Chapter 8

Military Operations Other Than War

This chapter discusses Army MOOTW—operations in two states
of the range of military operations: peacetime and conflict. Peacetime
is a state in which diplomatic, economic, informational, and military
powers of the nation are employed to achieve national objectives.
Since peacetime is the preferred state of affairs (as opposed to conflict
or war), how well the Army and other services accomplish their
missions in peacetime is vital to US national interests.
Conflict is a unique environment in which the ARFOR
commander works closely with diplomatic leaders to control
hostilities, with the goal of returning to peacetime conditions. In
conflict, the military, as an element of national power, takes on a
more prominent role than in peacetime. The Army participates in
conflict as a component of a joint organization that is usually an
element of a multinational structure. Other US Government
agencies, NGOs, PVOs, and international organizations (IOs) often
participate.
FUNDAMENTALS OF MOOTW
Army warfighting doctrine is based on well- measure of a unit’s ability to counter an
established principles of war. MOOTW are expected threat and execute a mission. A force
based on similar principles that guide the must have the capability to accomplish a
force’s actions. The principles of war apply for military mission by virtue of its training,
those actions that involve our forces in combat. equipment, and structure.
For MOOTW that do not require direct combat, The force composition for MOOTW must be
the principles are objective, unity of effort, proportionate to the stated goals of the
legitimacy, perseverance, restraint, and security. sponsoring authority and provide sufficient
FMs 100-5 and 100-23 describe these principles capability to complete the mission and protect
and their application. These principles are not the force. The perception that the force
immutable, but serve as guides for action. employed exceeds the limits of its mandate
Commanders must balance these principles lessens legitimacy with the international
against the specific missions and nature of the community, the US public, and the indigenous
operation. population. Capability and acceptability are
In planning for military operations in not constants but vary based upon the threat,
peacetime and conflict, commanders must tailor the intensity of operations, the missions to be
a force that is suitable for the mission. performed, and changing international
Suitability is the measure of a force’s capability perceptions.
against possible threats and the diplomatic The composition of the force should reflect
acceptability of the chosen force. Acceptability is the commander’s consideration of the military
based on the force’s appropriateness, given end state, METT-T, mission-specific training
diplomatic considerations, and qualities that requirements, strategic lift, pre-positioned
are consistent with accomplishment of national assets, joint and multinational military
interests and objectives. The commander’s forces, reserve component forces, nonmilitary
acceptability of the force includes the US agencies, NGOs, PVOs, and host nations
perceptions of the indigenous population, forces. The nature of MOOTW is such that CS
the international community, and the and CSS units may have an equal if not greater
American public. Force capability is the role than combat units.

RESPONSIBILITIES IN PEACETIME
The Army’s responsibilities in peacetime During peacetime, senior army commanders
are as important as its traditional combat roles. are always postured to present a deterrent to

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internal or external threats to US national programs, security assistance programs, and

interests. They do this by conducting routine multinational training exercises. Like
peacetime operations and nonhostile activities. conventional forces, SOF are a deterrent. In
multinational operations, SOF involvement
UNIFIED COMMANDERS with allies worldwide contributes to deterrence
and provides a low-visibility means of
At the direction of national leaders, CINCs extending US influence.
may use ARFOR to perform noncombat
missions that support diplomatic initiatives. Due to extensive unconventional warfare
Army leaders then carry out these activities as (UW) training, SOF are well-suited to conduct
part of the overall unified command plan. various peacetime operations and provide
These activities may include job training various types of support. SOF should be
exercises, peace support operations, nation considered the force of choice for peacetime
assistance activities, disaster relief and missions. General-purpose forces may also be
humanitarian assistance, security assistance, called for their particular specialties or when
shows of force, and support for counterdrug the scope of operations is so vast that
operations. conventional forces are required.
The commander of a unified command,
such as PACOM and ACOM, may control and ARMY SERVICE COMPONENT
coordinate military support to domestic COMMANDER
emergencies in the states of Alaska and Hawaii The operational-level functions discussed
and territories and possessions of the US. here are used as a starting point to discuss the
CINCs must continuously assess their regions ASCC in peacetime. Some systems, such as
to identify the strategic situation and operational fires, may not have extensive
situations requiring military forces for peacetime applications. Still, the operational-
noncombat missions. Armed forces may be level commander and his staff need to analyze
tasked with direct responsibility, or they may each function and its corresponding
conduct operations that support other US subfunctions, augmenting or deleting as
Government agencies. necessary to ensure the proper integration and
synchronization of all peacetime operations
SENIOR ARMY COMMANDERS and activities.
The Army’s role in peacetime is to support
the regional CINC’s efforts to prevent unstable Movement and Maneuver
situations from developing into the loss of local The CINC may use armored, light, or
control or open conflict. Senior army special operations Army forces and their
commanders may do this by conducting routine corresponding CS or CSS structures available
activities that maintain the potential of within the region. Some situations require
ARFOR to conduct major operations. This deployment of additional units via strategic
potential may serve as a deterrent, or it can lift. The MCA provides for the orderly flow of
enhance the capability to react in emergencies. these forces and resources. The ASCC receives
Army component forces may turn this potential and prepares incoming units for operations.
into actual mission execution to actively control Since peacetime operations are normally
a situation. As ASCCs or other senior army conducted in a permissive environment, CS or
commanders respond to the regional CINC, CSS units may be the predominant elements
they may be required to conduct peacetime and deploy early to prepare to support the
operations in one region while simultaneously arrival of other units.
conducting conflict and/or war operations in
others. The CINC may assign operating forces a
JOA, but he generally uses few boundaries or
other special control measures. Normally, the
SPECIAL OPERATIONS ASCC, a subordinate Army commander, or a
FORCES COMMANDERS JFC employs these forces to execute a specific
In peacetime, SOF help attain peacetime MOOTW mission. Each operation is discrete in
military objectives and may promote regional response to a specific situation, though it may
stability by advising, training, and assisting be sequenced with past and future operations.
allies. SOF peacetime activities could be the Execution focuses on near-term operations.
conduct of US humanitarian assistance Peacetime operations often require special

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engineer, legal, CA, PSYOP, and PA self-defense and deterrent posture. These rules
considerations. Once the operating force deal with terrorist and other threats.
completes its mission, it redeploys to its home
station or continues peacetime activities in Maintaining
theater with little requirement for Discipline and Order
consolidation operations or other transition
efforts. Good order and discipline are instrumental
for conserving military potential. The ASCC
Protection establishes a command climate conducive to
this end. He ensures the maintenance of proper
Protecting forces and resources from a wide liaison with DOD police organizations as well
range of threats is an important responsibility as with local or host nation, allied, and
for all senior commanders. In force-projection interagency police agencies. Within Army
contingency operations, the threat of the use of organizations, the ASCC facilitates Army MP
WMD must be continually tracked to preclude and Criminal Investigation Command
unacceptable risk to the force. Options for elements investigating offenses. In addition,
protection from these weapons encompass the the ASCC enforces the policies of the senior
politico-military range and include diplomatic army commanders. The ASCC may provide
defusing and deterrence through NBC prisoner confinement facilities for those who
readiness, active and passive defense, air violate good order and discipline.
defense, and WMD reduction. The ASCC
directs measures in peacetime to conserve Providing Limited
military potential so that it can be applied at a
decisive place and time. Deception Measures
Protecting the force depends on current, Peacetime operations usually require little
accurate intelligence for I&W of possible deception beyond normal OPSEC. OPSEC, or
obstacles or threats. Protection includes the information measures the ASCC uses,
conducting antiterrorism measures, must be consistent with established guidelines
maintaining discipline and order, and and may require interagency coordination.
providing limited deception measures. As part
of protecting the force, the ASCC issues the Fires
peacetime ROE established by the regional A major challenge for any force taking part
commander in coordination with JCS, the host in peacetime operations is to be organized to
nation, and the ambassador. Through an accomplish the goals of the sponsoring
operational risk assessment, the ASCC ensures authority and provide sufficient capability to
the conservation and safety of the force. protect the force. The committed ARFOR must
Providing air defense of the force and selected be sufficiently lethal and survivable to protect
geopolitical assets has a deterrent value. It also itself, deter possible aggression, and
has an advantage that it is seen as a accomplish its mission. This specialized force
nonescalatory measure. must be capable of performing both hostile and
nonhostile actions simultaneously throughout
Conducting Antiterrorism its AO. The ASCC must always have available
Measures and continuously plan for the employment of a
Terrorist acts overseas are a constant joint or multinational force suite of fire support
threat to US armed forces, civilians, and systems. A credible operational fires capability
facilities. The ASCC presumes civil authorities deters aggression and increases the options
and host governments will implement available to the commander to accomplish his
counterterrorism procedures to protect people mission and protect the force.
within their territory. The CINC ensures Fire support units provide more than lethal
coordination of all local antiterrorist policies and nonlethal fires during MOOTW. Fire
and measures for protecting DOD facilities, support coordinators and operational-level
equipment, personnel, and family members planners must establish liaison early to start
abroad. The ASCC may assist in implementing planning and coordinating targeting functions
specific antiterrorist actions called for by (operational IPB, high-payoff target selection,
terrorist threat conditions (THREATCONs) target acquisition and attack system selection/
discussed later in this chapter. The theater tasking, and BDA planning) should fires be
commander’s peacetime ROE provide a flexible needed. The organization and equipment of fire

