Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-46863             November 18, 1939

IRINEO MOYA, petitioner, 
vs.
AGRIPINO GA. DEL FIERO, respondent.

Elpidio Quirino for petitioner.

Claro M. Recto for respondent.

LAUREL, J.:

This is a petition for review by certiorari of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in the above entitled case declaring the
respondent, Agripino Ga. del Fierro, the candidate-elect for the office of mayor of the municipality of Paracale, Province of
Camarines Norte, with a majority of three votes over his rival, Irineo Moya. In the general elections held on December 14, 1937,
the parties herein were contending candidates for the aforesaid office. After canvass of the returns the municipal council of
Paracale, acting as board of canvassers, proclaimed the petitioner as the elected mayor of said municipality with a majority of
102 votes. On December 27, 1937, the respondent field a motion of protest in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, the
Court of Appeals, on July 13, 1939 rendered the judgment hereinbefore mentioned which is sought by the petitioner to be
reviewed and reversed upon the errors alleged to have been committed by the Court of Appeals:

1. In admitting and counting in favor of the respondent, 8 ballots either inadvertently or contrary to the controlling
decisions of this Honorable Court.

2. In admitting and counting in favor of the respondent, 3 ballots marked "R. del Fierro."

3. In admitting and counting in favor of the respondent, 7 ballots marked "Rufino del Firro."

4. In admitting and counting in favor of the respondent, 72 ballots marked "P. del Fierro."

Taking up seriatim the alleged errors, we come to the first assignment involving the eight (8) ballots now to be mentioned. (1)
With reference to ballot Exhibit F-175 in precinct No. 2, alleged to have been inadvertently admitted in favor of the respondent,
such inadvertence raises a question of fact which could have been corrected by the Court of Appeals and which could we are not
in a position to determine in this proceeding for review by certiorari. Upon the other hand, if the error attributed to the Court of
Appeals consisted in having admitted ballot Exhibit F-175 in precinct No. 2 instead of the ballot bearing the same number
corresponding to precinct No. 1, and this latter ballot clearly appears admissible for the respondent because the name written on
the space for mayor is "Primo del Fierro" or "Pimo de Fierro", the error is technical and deserves but scanty consideration. (2)
Ballot Exhibit F-26 in precinct No. 3 was erroneously admitted for the respondent by the Court of Appeals, the name written on
the space for mayor being "G.T. Krandes." It is true that on the fourth line for the councilor "Alcalde Pinong del Fierro": appears;
but the intention of the elector is rendered vague and incapable of ascertaining and the ballot was improperly counted for the
respondent. As to this ballot, the contention of the petitioner is sustained (3) Ballot Exhibit F-77 in precinct No. 2 should also
have been rejected by the Court of Appeals. The ballot bears the distinguishing mark "O. K." placed after the name "M. Lopis"
written on space for vice-mayor. The contention of the petitioner in this respect is likewise sustained. (4) Ballot Exhibit F-9 in
precinct No. 2 was properly admitted for respondent. On this ballot the elector wrote within the space for mayor the name of
Regino Guinto, a candidate for the provincial board and wrote the respondent's name immediately below the line for mayor but
immediately above the name "M. Lopez" voted by him for vice-mayor. The intention of the elector to vote for the respondent for
the office of the mayor is clear under the circumstances. (5) Ballot F-131 in precinct No. 1 was also properly counted for the
respondent. On this ballot the elector wrote the respondent's name on the space for vice-mayor, but, apparently realizing his
mistake, he placed an arrow connecting the name of the respondent to the word "Mayor" (Alcalde) printed on the left side of the
ballot. The intention of the elector to vote for the respondent for the office of mayor is thus evident, in the absence of proof
showing that the ballot had been tampered with. (6) Ballot F-7 in precinct No. 5 is admissible for the respondent and the Court of

1
Appeals committed no error in so adjudicating. Although the name of the respondent is written on the first space for member of
the provincial board, said name is followed in the next line by "Bice" Culastico Palma, which latter name is followed in the next
line by word "consehal" and the name of a candidate for this position. The intention of the elector to vote for the respondent for
the office of mayor being manifest, the objection of the petitioner to the admission of this ballot is overruled. (7) Ballot F-1 in
precinct No. 2 is valid for the respondent. On this ballot the Christian name of the respondent was written on the second space
for member of the provincial board, but his surname was written on the proper space for mayor with no other accompanying
name or names. The intention of the elector being manifest, the same should be given effect in favor of the respondent. (8) Ballot
F-44 in precinct No. 2 wherein "Agripino F. Garcia" appears written on the proper space, is valid for the respondent. In his
certificate of candidacy the respondent gave his name as "Agripino Ga. del Fierro." The conclusion of the trial court, upheld by the
Court of Appeals, that the letter "F" stands for "Fierro" and "Garcia" for the contraction "Ga." is not without justification and, by
liberal construction, the ballot in question was properly admitted for the respondent.

The second error assigned by the petitioner refers to three ballots, namely, Exhibit F-119 in precinct No. 1 Exhibit F-24 in
precinct No. 2, and Exhibit F-6 in precinct No. 4. These three ballots appear to be among the 75 ballots found by the Court of
Appeals as acceptable for the respondent on the ground that the initial letter "P" stands for "Pino" in "Pino del Fierro" which is a
name mentioned in the certificate of candidacy of the respondent. The petitioner contends that the initial "R" and not "P". Even if
we could reverse this finding, we do not feel justified in doing so after examining the photostatic copies of these ballots attached
to the herein petition for certiorari. The second assignment of error is accordingly overruled.

Upon the third assignment of error, the petitioner questions the correctness of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in
adjudicating to the respondent the seven ballots wherein "Rufino del Fierro" was voted for the office of mayor. We are of the
opinion that the position taken by the Court of Appeals is correct. There was no other candidate for the office of mayor with the
name of "Rufino" or similar name and, as the respondent was districtly identified by his surname on these ballots, the intention
of the voters in preparing the same was undoubtedly to vote for the respondent of the office for which he was a
candidate.lawphi1.net

The fourth assignment of error deals with the 72 ballots wherein "P. del Fierro" was voted for the office of mayor, and it is the
contention of the petitioner that said ballots should not have been counted by the Court of Appeals in favor of the respondent.
For the identical reason indicated under the discussion of petitioner's second assignment of error, namely, that "P" stands for
"Pino" in "Pino del Fierro" which is a name mentioned in the certificate of candidacy of the respondent, we hold that there was no
error in the action of the Court of Appeals in awarding the said ballots to the respondent.

With the exception of ballot marked as Exhibit F-26 in precinct No. 3 and ballot marked as Exhibit F-77 in precinct No. 2, we are
inclined to accept the rest of the disputed ballots for the respondent not only for the specific reasons already given but also and
principally for the more fundamental reason now to be stated. As long as popular government is an end to be achieved and
safeguarded, suffrage, whatever may be the modality and form devised, must continue to be the manes by which the great
reservoir of power must be emptied into the receptacular agencies wrought by the people through their Constitution in the
interest of good government and the common weal. Republicanism, in so far as it implies the adoption of a representative type of
government, necessarily points to the enfranchised citizen as a particle of popular sovereignty and as the ultimate source of the
established authority. He has a voice in his Government and whenever called upon to act in justifiable cases, to give it efficacy
and not to stifle it. This, fundamentally, is the reason for the rule that ballots should be read and appreciated, if not with utmost,
with reasonable, liberality. Counsel for both parties have called our attention to the different and divergent rules laid down by
this Court on the appreciation of ballots. It will serve no good and useful purpose for us to engage in the task of reconciliation or
harmonization of these rules, although this may perhaps be undertaken, as no two cases will be found to be exactly the same in
factual or legal environment. It is sufficient to observe, however, in this connection that whatever might have been said in cases
heretofore decided, no technical rule or rules should be permitted to defeat the intention of the voter, if that intention is
discoverable from the ballot itself, not from evidence aliunde. This rule of interpretation goes to the very root of the system.
Rationally, also, this must be the justification for the suggested liberalization of the rules on appreciation of ballots which are
now incorporated in section 144 of the Election Code (Commonwealth Act No. 357).

It results that, crediting the petitioner with the two ballots herein held to have been erroneously admitted by the Court of
Appeals for the respondent, the latter still wins by one vote. In view whereof it becomes unnecessary to consider the counter-
assignment of errors of the respondent.

With the modification of the decision of the Court of Appeals, the petition for the writ of certiorari is hereby dismissed, without
pronouncement regarding costs.

Avanceña, C.J., Villa-Real, Imperial, Diaz, Concepcion and Moran, JJ., concur.

2
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-29333             February 27, 1969

MARIANO LL. BADELLES, protestant-appellant, 

vs.
CAMILO P. CABILI, protegee-appellee.

--------------------------

G.R. No. L-29334             February 27, 1969

BONIFACIO P. LEGASPI and CECILlO T. BARAZON protestants-appellants, 

vs.
FELIX Z. ACTUB, PROVIDENCIO P. ABRAGAN, MANUEL F. CELDRAN, CASIMERO P. CABIGON and BENITO ONG, protestees-
appellees.

Bonifacio P. Legaspi for and in his own behalf. 

Camilo P. Cabili. Gerardo B. Padilla and Ignacio Español and Voltaire I. Roviro for protestees-appellees.

FERNANDO, J.:

Two election protests against the duly proclaimed Mayor and Councilors of Iligan City, after the Nov. 14, 1967 elections, based on
the allegations of flagrant violations of certain mandatory provisions of the Election Code, to be more specifically set forth
hereafter, were dismissed in a single order by the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte, the Honorable Teodulo C. Tandayag
presiding. The cases are now before us on appeal.

In one of them, 1 the election of Honorable Camilo P. Cabili to the Office of City Mayor of Iligan City, was contested by protestant,
now appellant, Mariano Badelles. In the other, 2 the protestants are the now appellants, Bonifacio P. Legaspi and Cecilia T.
Barazon who along with the five protestees  3 were among those who were registered candidates voted for in such election for
councilors in the City of Iligan, with the protestees being credited with the five highest number of votes, with protestants Legaspi
and Barazon obtaining sixth and seventh places, respectively.

In such order of dismissal, it was admitted that while irregularities as well as misconduct on the part of election officers were
alleged in the election protests filed, there was however an absence of an allegation that they would change the result of the
election in favor of the protestants and against the protestees, that such irregularities would destroy the secrecy and integrity of
the ballots cast, or that the protestees knew of or participated in the commission thereof. For the lower court then, the lack of a
cause of action was rather evident.

Hence the order of dismissal of March 23, 1968, which was sought to be fortified by the invocation of the doctrines that voters
should not be deprived of their right to vote occasioned by the failure of the election officials to comply with the formal
prerequisites to the exercise of the right of suffrage and that the rules and regulations for the conduct of elections while
mandatory before the voting should be considered directory thereafter. The validity of such order of dismissal is now to be
inquired into by us in this appeal.

In the petition of protestant Badelles, dated December 8, 1967, and marked as received the next day by the Clerk of Court of the
Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte, 15th Judicial District, it was stated that both he and protestee Camilo P. Cabili were the
duly registered candidates for the Office of City Mayor of Iligan City, both having filed their respective certificates of candidacy in
accordance with law and as such candidates voted for in the November 14, 1967 election. It was then alleged that the Board of
Canvassers, on November 25, 1967, proclaimed as elected protestee for having obtained 11,310 votes while protestant was
credited with 8,966 votes. Protestant would impugn the election of Cabili on the ground that there were "flagrant violation of
mandatory provisions of law relating to or governing elections ...." in that more than 200 voters were registered per precinct
contrary to the provision limiting such number of 200 only and that no publication of the list of voters for each precinct was

3
made up to the election day itself, enabling persons who under the law could not vote being allowed to do so. As a result of such
alleged "flagrant violations of the laws relation to or governing elections" around 8,300 individuals were allowed to vote illegally.

It was likewise asserted that not less than 8,000 qualified voters were unable to exercise their right of suffrage in view of their
failure, without any fault on their part, to have the proper identification cards or the non-listing of their names in the list of
voters. It was stated further that even in the case of those individuals provided with identification cards with their names
included in the list of voters, they could not avail themselves of their right of suffrage as their applications for registration could
not be found. Mention was also made of the fact that the final lists of voters and the applications for registration were delivered
to their respective precincts late on election day itself thus preventing them from voting. Moreover, confusion, so it was alleged,
was caused by the excessive number of voters being listed and many having been assigned to precincts other than the correct
ones.

What was thus objected to is the fact that illegal votes were cast by those not qualified to do so, numbering 8,300 or more and
that an approximately equal number, who were duly registered with the Commission on Elections, Iligan City, were unable to
vote due to the above circumstances. The proclamation then could not have reflected the true will of the electorate as to who was
the mayor elected, as the majority of protestee Cabili over the protestant consisted of only 2,344 votes.

The prayer was among others for the proclamation of protestee as well as other candidates for elective positions in the City of
Iligan being set aside and declared null and void, protestant pleading further that he be granted other such relief as may be
warranted in law and equity.

The protest of the candidates for councilor Legaspi and Barazon in the other case against protestees  4 was in substance similarly
worded. The prayer was for the setting aside and declaring null and void the proclamation of protestees with protestants seeking
such other relief which should be theirs according to law and to equity.

In the first case, protestee Cabili moved to dismiss the petition on the following grounds: "1. That the protest was filed beyond
the reglementary period allowed by the Revised Election Code; 2. That [the lower court] has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the present case, the Commission on Elections being the proper body to hear the same; 3. That the complaint states no
cause of action." 5 This very same grounds were relied upon in a motion to dismiss by protestees Actub and Cabigon, filed in the
other suit.

As above noted, in a single order of March 23, 1968, the two above election protests were dismissed, the lower court being of the
opinion that neither petition alleged a cause of action "to justify [it] to try the same." The first ground of the motion to dismiss to
the effect that the protests in both cases were filed beyond the reglementary period was rejected. The claim as to lack of
jurisdiction was likewise held to be without merit. The single order of dismissal in both cases as indicated was based on the lack
of a cause of action.

The reasoning followed by the lower court in reaching the above conclusion that there was no cause of action, proceeded along
these lines: "Mere irregularities or misconduct on the part of election officers which do not tend to affect the result of the
elections are not of themselves either ground for contest or for proper matters of inquiry... There is no allegation in the protest
that the alleged irregularities committed by the election officers would tend to change the result of the election in favor of the
protestants and against the protestees. There is no allegation in the petition that the 8,000 voters who failed to vote were all
voters of protestants and the 8,300 illegal voters who voted were for the protestees. There is, therefore, no legal and practical
justification for the court to inquire into the irregularities committed by the election officials, as alleged in the petition, for it
would not give any benefit in favor of the protestants to the end that they will be declared the duly elected mayor and councilors,
respectively, of this City."6

It was further stated in such order of dismissal: "There is no allegation in the petition that the irregularities committed by the
election officials have destroyed the secrecy and integrity of the ballots cast. There is no allegation in the petition that the non-
compliance of the election officials of the provisions of the election laws regarding the registration of voters were intentional on
their part for the purpose of committing frauds for the benefit of the protestees. There is no allegation in the petition that
because of the alleged irregularities committed by the election officials in not following the provisions of the election laws
regarding the registration of voters and the distribution of the precincts, that all the votes cast during said elections are illegal,
nor is there an allegation in the protests that the irregularities committed by the election officials would affect the election in
favor of the protestees." 7

A greater regard for the cause of accuracy ought to have admonished the lower court from asserting in an uncompromising tone
the absence of an allegation that the protestants in both cases failed to allege that if the facts pleaded by them were proved the
result would not have been different. It is true the complaints could have been more explicitly worded, but as they stood, the
absence of such a claim could not be so confidently asserted.

4
To repeat, both protests were dismissed. We do not discount a certain degree of plausibility attaching to the line of reasoning
thus pursued by the lower court. We are not unaware of the undeniable fact that both petitions were not distinguished by skill in
their drafting or precision in their terminology. Nonetheless the seriousness and gravity of the imputed failure to have the
elections conducted freely and honestly, with such irregularities alleged, give rise to doubts, rational and honest, as to who were
the duly elected officials. Such allegations, it is to be stressed, would have to be accepted at their face value for the purpose of
determining whether there is a cause of action, a motion to dismiss amounting to a hypothetical admission of facts thus pleaded.
We cannot in law and in conscience then sustain the order of dismissal.

Without the lower court having so intended, the dismissal would amount to judicial abnegation of a sworn duty to inquire into
and pass upon in an appropriate proceeding allegations of misconduct and misdeeds of such character. Accordingly, we reverse.

Abes v. Commission on Elections  8 points the way, but the lower court was apparently impervious to its teaching. It may not be
controlling, but it furnishes more than a hint. It would seem, though, that for the court below, its message did not ring out loud
and clear.

The opinion in the Abes case, penned by Justice Sanchez, starts thus: "Petitioner's cry for relief, so their petition avers, is planted
upon the constitutional mandate of free, orderly, and honest elections. Specifically, they list a number of repressible acts." Among
those mentioned were that blank official registration forms were taken from the office of the Quezon City Comelec Register
several weeks before election day, November 14, 1967; that active campaigning within the polling places by Nacionalista leaders
or sympathizers of Nacionalista candidates were allowed; that voters were permitted to vote on mere mimeographed notices of
certain Nacionalista candidates; that voters were compelled to fill their official ballots on open tables, desks and in many
precincts outside the polling places; that thousands of voters sympathetic to the Nacionalista candidates were allowed to vote
beyond the hours for voting allowed by law; that identification cards were delivered by partisan leaders of respondents
Nacionalista candidates, and those who did not signify their preference for Nacionalista candidates were not given such cards;
that the precinct books of voters were not sealed within the deadline fixed by law; and that the resulting effect of irregularities
was to prevent full fifty-one per cent of the registered voters from voting.

One of the issues raised on the above facts is whether or not the Commission on Elections could annul the aforesaid election in
Quezon City on the above allegations of fraud, terrorism and other illegal practices committed before and during the election.
The petition did not prosper; it was dismissed. The remedy, we held, lay not with the Commission on Elections but with the
courts of justice in an election protest.

In the language of Justice Sanchez: "The boundaries of the forbidden area into which Comelec may not tread are also marked by
jurisprudence. That Comelec is not the proper forum to seek annulment of an election based on terrorism, frauds and other
illegal practices, is a principle emphasized in decisions of this Court." For as announced in Nacionalista Party v. Commission on
Elections, 9 assuming that there be a failure to conduct an election in a free, orderly and honest manner, "the duty to cure or
remedy the resulting evil" did not rest with the Commission on Elections but in "some other agencies of the Government." More
specifically, with reference to provincial and municipal officials, election contests "are entrusted to the courts." Then came this
express affirmation: "The power to decide election contests necessarily includes the power to determine the validity or nullity of
the votes questioned by either of the contestants." .

As so emphatically observed in the Abes opinion, "there has been neither deviation nor retreat from the foregoing
pronouncement." After which came the following: "The ratiocination advanced that there was failure of election due to rampancy
of terrorism, frauds, and other irregularities, before and during elections, such that allegedly about 51% of the registered voters
were not able to vote, will not carry the day for petitioners. For, in the first place, this is grounded upon bare assertions.
Respondents contest the correctness thereof. And in the answer of respondents Amoranto, Mathay and others, they aver that out
of 162,457 registered voters in Quezon City, 100,382 voters actually cast their votes — about 62% of the registered voters. But
above all, as pointed out in City Board of Canvassers vs. Moscoso, [the] nullity of an election for municipal officials should be
determined in a petition contesting the election of municipal officers-elect to be filed before the Court of First Instance."

Why an election protest is more fitly and appropriately the procedure for determining whether irregularities or serious
violations of the electoral law vitiated the conduct of elections was clearly and succinctly explained in the Moscoso decision
above cited, the opinion coming from Justice Makalintal. 10 Thus: "The question of whether or not there had been terrorism, vote-
buying and other irregularities in the 1959 elections in Tacloban City should be ventilated in a regular election protest, pursuant
to section 174 of the Election Code, and not in a petition to enjoin the city board of canvassers from canvassing the election
returns and proclaiming the winning candidates for municipal offices."

It would follow then that if the grievance relied upon is the widespread irregularities and the flagrant violations of the election
law, the proper remedy is the one availed of here, the protest.

5
That such should be the case should occasion no surprise. Time and time again, 11 we have stressed the importance of preserving
inviolate the right of suffrage. If that right be disregarded or frittered away, then popular sovereignty becomes a myth.

As Justice Laurel correctly pointed out: "As long as popular government is an end to be achieved and safeguarded, suffrage,
whatever may be the modality and form devised, must continue to be the means by which the great reservoir of power must be
emptied into the receptacular agencies wrought by the people through their Constitution in the interest of good government and
the common weal. Republicanism, in so far as it implies the adoption of a representative type of government, necessarily points
to the enfranchised citizen as a particle of popular sovereignty and as the ultimate source of the established authority." 12

A republic then to be true to its name requires that the government rests on the consent of the people, consent freely given,
intelligently arrived at, honestly recorded, and thereafter counted. Only thus can they be really looked upon as the ultimate
sources of established authority. It is their undeniable right to have officials of their unfettered choice. The election law has no
justification except as a means for assuring a free, honest and orderly expression of their views. It is of the essence that
corruption and irregularities should not be permitted to taint the electoral process.

It may not always be thus unfortunately. That should be the ideal however. If there be a failure to observe the mandates of the
Election Code, the aggrieved parties should not be left remediless. Under the law as it stands, it is precisely an election protest
that fitly serves that purpose.lawphi1.nêt

It was sought to be thus utilized in these two cases, perhaps in a rather awkward and far from entirely satisfactory manner. Than
itself is no reason for the courts to slam the door against any opportunity for redress. Yet, that is what would happen if the order
of dismissal complained of were not set aside.

Hence the inevitability of its reversal. The scope of our decision must not be misinterpreted however. All that it directs is that the
protetees in both cases be required to answer. Thereafter, if, as is not unlikely, there be a denial of the serious imputations made
as to the alleged irregularities, the lower court could properly inquire into what actually transpired. After the facts are thus
ascertained in accordance with the accepted procedural rules, then the appropriate law could be applied.

It must be clearly emphasized that we do not at this stage intimate any view as to the merit, or lack of it, of either protest. That
would be premature to say the least. All we do is to set aside the order of dismissal.

WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal of March 23, 1968, is reversed and the two cases remanded to the lower court for
proceeding and trial in accordance with this opinion and the law. Without costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Capistrano and Teehankee, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

BARREDO, J., concurring:

I concur whole-heartedly in everything contained in the ably written opinion of our distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice
Fernando, including, of course, the disposition he makes therein of these cases before Us. It may not be amiss, nonetheless, to add
a few words which I consider appropriate, in the light of my experience in handling some election cases before my appointment
as Solicitor General.

The thing that has struck me most in these two cases, both denominated as election protests, is that the prayers of the two
petitions therein are identical in that they do not ask for the seating of the petitioners, who call themselves protestants, in the
places of the protestees-respondents. What they ask in the main is that "the proclamation of the protegees as duly elected (mayor
and councilors) be set aside and declared null and void". This sole principal prayer was precisely what gave appellees in both
cases cause to contend that (1) the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Sur had no jurisdiction over the subject matter, it being
allegedly the Commission on Elections that has such jurisdiction, and (2) neither of the petitions state any cause of action. Of
course, the trial court properly overruled the first ground. It is, however, best for all concerned that the observations and
arguments adduced by the trial judge in disposing of the second ground are placed in proper light.

