Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-1299          November 16, 1903

VICENTE PEREZ, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EUGENIO POMAR, Agent of the Compañia General de Tabacos, defendant-appellant.

Francisco Dominguez for appellant.

TORRES, J.:

In a decision dated February 9, 1903, the judge of the Sixth Judicial District, deciding a case
brought by the plaintiff against the defendant for the recovery of wages due and unpaid, gave
judgment against the latter for the sum of $600 and the costs of suit, less the sum of $50,
Mexican.

On August 27, 1902, Don Vicente Perez filed in the Court of First Instance of Laguna a
complaint, which was amended on the 17th of January of this year, asking that the court
determine the amount due the plaintiff, at the customary rate of compensation for interpreting in
these Islands, for services rendered in the Tabacalera Company, and that, in view of the
circumstances of the case, judgment be rendered in his favor for such sum. The complaint also
asked that the defendant be condemned to the payment of damages in the sum of $3,200, gold,
together with the costs of suit. In this complaint it was alleged that Don Eugenio Pomar, as
general agent of the Compañia General de Tabacos in the said province, verbally requested the
plaintiff on the 8th of December, 1901, to act as interpreter between himself and the military
authorities; that after the date mentioned the plaintiff continued to render such services up to
and including May 31, 1902; that he had accompanied the defendant, Pomar, during that time at
conferences between the latter and the colonel commanding the local garrison, and with various
officers and doctors residing in the capital, and at conferences with Captain Lemen in the town
of Pilar, and with the major in command at the town of Pagsanjan, concerning the shipment of
goods from Manila, and with respect to Pagsanjan to this city; that the plaintiff during this period
held himself in readiness to render services whenever required; that on this account his private
business, and especially a soap factory established in the capital, was entirely abandoned; that
to the end that such services might be punctually rendered, the agent, Pomar, assured him that
the Tabacalera Company always generously repaid services rendered it, and that he therefore
did not trouble himself about his inability to devote the necessary amount of time to his
business, the defendant going so far as to make him flattering promises of employment with the
company, which he did not accept; that these statements were made in the absence of
witnesses and that therefore his only proof as to the same was Mr. Pomar's word as a
gentleman; that the employees of the company did not understand English, and by reason of
the plaintiff's mediation between the agent, and the military authorities large profits were
obtained, as would appear from the account and letterpress books of the agency corresponding
to those dates. In the amended complaint it was added that the defendant, on behalf of the
company, offered to renumerate the plaintiff for the services rendered in the most advantageous
manner in which such services are compensated, in view of the circumstances under which they
were requested; and that the plaintiff, by rendering the company such services, was obliged to
abandon his own business, the manufacture of soap, and thereby suffered damages in the sum
of $3,200, United States currency.

The defendant, on the 25th of September, 1902, filed an answer asking for the dismissal of the
complaint, with costs to the plaintiff. In his answer the defendant denied the allegation in the first
paragraph of the complaint, stating that it was wholly untrue that the company, and the
defendant as its agent, had solicited the services of the plaintiff as interpreter before the military
authorities for the period stated, or for any other period, or that the plaintiff had accompanied
Pomar at the conferences mentioned, concerning shipments from Manila and exports from
some of the towns of the province to this capital. He stated that he especially denied paragraphs
2 of the complaint, as it was absolutely untrue that the plaintiff had been at the disposal of the
defendant for the purpose of rendering such services; that he therefore had not been obliged to
abandon his occupation or his soap factory, and that the statement that an offer of employment
with the company had been made to him was false. The defendant also denied that through the
mediation of the plaintiff the company and himself had obtained large profits. The statements in
paragraphs 6, 7, 8, and 9 of the complaint were also denied. The defendant stated that, on
account of the friendly relations which sprang up between the plaintiff and himself, the former
borrowed from him from time to time money amounting to $175 for the purposes of his
business, and that he had also delivered to the plaintiff 36 arrobas of oil worth $106, and three
packages of resin for use in coloring his soap; that the plaintiff accompanied the defendant to
Pagsanjan, Pilar, and other towns when the latter made business trips to them for the purpose
of extending his business and mercantile relations therein; that on these excursions, as well as
on private and official visits which he had to make, the plaintiff occasionally accompanied him
through motives of friendship, and especially because of the free transportation given him, and
not on behalf of the company of which he was never interpreter and for which he rendered no
services; that the plaintiff in these conferences acted as interpreter of his own free will, without
being requested to do so by the defendant and without any offer of payment or compensation;
that therefore there existed no legal relation whatever between the company and the plaintiff,
and that the defendant, when accepting the spontaneous, voluntary and officious services of the
plaintiff, did so in his private capacity and not as agent of the company, and that it was for this
reason that he refused to enter into negotiations with the plaintiff, he being in no way indebted to
the latter. The defendant concluded by saying that he answered in his individual capacity.

