of proving the limited grounds
for the dissolution of marriage,83 support pendente lite of the spouses and children,84 the liquidation,
partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses,85 and the investigation of the public
prosecutor to determine collusion.86 A direct action for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage
is also necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the Family
Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or correction of entries in
the civil registry may be filed in the Regional Trial Court "where the corresponding civil registry is
located."87 In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of
changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry.

However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or cancellation of a civil registry entry based
on the recognition of a foreign judgment annulling a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of
the foreign country. There is neither circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of
marriage under Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A
recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action for Philippine
courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case which was
already tried and decided under foreign law. The procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not
apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment annulling a bigamous marriage where one of the
parties is a citizen of the foreign country. Neither can R.A. No. 8369 define the jurisdiction of the
foreign court.

Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign
divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the
dissolution of the marriage. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides that
"[w]here a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." In Republic v. Orbecido,88 this Court
recognized the legislative intent of the second paragraph of Article 26 which is "to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a
divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse"89 under the laws of his or her country. The
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code only authorizes Philippine courts to adopt the
effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow divorce.
Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits because it is tantamount to trying a case for
divorce.

The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective measure to address the anomaly that results
from a marriage between a Filipino, whose laws do not allow divorce, and a foreign citizen, whose
laws allow divorce. The anomaly consists in the Filipino spouse being tied to the marriage while the
foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country. The correction is made by
extending in the Philippines the effect of the foreign divorce decree, which is already effective in the
country where it was rendered. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is based on
this Court’s decision in Van Dorn v. Romillo90 which declared that the Filipino spouse "should not be
discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served."91

The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a marriage between a Filipino and a foreign
citizen who obtains a foreign judgment nullifying the marriage on the ground of bigamy. The Filipino
spouse may file a petition abroad to declare the marriage void on the ground of bigamy. The
principle in the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code applies because the foreign
spouse, after the foreign judgment nullifying the marriage, is capacitated to remarry under the laws
of his or her country. If the foreign judgment is not recognized in the Philippines, the Filipino spouse
will be discriminated—the foreign spouse can remarry while the Filipino spouse cannot remarry.

Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts are empowered to
correct a situation where the Filipino spouse is still tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is
free to marry. Moreover, notwithstanding Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts already
have jurisdiction to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines to the extent that the
foreign judgment does not contravene domestic public policy. A critical difference between the case
of a foreign divorce decree and a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is that bigamy, as
a ground for the nullity of marriage, is fully consistent with Philippine public policy as expressed in
Article 35(4) of the Family Code and Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The Filipino spouse has
the option to undergo full trial by filing a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC, but this is not the only remedy available to him or her. Philippine courts have
jurisdiction to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage, without prejudice to a
criminal prosecution for bigamy.
In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute their
judgment on how a case was decided under foreign law. They cannot decide on the "family rights
and duties, or on the status, condition and legal capacity" of the foreign citizen who is a party to the
foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the question of whether to extend the effect
of a foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage
involving a citizen of a foreign country, Philippine courts only decide whether to extend its effect to
the Filipino party, under the rule of lex nationalii expressed in Article 15 of the Civil Code.

For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign judgment is
inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging party is
able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. If there is neither inconsistency
with public policy nor adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts should, by default,
recognize the foreign judgment as part of the comity of nations. Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules
of Court states that the foreign judgment is already "presumptive evidence of a right between the
parties." Upon recognition of the foreign judgment, this right becomes conclusive and the judgment
serves as the basis for the correction or cancellation of entry in the civil registry. The recognition of
the foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is a subsequent event that establishes a new
status, right and fact92 that needs to be reflected in the civil registry. Otherwise, there will be an
inconsistency between the recognition of the effectivity of the foreign judgment and the public
records in the Philippines.1âwphi1

However, the recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is without prejudice to
prosecution for bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.93 The recognition of a foreign
judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is not a ground for extinction of criminal liability under
Articles 89 and 94 of the Revised Penal Code. Moreover, under Article 91 of the Revised Penal
Code, "[t]he term of prescription [of the crime of bigamy] shall not run when the offender is absent
from the Philippine archipelago."

Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is inapplicable, the Court no longer sees the need to address the
questions on venue and the contents and form of the petition under Sections 4 and 5, respectively,
of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Order dated 31 January 2011 and the Resolution dated
2 March 2011 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 107, Quezon City, in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to REINSTATE the
petition for further proceedings in accordance with this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 188289               August 20, 2014

DAVID A. NOVERAS, Petitioner, 
vs.
LETICIA T. NOVERAS, Respondent.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review assailing the 9 May 2008 Decision  of the Court of Appeals in
1

CA-G.R .. CV No. 88686, which affirmed in part the 8 December 2006 Decision  of the Regional Trial
2

Court (RTC) of Baler, Aurora, Branch 96.

The factual antecedents are as follow:

David A. Noveras (David) and Leticia T. Noveras (Leticia) were married on 3 December 1988 in
Quezon City, Philippines. They resided in California, United States of America (USA) where they
eventually acquired American citizenship. They then begot two children, namely: Jerome T.

Noveras, who was born on 4 November 1990 and JenaT. Noveras, born on 2 May 1993. David was
engaged in courier service business while Leticia worked as a nurse in San Francisco, California.

During the marriage, they acquired the following properties in the Philippines and in the USA:

PHILIPPINES

PROPERTY FAIR MARKET VALUE

House and Lot with an area of 150 sq. m. ₱1,693,125.00

located at 1085 Norma Street, Sampaloc,
Manila (Sampaloc property)
Agricultural land with an area of 20,742 sq. ₱400,000.00
m. located at Laboy, Dipaculao, Aurora
A parcel of land with an area of 2.5 hectares ₱490,000.00
located at Maria Aurora, Aurora
3
A parcel of land with an area of 175 sq.m. ₱175,000.00
located at Sabang Baler, Aurora
3-has. coconut plantation in San Joaquin ₱750,000.00
Maria Aurora, Aurora

USA

PROPERTY FAIR MARKET VALUE

House and Lot at 1155 Hanover Street, Daly

City, California
$550,000.00
(unpaid debt of $285,000.00)
Furniture and furnishings $3,000

Jewelries (ring and watch) $9,000

2000 Nissan Frontier 4x4 pickup truck $13,770.00

 Bank of America Checking Account $8,000

Bank of America Cash Deposit

Life Insurance (Cash Value) $100,000.00

4
Retirement, pension, profit-sharing, annuities $56,228.00

The Sampaloc property used to beowned by David’s parents. The parties herein secured a loan from
a bank and mortgaged the property. When said property was about to be foreclosed, the couple paid
a total of ₱1.5 Million for the redemption of the same.

Due to business reverses, David left the USA and returned to the Philippines in 2001. In December
2002,Leticia executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) authorizing David to sell the Sampaloc
property for ₱2.2 Million. According to Leticia, sometime in September 2003, David abandoned his
family and lived with Estrellita Martinez in Aurora province. Leticia claimed that David agreed toand
executed a Joint Affidavit with Leticia in the presence of David’s father, Atty. Isaias Noveras, on 3
December 2003 stating that: 1) the ₱1.1Million proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc property
shall be paid to and collected by Leticia; 2) that David shall return and pay to Leticia ₱750,000.00,
which is equivalent to half of the amount of the redemption price of the Sampaloc property; and 3)
that David shall renounce and forfeit all his rights and interest in the conjugal and real properties
situated in the Philippines.  David was able to collect ₱1,790,000.00 from the sale of the Sampaloc
5

property, leaving an unpaid balance of ₱410,000.00.

Upon learning that David had an extra-marital affair, Leticia filed a petition for divorce with the
Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo, USA. The California court granted the divorce on
24 June 2005 and judgment was duly entered on 29 June 2005.  The California court granted to
6

Leticia the custody of her two children, as well as all the couple’s properties in the USA. 7

On 8 August 2005, Leticia filed a petition for Judicial Separation of Conjugal Property before the
RTC of Baler, Aurora. She relied on the 3 December 2003 Joint Affidavit and David’s failure to
comply with his obligation under the same. She prayed for: 1) the power to administer all conjugal
properties in the Philippines; 2) David and his partner to cease and desist from selling the subject
conjugal properties; 3) the declaration that all conjugal properties be forfeited in favor of her children;
4) David to remit half of the purchase price as share of Leticia from the sale of the Sampaloc
property; and 5) the payment of₱50,000.00 and ₱100,000.00 litigation expenses. 8

In his Answer, David stated that a judgment for the dissolution of their marriage was entered on 29
June 2005 by the Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo. He demanded that the conjugal
partnership properties, which also include the USA properties, be liquidated and that all expenses of
liquidation, including attorney’s fees of both parties be charged against the conjugal partnership. 9

The RTC of Baler, Aurora simplified the issues as follow:

1. Whether or not respondent David A. Noveras committed acts of abandonment and marital
infidelity which can result intothe forfeiture of the parties’ properties in favor of the petitioner
and their two (2) children.

2. Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the properties in California, U.S.A. and the
same can be included in the judicial separation prayed for.
 3. Whether or not the "Joint Affidavit" x x x executed by petitioner Leticia T. Noveras and
respondent David A. Noveras will amount to a waiver or forfeiture of the latter’s property
rights over their conjugal properties.

4. Whether or not Leticia T. Noveras isentitled to reimbursement of onehalf of the ₱2.2

[M]illion sales proceeds of their property in Sampaloc, Manila and one-half of the ₱1.5
[M]illion used to redeem the property of Atty. Isaias Noveras, including interests and charges.

5. How the absolute community properties should be distributed.

6. Whether or not the attorney’s feesand litigation expenses of the parties were chargeable
against their conjugal properties.

