SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
LEGAL ETHICS
DISBARMENT; Deceiving an aunt into entrusting money and later refusing to return it despite demand is a
deceitful conduct making a lawyer unworthy of membership in the legal profession.
FACTS:On January 1985, Atty. Orlando A. Rayos induced his aunt Mrs. Irene Rayos-Ombac, who was
then 85 years old, to withdraw all her bank deposits and entrust them to him for safekeeping. The aunt
was led to believe Atty. Rayos because the latter assured her that the deposits will be excluded from the
estate of her deceased husband and her husband’s other heirs will be precluded from inheriting part of it.
Mrs. Ombac preterminated all her time deposits with the Philippine National Bank and withdrew
P588,000.00.
Atty. Rayos then advised Mrs. Ombac to deposit the money with the Union Bank where he was working
and also urged her to deposit the money in his name to prevent the other heirs of her husband from tracing
the same. She heeded the advice and Atty. Rayos deposited the money with Union Bank under the name
of his wife in trust for seven beneficiaries, including his son.
On the maturity date, Mrs. Rayos made a demand on Atty. Rayos to return the money plus interest, but the
latter told her that he has renewed the deposit for another month and promised to return the whole amount
on June 1985. However, he failed to return the money. He told her that he could only return P400,000 to
be paid on installment. The aunt acceded to respondent’s proposal as she was already old and was in dire
need of money.
The respondent issued several postdated checks in favor of the complainant but the latter was not able to
encash the first issued check as it was dishonored due to insufficient funds. The remaining checks were
likewise dishonored by the drawee bank for lack of funds.
A petition for disbarment was filed by Mrs. Ombac against Atty. Rayos, for his failure to adhere to the
standards of mental and moral fitness set up for members of the Bar. The Commission on Bar Discipline
of the BR recommended the suspension of respondent from the practice of law for two years.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lawyer should be disbarred.
HELD: The nature of the office of a lawyer requires that he shall be of good moral character. This
qualification is not only a condition precedent to admission of the legal profession, but its continued
possession is essential to maintain one’s good standing in the profession.
Considering the depravity of respondent’s offense, the Supreme Court found the penalty recommended by
the IBP to be too mild. Such offense calls for the severance of respondent’s privilege to practice law not
only for two years but for life. [Rayos-Ombac vs. Atty. Rayos, Adm. Case No. 2884, January 28, 1998---
EN BA NC; Puno,J.]
DISBARMENT; Counsel who received an amount to be given to the offended party as
consideration for an out of court settlement which in fact did not occur and who failed to
account for said amount must be disbarred.
FACTS: Frankwell Management and Consultant, Inc., through its Administrative manager Estrellita
Valdez, engaged the legal services of respondent Atty. Rosendo Meneses III. While serving as such
counsel, Atty. Meneses handled various cases and was properly compensated by his client in accordance
with their retainer agreement. One of the litigations handled by him was the case of” People vs. Lai Chan
Kow, a.k.a. Wilson Lai, and Arthur Bretana. On December 24, 1993, respondent received the sum of
P50,000 from Arthur Bretana, the accused in said case to be given to therein offended party, a certain
Gleason, as consideration for an out-of-court settlement and with the understanding that a motion to
dismiss the case would be filed by respondent Meneses.
Despite subsequent repeated requests, Meneses failed to present to Frankwell the receipt acknowledging
that Gleason received said amount. A verification made revealed that no motion to dismiss or any
pleading in connection therewith had been filed, and the supposed amicable settlement was not finalized
and concluded. Despite repeated demands in writing or by telephone for an explanation, as well as
turnover of all documents pertaining to the aforementioned case, respondent Meneses deliberately ignored
the pleas of herein complainant.
The case was investigated by the Commission on Bar Discipline of the BAR. The Commission
recommended that Meneses be suspended from the practice of legal profession for a period of three years
and directed to return the P50,000 he received from the petitioner.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent should be disbarred.
HELD: The Court agrees with the findings and conclusions of the Commission. Such conduct on the part
of the respondent indicating his unfitness for the confidence and trust reposed on him, or showing such
lack of personal honesty or of good moral character as to render him unworthy of public confidence,
constitutes a ground for disciplinary action extending to disbarment. [Atty. Navarro for and in behalf of
Pan-Asia International Commodities, Inc. vs. Atty. Meneses III, CBD Adm. Court of Appeals No. 313,
January 30, 1998---EN BA NC, Per Curiam].
