FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 67813. January 29, 1988.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES , plaintiff-appellee, vs. ALFREDO
TUNDAY y CANOMAY, JAROLAN LAWRE y DATARTO, accused,
JAROLAN LAWRE y DATARTO , accused-appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION EXECUTED
WITHOUT THE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL, VIOLATIVE OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS. — In
Galit, we held that a confession must be made with the assistance of counsel unless
the right to counsel is waived with the assistance of counsel. Under Article III, Section
12 of the new Constitution, it is not only provided that the right to the assistance of
counsel, to be validly waived, must be made in writing but that it must also be done in
the presence of counsel. These requirements have not been met by Exhibit "A.". Apart
from this, it is clear from the said sworn statement that the accused-appellant was not
properly informed of his constitutional rights. Typically, the interrogation began with the
standard sacramental recital of such rights, but without any effort to explain them, and
ended with the mechanical question of whether he understood the noti cation,
followed by the usual docile "Opo" from the suspect. There is now a long list of cases
that have outlawed this unfeeling procedure as not su cient to satisfy the imperative
requisites laid down by the Bill of Rights for the protection of the person under
custodial investigation. The confession having been obtained in violation of the Bill of
Rights, it is not admissible in evidence against the accused-appellant.
2. ID.; ID.; FAILURE TO GIVE SATISFACTORY EXPLANATION AS TO THE
MANNER ONE CAME INTO POSSESSION OF STOLEN PROPERTY, SUFFICIENT PROOF
FOR CONVICTION OF QUALIFIED THEFT. — When the truck collided with the jeep, it was
already in the corner of Lopez and Rodriguez streets, and the person at the wheel was
the accused-appellant. He was caught red-handed. The accused-appellant was
positively identi ed as the person in possession of — and actually driving — the stolen
truck. The truck was stolen property. It was worth P100,000.00 and contained articles
valued at P70,000.00 It was found in his hands and he gave no reason for its
possession. As held in U.S. vs. Espia 16 Phil. 506, "It being proven that the carabao was
stolen, and being found in the possession of the defendant without his being able to
give a satisfactory explanation as to how he came into possession of the same, is
su cient proof to justify his conviction of the crime of larceny of the said carabao.
(U.S. v. Soriano, 9 Phil. Rep., 441; U.S. v. Santillan, 9 Phil. Rep. 445; U.S. v. Soriano, 12
Phil. Rep. 512.) Men who come honestly into the possession of property have no
difficulty in explaining the method by which they obtained such possession."
DECISION
CRUZ , J : p
The appellant in this case is Jarolan Lawre, who was convicted of quali ed theft
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2019 cdasiaonline.com
and sentenced to reclusion perpetua 1 on the basis mainly of his extrajudicial
confession.
As alleged by the prosecution and found by the trial court, the accused-appellant,
with two other companions, illegally took an Isuzu truck loaded with 14 rolls of iron rod
while it was parked in the corner of Patria and Rodriguez streets in Balut, Tondo, in the
early evening of November 3, 1983. In the corner of Rodriguez and Honorio Lopez
streets, however, the truck collided with a jeep and Lawre's companions ed, leaving
him alone at the wheel. Cesar Sulit, a barangay aide who was directing tra c,
approached Lawre and asked him why he did not stop at the timely tra c signal but all
the latter did was scratch his head. Then he suddenly ran away. 2 Eduardo Abad, the
owner of the truck, reported the incident to the police which, on the basis of the
identi cation furnished by Sulit, arrested Lawre and his co-accused Alfredo Tunday. 3
Lawre gave a statement in which he admitted stealing the truck with its contents, 4 but
Tunday refused to submit to any interrogation. LexLib
Tunday was eventually acquitted for insu cient evidence, but Lawre was found
guilty despite his defense of alibi and his allegation that the extrajudicial confession
was illegally obtained.
Examination of the extrajudicial confession shows it is indeed replete with details
that according to the trial court bespeak the guilt of the accused-appellant as no one
but the actual perpetrator of the offense could have described it with such particularly.
5 As convincing as it appears to be, however, it must still be rejected for violation of the
Constitution.