Corollary to the aboveis the issue of:

Whether or not the two common children of the parties are entitled to support and presumptive
legitimes.
10

On 8 December 2006, the RTC rendered judgment as follows:

1. The absolute community of property of the parties is hereby declared DISSOLVED;

2. The net assets of the absolute community of property ofthe parties in the Philippines are
hereby ordered to be awarded to respondent David A. Noveras only, with the properties in
the United States of America remaining in the sole ownership of petitioner Leticia Noveras
a.k.a. Leticia Tacbiana pursuant to the divorce decree issuedby the Superior Court of
California, County of San Mateo, United States of America, dissolving the marriage of the
parties as of June 24, 2005. The titles presently covering said properties shall be cancelled
and new titles be issued in the name of the party to whom said properties are awarded;

3. One-half of the properties awarded to respondent David A. Noveras in the preceding

paragraph are hereby given to Jerome and Jena, his two minor children with petitioner
LeticiaNoveras a.k.a. Leticia Tacbiana as their presumptive legitimes and said legitimes must
be annotated on the titles covering the said properties.Their share in the income from these
properties shall be remitted to them annually by the respondent within the first half of
January of each year, starting January 2008;

4. One-half of the properties in the United States of America awarded to petitioner Leticia
Noveras a.k.a. Leticia Tacbiana in paragraph 2 are hereby given to Jerome and Jena, her
two minor children with respondent David A. Noveras as their presumptive legitimes and said
legitimes must be annotated on the titles/documents covering the said properties. Their
share in the income from these properties, if any, shall be remitted to them annually by the
petitioner within the first half of January of each year, starting January 2008;

5. For the support of their two (2) minor children, Jerome and Jena, respondent David A.
Noveras shall give them US$100.00 as monthly allowance in addition to their income from
their presumptive legitimes, while petitioner Leticia Tacbiana shall take care of their food,
clothing, education and other needs while they are in her custody in the USA. The monthly
allowance due from the respondent shall be increased in the future as the needs of the
children require and his financial capacity can afford;
 6. Of the unpaid amount of ₱410,000.00 on the purchase price of the Sampaloc property, the
Paringit Spouses are hereby ordered to pay ₱5,000.00 to respondent David A. Noveras and
₱405,000.00 to the two children. The share of the respondent may be paid to him directly but
the share of the two children shall be deposited with a local bank in Baler, Aurora, in a joint
account tobe taken out in their names, withdrawal from which shall only be made by them or
by their representative duly authorized with a Special Power of Attorney. Such
payment/deposit shall be made withinthe period of thirty (30) days after receipt of a copy of
this Decision, with the passbook of the joint account to be submitted to the custody of the
Clerk of Court of this Court within the same period. Said passbook can be withdrawn from
the Clerk of Court only by the children or their attorney-in-fact; and

7. The litigation expenses and attorney’s fees incurred by the parties shall be shouldered by
them individually.11

The trial court recognized that since the parties are US citizens, the laws that cover their legal and
personalstatus are those of the USA. With respect to their marriage, the parties are divorced by
virtue of the decree of dissolution of their marriage issued by the Superior Court of California, County
of San Mateo on 24June 2005. Under their law, the parties’ marriage had already been dissolved.
Thus, the trial court considered the petition filed by Leticia as one for liquidation of the absolute
community of property regime with the determination of the legitimes, support and custody of the
children, instead of an action for judicial separation of conjugal property.

With respect to their property relations, the trial court first classified their property regime as absolute
community of property because they did not execute any marriage settlement before the
solemnization of their marriage pursuant to Article 75 of the Family Code. Then, the trial court ruled
that in accordance with the doctrine of processual presumption, Philippine law should apply because
the court cannot take judicial notice of the US law since the parties did not submit any proof of their
national law. The trial court held that as the instant petition does not fall under the provisions of the
law for the grant of judicial separation of properties, the absolute community properties cannot
beforfeited in favor of Leticia and her children. Moreover, the trial court observed that Leticia failed to
prove abandonment and infidelity with preponderant evidence.

The trial court however ruled that Leticia is not entitled to the reimbursements she is praying for
considering that she already acquired all of the properties in the USA. Relying still on the principle of
equity, the Court also adjudicated the Philippine properties to David, subject to the payment of the
children’s presumptive legitimes. The trial court held that under Article 89 of the Family Code, the
waiver or renunciation made by David of his property rights in the Joint Affidavit is void.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the trial court’s Decision by directing the equal division of
the Philippine properties between the spouses. Moreover with respect to the common children’s
presumptive legitime, the appellate court ordered both spouses to each pay their children the
amount of ₱520,000.00, thus:

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. Numbers 2, 4 and 6 of the

assailedDecision dated December 8, 2006 of Branch 96, RTC of Baler, Aurora Province, in Civil
Case No. 828 are hereby MODIFIED to read as follows:

2. The net assets of the absolute community of property of the parties in the Philippines are
hereby divided equally between petitioner Leticia Noveras a.k.a. Leticia Tacbiana (sic) and
respondent David A. Noveras;

xxx
 4. One-half of the properties awarded to petitioner Leticia Tacbiana (sic) in paragraph 2 shall
pertain to her minor children, Jerome and Jena, as their presumptive legitimes which shall be
annotated on the titles/documents covering the said properties. Their share in the income
therefrom, if any, shall be remitted to them by petitioner annually within the first half of
January, starting 2008;

xxx

6. Respondent David A. Noveras and petitioner Leticia Tacbiana (sic) are each ordered to
pay the amount of₱520,000.00 to their two children, Jerome and Jena, as their presumptive
legitimes from the sale of the Sampaloc property inclusive of the receivables therefrom,
which shall be deposited to a local bank of Baler, Aurora, under a joint account in the latter’s
names. The payment/deposit shall be made within a period of thirty (30) days from receipt
ofa copy of this Decision and the corresponding passbook entrusted to the custody ofthe
Clerk of Court a quowithin the same period, withdrawable only by the children or their
attorney-in-fact.

A number 8 is hereby added, which shall read as follows:

8. Respondent David A. Noveras is hereby ordered to pay petitioner Leticia Tacbiana (sic)
the amount of ₱1,040,000.00 representing her share in the proceeds from the sale of the
Sampaloc property.

The last paragraph shall read as follows:

Send a copy of this Decision to the local civil registry of Baler, Aurora; the local civil registry of
Quezon City; the Civil RegistrarGeneral, National Statistics Office, Vibal Building, Times Street
corner EDSA, Quezon City; the Office of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Aurora; and to the
children, Jerome Noveras and Jena Noveras.

The rest of the Decision is AFFIRMED. 12

In the present petition, David insists that the Court of Appeals should have recognized the California
Judgment which awarded the Philippine properties to him because said judgment was part of the
pleading presented and offered in evidence before the trial court. David argues that allowing Leticia
to share in the Philippine properties is tantamount to unjust enrichment in favor of Leticia considering
that the latter was already granted all US properties by the California court.

In summary and review, the basic facts are: David and Leticia are US citizens who own properties in
the USA and in the Philippines. Leticia obtained a decree of divorce from the Superior Court of
California in June 2005 wherein the court awarded all the properties in the USA to Leticia. With
respect to their properties in the Philippines, Leticiafiled a petition for judicial separation ofconjugal
properties.

At the outset, the trial court erred in recognizing the divorce decree which severed the bond of
marriage between the parties. In Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas,  we stated that:
13

The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our
courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a
rule, "no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of
another country." This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must beproven as facts
under our rules on evidence, together with the alien’s applicable national law to show the effect of
the judgment on the alien himself or herself. The recognition may be made in an action instituted
specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an
integral aspect of his claim or defense. 14

The requirements of presenting the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the foreigner must
comply with our Rules of Evidence. Specifically, for Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment
relating to the status of a marriage, a copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and
proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the
Rules of Court. 15

Under Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents of a sovereign authority or tribunal
may be proved by: (1) an official publication thereof or (2) a copy attested by the officer having the
legal custody thereof. Such official publication or copy must beaccompanied, if the record is not kept
in the Philippines, with a certificate that the attesting officer has the legal custody thereof. The
certificate may be issued by any of the authorized Philippine embassy or consular officials stationed
in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. The
attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part
thereof, asthe case may be, and must be under the official seal of the attesting officer.

Section 25 of the same Rule states that whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for the
purpose of evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the
original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal
of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if hebe the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of
such court.

Based on the records, only the divorce decree was presented in evidence. The required certificates
to prove its authenticity, as well as the pertinent California law on divorce were not presented.

It may be noted that in Bayot v. Court of Appeals,  we relaxed the requirement on certification where
16

we held that "[petitioner therein] was clearly an American citizenwhen she secured the divorce and
that divorce is recognized and allowed in any of the States of the Union, the presentation of a copy
of foreign divorce decree duly authenticatedby the foreign court issuing said decree is, as here,
sufficient." In this case however, it appears that there is no seal from the office where the divorce
decree was obtained.

Even if we apply the doctrine of processual presumption  as the lower courts did with respect to the
17

property regime of the parties, the recognition of divorce is entirely a different matter because, to
begin with, divorce is not recognized between Filipino citizens in the Philippines. Absent a valid
recognition of the divorce decree, it follows that the parties are still legally married in the Philippines.
The trial court thus erred in proceeding directly to liquidation.

As a general rule, any modification in the marriage settlements must be made before the celebration
of marriage. An exception to this rule is allowed provided that the modification isjudicially approved
and refers only to the instances provided in Articles 66,67, 128, 135 and 136 of the Family Code. 18

Leticia anchored the filing of the instant petition for judicial separation of property on paragraphs 4
and 6 of Article 135 of the Family Code, to wit:

Art. 135. Any of the following shall be considered sufficient cause for judicial separation of property:
 (1) That the spouse of the petitioner has been sentenced to a penalty which carries with it
civil interdiction;

(2) That the spouse of the petitioner has been judicially declared an absentee;

(3) That loss of parental authority ofthe spouse of petitioner has been decreed by the court;

(4) That the spouse of the petitioner has abandoned the latter or failed to comply with his or
her obligations to the family as provided for in Article 101;

(5) That the spouse granted the power of administration in the marriage settlements has
abused that power; and

(6) That at the time of the petition, the spouses have been separated in fact for at least one
year and reconciliation is highly improbable.

In the cases provided for in Numbers (1), (2), and (3), the presentation of the final judgment against
the guiltyor absent spouse shall be enough basis for the grant of the decree ofjudicial separation of
property. (Emphasis supplied).