JUDGES; Granting bail without hearing concerning a crime punish able by reclusion perpetua is gross
ignorance of the law.
FACTS: Two criminal complaints for rape were filed by Spouses Joel and Evangeline Almeron against
one Wilfredo Pino who allegedly committed the acts of rape against their 12- year old daughter.
At the outset, Judge Agustin Sardido granted no bail to the accused; however, before a warrant of arrest
could be issued and before a mandatory hearing could be conducted, the counsel of Pino engaged Judge
Sardido in a legal argument inside the latter’s chambers about the feasibility of granting bail to the
accused. Accordingly convinced by the counsel, the judge allowed the accused to post bail of P
200,000.00.
ISSUE: Whether or not the conduct of the judge was proper.
HELD: Simple rape is punishable with reclusion perpetua and no person charged with rape, when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall be granted or admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the bail to
execution as provided in the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. Thus, when a judge grant to an
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua without conducting a hearing, he is considered guilty of
ignorance of the law or incompetence the gravity of which cannot be excused by a claim of good faith or
excusable negligence.
The hearing to determine strength or weakness of evidence of guilt is considered mandatory and
absolutely indispensable. In his ignorance, the act of the judge of letting the Counsel for the accused to
engage him in an argument inside his chambers without any representative from the prose cution and
thereafter granting bail to the accused amounts to gross ignorance of the law and subjects him to
disciplinary actions. [Almeron v. Sardido, A. M. No. MTJ-1 142, November 6, 1997—Division; BeIlosiIlo,
J. ]
JUDGES; A judge must consider that all persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of cases before
all judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative bodies. He Is required by law to dispose of the court’s business
promptly and decide cases within the required periods.
FACTS: An administrative case has been filed against retired Judge Reno Gonzales for having failed to
decide three (3) civil cases within the three-month period from the time they had been submitted for his
decision and ten (10) criminal cases which he allegedly failed to archived. On his comment, Judge
Gonzales explained that his failure to decide the two (2) civil cases was due to the fact that he was
appointed as Acting Presiding Judge of two other salas in his province and that the other civil case cannot
be ascertained from the records of the court. As to the other criminal cases, he attributed the same to the
fact that the clerk of cOurt had to undergo surgery for renal cyst.
The office of the Court Administrator submitted a report finding Judge Gonzales administratively liable
and recommended that he be fined in the amount of P20,000 for failure to decide, act on, or archives the
cases mentioned above.
ISSUE: Whether or not the judge committed a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct on early
disposition of cases.
HELD: As provided for by Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, a judge shall dispose Of
the court’s business promptly afid decide cases within the required periods. In the instant case, Judge
Gonzales did not give a satisfactory reason for his failure to decide on two civil cases. He should have
asked for a&extension of time within which to decide it, if he believes that it will prejudice him as to his
duty to dispose the cases promptly. His claim that the other civil case submitted for decision could not be
ascertained from the records is totally unacceptable since the court keeps logbooks from which the status
of cases could easily be verified.
On matters of archiving criminal cases, Administrative Circular No. 7-A-82 provides that a criminal case
maybe archived only if after the issuance of the warrant of arrest, the accused remains at large for six
months from delivery of the warrant to the proper peace officer. Judge Gonzales’ claim that he failed to
archive the criminal cases because the clerk of court had to undergo a surgical operation for renal cyst is
not acceptable. He could have directed other court personnel to do the same. A judge must ‘consider that
all persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of cases’ before all judicial, quasi-judicial or
administrative bodies. [Re: Report on the Judicial Audit of Cases iii the RTC Branch 35, lriga City; AM
No. 97-8-262-RTC; November27, 1998 En Banc Mendoza, J.]
JUDGES; An act of a judge of demanding and receiving money from a party litigant of a
case before him makes him unfit for the judiciary and accordingly should be removed from
service.
FACTS: Judge Florencio Barron was designated as Acting Presiding Judge of Branch 41 where a pending
civil case involving Mainit Marine Resources Corporation (MMRC) was pending. Judge Barron through
Casilo Gabo, a former Sheriff of RTC arranged a meeting with MMRC President David Crear during
which the judge offered Crear help of rendering a favorable decision to MMRC on their case in exchange
of Crear’s shouldering the transportation fares to the United States of the judge’s wife and daughter. Crear
reported the incident and filed a complaint at the NBI Dumaguete City Sub-office. Thereafter, the NBI
agents arranged an entrapment plan against the judge and prepared bundles of money marked by
fluorescent powder and made to appear as equivalent to the amount requested by the judge. Upon the
second meeting between the judge and. Crear, the entrapment plan was pursued and it led to the arrest of
the judge having been found in possession of the marked money and a 9mm. caliber pistol. An
information for crime of Direct Bribery against the respondent judge was filed at Sandiganbayan. The
case was later brought to the attention of the Office of the Court Administrator through news reports.