6
Ruling on the first ground above-stated, His Honor held thus:

Mere irregularities or misconduct on the part of election officers which do not tend to affect the result of the elections
are not of themselves either ground for contest or for proper matters of inquiry... There is no allegation in the protest
that the alleged irregularities committed by the election officers would tend to change the result of the election in favor
of the protestants and against the protestees. There is no allegation in the petition that the 8,000 voters who failed to
vote were all voters of protestants and the 8,300 illegal voters who voted were for the protetees. There is, therefore, no
legal and practical justification for the court to inquire into the irregularities committed by the election officials, as
alleged in the petition, for it would not give any benefit in favor of the protestants to the end that they will be declared
the duly elected mayor and councilors, respectively, of this City.

The failure of election of officers to obey the mandatory provisions of a statute relating to the conduct of the
election and designed to secure the secrecy and integrity of the ballot may so taint the votes with irregularity
as to cause the rejection of the entire votes of the district. It should be remembered, however, that all statutes
tending to limit the citizen in the exercise of the right of suffrage are to be construed liberally in his favor, and
that the courts are loath to disfranchise voters who are wholly innocent of wrongdoing. As a consequence, it
is a firmly established general rule that voters will not be rejected, even though election officers fail to
comply with the directory provisions of a statute, if there is no fraud or other irregularity and failure to
comply is unintentional; nor is it material in this connection that the failure of the election officers to perform
their duty subjects them to penalties. Likewise, the courts will not permit the will of the voters to be defeated
by fraud on the part of election officers if it is possible to avoid such a result. In short, a fair election and an
honest return should be considered as paramount in importance to minor requirements which prescribe the
formal steps to reach that end, and the law should be so construed as to remedy the evils against which its
provisions are directed and at the same time not to disfranchise voters further than is necessary to attain
that object. In case of a violation of the law on the part of an election officer, punishment may be provided
therefor, and in this way the law can be rendered effectual without going to the extent of depriving a voter of
his right to have his vote counted in consequence of such violation. It may, therefore, be stated as a general
rule that if ballots are cast by voters who are, at the time, qualified to cast them and who have done all on
their part that the law requires of voters to make their voting effective, an erroneous or even unlawful
handling of the ballots by the election officers, charged with such responsibility will not be held to
disfranchise such voters by throwing out their votes on account of erroneous procedure had sorely by the
election officers, provided the votes are legal votes in their inception and are still capable of being given
proper effect as such. Nor will an election be set aside because of regularities on the part of the election
officials unless it appears that such irregularities affect the results. (18 Am. Jur. Sec. 225, pp. 331-332, cited
on pp. 621-622, Revised Election Code by Francisco).

There is no allegation in the petition that the irregularities committed by the election officials have destroyed the
secrecy and integrity of the ballots cast. There is no allegation in the petition that the non-compliance of the election
officials of the provisions of the election laws regarding the registration of voters were intentional on their part for the
purpose of committing frauds for the benefit of the protestees. There is no allegation in the petition that because of the
alleged irregularities committed by the election officials in not following the provisions of the election laws regarding
the registration of voters and the distribution of the precincts, that all the votes cast during said elections are illegal,
nor is there an allegation in the protests that the irregularities committed by the election officials would affect the
election in favor of protestees.

A misconduct or irregularity committed by an election official is not a sufficient ground to annul the votes
cast in the precincts where the person elected neither knew of nor participated in the misconduct and it is
not shown that any elector who voted or the persons elected either participated in such misconduct. (18 Am.
Jur. Sec. 228, p. 333, cited on page 622, Revised Election Code by Francisco).

While this ruling is, on the whole, correct, His Honor failed to emphasize that the cases before him were precisely ones for the
annulment and setting aside of the election for Mayor and Councilors in the City of Iligan and that, therefore, the only question
that should be resolved is whether or not the facts alleged in the petitions in question constitute sufficient grounds for such
relief. Instead, the trial court made as may be seen above, a long discourse on the thesis that "the purpose of an election contest is
to correct the canvass," and that "the general rule is that whatever may be the cause of an election contest, the true gravamen of
the case is to determine who receives the highest number of votes, etc." (pp. 5-8, Order in question) and then held that there was
no allegation in both petitions that "would give any benefit in favor of the protestants to the end that they will be declared the
duly elected mayor and councilors, respectively, of this City" ergo, the said petitions do not state any cause of action. More
specifically, the trial court looked in vain for allegations to the effect that "the alleged irregularities committed by the elections in
favor of the protestants and against the protestees." (p. 7, id.) For example, His Honor reasoned out that "there is no allegation ...
that the 8,000 voters who failed to vote were all voters of protestants and the 8,300 illegal voters who voted were for the
protetees." (id.).

7
I am afraid that such discourse, if quite impressive as an exposition of considerable learning in election law matters, is rather
irrelevant. I believe that what should be emphasized in these cases is that ruling in Our decision to the effect that in an election
protest, (otherwise entitled at times, petition or complaint or motion of protest) it is not necessary to allege that the true results
of the election in question would be in favor of protestant and against protestee on the basis of the legal votes, or that the
proclaimed result would be changed if the facts alleged are proven, when the sole ground of protest and the only purpose of the
protestant is to have the whole election in a precinct or municipality annulled and set aside. Indeed, as pointed out in the brief of
appellants:

In the case G.R. No. L-29333, the prayer is for the annulment of the proclamation of protestee-appellee Camilo P. Cabili
and of the local elections held in Iligan City on November 14, 1967, while in case G.R. No. L-29334, the prayer is for the
annulment of the proclamation of protestee-appellees Felix Z. Actub et al. and of the local elections held in Iligan City
on November 14, 1967.

Section 177 of the Revised Election Code provides:

SEC. 177. Decision of the Contest. — The court shall decide the protest ... and shall declare who among the parties has
been elected, or in the proper case, that none of them has been legally elected....

Under the above-quoted provision of law, the courts are authorized to declare that none of the candidates has been
legally elected, which in effect would mean that the elections are annulled.

If it were not the intention of the lawmaker not to authorize the courts to annul an election, such authority would not
have been provided in Section 177 of the Revised Election Code quoted above.

Francisco, in his book How to Try Election Cases, 1952 Edition, p. 82, citing as authorities the decisions of this
Honorable Court in Bustos vs. Moir and Fajardo 35 Phil. 16; and Manalo vs. Sevilla, 24 Phil. 609, states:

The court is authorized, in a proper case, not only to recount the ballots and reject those which it considers
illegal and accept those which it considers valid but it is also authorized, in a proper case, to annul the
election completely.

It is therefore clear that the trial court erred in holding that the purpose of the protestants in filing these
protest is not in accord with the purpose of the Revised Election Code in allowing a defeated candidate to file
an election protest.

In other words, I like to make it very clear that an election protest may be filed not only for the purpose of having the
protestant declared elected, but even for the purpose alone of having the election annulled. Otherwise stated,
protestants may come to court, not necessarily to win an election, but even if solely to have the court declare that no
one has won because the election is void and that it is obvious and pure common sense that in the latter case, the
protestant does not have to allege the probability of his being the real victor, for in such a case, his prayer precisely is
— that it be declared, using the language of the law, "that none of them has been legally elected." Surely, the following
ruling of the trial court:

An election contest is a summary proceeding the object of which is to expedite the settlement of the
controversy between candidates as to who received the majority of the legal ballots (Gardiner vs. Romulo, 26
Phil. 522, 524). The purpose of an election contest is to correct the canvass of which the proclamation is a
public manifestation and the power granted by law to the court must agree with and be adequate to such an
object. Hence, the court can directly declare which candidate is to be elected leaving the canvass made by the
Board null and void, and the candidate so declared elected may assume position of the office (Aquino vs.
Calebia & Sahagun, 55 Phil. 984). It being the policy of the law to give effect to elections, the general rule is
that whatever may be the cause of an election contest, the true gravamen of the case is to determine who
receives the highest number of votes (20 C.J. 217). In an election case, the court has an imperative duty to
ascertain by all means within its command who is the real candidate elected by the electorate. (Ibasco vs.
Ilao, G.R. No. L-17512, December 29, 1960). Hence, only candidates have the right to file an election protest.
(Gil Hermanos vs. Hord, 10 Phil. 217).

From the foregoing authorities, it could be concluded that the purpose of the election law to allow a
candidate to file an election protest is for the court to determine whether the protestant or the protestee is
the winner of the election under protest. In the present case, the object of the protestants in filing their
protests based on the prayer of their petitions is not to declare them the duly elected mayor and councilors,

8
 respectively, of this City but merely to declare null and void the proclamation and election of the protestees
as well as the elections held in Iligan City of November 14, 1967. The purpose, therefore of the protestants in
filing these protests is not in accord with the purpose of the Revised Election Code in allowing a defeated
candidate to file an election protest.

must be emphatically denounced as a misreading by His Honor of the real import of the authorities cited by Him. Such
proposition represents the most narrow concept of the judicial remedies in matters of election. No single precedent in extant
jurisprudence whether here or in any other country can be found to support it. I am equally confident that no thesis in any of the
existing legal publications can be referred to as upholding such an illogical idea. To sanction such a ruling is to kill almost entirely
all hopes for a clean, orderly and honest suffrage in this country, which the Commission on Elections alone may not be able to
achieve in all possible cases. Indeed, as pointed out by appellants the trial court would have been right if it had only adhered to
the decisions already rendered by this Court on the subject, cited by said appellants in their brief.

The real issue then in these cases is whether or not the facts alleged in the respective petitions of appellants constitute sufficient
ground or grounds for annulment of the election of Mayor and Councilors in Iligan City, held in November, 1967. On this score, it
has to be admitted that, indeed, the petitions of appellants which appear to have been prepared by a single counsel are not as
accurately and precisely worded as to fit exactly into the pattern that may perhaps be most ideal in cases of this nature, but I
cannot go along with His Honor's ruling that the allegations in said petitions are legally inadequate to serve as a basis for the
relief of annulment of the election therein prayed for. His Honor seemed to be more concerned with what he considered the need
for direct averments that the irregularities and violations of the election law alleged by appellants resulted in the destruction of
the "secrecy and integrity of the ballot cast," that "all the votes cast in said elections are illegal" and that "the irregularities
committed by the election officials would affect the election in favor of the protestees." (p. 8, id.) I feel that His Honor was asking
too much and unnecessarily because, as they appear to me, these allegations as well as the others His Honor considered as
indispensably required, are more in the nature of legal conclusions, not supposed to be averred in the pleadings, rather than
statements of ultimate facts. The truth of the matter is that, viewed as a whole, the petitions in question sufficiently lead to the
conclusion that what appellants are complaining about is that the elections held in Iligan City in November, 1967 were
characterized by general and specific circumstances, that leave rational doubt as to whether or not the true will of the people of
said City could be reflected in the proclaimed results. In the more polished and inimitable language of Mr. Justice Fernando, "...
the seriousness and gravity of the imputed failure to have the elections conducted freely and honestly, with such irregularities
alleged, give rise to doubts, rational and honest, as to who were the duly elected officials".

It is my considered opinion that while it is truly desirable that election protests should be discouraged where they have hardly
any basis in fact or in law, the earlier to free from doubt the title to their respective offices of those chosen to direct the affairs of
our government, whether national or local, thereby giving them the peace of mind and freedom of action gravely needed in the
formulation of policies and the implementation thereof, courts should also be careful in seeing to it that their doors are not
untimely shut to complaints regarding the commission of electoral frauds, irregularities and illegalities, the most despicable
banes of popular suffrage, which though unhappily worded are fairly indicative of a situation wherein the will of the electorate
has not been freely and clearly expressed. To my mind, the rule foIlowed in an unbroken line of decisions of this Court, to the
effect that the commission of irregularities by election officials, no matter how serious, and the actual discovery of frauds and
violations of law by either candidates or voters, are not in themselves sufficient to cause the annulment of an election unless so
expressly provided by law, or that the frauds, illegalities and irregularities are so rampant and diffusive as to place the result of
such election in grave doubt, is one that governs more the rendition of judgments in election cases and the evaluation of the
circumstances surrounding the elections in question, as portrayed in the evidence already presented before the court, rather
than as a strict criterion for determining whether a complaint or petition or motion of protest sufficiently states a cause of action
for annulment. Respecting contrary opinion others may entertain on the matter, I regard it as a sound rule that pleadings in
election cases, at least, should not be subjected to such minute examination as should be done to facts duly established after
proper hearing, if only because facts are unerring manifestations of the truth, while allegations in pleadings often suffer from the
common flaws in the means of human expressions as well as from the usual imperfection of human language. If words are but
children of thoughts, parents and offsprings not always, as among men and animals, look exactly alike. Pleadings in such cases
must, therefore, be read with more liberality so as to make it difficult, if not impossible for grievances against the suppression in
one form or another of the expression of the popular will, well-grounded in fact, may not be thrown out merely because of lack of
skill and precision in the formulation of the corresponding protests. More importance should be given to the substantial matters
sufficiently appearing in such pleadings as intended to be brought to the court for a remedy, than to the form, at times,
ambiguous and often ungrammatically phrased, in which they are expressed. In any event, in case of doubt as to which should be
done, such doubt must be resolved in giving due course to the protest, unless it is manifestly evident that the same has been filed
for other than legitimate purposes.

As already indicated, my vote is for the reversal of the appealed order sustaining the motion to dismiss filed by appellees in the
court below, because I agree with the decision herein of Mr. Justice Fernando that there are enough indications, within the four
corners of the questioned petitions, of irregularities and illegalities which, if proven, may result in the annulment of the elections
prayed for by appellants.

9
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. 148334. January 21, 2004]
ARTURO M. TOLENTINO and ARTURO C. MOJICA, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, SENATOR RALPH G.
RECTO and SENATOR GREGORIO B. HONASAN, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for prohibition to set aside Resolution No. NBC 01-005 dated 5 June 2001 (Resolution No. 01-005)
and Resolution No. NBC 01-006 dated 20 July 2001 (Resolution No. 01-006) of respondent Commission on Elections
(COMELEC). Resolution No. 01-005 proclaimed the 13 candidates elected as Senators in the 14 May 2001 elections while
Resolution No. 01-006 declared official and final the ranking of the 13 Senators proclaimed in Resolution No. 01-005.
The Facts
Shortly after her succession to the Presidency in January 2001, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo nominated then
Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. (Senator Guingona) as Vice-President. Congress confirmed the nomination of Senator
Guingona who took his oath as Vice-President on 9 February 2001.
Following Senator Guingonas confirmation, the Senate on 8 February 2001 passed Resolution No. 84 (Resolution
No. 84) certifying to the existence of a vacancy in the Senate. Resolution No. 84 called on COMELEC to fill the vacancy
through a special election to be held simultaneously with the regular elections on 14 May 2001. Twelve Senators, with a
6-year term each, were due to be elected in that election. [1] Resolution No. 84 further provided that the Senatorial
candidate garnering the 13th highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto T.
Guingona, Jr., which ends on 30 June 2004. [2]
On 5 June 2001, after COMELEC had canvassed the election results from all the provinces but one (Lanao del Norte),
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 01-005 provisionally proclaiming 13 candidates as the elected Senators. Resolution No.
01-005 also provided that the first twelve (12) Senators shall serve for a term of six (6) years and the thirteenth (13 th)
Senator shall serve the unexpired term of three (3) years of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. who was appointed Vice-
President.[3] Respondents Ralph Recto (Recto) and Gregorio Honasan (Honasan) ranked 12 th and 13th, respectively, in
Resolution No. 01-005.
On 20 June 2001, petitioners Arturo Tolentino and Arturo Mojica (petitioners), as voters and taxpayers, filed the
instant petition for prohibition, impleading only COMELEC as respondent. Petitioners sought to enjoin COMELEC from
proclaiming with finality the candidate for Senator receiving the 13 th highest number of votes as the winner in the special
election for a single three-year term seat. Accordingly, petitioners prayed for the nullification of Resolution No. 01-005 in
so far as it makes a proclamation to such effect.
Petitioners contend that COMELEC issued Resolution No. 01-005 without jurisdiction because: (1) it failed to notify
the electorate of the position to be filled in the special election as required under Section 2 of Republic Act No. 6645 (R.A.
No. 6645);[4] (2) it failed to require senatorial candidates to indicate in their certificates of candidacy whether they seek
election under the special or regular elections as allegedly required under Section 73 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881; [5]and,
consequently, (3) it failed to specify in the Voters Information Sheet the candidates seeking election under the special or
regular senatorial elections as purportedly required under Section 4, paragraph 4 of Republic Act No. 6646 (R.A. No.
6646).[6] Petitioners add that because of these omissions, COMELEC canvassed all the votes cast for the senatorial
candidates in the 14 May 2001 elections without distinction such that there were no two separate Senate elections held
simultaneously but just a single election for thirteen seats, irrespective of term. [7]
Stated otherwise, petitioners claim that if held simultaneously, a special and a regular election must be
distinguished in the documentation as well as in the canvassing of their results.  To support their claim, petitioners cite the
special elections simultaneously held with the regular elections of 13 November 1951 and 8 November 1955 to fill the
seats vacated by Senators Fernando Lopez and Carlos P. Garcia, respectively, who became Vice-Presidents during their
tenures in the Senate.[8] Petitioners point out that in those elections, COMELEC separately canvassed the votes cast for the
senatorial candidates running under the regular elections from the votes cast for the candidates running under the special
elections. COMELEC also separately proclaimed the winners in each of those elections. [9]
Petitioners sought the issuance of a temporary restraining order during the pendency of their petition.
Without issuing any restraining order, we required COMELEC to Comment on the petition.
On 20 July 2001, after COMELEC had canvassed the results from all the provinces, it issued Resolution No. 01-006
declaring official and final the ranking of the 13 Senators proclaimed in Resolution No. 01-005. The 13 Senators took their
oaths of office on 23 July 2001.
In view of the issuance of Resolution No. 01-006, the Court required petitioners to file an amended petition
impleading Recto and Honasan as additional respondents. Petitioners accordingly filed an amended petition in which they
reiterated the contentions raised in their original petition and, in addition, sought the nullification of Resolution No. 01-
006.
In their Comments, COMELEC, Honasan, and Recto all claim that a special election to fill the seat vacated by Senator
Guingona was validly held on 14 May 2001. COMELEC and Honasan further raise preliminary issues on the mootness of

10
the petition and on petitioners standing to litigate. Honasan also claims that the petition, which seeks the nullity of his
proclamation as Senator, is actually a quo warranto petition and the Court should dismiss the same for lack of jurisdiction.
For his part, Recto, as the 12th ranking Senator, contends he is not a proper party to this case because the petition only
involves the validity of the proclamation of the 13 th placer in the 14 May 2001 senatorial elections.
The Issues
The following are the issues presented for resolution:
(1) Procedurally
(a) whether the petition is in fact a petition for quo warranto over which the Senate Electoral Tribunal is the sole judge;
(b) whether the petition is moot; and
(c) whether petitioners have standing to litigate.
(2) On the merits, whether a special election to fill a vacant three-year term Senate seat was validly held on 14 May
2001.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit.
On the Preliminary Matters
The Nature of the Petition and the Courts Jurisdiction
A quo warranto  proceeding is, among others, one to determine the right of a public officer in the exercise of his
office and to oust him from its enjoyment if his claim is not well-founded. [10] Under Section 17, Article VI of the
Constitution, the Senate Electoral Tribunal is the sole judge of all contests relating to the qualifications of the members of
the Senate.
A perusal of the allegations contained in the instant petition shows, however, that what petitioners are questioning
is the validity of the special election on 14 May 2001 in which Honasan was elected. Petitioners various prayers are,
namely: (1) a declaration that no special election was held simultaneously with the general elections on 14 May 2001; (2)
to enjoin COMELEC from declaring anyone as having won in the special election; and (3) to annul Resolution Nos. 01-005
and 01-006 in so far as these Resolutions proclaim Honasan as the winner in the special election.  Petitioners anchor their
prayers on COMELECs alleged failure to comply with certain requirements pertaining to the conduct of that special
election. Clearly then, the petition does not seek to determine Honasans right in the exercise of his office as Senator.
Petitioners prayer for the annulment of Honasans proclamation and, ultimately, election is merely incidental to
petitioners cause of action. Consequently, the Court can properly exercise jurisdiction over the instant petition.
On the Mootness of the Petition
COMELEC contends that its proclamation on 5 June 2001 of the 13 Senators and its subsequent confirmation on 20
July 2001 of the ranking of the 13 Senators render the instant petition to set aside Resolutions Nos. 01-005 and 01-006
moot and academic.
Admittedly, the office of the writ of prohibition is to command a tribunal or board to desist from committing an act
threatened to be done without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
[11]
 Consequently, the writ will not lie to enjoin acts already done. [12] However, as an exception to the rule on mootness,
courts will decide a question otherwise moot if it is capable of repetition yet evading review. [13] Thus, in Alunan III v.
Mirasol,[14]we took cognizance of a petition to set aside an order canceling the general elections for the Sangguniang
Kabataan (SK) on 4 December 1992 despite that at the time the petition was filed, the SK election had already taken place.
We noted in Alunan that since the question of the validity of the order sought to be annulled is likely to arise in every SK
elections and yet the question may not be decided before the date of such elections, the mootness of the petition is no bar
to its resolution. This observation squarely applies to the instant case. The question of the validity of a special election to
fill a vacancy in the Senate in relation to COMELECs failure to comply with requirements on the conduct of such special
election is likely to arise in every such election. Such question, however, may not be decided before the date of the
election.
On Petitioners Standing
Honasan questions petitioners standing to bring the instant petition as taxpayers and voters because petitioners do
not claim that COMELEC illegally disbursed public funds. Neither do petitioners claim that they sustained personal injury
because of the issuance of Resolution Nos. 01-005 and 01-006.
Legal standing or locus standi refers to a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained
or will sustain direct injury because of the challenged governmental act. [15] The requirement of standing, which
necessarily sharpens the presentation of issues, [16] relates to the constitutional mandate that this Court settle only actual
cases or controversies. [17] Thus, generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when (1) he can show that he has
personally suffered some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the
injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. [18]
Applied strictly, the doctrine of standing to litigate will indeed bar the instant petition. In questioning, in their
capacity as voters, the validity of the special election on 14 May 2001, petitioners assert a harm classified as a generalized
grievance. This generalized grievance is shared in substantially equal measure by a large class of voters, if not all the
voters, who voted in that election. [19] Neither have petitioners alleged, in their capacity as taxpayers, that the Court should
give due course to the petition because in the special election held on 14 May 2001 tax money [was] x x x extracted and