A complaint having been filed against the Compañia General de Tabacos and Don Eugenio
Pomar, its agent in the Province of Laguna, the latter, having been duly summoned, replied to
the complaint, which was subsequently amended, and stated that he made such reply in his
individual capacity and not as agent of the company, with which the plaintiff had had no legal
relations. The suit was instituted between the plaintiff and Pomar, who, as such, accepted the
issue and entered into the controversy without objection, opposed the claim of the plaintiff, and
concluded by asking that the complaint be dismissed, with the costs to the plaintiff. Under these
circumstances and construing the statutes liberally, we think it proper to decide the case
pending between both parties in accordance with law and the strict principles of justice.

From the oral testimony introduced at the trial, it appears that the plaintiff, Perez, did on various
occasions render Don Eugenio Pomar services as interpreter of English; and that he obtained
passes and accompanied the defendant upon his journeys to some of the towns in the Province
of Laguna. It does not appear from the evidence, however, that the plaintiff was constantly at
the disposal of the defendant during the period of six months, or that he rendered services as
such interpreter continuously and daily during that period of time.

It does not appear that any written contract was entered into between the parties for the
employment of the plaintiff as interpreter, or that any other innominate contract was entered
into; but whether the plaintiff's services were solicited or whether they were offered to the
defendant for his assistance, inasmuch as these services were accepted and made use of by
the latter, we must consider that there was a tacit and mutual consent as to the rendition of the
services. This gives rise to the obligation upon the person benefited by the services to make
compensation therefor, since the bilateral obligation to render services as interpreter, on the one
hand, and on the other to pay for the services rendered, is thereby incurred. (Arts. 1088, 1089,
and 1262 of the Civil Code). The supreme court of Spain in its decision of February 12, 1889,
holds, among other things, "that not only is there an express and tacit consent which produces
real contract but there is also a presumptive consent which is the basis of quasi contracts, this
giving rise to the multiple juridical relations which result in obligations for the delivery of a thing
or the rendition of a service."

Notwithstanding the denial of that defendant, it is unquestionable that it was with his consent
that the plaintiff rendered him services as interpreter, thus aiding him at a time when, owing to
the existence of an insurrection in the province, the most disturbed conditions prevailed. It
follows, hence, that there was consent on the part of both in the rendition of such services as
interpreter. Such service not being contrary to law or to good custom, it was a perfectly licit
object of contract, and such a contract must necessarily have existed between the parties, as
alleged by the plaintiff. (Art. 1271, Civil Code.)

The consideration for the contract is also evident, it being clear that a mutual benefit was
derived in consequence of the service rendered. It is to be supposed that the defendant
accepted these services and that the plaintiff in turn rendered them with the expectation that the
benefit would be reciprocal. This shows the concurrence of the three elements necessary under
article 1261 of the Civil Code to constitute a contract of lease of service, or other innominate
contract, from which an obligation has arisen and whose fulfillment is now demanded.