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3
support units can augment the C I collection must first support the increased security
and other capabilities of the joint or requirements for both position defense and
multinational force. movement. Second, planners must recognize
Doctrine for fires and the basic tasks of fire the restrictions and constraints of ROE on the
application of force. Planners must then
support do not change during MOOTW. Still, consider indirect and nonlethal fires, in
the MOOTW environment presents unique addition to direct fire systems, when they
challenges that affect tactics, techniques, and write ROE. ROE should address appropriate
procedures for fires and require the meticulous responses to various expected threat actions
attention of planners. Planners must consider and force protection. The diversity of available
the characteristics of the MOOTW threat and fire support systems, including those of
their impact on both operational fires and fire coalition forces, requires that ROE include
support. weapon system and munition selection as well.
The MOOTW AO typically presents threats At all echelons of command, ROE significantly
that do not conform to linear operations. impact all aspects of fire planning, target
Threats are diverse and may manifest acquisition, and attack. Finally, the nonspecific
themselves anywhere at any time, making nature of MOOTW threats requires continuous
them difficult to predict. Threat personnel and planning. Consideration must be given to
activities may be indistinguishable from mutual support between adjacent units or
friendly until hostilities are initiated. The bases and even AOs.
prevalent threat in MOOTW is from hostile The fleeting nature of the threat requires
terrorist, guerilla, or partisan activities. near real-time target acquisition and sensor-to-
Additionally, environmental factors (weather, shooter links. Target acquisition systems must
disease) pose a serious threat. In some be capable of distinguishing between friendly
scenarios, they will be the prevalent threat. and threat activity. This capability increases
Normally, MOOTW threats do not involve a the importance of HUMINT and IMINT
sophisticated military force unless hostilities sources, which provide real time eyes on targets
have escalated to the realm of conflict or the such as patrols, police, SOF, UAV/RPV
threat is capable of rapidly massing and (remotely piloted vehicle), and J-STARS (joint
dispersing military or paramilitary force to surveillance target and attack radar system).
achieve its objectives. MOOTW threat Ground surveillance, countermortar, and
activities include hit and run harassing tactics counterbattery radars are equally important
such as attacks and raids, mining and booby and have special employment considerations in
traps, sabotage, deception, and psychological the MOOTW environment. Electronic
warfare designed to embarrass and demoralize intelligence (ELINT) systems may provide
friendly governments and forces. valuable situation development information,
External support from other nations for the but the need to verify target descriptions limits
indigenous MOOTW threat and adaptation of ELINT responsiveness and utility as a target
friendly operations to the local geography acquisition system for triggering target attack.
compound the problem. External support of the These considerations highlight the need for
threat extends the problem to the international close coordination among joint, multinational,
diplomatic arena, usually increasing the and coalition force operations; intelligence; and
restrictions and constraints on military fires representatives at the ASCC
options. The extremes in geography require headquarters. Although these considerations
organizations to prepare for and adapt to are not all-inclusive, they may appear to focus
variations in terrain and vegetation and the fire support at lower echelons rather than
impact of seasonal weather changes. operational fires. Still, the MOOTW
All of these aspects of the MOOTW threat environment forces the ASCC/ARFOR to plan
impact planning and execution of operational meticulously, coordinate, and execute
fires. The range of threats in an MOOTW application of force.
environment impact both operational fires and To expedite fire support coordination, fire
fire support. First, all friendly forces are planning, and clearance of fires, special
vulnerable. No rear area enjoys relative arrangements are required with the host
security. This vulnerability requires nation military, allied nations, joint services,
establishment of integrated base defenses with and national and local civilian authorities.
a mutually supporting fires capability. Fires These arrangements include determining

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communication requirements, identifying direction of the unified commander’s

liaison personnel, and establishing diplomatic-military staff element, may
procedures—all focused on the interoperability integrate ARFOR to support the ambassador.
of the multinational force effort to support Military commanders must work closely with
peacekeeping objectives. the ambassador and his country team to assure
Within NATO and the ABCA (American, effective exchange of information and
British, Canadian, Australian) quadripartite coordination. Sometimes, the military
working group, special agreements exist which commander may be a part of the country team
facilitate fire support operations. These are and directly advise the ambassador.
NATO standardization agreements
(STANAGs) and quadripartite standardization The Commander in Chief
agreements (QSTAGs). Many countries that The CINC may use forward-deployed Army
the US may support have no bilateral fire units in theater when the NCA directs. In such
support agreements. Action may be required, a case, command relationships change little
based on the situation, to establish from routine peacetime activities. The ASCC
agreements. Support in these efforts may be controls ARFOR operations and recommends
arranged through the appropriate DOS and coordinates the use of contingency forces
agencies and country
2
teams. This increase in and mobilization of reserve forces from outside
centralized C of fires is needed for civil- the theater. In such a case, the CINC may use
military cooperation, developing and adhering existing command relationships, or, if the
to ROE, establishing appropriate procedures mission requires forces of multiple services, he
for clearance of fires, and establishing an may establish a JTF. The ASCC may advise the
appropriate joint/multinational force staff CINC to integrate reserve component forces
structure to plan, coordinate, and, when either in a training status or brought to active
necessary, control operational fires. duty for an extended period to assist in
executing operations.
Command and Control
Peacetime operations contribute to Intelligence
stability and conflict prevention in order to The ASCC needs high-quality, timely
complement diplomatic initiatives. The ASCC intelligence to conduct peacetime operations.
may conduct a wide range of peacetime The ACE serves as the clearinghouse for all-
operations that directly or indirectly stabilize a source intelligence. The ACE maintains lists of
situation or contribute to the general welfare. I&W that the ASCC uses to anticipate
Contingency force-projection operations peacetime operations. The ACE produces
develop through CAP (see Chapter 6). These intelligence information and disseminates it to
actions may evolve into longer-term commanders and staff agencies for use. This
commitments such as regional peacekeeping intelligence effort must address diplomatic and
operations. Other peacetime operations may economic information as well as information
begin as long-term commitments that may related to potential natural disasters. Based on
require deliberate planning. Examples include these indicators and CINC guidance, the ASCC
overt PSYOP programs, nation assistance, and focuses the collection and processing of
security assistance. information on specific peacetime operations.
Command relationships in peacetime are Intelligence provides a basis for all US
normally based on the in-place theater plans and operations in MOOTW. The nature
structure that conducts routine peacetime of MOOTW is one of heavy involvement with
activities. These peacetime relationships the host nation populace, government, and
require special sensitivity to and coordination military. Due to this heavy involvement with
with nonmilitary organizations. As a result, the host nation, most activities in MOOTW are
operational-level command relationships and HUMINT-intensive. HUMINT operations
unity of command may be clouded. provide valuable intelligence, as well as I&W
on threat activities and operations. HUMINT
The Ambassador provides timely information on threat
The ambassador is responsible for the capabilities and intentions. HUMINT collects
direction, coordination, and supervision of all information by interrogation, observation,
US Government interagency activities within a elicitation of personnel, and exploitation of
particular country. The ASCC’s staff, under the documents and material. HUMINT is also the