Upon verification of the reports, the Deputy Court Administrator recoinmended that the respondent judge
be suspended and the case be referred to the Court of Appeals.
Judge Barron contended that it was David Crear who offered to bribe him. He presented witnesses to
whom he reported the bribery and a certain SPO1 Burlaza who recorded the same case at the PNP log
book. He likewise contended that what really happened was a frame-up rather than an entrapment. He
insisted that he never accepted the bribe money and that the NBI agents had illegally conducted their
operation and the search on him.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent judge should be dismissed.
HELD: The conduct of the respondent judge showed that he can be influenced by monetary
considerations. His act of demanding and receiving money from a party litigant constitutes serious
misconduct in office which erodes the respect for law and the courts. He tainted the image of the judiciary
to which he owes obligation of keeping it worthy of people’s trust. Respondent judge does not deserve to
remain in the judiciary and should accordingly be removed from service. The judge was dismissed from
service with forfeiture of benefits and privileges and likewise disqualified from re-employment in the
government. [Office of the Court Administmtor (OCA) vs. Judge Florencio S. Barron, A.M. No. RTJ 98-
1420, October 8, 1998-- EN BANC; Narvasa, C. J.]
JUDGES; Voluntary inhibition is addressed to the sound discretion of the judge. However, he should inhibit
himself if after a careful self-examination he becomes aware of circumstances which would reason ably induce
him to act In favor of one party or with bias or prejudice against another.
FACTS: The complainant Florentino C. Bagunas is the accused in the case of illegal possession of
firearms. He filed a verified complaint charging Acting Judge Concordio Fabillar of Mob, Giporlos --
Quinapandan, Eastern Samar with gross ignorance of the law and grave abuse of discretion in denying his
Urgent Motion for Inhibition and for the Forwarding of the Case to the Provincial Prosecutor. He alleged
in the said motion that the said judge is a relative of the prosecution witness, SPO2 Aquilino Fabillar,
since Judge Fabillar’s father is the third cousin of the witness’ grandfather. Hence, they are related within
the eleventh degree of consanguinity.
The judge for his part, however, holds that although he is a distant relative of prosecution witness SF02
Aquilino Fabillar, under Rule 137, he is not mandatorily required to inhibit himself from conducting the
preliminary investigation, their relationship being within the eleventh degree of consanguinity.
ISSUE: Whether the respondent judge is mandatorily required to inhibit himself or he should have
voluntarily inhibited himself from the case.
HELD: Under Par.1, Sec.1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court, a judge or judicial officer shall be
maridatorily disqualified to sit in any case in which: ‘[b] he is related to either party within the sixth
degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the
rules of civil law.” Paragraph 2 of Sec. 1, Rule 137, provides for the rule on voluntary inhibition in which
the judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or
valid reasons other than those mentioned above.”
In the case at bar, respondent judge is not mandatorily disqualified from conducting the preliminary
investigation of the complainant. His relationship to prosecution witness SF02 Aquilino Fabillar does not
fall under the scope of the prohibition mandated by the Rules of Court. However, he should have
voluntarily inhibited himself therefrom for his case was covered by the rule on voluntary inhibition. The
respondent judge gravely abused his discretion when he decided to proceed with the preliminary
investigation of the complainant knowing fully well that his impartiality was impaired. [Bagunas vs.
Fabillar, A.M No. MTJ-97- 1128, Apni 22, 1998---SECOND DIVISION; Puno, J.J
ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP; Acceptance ot the retainer fees effectively bars the lawyer from
disclaiming the existence of an attorney-client relationship. A lawyer’s fidelity to the cause of his client
requires him to be ever mindful of the responsibilities that should be expected of him.