11
spent in violation of specific constitutional protections against abuses of legislative power or that there [was]
misapplication of such funds by COMELEC or that public money [was] deflected to any improper purpose. [20]
On the other hand, we have relaxed the requirement on standing and exercised our discretion to give due course to
voters suits involving the right of suffrage. [21] Also, in the recent case of Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora,
[22]
 we gave the same liberal treatment to a petition filed by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). The IBP
questioned the validity of a Presidential directive deploying elements of the Philippine National Police and the Philippine
Marines in Metro Manila to conduct patrols even though the IBP presented too general an interest. We held:
[T]he IBP primarily anchors its standing on its alleged responsibility to uphold the rule of law and the Constitution. Apart
from this declaration, however, the IBP asserts no other basis in support of its locus standi. The mere invocation by the
IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with
standing in this case. This is too general an interest which is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry x x x.
Having stated the foregoing, this Court has the discretion to take cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy the
requirement of legal standing when paramount interest is involved. In not a few cases, the court has adopted a liberal
attitude on the locus standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to
the people. Thus, when the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public, the Court may brush aside
technicalities of procedure. In this case, a reading of the petition shows that the IBP has advanced constitutional issues
which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents.  Moreover,
because peace and order are under constant threat and lawless violence occurs in increasing tempo, undoubtedly
aggravated by the Mindanao insurgency problem, the legal controversy raised in the petition almost certainly will not go
away. It will stare us in the face again. It, therefore, behooves the Court to relax the rules on standing and to resolve the
issue now, rather than later.[23] (Emphasis supplied)
We accord the same treatment to petitioners in the instant case in their capacity as voters since they raise important
issues involving their right of suffrage, considering that the issue raised in this petition is likely to arise again.
Whether a Special Election for a Single, Three-Year Term
Senatorial Seat was Validly Held on 14 May 2001
Under Section 9, Article VI of the Constitution, a special election may be called to fill any vacancy in the Senate and
the House of Representatives in the manner prescribed by law, thus:
In case of vacancy in the Senate or in the House of Representatives, a special election may be called to fill such vacancy in
the manner prescribed by law, but the Senator or Member of the House of Representatives thus elected shall serve only
for the unexpired term. (Emphasis supplied)
To implement this provision of the Constitution, Congress passed R.A. No. 6645, which provides in pertinent parts:
SECTION 1. In case a vacancy arises in the Senate at least eighteen (18) months or in the House of Representatives at least
one (1) year before the next regular election for Members of Congress, the Commission on Elections, upon receipt of a
resolution of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, certifying to the existence of such vacancy
and calling for a special election, shall hold a special election to fill such vacancy. If Congress is in recess, an official
communication on the existence of the vacancy and call for a special election by the President of the Senate or by the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, as the case may be, shall be sufficient for such purpose.The Senator or Member
of the House of Representatives thus elected shall serve only for the unexpired term.
SECTION 2. The Commission on Elections shall fix the date of the special election, which shall not be earlier than forty-five
(45) days nor later than ninety (90) days from the date of such resolution or communication, stating among other things
the office or offices to be voted for: Provided, however, That if within the said period a general election is scheduled to be
held, the special election shall be held simultaneously with such general election. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7166 subsequently amended Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as follows:
Postponement, Failure of Election and Special Elections. x x x In case a permanent vacancy shall occur in the Senate or
House of Representatives at least one (1) year before the expiration of the term, the Commission shall call and hold a
special election to fill the vacancy not earlier than sixty (60) days nor longer than ninety (90) days after the occurrence of
the vacancy. However, in case of such vacancy in the Senate, the special election shall be held simultaneously with the
next succeeding regular election. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, in case a vacancy arises in Congress at least one year before the expiration of the term, Section 2 of R.A. No.
6645, as amended, requires COMELEC: (1) to call a special election by fixing the date of the special election, which shall
not be earlier than sixty (60) days nor later than ninety (90) after the occurrence of the vacancy but in case of a vacancy in
the Senate, the special election shall be held simultaneously with the next succeeding regular election; and (2) to give
notice to the voters of, among other things, the office or offices to be voted for.
Did COMELEC, in conducting the special senatorial election simultaneously with the 14 May 2001 regular elections,
comply with the requirements in Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645?
A survey of COMELECs resolutions relating to the conduct of the 14 May 2001 elections reveals that they contain
nothing which would amount to a compliance, either strict or substantial, with the requirements in Section 2 of R.A. No.
6645, as amended. Thus, nowhere in its resolutions [24] or even in its press releases [25] did COMELEC state that it would
hold a special election for a single three-year term Senate seat simultaneously with the regular elections on 14 May 2001.
Nor did COMELEC give formal notice that it would proclaim as winner the senatorial candidate receiving the 13 th highest
number of votes in the special election.

12
 The controversy thus turns on whether COMELECs failure, assuming it did fail, to comply with the requirements in
Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as amended, invalidated the conduct of the special senatorial election on 14 May 2001 and
accordingly rendered Honasans proclamation as the winner in that special election void. More precisely, the question is
whether the special election is invalid for lack of a call for such election and for lack of notice as to the office to be filled
and the manner by which the winner in the special election is to be determined. For reasons stated below, the Court
answers in the negative.
COMELECs Failure to Give Notice
of the Time of the Special Election Did Not
Negate the Calling of such Election
The calling of an election, that is, the giving notice of the time and place of its occurrence, whether made by the
legislature directly or by the body with the duty to give such call, is indispensable to the elections validity. [26] In a general
election, where the law fixes the date of the election, the election is valid without any call by the body charged to
administer the election.[27]
In a special election to fill a vacancy, the rule is that a statute that expressly provides that an election to fill a vacancy
shall be held at the next general elections fixes the date at which the special election is to be held and operates as the call
for that election. Consequently, an election held at the time thus prescribed is not invalidated by the fact that the body
charged by law with the duty of calling the election failed to do so. [28] This is because the right and duty to hold the
election emanate from the statute and not from any call for the election by some authority [29] and the law thus charges
voters with knowledge of the time and place of the election. [30]
Conversely, where the law does not fix the time and place for holding a special election but empowers some
authority to fix the time and place after the happening of a condition precedent, the statutory provision on the giving of
notice is considered mandatory, and failure to do so will render the election a nullity. [31]
In the instant case, Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645 itself provides that in case of vacancy in the Senate, the special election
to fill such vacancy shall be held simultaneously with the next succeeding regular election.  Accordingly, the special
election to fill the vacancy in the Senate arising from Senator Guingonas appointment as Vice-President in February 2001
could not be held at any other time but must be held simultaneously with the next succeeding regular elections on 14 May
2001. The law charges the voters with knowledge of this statutory notice and COMELECs failure to give the additional
notice did not negate the calling of such special election, much less invalidate it.
Our conclusion might be different had the present case involved a special election to fill a vacancy in the House of
Representatives. In such a case, the holding of the special election is subject to a condition precedent, that is,  the vacancy
should take place at least one year before the expiration of the term.  The time of the election is left to the discretion of
COMELEC subject only to the limitation that it holds the special election within the range of time provided in Section 2 of
R.A. No. 6645, as amended. This makes mandatory the requirement in Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as amended, for
COMELEC to call x x x a special election x x x not earlier than 60 days nor longer than 90 days after the occurrence of the
vacancy and give notice of the office to be filled. The COMELECs failure to so call and give notice will nullify any attempt to
hold a special election to fill the vacancy. Indeed, it will be well-nigh impossible for the voters in the congressional district
involved to know the time and place of the special election and the office to be filled unless the COMELEC so notifies them.
No Proof that COMELECs
Failure to Give Notice of the Office
to be Filled and the Manner of
Determining the Winner in the Special
Election Misled Voters
The test in determining the validity of a special election in relation to the failure to give notice of the special election
is whether the want of notice has resulted in misleading a sufficient number of voters as would change the result of the
special election. If the lack of official notice misled a substantial number of voters who wrongly believed that there was no
special election to fill a vacancy, a choice by a small percentage of voters would be void. [32]
The required notice to the voters in the 14 May 2001 special senatorial election covers two matters.  First, that
COMELEC will hold a special election to fill a vacant single three-year term Senate seat simultaneously with the regular
elections scheduled on the same date. Second, that COMELEC will proclaim as winner the senatorial candidate receiving
the 13th highest number of votes in the special election. Petitioners have neither claimed nor proved that COMELECs
failure to give this required notice misled a sufficient number of voters as would change the result of the special senatorial
election or led them to believe that there was no such special election.
Instead, what petitioners did is conclude that since COMELEC failed to give such notice, no special election took
place. This bare assertion carries no value.Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as amended, charged those who voted in the
elections of 14 May 2001 with the knowledge that the vacancy in the Senate arising from Senator Guingonas appointment
as Vice-President in February 2001 was to be filled in the next succeeding regular election of 14 May 2001. Similarly, the
absence of formal notice from COMELEC does not preclude the possibility that the voters had actual notice of the special
election, the office to be voted in that election, and the manner by which COMELEC would determine the winner.  Such
actual notice could come from many sources, such as media reports of the enactment of R.A. No. 6645 and election
propaganda during the campaign. [33]

13
 More than 10 million voters cast their votes in favor of Honasan, the party who stands most prejudiced by the
instant petition. We simply cannot disenfranchise those who voted for Honasan, in the absence of proof that COMELECs
omission prejudiced voters in the exercise of their right of suffrage so as to negate the holding of the special
election. Indeed, this Court is loathe to annul elections and will only do so when it is impossible to distinguish what votes
are lawful and what are unlawful, or to arrive at any certain result whatever, or that the great body of the voters have
been prevented by violence, intimidation, and threats from exercising their franchise. [34]
Otherwise, the consistent rule has been to respect the electorates will and let the results of the election stand,
despite irregularities that may have attended the conduct of the elections. [35] This is but to acknowledge the
purpose and role of elections in a democratic society such as ours, which is:
to give the voters a direct participation in the affairs of their government, either in determining who shall be their public
officials or in deciding some question of public interest; and for that purpose all of the legal voters should be permitted,
unhampered and unmolested, to cast their ballot. When that is done and no frauds have been committed, the ballots should
be counted and the election should not be declared null.  Innocent voters should not be deprived of their participation in the
affairs of their government for mere irregularities on the part of the election officers, for which they are in no way
responsible. A different rule would make the manner and method of performing a public duty of greater importance than
the duty itself.[36] (Emphasis in the original)
Separate Documentation and Canvassing
not Required under Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645,
Neither is there basis in petitioners claim that the manner by which COMELEC conducted the special senatorial
election on 14 May 2001 is a nullity because COMELEC failed to document separately the candidates and to canvass
separately the votes cast for the special election. No such requirements exist in our election laws. What is mandatory
under Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645 is that COMELEC fix the date of the election, if necessary, and state, among others, the
office or offices to be voted for. Similarly, petitioners reliance on Section 73 of B.P. Blg. 881 on the filing of certificates of
candidacy, and on Section 4(4) of R.A. No. 6646 on the printing of election returns and tally sheets, to support their claim
is misplaced. These provisions govern elections in general and in no way require separate documentation of candidates or
separate canvass of votes in a jointly held regular and special elections.
Significantly, the method adopted by COMELEC in conducting the special election on 14 May 2001 merely
implemented the procedure specified by the Senate in Resolution No. 84. Initially, the original draft of Resolution No. 84
as introduced by Senator Francisco Tatad (Senator Tatad) made no mention of the manner by which the seat vacated by
former Senator Guingona would be filled. However, upon the suggestion of Senator Raul Roco (Senator Roco), the Senate
agreed to amend Resolution No. 84 by providing, as it now appears, that the senatorial candidate garnering the thirteenth
(13th) highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. Senator
Roco introduced the amendment to spare COMELEC and the candidates needless expenditures and the voters further
inconvenience, thus:
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. Mr. President, I move that we now consider Proposed Senate Resolution No. 934 [later converted to
Resolution No. 84].
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the motion is approved.
Consideration of Proposed Senate Resolution No. 934 is now in order. With the permission of the Body, the Secretary will
read only the title and text of the resolution.
T[HE] S[ECRETARY]. Proposed Senate Resolution No. 934 entitled
RESOLUTION CERTIFYING TO THE EXISTENCE OF A VACANCY IN THE SENATE AND CALLING ON THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS (COMELEC) TO FILL UP SUCH VACANCY THROUGH ELECTION TO BE HELD SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE
REGULAR ELECTION ON MAY 14, 2001 AND THE SENATOR THUS ELECTED TO SERVE ONLY FOR THE UNEXPIRED TERM
WHEREAS, the Honorable Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. was elected Senator of the Philippines in 1998 for a term which will
expire on June 30, 2004;
WHEREAS, on February 6, 2001, Her Excellency President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo nominated Senator Guingona as Vice-
President of the Philippines;
WHEREAS, the nomination of Senator Guingona has been confirmed by a majority vote of all the members of both House
of Congress, voting separately;
WHEREAS, Senator Guingona will take his Oath of Office as Vice-President of the Philippines on February 9, 2001;
WHEREAS, Republic Act No. 7166 provides that the election for twelve (12) Senators, all elective Members of the House of
Representatives, and all elective provincial city and municipal officials shall be held on the second Monday and every
three years thereafter; Now, therefore, be it
RESOLVED by the Senate, as it is hereby resolved, to certify, as it hereby certifies, the existence of a vacancy in the Senate
and calling the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to fill up such vacancy through election to be held simultaneously
with the regular election on May 14, 2001 and the Senator thus elected to serve only for the unexpired term.
Adopted,
(Sgd.) FRANCISCO S. TATAD
Senator
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. Mr. President, I move for the adoption of this resolution.
S[ENATOR] O[SMEA] (J). Mr. President.

14
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Sen. John H. Osmea is recognized.
S[ENATOR] O[SMEA] (J). Thank you, Mr. President. Will the distinguished Majority Leader, Chairman of the Committee on
Rules, author of this resolution, yield for a few questions?
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. With trepidation, Mr. President. [Laughter]
S[ENATOR] O[SMEA] (J). What a way of flattery. [Laughter]
Mr. President, I think I recall that sometime in 1951 or 1953, there was a special election for a vacant seat in the
Senate. As a matter of fact, the one who was elected in that special election was then Congressman, later Senator
Feli[s]berto Verano.
In that election, Mr. President, the candidates contested the seat. In other words, the electorate had to cast a vote for a
ninth senator because at that time there were only eight to elect a member or rather, a candidate to that particular seat.
Then I remember, Mr. President, that when we ran after the EDSA revolution, twice there were 24 candidates and the first
12 were elected to a six-year term and the next 12 were elected to a three-year term.
My question therefore is, how is this going to be done in this election? Is the candidate with the 13th largest number of
votes going to be the one to take a three-year term? Or is there going to be an election for a position of senator for the
unexpired term of Sen. Teofisto Guingona?
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. Mr. President, in this resolution, we are leaving the mechanics to the Commission on Elections. But
personally, I would like to suggest that probably, the candidate obtaining the 13 th largest number of votes be declared as
elected to fill up the unexpired term of Senator Guingona.
S[ENATOR] O[SMEA] (J). Is there a law that would allow the Comelec to conduct such an election? Is it not the case that
the vacancy is for a specific office? I am really at a loss. I am rising here because I think it is something that we should
consider. I do not know if we can No, this is not a Concurrent Resolution.
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. May we solicit the legal wisdom of the Senate President.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. May I share this information that under Republic Act No. 6645, what is needed is a resolution of this
Chamber calling attention to the need for the holding of a special election to fill up the vacancy created, in this particular
case, by the appointment of our colleague, Senator Guingona, as Vice President.
It can be managed in the Commission on Elections so that a slot for the particular candidate to fill up would be that
reserved for Mr. Guingonas unexpired term. In other words, it can be arranged in such a manner.
xxxx
S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. Mr. President.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Sen. Raul S. Roco is recognized.
S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. May we suggest, subject to a one-minute caucus, wordings to the effect that in the simultaneous
elections, the 13th placer be therefore deemed to be the special election for this purpose.  So we just nominate 13 and it is
good for our colleagues. It is better for the candidates. It is also less expensive because the ballot will be printed and there
will be less disfranchisement.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. That is right.
S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. If we can just deem it therefore under this resolution to be such a special election, maybe, we satisfy
the requirement of the law.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Yes. In other words, this shall be a guidance for the Comelec.
S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. Yes.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. to implement.
S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. Yes. The Comelec will not have the flexibility.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. That is right.
S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. We will already consider the 13th placer of the forthcoming elections that will be held simultaneously
as a special election under this law as we understand it.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Yes. That will be a good compromise, Senator Roco.
S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. Yes. So if the sponsor can introduce that later, maybe it will be better, Mr. President.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. What does the sponsor say?
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. Mr. President, that is a most satisfactory proposal because I do not believe that there will be anyone
running specifically
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Correct.
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. to fill up this position for three years and campaigning nationwide.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Actually, I think what is going to happen is the 13 th candidate will be running with specific groups.
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. Yes. Whoever gets No. 13.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. I think we can specifically define that as the intent of this resolution.
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. Subject to style, we accept that amendment and if there will be no other amendment, I move for the
adoption of this resolution.
xxxx
ADOPTION OF S. RES. NO. 934
If there are no other proposed amendments, I move that we adopt this resolution.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. There is a motion to adopt this resolution. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the
motion is approved.[37]

15
 Evidently, COMELEC, in the exercise of its discretion to use means and methods to conduct the special election
within the confines of R.A. No. 6645, merely chose to adopt the Senates proposal, as embodied in Resolution No. 84. This
Court has consistently acknowledged and affirmed COMELECs wide latitude of discretion in adopting means to carry out
its mandate of ensuring free, orderly, and honest elections subject only to the limitation that the means so adopted are not
illegal or do not constitute grave abuse of discretion. [38] COMELECs decision to abandon the means it employed in the 13
November 1951 and 8 November 1955 special elections and adopt the method embodied in Resolution No. 84 is but a
legitimate exercise of its discretion. Conversely, this Court will not interfere should COMELEC, in subsequent special
senatorial elections, choose to revert to the means it followed in the 13 November 1951 and 8 November 1955 elections.
That COMELEC adopts means that are novel or even disagreeable is no reason to adjudge it liable for grave abuse of
discretion. As we have earlier noted:
The Commission on Elections is a constitutional body. It is intended to play a distinct and important part in our scheme of
government. In the discharge of its functions, it should not be hampered with restrictions that would be fully warranted in
the case of a less responsible organization. The Commission may err, so may this Court also. It should be allowed
considerable latitude in devising means and methods that will insure the accomplishment of the great objective for which
it was created free, orderly and honest elections.We may not agree fully with its choice of means, but unless these are
clearly illegal or constitute gross abuse of discretion, this court should not interfere. [39]
A Word to COMELEC
The calling of a special election, if necessary, and the giving of notice to the electorate of necessary information
regarding a special election, are central to an informed exercise of the right of suffrage. While the circumstances attendant
to the present case have led us to conclude that COMELECs failure to so call and give notice did not invalidate the special
senatorial election held on 14 May 2001, COMELEC should not take chances in future elections. We remind COMELEC to
comply strictly with all the requirements under applicable laws relative to the conduct of regular elections in general and
special elections in particular.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, Quisumbing, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and  Azcuna,
JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J.,  joins Mr. Justice Puno in his dissent.
Puno, J., please see dissenting opinion.
Vitug, J., joins the dissent.
Ynares-Santiago, J., joins J. Punos dissent.
Tinga, J.,  joins Justice Punos dissent.

[1]
 As provided under Section 2 of Republic Act. No. 7166, as amended.
[2]
 Resolution No. 84 reads:
WHEREAS, the Honorable Teofisto Guingona, Jr. was elected Senator of the Philippines in 1998 for a term which will
expire on June 30, 2004;
WHEREAS, on February 6, 2001, Her Excellency President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo nominated Senator Guingona as Vice-
President of the Philippines;
WHEREAS, the nomination of Senator Guingona has been conferred by a majority vote of all the members of both Houses
of Congress, voting separately;
WHEREAS, Senator Guingona will take his Oath of Office as Vice-President of the Philippines on February 9, 2001;
WHEREAS, Republic Act No. 7166 provides that the election for twelve (12) Senators, all elective Members of the House of
Representatives, and all elective provincial, city and municipal officials shall be held on the second Monday of
May and every three years thereafter. Now, therefore be it Resolved by the Senate, as it is hereby resolved to
certify as it hereby certifies, the existence of a vacancy in the Senate and calling the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) to fill up said vacancy through election to be held simultaneously with the regular election on May
14, 2001 and the senatorial candidate garnering the thirteenth (13 th) highest number of votes shall serve only
for the unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. (Emphasis supplied)
[3]
 Resolution No. 01-005 reads:
WHEREAS, the Commission on Elections, sitting [E]n [B]anc as the National Board of Canvassers for the election of
Senators of the Philippines, officially canvassed in open and public proceedings the certificates of canvass of
votes cast nationwide for senators in the national and local elections conducted on May 14, 2001.
Based on the canvass of the Certificates of Canvass submitted by seventy-eight (78) out of seventy-nine (79) Provincial
Boards of Canvassers, twenty (20) City Boards of Canvassers of cities comprising one (1) or more legislative
districts, two (2) District Boards of Canvassers of Metro Manila, and one (1) Absentee Voting, and the remaining
uncanvassed certificate of canvass which will not anymore affect the results, the Commission on Elections

16
 sitting En Banc as the National Board of Canvassers finds that the following candidates for senators in said
elections obtained as of June 04, 2001 the following number of votes as indicated opposite their names:
Name Votes Garnered
(as of 4 June 2001)
NOLI DE CASTRO 16,157,811
JUAN M. FLAVIER 11,676,129
SERGIO R. OSMEA, III 11,531,427
FRANKLIN M. DRILON 11,223,020
RAMON B. MAGSAYSAY, JR. 11,187,447
JOKER P. ARROYO 11,163,801
MANUEL B. VILLAR, JR. 11,084,884
FRANCIS N. PANGILINAN 10,877,989
EDGARDO  J. ANGARA 10,746,843
PANFILO M. LACSON 10,481,755
LUISA P. EJERCITO ESTRADA 10,456,674
RALPH G. RECTO 10,387,108
GREGORIO G. HONASAN 10,364,272
NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it under the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code and other
election laws, the Commission on Elections sitting En Banc as the National Board of Canvassers hereby
PROCLAIMS the above-named thirteen (13) candidates as the duly elected Senators of the Philippines in the May
14, 2001 elections. Based on the certificates of canvass finally tabulated, the first twelve (12) Senators shall
serve for a term of six (6) years and the thirteenth (13 th) Senator shall serve the unexpired term of three (3)
years of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. who was appointed Vice-President of the Philippines pursuant to
Section 9, Article VII of the Constitution, in relation to Section 9, Article VI thereof, as implemented under
Republic Act No. 6645. (Emphasis supplied)
[4]
 This provision states: The Commission on Elections shall fix the date of the special election, which shall not be earlier
than forty-five (45) days nor later than ninety (90) days from the date of such resolution or communication,
stating among other things the office or offices to be voted for: Provided, however, That if within the said period a
general election is scheduled to be held, the special election shall be held simultaneously with such general
election.
[5]
 This provision reads: Certificate of candidacy. No person shall be eligible for any elective public office unless he files a
sworn certificate of candidacy within the period fixed herein.
A person who has filed a certificate of candidacy may, prior to the election, withdraw the same by submitting to the office
concerned a written declaration under oath.
No person shall be eligible for more than one office to be filled in the same election, and if he files his certificate of
candidacy for more than one office, he shall not be eligible for any of them.However, before the expiration of the
period for the filing of certificates of candidacy, the person who has filed more than one certificate of candidacy
may declare under oath the office for which he desires to be eligible and cancel the certificate of candidacy for
the other office or offices.
The filing or withdrawal of a certificate of candidacy shall not affect whatever civil, criminal or administrative liabilities
which a candidate may have incurred.
[6]
 This provision reads: Certificates of Candidacy; Certified List of Candidates. x x x The names of all registered candidates
immediately followed by the nickname or stage name shall also be printed in the election returns and tally
sheets.
[7]
  Rollo, pp. 5-7, 12-14.
[8]
 Senator Roseller T. Lim was elected in the special election of 13 November 1951 while Senator Felisberto Verano was
elected in the special election of 8 November 1955.
[9]
  Rollo, pp. 8-12.
[10]
 Castro v. Del Rosario, 25 Phil. 611 (1967); Section 1(a), Rule 66, THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
[11]
 Sections 1-2, Rule 65, THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
[12]
 Gil v. Benipayo, G.R. No. 148179, 26 June 2001 (minute resolution).
[13]
 Acop v. Guingona, G.R. No. 134856, 2 July 2002, 383 SCRA 577; Viola v. Hon. Alunan III, 343 Phil. 184 (1997); Alunan
III v. Mirasol, 342 Phil. 467 (1997).
[14]
 342 Phil. 467 (1997).
[15]
 Joya v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 96541, 24 August 1993, 225 SCRA 568.
[16]
 Kilosbayan, Incorporated  v. Morato, 316 Phil. 652 (1995).
[17]
 CONST., art. VIII, secs. 1 and 5(2).
[18]
 Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc.  v. Commission on Elections, 352 Phil. 153 (1998).
[19]
 See Warth v. Seldin, 442 U.S. 490, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975).
[20]
 Dumlao v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-52245, 22 January 1980, 95 SCRA 392 (internal citations omitted).