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most effective intelligence discipline available Area studies provide host nation weather
to the threat. Consequently, counter-HUMINT and geographical information, as well as basic
operations are the key to the success of any intelligence (seaports, airports, transportation
activity in MOOTW. Counter-HUMINT systems, water storage, POL storage, building
operations are used to degrade or neutralize materials availability) helpful in preparing for
threat espionage, sabotage, and subversion natural disasters and other contingency-type
capabilities. operations. Forward presence, both through
Close liaison with a variety of US and host permanent stationing and periodic deployment
nation military and civil organizations is of CONUS-based HUMINT resources, is
critical to the success of any MOOTW activity. essential to this effort.
This liaison is imperative for coordination, The theater-level MI organization
intelligence collecting, and information continuously develops and refines indicator
sharing. CI personnel are uniquely suited to lists. These lists allow the ASCC to monitor
this task. As a minimum, CI personnel must diplomatic, military, and economic conditions
coordinate with members of the US country in the area. Army intelligence sources provide
team, US MI units, US MP units, CA units, the necessary information and intelligence to
PSYOP units, HN regional and urban area identify and predict potential threats. All-
coordination centers, HN intelligence and source intelligence analysis provides the ASCC
security forces, and HN military, paramilitary, with the necessary information to protect his
and police. forces, noncombatants, and resources. It also
allows him to prepare for future operations
Battle Space while minimizing the probability of surprise
In MOOTW, commanders seek to counter from a potential threat.
the threat’s effects in a given battle space. The
threats in MOOTW will vary between each Logistics
MOOTW activity. Battle space is a physical The ASCC is responsible for developing
volume that expands or contracts in relation to and providing the elements of sustainment for
the ability to influence and counter the threat. ARFOR within a region and for other services,
A higher commander does not assign battle based on executive agent responsibilities for
space, which extends beyond the limits of the common servicing. Unless directed by national
commander’s AO. Battle space is based on the authority, NGOs and PVOs will provide their
premise that the commander’s thinking respective support. Strategic logistics support
expands to develop a vision for countering the is projected from CONUS and other OCONUS
threat before any mental constraints are sites, using all national resources, including
emplaced, such as boundaries, legal mandates, USAMC, DLA, other services, and commercial
or terms of reference (TOR). sources. The ASCC provides logistics,
Battle space includes all friendly assets direction, and prioritization. The ASCC staff
available to counter the threat. In MOOTW, monitors all support activities to ensure
pure combat power is only a small portion of smooth, daily sustainment of the force. The
the true battle space. Other assets may include ASCC seeks to conserve Army resources
the diplomatic efforts of embassy officials, whenever possible by using contractors, the
liaisons with host nation governments and host nation, or other viable sources of support.
military agencies, as well as the efforts of In peacetime, the CONUS support base
NGOs, PVOs, and IOs. continues to project logistics support from
national resources. The ASCC monitors the
Unity of effort is essential to operations support of the soldier as well.
within a given battle space. Ownership of
assets is less important than application of The Army personnel system and training
their effects toward countering the threat. An base provide a supply of qualified soldiers into
understanding of battle space allows forward-deployed/forward-presence theaters or
commanders to keep their options open, to units that may deploy into any region. The
synchronize all friendly assets, and counter the following agencies provide daily support to
threat. As the commander considers the soldiers and their family members:
mission, as well as any perceived mission creep, •Defense Finance and Accounting Service.
he can visualize his battle space throughout •Legal Services Agency.
the operation and how the battle space may
change as he moves to counter the threat. •Chaplaincy Service Support Agency.

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•Community and Family Support Center.

•Other Army staff field operating agencies.
The ASCC may coordinate augmentation of
this support through other services or allies.
Combat health support (CHS) of soldiers
includes all services performed, provided, or
arranged by the Army Medical Department to
promote, conserve, or restore the mental or
physical well-being of personnel in the Army
and, as directed, in other services, agencies,
and organizations. The surgeon general has
overall worldwide responsibility for Army
health care. Senior army commanders and
service components must ensure their soldiers
and their soldiers’ family members receive
these services effectively. In theater, the CHS
system provides care in Echelons I through IV,
ultimately leading to treatment in the US.
Senior commanders ensure that the Army
health care system provides preventive
measures, progressive treatment,
hospitalization, and evacuation of service
members and their families. In developed
theaters the support structure is available to
support peacetime operations. This structure
includes host nation, contract, and interservice
support agreements. Forces conducting
peacetime operations integrate their
operations into this structure.
When operating forces require support not
present in theater or operate in an austere
theater, the ASCC plans and coordinates
support arrangements either unilaterally or
with joint support agencies. Army commanders
develop tailored support packages to provide
essential support for the ARFOR. This could
include functional and area army commands to
provide large-scale or long-term support. These
considerations provide operational-level
commanders with general synchronization
requirements applicable to most peacetime
operations.
Training
Training for war is the Army’s top priority.
The ASCC provides the direction, purpose, and
necessary motivation to his subordinates to
successfully accomplish the training mission.
The ASCC outlines his intent and then ensures
that his subordinates focus on mission-
essential task lists (METLs). Most missions
during peacetime can be accomplished by a
disciplined force proficient in METL tasks.
Subordinate METLs must support the CINC’s
theater strategy.

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The ASCC goes beyond these fundamental defense policy of strategic deterrence. Training
training considerations. Since much of the for leaders may be much broader than the
operational-level EAC support structure subordinate METL indicate to ensure the
resides in the reserve components, the ASCC leader flexibility required for conducting both
must be involved with active and reserve warfighting and MOOTW missions. Peacetime
component training as well as with joint operations take advantage of the established
requirements and potentially multinational support structure and capabilities of the
training. Training during peacetime must support and service support elements that
prepare ARFOR for missions across the range sustain the routine peacetime activities.
of military operations and support the national