FACTS: Sometime in January 1987, complainant Villafuet-te went to the office of respondent lawyer
Cruz to discuss his civil case for reconveyance. During their initial meeting, complainant tried to
reconstruct before respondent the incidents of the case merely from memory prompting the latter to ask
complainant to instead return at another time with the records of the case. Complainant again saw
respondent at another time but still sans the records. He requested respondent to accept the case, paying
the latter the sum of P 1,750.00 representing the acceptance fee of P1, 500.00 and P250.00 retainer fee for
January 1987. The respondent accepted the money with much reluctance and only upon condition that
complainant would get the records of the case from, as well as secure the withdrawal of appearance of the
former counsel of complainant. Allegedly, Villafuerte never showed up thereafter until November 1989
when he went to the office of respondent lawyer but only to leave a copy of a writ of execution in another
civil case for ejectment, which, according to respondent, was never priorly mentioned to him by
complainant. Indeed, said respondent had never entered his appearance in the aforementioned case.
Feeling aggrieved by what he perceives to be a neglect in the handling of his cases by respondent lawyer,
despite the latter’s receipt of P1,750.00 acceptance and retainer fees, complainant Villafuerte seeks, in the
instant proceedinqs, the disbarment of Atty. Dante Cruz.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent lawyer may be held liable.
HELD: The respondent lawyer has somehow been remiss in his responsibilities. A lawyer-client
relationship, given the circumstances, has arisen between respondent and complainant. Respondent
lawyer has admitted having received the amount of P1, 750.00 including its nature and purpose, from
complainant. His acceptance of the payment effectively bars him from altogether disclaiming the
existence of an attorney-client relationship between them. It would not matter really whether the money
has been intended to pertain only to the civil case for reconveyance or to include the civil case for
ejectment, there being no showing, in any event, that respondent lawyer has attended to either of said
cases. It would seem that he hardly has exerted any effort to find out what might have happened to his
client’s cases. A lawyer’s fidelity to the cause of his client requires him to be ever mindful of the
responsibilities that should be expected of him. He is mandated to exert his best efforts to protect, within
the bounds of the law, the interests of his client. The Code of Professional Responsibility is clear in its
dictum that a “lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence,” and that he “shall not neglect
a legal matter entrusted to him.” [Vlllafuerte vs. Cortez; Adm. Case No. 3455; April 14, 1998---FIRST
DIVISION; Vitug J.]
JUDGES; It is imperative that a judge’s official conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety
and that his personal behavior in everyday life is shown to be beyond reproach.
FACTS: Judge Balgos was charged with grave abuse of discretion and improper conduct. The complaint
stemmed from a case brought before respondent for preliminary investigation. It was alleged that a 14-
year old girl was kidnapped and brought to the house of the accused where she was detained and raped by
several men. The victim was able to escape. Warrants of arrest were issued against the accused and his
companions. The latter, through counsel, filed a motion to recall the warrant of arrest issued against him
which was immediately heard and granted. It was argued by complainant that the judge should have
instead inhibited himself from hearing the same since the counsel of the accused is the family lawyer of
the judge in a pending civil case. Eventually, however, the judge inhibited himself.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct because the counsel of the
accused was the counsel of the respondent’s family.
HELD: Judges should endeavor to maintain at all times the confidence and high respect accorded to those
who wield the gavel. It is imperative that a judge’s official conduct should be free from the appearance of
impropriety and that his personal behavior in everyday life shown to be beyond reproach. The respondent
judge is reprimanded and reminded that the foremost duty of a magistrate is to uphold the people’s trust
and confidence in the judiciary. [YuIo vs. Judge Balgos, A.M. No. MTJ.98-1149, March 31,1998---THIRD
DIVISION; Romero, J.]
JUDGES; Judges should bear in mind that those involved in the administration of justice from the highest to
the lowest level must live up to the strictest standards of honesty and integrity in the public service.
FACTS: An anonymous letter was sent to the office of Chief Justice Andres Narvasa bringing to his
attention the alleged failure of Judge Amer Baraacal to report to his official station at the Sharia Court in
Tawi-tawi. After a thorough investigation, it was proved that the judge was guilty of absentee ism and
dereliction of duty. Furthermore, he aggravated his misconduct by submitting falsified certificates of
service to make it appear that he regularly reported for work.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent judge should be dismissed from service.
HELD: Judges should bear in mind that those involved in the administration of justice from the highest to
the lowest level must live up to the strictest standards of honesty and integrity in the public service.