The trial court had categorically ruled that there was no abandonment in this case to necessitate
judicial separation of properties under paragraph 4 of Article 135 of the Family Code. The trial court
ratiocinated:

Moreover, abandonment, under Article 101 of the Family Code quoted above, must be for a valid
cause and the spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when he/she has left the conjugal
dwelling without intention of returning. The intention of not returning is prima facie presumed if the
allegedly [sic] abandoning spouse failed to give any information as to his or her whereabouts within
the period of three months from such abandonment.

In the instant case, the petitioner knows that the respondent has returned to and stayed at his
hometown in Maria Aurora, Philippines, as she even went several times to visit him there after the
alleged abandonment. Also, the respondent has been going back to the USA to visit her and their
children until the relations between them worsened. The last visit of said respondent was in October
2004 when he and the petitioner discussed the filing by the latter of a petition for dissolution of
marriage with the California court. Such turn for the worse of their relationship and the filing of the
saidpetition can also be considered as valid causes for the respondent to stay in the Philippines. 19

Separation in fact for one year as a ground to grant a judicial separation of property was not tackled
in the trial court’s decision because, the trial court erroneously treated the petition as liquidation of
the absolute community of properties.

The records of this case are replete with evidence that Leticia and David had indeed separated for
more than a year and that reconciliation is highly improbable. First, while actual abandonment had
not been proven, it is undisputed that the spouses had been living separately since 2003 when
David decided to go back to the Philippines to set up his own business. Second, Leticia heard from
her friends that David has been cohabiting with Estrellita Martinez, who represented herself as
Estrellita Noveras. Editha Apolonio, who worked in the hospital where David was once confined,
testified that she saw the name of Estrellita listed as the wife of David in the Consent for Operation
form. Third and more significantly, they had filed for divorce and it was granted by the California
20

court in June 2005.

Having established that Leticia and David had actually separated for at least one year, the petition
for judicial separation of absolute community of property should be granted.

The grant of the judicial separation of the absolute community property automatically dissolves the
absolute community regime, as stated in the 4th paragraph of Article 99 ofthe Family Code, thus:

Art. 99. The absolute community terminates:

(1) Upon the death of either spouse;

(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;

(3) When the marriage is annulled or declared void; or

(4) In case of judicial separation of property during the marriage under Articles 134 to 138.
(Emphasis supplied).

Under Article 102 of the same Code, liquidation follows the dissolution of the absolute community
regime and the following procedure should apply:

Art. 102. Upon dissolution of the absolute community regime, the following procedure shall apply:

(1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the properties of the absolute
community and the exclusive properties of each spouse.

(2) The debts and obligations of the absolute community shall be paid out of its assets. In
case of insufficiency of said assets, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid
balance with their separate properties in accordance with the provisions of the second
paragraph of Article 94.

(3) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses shall thereafter be delivered
to each of them.

(4) The net remainder of the properties of the absolute community shall constitute its net
assets, which shall be divided equally between husband and wife, unless a different
proportion or division was agreed upon in the marriage settlements, or unless there has
been a voluntary waiver of such share provided in this Code. For purposes of computing the
net profits subject to forfeiture in accordance with Articles 43, No. (2) and 63, No. (2),the said
profits shall be the increase in value between the market value of the community property at
the time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of its dissolution.

(5) The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be delivered upon partition, in
accordance with Article 51.

(6) Unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, in the partition of the properties, the
conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated shall be adjudicated tothe spouse with
whom the majority of the common children choose to remain. Children below the age of
seven years are deemed to have chosen the mother, unless the court has decided
otherwise. In case there is no such majority, the court shall decide, taking into consideration
the best interests of said children. At the risk of being repetitious, we will not remand the
 case to the trial court. Instead, we shall adopt the modifications made by the Court of
Appeals on the trial court’s Decision with respect to liquidation.

We agree with the appellate court that the Philippine courts did not acquire jurisdiction over the
California properties of David and Leticia. Indeed, Article 16 of the Civil Code clearly states that real
property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated. Thus,
liquidation shall only be limited to the Philippine properties.

We affirm the modification madeby the Court of Appeals with respect to the share of the spouses in
the absolutecommunity properties in the Philippines, as well as the payment of their children’s
presumptive legitimes, which the appellate court explained in this wise:

Leticia and David shall likewise have an equal share in the proceeds of the Sampaloc
property.  While both claimed to have contributed to the redemption of the Noveras property, absent
1âwphi1

a clear showing where their contributions came from, the same is presumed to have come from the
community property. Thus, Leticia is not entitled to reimbursement of half of the redemption money.

David's allegation that he used part of the proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc property for the
benefit of the absolute community cannot be given full credence. Only the amount of ₱120,000.00
incurred in going to and from the U.S.A. may be charged thereto. Election expenses in the amount of
₱300,000.00 when he ran as municipal councilor cannot be allowed in the absence of receipts or at
least the Statement of Contributions and Expenditures required under Section 14 of Republic Act
No. 7166 duly received by the Commission on Elections. Likewise, expenses incurred to settle the
criminal case of his personal driver is not deductible as the same had not benefited the family. In
sum, Leticia and David shall share equally in the proceeds of the sale net of the amount of
₱120,000.00 or in the respective amounts of ₱1,040,000.00.

xxxx

Under the first paragraph of Article 888 of the Civil Code, "(t)he legitime of legitimate children and
descendants consists of one-half or the hereditary estate of the father and of the mother." The
children arc therefore entitled to half of the share of each spouse in the net assets of the absolute
community, which shall be annotated on the titles/documents covering the same, as well as to their
respective shares in the net proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc property including the
receivables from Sps. Paringit in the amount of ₱410,000.00. Consequently, David and Leticia
should each pay them the amount of ₱520,000.00 as their presumptive legitimes therefrom. 21

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R.
CV No. 88686 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 195432               August 27, 2014

EDELINA T. ANDO, Petitioner, 
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Respondent.

DECISION

SERENO, CJ:
This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking the nullification of the
Orders dated 14 January and 8 February 2011 issued by the Regional Trial Court (R TC), Third
Judicial Region, Branch 45,  City of San Fernando, Pampanga, in Civil Case No. 137, which
1

dismissed the Petition for Declaratory Relief filed therein.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND OF THE CASE

The pertinent facts of the case, as alleged by petitioner, are as follows:

3. On 16 September 2001, petitioner married Yuichiro Kobayashi, a Japanese National, in a

civil wedding solemnized at Candaba, Pampanga. A copy of their Certificate of Marriage is
hereto attached as Annex 'A' and made an integral part hereof.

4. On 16 September 2004, Yuichiro Kobayashi sought in Japan, and was validly granted
under Japaneselaws, a divorce in respect of his marriage with petitioner. A copy of the
Divorce Certificate duly issued by the Consulate-General of Japan and duly authenticated by
the Department of Foreign Affairs, Manila, is heretoas Annex ‘B’ and made an integral part
hereof. 5. Said Divorce Certificate was duly registered with the Office of the Civil Registry of
Manila. A copy of the Certification dated 28 October 2005 is hereto attached as Annex ‘C’
and made an integral part hereof.

6. Believing in good faith that said divorce capacitated her to remarry and that by such she
reverted to her single status, petitioner married Masatomi Y. Ando on 13 September 2005 in
a civil wedding celebrated in Sta. Ana, Pampanga. A copy of their Certificate of Marriage is
hereto attached as Annex ‘D’ and made an integral part hereof.

7. In the meantime, Yuichiro Kobayashi married Ryo Miken on 27 December 2005. A copy of
the JapaneseFamily Registry Record of Kobayashi showing the divorce he obtained and his
remarriage with Ryo Miken, duly authenticated by the Consulate-General of Japan and the
Department of Foreign Affairs, Manila, is hereto attached as Annex ‘E’ and made an integral
part hereof.

8. Recently, petitioner applied for the renewal of her Philippine passport to indicate her
surname withher husband Masatomi Y. Ando but she was told at the Department of Foreign
Affairs that the same cannot be issued to her until she can prove bycompetent court decision
that her marriage with her said husband Masatomi Y. Ando is valid until otherwise declared.

xxxx

12. Prescinding from the foregoing, petitioner’s marriage with her said husband Masatomi Y.
Ando musttherefore be honored, considered and declared valid, until otherwise declared by
a competent court. Consequently, and until then, petitioner therefore is and must be declared
entitled to the issuance of a Philippine passport under the name ‘Edelina Ando y Tungol.’
Hence, this petitioner pursuant to Rule 63 of the Rules of Court. 2

On 29 October 2010, petitioner filed with the RTC a Petition for Declaratory Relief, which was later
raffled off to Branch 46. She impleaded the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) as respondent and
prayed for the following reliefs before the lower court:

WHEREFORE, petitioner most respectfully prays of this Honorable Court that after proper
proceedings, judgment be rendered, as follows:
 (a) declaring as valid and subsisting the marriage between petitioner Edelina T. Ando and
her husband Masatomi Y. Ando until otherwise declared by a competent court;

(b) declaring petitioner entitled to the issuance of a Philippine Passport under the name
"Edelina Ando y Tungol"; and

(c) directing the Department ofForeign Affairs to honor petitioner’s marriage to her husband
Masatomi Y. Ando and to issue a Philippine Passport to petitioner under the name "Edelina
Ando y Tungol".

Petitioner prays for such other just and equitable reliefs. 3

On 15 November 2010, in an Order dismissing the Petition for want of cause and action, as well as
jurisdiction, the RTC held thus:

Records of the case would reveal that prior to petitioner’s marriage to Masatomi Y. Ando, herein
petitioner was married to Yuichiro Kobayashi, a Japanese National, in Candaba, Pampanga, on
September 16, 2001, and that though a divorce was obtained and granted in Japan, with respect to
the their (sic) marriage, there is no showing that petitioner herein complied with the requirements set
forth in Art. 13 of the Family Code – that is obtaining a judicial recognition of the foreign decree of
absolute divorce in our country.

It is therefore evident, under the foregoing circumstances, that herein petitioner does not have any
causeof action and/or is entitled to the reliefs prayed for under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court. In the
same vein, though there is other adequate remedy available to the petitioner, such remedy is
however beyond the authority and jurisdiction of this court to act upon and grant, as it isonly the
family court which is vested with such authority and jurisdiction.4

On 3 December 2010, petitioner filed an Ex ParteMotion for Reconsideration of the Order dated 15
November 2010. In anOrder dated 14 December 2010, the RTC granted the motion in this wise:

WHEREFORE, considering that the allegations and reliefs prayed for by the petitioner in her petition
and the instant Motion for Reconsideration falls within the jurisdiction of the Special Family Court of
this jurisdiction and for the interest ofsubstantial justice, the Order of the Court dated November 15,
2010 is hereby reconsidered.