OPERATIONS IN PEACETIME
ASCC peacetime operations include, but nations in response to a crisis requiring a surge
are not limited to, security assistance, nation of military support.
assistance, search and rescue, CA, NEO,
peacekeeping, shows of force, support to NATION ASSISTANCE
counterdrug operations, and humanitarian
assistance and disaster relief. Nation assistance programs promote
stability and orderly progress, thus
contributing to the prevention of conflict. If
SECURITY ASSISTANCE internal conflict has begun, the goal of nation
The Army conducts security assistance assistance is to aid in removing its root causes.
operations to provide military articles, Nation assistance becomes a primary means of
training, and defense-related services bringing the conflict to a successful resolution
authorized by statute law. Security assistance according to the internal defense and
is a key element of US foreign policy, with DOS development strategy. Nation assistance
as the lead agent supported by DOD. These consists of general missions such as assisting
operations are strictly controlled by the with development-related infrastructure
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, which deals projects, training health care workers, and
with international military education and improving the professionalism of national
training (IMET), or the Arms Export Control military forces. Nation assistance missions can
Act of 1976, which deals with foreign military generate useful good will toward the US and
sales. The US Government provides security assist friendly governments.
assistance on a credit or cash basis to the host
nation. Senior army commanders must be SEARCH AND RESCUE
careful not to commit the US Government to
providing any assistance that could be Search and rescue operations are
construed as security assistance without sophisticated actions requiring precise
following the statutory requirements. execution. They may be clandestine or overt.
They may include the rescue of US or foreign
The in-country security assistance office nationals or items critical to US national
(SAO) is the military focal point for security. Rescue operations require timely
formulating, planning, and executing these intelligence and detailed planning. They
programs. Theater CINCs make significant usually involve highly trained special units but
contributions, to include supervision, support, may be supported by general-purpose forces.
selection, and command of SAOs. The ASCC Search and rescue operations may be required
contributes to developing assistance in peacetime as well as in conflict and war.
requirements. CONUS-based units are usually
called on to provide security assistance
training teams. Still, in-theater or OCONUS- NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION
based units could also provide the training. NEOs are normally conducted to evacuate
Training provides the most lasting military US civilian noncombatants and nonessential
contribution for security assistance efforts. US military personnel from locations in a
Security assistance officials, in rare foreign (host) nation to a safe haven, preferably
circumstances, may direct the Army to transfer the US. An NEO is normally conducted to
military hardware or materiel to foreign evacuate US citizens whose lives are in danger

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 FM 100-7

from a hostile environment or natural disaster. These operations can influence other
NEOs may also include the selective governments or politico-military organizations
evacuation of citizens of the host nation and to respect US interests and international law.
third-country nationals. These operations can take the form of aircraft
NEOs involve swift, temporary occupancy and ship visits, multinational training
of an objective, perhaps using temporarily exercises, forward deployment of military
disabling technologies to minimize casualties forces, and introduction or buildup of military
and end with planned withdrawals. They may forces in a region. The appearance of a credible,
include the use of force. Under ideal trained military force underscores national
circumstances, little or no opposition to the policy interests and commitment, improves
operation exists. Still, commanders must host-nation military readiness and morale, and
anticipate and plan for possible hostilities. If provides an insight into US values.
military forces are employed in an NEO, they
usually comprise units from more than one
service. The regional CINC, on being ordered to COUNTERDRUG OPERATIONS
support an NEO, designates a JFC to exercise Support to counterdrug operations
overall control of the operations involved in the complies with the national drug control
NEO. strategy, complements the efforts of law
Evacuation operations differ from other enforcement agencies, and supports foreign
military operations, since direction of the governments. At the level of national strategy,
operation may remain with the American the NCA places increasing importance on the
ambassador at the time of the evacuation. role of DOD in controlling the flow of drugs
Further, the order to evacuate is a diplomatic— across US borders. The objective of military
rather than a military—decision, with counterdrug efforts is to reduce the flow of
extensive ramifications. FM 90-29 provides illegal drugs into the US. Military support is
details on NEO operations. therefore a balanced effort to attack the flow of
illegal drugs at the source, while in transit, and
during distribution in the US. Military
PEACEKEEPING counterdrug activities may also be used to
Military peacekeeping operations support support insurgences and counterinsurgencies
diplomatic efforts to achieve or maintain peace and to combat terrorism.
in areas of potential or actual conflict. The
single, most important requirement of a
peacekeeping operation is consent to the HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND
operation by all the parties to the dispute. Such DISASTER RELIEF
consent represents an explicit agreement, Humanitarian assistance and disaster
permitting the introduction of a neutral third relief operations are unique peacetime
party. operations because they could be conducted
The US may participate in peacekeeping within CONUS. Recent examples in the US
operations under the sponsorship of the UN or have included assistance rendered in the
other IOs, such as the Organization of northwest states to contain forest fires and
American States, or in cooperation with other relief operations following Hurricanes Hugo in
countries. The UN has been the most frequent 1989 and Andrew in 1992. These operations fall
sponsor of peacekeeping operations. within the category of support to domestic civil
Peacekeeping often involves ambiguous authorities. Examples of in-theater operations
situations that require the peacekeeping force include famine relief efforts in Somalia and
to deal with extreme tension and violence hurricane relief operations in Hawaii following
without becoming a participant. Based on the Hurricane Iniki.
peacekeeping mandate and the stationing
agreement, specific TOR, follow-on command Humanitarian assistance and disaster
directives, and ROE are established. relief operations provide emergency relief to
victims of natural or man-made disasters.
These operations may include refugee
SHOWS OF FORCE assistance, food preparation and distribution
Shows of force lend credibility to the programs, medical treatment and care, damage
nation’s promises and commitments, increase assessment and control, forensic identification,
its regional influence, and demonstrate resolve. maintenance of law and order, reestablishment

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of communications networks, and sanitation/ are suited to both short-term and longer-term
water facilities. involvement. To be effective in short-term
ARFOR are committed to these operations operations, these programs require continuous
when localities become overwhelmed by the preparation, regional expertise, and consistent
extent of the situation and can no longer coordination between civil and military
provide basic human needs and protection. The authorities. This preparation is best achieved
ability to respond on short notice with a wide through peacetime involvement in the theater.
array of capabilities is a unique attribute of the
Army. The length of commitment is normally Psychological Operations
limited to the time that communities and other ARFOR PSYOP forces execute PSYOP to
government and private agencies can handle support the unified commander and US
continued operations by themselves. When national interests. Throughout the range of
properly executed, military participation in military operations, PSYOP is a vital force
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief employed to optimize the influence of US
operations has long-term positive effects. national policy on foreign target audiences,
Overseas, such participation demonstrates whether neutral, hostile, or friendly. In
good will and engenders mutual respect. At MOOTW, PSYOP provides the commander
home, it provides soldiers the opportunity to with the capability to project the purpose and
demonstrate their skills while helping their mission of US forces and to influence target
fellow citizens. audience behavior to support the commander’s
mission.
CIVIL AFFAIRS AND PSYOP is a force multiplier, providing
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS long-range, mid- to long-term support of the
unified commander’s intent. While classified as
Although not a peacetime operation, CA SOF, PSYOP is a general force multiplier. This
and PSYOP are critical operations that aid support exists at all levels of command and
commanders in accomplishing their peacetime operations—from strategic to tactical. PSYOP
objectives. Commanders at all levels must units are regionally focused and maintain
understand the depth and capabilities of CA extensive historical research and expertise on
and psychological support found throughout the sociological, economical, and religious
any given command. Commanders must practices and on the languages of a given AO.
understand the CA and PSYOP ability to ARFOR PSYOP support US Army, Navy,
support US and allied armed forces. Marine Corps, Air Force, and allied forces.
Except for PSYOP-unique equipment and
Civil Affairs military occupational specialties (MOS), the
ARFOR execute CA programs to support unit of attachment sustains PSYOP elements.
the unified commander. During peacetime, CA For PSYOP to achieve maximum effectiveness,
support is often provided as an ancillary planners must include it in the planning
benefit to deployments for training. CA units process early.