17
[21]
 De Guia v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 104712, 6 May 1992, 208 SCRA 420; Gonzales v. COMELEC, 129 Phil. 7 (1967). See also
Telecom & Broadcast Attys. of the Phils., Inc. v. COMELEC, 352 Phil. 153 (1998).
[22]
 G.R. No. 141284, 15 August 2000, 338 SCRA 81.
[23]
 Integrated Bar of the Philippines  vs. Zamora, G.R. No. 141284, 15 August 2000, 338 SCRA 81.
[24]
 E.g.  Resolution No. 3258, dated 28 September 2000 (providing for the calendar of activities and periods of prohibited
acts in connection with the 14 May 2001 elections as amended by Resolution Nos. 3322, dated 5 October 2000;
3284, dated 20 October 2000; 3306, dated 7 November 2000; 3426, dated 22 December 2000; and 3359, dated 6
February 2001); Resolution No. 3632, dated 1 March 2001 (canceling the certificates of candidacy of nuisance
senatorial candidates); and Resolution No. 3743, dated 12 March 2001 (providing for the general instructions to
the Boards of Election Inspectors on the casting and counting of votes).
[25]
 E.g. undated  COMELEC pamphlet entitled Frequently Asked Questions on the May 14, 2001 Elections.
[26]
 26 AM. JUR. 2d Elections 281 (1996); 29 C.J.S. Elections 70 (1965).
[27]
 Ibid; ibid.
[28]
 26 AM. JUR. 2d Elections 282 (1996).
[29]
  Ibid.
[30]
 McCoy  v. Fisher, 67 S.E. 2d 543 (1951).
[31]
 26 AM. JUR. 2d Elections 281 (1996); 29 C.J.S. Elections 70 (1965).
[32]
 See 26 AM. JUR. 2d Elections 292 (1996); 29 C.J.S. Elections 72 (1965).
[33]
 Indeed, the fact that 13 senators were due to be elected in the 14 May 2001 elections and that the senator elected to
the 13th place will serve the remaining term of Senator Guingona was published in news reports ( see Philippine
Star, 9 February 2001, pp. 1, 6 and Daily Tribune,  9 February 2001, pp. 1, 8; Philippine Daily
Inquirer,  12  February 2001, pp. 1, 10; 14 February 2001, pp. 1, A20; Today, 8 February 2001, p. 10; Manila
Bulletin, 9 February 2001, pp. 3, 8). Furthermore, the fact that the administration and opposition coalitions each
fielded 13 senatorial candidates (and not only 12) was similarly given extensive coverage by news publications
(see Philippine Daily Inquirer, 12 February 2001, pp. 1, 10; 13 February 2001, pp. 1, A14; 14 February 2001, pp.
1, A20; Philippine Star, 13 February 2001, pp. 1, 4; 14 February 2001, pp. 1, 6; Today, 9 February 2001, pp. 1, 4;
12 February 2001, pp. 1, 10; 13 February 2001, pp. 1, 10; Manila Standard, 13 February 2001, pp. 1, 2; Malaya,
13 February 2001, pp. 1, 6; 14 February 2001, pp. 1, 4; Daily Tribune 14 February 2001, pp. 1, 6; Manila Times,
14 February 2001, pp. 1, 2A; Philippine Star Ngayon, 13 February 2001, pp. 1, 4).
[34]
 Florendo, Sr. vs. Buyser, 129 Phil. 353 (1967); Capalla  v. Tabiana, 63 Phil. 95 (1936); Kiamzon v. Pugeda, 54 Phil. 755
(1930); Cailles  v. Gomez, 42 Phil. 852 (1924). Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, as amended, (Omnibus Election Code),
on failure of elections (resulting to the annulment of elections), provides: SEC. 6. Failure of election. If, on account
of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes the election in any polling place had not
been held on the date fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or
after the voting and during the preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in the custody or
canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect, and in any of such cases the failure or suspension of
election would affect the result of the election, the Commission shall, on the basis of a verified petition by an
interested party and after due notice and hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the election not held,
suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect on a date reasonably close to the date of the election not held,
suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of
such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect.
[35]
 Alcala v. Commission on Elections, 218 Phil. 322 (1984); Villareal  v. Fornier, 84 Phil. 756 (1949); Lucero v. De Guzman,
45 Phil. 852 (1924).
[36]
 Lino Luna vs. Rodriguez, 39 Phil. 208 (1918).
[37]
 Transcript of Session Proceedings of the Philippine Senate, 8 February 2001, pp. 49-54. (Emphasis supplied)
[38]
 E.g. Cauton v. COMELEC, 126 Phil. 291 (1967).
[39]
 Pugutan v. Abubakar, 150 Phil. 1 (1972) citing Sumulong  v. Commission on Elections, 73 Phil. 237 (1941).

18
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-22335      December 31, 1965

AMANTE P. PURISIMA, petitioner, 
vs.
HON. ANGELINO C. SALANGA, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur. THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF
CANVASSERS, THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and GREGORIO CORDERO, respondents.

Jose W. Diokno for petitioner.

Provincial Fiscal Juvenal K. Guerrero for respondent Provincial Board of Canvassers
Antonio Barredo for respondents Judge Salanga and Gregorio Cordero
Ramon Barrios for respondent Commission on Elections.

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

In the election of November 12, 1963, Amante Purisima and Gregorio Cordero were among the candidates for any of the
three offices of Provincial Board Member of Ilocos Sur. After the election or on November 25, 1963 the provincial board of
canvassers met and started canvassing the returns for said office.

Purisima noted during the canvass that the returns from some precincts, forty-one (41) in all, showed on their face that
the words and figures for Cordero's votes had been "obviously and manifestly erased" and superimposed with other
words and figures. For purposes of comparison, the Nacionalista Party copies of the returns for the aforesaid precincts
were submitted to the board. A discrepancy of 5,042 votes in favor of Cordero was thereby found, thus:

Provincial Treasurer's copy: 7,277 votes for Cordero

Nacionalista Party's copy 2,235 votes for Cordero

A request for suspension of the canvass was thereupon made by Purisima. The board of canvassers denied said request
upon the ground that it was not yet ascertainable if the discrepancies would materially affect the result. Canvass
proceeded.

After the returns had all been read, the result for the office of third (and last) member of the Provincial Board was the
following:

Cordero 41,229 votes

Purisima 39,372 votes.

Difference 1,857 votes

Purisima again called attention to the erasures and discrepancies and asked for suspension of canvass — for him to have
recourse to judicial remedy. Denying said request, the board of canvassers finished the canvass and proclaimed Cordero
the winner, on November 28.

On November 29, Purisima filed a petition in the Commission on Elections to annul the canvass and proclamation above-
mentioned. The Commission on Elections issued a resolution on November 30, annulling the canvass and proclamation, as
regards Cordero and Purisima.

19
Purisima, on December 10, filed in the Court of First Instance a petition for recount under Section 163 of the Revised
Election Code. Subsequently, motions to dismiss the same were filed by the board of canvassers and by Cordero. In his
motion to dismiss, Cordero admitted the erasures and discrepancies on the face of the returns from 41 precincts, but
denied that said erasures were due to tampering or falsification.

After a preliminary hearing on the motions to dismiss, the Court of First Instance, on December 27, dismissed the petition
for recount. And on December 28, Cordero filed in the Commission on Elections a motion for resumption of the canvass.

Purisima, on January 2, 1964, moved for reconsideration of the Court of First Instance's order of dismissal. In the same
case, he also filed, on January 8, a petition for preliminary injunction to restrain the holding of another canvass. Annexed
to said petition were certified photostatic copies of the Comelec's copies of the returns from the 41 precincts in question.
Furthermore, Purisima filed with the Commission on Elections, on January 11, an opposition to the resumption of the
canvass.

Alleging that the Commission on Elections was about to order the canvass resumed, Purisima came to this Court, on
January 17, 1964, by petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction. Petitioner asked that the lower court's order
dismissing his petition for recount be set aside and that the Commission on Elections be enjoined from ordering
resumption of the canvass until after the judicial recount.

On January 22, 1964 we ordered respondents to answer, and allowed preliminary injunction to be issued as prayed for
upon the posting of a bond of P500.00. After respondents filed their answer the case was heard and submitted for
decision.

The requisites for judicial recount are set forth in Section 163 of the Revised Election Code:

When statements of precinct are contradictory. — In case it appears to the provincial board of canvassers that
another copy or other authentic copies of the statement from an election precinct submitted to the board give to
a candidate a different number of votes and the difference affects the result of the election, the Court of First
Instance of the province, upon motion of the board or of any candidate affected, may proceed to recount the
votes cast in the precinct for the sole purpose of determining which is the true statement or which is the true
result of the count of the votes cast in said precinct for the office in question. Notice of such proceeding shall be
given to all candidates affected.

In dismissing the petition for recount, respondent Judge stated that some of the requisites were not present, namely: first,
that it appears to the provincial board of canvassers that a discrepancy exists; second, that said discrepancy is between
the copy submitted to the board and another authentic copy thereof; third, that said authentic copy must also be
submitted to the board.

First of all, it is not disputed that a candidate affected can file the petition for recount, even if he does so alone, without the
concurrence of the provincial board of canvassers (Cawa v. Del Rosario, L-16837-40, May 30,1960). From the fact,
therefore, that the provincial board of canvassers has not petitioned for a recount it cannot be inferred that they were not
convinced a discrepancy existed.

In fact, when Purisima first called attention to the discrepancy between the Nacionalista Party copies and the Provincial
Treasurer's copies, the board of canvassers admitted the discrepancy but stated that it was not yet ascertainable whether
the discrepancy would amount to enough votes as to affect the result. There is no more question now that the number of
votes involved in said discrepancy is more than enough to alter the result.

Finally, in the motion to dismiss filed by the board of canvassers, the existence of the discrepancy is not disputed, and the
board merely raises the defense that the recount is up to the court and not to said board (Annex D, Petition).

Passing on to the next point, the basis of the petition for recount was not merely a discrepancy between the Nacionalista
Party copies and the Provincial Treasurer's copies of the returns. Paragraph 8 of said petition shows that, in addition, the
Commission on Elections' copies were relied upon:

That as a result of the aforesaid erasures, tampering and apparent falsifications, there exist discrepancies
between the Provincial Treasurer's copies (the basis of the canvass) of the election returns in the precincts in

20
 question, on one hand, and the copies pertaining to the Nacionalista Party and those pertaining to the
Commission on Elections, on the other, and that said discrepancies materially affect the result of the election as
between herein petitioner and respondent Gregorio Cordero;

Accordingly, even assuming for the nonce — a point we do not here decide — that the Nacionalista Party copies are not
copies that may be the basis of a petition for recount, the fact remains that the Commission on Elections' copies were said
to reflect the same discrepancy with the Provincial Treasurer's copies. It is settled that the Commission on Elections'
copies are authentic copies within the meaning of Section 163 of the Revised Election Code (Laws in v. Escalona, L-22540,
July 31, 1964; Matanog v. Alejandro, L-22502-08, June 30, 1964.)

The trial court. however, ruled that the Commission on Elections' copies had no application to the petition for recount
because they were not submitted to the board of canvassers. The record definitely shows that the reason why Purisima
was not able to submit to the board said Commission on Elections' copies was because the board declined to suspend the
canvass and proclamation.

It is the duty of the board of canvassers to suspend the canvass in case of patent irregularity in the election returns. In the
present case, there were patent erasures and superimpositions, in words and figures on the face of the election returns
submitted to the board of canvassers. It was therefore imperative for the board to stop the canvass so as to allow time for
verification of authentic copies and recourse to the courts (Javier v. Commission on Elections, L-22248, January 30, 1965).
A canvass or proclamation made notwithstanding such patent defects, without awaiting proper remedies, is null and void
(Ibid.). In fact, as stated, the Commission on Elections declared the canvass and proclamation, made by respondent
provincial board of canvassers, null and void.

Since the board of canvassers prevented Purisima from securing the Commission on Elections' copies of the returns to
establish a discrepancy between them and the Provincial Treasurer's copies, the failure to submit the Commission on
Elections' copies to said board should not prejudice Purisima's right to petition for recount before the court. It was
therefore grave abuse of discretion for respondent court to refuse to consider the Commission on Elections' copies,
regardless of the patent and admitted irregularities on the face of the Provincial Treasurer's copies and the alleged
discrepancy amounting to thousands of votes sufficient to affect the results.

Interpretation of election laws should give effect to the expressed will of the electorate. Patent erasures and
superimpositions in words and figures of the votes stated in the election returns strike at the reliability of said returns as
basis for canvass and proclamation. A comparison with the other copies, and, in case of discrepancy, a recount, is the only
way to remove grave doubts as to the correctness of said returns as well as of ascertaining that they reflect the will of the
people.

WHEREFORE, the dismissal of the petition for recount is set aside, respondent Judge is ordered to proceed with the
petition for recount, and respondents Commission on Elections and Provincial Board of Canvassers are enjoined, until
after the termination of proceedings in the petition for recount, from ordering or holding another canvass and
proclamation as between petitioner Purisima and respondent Cordero.

Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.

21
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-25467             April 27, 1967

LUCAS V. CAUTON, petitioner, 
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and PABLO SANIDAD, respondents.

Antonio Barredo for petitioner.

Ramon Barrios for respondent Commission on Elections.
Pablo C. Sanidad and F. D. Villanueva and Associates for respondent Sanidad.

ZALDIVAR, J.:

In the national elections held on November 9, 1965, petitioner Lucas V. Cauton and respondent Pablo Sanidad, along with Godofredo S.
Reyes, were candidates for the office of Representative in the second congressional district of Ilocos Sur.

During the canvass by the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Ilocos Sur of the votes cast for the candidates for Representative in the
second congressional district of Ilocos Sur, and particularly after the Board had opened the envelopes containing the copies of the
election returns from each of the election precincts in the municipalities of Candon, Santiago and Sta. Cruz that were presented by the
Provincial Treasurer of Ilocos Sur to the Board, respondent Sanidad brought to the attention of the Board the fact that the entries of votes
for the candidates for Representative in those copies of the election returns that came from the envelopes presented by the provincial
treasurer differed from the entries appearing in the copies of the returns from the same election precincts that were in the possession of
the Liberal Party.1äwphï1.ñët

Respondent Sanidad filed a petition with the Commission on Elections praying for the opening of the ballot boxes in all the precincts of
Candon, Santiago and Sta. Cruz, in order to retrieve the election returns deposited therein so that those election returns might be used in
the canvass of the votes for the candidates for Representative in the second district of Ilocos Sur, and that in the meantime the Provincial
Board of Canvassers of Ilocos Sur be ordered to refrain from proclaiming the winning candidate for the office of Representative in said
district. The Commission on Elections issued the restraining order prayed for by respondent Sanidad and set his petition for hearing.

After hearing, the Commission on Elections found "that it had been clearly established that the copies of the election returns for the
Municipal Treasurer, for the Commission on Elections and for the Provincial Treasurer for the municipality of Santa Cruz have uniform
alterations in the entries of the votes cast for representative showing different number of votes compared with the Liberal Party copies,
while the copies of the election returns for the Commission on Elections and the Provincial Treasurer for the municipalities of Candon
and Santiago have likewise uniform alterations and showing different numbers compared with the Liberal Party copies ...." 1The copies of
the election returns that were furnished the municipal treasurers of Candon and Santiago were never verified because the municipal
treasurers of those two municipalities did not comply with the subpoena duces tecum issued by the Commission on Elections directing
them to bring to the Commission the copies of the election returns of the precincts in their respective municipalities that were in their
possession.

On December 22, 1965, respondent Commission on Elections issued an order providing, among others, that

... to enable the aggrieved party to establish discrepancy between copies of the election returns provided by law in the
aforementioned precincts for the purpose of obtaining judicial remedy under the provisions of Section 163 of the Revised
Election Code, the Commission Resolved ... to direct immediately the opening of the ballot boxes of the municipalities of
Candon, Sta. Cruz and Santiago which are now impounded and under the custody of the Zone Commander of the 1st PC Zone in
Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga solely for the purpose of retrieving therefrom the corresponding election returns,
copies for the ballot box, in all the precincts of said municipalities.

Pursuant to the instructions of respondent Commission, contained in the resolution of December 22, 1965, the ballot boxes from all the
precincts in the municipalities of Candon, Sta. Cruz and Santiago were opened by the Chief of the Law Enforcement Division of the
Commission, Atty. Fernando Gorospe, Jr., in the presence of witnesses, and the envelopes containing the election returns found inside the
ballot boxes were taken and brought to Manila on December 23, 1965.

On the same date, December 23, 1965, herein petitioner, Lucas V. Cauton, filed before this Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with preliminary injunction, praying that the resolution of the respondent Commission on Elections dated December 22, 1965 ordering

22
the opening of the ballot boxes used in all the precincts of Candon, Sta. Cruz and Santiago in the elections of November 9, 1965 be
annulled and set aside. The petition further prays that the Commission on Elections be restrained from opening, the envelopes containing
the election returns found in the afore-mentioned ballot boxes and be ordered to return the said envelopes to the corresponding ballot
boxes. In his petition, petitioner alleges that the respondent Commission on Elections acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in
issuing the resolution of December 22, 1965. This Court gave due course to the petition, but did not issue the writ of preliminary
injunction prayed for. This petition is now the case before Us.

Upon instructions by respondent Commission on Elections, on December 28, 1966, the envelopes that were taken from the ballot boxes
were opened and the election returns were taken out and their contents examined and recorded by a committee appointed by the
Commission. This was done in a formal hearing with notice to the parties concerned.

Respondent Pablo C. Sanidad filed his answer to instant petition on January 5, 1966, admitting some of the allegations and denying
others, and maintaining that the Commission on Elections had acted well within the bounds of its authority in issuing the order of
December 22, 1965. Respondent Commission on Elections also filed its answer on January 5, 1966, maintaining that it has authority
under the law to order the opening of the ballot boxes as stated in its resolution of December 22, 1965.

In the meantime, on the basis of the discrepancies in the entries of the votes for the candidates for Representative, between the election
returns taken out of the ballot boxes that were opened by order of the Commission of Elections and the election returns submitted by the
Provincial Treasurer of Ilocos Sur to the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Ilocos Sur, respondent Pablo C. Sanidad filed a petition with
the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, docketed as Election Case No. 16-N, for a recount of the votes in all the precincts of Candon, Sta.
Cruz and Santiago, pursuant to the provisions of Section 163 of the Revised Election Code.

On February 14, 1966, petitioner filed before this Court in urgent motion, in this case, praying for the issuance of an order enjoining the
Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur (Branch II-Narvacan) from further proceeding with Election Case No. 16-N, abovementioned, pending
final decision of the instance case, upon the ground that the recount of the ballots in that case in the court below would render the instant
case moot and academic. This motion was denied by this Court in a resolution dated February 17, 1966.

The principal issue in the present case revolves on the of the resolution of the respondent Commission of Elections, dated December 22,
1965, which orders the opening of the ballot boxes used in all the precincts in the municipalities of Candon, Sta. Cruz and Santiago, Ilocos
Sur, during the elections of November 9, 1965 for the purpose of retrieving therefrom the corresponding election returns, copies for the
ballot box, "to enable the aggrieved party to establish discrepancy between copies of the election returns provided by law in the
aforementioned precincts for the purpose of obtaining judicial remedy under the provisions of Section 163 of the Revised Election Code."

It is the stand of the petitioner that respondent Commission on Elections is without jurisdiction to issue, or has acted in excess of
jurisdiction in issuing, the resolution in question, so that said resolution is null and void and should not be given legal force and effect.
The petitioner contends that under Section 157 of the Revised Election Code the Commission on Elections has authority to order the
opening of the ballot boxes "only in connection with an investigation conducted for the purpose of helping the prosecution of any
violation of the election laws or for the purely administrative purpose but not when the sole purpose is, as in this case, to assist a party in
trying to win the election ...." The petitioner further, contends that "the mere fact that the copies of the returns in the precincts in
question in the possession of the Liberal Party do not tally with the returns involving the same precincts in the possession of the
Provincial Treasurer, the Commission of Elections and the Nacionalista Party as well does not legally support the validity of the
resolution of the respondent Commission in question ...."2

We cannot sustain the stand of the petitioner. We believe that in issuing the resolution in question the Commission on Elections simply
performed a function as authorized by the Constitution, that is, to "have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all
laws relative to the conduct of elections and ... exercise all other functions which may be conferred upon it by law." The Commission has
the power to decide all administrative questions affecting elections, except the question involving the right to vote. 3

This Court in a line of decisions has ruled that the Commission on Election has the power to investigate and act on the propriety or
legality of the canvass of election returns made by the board of canvassers. In the case of Albano vs. Arranz, L-19260, January 31, 1962,
this Court, through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, held as follows:

The suspension of the proclamation of the winning candidate pending an inquiry into irregularities brought to the attention of
the Commission on Elections was well within its administrative jurisdiction, in view of the exclusive authority conferred upon
it by the Constitution (Art. X ) for the administration and enforcement of all laws relative to elections. The Commission
certainly had the right to inquire whether or not discrepancies existed between the various copies of election returns for the
precincts in question, and suspend the canvass all the meantime so the parties could ask for a recount in case of variance ....'

What the respondent Commission on Elections did in the case now before Us is just what is contemplated in the abovequoted ruling of
this Court. The power of the Commission on Elections in this respect is simply administrative and supervisory — intended to secure the
proclamation of the winning candidate based on the true count of the votes cast. When the Commission on Elections exercises this power
the purpose is not for the Commission to help a candidate win the election but to bring about the canvass of the true results of the
elections as certified by the boards of election inspectors in every precinct. The object of the canvass is to determine the result of the
elections based on the official election returns. In order that the result of the canvass would reflect the true expression of the people's

23
will in the choice of their elective officials, the canvass must be based on true, genuine, correct, nay untampered, election returns. It is in
this proceedings that the Commission on Elections exercises its supervisory and administrative power in the enforcement of laws
relative to the conduct of elections, by seeing to it that the canvass is based on the election returns as actually certified by the members of
the board of inspectors. Once the Commission on Elections is convinced that the elections returns in the hands of the board of canvassers
do not constitute the proper basis in ascertaining the true result of the elections, it should be its concern, nay its duty, to order the taking
of such steps as may be necessary in order that the proper basis for the canvass is obtained or made available.