Let the record of this case be therefore referred back to the Office of the Clerk of Court for proper
endorsement to the Family Court of this jurisdiction for appropriateaction and/or
disposition.  Thereafter, the case was raffled to Branch 45 of the RTC. On 14 January 2011, the trial
5

court dismissed the Petition anew on the ground that petitioner had no cause of action. The Order
reads thus:

The petition specifically admits that the marriage she seeks to be declared as valid is already her
second marriage, a bigamous marriage under Article 35(4) of the Family Codeconsidering that the
first one, though allegedly terminated by virtue of the divorce obtained by Kobayashi, was never
recognized by a Philippine court, hence, petitioner is considered as still married to Kobayashi.
Accordingly, the second marriage with Ando cannot be honored and considered asvalid at this time.

Petitioner’s allegation of Sec. 2 (a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is misplaced. The fact that no judicial
declaration of nullity of her marriage with Ando was rendered does not make the same valid because
such declaration under Article 40 ofthe Family Code is applicable onlyin case of re-marriage. More
importantly, the absence of a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage is not even a requisite to make
a marriage valid.

In view of the foregoing, the dismissal of this case is imperative. 6

On 1 February 2011,petitioner filed an Ex ParteMotion for Reconsideration of the Order dated 14

January 2011. The motion was denied by the RTC in open court on 8 February2011, considering
that neither the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) nor respondent was furnished with copies of
the motion.

On 24 March 2011, petitioner filed the instant Petition for Review, raising the sole issue of whether
or not the RTC erred in ruling that she had no cause of action.

Petitioner argues that under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, or the Rule on the Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, it is solely the wife or the husband
who can file a petition for the declaration of the absolute nullity of a void marriage. Thus, as the state
is not even allowed to filea direct petition for the declaration of the absolute nullity of a void
marriage,with even more reason can it not collaterally attack the validity of a marriage, as in a
petition for declaratory relief. Further, petitioner alleges that under the law, a marriage – even one
that is void or voidable – shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding.

Petitioner also argues that assuming a court judgment recognizing a judicial decree of divorce is
required under Article 13 of the Family Code, noncompliance therewith is a mere irregularity in the
issuance of a marriage license. Any irregularity in the formal requisites of marriage, such as with
respect to the marriage license, shall notaffect the legality of the marriage. Petitioner further claims
that all the requisites for a petition for declaratory relief have been complied with.

With respect to the failure to furnish a copy of the Ex ParteMotion for Reconsideration to the OSG
and the DFA, petitioner avers that at the time of the filing, the RTC had yet to issue a summons to
respondent; thus, it had yet to acquire jurisdiction over them.

Thereafter, the DFA, through the OSG, filed a Comment on the Petition. The latter raised the
following arguments: (1) the Petition was improperly verified, as the juratin the Verification thereof
only stated that the affiant had exhibited "her currentand valid proof of identity," which proof was not
properly indicated, however; (2) prior judicial recognition by a Philippine court of a divorce decree
obtained by the alien spouse is required before a Filipino spouse can remarry and be entitled to the
legal effects of remarriage; (3) petitioner failed to show that she had first exhausted all available
administrative remedies, such as appealing to the Secretary of the DFA under Republic Act No.
(R.A.) 8239, or the Philippine Passport Act of 1996, before resorting to the special civil action of
declaratory relief; and (4) petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration before the RTC was a mere scrap
of paper and did not toll the running of the period to appeal. Hence, the RTC Order dated 14 January
2011 is now final.

On 29 November 2011, petitioner filed her Reply to the Comment, addressing the issues raised
therein.

THE COURT’S RULING

The Court finds the Petition to be without merit.

First, with respect to her prayer tocompel the DFA to issue her passport, petitioner incorrectly filed a
petition for declaratory relief before the RTC. She should have first appealed before the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs, since her ultimate entreaty was toquestion the DFA’s refusal to issue a passport to
her under her second husband’s name.

Under the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. 8239, which was adopted on 25
February 1997, the following are the additional documentary requirements before a married woman
may obtain a passport under the name of her spouse:

SECTION 2. The issuance of passports to married, divorced or widowed women shall be made
inaccordance with the following provisions:

a) In case of a woman who is married and who decides to adopt the surname of her husband
pursuant to Art. 370 of Republic Act No. 386, she must present the original or certifiedtrue
copy of her marriage contract, and one photocopy thereof.

In addition thereto, a Filipino who contracts marriage in the Philippines to a foreigner, shall
be required to present a Certificate of Attendance in a Guidance and Counselling Seminar
conducted by the CFO when applying for a passport for the first time.

b) In case of annulment of marriage, the applicant must present a certified true copy of her
annotated Marriage Contract or Certificate of Registration and the Court Order effecting the
annulment.

c) In case of a woman who was divorced by her alien husband, she must present a certified
true copy of the Divorce Decree duly authenticated by the Philippine Embassy or consular
post which has jurisdiction over the place where the divorce is obtained or by the concerned
foreign diplomatic or consular mission in the Philippines.

When the divorcee is a Filipino Muslim, she must present a certified true copy of the Divorce Decree
or a certified true copy of the Certificate of Divorce from the Shari’ah Court or the OCRG. d) In the
event that marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband, the applicant must present the original
or certified true copy of the Death Certificate of the husband or the Declaration of Presumptive Death
by a Civil or Shari’ah Court, in which case the applicant may choose to continue to use her
husband’s surname or resume the use of her maiden surname. From the above provisions, it is clear
that for petitioner to obtain a copy of her passport under her married name, all she needed to
present were the following: (1) the original or certified true copyof her marriage contract and one
photocopy thereof; (2) a Certificate of Attendance in a Guidance and Counseling Seminar, if
applicable; and (3) a certified true copy of the Divorce Decree duly authenticated by the Philippine
Embassy or consular post that has jurisdiction over the place where the divorce is obtained or by the
concerned foreign diplomatic or consular mission in the Philippines.

In this case, petitioner was allegedly told that she would not be issued a Philippine passport under
her second husband’s name.  Should her application for a passport be denied, the remedies
1âwphi1

available to her are provided in Section 9 of R.A. 8239, which reads thus:

Sec. 9. Appeal. — Any person who feels aggrieved as a result of the application of this Act of the
implementing rules and regulations issued by the Secretary shall have the right to appeal to the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs from whose decision judicial review may be had to the Courts in due
course.
The IRR further provides in detail:

ARTICLE 10
Appeal

In the event that an application for a passport is denied, or an existing one cancelled or restricted,
the applicant or holder thereof shall have the right to appeal in writing to the Secretary within fifteen
(15) days from notice of denial, cancellation or restriction.

Clearly, she should have filed anappeal with the Secretary of the DFA in the event of the denial of
her application for a passport, after having complied with the provisions of R.A. 8239. Petitioner’s
argument that her application "cannot be said to havebeen either denied, cancelled or restricted by
[the DFA ], so as to make her an aggrieved party entitled to appeal",  as instead she "was merely
7

told"  that her passport cannot be issued, does not persuade. The law provides a direct recourse for
8

petitioner in the event of the denial of her application.

Second, with respect to her prayer for the recognition of her second marriage as valid, petitioner
should have filed, instead, a petition for the judicial recognition of her foreign divorce from her first
husband.

In Garcia v. Recio,  we ruled that a divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our
9

jurisdiction, provided the decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. The
presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient; both the divorce decree and the governing
personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven. Because our courts do
not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment, our law on evidence requires that both the
divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven and like any other fact. 10

While it has been ruled that a petition for the authority to remarry filed before a trial court actually
constitutes a petition for declaratory relief,  we are still unable to grant the prayer of petitioner. As
11

held by the RTC, there appears to be insufficient proof or evidence presented on record of both the
national law of her first husband, Kobayashi, and of the validity of the divorce decree under that
national law.  Hence, any declaration as to the validity of the divorce can only be made upon her
12

complete submission of evidence proving the divorce decree and the national law of her alien
spouse, in an action instituted in the proper forum.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED without prejudice to petitioner's recourse to the proper
remedies available.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 192718               February 18, 2015

ROBERT F. MALLILIN, Petitioner, 
vs.
LUZ G. JAMESOLAMIN and the REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court assailing the
November 20, 2009 Decision  of the Court of Appeals (CA) and its June 1, 2010 Resolution,2 in CA-
1

G.R. CV No. 78303-MIN, which reversed and set aside the September 20, 2002 Decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 37, Cagayan de Oro City(RTC-Br.37), declaring the marriage between
petitioner Robert F. Mallilin (Robert) and private respondent Luz G. Jamesolamin (Luz) null and void.

The Facts:

Robert and Luz were married on September 6, 1972. They begot three (3) children.

On March 16, 1994, Robert filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC,
Branch 23, Cagayan de Oro City (RTC-Br. 23). On March 7, 1996, RTC-Br. 23 denied the petition.
Robert appealed this judgment before the CA where it was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 54261. On
January 29, 1999, the CA reversed the RTC-Br. 23 decision "due to lack of participation of the State
as required under Article 48 of the Family Code." The case was remanded to the RTC for further
3

proceedings and its records were thereafter transferred from RTC-Br. 23 to RTC-Br. 37, as the latter
was designated as Family Court pursuant to the Family Code Act of 1997.

In the complaint, Robert alleged that at the time of the celebration of their marriage, Luz was
suffering from psychological and mental incapacity and unpreparedness to enter into such marital
life and to comply with its essential obligations and responsibilities. Such incapacity became even
more apparent during their marriage when Luz exhibited clear manifestation of immaturity,
irresponsibility, deficiency of independent rational judgment, and inability to cope with the heavy and
oftentimes demanding obligation of a parent.

