1. People vs.
San Diego GR L-29676, 24 December 1968
FACTS:
Mario Henson, Rafael Gonzales, Angel Mendoza, Rogelio Lazaro and Bienvenido Wijangco
werecharged before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch (Criminal case Q-8711) as
principals of the murder of Jesus Lapid with the qualifying circumstances of treachery, evident
premeditation, and abuse of superior strength and with the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity, aid of
armed men and craft or fraud. The prosecution and the defense agreed that the motions for bail of the
defendants would be considered in the course of the regular trial instead of in a summary proceeding. In
the course of the regular trial, after the prosecution had presented eight witnesses, the trial court resolved
the motions for bail granting the same despite the objection of the prosecution on the ground that it still
had material witnesses to present. Fiscal Oscar Inocentes moved for reconsideration. Inocentes, for the
People, filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether the order to grant or deny bail (especially those involving capital punishment) should be
made only after the prosecution has presented its evidence.
HELD:
Whether the motion for bail of a defendant who is in custody for a capital offense be resolved in
a summary proceeding or in the course of a regular trial, the prosecution must be given an opportunity to
present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may desire to introduce before the court should
resolve the motion for bail. If the prosecution should be denied such an opportunity, there would be a
violation of procedural due process, and the order of the court granting bail should be considered void on
that ground. The court's discretion to grant bail in capital offenses must be exercised in the light of a
summary of the evidence presented by the prosecution; otherwise, it would be uncontrolled and might be
capricious or whimsical.
2. VILLASENOR VS. ABANO GR L-23599, 29 SEPTEMBER 1967
Facts:
The Provincial Fiscal charged Reynaldo C. Villaseñor for the murder of Boac police sergeant
Alfonso Madla ebfore the Court of First Instance of Marinduque (Criminal Case 2299). Villaseñor was,
on motion, admitted to a P60,000.00 bail. The amount of the bond was, on verbal representation of
Villaseñor's wife, reduced to P40,000.00. On 29 May 1964, Villaseñor posted a property bond, was set at
provisional liberty. Before arraignment on the murder charge, however, the Provincial Fiscal amended the
information. This time he accused Villaseñor with "Direct Assault Upon an Agent of a Person in
Authority with Murder." On 7 August 1964, the judge sua sponte (Judge Maximo Abaño) cancelled
Villaseñor's bond, and ordered his immediate arrest. On Villaseñor's motion to reconsider, the judge, on 9
September 1964, after hearing, resolved to admit him to bail provided he puts up a cash bond of
P60,000.00. On 15 September 1964, on Villaseñor's motion that the original bond previously given be
reinstated, the judge resolved to fix "the bond anew in real property in the amount of P60,000, but to be
posted only by residents of the province of Marinduque actually staying therein" with properties which
"must be in the possession and ownership of said residents for five years." On 1 October 1964, Villaseñor
came to the Supreme Court on certiorari, with a prayer for preliminary injunction.
ISSUE:
Whether the P60,000.00-bond fixed by judge transgress the constitutional injunction that
"excessive bail shall not be required,” in light of the fact that the accused is a mere government employee,
earning but a monthly salary of P210.00, and the sole breadwinner of a family of five.
HELD:
To be read with the constitutional precept, that "excessive bail shall not be required,” is Section
12, Rule 114, Rules of Court, which provides that "the court may, upon good cause shown, either increase
or reduce the amount" of the bail, and that "defendant may be committed to custody unless he gives bail
in the increased amount he is called upon to furnish." Along with the court's power to grant bail in
bailable cases is its discretion to fix the amount therefor, and, as stated, to increase or reduce the same.
The question of whether bail is excessive "lays with the court to determine." In the matter of bail fixing,
courts perforce are to be guided at all times by the purpose for which bail is required. The definition of
bail in Section 1, Rule 114, Rules of Court, gives this purpose — "the security required and given for the
release of a person who is in the custody of the law, that he will appear before any court in which his
appearance may be required as stipulated in the bail bond or recognizance." And, in amplification thereof,
Section 2 of the same rule states that the condition of the bail is that "defendant shall answer the
complaint or information in the court in which it is filed or to which it may be transferred for trial, and
after conviction, if the case is appealed to the Court of First Instance upon application supported by an
undertaking or bail, that he will surrender himself in execution of such judgment as the appellate court
may render, or that, in case the cause is to be tried anew or remanded for a new trial, he will appear in the
court to which it may be remanded and submit himself to the orders and processes thereof." Expressions
in varying language spell out in a general way the principles governing bail fixing. One is that the amount
should be high enough to assure the presence of defendant when required but no higher than is reasonably
calculated to fulfill this purpose. Another is that "the good of the public as well as the rights of the
accused," and "the need for a tie to the jurisdiction and the right to freedom from unnecessary restraint
before conviction under the circumstances surrounding each particular accused, "should all be balanced in
one equation. The inability of a defendant to secure bail in a certain amount, by itself, does not make the
amount excessive. For, where an accused has no means of his own, no one to bail him out, or none to turn
to for premium payments, any amount fixed no matter how small would fall into the category of
excessive bail; and, he "would be entitled to be discharged on his own recognizance.