The election law requires the board of inspectors to prepare four copies of the election return in each precinct — one to be deposited in
the ballot box, one to be delivered to the municipal treasurer, one to be sent to the provincial treasurer, and one to be sent to the
Commission on Elections. In the case of the canvass of the election returns for candidates for provincial or national offices, the election
returns received by the provincial treasurer from the boards of inspectors are used. It is the duty of the provincial treasurer to turn over
to the provincial board of canvassers the election returns received by him from the boards of inspectors. If the Commission on Elections
is duly informed and it so finds, in appropriate proceedings, that the election returns in the hands of the provincial treasurer are
tampered, then the Commission should afford the candidate adversely affected by the tampering an opportunity to show that there exist
authentic copies of the same election returns which are not tampered. A recourse may be had to the copies received by the Commission
on Elections and to the copies received by the municipal treasurer. If it is shown, that the copies in the hands of the Commission on
Elections and of the municipal treasurer are similarly tampered as the copies in the hands of the provincial treasurer, then it becomes
evident that all the three copies of the election returns outside the ballot box do not constitute a reliable basis for a canvass. The only
copies left to be checked, whether they are also tampered or not, are the ones inside the ballot boxes. Certainly, the Commission on
Elections, in the exercise of its power to administer and enforce the laws relative to the conduct of elections, may order the opening of
the ballot boxes to ascertain whether the copy inside each ballot box is also tampered like the three copies outside the ballot box,
corresponding to each precinct. The Commission on Elections may do this on its own initiative, or upon petition by the proper party.
Once it is found that the copy of the election return inside the ballot box is untampered, the Commission on Elections would then have
accomplished two things, namely: (1) secured a basis for the prosecution for the violation of the laws relative to elections, and (2)
afforded the party aggrieved by the alteration of the election returns outside the ballot box a basis for a judicial recount of the votes as
provided for in Section 163 of the Revised Election Code. Thus, the Commission on Elections has thereby made available the proper and
reliable basis for the canvass of the votes that will lead to the proclamation by the board of canvassers of the true winner in the elections.
In so doing the Commission on Elections, as we have said, had performed its constitutional duty of administering and enforcing the laws
relative to the conduct of elections with a view to promoting clean and honest elections — the very purpose for which the Commission on
Elections was created by constitutional mandate.

In the case now before Us, the Commission on Elections issued the questioned resolution "after hearing the arguments of the petitioner
and the opposition thereto and considering that it has been clearly established that the copies of the election returns for the Municipal
Treasurer, for the Commission on Elections and for the Provincial Treasurer for the municipality of Sta. Cruz have uniform alteration in
the entries of the votes cast for representative showing different number of votes compared with the Liberal Party copies, while the
copies of the election returns for the Commission of Elections and the Provincial Treasurer for the municipalities of Candon and Santiago
have likewise uniform alterations and showing different numbers compared with the Liberal Party copies ..." 5Indeed, in the face of this
finding by the Commission on Elections, which indicates a clear violation of the election law, and which indicates an attempt to procure
the proclamation of the winner in the elections for Representative in the second congressional district of Ilocos Sur by the use of
tampered election returns, can the Commission on Elections be remiss in the performance of its duties as a constitutional body
committed with the exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections? The Revised
Election Code gives to the Commission on Elections the direct and immediate supervision over provincial, municipal and city officials
designated by law to perform duties relative to the conduct of elections — and included among these officials are members of the
provincial board of canvassers.6The provincial board of canvassers is enjoined by law to canvass all the votes cast for Representatives on
the basis of the election returns produced by the provincial treasurer. 7The Commission on Elections has a duty to enforce this law and it
has the duty to see to it that the election returns to be used for canvassing must be genuine and authentic, not falsified or tampered with.
Where the election returns produced by the provincial treasurer have been shown to have been tampered, and all the other copies
outside the ballot boxes have also been shown to have been tampered or falsified, it is certainly within the power of the Commission on
Elections to issue such order as would ascertain the existence of the genuine, authentic and untampered election returns, and thus open
the way for the summary recount of the votes, in accordance with law, for the purposes only of the canvass of the votes and the
proclamation of the candidate found to have obtained the highest number of votes. In the case now before Us, it is found by the
Commission on Elections that no other copies can be had except those deposited in the ballot boxes. Hence, the necessity for the
Commission to order the retrieving of the copies of the election returns from the ballot boxes. An order to this effect does not affect the
right to vote or the validity of any vote cast, so that it is perfectly within the power of the Commission on Elections to issue such an order
in the exercise of its exclusive power to administer and enforce the laws relative to the conduct of elections. It would indeed be absurd to
say that the Commission on Elections has a legal duty to perform and at the same time it is denied the necessary means to perform said
duty.

The purpose of the Revised Election Code is to protect the integrity of elections and to suppress all evils that may violate its purity and
defeat the will of the voters. 8The purity of the elections is one of the most fundamental requisites of popular government. 9The
Commission on Elections, by constitutional mandate, must do everything in its power to secure a fair and honest canvass of the votes cast
in the elections. In the performance of its duties, the Commission must be given a considerable latitude in adopting means and methods
that will insure the accomplishment of the great objective for which it was created — to promote free, orderly, and honest elections. The
choice of means taken by the Commission on Elections, unless they are clearly illegal or constitute grave abuse of discretion, should not
be interfered with.10Technicalities, which are not conducive to free, orderly and honest elections, but on the contrary may defeat the will
of the sovereign people as expressed in their votes, should not be allowed to hamper the Commission on Elections in the performance of
its duties. To sustain the petitioner in the present case is to deny the Commission on Elections the power to retrieve the copies of the

24
election returns from the ballot boxes in order that the true number of votes cast for a candidate may be known and thus permit a
canvass on the basis of election returns that are patently falsified. We cannot, and We must not, sanction the stand of petitioner.

As We have adverted to, the Commission on Elections has the power to inquire whether there exist discrepancies among the various
copies of the election returns.11Of all the copies prepared by the board of inspectors the copy least susceptible to being tampered with is
the one deposited in the ballot box. Where the three copies outside the ballot boxes appear to have been uniformly altered, there is no
plausible reason why the copy deposited in the ballot box may not be used to determine whether discrepancies exist in the various
copies. Inasmuch as the Commission on Elections has the right to determine whether said discrepancies exist, it must also have the right
to consult said returns, which cannot be done unless the ballot boxes are opened. It is noteworthy that the Revised Election Code does
not provide that it is the courts that have the power to order the opening of the ballot box in a situation like this.

Section 157 of the Revised Election Code, on which petitioner herein relies in support of his stand in the present case, authorizes the
opening of the ballot box whenever it is the subject of an official investigation. It provides:

The municipal treasurer shall keep the boxes unopened in his possession in a secure place and under his responsibility for
three months, unless they are the subject of an official investigation, or a component court or tribunal shall demand them
sooner, or the competent authority shall order their preservation for a longer time in connection with any pending contest or
investigation.

Under this section the ballot boxes may be opened in case there is an election contest. They may also be opened even if there is no
election contest when their contents have to be used as evidence in the prosecution of election frauds. 12Moreover, they may be opened
when they are the subject of any official investigation which may be ordered by a competent court or other competent authority. 13The
"competent authority" must include the Commission on Elections which is charged with the administration and enforcement of the laws
relative to the conduct of elections. In the instant case the Commission on Elections found that it has been clearly established that the
election returns outside the ballot boxes, in all the precincts in the municipalities of Candon, Santiago and Sta. Cruz, have been tampered
with. It is within the power of the Commission to order the investigation of that apparent anomaly that has connection with the conduct
of elections. The investigation may be in connection with the prosecution for the violations of the election laws and at the same time to
ascertain the condition of the election returns inside the ballot boxes as compared with the election returns outside the ballot boxes, for
the same precincts. The opening of the ballot boxes may, therefore, be prayed for by a candidate who is prejudiced by the apparent
falsification of the election returns outside the ballot boxes, and in ordering the opening of the ballot boxes the purpose of the
Commission is not to help a particular candidate win an election but to properly administer and enforce the laws relative to the conduct
of elections.

From what has been said We hold that the order of December 22, 1965, being questioned by the petitioner in the present case, was
perfectly within the power of the Commission on Elections to issue.

Wherefore, the petition for certiorari and prohibition in the present case is dismissed, with costs against the petitioner. It is so ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.

25
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
 
EN BANC
 
H. HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL R. BUTUYAN, ROMEL   G.R. No. 188456
R. BAGARES, ALLAN JONES F. LARDIZABAL, GILBERT  
T. ANDRES, IMMACULADA D. GARCIA, ERLINDA T.  
MERCADO, FRANCISCO A. ALCUAZ, MA. AZUCENA P. Present:
MACEDA, and ALVIN A. PETERS,  
Petitioners, PUNO,  C.J.,
- versus - QUISUMBING,*
  YNARES-SANTIAGO,
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, CARPIO,
Represented by HON. CHAIRMAN JOSE MELO, CORONA,
COMELEC SPECIAL BIDS and AWARDS COMMITTEE, CARPIO MORALES,
represented by its CHAIRMAN HON. FERDINAND CHICO-NAZARIO,
RAFANAN, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET and VELASCO, JR.,
MANAGEMENT, represented by HON. ROLANDO NACHURA,
ANDAYA, TOTAL INFORMATION MANAGEMENT LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
CORPORATION and SMARTMATIC INTERNATIONAL BRION,
CORPORATION, PERALTA,
Respondents. BERSAMIN,
  DEL CASTILLO, and
PETE QUIRINO-QUADRA, ABAD, JJ.
Petitioner-in-Intervention.  
   
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its  
President, JUAN PONCE ENRILE,  
Movant-Intervenor.  
   
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Promulgated:
September 10, 2009
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
 
VELASCO, JR., J.:
 
In a democratic system of government, the peoples voice is sovereign. Corollarily, choosing through the ballots
the men and women who are to govern the country is perhaps the highest exercise of democracy.  It is thus the interest of
the state to insure honest, credible and peaceful elections, where the sanctity of the votes and the secrecy of the ballots
are safeguarded, where the will of the electorate is not frustrated or undermined. For when the popular will itself is
subverted by election irregularities, then the insidious seeds of doubt are sown and the ideal of a peaceful and smooth
transition of power is placed in jeopardy. To automate, thus breaking away from a manual system of election, has been
viewed as a significant step towards clean and credible elections, unfettered by the travails of the long wait and cheating
that have marked many of our electoral exercises.
 
The Commission on Elections (Comelec), private respondents, the National Computer Center and other
computer wizards are confident that nationwide automated elections can be successfully implemented. Petitioners and
some skeptics in the information technology (IT) industry have, however, their reservations, which is quite
understandable. To them, the automated election system and the untested technology Comelec has chosen and set in

26
motion are pregnant with risks and could lead to a disastrous failure of elections. Comelec, they allege, would not be up to
the challenge. Cheating on a massive scale, but this time facilitated by a machine, is perceived to be a real possibility.
In this petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for a restraining order and/or preliminary
injunction, petitioners H. Harry L. Roque, Jr., et al., suing as taxpayers and concerned citizens, seek to nullify respondent
Comelecs award of the 2010 Elections Automation Project (automation project) to the joint venture of Total Information
Management Corporation (TIM) and Smartmatic International Corporation (Smartmatic) [1]and to permanently prohibit
the Comelec, TIM and Smartmatic from signing and/or implementing the corresponding contract-award.
 
By Resolution[2] of July 14, 2009, the Court directed the respondents as well as the University of the Philippines
(UP) Computer Center, National Computer Center (NCC) and Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines
(Infotech, hereinafter) to submit their collective or separate comments to the petition on or before July 24, 2009. Before
any of the comments could actually be filed, Atty. Pete Quirino-Quadra sought leave to intervene. In another resolution,
the Court allowed the intervention and admitted the corresponding petition-in-intervention. [3]
 
On July 29, 2009, the Court heard the principal parties in oral arguments which was followed by the submission
of their and the resource persons instructive, albeit clashing, memoranda. The Senate, through the Senate President,
would later join the fray via a Motion for Leave to Intervene. In a Resolution of August 25, 2009, the Court admitted the
Senates comment-in-intervention.
 
From the petition, the separate comments thereon, with their respective annexes, and other pleadings, as well as
from admissions during the oral arguments, the Court gathers the following facts:
 
On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted Republic Act No. (RA) 8436 authorizing the adoption of an automated
election system (AES) in the May 11, 1998 national and local elections and onwards. The 1998, 2001, and 2004 national
and local polls, however, came and went but purely manual elections were still the order of the day. On January 23, 2007,
the amendatory RA 9369[4] was passed authorizing anew the Comelec to use an AES. Of particular relevance are Sections 6
and 10 of RA 9369originally Secs. 5 and 8, respectively of RA 8436, as amendedeach defining Comelecs specific mandates
insofar as automated elections are concerned. The AES was not utilized in the May 10, 2000 elections, as funds were not
appropriated for that purpose by Congress and due to time constraints.
RA 9369 calls for the creation of the Comelec Advisory Council [5] (CAC). CAC is to recommend, among other
functions, the most appropriate, applicable and cost-effective technology to be applied to the AES. [6] To be created by
Comelec too is the Technical Evaluation Committee (TEC) [7]which is tasked to certify, through an established international
certification committee, not later than three months before the elections, by categorically stating that the AES, inclusive of
its hardware and software components, is operating properly and accurately based on defined and documented
standards.[8]
 
In August 2008, Comelec managed to automate the regional polls in the Autonomous Region of Muslim
Mindanao[9] (ARMM), using direct recording electronics (DRE) technology [10] in the province of Maguindanao; and the
optical mark reader/recording (OMR) system, particularly the Central Count Optical Scan (CCOS), [11] in the rest of ARMM.
[12]
 What scores hailed as successful automated ARMM 2008 elections paved the way for Comelec, with some prodding
from senators,[13] to prepare for a nationwide computerized run for the 2010 national/local polls, with the many lessons
learned from the ARMM experience influencing, according to the NCC, the technology selection for the 2010 automated
elections.[14]
 
Accordingly, in early March 2009, the Comelec released the Request for Proposal (RFP), also known as Terms of
Reference (TOR), for the nationwide automation of the voting, counting, transmission, consolidation and canvassing of
votes for the May 10, 2010 Synchronized National and Local Elections. What is referred to also in the RFP and other
contract documents as the 2010 Elections Automation Project (Automation Project) consists of three elaborate
components, as follows:
 
Component 1: Paper-Based AES.[15] 1-A. Election Management System (EMS); 1-B Precinct-Count Optic
Scan (PCOS) [16] System and 1-C. Consolidation/Canvassing System (CCS);
 
Component 2: Provision for Electronic Transmission of Election Results using Public Telecommunications Network; and
 
Component 3: Overall Project Management
 
And obviously to address the possibility of systems failure, the RFP required interested bidders to submit,
among other things: a continuity plan[17] and a back-up plan. [18]
 

27
 Under the two-envelope system designed under the RFP, [19] each participating bidder shall submit, as part of its
bid, an Eligibility Envelope[20]that should inter alia establish the bidders eligibility to bid. On the other hand, the second
envelope, or the Bid Envelope itself, shall contain two envelopes that, in turn, shall contain the technical proposal and the
financial proposal, respectively.[21]
 
Subsequently, the Comelec Special Bids and Awards Committee (SBAC), earlier constituted purposely for the
aforesaid project, caused the publication in different newspapers of the Invitation to Apply for Eligibility and to Bid[22]  for
the procurement of goods and services to be used in the automation project. [23] Meanwhile, Congress enacted RA 9525
appropriating some PhP 11.3 billion as supplemental budget for the May 10, 2010 automated national and local elections.
 
Of the ten (10) invitation-responding consortia which obtained the bid documents, only seven (7) submitted
sealed applications for eligibility and bids [24] which, per Bid Bulletin No. 24, were to be opened on a pre-set date, following
the convening of the pre-bid conference. Under the RFP, among those eligible to participate in the bidding are
manufacturers, suppliers and/or distributors forming themselves into a joint venture.  A joint venture is defined as a group
of two or more manufacturers, suppliers and/or distributors that intend to be jointly and severally responsible or liable for a
particular contract.[25]
 
Among the submitted bids was that of the joint venture (JV) of TIM and Smartmatic, the former incorporated
under the Corporation Code of the Philippines. Smartmatic, on the other hand, was organized under the laws of Barbados.
[26]
 For a stated amount, said JV proposed to undertake the whole automation project, inclusive of the delivery of 82,200
PCOS machines. After the conclusion of the eligibility evaluation process, only three consortia [27] were found and thus
declared as eligible. Further on, following the opening of the passing bidders Bid Envelope and evaluating the technical
and financial proposals therein contained, the SBAC, per its Res. No. 09-001, s.-2009, declared the above-stated bid of the
JV of TIM-Smartmatic as the single complying calculated bid.[28] As required by the RFP, the bid envelope contained an
outline of the joint ventures back-up and continuity or contingency plans, [29] in case of a systems breakdown or any such
eventuality which shall result in the delay, obstruction or nonperformance of the electoral process.
 
After declaring TIM-Smartmatic as the best complying bidder, the SBAC then directed the joint venture to
undertake post-qualification screening, and its PCOS prototype machinesthe Smarmatic Auditable Electronic System
(SAES) 1800to undergo end-to-end[30] testing to determine compliance with the pre-set criteria.
 
In its Memorandum of June 01, 2009, on the Subject: Systems Evaluation Consolidated Report and Status Report
on the Post-Qualification Evaluation Procedures,  the SBAC Technical Working Group (TWG) stated that it was undertaking
a 4-day (May 27 to May 30, 2009) test evaluation of TIM and Smartmatics proposed PCOS project machines. Its
conclusion: The demo systems presented PASSED all tests as required in the 26-item criteria specified in the [RFP] with
100% accuracy rating.[31] The TWG also validated the eligibility, and technical and financial qualifications of the TIM-
Smartmatic joint venture.
 
On June 9, 2009, Comelec, upon the recommendation of its SBAC, the CAC and other stakeholders, issued
Resolution No. (Res.) 8608[32]authorizing the SBAC to issue, subject to well-defined conditions, the notice of award and
notice to proceed in favor of the winning joint venture.
 
Soon after, TIM wrote Comelec expressing its desire to quit the JV partnership. In time, however, the parties
were able to patch up what TIM earlier described as irreconcilable differences between partners.
 
What followed was that TIM and Smartmatic, pursuant to the Joint Venture Agreement (JVA), [33] caused the
incorporation of a joint venture corporation (JVC) that would enter into a contract with the Comelec. On July 8, 2009, the
Securities and Exchange Commission issued a certificate of incorporation in favor of Smartmatic TIM Corporation. Two
days after, or on July 10, 2009, Comelec and Smartmatic TIM Corporation, as provider, executed a contract [34] for the lease
of goods and services under the contract for the contract amount of PhP 7,191,484,739.48, payable as the Goods and
Services are delivered and/or progress is made in accordance [with pre-set] Schedule of Payments. [35] On the same date,
a Notice to Proceed[36] was sent to, and received by, Smartmatic TIM Corporation.
 
Meanwhile, or on July 9, 2009, petitioners interposed the instant recourse which, for all intents and purposes,
impugns the validity and seeks to nullify the July 10, 2009 Comelec-Smartmatic-TIM Corporation automation contract
adverted to. Among others, petitioners pray that respondents be permanently enjoined from implementing the
automation project on the submission that:
PUBLIC RESPONDENTS COMELEC AND COMELEC-SBAC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN AWARDING THE 2010 ELECTIONS
AUTOMATION PROJECT TO PRIVATE RESPONDENTS TIM AND SMARTMATIC FOR THE FOLLOWING
REASONS:

28
 x x x COMELEC DID NOT CONDUCT ANY PILOT TESTING OF THE x x x PCOS MACHINES
OFFERED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS SMARTMATIC AND TIM, IN VIOLATION OF [RA] 8436
(AS AMENDED BY [RA] 9369)
THE [PCOS] MACHINES [THUS] OFFERED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS x x x DO NOT SATISFY
THE MINIMUM SYSTEM CAPABILITIES SET BY [RA] NO. 8436 (AS AMENDED BY [RA] 9369).
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS x x x DID NOT SUBMIT THE REQUIRED DOCUMENTS DURING THE
BIDDING PROCESS THAT SHOULD ESTABLISH THE DUE EXISTENCE, COMPOSITION, AND
SCOPE OF THEIR JOINT VENTURE, IN VIOLATION OF THE SUPREME COURTS HOLDING
IN INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY FOUNDATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. COMELEC (G.R. No.
159139, Jan. 13, 2004).
THERE WAS NO VALID JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT [JVA] BETWEEN PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS SMARTMATIC AND TIM DURING THE BIDDING, IN VIOLATION OF THE
SUPREME COURTS HOLDING IN INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY FOUNDATION OF THE
PHILIPPINES vs. COMELEC x x x WHICH REQUIRES A JOINT VENTURE TO INCLUDE A COPY
OF ITS [JVA] DURING THE BIDDING.
 
THE ALLEGED JOINT VENTURE COMPOSED OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS SMARTMATIC AND
TIM, DOES NOT SATISFY THE SUPREME COURTS DEFINITION OF A JOINT VENTURE
IN INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY FOUNDATION OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COMELEC  x x xWHICH
REQUIRES A COMMUNITY OF INTEREST IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THE SUBJECT MATTER.
 
Filed as it was before contract signing, the petition understandably did not implead Smartmatic TIM
Corporation, doubtless an indispensable party to these proceedings, an incident that did not escape Comelecs notice. [37]
 
As a preliminary counterpoint, either or both public and private respondents question the legal standing
or locus standi of petitioners, noting in this regard that the petition did not even raise an issue of transcendental
importance, let alone a constitutional question.
 
As an additional point, respondents also urge the dismissal of the petition on the ground of prematurity,
petitioners having failed to avail themselves of the otherwise mandatory built-in grievance mechanism under Sec. 55 in
relation to Sec. 58 of RA 9184, also known as the Government Procurement Reform Act, as shall be discussed shortly.
 
PROCEDURAL GROUNDS
 
The Court is not disposed to dismiss the petition on procedural grounds advanced by respondents.
 
Locus Standi and Prematurity
 
It is true, as postulated, that to have standing, one must, as a rule, establish having suffered some actual or
threatened injury as a result of the alleged illegal government conduct; that the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged
action; and that the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. [38] The prescription on standing, however, is a
matter of procedure. Hence, it may be relaxed, as the Court has often relaxed the rule for non-traditional plaintiffs, like
ordinary citizens and taxpayers, when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental
importance, of overarching significance to society, or of paramount public interest. [39] As we wrote in Chavez v. PCGG,
[40]
 where issues of public importance are presented, there is no necessity to show that the suitor has experienced or is in
actual danger of suffering direct and personal injury as the requisite injury is assumed.
 