TRANSITION TO HOSTILITIES
Operations conducted in peacetime are The theater CINC organizes his AOR for
designed to preclude the onset of conflict. Due orderly and rapid transition from a peacetime
to factors that may not be controlled, conflict posture to different levels of hostility. This
may evolve. Because the transition to conflict process is sequential and sufficiently flexible to
may occur in a gradual or abrupt manner, the respond to any situation. The transition
ARFOR commander must prepare for either process must be responsive enough to
eventuality. The operational METT-T diplomatic initiatives to be halted or reversed
assessment provides the mental process for the once it has begun. The CINC must be sensitive
continuing reevaluation of the operational to the fact that a prolonged state of heightened
environment. That reevaluation aids the readiness for combat without action may drain
identification of needed Army capabilities in resources and adversely affect morale.
the event of conflict. Such identification assists
national-level decision makers in determining The ASCC translates mission orders from
mobilization requirements. the CINC into plans and military operations. If

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 FM 100-7

mobilization is required, AMOPES—the Army confrontation; though sometimes, combat

system that supports JOPES—provides a operations may not occur. Army leaders may
disciplined planning procedure for conducting conduct operations very similar to operations
Army mobilization, deployment, planning, and during war but execute them with both
execution (see also FM 100-17). The ASCC and restraints and constraints placed on the use of
appropriate Army commanders review the firepower and maneuver.
mobilization requirements established in
AMOPES, CONPLANs, 2
and OPLANs to meet Factors
the situation. C relationships are likely to Senior army commanders must keep four
change as levels of hostility and military factors in mind when considering operations in
involvement increase. conflict: coordination, balance, planning for
Commanders participate in joint and uncertainty, and identification of risk.
multinational planning efforts and coordinate
and prepare ARFOR for deployment and Coordination
employment. Finally, commanders contribute Coordination is critical to establishing the
ARFOR ready to meet joint and multinational basis for the operations being conducted. The
operational requirements and to establish a Army must cooperate with other government
logistical base to support fielded Army units. agencies, services, and nations to deal
effectively with the diplomatically sensitive
RESPONSIBILITIES situations present in conflict.
IN CONFLICT Balance
The theater CINC, with concurrence from Commanders must balance the combat
the NCA, determines when all or part of his posture and readiness of their soldiers against
AOR is in a state of conflict. Conflict is a state the volatile environment in which they
of hostile opposition among organized parties function. A balance must also be struck
or groups within a nation, or between or among between diplomatic goals and the scale,
nations, and usually involves irregular forces intensity, and nature of Army operations
to achieve limited diplomatic or military supporting those goals.
objectives. Conflict is often protracted, and
irregular forces often dominate. Planning for Uncertainty
Military actions may be confined to Commanders must build flexibility into
geographic areas. When US Army units are their plans and operations. Conflict situations
directly engaged in conflict, they can expect are full of uncertainty as presented by both the
guidelines on weaponry and the degree of force threat and the diplomatic conditions that limit
authorized. Diplomatic leaders will likely limit Army options.
objectives to those achievable with short,
focused, and direct application of military Identification of Risk
force. Even though limited in scope, these short Commanders must seek to increase their
applications of force may be part of a campaign options while limiting the enemy’s options.
or major operation phased over an extended Successful commanders do not run out of
period. The NCA or the CINC may further limit options. Risks and gambles are part of option
the conduct of military operations to a specific decisions. The decision to take risks is weighed
geographic area. against the mission, probability of success,
The Army’s Role available intelligence, and as many other
factors as are available to the commander in
The Army’s role in conflict is to assist a JFC his decision cycle.
in gaining control, deterring escalation, and
restoring order. Conflict operations are ARMY SERVICE COMPONENT
challenging because they require a measured
application of military force sufficient to FUNCTIONS IN CONFLICT
accomplish the designated objectives. Operations during conflict present a
Typically, conflict occurs in diplomatically— challenge to Army leadership. The military, as
charged situations within specific legal one of four elements of national power, may not
boundaries. ARFOR operate in a hostile dominate events but may adapt its operations
environment with a high probability of physical to fit those of other lead agencies. In coalition

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Chapter 8

and interagency operations, the ASCC must over time and space. Chapter 6 addresses some
achieve unity of effort through cooperation, considerations for forcible entry. Among the
liaison, negotiation, and compromise. Where key considerations is the element of force mix.
practicable, agreements should be formalized Combat forces are key to seizing the lodgment
in writing as TOR, memorandums of area, but support forces become immediately
understanding (MOUs), or similar critical thereafter. Strategic planners and force
instruments. Tasks required of the ARFOR will commanders must ensure that logistics forces
vary relative to the success of returning the and sustainment resources are deployed in
area in conflict to a state of peace. ARFOR must theater as soon as possible to enable combat
be flexible enough to meet a wide range of forces to conduct continuous operations.
operational requirements. The conflict
environment will challenge the versatility of Reception and Onward
the force. Movement
Movement and Maneuver The mission of reception and onward
Movement and maneuver in conflict are movement is to integrate rapidly arriving
characterized by planning that reflects the forces and supplies into the theater without
restrictions and constraints placed on military disrupting the operation’s tempo. This mission
operations. These restrictions and constraints must be balanced against support to current
form a set of requirements and prohibitions operations, as both are logistically intensive.
imposed by the NCA. They usually have a Accordingly, the ASCC must carefully plan and
diplomatic basis that outweighs militarily execute reception and onward movement to
preferred alternatives. The NCA articulates maintain the proper balance to support
these restrictions and constraints in different arriving forces and the operation’s tempo.
manners. Early base development efforts are key
considerations for the Army commander. Units
ROE are the translation of circumstances and facilities for the reception of forces are
and limitations for the initiation and conduct of critical, especially in the initial phase and in an
engagements with hostile forces. Personnel undeveloped theater.
ceiling caps restrict the level of forces that can
become involved in a conflict within prescribed Disposition of Forces
geographical boundaries. Designated AOs The final consideration for maneuver
define restrictions on the commander’s battle during conflict is the disposition of forces.
space. These factors combine to influence the Deployment of forces into their initial positions
movement of forces into the AO. After that is critical. This positioning must support both
movement, maneuver is influenced by these current and subsequent operations as
same factors. envisioned by the Army commanders. ARFOR
Army Force may operate from noncontiguous bases that
In conflict, the Army force needed is a key require the Army commander to develop lines
of operation and support with a minimum
consideration. Often the presence of amount of protection. To be able to rapidly
overwhelming force in the conflict area mass his forces and prevent the enemy from
discourages enemy actions. Senior army gaining the initiative, the commander must
commanders must forthrightly articulate the have a finely tuned intelligence capability, a
resources required to achieve quick and detailed understanding of the physical
decisive victory with minimum casualties. disposition of friendly forces, and a high degree
Based upon the diplomatic situation and other of operational-level mobility.
competing priorities, the Army commander
may have to achieve his goals with
considerably fewer resources than he desires. Fires
The sequencing of major operations in this Operational-level fires during conflict
environment requires patience and a clear revolve around two key considerations: ROE
understanding of the diplomatic realities that and coordination of joint fires. The types of fires
apply to the particular conflict. permitted are likely to be limited, and the fires
used will require a higher level of precision and
Forcible Entry greater reliance on temporary disabling
Conditions may require a forcible entry. techniques and technology. Collateral damage
This capability requires the staging of forces is less tolerable in conflict. Failure to control