Article 1254 of the Civil Code provides that a contract exists the moment that one or more
persons consent to be bound, with respect to another or others, to deliver some thing or to
render some service. Article 1255 provides that the contracting parties may establish such
covenants, terms, and conditions as they deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to
law, morals or public policy. Whether the service was solicited or offered, the fact remains that
Perez rendered to Pomar services as interpreter. As it does not appear that he did this
gratuitously, the duty is imposed upon the defendant, having accepted the benefit of the service,
to pay a just compensation therefor, by virtue of the innominate contract of facio ut des implicitly
established.

The obligations arising from this contract are reciprocal, and, apart from the general provisions
with respect to contracts and obligations, the special provisions concerning contracts for lease
of services are applicable by analogy.

In this special contract, as determined by article 1544 of the Civil Code, one of the parties
undertakes to render the other a service for a price certain. The tacit agreement and consent of
both parties with respect to the service rendered by the plaintiff, and the reciprocal benefits
accruing to each, are the best evidence of the fact that there was an implied contract sufficient
to create a legal bond, from which arose enforceable rights and obligations of a bilateral
character.lawphi1.net

In contracts the will of the contracting parties is law, this being a legal doctrine based upon the
provisions of articles 1254, 1258, 1262, 1278, 1281, 1282, and 1289 of the Civil Code. If it is a
fact sufficiently proven that the defendant, Pomar, on various occasions consented to accept an
interpreter's services, rendered in his behalf and not gratuitously, it is but just that he should pay
a reasonable remuneration therefor, because it is a well-known principle of law that no one
should be permitted to enrich himself to the damage of another.

With respect to the value of the services rendered on different occasions, the most important of
which was the first, as it does not appear that any salary was fixed upon by the parties at the
time the services were accepted, it devolves upon the court to determine, upon the evidence
presented, the value of such services, taking into consideration the few occasions on which they
were rendered. The fact that no fixed or determined consideration for the rendition of the
services was agreed upon does not necessarily involve a violation of the provisions of article
1544 of the Civil Code, because at the time of the agreement this consideration was capable of
being made certain. The discretionary power of the court, conferred upon it by the law, is also
supported by the decisions of the supreme court of Spain, among which may be cited that of
October 18, 1899, which holds as follows: "That as stated in the article of the Code cited, which
follows the provisions of law 1, title 8, of the fifth partida, the contract for lease of services is one
in which one of the parties undertakes to make some thing or to render some service to the
other for a certain price, the existence of such a price being understood, as this court has held
not only when the price has been expressly agreed upon but also when it may be determined by
the custom and frequent use of the place in which such services were rendered."

No exception was taken to the judgment below by the plaintiff on account of the rejection of his
claim for damages. The decision upon this point is, furthermore, correct.

Upon the supposition that the recovery of the plaintiff should not exceed 200 Mexican pesos,
owing to the inconsiderable number of times he acted as interpreter, it is evident that the
contract thus implicitly entered into was not required to be in writing and that therefore it does
not fall within article 1280 of the Civil Code; nor is it included within the provisions of section 335
of the Code of Civil Procedure, as this innominate contract is not covered by that section. The
contract of lease of services is not included in any of the cases expressly designated by that
section of the procedural law, as affirmed by the appellant. The interpretation of the other
articles of the Code alleged to have been infringed has also been stated fully in this opinion.

For the reasons stated, we are of the opinion that judgment should be rendered against Don
Eugenio Pomar for the payment to the plaintiff of the sum of 200 Mexican pesos, from which will
be deducted the sum of 50 pesos is made as to the costs of this instance. The judgment below
is accordingly affirmed in so far as it agrees with this opinion, and reversed in so far as it may be
in conflict therewith. Judgment will be entered accordingly twenty days after this decision is filed.

Arellano, C.J., Willard, and Mapa, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

MCDONOUGH, J., dissenting:
I dissent from the opinion of the majority. In my opinion there is no legal evidence in the case from
which the court may conclude that the recovery should be 200 Mexican pesos. I am therefore in
favor of affirming the judgment.

Cooper, J., concurs.