Petitioners counsel, when queried, hedged on what specific constitutional proscriptions or concepts had been
infringed by the award of the subject automation project to Smartmatic TIM Corporation, although he was heard to say
that our objection to the system is anchored on the Constitution itself a violation   [sic]  of secrecy of voting and the sanctity of
the ballot.[41] Petitioners also depicted the covering automation contract as constituting an abdication by the Comelec of its
election-related mandate under the Constitution, which is to enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of
elections. Worse still, according to the petitioners, the abdication, with its anti-dummy dimension, is in favor of a foreign
corporation that will be providing the hardware and software requirements. [42] And when pressed further, petitioners
came out with the observation that, owing in part to the sheer length of the ballot, the PCOS would not comply with Art. V,
Sec. 2 of the Constitution[43] prescribing secrecy of voting and sanctity of the ballot. [44]
 
There is no doubt in our mind, however, about the compelling significance and the transcending public
importance of the one issue underpinning this petition: the successand the far-reaching grim implications of the failureof
the nationwide automation project that will be implemented via the challenged automation contract.
 

29
 The doctrinal formulation may vary, but the bottom line is that the Court may except a particular case from the
operations of its rules when the demands of justice so require. [45] Put a bit differently, rules of procedure are merely tools
designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. [46]Accordingly, technicalities and procedural barriers should not be allowed
to stand in the way, if the ends of justice would not be subserved by a rigid adherence to the rules of procedure. [47] This
postulate on procedural technicalities applies to matters of locus standi and the presently invoked principle of hierarchy
of courts, which discourages direct resort to the Court if the desired redress is within the competence of lower courts to
grant. The policy on the hierarchy of courts, which petitioners indeed failed to observe, is not an iron-clad rule. For indeed
the Court has full discretionary power to take cognizance and assume jurisdiction of special civil actions for  certiorari and
mandamus filed directly with it for exceptionally compelling reasons [48] or if warranted by the nature of the issues clearly
and specifically raised in the petition.[49]
 
The exceptions that justify a deviation from the policy on hierarchy appear to obtain under the premises. The
Court will for the nonce thus turn a blind eye to the judicial structure intended, first and foremost, to provide an orderly
dispensation of justice.
 
 
Hierarchy of Courts
 
At this stage, we shall dispose of another peripheral issue before plunging into the core substantive issues
tendered in this petition.
 
Respondents contend that petitioners should have availed themselves of the otherwise mandatory protest
mechanism set forth in Sections 55 and 58 of the procurement law (RA 9184) and the counterpart provisions found in its
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR)-A before seeking judicial remedy. Insofar as relevant, Sec. 55 of RA 9184
provides that decisions of the bids and awards committee (BAC) in all stages of procurement may be protested, via
a verified position paper, to the head of the procuring agency. On the other hand, the succeeding Sec. 58 states that court
action may be resorted to only after the protest contemplated in Sec. 55 shall have been completed. Petitioners except. As
argued, the requirement to comply with the protest mechanism, contrary to what may have been suggested in Infotech,  is
imposed on the bidders.[50]
 
Petitioners position is correct. As a matter of common sense, only a bidder is entitled to receive a notice of the
protested BAC action. Only a losing bidder would be aggrieved by, and  ergo would have the personality to challenge, such
action. This conclusion finds adequate support from the ensuing provisions of the aforesaid IRR-A:
 
55.2. The verified position paper shall contain the following documents:
a)      The name of bidder;
b)      The office address of the bidder x x x.
 
 
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
 
We now turn to the central issues tendered in the petition which, in terms of subject matter, revolved around
two concerns, viz: (1) the Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) of Smartmatic and TIM; and (2) the PCOS machines to be used.
Petitioners veritably introduced another issue during the oral arguments, as amplified in their memorandum, i.e. the
constitutionality and statutory flaw of the automation contract itself. The petition-in-intervention confined itself to
certain features of the PCOS machines.
 
The Joint Venture Agreement: Its Existence and Submission
 
The issue respecting the existence and submission of the TIM-Smartmatic JVA does not require an extended
disquisition, as repairing to the records would readily provide a satisfactory answer.  We note in fact that the petitioners
do not appear to be earnestly pressing the said issue anymore, as demonstrated by their counsels practically cavalier
discussion thereof during the oral argument. When reminded, for instance, of private respondents insistence on having in
fact submitted their JVA dated April 23, 2009, petitioners counsel responded as follows: We knew your honor that there
was, in fact, a joint venture agreement filed. However, because of the belated discovery that [there] were irreconcilable
differences, we then made a view that this joint venture agreement was a sham, at best pro forma because it did not contain
all the required stipulations in order to evidence unity of interest  x x x.[51]
 
Indeed, the records belie petitioners initial posture that TIM and Smartmatic, as joint venture partners, did not
include in their submitted eligibility envelope a copy of their JVA. The SBACs  Post Qualification Evaluation Report
(Eligibility)  on TIM-Smartmatic, on page 10, shows the following entry: Valid Joint Venture Agreement, stating among

30
things, that the members are jointly and severally liable for the whole obligation, in case of joint venture Documents verified
compliance.[52]
 
Contrary to what the petitioners posit, the duly notarized JVA, as couched, explained the nature and the limited
purpose[53] of the joint venture and expressly defined, among other things, the composition, scope, and the 60-40 capital
structure of the aggroupment. [54] The JVA also contains provisions on the management [55] and division of profits. [56] Article
3[57] of the JVA delineates the respective participations and responsibilities of the joint venture partners in the automation
project.
 
Given the foregoing perspective, the Court is at a loss to understand how petitioners can assert that the
Smartmatic-TIM consortium has failed to prove its joint venture existence and/or to submit evidence as would enable the
Comelec to know such items as who it is dealing with, which between the partners has control over the decision-making
process, the amount of investment to be contributed by each partner, the parties shares in the profits and like details. Had
petitioners only bothered to undertake the usual due diligence that comes with good judgment and examined the
eligibility envelope of the Smartmatic-TIM joint venture, they would have discovered that their challenge to and
arguments against the joint venture and its JVA have really no factual basis.
 
It may be, as petitioners observed, that the TIM-Smartmatic joint venture remained an unincorporated
aggroupment during the bid-opening and evaluation stages. It ought to be stressed, however, that the fact of non-
incorporation was without a vitiating effect on the validity of the tender offers. For the bidding ground rules, as spelled
out primarily in the RFP and the clarificatory bid bulletins, does not require, for bidding purposes, that there be an
incorporation of the bidding joint ventures or consortiums. In fact, Bid Bulletin Nos. 19 and 20 recognize the existence
and the acceptability of proposals of unincorporated joint ventures. In response to a poser, for example, regarding the
60% Filipino ownership requirement in a joint venture arrangement, the SBAC, in its Bid Bulletin No. 22, stated: In
an unincorporated joint venture, determination of the required Filipino participation may be made by examining the
terms and conditions of the [JVA] and other supporting financial documents submitted by the joint venture. (Emphasis
ours.)Petitioners, to be sure, have not shown that incorporation is part of the pass/fail criteria used in determining
eligibility.
 
Petitioners have made much of the Courts ruling in Information Technology Foundation of
the  Philippines  [Infotech] v. Comelec,[58] arguing in relation thereto that the partnership of Smartmatic and TIM does not
meet the Courts definition of a joint venture which requires community of interest in the performance of the subject matter.
 
Petitioners invocation of Infotech is utterly misplaced. Albeit Infotech and this case are both about modernizing the
election process and bidding joint ventures, the relevant parallelism ends there. Cast as they are against dissimilar factual
milieu, one cannot plausibly set Infotech side with and contextually apply to this case  the ratio of Infotech. Suffice it to
delve on the most glaring of differences. In Infotech, the winning bid pertained to the consortium of Mega Pacific, a
purported joint venture. Extant records, however, do not show the formation of such joint venture, let alone its
composition. To borrow from the ponencia  of then Justice, later Chief Justice, Artemio Panganiban, there is no sign
whatsoever of any [JVA], consortium agreement [or] memorandum agreement  x x x executed among the members of the
purported consortium.[59] There was in fine no evidence to show that the alleged joint venture partners agreed to
constitute themselves into a single entity solidarily responsible for the entirety of the automation contract. Unlike the
purported Mega Pacific consortium in Infotech, the existence in this case of the bidding joint venture of Smarmatic and
TIM is properly documented and spread all over the bid documents. And to stress, TIM and Smartmatic, in their JVA,
unequivocally agreed between themselves to perform their respective undertakings. And over and beyond their
commitments to each other, they undertook to incorporate, if called for by the bidding results, a JVC that shall be
solidarily liable with them for any actionable breach of the automation contract.
 
In Infotech, the Court chastised the Comelec for dealing with an entity, the full identity of which the poll body knew
nothing about. Taking a cue from this holding, petitioners tag the TIM-Smartmatic JVA as flawed and as one that would
leave the Comelec hanging for the non-inclusion, as members of the joint venture, of three IT providers. The three
referred to are Jarltech International, Inc. (Jarltech), a subsidiary of Smartmatic that manufactures the Smartmatic voting
machines; Dominion Voting Systems (Domino), the inventor of said PCOS machines; and 2GO Transportation System
Corporation (2GO), the subcontractor responsible for the distribution of the PCOS machines throughout the country.
 
Petitioners beef against the TIM-Smartmatic JVA is untenable. First off, the Comelec knows the very entities whom they
are dealing with, which it can hold solidary liable under the automation contract, should there be contract violation.
Secondly, there is no requirement under either RA 8436, as amended, or the RFP, that all the suppliers, manufacturers or
distributors involved in the transaction should be part of the joint venture. On the contrary, the Instruction to Biddersas
petitioners themselves admit[60]allows the bidder to subcontract portions of the goods or services under the automation
project.[61]

31
 
To digress a bit, petitioners have insisted on the non-existence of a bona fide JVA between TIM and Smarmatic. Failing to
gain traction for their indefensible posture, they would thrust on the Court the notion of an invalid joint venture due to
the non-inclusion of more companies in the existing TIM-Smartmatic joint venture. The irony is not lost on the Court.
This brings us to the twin technical issues tendered herein bearing on the PCOS machines of Smartmatic.
 
At its most basic, the petition ascribes grave abuse of discretion to the Comelec for, among other things,
awarding the automation project in violation of RA 8436, as amended. Following their line, no pilot test of the PCOS
technology Smartmatic-TIM offered has been undertaken; hence, the Comelec cannot conduct a nationwide automation of
the 2010 polls using the machines thus offered. Hence, the contract award to Smartmatic-TIM with their untested PCOS
machines violated RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369, which mandates that with respect to the May 2010 elections and
onwards, the system procured must have been piloted in at least 12 areas referred to in Sec. 6 of RA 8436, as
amended. What is more, petitioners assert, private respondents PCOS machines do not satisfy the minimum system
capabilities set by the same law envisaged to ensure transparent and credible voting, counting and canvassing of votes.
And as earlier narrated, petitioners would subsequently add the abdication angle in their bid to nullify the automation
contract.
 
Pilot Testing Not Necessary
 
Disagreeing, as to be expected, private respondents maintain that there is nothing in the applicable law
requiring, as a pre-requisite for the 2010 election automation project award, that the prevailing bidders automation
system, the PCOS in this case, be subjected to pilot testing. Comelec echoes its co-respondents stance on pilot testing, with
the added observation that nowhere in the statutory provision relied upon are the words pilot testing used. [62] The
Senates position and its supporting arguments match those of private respondents.
 
The respondents thesis on pilot testing and the logic holding it together are well taken. There can be no
argument about the phrase pilot test not being found in the law. But does it necessarily follow that a pilot test is
absolutely not contemplated in the law? We repair to the statutory provision petitioners cited as requiring a pilot run,
referring to Sec. 6 of RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369, reading as follows:
 
Sec. 5.  Authority to use an Automated Election System.- To carry out the above stated-policy,
the [Comelec], x x x is hereby authorized to use an automated election system or systems in the same
election in different provinces, whether paper-based or a direct recording electronic election system as
it may deem appropriate and practical for the process of voting, counting of votes and
canvassing/consolidation and transmittal of results of electoral exercises: Provided, that for the
regular national and local elections, which shall be held immediately after the effectivity of this
Act, the AES shall be used in at least two highly urbanized cities and two provinces each in
Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao to be chosen by the [Comelec]: Provided, further, That local
government units whose officials have been the subject of administrative charges within sixteen (16)
month prior to the May 14, 2007 elections shall not be chosen. Provided, finally, That no area shall be
chosen without the consent of the Sanggunian of the local government unit concerned. The term local
government unit as used in this provision shall refer to a highly urbanized city or province. In
succeeding regular national or local elections, the AES shall be implemented. (Emphasis and
underscoring added.)
 
RA 9369, which envisages an AES, be it paper-based or direct-recording electronic, took effect in the second
week of February 2007 or thereabout. [63] The regular national and local elections referred to after the effectivity of this
Act can be no other than the May 2007 regular elections, during which time the AES shall, as the law is worded, be used in
at least two highly urbanized cities and provinces in Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao. The Court takes judicial notice that the
May 2007 elections did not deploy AES, evidently due to the mix of time and funding constraints.
To the petitioners, the underscored portion of the aforequoted Sec. 6 of RA 8436 is the pilot-testing provision
that Comelec failed to observe.
 
We are not persuaded.
 
From the practical viewpoint, the pilot testing of the technology in question in an actual, scheduled electoral
exercise under harsh conditions would have been the ideal norm in computerized system implementation. The
underscored proviso of Sec. 6 of RA 8436 is not, however, an authority for the proposition that the pilot testing of the
PCOS in the 2007 national elections in the areas thus specified is an absolute must for the machines use in the 2010
national/local elections. The Court can concede that said proviso, with respect to the May 2007 elections, commands the
Comelec to automate in at least 12 defined areas of the country. But the bottom line is that the required 2007 automation,

32
be it viewed in the concept of a pilot test or not, is not a mandatory requirement for the choice of system in, or a
prerequisite for, the full automation of the May 2010 elections.
 
As may be noted, Sec. 6 of RA 8436 may be broken into three essential parts, the first partaking of the nature of a
general policy declaration: that Comelec is authorized to automate the entire elections. The second part states that for the
regular national and local elections that shall be held in May 2007, Comelec shall use the AES, with an option, however, to
undertake automation, regardless of the technology to be selected, in a limited area or, to be more precise, in at least two
highly urbanized cities and two provinces each in Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao to be chosen by the Comelec. On the
other hand, the last part, phrased sans reference to the May 2007 elections, commands thus: [I]n  succeeding regular
national or local elections, the [automated election system] shall be implemented. Taken in its proper context, the last
part is indicative of the legislative intent for the May 2010 electoral exercise to be fully automated, regardless of whether
or not pilot testing was run in the 2007 polls.
 
To argue that pilot testing is a condition precedent to a full automation in 2010 would doubtless undermine the
purpose of RA 9369. For, as aptly observed during the oral arguments, if there was no political exercise in May 2007, the
country would theoretically be barred forever from having full automation.
 
Sec. 6 of the amended RA 8436, as couched, therefore, unmistakably conveys the idea of unconditional full
automation in the 2010 elections. A construal making pilot testing of the AES a prerequisite or condition  sine qua non to
putting the system in operation in the 2010 elections is tantamount to reading into said section something beyond the
clear intention of Congress, as expressed in the provision itself. We reproduce with approval the following excerpts from
the comment of the Senate itself:
 
The plain wordings of RA 9369 (that amended RA 8436) commands that the 2010 elections
shall be fully automated, and such full automation is not conditioned on pilot testing in the May 2007
elections. Congress merely gave COMELEC the flexibility to partially use the AES in some parts of the
country for the May 2007 elections.[64]
 
Lest it be overlooked, an AES is not synonymous to and ought not to be confused with the PCOS. Sec. 2(a) of RA
8436, as amended, defines an AES as a system using appropriate technology which has been demonstrated in the voting,
counting, consolidating, canvassing and transmission of election results, and other electoral processes. On the other hand,
PCOS refers to a technology wherein an optical ballot scanner, into which optical scan paper ballots marked by hand by
the voter are inserted to be counted.[65] What may reasonably be deduced from these definitions is that PCOS is merely
one of several automated voting, counting or canvassing technologies coming within the term AES, implying in turn that
the automated election system or technology that the Comelec shall adopt in future elections need not, as a matter of
mandatory arrangement, be piloted in the adverted two highly urbanized cities and provinces.
 
In perspective, what may be taken as mandatory prerequisite for the full automation of the 2010 regular
national/ local elections is that the system to be procured for that exercise be a technology tested either here or abroad.
The ensuing Section 8 of RA 8436, as amended, says so.
 
SEC 12. Procurement of Equipment and Materials. To achieve the purpose of this Act, the
Commission is authorized to procure, xxx, by purchase, lease, rent or other forms of acquisition,
supplies, equipment, materials, software, facilities, and other services, from local or foreign sources
xxx. With respect to the May 10, 2010 elections and succeeding electoral exercises, the system
procured must have demonstrated capability and been successfully used in prior electoral
exercise here or abroad. Participation in the 2007 pilot exercise shall not be conclusive of the
systems fitness. (Emphasis supplied).
 
While the underscored portion makes reference to a 2007 pilot exercise, what it really exacts is that, for the automation of
the May 2010 and subsequent elections, the PCOS or any AES to be procured must have demonstrated its capability and
success in either a local or a foreign electoral exercise. And as expressly declared by the provision, participation in the
2007 electoral exercise is not a guarantee nor is it conclusive of the systems fitness.  In this regard, the Court is inclined to
agree with private respondents interpretation of the underscored portion in question: The provision clearly conveys that
the [AES] to be used in the 2010 elections need not have been used in the 2007 elections, and that the demonstration of
its capability need not be in a previous Philippine election. Demonstration of the success and capability of the PCOS may
be in an electoral exercise in a foreign jurisdiction. [66] As determined by the Comelec, the PCOS system had been
successfully deployed in previous electoral exercises in foreign countries, such as  Ontario,Canada; and New York, USA,
[67]
 albeit Smartmatic was not necessarily the system provider. But then, RA 9369 does not call for the winning bidder of
the 2010 automation project and the deploying entity/provider in the foreign electoral exercise to be one and the same

33
entity. Neither does the law incidentally require that the system be first used in an archipelagic country or with a
topography or a voting population similar to or approximating that of the Philippines.
 
At any event, any lingering doubt on the issue of whether or not full automation of the 2010 regular elections
can validly proceed without a pilot run of the AES should be put to rest with the enactment in March 2009 of RA 9525,
[68]
 in which Congress appropriated PhP 11.301 billion to automate the 2010 elections, subject to compliance with the
transparency and accuracy requirements in selecting the relevant technology of the machines, thus:
Sec. 2. Use of Funds. x x x Provided, however, That disbursement of the amounts herein appropriated or
any part thereof shall be authorized only in strict compliance with the Constitution, the provisions of
[RA] No. 9369 and other election laws incorporated in said Act as to ensure the conduct of a free,
orderly, clean, honest and credible election and shall adopt such measures that will guaranty
transparency and accuracy in the selection of the relevant technology of the machines to be used on
May 10, 2010 automated national and local elections. (Emphasis added.)
 
It may safely be assumed that Congress approved the bill that eventually became RA 9525, fully aware that the system
using the PCOS machines were not piloted in the 2007 electoral exercise. The enactment of RA 9525 is to us a compelling
indication that it was never Congress intent to make the pilot testing of a particular automated election system in the
2007 elections a condition precedent to its use or award of the 2010 Automation Project. The comment-in-intervention of
the Senate says as much.
Further, the highly charged issue of whether or not the 2008 ARMM electionscovering, as NCC observed, three
conflict-ridden island provincesmay be treated as substantial compliance with the pilot test requirement must be
answered in the affirmative. No less than Senator Richard J. Gordon himself, the author of the law, said that the system has
been tried and tested in the ARMM elections last year, so we have to proceed with the total implementation of the law. [69]
 
We note, though, the conflicting views of the NCC [70] and ITFP[71] on the matter. Suffice it to state at this juncture
that the system used in the 2008 ARMM election exercise bears, as petitioners to an extent grudgingly admit,  [72] a
similarity with the PCOS. The following, lifted from the Comelecs comment, is to us a fair description of how the two
systems (PCOS and CCOS) work and where the difference lies:
xxx the elections in the [ARMM] utilized the Counting Center Optical Scan (CCOS), a system which uses
the Optical Mark Reader (OMR), the same technology as the PCOS.
 
Under the CCOS, the voters cast their votes by shading or marking the circles in the paper
ballots which corresponded to the names of their chosen candidates [like in PCOS]. Thereafter, the
ballot boxes were brought to the counting centers where they were scanned, counted and canvassed.
 
xxx Under the PCOS, the counting, consolidation and canvassing of the votes are done at the precinct level.  The
election results at the precincts are then electronically transmitted to the next level, and so on. xxx
PCOS dispenses with the physical transportation of ballot boxes from the precincts to the
counting centers.[73]
 
 
Moreover, it has been proposed that a partial automation be implemented for the May 2010 elections in accordance with
Section 5 of RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369 instead of full automation.  The Court cannot agree as such proposition has
no basis in law. Section 5, as worded, does not allow for partial automation. In fact, Section 5 clearly states that the
AES shall be implemented nationwide.[74] It behooves this Court to follow the letter and intent of the law for full
automation in the May 2010 elections.
 
PCOS Meets Minimum Capabilities Standards
As another ground for the nullification of the automation contract, petitioners posit the view that the PCOS machines do
not satisfy the minimum system capabilities prescribed by RA 8436, as amended. To a specific point, they suggest that the
PCOS system offered and accepted lacks the features that would assure accuracy in the recording and reading of votes, as
well as in the tabulation, consolidation/canvassing, electronic transmission, storage results and accurate ballot counting.
[75]
 In this particular regard, petitioners allege that, based on Smartmatics website, the PCOS has a margin of error of from
2% to 10%, way beyond that of the required 99.99% accuracy in the counting of votes. [76]
 
The minimum system capabilities provision cited is Sec. 7 of RA 8436, as amended, and the missing features
referred to by petitioners are pars. (b) and (j). In full, Sec. 7 of RA 8436, as amended, reads:
 
SEC. 6. Minimum System Capabilities. - The automated election system must at least have the
following functional capabilities:
 

34
 (a)    Adequate security against unauthorized access;
(b)   Accuracy in recording and reading of votes as well as in the tabulation,
consolidation/canvassing, electronic transmission, and storage of results;
(c)    Error recovery in case of non-catastrophic failure of device;
(d)   System integrity which ensures physical stability and functioning of the vote recording
and counting process;
(e)    Provision for voter verified paper audit trail;
(f)    System auditability which provides supporting documentation for verifying the
correctness of reported election results;
(g)   An election management system for preparing ballots and programs for use in the
casting and counting of votes and to consolidate, report and display election result in the
shortest time possible;
(h)   Accessibility to illiterates and disabled voters;
(i)     Vote tabulating program for election, referendum or plebiscite;
(j)     Accurate ballot counters;
(k)   Data retention provision;
(l)     Provide for the safekeeping, storing and archiving of physical or paper resource used in
the election process;
(m) Utilize or generate official ballots as herein defined;
(a)    Provide the voter a system of verification to find out whether or not the machine has
registered his choice; and
(o) Configure access control for sensitive system data and function.
 
In the procurement of this system, the Commission shall develop and adopt an evaluation system to
ascertain that the above minimum system capabilities are met. The evaluation system shall be
developed with the assistance of an advisory council.
From the records before us, the Court is fairly satisfied that the Comelec has adopted a rigid technical evaluation
mechanism, a set of 26-item/check list criteria, as will be enumerated shortly, to ensure compliance with the above
minimum systems capabilities.
 