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 FM 100-7

and limit collateral damage can endanger the soldiers are not placed in an undue risk
long-term effects supporting stability. situation. Strong command and levels of
The Army may find itself in a supported discipline and training lessen those risks.
role in the area of operational fires. For Training in peacetime must be realistic and
instance, the precision and depth of the fires equate to requirements for fighting in war.
required may dictate a predominant Air Force •The fourth component is avoiding
role. To achieve his operational objectives and
complement the JFC’s plan, the Army fratricide— the unintentional killing or
commander selects targets for Army resources wounding of friendly personnel by fire.
to attack and nominates targets for other Commanders must maintain situational
resources to attack. The joint coordination awareness of the enemy and their
process is critical to ensuring that resources personnel. This situational awareness,
are not wasted and that fires create a along with strong command presence,
synergistic effect. disciplined operations, and anticipation of
The Army operational-level commander future operations helps limit probability
must have an organic staff capability to plan and occurrences of fratricide.
and coordinate operational-level fires. This
staff element is the DOCC. His staff must also Commanders implement the
have the capability to augment the joint staff THREATCON system. Table 8-1 briefly
for planning and coordinating joint operational describes THREATCONs Normal, Alpha,
fires. Because of potential restraints and Bravo, Charlie, and Delta. The implementation
constraints caused by concerns over collateral decision is based upon—
damages, other systems may take on a role of •The threat assessment.
greater utility. Other systems’ fires are
designed to impair, disrupt, or delay the •Personnel and facility criticality and
performance of enemy operational forces, vulnerabilities.
functions, and facilities.2 PSYOP, SOF, EW •Resource availability.
(jamming), and other C countermeasures are
all disabling fire options. •Operations and morale impacts.
•Damage control considerations.
Protection
Protection of the force requires heightened •International relations.
awareness as conditions move toward direct •Possible terrorist retaliatory responses.
confrontation. As the likelihood of
confrontation increases, so does the The commander must recognize that
vulnerability of the force, unless additional information on the threat is difficult to obtain
protection measures are implemented. prior to an incident. Army Regulation 525-13
Protection conserves the fighting potential of a discusses the combatting terrorism program in
force and is every soldier’s responsibility. detail. The identification of friendly force
Protection has four components. vulnerabilities and geopolitical assets are key
•The first component includes OPSEC and steps in protection. Essential facilities must be
deception operations. Successful execution identified. Communications must be protected
from interference and interception. While the
of this component prevents the enemy from basic principles for deception hold true during
locating and causing harm to friendly forces. conflict, they are often more difficult to apply.
•The second component supports keeping OPSEC is significantly harder to sustain in
soldiers healthy and maintaining their an open society where national survival is not
fighting morale. It includes protecting their at stake. Deception is more difficult to achieve
equipment and supplies and taking care of when the operational-level objectives have
their basic needs. more diplomatic content than military
significance. The Army commander must
•The third component is safety. It is a ensure that his deception plans support the
principal element and must be an integral unified command’s plans and are not
part of all military operations. Soldiers compromised by information leaks. The
conducting military operations are placed at environment of conflict often appears peaceful,
risk; still, commanders must ensure that requiring commanders to remain vigilant to

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Chapter 8

guard against complacency. Terrorism is most transition to a state of conflict footing. Conflict
effective when the threat is not highly visible planners may have to consider combined
and surprise is likely to be achieved. relationships. The level 2
of international
integration will affect C . The unified command
Command and Control 2
structure2 serves as the C structure to build
During conflict, the ASCC contributes to upon. C may emanate straight from the
the CINC’s theater strategy of limiting national level if operations include actions of
hostilities. These efforts often involve direct direct strategic importance.
use of military power to complement
2
diplomatic As operations in theater transition to2
initiatives. The principal C problem is how to conflict, in-theater forces and existing C
integrate US military actions with lead relationships may be adequate to accomplish
agencies of our own or foreign governments. the mission. ARFOR from CONUS or other
The Army has a variety of operations to select theaters could increase the complexity, scope,
from in supporting conflict2 situations, all of and level of forces executing operations beyond
which have some common C considerations. the capabilities of the normal theater
Structure structure. This would thereby require
augmentation or restructuring. In austere
Military leaders conduct conflict operations theaters, an Army force may have to arrive in
without a declaration of war. The absence of theater prepared to support itself and execute
this declaration restricts the structuring of the operations unassisted. Later, the theater
theater for operations. In MOOTW, the CINC ASCC may control all operations, or the CINC
does not establish a theater of war or theaters could task the ASCC to support operations
of operation unless it is a major conflict. while he directly controls the execution of
Normally, he establishes smaller areas, such as operations through a separate operational
a JOA, for conducting operations. Diplomatic chain of command.
considerations predominate over purely 2
military requirements and constrain C . The
senior military leader has a greater level of Planning
freedom than in peacetime but must coordinate Army operational-level commanders are
closely with nonmilitary agencies. Whatever active participants in the development of all
the geographic organization,
2
the ASCC must conflict plans. They may participate in
establish clear C structures for conducting deliberate planning (JOPES, Volume VI) to
operations in conflict. prepare for anticipated or potential actions.
Unanticipated or rapidly developing situations
Command Relationships may require operational-level commanders to
Command relationships and structure conduct CAP. Planning for conflict, especially
usually begin with existing peacetime at the operational level, is a continuous
arrangements that require a degree of process. Rapidly changing diplomatic

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 FM 100-7

conditions may change the desired objective, closely with the host government to develop
composition, and sequencing of conflict and improve the intelligence capabilities of all
operations. Planners must prepare multiple security forces. During counterinsurgency
branches and sequels to enhance their ability operations, intelligence provides the basis for
to provide timely support. Senior army all US and host nation plans. Prior to
commanders require a flexible force structure commitment, US military forces provide
to enable their organization to achieve the specific intelligence requirements to the US
desired strategic end. national intelligence community. This ensures
that national-level collection focuses on force
Intelligence requirements. Cooperative or multinational MI
Early establishment of an ACE is critical activities at the operational level are integral
for successful operations. ACE operations to effective intelligence collection and
should commence within the theater of production. Army intelligence units provide
operations before hostilities. Intelligence technical expertise, management, and advice to
communications established between the develop host nation intelligence capabilities.
theater intelligence center and the national They help establish objectives and, where
systems provide the critical intelligence that desirable and feasible, develop common
US military forces require immediately upon procedures.
arrival and until tactical intelligence flow is The Army can provide tactical intelligence
established. support in conflict situations. ARFOR can
Operational intelligence must support the contribute experience and expertise to
targeting effort of operational fires and/or establish and manage all-source intelligence
set the stage for operational-level maneuver. operations and enhance overall management of
Success requires sound IPB. In conflict, IPB the intelligence effort. This management of
may follow the process used for a conventional intelligence information includes data on
battlefield or a modified process that focuses on internal unrest, on external support for
nonmilitary information. Civilian trends are insurgencies, and on host nation military
often as important as operational information. capabilities, including intelligence and
Weather analysis remains an important part of counterintelligence.
IPB. Doctrinal templates for guerrillas, The threat of sabotage, terrorism, and
surrogates, and narcotics traffickers do not subversion requires MI staffs to focus their
exist. counterintelligence collection efforts. These
Intelligence personnel need different efforts require close coordination with host
collection techniques and background nation police and legal officials. In countries
information, which may require continuous where cooperative or multinational intelligence
updating. The process must react to the systems already exist, newly arrived Army
dynamics of the specific situation it supports, tactical units normally work with the area
as well as to the worldwide situation. itelligence elements on a mutual support
Intelligence agencies must exploit the full basis. When the situation forces Army units to
range of both US and host nation intelligence move frequently, they should not assume
and counterintelligence production responsibility for long-term, area-oriented
capabilities. This includes the collection and intelligence programs. Still, they may
analysis of SIGINT, IMINT, and HUMINT, contribute significantly to short-term collection
which are particularly valuable in determining and production efforts. All Army personnel
hostile intentions. during conflict provide information which,
when tied into the data-gathering system, can
The ASCC provides theater-specific produce useful intelligence.
intelligence integration for the Army
operational-level commander. The Army Logistics
commander develops his picture of the In conflict, the ASCC tailors logistics to
operational area, based upon the threat he provide basic requirements in an austere
faces and the information gathered by the situation. He stages logistics and uses
intelligence system. Intelligence should be the intermediate support bases, leading to full base
basis for all action. development if necessary. He does this with the
During foreign internal defense operations, use of HNS. Early deployment of the LSE from
the Army’s intelligence organization works USAMC ensures a positive link from the

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Chapter 8

deploying units to the national logistics system organizations. These logistics responsibilities
and may be required to fill gaps in the TOE include—
logistics infrastructure or projected selected •Patient evacuation and medical regulation.
elements of the national/industrial base into2
theater. The LSE could provide an initial C •Hospitalization.
structure to orchestrate USAMC resources and •Health service Iogistics/blood management.
the logistics efforts of contractors and HNS. •Preventive medicine, dental, veterinary,
The degree of development of the host nation’s
infrastructure has a significant influence upon medical laboratory, and combat stress
the Army commander’s long-range logistics control services.
operations. In an austere environment, •Area medical support.
logistics operations can take precedence over •Command, control, and communications
near-term combat operations. 3
(C ).
The Army commander takes a long-range Logistics operations may become the
view of the conflict situation and plans his primary Army weapon in conflict. Critical
logistics for the anticipated duration of combat logistical skills supplied by the Army may
operations, plus a transition period. He is allow the host nation to focus on combat
responsible for providing HSS to ARFOR and, requirements in the particular conflict, with
as directed, to other services, agencies, and little or no US Army participation.