Luz filed her Answer with Counterclaim contesting the complaint. She averred that it was Robert who
manifested psychological incapacity in their marriage. Despite due notice, however, she did not
appear during the trial. Assistant City Prosecutor Isabelo Sabanal appeared for the State. When
Robert testified, he disclosed that Luz was already living in California, USA, and had married an
American. He also revealed that when they were still engaged, Luz continued seeing and dating
another boyfriend, a certain Lt. Liwag. He also claimed that from the outset, Luz had been remiss in
her duties both as a wife and as a mother as shown by the following circumstances: (1) it was he
who did the cleaning of the room because Luz did not know how to keep order; (2) it was her mother
who prepared their meal while her sister was the one who washed their clothes because she did not
want her polished nails destroyed; (3) it was also her sister who took care of their children while she
spent her time sleeping and looking at the mirror; (4) when she resumed her schooling, she dated
different men; (5) he received anonymous letters reporting her loitering with male students; (6) when
he was not home, she would receive male visitors; (7) a certain Romy Padua slept in their house
when he was away; and (6) she would contract loans without his knowledge.

In addition, Robert presented the testimony of Myrna Delos Reyes Villanueva (Villanueva), Guidance
Psychologist II of Northern Mindanao Medical Center.

On May 8, 2000, while the case was pending before the trial court, Robert filed a petition for
marriage annulment with the Metropolitan Tribunal of First Instance for the Archdiocese of Manila
(Metropolitan Tribunal).

On October 10, 2002, the Metropolitan Tribunal handed down a decision declaring their marriage
invalid ab initio on the ground of grave lack of due discretion on the part of both parties as
contemplated by the second paragraph of Canon1095. This decision was affirmed by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal (NAMT).
Prior to that, on September 20, 2002,the RTC had rendered a decision declaring the marriage null
and void on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of Luz as she failed to comply with
the essential marital obligations.

The State, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), interposed an appeal with the
CA. The OSG argued that Robert failed to make a case for declaration of nullity of his marriage with
Luz. It pointed out that the real cause of the marital discord was the sexual infidelity of Luz. Such
ground, the OSG contended, should not result in the nullification of the marriage under the law, but
merely constituted a ground for legal separation.

The CA, in its November 20, 2009 Decision,  granted the petition and reversed the RTC decision.
4

The decision, including the decretal portion, partially reads:

[W]e find that the trial court committed a reversible error. Closer scrutiny of the records reveals, as
correctly noted by the Solicitor General, sexual infidelity are not rooted on some debilitating
psychological condition but a mere refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. x x x.

xxxx

In the case at bar, apart from his self-serving declarations, the evidence adduced by Robert fell short
of establishing the fact that at the time of their marriage, Luz was suffering from a psychological
defect which in fact deprived [her] of the ability to assume the essential duties of marriage and its
concomitant responsibilities.

xxxx

We commiserate with the plaintiff-appellee’s undeserved marital plight. Yet, Our paramount duty as
a court compels Us to apply the law at all costs, however harsh it may be on whomsoever is called
upon to bear its unbiased brunt.

FOR THESE REASONS, the appealed Decision dated September 20, 2002 in Civil Case No. 94-178
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No costs.

SO ORDERED. 5

Robert filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the CA in its June 1, 2010
Resolution,  stating that the arguments of Robert were mere rehash of the same ground, arguments
6

and discussion previously pointed out by him, and that no new substance was brought out to warrant
the reconsideration or reversal of its decision.

Hence, this petition.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS’ HOLDING THAT THE ABSENCE OF THE

PSYCHOLOGICAL EXAMINATION OF THE WIFE UNDERSCORES THE EVIDENTIAL
GAP TO SUSTAIN THE DECISION OFTHE RTC DECLARING THE MARRIAGE OF
 PETITIONER TO RESPONDENT NULL AND VOID ON THE GROUND OF
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY IS CONTRARY TO LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE.

II

THE RESPONDENT WIFE WAS ALSO DECLARED BY THE NATIONAL APPELLATE

MATRIMONIAL TRIBUNAL OF THE CATHOLIC BISHOP’S CONFERENCE OF THE
PHILIPPINES AS GUILTY OF GRAVE LACKOF DUE DISCRETION.

III

THE RESPONDENT WIFE WAS ALSO FOUND BY THE LOWER COURT AS

PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL MARITAL
OBLIGATIONS.

Robert now argues that he has sufficiently proven the nullity of his marriage even in the absence of
any medical, psychiatric or psychological examination of the wife by a competent and qualified
professional. To bolster his claim, he avers that the Metropolitan Tribunal already declared that Luz
exhibited grave lack of discretion in judgment concerning the essential rights and obligations
mutually given and accepted in marriage. The said decision was affirmed by the NAMT.

Robert further argues that the sexual indiscretion of Luz with different men coupled with the fact that
she failed to function as a home maker to her family and as a housewife to him incapacitated her
from accepting and complying with her essential marital obligations. For said reason, he asserts that
the case of Luz was not a mere case of sexual infidelity, but clearly an illness that was rooted on
some debilitating psychological condition which incapacitated her to carry out the responsibilities of a
married woman. Robert avers that a sex maniac is not just a mere sexual infidel but one who is
suffering from a deep psychological problem.

Position of the State

The OSG argues that the CA correctly ruled that the totality of evidence presented by Robert was
not sufficient to support a finding that Luz was psychologically incapacitated. His evidence fell short
of establishing his assertion that at the time of their marriage, Luz was suffering from a psychological
defect which deprived her of the ability to assume the essential duties of marriage and its
concomitant responsibilities.

With regard to the findings of the Metropolitan Tribunal and the NAMT, the OSG claims that the
same were only given persuasive value and were not controlling or decisive in cases of nullity of
marriage. Further, the decision was based on grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning
matrimonial rights and obligations due to outside factors other than psychological incapacity as
contemplated in Article 36 of the Family Code. The OSG also raises the strong possibility of
collusion between the parties as shown by the events that took place after the issuance of the March
7, 1996 RTC Decision. The OSG wrote:

Significantly, the chronological events after the trial court issued its March 7, 1996 Decision
unmistakably show the collusion between the parties to obtain the reliefs pleaded. Among others,
respondent’s Retraction of Testimony was executed without the presence of counsel sometime in
1998, a few months before she married an American. This irregularity was even noticed by the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 54261:
 xxxx

The involvement and active participation of the Solicitor General became indispensable, in the
present recourse, when, in a whirlwind turn of events, the Appellee made a VOLTE FACE executed
a "Retraction of Testimony" and a "Waiver of Custody" waiving custody of Franco Mark J Mallillin,
still a minor, her son by the Appellant. It bears stressing that the Appellee, in the Court a quo,
obdurately denied the material allegations of the Appellant’s complaint and declared that it was the
Appellant who was psychologically incapacitated. The sudden turn-about of the appellee, in the
present recourse, to the extent of disowning her testimony in the Court a quo and even praying for
the reversal of the Decision of the Trial Court is strongly suggestive, if not constitutive, of collusion or
a modus vivendi between the parties, outlawed by the Family Code of the Philippines and the
Constitution. x x x

The Court’s Ruling

The main issue is whether the totality of the evidence adduced proves that Luz was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage warranting the annulment of their
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.

The petition is bereft of merit.

A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is anchored on Article 36 of the Family Code which
provides:

Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligation of marriage, shall likewise be void even
if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. "Psychological incapacity," as a
ground to nullify a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, should refer to no less than a
mental – not merely physical – incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage which, as so expressed in Article 68 of the Family Code, among others, include their
mutual obligations to live together; observe love, respect and fidelity; and render help and support.
There is hardly a doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
"psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of
an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. 7

Psychological incapacity as required by Article 36 must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would
be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage. It must be rooted in the history
of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may only emerge after the
marriage. It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of
the party involved. 8

In Republic v. Court of Appeals and Eduardo C. De Quintos, Jr.,  the Court reiterated the well-settled
9

guidelines in resolving petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage, embodied in Republic v. Court
of Appeals and Molina, based on Article 36 of the Family Code. Thus:
10

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. x x x.
 xxxx

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be
psychological — not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical.
x x x.

xxxx

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the
marriage. x x x.

xxxx

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
x x x.

xxxx

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. x x x.

xxxx

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s)
must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by
our courts.

x x x.

xxxx

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. x x x.

Guided by these pronouncements, the Court is of the considered view that Robert’s evidence failed
to establish the psychological incapacity of Luz.

First, the testimony of Robert failed to overcome the burden of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage. Other than his self-serving testimony, no other evidence was adduced to show the alleged
incapacity of Luz. He presented no other witnesses to corroborate his allegations on her behavior.
Thus, his testimony was self-serving and had no serious value as evidence.
Second, the root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity of Luz was not medically or clinically
identified, and sufficiently proven during the trial. Based on the records, Robert failed to prove that
her disposition of not cleaning the room, preparing their meal, washing the clothes, and propensity
for dating and receiving different male visitors, was grave, deeply rooted, and incurable within the
parameters of jurisprudence on psychological incapacity.

The alleged failure of Luz to assume her duties as a wife and as a mother, as well as her emotional
immaturity, irresponsibility and infidelity, cannot rise to the level of psychological incapacity that
justifies the nullification of the parties' marriage. The Court has repeatedly stressed that
psychological incapacity contemplates "downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to
assume the basic marital obligations," not merely the refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will,
on the part of the errant spouse.  Indeed, to be declared clinically or medically incurable is one thing;
11

to refuse or be reluctant to perform one's duties is another. Psychological incapacity refers only to
the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.12

As correctly found by the CA, sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not, by
themselves, constitute grounds for declaring a marriage void based on psychological incapacity.
Robert argues that the series of sexual indiscretion of Luz were external manifestations of the
psychological defect that she was suffering within her person, which could be considered as
nymphomania or "excessive sex hunger." Other than his allegations, however, no other convincing
evidence was adduced to prove that these sexual indiscretions were considered as nymphomania,
and that it was grave, deeply rooted, and incurable within the term of psychological incapacity
embodied in Article 36. To stress, Robert’s testimony alone is insufficient to prove the existence of
psychological incapacity.

In Sivino A. Ligeralde v. May Ascension A. Patalinghug and the Republic of the Philippines,  the
13

Court ruled that the respondent’s act of living an adulterous life cannot automatically be equated with
a psychological disorder, especially when no specific evidence was shown that promiscuity was a
trait already existing at the inception of marriage. The petitioner must be able to establish that the
respondent’s unfaithfulness was a manifestation of a disordered personality, which made her
completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state.