In his testimony, Lawre declared he was subjected to manhandling by as many as
six policemen during the time he was under investigation. He claims he was hit in the
head with handcuffs, his private organ was electri ed, and he was forced to sign the
confession which he had not even been allowed to read. 6
There is no physical evidence of the accused-appellant's charges, and there is no
showing either that he complained later of the violence and intimidation imposed upon
him. Moreover, the allegation of third-degree methods was denied under oath by the
investigator who conducted the interrogation. 7 Even so, the supposed confession
must fail under our ruling in the Galit case and the provisions of the new Bill of Rights.
In Galit, 8 we held that a confession must be made with the assistance of counsel
unless the right to counsel is waived with the assistance of counsel. Under Article III,
Section 12 of the new Constitution, it is not only provided that the right to the
assistance of counsel, to be validly waived, must be made in writing but that it must
also be done in the presence of counsel. These requirements have not been met by
Exhibit "A."
Apart from this, it is clear from the said sworn statement that the accused-
appellant was not properly informed of his constitutional rights. Typically, the
interrogation began with the standard sacramental recital of such rights, but without
any effort to explain them, and ended with the mechanical question of whether he
understood the noti cation, followed by the usual docile "Opo" from the suspect. There
is now a long list of cases that have outlawed this unfeeling procedure as not su cient
to satisfy the imperative requisites laid down by the Bill of Rights for the protection of
the person under custodial investigation. 9
The confession having been obtained in violation of the Bill of Rights, it is not
admissible in evidence against the accused-appellant. 1 0
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2019 cdasiaonline.com
Still and all, the conviction can be sustained, but on another basis. The evidence
shows conclusively that the authorized driver of the subject truck was Julieto Cabilto,
who parked the same in the corner of Rodriguez and Patria streets when the period of
the truck ban began. When the truck collided with the jeep, it was already in the corner
of Lopez and Rodriguez streets, and the person at the wheel was the accused-
appellant. 1 1 He was caught red-handed. When questioned, he simply scratched his
head, and the next instant he had already bolted.
The accused-appellant was positively identi ed as the person in possession of —
and actually driving — the stolen truck. But all he pleaded in his defense was his feeble
alibi. No effort was made to explain why the truck which he was not authorized to drive,
was being driven by him when it collided with the jeep. The truck was stolen property. It
was worth P100,000.00 and contained articles valued at P70,000.00 It was found in his
hands and he gave no reason for its possession. LLpr
In United States v. Espia, 1 2 decided in 1910, it was held:
"An examination of the evidence establishes the fact, beyond peradventure
of doubt, that the animal described in the complaint was stolen from its owner,
Liberto Ortizo, on or about the 24th of December 1908; that the said carabao, in
the month of August, 1909, was found in the possession of the defendant; that
the defendant was unable to make any satisfactory explanation showing how he
became the possessor of said carabao. It being proven that the carabao was
stolen, and being found in the possession of the defendant without his being able
to give a satisfactory explanation as to how he came into possession of the
same, is su cient proof to justify his conviction of the crime of larceny of the
said carabao. (U.S. v. Soriano, 9 Phil. Rep., 441; U.S. v. Santillan, 9 Phil. Rep. 445;
U.S. v. Soriano, 12 Phil. Rep. 512.) Men who come honestly into the possession of
property have no di culty in explaining the method by which they obtained such
possession."
The above is still sound doctrine and like a voice from the past echoes through
the years to condemn the accused-appellant.
WHEREFORE, for the reason above discussed, the sentence of reclusion perpetua
is AFFIRMED, with costs against the accused-appellant. It is so ordered.
Teehankee, C.J., Narvasa, Paras and Gancayco, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. Decision, p. 10.
2. Ibid., pp. 2-3.
3. Id., p. 3.
4. Id., pp. 3-7; Exhibit "A".
5. Id., p. 8.
6. TSN, pp. 38-39.
7. Ibid., p. 61.
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2019 cdasiaonline.com
8. 135 SCRA 465.
9. People v. Natripavat, 145 SCRA 483; People v. Duhan, 142 SCRA 100; People v. Nicandro,
141 SCRA 289; People v. Ramos, 122 SCRA 312; People v. Caguioa, 95 SCRA 2; People v.
Galit, supra; People v. Poyos, 143 SCRA 542.
10. Article III, Sec. 12(3), Constitution.
11. Decision, p. 2.
12. 16 Phil. 506.
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2019 cdasiaonline.com