The SBAC Memorandum[77] of June 03, 2009, as approved by Comelec Res. 8608, [78] categorically stated that the SBAC-
TWG submitted its report that TIM/Smartmatics proposed systems and machines PASSED all the end-to-end demo tests
using the aforementioned 26-item criteria, inclusive of the accuracy rating test of at least 99.955%. As appearing in the
SBAC-TWG report, the corresponding answers/remarks to each of the 26 individual items are as herein indicated: [79]
 

ITEM REQUIREMENT REMARK/DESCRIPTION

1 Does the system allow manual feeding of a ballot Yes. The proposed PCOS machine accepted the test
into the PCOS machine? ballots which were manually fed one at a time.
2 Does the system scan a ballot sheet at the speed Yes. A 30-inch ballot was used in this test.
of at least 2.75 inches per second? Scanning the 30-inch ballot took 2.7 seconds,
which translated to 11.11inches per second.
3 Is the system able to capture and store in an Yes the system captured the images of the 1,000
encrypted format the digital images of the ballot ballots in encrypted format. Each of the 1,000
for at least 2,000 ballot sides (1,000 ballots, with images filescontained the images of the front and
back to back printing)? back sides of the ballot, totaling to 2,000 ballot
side.
 
To verify the captured ballot images, decrypted
copies of the encrypted files were also provided.
The same were found to be digitized
representations of the ballots cast.
4 Is the system a fully integrated single device as Yes. The proposed PCOS is a fully integrated single
described in item no. 4 of Component 1-B? device, with built-in printer and built-in data
communications ports (Ethernet and USB).
5 Does the system have a scanning resolution of at Yes. A portion of a filled up marked oval was blown
least 200 dpi? up using image editor software to reveal the

35
 number of dots per inch. The sample image
showed 200 dpi.
 
File properties of the decrypted image file also
revealed 200 dpi.
6 Does the system scan in grayscale? Yes. 30 shades of gray were scanned in the test
PCOS machine, 20 of which were required,
exceeding the required 4-bit/16 levels of gray as
specified in the Bid Bulletin No. 19.
7 Does the system require authorization and
Yes. The system required the use of a security key
authentication of all operators, such as, but not
with different sets ofpasswords/PINs for
limited to, usernames and passwords, with
Administrator and Operator users.
multiple user access levels?
8 Does the system have an electronic display? Yes. The PCOS machine makes use of an LCD
display to show information:
 
                  if a ballot may be inserted into the
machine;
                  if a ballot is being processed; if a ballot is
being rejected;
                  on other instructions and information to
the voter/operator.
9 Does the system employ error handling Yes. The PCOS showed error messages on its
procedures, including, but not limited to, the use screen whenever a ballot isrejected by the
of error prompts and other related instructions? machine and gives instructions to the voter on
what to do next, or when there was a ballot jam
error.
10 Does the system count the voters vote as Yes. The two rounds of tests were conducted for
marked on the ballot with an accuracy rating of this test using only valid marks/shades on the
at least 99.995%? ballots. 20,000 marks were required to complete
this test, with only one (1) allowable reading error.
 
625 ballots with 32 marks each were used for this
test. During the comparison of the PCOS-generated
results with the manually
prepared/predetermined results, it was found out
that there were seven (7) marks which were
inadvertently missed out during ballot preparation
by the TWG. Although the PCOS-generated results
turned out to be 100% accurate, the 20,000-mark
was not met thereby requiring the test to be
repeated.
 
To prepare for other possible missed out
marks,650 ballots with (20,800 marks) were used
for the next round of test, which also yielded 100%
accuracy.
11 Does the system detect and reject fake or Yes. This test made use of one (1) photocopied
spurious, and previously scanned ballots? ballot and one (1) re-created ballot. Both were
rejected by the PCOS.
12 Does the system scan both sides of a ballot and Yes. Four (4) ballots with valid marks were fed
in any orientation in one pass? into the PCOS machine in the four (4) portrait
orientations specified in Bid Bulletin No. 4 (either
back or front, upside down or right side up), and
all were accurately captured.
13 Does the system have necessary safeguards to Yes. The system was able to recognize if the
determine the authenticity of a ballot, such as, security features on the ballot are missing.
but not limited to, the use of bar codes,  
holograms, color shifting ink, micro printing, to Aside from the test on the fake or spurious ballots
be provided on the ballot, which can be (Item No. 11), three (3) test ballots with tampered

36
 recognized by the system? bar codesand timing marks were used and were all
rejected by the PCOS machine.
 
The photocopied ballot in the test for Item No. 11
was not able to replicate the UV ink pattern on top
portion of the ballot causing the rejection of the
ballot.
14 Are the names of the candidates pre-printed on Yes. The Two sample test ballots of different
the ballot? lengths were provided: one (1) was 14
inches long while the other was 30 inches
long. Both were 8.5 inches wide.
 
The first showed 108 pre-printed candidate names
for the fourteen (14) contests/positions,
including two (2) survey questions on
gender and age group, and a plebiscite
question.
 
The other showed 609 pre-printed candidate
names, also for fourteen (14)
positions including three (3) survey
questions.
15 Does each side of the ballot sheet accommodate Yes. The 30-inch ballot, which was used to test
at least 300 names of candidates with a Item No. 2, contained 309 names for the national
minimum font size of 10, in addition to other positions and 300 names for local positions. The
mandatory information required by law? total pre-printed names on the ballot totaled 609.
 
This type of test ballot was also used for test voting
by the public, including members of the
media.
 
Arial Narrow, font size 10, was used in the printing
of the candidate names.
16 Does the system recognize full shade marks on Yes. The ballots used for the accuracy test (Item
the appropriate space on the ballot opposite the No. 10), which made use of full shade marks, were
name of the candidate to be voted for? also used in this test and were accurately
recognized by the PCOS machine.
17 Does the system recognize partial shade marks Yes. Four (4) test ballots were used with one (1)
on the appropriate space on the ballot opposite mark each per ballot showing the following pencil
the name of the candidate to be voted for? marks:
 
   top half shade;
   bottom half shade;
   left half shade; and
   right half shade
 
These partial shade marks were all recognized by
the PCOS machine
18 Does the system recognize check ()marks on the Yes. One (1) test ballot with one check () mark,
appropriate space on the ballot opposite the using a pencil, was used for this test.
name of the candidate to be voted for? The mark was recognized successfully.
19 Does the system recognize x marks on the Yes. One (1) test ballot with one x mark, using a
appropriate space on the ballot opposite the pencil, was used for this test.
name of the candidate to be voted for? The mark was recognized successfully.
20 Does the system recognize both pencil and ink Yes. The 1000 ballots used in the accuracy test
marks on the ballot? (Item No. 10) were marked using the proposed
marking pen by the bidder.
 
A separate ballot with one (1) pencil mark was
also tested. This mark was also recognized by the

37
 PCOS machine. Moreover, the tests for Items No.
17, 18 and 19 were made using pencil marks on
the ballots.
21 In a simulation of a system shut down, does the Yes. Five (5) ballots were used in this test. The
system have error recovery features? power cord was pulled from the PCOS while the
3rd ballot was in the middle of the scanning
procedure, such that it was left hanging in the
ballot reader.
 
After resumption of regular power supply, the
PCOS machine was able to restart successfully with
notification to the operator that there were two (2)
ballots already cast in the machine. The hanging
3rd ballot was returned to the operator and was
able to be re-fed into the PCOS machine. The marks
on all five (5) were all accurately recognized.
22 Does the system have transmission and Yes. The PCOS was able to transmit to the CCS
consolidation/canvassing capabilities? during the end-to-end demonstration using GLOBE
prepaid Internet kit.
23 Does the system generate a backup copy of the Yes. The PCOS saves a backup copy of the ERs,
generated reports, in a removable data storage ballot images, statistical report and audit log into a
device? Compact Flash (CF) Card.
24 Does the system have alternative power sources, Yes. A 12 bolt 18AH battery lead acid was used in
which will enable it to fully operate for at least this test. The initial test had to be repeated due to a
12 hours? short circuit, after seven (7) hours from start-up
without ballot scanning. This was explained by
TIM-Smartmatic to be caused by non-compatible
wiring of the battery to the PCOS. A smaller wire
than what is required was inadvertently used,
likening the situation to incorrect wiring of a car
battery. Two (2) COMELEC electricians were called
to confirm TIM-Smartmatics explanation. The
PCOS machine was connected to regular power
and started successfully. The following day, the re-
test was completed in 12 hours and 40 minutes
xxx 984 ballots were fed into the machine. The ER,
as generated by the PCOS was compared with
predetermined result, showed 100% accuracy.
25 Is the system capable of generating and printing Yes. The PCOS prints reports via its built-in printer
reports? which includes:
1. Initialization Report; 2. Election Returns (ER); 3.
PCOS Statistical Report; 4. Audit Log.
26 Did the bidder successfully demonstrate EMS, Yes. An end-to-end demonstration of all proposed
voting counting, consolidation/canvassing and systems was presented covering: importing of
transmission? election data into the EMS; creation of election
configuration data for the PCOS and the CCS using
EMS; creation of ballot faces using EMS;
configuring the PCOS and the CCS using the EMS-
generated election configuration file; initialization,
operation, generation of reports and backup using
the PCOS; electronic transmission of results to the:
[1] from the PCOS to city/municipal CCS and the
central server. [2] from the city/municipal CCS to
the provincial CCS. [3] from the provincial CCS to
the national CCS; receipt and canvass of
transmitted results: [1] by the city/municipal CCS
from the PCOS. [2] by the provincial CCS from the
city/municipal CCS. [3] by the national CCS from
the provincial CCS; receipt of the transmittal
results by the central server from the PCOS.

38
 
Given the foregoing and absent empirical evidence to the contrary, the Court,  presuming regularity in the
performance of regular duties, takes the demo-testing thus conducted by SBAC-TWG as a reflection of the capability of the
PCOS machines, although the tests, as Comelec admits, [80] were done literally in the Palacio del Governador building, where
a room therein simulated a town, the adjoining room a city, etc. Perusing the RFP, however, the real worth of the PCOS
system and the machines will of course come after they shall have been subjected to the gamut of acceptance tests
expressly specified in the RFP, namely, the lab test, field test, mock election test, transmission test and, lastly, the final test
and sealing procedure of all PCOS and CCS units using the actual Election Day machine configuration. [81]
 
Apropos the counting-accuracy feature of the PCOS machines, petitioners no less impliedly admit that the web
page they appended to their petition, showing a 2% to 10% failing rate, is no longer current. [82] And if they bothered to
examine the current website of Smartmatic specifically dealing with its SAES 1800, the PCOS system it offered, they would
have readily seen that the advertised accuracy rating is over 99.99999%. [83]Moreover, a careful scrutiny of the old
webpage of Smarmatic reveals that the 2% to 10% failure rate applied to optical scanners and not to SAES. Yet the same
page discloses that the SAES has 100% accuracy. Clearly, the alleged 2% to 10% failing rate is now irrelevant and the
Court need not belabor this and the equally irrelevant estoppel principle petitioners impose on us.
 
Intervenor Cuadras concern relates to the auditability of the election results. In this regard, it may suffice to
point out that PCOS, being a paper-based technology, affords audit since the voter would be able, if need be, to verify if the
machine had scanned, recorded and counted his vote properly.Moreover, it should also be noted that the PCOS machine
contains an LCD screen, one that can be programmed or configured to display to the voter his votes as read by the
machine. [84]
No Abdication of Comelecs Mandate and Responsibilty
 
As a final main point, petitioners would have the Comelec-Smartmatic-TIM Corporation automation contract
nullified since, in violation of the Constitution, it constitutes a wholesale abdication of the poll bodys constitutional
mandate for election law enforcement. On top of this perceived aberration, the mechanism of the PCOS machines would
infringe the constitutional right of the people to the secrecy of the ballot which, according to the petitioners, is provided in
Sec. 2, Art. V of the Constitution.[85]
 
The above contention is not well taken.
 
The first function of the Comelec under the Constitution [86]and the Omnibus Election Code for that matterrelates to the
enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations relating to the conduct of elections to public office to
ensure a free, orderly and honest electoral exercise. And how did petitioners come to their conclusion about their
abdication theory? By acceding to Art. 3.3 of the automation contract, Comelec relinquished, so petitioners claim,
supervision and control of the system to be used for the automated elections. To a more specific point, the loss of
control, as may be deduced from the ensuing exchanges, arose from the fact that Comelec would not be holding
possession of what in IT jargon are the public and private keys pair.
CHIEF JUSTICE: Well, more specifically are you saying that the main course of this lost of
control is the fact that SMARTMATIC holds the public and private keys to the sanctity of this system?
ATTY. ROQUE: Yes, Your Honor, as well as the fact that they control the program embedded in
the key cost that will read their votes by which the electorate may verify that their votes were counted.
CHIEF JUSTICE: You are saying that SMARTMATIC and not its partner TIM who hold these
public and private keys?
ATTY. ROQUE: Yes, Your Honor.
The Court is not convinced. There is to us nothing in Art 3.3 of the automation contract, even if read separately from other
stipulations and the provisions of the bid documents and the Constitution itself, to support the simplistic conclusion of
abdication of control pressed on the Court. Insofar as pertinent, Art 3.3 reads:
 
3.3 The PROVIDER shall be liable for all its obligations under this Project and the performance of portions
thereof by other persons or entities not parties to this Contract shall not relieve the PROVIDER of said
obligations and concomitant liabilities.
SMARTMATIC, as the joint venture partner with the greater track record in automated elections,
shall be in charge of the technical aspects of the counting and canvassing software and
hardware, including transmission configuration and system integration. SMARTMATIC shall also be
primarily responsible for preventing and troubleshooting technical problems that may arise during the
elections. (Emphasis added.)
The proviso designating Smartmatic as the joint venture partner in charge of the technical aspect of the counting
and canvassing wares does not to us translate, without more, to ceding control of the electoral process to Smartmatic.  It
bears to stress that the aforesaid designation of Smartmatic was not plucked from thin air, as it was in fact an eligibility

39
requirement imposed, should the bidder be a joint venture. Part 5, par. 5.4 (e) of the  Instruction to Bidders on the
subject Eligible Bidders, whence the second paragraph of aforequoted Art. 3.3 came from, reads:
 
5.4 A JV of two or more firms as partners shall comply with the following requirements.
xxxx
(e) The JV member with a greater track record in automated elections, shall be in-charge of
the technical aspects of the counting and canvassing software and hardware, including transmission
configuration and system integration
 
And lest it be overlooked, the RFP, which forms an integral part of the automation contract, [87] has put all
prospective bidders on notice of Comelecs intent to automate and to accept bids that would meet several needs, among
which is a complete solutions provider which can provide effective overall nationwide project management service under
COMELEC supervision and control, to ensure effective and successful implementation of the [automation] Project.
[88]
 Complementing this RFP advisory as to control of the election process is Art. 6.7 of the automation contract, providing:
 
6.7 Subject to the provisions of the General Instructions to be issued by the Commission En
Banc, the entire processes of voting, counting, transmission, consolidation and canvassing of
votes shall be conducted by COMELECs personnel and officials, and their performance, completion
and final results according to specifications and within the specified periods shall be the shared
responsibility of COMELEC and the PROVIDER. (Emphasis added.)
 
But not one to let an opportunity to score points pass by, petitioners rhetorically ask: Where does Public Respondent
Comelec intend to get this large number of professionals, many of whom are already gainfully employed abroad? [89] The
Comelec, citing Sec. 3[90] and Sec. 5 of RA 8436,[91] as amended, aptly answered this poser in the following wise:
x x x [P]ublic respondent COMELEC, in the implementation of the automated project, will forge
partnerships with various entities in different fields to bring about the success of the 2010 automated
elections.
Public respondent COMELEC will partner with Smartmatic TIM Corporation for the training and
hiring of the IT personnel as well as for the massive voter-education campaign. There is in fact a budget
allocation x x x for these undertakings. x x x
As regards the requirement of RA 9369 that IT-capable personnel shall be deputized as a member of the
BEI and that another IT-capable person shall assist the BOC, public respondent COMELEC shall partner
with DOST and other agencies and instrumentalities of the government.
In not so many words during the oral arguments and in their respective Memoranda, public and private
respondents categorically rejected outright allegations of abdication by the Comelec of its constitutional duty. The
petitioners, to stress, are strangers to the automation contract. Not oneparticipated in the bidding conference or the
bidding proper or even perhaps examined the bidding documents and, therefore, none really knows the real intention of
the parties. As case law tells us, the court has to ferret out the real intent of the parties. What is fairly clear in this case,
however, is that petitioners who are not even privy to the bidding process foist upon the Court their own view on the
stipulations of the automation contract and present to the Court what they think are the parties true intention.  It is a
study of outsiders appearing to know more than the parties do, but actually speculating what the parties intended. The
following is self-explanatory:
 
CHIEF JUSTICE: Why did you say that it did not, did you talk with the Chairman and Commissioners of
COMELEC that they failed to perform this duty, they did not exercise this power of control?
ATTY. ROQUE : Your Honor, I based it on the fact that it was the COMELEC in fact that entered into this
contract .
CHIEF JUSTICE : Yes, but my question is did you confront the COMELEC officials that they forfeited
their power of control in over our election process?
ATTY. ROQUE : We did not confront, your Honor. We impugned their acts, Your Honor.[92]
Just as they do on the issue of control over the electoral process, petitioners also anchor on speculative reasoning their
claim that Smartmatic has possession and control over the public and private keys pair that will operate the PCOS
machines. Consider: Petitioners counsel was at the start cocksure about Smartmatics control of these keys and, with its
control, of the electoral process.[93]
 
Several questions later, his answers had a qualifying tone:
 
JUSTICE NACHURA: And can COMELEC under the contract not demand that it have access, that it be
given access to and in fact generate its own keys independently with SMARTMATIC so that it would be
COMELEC and not SMARTMATIC that would have full control of the technology insofar as the keys are
concerned xxx?

40
  
ATTY. ROQUE: I do not know if COMELEC will be in a position to generate these keys, xxx.  [94]
 
 
And subsequently, the speculative nature of petitioners position as to who would have possession and control of
the keys became apparent.
 
CHIEF JUSTICE: Yes, but did you check with the COMELEC who will be holding these two keys x x x did
you check with COMELEC whether this system is correct?
 
ATTY.ROQUE: We have not had occasion to do so, x x x Your Honor.
 
xxxx
 
CHIEF JUSTICE: Why do you make that poor conclusion against the COMELEC x x x May not the
COMELEC hire the services of experts in order for the institution to be able to discharge its
constitutional functions?
 
ATTY. ROQUE: That is true, but x x x there is too much reliance on individuals who do not have the
same kind of accountability as public officers x x x
 
CHIEF JUSTICE: Are you saying that the COMELEC did not consult with available I.T. experts in the
country before it made the bidding rules before it conducted the bidding and make the other policy
judgments?
 
ATTY. ROQUE: Your Honor, what I am sure is that they did not confer with the I.T. Foundation x x x.
CHIEF JUSTICE: But is that foundation the only expert, does it have a monopoly of knowledge? [95]
 
 
The Court, to be sure, recognizes the importance of the vote-security issue revolving around the issuance of the
public and private keys pair to the Board of Election Inspectors, including the digital signatures. The NCC comment on the
matter deserves mention, appearing to hew as it does to what appear on the records. The NCC wrote:
 
The RFP/TOR used in the recent bidding for the AES to be used in the 2010 elections
specifically mandated the use of public key cryptography. However, it was left to the discretion of the
bidder to propose an acceptable manner of utilization for approval/acceptance of the Comelec.
Nowhere in the RFP/TOR was it indicated that COMELEC would delegate to the winning bidder the full
discretion, supervision and control over the manner of PKI [Public Key Infrastructure] utilization.
 
 
With the view we take of the automation contract, the role of Smartmatic TIM Corporation is basically to supply
the goods necessary for the automation project, such as but not limited to the PCOS machines, PCs, electronic
transmission devices and related equipment, both hardware and software, and the technical services pertaining to
their operation. As lessees of the goods and the back-up equipment, the corporation and its operators would provide
assistance with respect to the machines to be used by the Comelec which, at the end of the day, will be conducting the
election thru its personnel and whoever it deputizes.
 
And if only to emphasize a point, Comelecs contract is with Smartmatic TIM Corporation of which Smartmatic is
a 40% minority owner, per the JVA of TIM and Smartmatic and the Articles of Incorporation of Smartmatic TIM
Corporation. Accordingly, any decision on the part or on behalf of Smartmatic will not be binding on Comelec. As a
necessary corollary, the board room voting arrangement that Smartmatic and TIM may have agreed upon as joint venture
partners, inclusive of the veto vote that one may have power over the other, should really be the least concern of the
Comelec.
 
Parenthetically, the contention that the PCOS would infringe on the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot because, as
petitioners would put it, the voter would be confronted with a three feet long ballot, [96] does not commend itself for
concurrence. Surely, the Comelec can put up such infrastructure as to insure that the voter can write his preference in
relative privacy. And as demonstrated during the oral arguments, the voter himself will personally feed the ballot into the
machine. A voter, if so minded to preserve the secrecy of his ballot, will always devise a way to do so. By the same token,
one with least regard for secrecy will likewise have a way to make his vote known.
 

41
 During the oral arguments, the notion of a possible violation of the Anti-Dummy Law cropped up, given the RFP
requirement of a joint venture bidder to be at least be 60% Filipino. On the other hand, the winning bidder, TIM-
Smartmatic joint venture, has Smartmatic, a foreign corporation, owning 40% of the equity in, first, the joint venture
partnership, and then in Smartmatic TIM Corporation.
 
The Anti-Dummy Law[97] pertinently states:
 
Section 1. Penalty. In all cases in which any constitutional or legal provision requires
Philippine or any other specific citizenship as a requisite for the exercise or enjoyment of a
right, franchise or privilege, any citizen of the Philippines or of any other specific country who allows
his name or citizenship to be used for the purpose of evading such provision, and any alien or foreigner
profiting thereby, shall be punished by imprisonment xxx and by a fine xxx.
 
SECTION 2. Simulation of minimum capital stock In all cases in which a constitutional or
legal provision requires that a corporation or association may exercise or enjoy a right, franchise or
privilege, not less than a certain per centum of its capital must be owned by citizens of the Philippines
or any other specific country, it shall be unlawful to falsely simulate the existence of such
minimum stock or capital as owned by such citizen for the purpose of evading such provision .
xxx
 
SECTION 2-A. Unlawful use, Exploitation or Enjoyment. Any person, corporation, or association
which, having in its name or under its control, a right, franchise, privilege, property or business,
the exercise or enjoyment of which is expressly reserved by the Constitution or the laws to
citizens of the Philippines or of any other specific country, or to corporations or associations at
least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, permits or allows the use,
exploitation or enjoyment thereof by a person, corporation, or association not possessing the
requisites prescribed by the Constitution or the laws of the Philippines; or leases, or in any other way,
transfers or conveys said right, franchise, privilege, property or business to a person, corporation or
association not otherwise qualified under the Constitution xxx shall be punished by imprisonment xxx
(Emphasis added.)
 