Third, the psychological report of Villanueva, Guidance Psychologist II of the Northern Mindanao
Medical Center, Cagayan deOro City, was insufficient to prove the psychological in capacity of Luz.
There was nothing in the records that would indicate that Luz had either been interviewed or was
subjected to a psychological examination. The finding as to her psychological incapacity was based
entirely on hearsay and the self-serving information provided by Robert.

Fourth, the decision of the Metropolitan Tribunal is insufficient to prove the psychological incapacity
of Luz. Although it is true that in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,  the Court
14

stated that interpretations given by the NAMT of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts, still it is subject to the law on
evidence. Thus:

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with
the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great
persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally – subject to our
law on evidence– what is decreed as [canonically] invalid should be decreed civilly void x x x.
(Emphasis supplied)

Pertinently, Rule 132, Section 34 of the Rules of Evidence provides:

The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose of which the
evidence is offered must be specified.

In this regard, the belated presentation of the decision of the NAMT cannot be given value since it
was not offered during the trial, and the Court has in no way of ascertaining the evidence considered
by the same tribunal.

Granting that it was offered and admitted, it must be pointed out that the basis of the declaration of
nullity of marriage by the NAMT was not the third paragraph of Canon 1095 which mentions causes
of a psychological nature similar to Article 36 of the Family Code, but the second paragraph of
Canon 1095 which refers to those who suffer from grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning
essential matrimonial rights and obligations to be mutually given and accepted. For clarity, the
pertinent portions of the NAMT decision are as follows:

The FACTS on the Case prove with the certitude required by law that based on the deposition of the
petitioner – the respondent understandably ignored the proceedings completely for which she was
duly cited for Contempt of Court – and premised on the substantially concordant testimonies of the
Witnesses, the woman Respondent demonstrated in the external forum through her action and
reaction patterns, before and after the marriage-in-fact, her grave lack of due discretion in judgement
for marriage intents and purposes basically by reason of her immaturity of judgement as manifested
by her emotional ambivalence x x x.

WHEREFORE, this COLLEGIAL COURT OF APPEALS, having invoked the Divine Name and
having in mind the Law, the Jurisprudence and the Facts pertaining to the Case, hereby declares
and decrees the confirmation of the nullity decision rendered by the Metropolitan Tribunal of First
Instance for the Archdiocese of Manil on the Marriage Case MALLILIN – JAMISOLAMIN with Prot.
N. 63/2000 on the ground provided by Canon 1095 par. 2CIC on the part of the woman Respondent
– but NOT on the part of the man Petitioner for lack of evidence. (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)15

In Santos v. Santos,  the Court referred to the deliberations during the sessions of the Family Code
6

Revision Committee, which drafted the Code, to provide an insight on the import of Article 36 of the
Family Code. It went out to state that a part of the provision is similar to the third paragraph of Canon
1095 of the Code of Canon Law, which reads:

Canon 1095. The following are incapable of contracting marriage:

1. those who lack sufficient use of reason;

2. those who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning the essential
matrimonial rights and obligations to be mutually given and accepted;

3. those who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage.(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In Najera v. Najera,  the Court was also confronted with a similar issue of whether to consider an
17

annulment by the NAMT as also covering psychological incapacity, the only ground recognized in
our law. In the said case, the NAMT decision was also based on the second paragraph of Canon
1095. The Court ruled that it was not similar to, and only annulments under the third paragraph of,
Canon 1095 should be considered. Elucidating, the Court wrote: Petitioner’s argument is without
merit.
In its Decision dated February 23, 2004, the Court of Appeals apparently did not have the
opportunity to consider the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal. Nevertheless, it
is clear that the Court of Appeals considered the Matrimonial Tribunal’s decision in its Resolution
dated August 5, 2004 when it resolved petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. In the said Resolution,
the Court of Appeals took cognizance of the very same issues now raised before this Court and
correctly held that petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was devoid of merit. It stated:

The Decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal dated July 2, 2002, which was
forwarded to this Court only on February 11, 2004, reads as follows:

[T]he FACTS collated from party complainant and reliable witnesses which include a sister-in-law of
Respondent (despite summons from the Court dated June14, 1999, he did not appear before the
Court, in effect waiving his right to be heard, hence, trial in absentia followed) corroborate and lead
this Collegiate Court to believe with moral certainty required by law and conclude that the husband-
respondent upon contracting marriage suffered from grave lack of due discretion of judgment,
thereby rendering nugatory his marital contract: First, his family was dysfunctional in that as a child,
he saw the break-up of the marriage of his own parents; his own two siblings have broken
marriages; Second, he therefore grew up with a domineering mother with whom [he] identified and
on whom he depended for advice; Third, he was according to his friends, already into drugs and
alcohol before marriage; this affected his conduct of bipolar kind: he could be very quiet but later
very talkative, peaceful but later hotheaded even violent, he also was aware of the infidelity of his
mother who now lives with her paramour, also married and a policeman; Finally, into marriage, he
continued with his drugs and alcohol abuse until one time he came home very drunk and beat up his
wife and attacked her with a bolo that wounded her; this led to final separation.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court of Second Instance, having invoked the Divine
Name and having considered the pertinent Law and relevant Jurisprudence to the Facts of the Case
hereby proclaims, declares and decrees the confirmation of the sentence from the Court a quo in
favor of the nullity of marriage on the ground contemplated under Canon 1095, 2 of the 1983 Code
of Canon Law.

However, records of the proceedings before the Trial Court show that, other than herself, petitioner-
appellant offered the testimonies of the following persons only, to wit: Aldana Celedonia (petitioner-
appellant’s mother), Sonny de la Cruz (member, PNP, Bugallon, Pangasinan), and Ma. Cristina R.
Gates (psychologist). Said witnesses testified, in particular, to the unfaithful night of July 1, 1994
wherein the respondent allegedly made an attempt on the life of the petitioner. But unlike the hearing
and finding before the Matrimonial Tribunal, petitioner-appellant’s sister-in-law and friends of the
opposing parties were never presented before said Court. As to the contents and veracity of the
latter’s testimonies, this Court is without any clue. True, in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals,
et al. (268 SCRA 198), the Supreme Court held that the interpretations given by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or
decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. However, the Highest Tribunal expounded as
follows:

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with
the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great
persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally – subject to our
law on evidence– what is decreed as [canonically] invalid should be decreed civilly void x x x.

And in relation thereto, Rule 132, Sec. 34 of the Rules of Evidence states:
The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose of which the
evidence is offered must be specified.

Given the preceding disquisitions, petitioner-appellant should not expect us to give credence to the
Decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal when, apparently, it was made on a different
set of evidence of which We have no way of ascertaining their truthfulness. Furthermore, it is an
elementary rule that judgments must be based on the evidence presented before the court
(Manzano vs. Perez, 362 SCRA 430 [2001]). And based on the evidence on record, We find no
ample reason to reverse or modify the judgment of the Trial Court.[31]

Santos v. Santos18 cited the deliberations during the sessions of the Family Code Revision
Committee, which drafted the Code, to provide an insight on the import of Article 36 of the Family
Code. It stated that a part of the provision is similar to the third paragraph of Canon 1095 of the
Code of Canon Law, which reads:

Canon 1095. The following are incapable of contracting marriage:

1. those who lack sufficient use of reason;

2. those who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning the essential
matrimonial rights and obligations to be mutually given and accepted;

3. those who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage.

It must be pointed out that in this case, the basis of the declaration of nullity of marriage by the
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal is not the third paragraph of Canon 1095 which mentions
causes of a psychological nature, but the second paragraph of Canon 1095 which refers to those
who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning essential matrimonial rights and
obligations to be mutually given and accepted. For clarity, the pertinent portion of the decision of the
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal reads:

The FACTS collated from party complainant and reliable witnesses which include a sister-in-law of
Respondent (despite summons from the Court dated June 14, 1999, he did not appear before the
Court, in effect waiving his right to be heard, hence, trial in absentia followed) corroborate and lead
this Collegiate Court to believe with moral certainty required by law and conclude that the husband-
respondent upon contacting marriage suffered from grave lack of due discretion of judgment,
thereby rendering nugatory his marital contract x x x.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court of Second Instance, having invoked the Divine
Name and having considered the pertinent Law and relevant Jurisprudence to the Facts of the Case
hereby proclaims, declares and decrees the confirmation of the sentence from the Court a quo in
favor of the nullity of marriage on the ground contemplated under Canon 1095, 2 of the 1983 Code
of Canon Law. x x x.

Hence, even if, as contended by petitioner, the factual basis of the decision of the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal is similar to the facts established by petitioner before the trial court, the decision
of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal confirming the decree of nullity of marriage by the
court a quo is not based on the psychological incapacity of respondent. Petitioner, therefore, erred in
stating that the conclusion of Psychologist Cristina Gates regarding the psychological incapacity of
respondent is supported by the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal.
In fine, the Court of Appeals did not err in affirming the Decision of the RTC. (Emphases in the
original; Underscoring supplied)

Hence, Robert’s reliance on the NAMT decision is misplaced. To repeat, the decision of the NAMT
was based on the second paragraph of Canon 1095 which refers to those who suffer from a grave
lack of discretion of judgment concerning essential matrimonial rights and obligations to be mutually
given and accepted, a cause not of psychological nature under Article 36 of the Family Code. A
cause of psychological nature similar to Article 36 is covered by the third paragraph of Canon 1095
of the Code of Canon Law (Santos v. Santos 19), which for ready reference reads:

Canon 1095. The following are incapable of contracting marriage:

xxxx

3. those who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage.

To hold that annulment of marriages decreed by the NAMT under the second paragraph of Canon
1095 should also be covered would be to expand what the lawmakers did not intend to include.
What would prevent members of other religious groups from invoking their own interpretation of
psychological incapacity? Would this not lead to multiple, if not inconsistent, interpretations?

To consider church annulments as additional grounds for annulment under Article 36 would be
legislating from the bench.  As stated in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,  interpretations
1âwphi1
20

given by the NAMT of the Catholic Church in the Philippines are given great respect by our courts,
but they are not controlling or decisive.