Inasmuch as he has indubitably shown that he is loath, for whatever reason, to report for work and
discharge his judicial duties, the Supreme Court is not disinclined to release him completely and
absolutely from service. The judge is therefore dismissed. [Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge
Bara-acal, A.M. No. SCC-95-2, March 31, 1998--- EN BANC Per Curiam]
LAWYERS; The prohibition with respect to acquisition by an attorney of any property belonging to a client
in a case extends only to property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in which he may take
part by virtue of his profession.
FACTS: Atty. Esteban Abecia was the counsel of the complainant Regalado Daroy in a case for forcible
entry. They were able to secure a judgment in their favor. To satisfy the judgment obligation, the sheriff
sold in a public auction a.parcel of land of the defendant. Daroy was the highest bidder and the ownership
over the land was consolidated in his name upon failure on the part of the defendant to redeem the land.
Later on, Daroy found out that Atty. Abecia conveyed the property in favor of Jose Gangay by virtue of a
deed of sale. Two weeks thereafter, the property was subsequently sold to Atty. Abecias wife. Daroy
claimed that Atty. Abecia forged his signature in the deed of sale and upon the forged deed, Atty. Abecia
was able to obtain a new TCT first in the name of Gangay and later in the name of his wife.
Daroy filed a complaint for malpractice against Atty. Abecia on the theory that the latter is prohibited
from acquiring the property of his client as provided under Art. 1491 of the New Civil Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not the acquisition of the land by Atty. Abecia is proper.
HELD: The acquisition is proper. The parties were mistaken that Atty. Abecia could not validly acquire
the land. The prohibition in Article 1491 applies only in cases of sale of a parcel of land belonging to the
client and which is a subject of litigation. The prohibition does not apply to a sale of parcel of land
acquired by a client in an auction sale to satisfy a judgment in his favor. For indeed, while judges,
prosecuting attorneys and others connected with the administration of justice are prohibited from
acquiring property or rights in litigation or levied upon in execution, the prohibition with respect to
attorneys in the case extends only to property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in
which they may take part by virtue of their profession. [Daroy vs. Abecia, Adm. Case No. 3046,
October26, 1998; Mendoza, J]
INHIBITION; No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he has been counsel for a party
without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.
FACTS: This refers to the order of inhibition which respondent Judge Eddie R. Rojas of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 39, Polomolok, South Cotabato issued in a criminal case. It appears that the case was
initially tried in the RTC, with Judge Rojas as public prosecutor. While the case was pending, Rojas was
appointed judge of the trial court. As the original counsel for the accused did not interpose any objection,
Judge Rojas tried the case. A year and a half later, Judge Rojas decided to inhibit himself from the case
explaining that after a close reflection of the records, he discovered and remembered that he handled the
aforeoited case as public prosecutor years back. He stated that he had not inhibited himself at the
beginning because the previous counsel of the accused did not object to his sitting in the case as the
judge.
ISSUE: Whether or not the judge violated the law when he failed to inhibit himself from the case at the
soonest possible time.
HELD: There was a violation of Rule 137, Section 1 of the Rules of Court which expressly states that no
judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he has been counsel for a party without the written
consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record. The prohibition is thus not
limited to cases in which a judge hears the evidence of the parties but includes as well cases where he acts
by resolving motions, issuing orders and the like as Judge Rojas has done in the criminal case. In
violation of these rules, Judge Rojas sat as a judge in the aforecited criminal case without securing the
written consent of both the prosecution and the defense and entering the same upon the record of the case.
For almost one and a half years, he issued various orders resetting the dates of the hearing and of the
reception of additional evidence for the prosecution and for the defense. Undoubtedly, by these acts, he
sat in and acted on the case. The failure of Judge Rojas to observe these elementary rules of judicial
conduct betrays his interest in the case, which he allowed to prevail over his sworn duty to administer the
law impartially without any fear or favor. [RE: Inhibition of Judge Eddie R. Rojas, RTC-Branch 39,
PolomoloK South Cotabato in CriminaI Case No. 09-5668, A.M. No. 98-6-185-RTC, October 30, 1998,
EN BANC, Mendoza, J.J
JUDGES; While every office in the government service is a public trust, no position exacts a greater demand
on moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the judiciary.
FACTS: Respondent Judge Adrian N. Pagalilauan, was administratively charged with grave misconduct
committed for peeping into the bathroom where Marilyn Dumayas was then taking a bath. In his
comment, respondent denied the charges but admitted that he boarded in the house of Marilyn’s father.