OPERATIONS IN CONFLICT
In conflict, the ASCC executes a variety of a terrorist act. Antiterrorism includes those
operations that contribute to the achievement of defensive measures that reduce the
theater-strategic goals. These may include the vulnerability of individuals and property. The
continuation and expansion of the full range of extent of these defensive measures varies
previously discussed operations begun in based on assessment of the local threat. These
peacetime, as well as attacks, raids, UW, measures include—
support of insurgences and •Being personally aware and knowledgeable
counterinsurgencies, peacemaking, security of personal protection techniques.
assistance surges, and operations to combat
terrorism. Sometimes operations are in •Implementing crime and physical security
response to a crisis or other rapidly developing programs to harden the target.
situation. At other times operations may call for
long-term planning and sequenced execution to •Making installations and personnel less
support theater goals. Chapter 4 provides Army appealing as terrorist targets.
planning and deployment considerations for
crisis situations. FM 100-17 addresses Army Counterterrorism
planning and deployment considerations across Counterterrorism includes the full range of
the range of military operations. offensive measures to prevent, deter, and
respond to terrorism. These measures are
TERRORISM normally carried out by SOF under the
Terrorism is the calculated use of violence direction of the NCA. Local measures include
or the threat of violence to inculcate fear. only those actions taken to terminate an
Terrorism is intended to coerce or intimidate incident or apprehend individuals responsible
governments or societies pursuing goals that for terrorist acts. Other countermeasures—
are generally diplomatic, religious, or preemption, intervention, or retaliation with
ideological. Combatting terrorism consists of specialized forces operating under the direction
defensive (antiterrorism) and offensive of the NCA—have the characteristics of attacks
(counterterrorism) actions. or raids.
The Army commander may conduct actions
Antiterrorism before, during, or after a terrorist incident.
Antiterrorism includes all measures that Although DOS has the lead in combatting
installations, units, and individuals take to OCONUS terrorism, the Army commander and
reduce the probability of their falling victim to his staff must understand the threat and its

8-16
 FM 100-7

tactics, as well as current US policies, when and diplomatic development, while UW

dealing with terrorists. The Army may be the emphasizes military actions.
lead or a supporting force in an effort to combat
terrorism during a specific operation. INSURGENCY AND
COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS
ATTACKS AND RAIDS Insurgency and counterinsurgency are two
Attacks and raids can support rescue or aspects of the same process. However, they
recovery operations to destroy or seize differ in execution. Insurgents assume that
equipment or facilities that demonstrably appropriate change within the existing system
threaten national collective security interests. is not possible or likely. Insurgency therefore
They can also support counterdrug operations focuses on radical change in diplomatic control
by destroying narcotics production or and requires extensive use of covert
transshipment facilities (if authorized by the instruments and methods. Counterinsurgency
NCA) or by supporting a host government’s uses principally overt methods and assumes
actions in this regard. The principles of combat appropriate change within the existing system
operations directly apply. is possible and likely. The US supports selected
Attacks by ground, air, and naval forces insurgences that oppose oppressive regimes
damage or destroy high-value targets or which work against US interests. Since
demonstrate the capability to do so. Raids are support for insurgences is often covert, many
usually small-scale operations involving swift operations connected with them are special
penetration of hostile territory to secure activities. Because of their extensive UW
information, seize an objective, or destroy training, SOF are well-suited to provide such
targets. Attacks and raids end with a support.
withdrawal. Successful attacks and raids can Conventional forces may be called on when
create situations that permit seizing and the situation requires their functional
maintaining the diplomatic initiative. To be specialties. Their tasks may include support
successful, they require the proper focus of and advice. The CINC may direct the ASCC to
planning, organization, training, and provide equipment, training, and services to
equipment. Attacks and raids may involve insurgent forces. In the following types of
conventional forces and SOF. The JFC usually operations, ARFOR can assist insurgents:
plays a larger role than the Army operational- •Recruiting, organizing, training, and
level commander in planning and executing equipping forces to perform unconventional
these types of operations.
or guerrilla warfare.
UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE •PSYOP.
UW is a series of military and paramilitary •Institutional and infrastructure
operations conducted in enemy-held, enemy- development.
controlled, or diplomatically sensitive territory.
UW includes, but is not limited to, guerrilla •Intelligence-gathering.
warfare, evasion and escape, subversion, •Surreptitious insertion.
sabotage, and other operations of a low
visibility, covert, or clandestine nature. US •Linkups.
military support to UW operations can include •Evasion and escape of combatants.
the use of both conventional forces and SOF.
UW is usually a long-term effort. •Subversion.
Techniques and tactics for certain UW •Sabotage.
operations are similar to those employed in •Resupply.
support of insurgences. However, support for
insurgency differs from that for UW. The US uses its military resources to
Insurgency accomplishes strategic goals provide support to a host nation’s
directly, whereas UW typically supports counterinsurgency operations in the context of
conventional operations. The difference affects foreign internal defense (FID). FID is the
the operational and strategic design of the participation by civilian and military agencies
operation. For example, operations in support in any of the action programs another
of insurgences give priority to infrastructure government takes to free its society from

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Chapter 8

subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. The The long-range goals of a PE operation are
US ambassador, through his country team, two-fold. The first goal is to contain the conflict
provides the focal point for interagency to prevent the destabilization of adjacent areas.
coordination and supervision of FID. The second goal is the agreement to a
Military support to FID is provided negotiated settlement by the parties to the
through the unified CINC. Military resources conflict. This settlement must resolve the basis
provide materiel, advisors, trainers, and for the conflict and establish the foundation for
security assistance forces to support the host the transition to peacekeeping operations and
nation government’s counterinsurgency peacetime operations. The diplomatic
operations through SAOs. ARFOR operations complexities of operations to restore order
that support a host nation conducting a require that available force be sufficient but its
counterinsurgency may include, but are not use be applied with discretion. The operation
limited to, intelligence-gathering, joint and also requires that the forces be appropriate to
combined exercises, civil-military operations, the environment.
humanitarian or civic assistance, logistical The senior army commander must
support operations, populace and resource understand the constraints and diplomatic
control operations, drug-interdiction sensitivities of this environment and recognize
operations, and tactical operations. that local law and customs often influence his
actions. PE operations require 2
continuous
PEACE ENFORCEMENT mission analysis, clear C relationships,
effective communications facilities, joint and
(OPERATIONS TO RESTORE ORDER) multinational force liaison, and effective public
When in the national interest to stop a diplomacy and PSYOP.
violent conflict and force a return to diplomatic
methods, the US conducts peace enforcement SECURITY ASSISTANCE
(PE) operations with its military forces. The US SURGES
typically undertakes PE operations at the
request of appropriate national authorities in a The US accelerates security assistance
foreign state or to protect US citizens as part of when a friendly or allied nation faces imminent
an international multilateral or unilateral threat. In these surges, operations usually
operation. The PE force does not represent a focus on logistical support. Geography, the
wholly disinterested power or such a drastic magnitude of the logistics effort, and time
commitment would not be made. However, the limitations determine airlift and sealift
interests of the country or countries that requirements. US support to Israel during the
provide forces for these operations are served 1973 Arab-Israeli War illustrates this kind of
best by a cessation of violence and a negotiated operation. The Yom Kippur War demonstrates
settlement. the importance of airlift in the initial stages of
conflict and the follow-on strength of sealift.
Conflict within a given area eventually The CINC may direct the senior army
affects adjacent areas. These effects are seldom commander to provide equipment from his
desirable and can include refugee movements, command as part of security assistance surges.
arms marketing, proliferation of weapons, and The senior army commander may also provide
environmental contamination. A further some of the logistical support (port operation
potential exists for the expansion of the conflict and line haul units) needed to transfer surge
beyond its original boundaries. equipment to the friendly nation.