In Republic v. Galang,  it was written that the Constitution set out a policy of protecting and
21

strengthening the family as the basic social institution, and the marriage was the foundation of the
family. Marriage, as an inviolable institution protected by the State, cannot be dissolved at the whim
of the parties. In petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage, the burden of proof to show the nullity
of marriage lies with the plaintiff. Unless the evidence presented clearly reveals a situation where the
parties, or one of them, could not have validly entered into a marriage by reason of a grave and
serious psychological illness existing at the time it was celebrated, the Court is compelled to uphold
the indissolubility of the marital tie.

In fine, the Court holds that the CA decided correctly. Petitioner Robert failed to adduce sufficient
and convincing evidence to prove the alleged psychological incapacity of Luz.

As asserted by the OSG, the allegations of the petitioner make a case for legal separation. Hence,
this decision is without prejudice to an action for legal separation if a party would want to pursue
such proceedings. In this disposition, the Court cannot decree a legal separation because in such
proceedings, there are matters and consequences like custody and separation of properties that
need to be considered and settled.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
78303-MIN, dated November 20, 2009, and its Resolution, dated June 1, 2010, are hereby
AFFIRMED, without prejudice.

No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 184621               December 10, 2013

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, 

vs.
MARIA FE ESPINOSA CANTOR, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

The petition for review on certiorari  before us assails the decision  dated August 27, 2008 of the
1 2

Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 01558-MIN which affirmed be order  dated December 15,
3

2006 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 25, Koronadal City, South Cotabato, in SP Proc.
Case No. 313-25, declaring Jerry F. Cantor, respondent Maria Fe Espinosa Cantor’s husband,
presumptively dead under Article 41 of the Family Code.

The Factual Antecedents

The respondent and Jerry were married on September 20, 1997. They lived together as husband
and wife in their conjugal dwelling in Agan Homes, Koronadal City, South Cotabato. Sometime in
January 1998, the couple had a violent quarrel brought about by: (1) the respondent’s inability to
reach "sexual climax" whenever she and Jerry would have intimate moments; and (2) Jerry’s
expression of animosity toward the respondent’s father.

After their quarrel, Jerry left their conjugal dwelling and this was the last time that the respondent
ever saw him. Since then, she had not seen, communicated nor heard anything from Jerry or about
his whereabouts.

On May 21, 2002, or more than four (4) years from the time of Jerry’s disappearance, the
respondent filed before the RTC a petition4for her husband’s declaration of presumptive death,
docketed as SP Proc. Case No. 313-25. She claimed that she had a well-founded belief that Jerry
was already dead. She alleged that she had inquired from her mother-in-law, her brothers-in-law, her
sisters-in-law, as well as her neighbors and friends, but to no avail. In the hopes of finding Jerry, she
also allegedly made it a point to check the patients’ directory whenever she went to a hospital. All
these earnest efforts, the respondent claimed, proved futile, prompting her to file the petition in court.

The Ruling of the RTC

After due proceedings, the RTC issued an order granting the respondent’s petition and declaring
Jerry presumptively dead. It concluded that the respondent had a well-founded belief that her
husband was already dead since more than four (4) years had passed without the former receiving
any news about the latter or his whereabouts. The dispositive portion of the order dated December
15, 2006 reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares, as it hereby declared that respondent Jerry F. Cantor is
presumptively dead pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines without prejudice to
the effect of the reappearance of the absent spouse Jerry F. Cantor. 5

The Ruling of the CA

The case reached the CA through a petition for certiorari6filed by the petitioner, Republic of the
Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). In its August 27, 2008 decision, the
CA dismissed the petitioner’s petition, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the RTC’s part, and,
accordingly, fully affirmed the latter’s order, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises foregoing (sic), the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED and the assailed
Order dated December 15, 2006 declaring Jerry F. Cantor presumptively dead is hereby AFFIRMED
in toto.
7

The petitioner brought the matter via a Rule 45 petition before this Court. The Petition The petitioner
contends that certiorari lies to challenge the decisions, judgments or final orders of trial courts in
petitions for declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under Rule 41 of the Family
Code. It maintains that although judgments of trial courts in summary judicial proceedings, including
presumptive death cases, are deemed immediately final and executory (hence, not appeal able
under Article 247 of the Family Code), this rule does not mean that they are not subject to review
on certiorari.

The petitioner also posits that the respondent did not have a well-founded belief to justify the
declaration of her husband’s presumptive death. It claims that the respondent failed to conduct the
requisite diligent search for her missing husband. Likewise, the petitioner invites this Court’s
attention to the attendant circumstances surrounding the case, particularly, the degree of search
conducted and the respondent’s resultant failure to meet the strict standard under Article 41 of the
Family Code.

The Issues

The petition poses to us the following issues:

(1) Whether certiorarilies to challenge the decisions, judgments or final orders of trial courts
in petitions for declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the
Family Code; and

(2) Whether the respondent had a well-founded belief that Jerry is already dead.

The Court’s Ruling

We grant the petition.

a. On the Issue of the Propriety of Certiorari as a Remedy

Court’s Judgment in the Judicial

Proceedings for Declaration of
Presumptive Death Is Final and
Executory, Hence, Unappealable

The Family Code was explicit that the court’s judgment in summary proceedings, such as the
declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code, shall be
immediately final and executory.

Article 41,in relation to Article 247, of the Family Code provides:

Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null
and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been
absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the
circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two
years shall be sufficient.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph the spouse
present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent
spouse.

Art. 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory. [underscores ours]

With the judgment being final, it necessarily follows that it is no longer subject to an appeal, the
dispositions and conclusions therein having become immutable and unalterable not only as against
the parties but even as against the courts.  Modification of the court’s ruling, no matter how
8

erroneous is no longer permissible. The final and executory nature of this summary proceeding thus
prohibits the resort to appeal. As explained in Republic of the Phils. v. Bermudez-Lorino,  the right to
9

appeal is not granted to parties because of the express mandate of Article 247 of the Family Code,
to wit:

In Summary Judicial Proceedings under the Family Code, there is no reglementary period within
which to perfect an appeal, precisely because judgments rendered thereunder, by express provision
of [Article] 247, Family Code, supra, are "immediately final and executory." It was erroneous,
therefore, on the part of the RTCto give due course to the Republic’s appeal and order the
transmittal of the entire records of the case to the Court of Appeals.

An appellate court acquires no jurisdiction to review a judgment which, by express provision of law,
is immediately final and executory. As we have said in Veloria vs. Comelec, "the right to appeal is
not a natural right nor is it a part of due process, for it is merely a statutory privilege." Since, by
express mandate of Article 247 of the Family Code, all judgments rendered in summary judicial
proceedings in Family Law are "immediately final and executory," the right to appeal was not granted
to any of the parties therein. The Republic of the Philippines, as oppositor in the petition for
declaration of presumptive death, should not be treated differently. It had no right to appeal the RTC
decision of November 7, 2001. [emphases ours; italics supplied]

Certiorari Lies to Challenge the 

Decisions, Judgments or Final 
Orders of Trial Courts in a Summary 
Proceeding for the Declaration of Presumptive 
Death Under the Family Code

A losing party in this proceeding, however, is not entirely left without a remedy. While jurisprudence
tells us that no appeal can be made from the trial court's judgment, an aggrieved party may,
nevertheless, file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to question any abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction that transpired.

As held in Delos Santos v. Rodriguez, et al.,  the fact that a decision has become final does not
10

automatically negate the original action of the CA to issue certiorari, prohibition and mandamus in
connection with orders or processes issued by the trial court. Certiorari may be availed of where a
court has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, and where the
ordinary remedy of appeal is not available. Such a procedure finds support in the case of Republic v.
Tango,  wherein we held that:
11

This case presents an opportunity for us to settle the rule on appeal of judgments rendered in
summary proceedings under the Family Code and accordingly, refine our previous decisions
thereon.

Article 238 of the Family Code, under Title XI: SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE
FAMILY LAW, establishes the rules that govern summary court proceedings in the Family Code:

"ART. 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title shall apply in all
cases provided for in this Code requiring summary court proceedings. Such cases shall be decided
in an expeditious manner without regard to technical rules."

In turn, Article 253 of the Family Code specifies the cases covered by the rules in chapters two and
three of the same title. It states:

"ART. 253. The foregoing rules in Chapters 2and 3 hereof shall likewise govern summary
proceedings filed under Articles 41, 51, 69, 73, 96, 124 and 217, insofar as they are
applicable."(Emphasis supplied.)

In plain text, Article 247 in Chapter 2 of the same title reads:

"ART.247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory."

By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding shall be
immediately final and executory. As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be had of the
trial court's judgment ina summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of an absent
spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. It goes without saying, however, that an aggrieved party
may file a petition for certiorari to question abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Such
petition should be filed in the Court of Appeals in accordance with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of
Courts. To be sure, even if the Court's original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent
with the RTCs and the Court of Appeals in certain cases, such concurrence does not sanction an
unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. [emphasis ours]

Viewed in this light, we find that the petitioner’s resort to certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court to question the RTC’s order declaring Jerry presumptively dead was proper.

b. On the Issue of the Existence of Well-Founded Belief

The Essential Requisites for the 

Declaration of Presumptive Death 
Under Article 41 of the Family Code

Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be obtained, it must be shown that the prior
spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the present spouse had a well-founded
belief that the prior spouse was already dead. Under Article 41 of the Family Code, there are four (4)
essential requisites for the declaration of presumptive death:
 1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive
years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances
laid down in Article 391, Civil Code;

2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;

3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and

4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee. 12

The Present Spouse Has the Burden 

of Proof to Show that All the 
Requisites Under Article 41 of the 
Family Code Are Present

The burden of proof rests on the present spouse to show that all the requisites under Article 41 of
the Family Code are present. Since it is the present spouse who, for purposes of declaration of
presumptive death, substantially asserts the affirmative of the issue, it stands to reason that the
burden of proof lies with him/her. He who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere
allegation is not evidence.
13

Declaration of Presumptive Death 

Under Article 41 of the Family Code 
Imposes a Stricter Standard

Notably, Article 41 of the Family Code, compared to the old provision of the Civil Code which it
superseded, imposes a stricter standard. It requires a "well-founded belief " that the absentee is
already dead before a petition for declaration of presumptive death can be granted. We have had
occasion to make the same observation in Republic v. Nolasco,  where we noted the crucial
14

differences between Article 41 of the Family Code and Article 83 of the Civil Code, to wit:

Under Article 41, the time required for the presumption to arise has been shortened to four (4) years;
however, there is need for a judicial declaration of presumptive death to enable the spouse present
to remarry. Also, Article 41 of the Family Code imposes a stricter standard than the Civil Code:
Article 83 of the Civil Code merely requires either that there be no news that such absentee is still
alive; or the absentee is generally considered to be dead and believed to be so by the spouse
present, or is presumed dead under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code. The Family Code, upon
the other hand, prescribes as "well founded belief" that the absentee is already dead before a
petition for declaration of presumptive death can be granted.