Respondent also admitted his presence in the adjoining toilet separated from the bathroom by a 2 1/2-
meter high concrete divider and explained that since he was not accustomed to sitting on the toilet bowl in
the comfort room, he would squat on the bowl with his feet. Under the circumstances, he had to balance
himself by placing one hand on the divider while mounting and dismounting the bowl. One morning,
while using the toilet bowl, he had to hold the top of the divider with his left hand to balance himself. His
left hand almost dislodged the clothes of Marilyn which were draped on the divider. He held on to them to
prevent them from falling on the floor. He concluded that Marilyn who was at the adjacent bathroom must
have interpreted the movement of her hanging clothes as a deliberate and malicious act on his part thus
giving rise to her suspicion that he was actually peeping at her. On the other hand, Marilyn executed a
sworn statement bolstering the charge, though, 2 years thereafter and upon inquiry conducted by the
Court of Appeals she declared that she just “simply suspected” that the respondent peeped at her and that
she cannot remember other details.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Judge is guilty of grave misconduct.
HELD: Respondent is guilty of grave misconduct. The sworn statement of Marilyn was given more
weight than her testimony as her testimony may have shown “failure of memory” or could have been
swayed by the fact that her husband was the respondent’s process server and her father was respondent’s
former sheriff. By committing the prurient acts in question, respondent violated the trust reposed in him
and utterly failed to live up to the noble ideals and rigid standards of morality required in the judicial
profession. People who run the judiciary particularly justices and judges, must not only be proficient in
both the substantive and procedural aspects of the law, but more importantly, they must possess the
highest degree of integrity and probity and unquestionable moral uprightness both in their public and
private lives. /Tomas Cabulisan vs. Judge Adrian Pagalilauan, A. M. No. RTJ-96- 1363, October 12,
1998 ; BeIIosiIlo, J.]
COURT PERSONNEL; Forging the signature of the presiding judge of the court where one is employed is
deplorable, for it involves dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service which are
grounds for disciplinary action.
FACTS: Complainant Judge Moner charged respondent Ampatua with falsification of a public document
alleging that the latter falsified the former’s signature in a letter addressed to the City Mayor of lligan
City, by virtue of which, the Mayor was misled into issuing a Travel Order thereby allowing respondent to
draw the amount of P2,000 from the City Treasurer’s Office to answer for respondent’s travelling
expenses for the annual convention of the Philippine Association of Court Employees. The Court referred
the case to Executive Judge Mangotara of the RTC of lligan City who recommended two months
suspension without pay against the defendant. The Supreme Court then referred the same to the Office of
the Court Administrator which agreed with the findings of Judge Mangotara, but recommended the
penalty of dismissal from the service with prejudice to re-employment in any government-owned or
controlled corporation.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Ampatua’s act warrants a penalty of dismissal from the service with
prejudice to re-employment in any government-owned or -controlled corporation.
HELD: Dismissal is the proper penalty for Ampatua’s acts, but as to the ban on re-employment, such
must not only be from ‘any government owned or controlled corporation,” but from the judiciary and any
other branch of service, agency or instrumentality of the government. Forging the signature of the
presiding judge of the court where he was employed is deplorable, for it involves dishonesty and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service which are grounds for disciplinary action. The judiciary has
no place for dishonest personnel. The solemn task of administering justice logically demands that those
who are privileged to serve therein, from the highest official to the lowliest employee, must truly be
servants of the people who must not only be competent and dedicated, but must live and practice the
virtues of honesty and integrity. [Judge Nagamura T. Moner, Shari’a Circuit Court, Iligan City vs. Datu
Salem P. Ampatua, A.M.. No. SCC-98-3(P), September 3, 1998-- EN BANC; PER CURIAM]
COURT PERSONNEL; Court personnels, from the judge to the lowliest clerk, are invested with the sacred
duty to maintain the good name and standing of the institution they serve.
FACTS: Mrs. Carmelita Lledo filed a complaint for immorality, abandonment and conduct unbecoming of
a public official against her husband, Atty. Cesar Lledo, Branch Clerk of Court at the RTC of Quezon
City. According to her, she received information that he is keeping a paramour named Katrina Narvaez
with whom he has children. She was able to secure a copy of the birth certificate of his son with Katrina.