TRANSITION TO PEACETIME
OR WAR
The successful termination of conflict operations and prepare the way for the use of
operations leads to a return to peacetime. The diplomatic, informational, and economic
unsuccessful termination of conflict endangers elements of power in a peacetime environment.
US interests or threatens a possible transition As the level of hostility lessens, the ASCC
to war. In either case, the ASCC must be changes the composition of his force. He
prepared for these outcomes. The ASCC plans replaces those combat arms forces—essential
consolidation operations to terminate combat during combat operations—with CS and CSS

8-18
 FM 100-7

forces as hostilities subside. Finally, he and reconstitution of forces, which facilitates a

positions nation-assistance forces to complete return to peacetime activities. As a part of
the transition to peacetime operations. postoperation reporting, the commander
develops lessons learned for incorporation into
The ASCC plans an orderly redeployment training during peacetime activities.
of forces. This redeployment includes recovery

8-19
 Appendix D
Digitization of the Battlefield
The concept for information operations describes the explosion in
information technology and the effects on Army operations. It relates
the importance of information and how to win the information war in
military operations, now and into the twenty-first century. The
ability to manipulate, isolate, or negate portions of information
infrastructure systems (electromagnetic spectrum, computers, and so
forth) will be key element of future military operations—in war and
MOOTW. Disrupting an opponent’s ability to effectively use these
systems, while protecting our own, will prove crucial in the future.

INFORMATION AGE TECHNOLOGY

Information Age technology will provide distributed among all committed forces—land,
the means to control and dominate the battle sea, air, and space-to create a common view of
space in any situation. The Army of today and the battle space and a shared situational
into the twenty-first century will meet the awareness across the force. This shared
challenges of the Information Age by achieving situational awareness, coupled with the ability
force coherence through shared knowledge, to conduct continuous operations, will allow
instead of through traditional means such as Force XXI armies to observe, decide, and act
graphic control measures or geographical faster, more correctly, and more precisely than
demarcations. Joint Pub 3-13 and FM 100-6 their adversaries.
establish doctrine for this new domain. Soldiers do not gain advantage over the
Information operations provide commanders
the METT-T-specific knowledge, coupled with enemy by simply using automated equipment.
a rapid and precise vision of the battlefield, to Soldiers achieve and exploit the advantage
gain dominance in a battle space and control when they optimize information presented by
the tempo of operations. digital systems. Optimizing the use of
2
automated information begins with discretion
Rapid advances in automated C systems in the use of digital reporting. Digital reporting
require commanders and soldiers to operate and the digital display are not substitutes for
highly sophisticated equipment to function hard copy reports or maps; they are aids in
effectively on the battlefield. Information about managing and presenting information for the
the adversary and friendly formations will be purpose of decision making.

THE DIGITIZED FORCE

Future information technology will provide conventionally-equipped predecessor. The
the means to collect, process, disseminate, and digitized force has an improved capability to
display information in unparalleled volume, achieve the agility, depth, and synchronization
speed, and accuracy. Digitization of the that characterize successful Army operations
battlefield provides common formats, rapid through the use of shared collective unit
processing, and timely transmission of data. images.
The ASCC/ARFOR commander must be
concerned with asymmetrical capabilities Collective unit images form a battle space
within the force. While modernizing the force, framework. This framework is based on shared
he must be cognizant of units that are real-time awareness of the arrangement of
maintaining current capabilities—not only forces in the battle space, instead of a rigid
ARFOR but also joint and multinational as framework of battlefield geometry such as
well. The digitized force has capabilities and phase lines, objectives, and battle positions.
limitations distinctly separate from its Digitization of the force permits commanders

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 FM 100-7

at every level to share a common, relevant which provide the capability to share
picture of the battlefield scaled to their level of information at each level of the chain of
interest and tailored to their specific needs. command. The recipient of a report can look
Commanders of digitized units at the same at the location of the reported enemy
echelon share a perspective (situational element and compare it to his operational
awareness) of their position in relation to
adjacent units. Combat, CS, and CSS leaders, graphics and friendly unit locations. This
horizontally linked by common information, comparison allows the recipient to
visualize how they will conduct and support determine potential problems with the
major operations, battles, and engagements. disposition or orientation of friendly units
Their execution is integrated by a shared vision and adjust accordingly.
of the battle space.
The commander of a digitized force has In offensive operations, automated
significant advantages over commanders of reporting is useful in synchronizing the scheme
conventionally-equipped forces. The most of maneuver during unexpected contingencies
significant advantages are- such as identifying enemy obstacles. This
exchange of automated combat information
•An increased situational awareness. provides the commander and his staff critical
information necessary to maintain and exploit
•Enhancement of the planning and the initiative during offensive operations. In
preparation of orders and the distribution defensive operations, automated reports
process. enable commanders of digital units to transmit
•Digital aids that enhance the timeliness and all information on enemy activity in sector in
accuracy of the reporting process and one digital spot report, instead of in many
employment of assets. separate spot reports. With the increased
reliance on digital technology comes the
•An improved capability to achieve mass at limitations of the hardware and software
the decisive point. (This includes the associated with the systems. Limitations in
achievement of mass of CS and CSS assets computer memory and communications
as well). capabilities address the requirement to
maintain conventional control methods for
•Digitization and automation of reports, units.

NONDIGITAL UNIT INTEGRATION

The integration of digitally-equipped The ASCC/ARFOR commander must use
elements with conventionally-equipped liaison officers or establish other positive
(nondigital) elements into the force presents control measures to ensure proper coordination
special challenges for the commander and staff. between digital and nondigital units. The
The commander must ensure that both digital ASCC/ARFOR commander must establish
and nondigital procedures are available for procedures that specify which reports will be
communicating and supporting. The ASCC/ communicated digitally, by voice, or in hard
ARFOR commander must establish provisions copy. Digital information will be processed for
to receive automated information from digital distribution to nondigital units.
units. Control measures used by digital units
are identical to hard-copy overlays.

SUPPORTING THE FORCE

Application of information operations requirement for Army-managed, in-theater
(electronic management and information stockpiles and incorporate split-based
systems) necessitates the formation of strategic operations. Because of situational awareness
alliances between Army logistics mechanisms (the shared knowledge on the digitized
in theater and civilian industry. This forged battlefield between combat, CS, and CSS
linkage between the sustainment base and the units), CSS units can maintain an on-time
ASCC/ARFOR commander will negate the inventory of supplies and deliver the supplies
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Appendix D

more efficiently. CSS units will push required 2

support forward—to the right units at the right •C on the move.
time. •Horizontal integration.
Digitization of the battlefield will increase
awareness and coordination over a wide area, •Combat identification.
enabling the commander to obtain the near
real-time information he needs in the most •Fratricide prevention.
efficient and effective format. This digitization To effectively plan the application and
provides the commander with— employment of these new technologies within
•A common view of the battlefield. the force, the ASCC/ARFOR commander must
•Situational awareness. be aware of their advantages and
disadvantages. Synchronizing digitized and
•Battlefield synchronization. nondigitized units will be a major task.

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