Thus, mere absence of the spouse (even for such period required by the law), lack of any news that
such absentee is still alive, failure to communicate or general presumption of absence under the
Civil Code would not suffice. This conclusion proceeds from the premise that Article 41 of the Family
Code places upon the present spouse the burden of proving the additional and more stringent
requirement of "well-founded belief" which can only be discharged upon a showing of proper and
honest-to-goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain not only the absent spouse’s whereabouts but,
more importantly, that the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead.
15

The Requirement of Well-Founded Belief

The law did not define what is meant by "well-founded belief." It depends upon the circumstances of
each particular case. Its determination, so to speak, remains on a case-to-case basis. To be able to
comply with this requirement, the present spouse must prove that his/her belief was the result of
diligent and reasonable efforts and inquiries to locate the absent spouse and that based on these
efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the circumstances, the absent spouseis already
dead. It requires exertion of active effort (not a mere passive one).

To illustrate this degree of "diligent and reasonable search" required by the law, an analysis of the
following relevant cases is warranted:

i. Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals (Tenth Div.) 16

In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals (Tenth Div.),  the Court ruled that the present
17

spouse failed to prove that he had a well-founded belief that his absent spouse was already dead
before he filed his petition. His efforts to locate his absent wife allegedly consisted of the following:

(1) He went to his in-laws’ house to look for her;

(2) He sought the barangay captain’s aid to locate her;

(3) He went to her friends’ houses to find her and inquired about her whereabouts among his
friends;

(4) He went to Manila and worked as a part-time taxi driver to look for her in malls during his
free time;

(5) He went back to Catbalogan and again looked for her; and

(6) He reported her disappearance to the local police station and to the NBI.

Despite these alleged "earnest efforts," the Court still ruled against the present spouse. The Court
found that he failed to present the persons from whom he allegedly made inquiries and only reported
his wife’s absence after the OSG filed its notice to dismiss his petition in the RTC.

The Court also provided the following criteria for determining the existence of a "well-founded belief"
under Article 41 of the Family Code:

The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to goodness inquiries and
efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether the absent spouse is still
alive or is already dead. Whether or not the spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of death
of the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many circumstances
occurring before and after the disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature and extent of the
inquiries made by [the] present spouse. 18

ii. Republic v. Granada 19

Similarly in Granada, the Court ruled that the absent spouse failed to prove her "well-founded belief"
that her absent spouse was already dead prior to her filing of the petition. In this case, the present
spouse alleged that her brother had made inquiries from their relatives regarding the absent
spouse’s whereabouts. The present spouse did not report to the police nor seek the aid of the mass
media. Applying the standards in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals (Tenth Div.),  the
20

Court ruled against the present spouse, as follows:

Applying the foregoing standards to the present case, petitioner points out that respondent Yolanda
did not initiate a diligent search to locate her absent husband. While her brother Diosdado Cadacio
testified to having inquiredabout the whereabouts of Cyrus from the latter’s relatives, these relatives
were not presented to corroborate Diosdado’s testimony. In short, respondent was allegedly not
diligent in her search for her husband. Petitioner argues that if she were, she would have sought
information from the Taiwanese Consular Office or assistance from other government agencies in
Taiwan or the Philippines. She could have also utilized mass media for this end, but she did not.
Worse, she failed to explain these omissions.

iii.Republic v. Nolasco 21

In Nolasco, the present spouse filed a petition for declaration of presumptive death of his wife, who
had been missing for more than four years. He testified that his efforts to find her consisted of:

(1) Searching for her whenever his ship docked in England;

(2) Sending her letters which were all returned to him; and

(3) Inquiring from their friends regarding her whereabouts, which all proved fruitless. The
Court ruled that the present spouse’s investigations were too sketchy to form a basis that his
wife was already dead and ruled that the pieces of evidence only proved that his wife had
chosen not to communicate with their common acquaintances, and not that she was dead.

iv.The present case

In the case at bar, the respondent’s "well-founded belief" was anchored on her alleged "earnest
efforts" to locate Jerry, which consisted of the following:

(1) She made inquiries about Jerry’s whereabouts from her in-laws, neighbors and friends;
and

(2) Whenever she went to a hospital, she saw to it that she looked through the patients’
directory, hoping to find Jerry.

These efforts, however, fell short of the "stringent standard" and degree of diligence required by
jurisprudence for the following reasons:

First, the respondent did not actively look for her missing husband.  It can be inferred from the
1âwphi1

records that her hospital visits and her consequent checking of the patients’ directory therein were
unintentional. She did not purposely undertake a diligent search for her husband as her hospital
visits were not planned nor primarily directed to look for him. This Court thus considers these
attempts insufficient to engender a belief that her husband is dead.

Second, she did not report Jerry’s absence to the police nor did she seek the aid of the authorities to
look for him. While a finding of well-founded belief varies with the nature of the situation in which the
present spouse is placed, under present conditions, we find it proper and prudent for a present
spouse, whose spouse had been missing, to seek the aid of the authorities or, at the very least,
report his/her absence to the police.
Third, she did not present as witnesses Jerry’s relatives or their neighbors and friends, who can
corroborate her efforts to locate Jerry. Worse, these persons, from whom she allegedly made
inquiries, were not even named. As held in Nolasco, the present spouse’s bare assertion that he
inquired from his friends about his absent spouse’s whereabouts is insufficient as the names of the
friends from whom he made inquiries were not identified in the testimony nor presented as
witnesses.

Lastly, there was no other corroborative evidence to support the respondent’s claim that she
conducted a diligent search. Neither was there supporting evidence proving that she had a well-
founded belief other than her bare claims that she inquired from her friends and in-laws about her
husband’s whereabouts. In sum, the Court is of the view that the respondent merely engaged in a
"passive search" where she relied on uncorroborated inquiries from her in-laws, neighbors and
friends. She failed to conduct a diligent search because her alleged efforts are insufficient to form a
well-founded belief that her husband was already dead. As held in Republic of the Philippines v.
Court of Appeals (Tenth Div.),  "[w]hether or not the spouse present acted on a well-founded belief
22

of death of the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many
circumstances occurring before and after the disappearance of the absent spouse and the
natureand extent of the inquiries made by [the] present spouse."

Strict Standard Approach Is

Consistent with the State’s Policy
to Protect and Strengthen Marriage

In the above-cited cases, the Court, fully aware of the possible collusion of spouses in nullifying their
marriage, has consistently applied the "strictstandard" approach. This is to ensure that a petition for
declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code is not used as a tool to
conveniently circumvent the laws. Courts should never allow procedural shortcuts and should ensure
that the stricter standard required by the Family Code is met. In Republic of the Philippines v. Court
of Appeals (Tenth Div.),  we emphasized that:
23

In view of the summary nature of proceedings under Article 41 of the Family Code for the declaration
of presumptive death of one’s spouse, the degree of due diligence set by this Honorable Court in the
above-mentioned cases in locating the whereabouts of a missing spouse must be strictly complied
with. There have been times when Article 41 of the Family Code had been resorted to by parties
wishing to remarry knowing fully well that their alleged missing spouses are alive and well. It is even
possible that those who cannot have their marriages xxx declared null and void under Article 36 of
the Family Code resort to Article 41 of the Family Code for relief because of the xxx summary nature
of its proceedings.

The application of this stricter standard becomes even more imperative if we consider the State’s
policy to protect and strengthen the institution of marriage.  Since marriage serves as the family’s
24

foundation  and since it is the state’s policy to protect and strengthen the family as a basic social
25

institution,  marriage should not be permitted to be dissolved at the whim of the parties. In
26

interpreting and applying Article 41, this is the underlying rationale –to uphold the sanctity of
marriage. Arroyo, Jr.v. Court of Appeals  reflected this sentiment when we stressed:
27

[The]protection of the basic social institutions of marriage and the family in the preservation of which
the State has the strongest interest; the public policy here involved is of the most fundamental kind.
In Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution there is set forth the following basic state policy:

The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution.
Strict Standard Prescribed Under
Article 41 of the Family Code
Is for the Present Spouse’s Benefit

The requisite judicial declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse (and consequently, the
application of a stringent standard for its issuance) is also for the present spouse's benefit. It is
intended to protect him/her from a criminal prosecution of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code which might come into play if he/she would prematurely remarry sans the court's
declaration.

Upon the issuance of the decision declaring his/her absent spouse presumptively dead, the present
spouse's good faith in contracting a second marriage is effectively established. The decision of the
competent court constitutes sufficient proof of his/her good faith and his/her criminal intent in case of
remarriage is effectively negated.  Thus, for purposes of remarriage, it is necessary to strictly comply
28

with the stringent standard and have the absent spouse judicially declared presumptively dead.

Final Word

As a final word, it has not escaped this Court's attention that the strict standard required in petitions
for declaration of presumptive death has not been fully observed by the lower courts. We need only
to cite the instances when this Court, on review, has consistently ruled on the sanctity of marriage
and reiterated that anything less than the use of the strict standard necessitates a denial. To rectify
this situation, lower courts are now expressly put on notice of the strict standard this Court requires
in cases under Article 41 of the Family Code.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the assailed decision dated August 27, 2008 of the Court of
Appeals, which affirmed the order dated December 15, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 25,
Koronadal City, South Cotabato, declaring Jerry F. Cantor presumptively dead is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.