It was alleged further that Atty. Lledo executed an affidavit attesting to the truth that Katrina is his wife
and that they are known in the community as husband and wife. Respondent denied all the material
allegations of the complainant stating that since the birth of all his children with Carmelita he has not
been remiss in his obligation to provide for their support and that the filing of the case was triggered on
the unfounded ground or claim that the petitioner would not get her alleged share of the respondent’s
pension. After a thorough investigation, the court recommended that corresponding penalty of dismissal
from the service be meted out to respondent Atty. Cesar Lledo.
ISSUE: Whether or not the conduct and behavior of respondent Lledo warrants a penalty of dismissal.
HELD: Dismissal from service with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and leave credits and with
prejudice to reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including any government
or controlled corporation is the proper penalty for respondent Lledo. This is also without prejudice to the
filing of a case for disbarment against him.
The conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an office charged with the dispensation of justice,
from the presiding judge to the sheriff and to the lowliest clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy
burden of responsibility. In the present case, sufficient proof, both oral and documentary was presented to
show that Lledo abandoned his conjugal dwelling without providing support for his legitimate children
and subsequently cohabited with another with whom he had 3 children. It is beyond ciispute that
respondent flaunted his disregard of the fundamental institution of marriage and his elementary obligation
to provide for his legitimate children. Clearly, the respondent has failed to comply with the strict
standards required of court employees. His conduct betrays an unscrupulous streak that has, in turn,
tarnished the image of the judiciary. [Carmelita Lledo vs. Atty. Cesar Liedo, A.M. No. P-95- 1167,
December21, 1998 EN BANC; PER CURIAM]
SHERIFFS; The sheriff cannot exercise discretion in the execution~of a final deed of sale after the lapse of the
one year redemption period because his functions are purely ministerial.
FACTS: The complainant Edgar Remollo filed an administrative complaint against respondent Clerk of
Court Atty. Thelma Garcia for misfeasance, bias, ignorance of the law and usurpation of judicial
functions, It appears that in an action filed by Remollo’s parents against respondent Garcia’s brother-in-
law and his wife, the court rendered judgment in favor of Remollo’s parents. To satisfy the judgment,
parcels of land belonging to Garcia’s brother-in-law and his wife were sold at public auction in which the
heirs of the Remollo spouses, were the highest bidders. A sheriff’s Certificate of Sale was issued and
thereafter registered with the Register of Deeds. However, despite the expiration of the period of
redemption, Garcia, then Clerk of Court and Ex-oficio Provincial Sheriff, refused to execute the sheriff’s
final deed of sale This led to the filing of a civil case for mandamus and an administrative case against
Garcia. In due time, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment directing her to execute the final deed of
sale. Despite the judgment, she continued in her refusal to do so allegedly because the heirs of her
brother-in-law were making partial payments of the obligation. Remollo refiled the administrative
complaint against her. The case was evaluated by the Court Administrator who thereafter recommended
the imposition of P5,000 fine on respondent for her having been remiss in the performance of her
ministerial functions. Meanwhile, respondent retired compulsorily.
ISSUE: Whether or not Garcia can be held administratively liable; whether or not the 5,000-peso fine was
proper in this case.
HELD: Garcia is administratively liable. From the records it is clear that respondent was not simply
remiss or neglectful of her duties. On the contrary, and in fact, she intentionally refused to execute the
deed despite the clear mandate of the law that the sheriff shall execute the corresponding deed of
conveyance upon the expiration of the redemption period. It is well settled that a sheriff’s functions are
purely ministerial, not discretionary. As a ministerial officer, she is not only under obligation to conduct
herself, at all times, with propriety; but most of all, be above suspicion for the image of the court of
justice is necessarily mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise, of the personnel who work thereat,
from the judge to the lowest of its personnel.
The 5,000-peso fine was not enough. The respondent’s liability is compounded by the fact that she used
her official position for personal and selfish ends, i.e., favoring party-litigants who are her kin. Public
officials and employees are prohibited from dispensing or extending undue favors on account of their
office to their relatives whether by consanguinity or affinity except with respect to appointments of such
relatives to strictly confidential positions or as coterminous members of their personal staff. By her
actuation respondent has not only cause anguish and damage to the complainant but more importantly, she
has placed the court where she works in a bad light and has undermined the faith of a party-litigant and of
the public in general in that court’s administration of justice, hence warranting the penalty of P30,000.00
as fine. [Edgar P. Remollo vs. Atty. Thelma Garcia, RTC Dumaguete City, A.M.. No. P-98- 1276,
September 25, 1998; Bellosillo, J.]