 
The Anti-Dummy Law has been enacted to limit the enjoyment of certain economic activities to Filipino citizens
or corporations. For liability for violation of the law to attach, it must be established that there is a law limiting or
reserving the enjoyment or exercise of a right, franchise, privilege, or business to citizens of the  Philippines or to
corporations or associations at least 60 per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens. In the case at bench,
the Court is not aware of any constitutional or statutory provision classifying as a nationalized activity the lease or
provision of goods and technical services for the automation of an election. In fact, Sec. 8 of RA 8436, as amended, vests
the Comelec with specific authority to acquire AES from foreign sources, thus:
 
SEC 12. Procurement of Equipment and Materials. To achieve the purpose of this Act, the
Commission is authorized to procure, xxx, by purchase, lease, rent or other forms of acquisition,
supplies, equipment, materials, software, facilities, and other services, from local
or foreign sources xxx. (Emphasis added.)
 
Petitioners cite Executive Order No. (EO) 584, [98] Series of 2006, purportedly limiting contracts for the supply of
materials, goods and commodities to government-owned or controlled corporation, company, agency or municipal
corporation to corporations that are 60% Filipino. We do not quite see the governing relevance of EO 584. For let alone
the fact that RA 9369 is, in relation to EO 584, a subsequent enactment and, therefore, enjoys primacy over the executive
issuance, the Comelec does fall under the category of a government-owned and controlled corporation, an agency or a
municipal corporation contemplated in the executive order.
 
A view has been advanced regarding the susceptibility of the AES to hacking, just like the voting machines used
in certain precincts in Florida,USA in the Gore-Bush presidential contests. However, an analysis of post-election reports
on the voting system thus used in the US during the period material and the AES to be utilized in the 2010 automation
project seems to suggest stark differences between the two systems. The first relates to the Source Code, defined in RA
9369 as human readable instructions that define what the computer equipment will do. [99] The Source Code for the 2010
AES shall be available and opened for review by political parties, candidates and the citizens arms or their
representatives;[100] whereas in the US precincts aforementioned, the Source Code was alleged to have been kept secret by
the machine manufacture company, thus keeping the American public in the dark as to how exactly the machines counted
their votes. And secondly, in the AES, the PCOS machines found in the precincts will also be the same device that would

42
tabulate and canvass the votes; whereas in the US, the machines in the precincts did not count the votes. Instead the votes
cast appeared to have been stored in a memory card that was brought to a counting center at the end of the day. As a
result, the hacking and cheating may have possibly occurred at the counting center.
 
Additionally, with the AES, the possibility of system hacking is very slim. The PCOS machines are only online
when they transmit the results, which would only take around one to two minutes. In order to hack the system during this
tiny span of vulnerability, a super computer would be required. Noteworthy also is the fact that the memory card to be
used during the elections is encrypted and read-onlymeaning no illicit program can be executed or introduced into the
memory card.
 
Therefore, even though the AES has its flaws, Comelec and Smartmatic have seen to it that the system is well-
protected with sufficient security measures in order to ensure honest elections.
 
And as indicated earlier, the joint venture provider has formulated and put in place a continuity and back-up
plans that would address the understandable apprehension of a failure of elections in case the machines falter during the
actual election. This over-all fall-back strategy includes the provisions for 2,000 spare PCOS machines  on top of the
80,000 units assigned to an equal number precincts throughout the country. The continuity and back-up plans seek to
address the following eventualities: (1) The PCOS fails to scan ballots; (2) The PCOS scans the ballots, but fails to print
election returns (ERs); and/or (3) The PCOS prints but fails to transmit the ERs. In the event item #1 occurs, a spare
PCOS, if available, will be brought in or, if not available, the PCOS of another precinct (PCOS 2 for clarity), after observing
certain defined requirements,[101] shall be used. Should all the PCOS machines in the entire municipality/city fail, manual
counting of the paper ballots and the manual accomplishment of ERs shall be resorted to in accordance with Comelec
promulgated rules on appreciation of automated ballots. [102] In the event item #2 occurs where the PCOS machines fail to
print ERs, the use of spare PCOS and the transfer of PCOS-2 shall be effected. Manual counting of ERs shall be resorted to
also if all PCOS fails in the entire municipality. And should eventuality #3 transpire, the following back-up options, among
others, may be availed of: bringing PCOS-1 to the nearest precinct or polling center which has a functioning transmission
facility; inserting transmission cable of functioning transmission line to PCOS-1 and transmitting stored data from PCOS-1
using functioning transmission facility.
 
The disruption of the election process due to machine breakdown or malfunction may be limited to a precinct
only or could affect an entire municipal/city. The worst case scenario of course would be the wholesale breakdown of the
82,000 PCOS machines. Nonetheless, even in this most extreme case, failure of all the machines would not necessarily
translate into failure of elections. Manual count tabulation and transmission, as earlier stated, can be done, PCOS being a
paper-ballot technology. If the machine fails for whatever reason, the paper ballots would still be there for the hand
counting of the votes, manual tabulation and transmission of the ERs. Failure of elections consequent to voting machines
failure would, in fine, be a very remote possibility.
A final consideration.
 
The first step is always difficult. Hardly anything works, let alone ends up perfectly the first time around. As has
often been said, if one looks hard enough, he will in all likelihood find a glitch in any new system. It is no wonder some IT
specialists and practitioners have considered the PCOS as unsafe, not the most appropriate technology for Philippine
elections, and easily hackable, even. And the worst fear expressed is that disaster is just waiting to happen, that PCOS
would not work on election day.
 
Congress has chosen the May 2010 elections to be the maiden run for full automation. And judging from what
the Court has heard and read in the course of these proceedings, the choice of PCOS by Comelec was not a spur-of-
moment affair, but the product of honest-to-goodness studies, consultations with CAC, and lessons learned from the
ARMM 2008 automated elections. With the backing of Congress by way of budgetary support, the poll body has taken this
historic, if not ambitious, first step. It started with the preparation of the RFP/TOR, with a list of voluminous annexes
embodying in specific detail the bidding rules and expectations from the bidders. And after a hotly contested and, by most
accounts, a highly transparent public bidding exercise, the joint venture of a Filipino and foreign corporation won and,
after its machine hurdled the end-to-end demonstration test, was eventually awarded the contract to undertake the
automation project. Not one of the losing or disqualified bidders questioned, at least not before the courts, the  bona
fides of the bidding procedures and the outcome of the bidding itself.
 
Assayed against the provisions of the Constitution, the enabling automation law, RA 8436, as amended by RA
9369, the RFP and even the Anti-Dummy Law, which petitioners invoked as an afterthought, the Court finds the project
award to have complied with legal prescriptions, and the terms and conditions of the corresponding automation contract
in question to be valid. No grave abuse of discretion, therefore, can be laid on the doorsteps of respondent Comelec. And
surely, the winning joint venture should not be faulted for having a foreign company as partner.
 

43
 The Comelec is an independent constitutional body with a distinct and pivotal role in our scheme of government.
In the discharge of its awesome functions as overseer of fair elections, administrator and lead implementor of laws
relative to the conduct of elections, it should not be stymied with restrictions that would perhaps be justified in the case of
an organization of lesser responsibility. [103] It should be afforded ample elbow room and enough wherewithal in devising
means and initiatives that would enable it to accomplish the great objective for which it was createdto promote free,
orderly, honest and peaceful elections. This is as it should be for, too often, Comelec has to make decisions under difficult
conditions to address unforeseen events to preserve the integrity of the election and in the process the voice of the
people. Thus, in the past, the Court has steered away from interfering with the Comelecs exercise of its power which, by
law and by the nature of its office properly pertain to it. Absent, therefore, a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion on
Comelecs part, as here, the Court should refrain from utilizing the corrective hand of certiorari to review, let alone nullify,
the acts of that body. This gem, while not on all fours with, is lifted from, the Courts holding in an old but oft-cited case:
 
x x x We may not agree fully with [the Comelecs] choice of means, but unless these are clearly
illegal or constitute gross abuse of discretion, this court should not interfere.  Politics is a practical
matter, and political questions must be dealt with realisticallynot from the standpoint of pure theory
[or speculation]. x x x
 
xxxx
 
There are no ready-made formulas for solving public problems. Time and experience are
necessary to evolve patterns that will serve the ends of good government. In the matter of the
administration of the laws relative to the conduct of elections, x x x we must not by any excessive zeal
take away from the [Comelec] the initiative which by constitutional and legal mandates properly
belongs to it. Due regard to the independent character of the Commission x x x requires that the power
of this court to review the acts of that body should, as a general proposition, be used sparingly, but
firmly in appropriate cases.[104] x x x
The Court, however, will not indulge in the presumption that nothing would go wrong, that a successful
automation election unmarred by fraud, violence, and like irregularities would be the order of the moment on May 10,
2010. Neither will it guarantee, as it cannot guarantee, the effectiveness of the voting machines and the integrity of the
counting and consolidation software embedded in them. That task belongs at the first instance to Comelec, as part of its
mandate to ensure clean and peaceful elections. This independent constitutional commission, it is true, possesses
extraordinary powers and enjoys a considerable latitude in the discharge of its functions. The road, however, towards
successful 2010 automation elections would certainly be rough and bumpy. The Comelec is laboring under very tight
timelines. It would accordingly need the help of all advocates of orderly and honest elections, of all men and women of
goodwill, to smoothen the way and assist Comelec personnel address the fears expressed about the integrity of the
system. Like anyone else, the Court would like and wish automated elections to succeed, credibly.
 
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED.
 
SO ORDERED.
 
 
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice

44
 G.R. No. 199082 July 23, 2013 JOSE MIGUEL T. ARROYO vs. DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE
G.R. No. 199082               July 23, 2013
JOSE MIGUEL T. ARROYO, Petitioner,
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; et al, Respondents.
PERALTA, J.:

NATURE:
These are separate motions for reconsideration filed by movants Gloria Macapagal Arroyo  in G.R. No. 199118 and Jose
Miguel T. Arroyo in G.R. No. 199082 praying that the Court take a second look at our September 18, 2012
Decision3 dismissing their petitions and supplemental petitions against respondents Commission on Elections (Comelec),
the Department of Justice (DOJ), Senator Aquilino M. Pimentel III (Senator Pimentel), Joint DOJ-Comelec Preliminary
Investigation Committee (Joint Committee) and DOJ-Comelec Fact-Finding Team (Fact-Finding Team), et al.

FACTS:
On August 15, 2011, the Comelec and the DOJ issued a Joint Order creating and constituting a Joint Committee and Fact-
Finding Team on the 2004 and 2007 National Elections electoral fraud and manipulation cases
In its Initial Report of the Fact-Finding Team concluded that manipulation of the results in the May 14, 2007 senatorial
elections in the provinces of North and South Cotabato, and Maguindanao was indeed perpetrated. It recommended that
Petitioner Benjamin S. Abalos, GMA, and Mike Arroyo be subjected to preliminary investigation for electoral sabotage and
manipulating the election results.
Thereafter, petitioners filed before the Court separate Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction assailing the creation of the Joint
Panel.
On September 18, 2012, the Court rendered the assailed Decision. It ruled that:
1.    Fact- Finding Team’s Initial Report dated October 20, 2011, are declared VALID. However, the Rules of Procedure on the
Conduct of Preliminary Investigation on the Alleged Election Fraud in the 2004 and 2007 National Elections is declared
INEFFECTIVE for lack of publication.
2.    The Joint Panel and the proceedings having been conducted in accordance with Rule 112 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure and Rule 34 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure, the conduct of the preliminary investigation is hereby declared
VALID.

ISSUES:
1.    Whether or not the creation of the Joint Panel undermines the decisional independence of the Comelec.
2.    Whether or not the DOJ should conduct preliminary investigation only when deputized by the Comelec but not exercise
concurrent jurisdiction

HELD:
1.    The grant of concurrent jurisdiction, the Comelec and the DOJ nevertheless included a provision in the assailed Joint Order
whereby the resolutions of the Joint Committee finding probable cause for election offenses shall still be approved by the
Comelec in accordance with the Comelec Rules of Procedure. 45 With more reason, therefore, that we the the court cannot
consider the creation of the Joint Committee as an abdication of the Comelec’s independence enshrined in the 1987
Constitution

2.     The creation of a Joint Committee is not repugnant to the concept of "concurrent jurisdiction" authorized by the
amendatory law The doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction means equal jurisdiction to deal with the same subject matter.
Contrary to the contention of the petitioners, there is no prohibition on simultaneous exercise of power between two
coordinate bodies. What is prohibited is the situation where one files a complaint against a respondent initially with one
office (such as the Comelec) for preliminary investigation which was immediately acted upon by said office and the re-
filing of substantially the same complaint with another office (such as the DOJ). The subsequent assumption of jurisdiction
by the second office over the cases filed will not be allowed. Indeed, it is a settled rule that the body or agency that first
takes cognizance of the complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others.

45
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 207264               October 22, 2013
REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES, Petitioner, 
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSEPH SOCORRO B. TAN, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
PEREZ, J.:
This is a Motion for Reconsideration of the En Bane Resolution of 25 June 2013 which stated that: IN VIEW OF THE
FOREGOING, the instant petition is DISMISSED, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Commission on
Elections. The 14 May 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc affirming the 27 March 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC
First Division is upheld."
In her Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner summarizes her submission, thus:
"81. Stated differently, the Petitioner x x x is not asking the Honorable Court to make a determination as regards her
qualifications, she is merely asking the Honorable Court to affirm the jurisdiction of the HRET to solely and exclusively
pass upon such qualifications and to set aside the COMELEC Resolutions for having denied Petitioner her right to due
process and for unconstitutionally adding a qualification not otherwise required by the constitution." 1(as originally
underscored)
The first part of the summary refers to the issue raised in the petition, which is:
"31. Whether or not Respondent Comelec is without jurisdiction over Petitioner who is duly proclaimed winner and who
has already taken her oath of office for the position of Member of the House of Representatives for the lone congressional
district of Marinduque."2
Tied up and neatened the propositions on the COMELEC-or-HRET jurisdiction go thus: petitioner is a duly proclaimed
winner and having taken her oath of office as member of the House of Representatives, all questions regarding her
qualifications are outside the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and are within the HRET exclusive jurisdiction.
The averred proclamation is the critical pointer to the correctness of petitioner's submission. The crucial question is
whether or not petitioner could be proclaimed on 18 May 2013. Differently stated, was there basis for the proclamation of
petitioner on 18 May 2013?
Dates and events indicate that there was no basis for the proclamation of petitioner on 18 May 2013. Without the
proclamation, the petitioner's oath of office is likewise baseless, and without a precedent oath of office, there can be no
valid and effective assumption of office.
We have clearly stated in our Resolution of 5 June 2013 that:
"More importantly, we cannot disregard a fact basic in this controversy – that before the proclamation of petitioner on 18
May 2013, the COMELEC En Banc had already finally disposed of the issue of petitioner's lack of Filipino citizenship and
residency via its Resolution dated 14 May 2013. After 14 May 2013, there was, before the COMELEC, no longer any
pending case on petitioner's qualifications to run for the position of Member of the House of Representatives. x x x As the
point has obviously been missed by the petitioner who continues to argue on the basis of her due proclamation, the
instant motion gives us the opportunity to highlight the undeniable fact we here repeat that the proclamation which
petitioner secured on 18 May 2013 was WITHOUT ANY BASIS.

46
 1. Four (4) days BEFORE the 18 May 2013 proclamation, or on 14 May 2013, the COMELEC En Banc has already
denied for lack o merit the petitioner's motion to reconsider the decision o the COMELEC First Division that
CANCELLED petitioner's certificate of candidacy.
2. On 18 May 2013, there was already a standing and unquestioned cancellation of petitioner's certificate o
candidacy which cancellation is a definite bar to her proclamation. On 18 May 2003, that bar has not been
removed, there was not even any attempt to remove it.
3. The COMELEC Rules indicate the manner by which the impediment to proclamation may be removed. Rule 18,
Section 13 (b) provides:
"(b) In Special Actions and Special Cases a decision or resolution of the Commission En Bane shall become final
and executory after five (5) days from its promulgation unless restrained by the Supreme Court."
Within that five (5 days, petitioner had the opportunity to go to the Supreme Court for a restraining order that
will remove the immediate effect of the En Banc cancellation of her certificate of candidacy. Within the five (5)
days the Supreme Court may remove the barrier to, and thus allow, the proclamation of petitioner. That did not
happen. Petitioner did not move to have it happen.
It is error to argue that the five days should pass before the petitioner is barred from being proclaimed.
Petitioner lost in the COMELEC as of respondent. Her certificate of candidacy has been ordered cancelled. She
could not be proclaimed because there was a final finding against her by the COMELEC. 3 She needed a
restraining order from the Supreme Court to avoid the final finding. After the five days when the decision
adverse to her became executory, the need for Supreme Court intervention became even more imperative. She
would have to base her recourse on the position that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
cancelling her certificate of candidacy and that a restraining order, which would allow her proclamation, will
have to be based on irreparable injury and demonstrated possibility of grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the COMELEC. In this case, before and after the 18 May 2013 proclamation, there was not even an attempt at the
legal remedy, clearly available to her, to permit her proclamation. What petitioner did was to "take the law into
her hands" and secure a proclamation in complete disregard of the COMELEC En Bane decision that was final on
14 May 2013 and final and executory five days thereafter.
4. There is a reason why no mention about notice was made in Section 13(b) of Rule 18 in the provision that the
COMELEC En Bane or decision "SHALL become FINAL AND EXECUTORY after five days from its promulgation
unless restrained by the Supreme Court." On its own the COMELEC En Bane decision, unrestrained, moves from
promulgation into becoming final and executory. This is so because in Section 5 of Rule 18 it is stated:
Section 5. Promulgation. -The promulgation of a decision or resolutions of the Commission or a division shall be made on
a date previously fixed, of which notice shall be served in advance upon the parties or their attorneys personally or by
registered mail or by telegram.
5. Apart from the presumed notice of the COMELEC En Bane decision on the very date of its promulgation on 14
May 2013, petitioner admitted in her petition before us that she in fact received a copy of the decision on 16 May
20 13.4 On that date, she had absolutely no reason why she would disregard the available legal way to remove
the restraint on her proclamation, and, more than that, to in fact secure a proclamation two days thereafter. The
utter disregard of a final COMELEC En Bane decision and of the Rule stating that her proclamation at that point
MUST be on permission by the Supreme Court is even indicative of bad faith on the part of the petitioner.

47
 6. The indicant is magnified by the fact that petitioner would use her tainted proclamation as the very reason to
support her argument that she could no longer be reached by the jurisdiction of the COMELEC; and that it is the
HRET that has exclusive jurisdiction over the issue of her qualifications for office.
7. The suggestions of bad faith aside, petitioner is in error in the conclusion at which she directs, as well as in her
objective quite obvious from such conclusion. It is with her procured proclamation that petitioner nullifies the
COMELEC's decision, by Division and then En Banc and pre-empts any Supreme Court action on the COMELEC
decision. In other words, petitioner repudiates by her proclamation all administrative and judicial actions
thereon, past and present. And by her proclamation, she claims as acquired the congressional seat that she
sought to be a candidate for. As already shown, the reasons that lead to the impermissibility of the objective are
clear. She cannot sit as Member of the House of Representatives by virtue of a baseless proclamation knowingly
taken, with knowledge of the existing legal impediment.
8. Petitioner, therefore, is in error when she posits that at present it is the HRET which has exclusive jurisdiction
over her qualifications as a Member of the House of Representatives. That the HRET is the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives is a
written constitutional provision. It is, however unavailable to petitioner because she is NOT a Member of the
House at present. The COMELEC never ordered her proclamation as the rightful winner in the election for such
membership.5 Indeed, the action for cancellation of petitioner's certificate of candidacy, the decision in which is
the indispensable determinant of the right of petitioner to proclamation, was correctly lodged in the COMELEC,
was completely and fully litigated in the COMELEC and was finally decided by the COMELEC. On and after 14
May 2013, there was nothing left for the COMELEC to do to decide the case. The decision sealed the proceedings
in the COMELEC regarding petitioner's ineligibility as a candidate for Representative of Marinduque. The
decision erected the bar to petitioner's proclamation. The bar remained when no restraining order was obtained
by petitioner from the Supreme Court within five days from 14 May 2013.
9. When petitioner finally went to the Supreme Court on 10 June 2013 questioning the COMELEC First Division
ruling and the 14 May 2013 COMELEC En Bane decision, her baseless proclamation on 18 May 2013 did not by
that fact of promulgation alone become valid and legal. A decision favorable to her by the Supreme Court
regarding the decision of the COMELEC En Bane on her certificate of candidacy was indispensably needed, not to
legalize her proclamation on 18 May 2013 but to authorize a proclamation with the Supreme Court decision as
basis.
10. The recourse taken on 25 June 2013 in the form of an original and special civil action for a writ of Certiorari
through Rule 64 of the Rules of Court is circumscribed by set rules and principles.
a) The special action before the COMELEC which was a Petition to Cancel Certificate of Candidacy was a
SUMMARY PROCEEDING or one heard summarily. The nature of the proceedings is best indicated by
the COMELEC Rule on Special Actions, Rule 23, Section 4 of which states that the Commission may
designate any of its officials who are members of the Philippine Bar to hear the case and to receive
evidence. COMELEC Rule 17 further provides in Section 3 that when the proceedings are authorized to
be summary, in lieu of oral testimonies, the parties may, after due notice, be required to submit their
position paper together with affidavits, counter-affidavits and other documentary evidence; x x x and
that this provision shall likewise apply to cases where the hearing and reception of evidence are
delegated by the Commission or the Division to any of its officials x x x.
b) The special and civil action of Certiorari is defined in the Rules of Court thus:

48
When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or
his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or
any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified
petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or
modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may
require.
The accepted definition of grave abuse of discretion is: a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner because of passion or hostility. 6
It is the category of the special action below providing the procedural leeway in the exercise of the COMELEC summary
jurisdiction over the case, in conjunction with the limits of the Supreme Court's authority over the FINAL COMELEC ruling
that is brought before it, that defines the way petitioner's submission before the Court should be adjudicated. Thus
further explained, the disposition of 25 June 2013 is here repeated for affirmation:
Petitioner alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it took cognizance of "newly-discovered
evidence" without the same having been testified on and offered and admitted in evidence. She assails the admission of
the blog article of Eli Obligacion as hearsay and the photocopy of the Certification from the Bureau of Immigration. She
likewise contends that there was a violation of her right to due process of law because she was not given the opportunity
to question and present controverting evidence.
Her contentions are incorrect.
It must be emphasized that the COMELEC is not bound to strictly adhere to the technical rules of procedure in the
presentation of evidence. Under Section 2 of Rule I the COMELEC Rules of Procedure shall be liberally construed in order
x x x to achieve just, expeditious and inexpensive determination and disposition of every action and proceeding brought
before the Commission. In view of the fact that the proceedings in a petition to deny due course or to cancel certificate of
candidacy are summary in nature, then the newly discovered evidence was properly admitted by respondent COMELEC.
Furthermore, there was no denial of due process in the case at bar as petitioner was given every opportunity to argue her
case before the COMELEC. From 10 October 2012 when Tan's petition was filed up to 27 March 2013 when the First
Division rendered its resolution, petitioner had a period of five (5) months to adduce evidence. Unfortunately, she did not
avail herself of the opportunity given her.
Also, in administrative proceedings, procedural due process only requires that the party be given the opportunity or right
to be heard. As held in the case of Sahali v. COMELEC:
The petitioners should be reminded that due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing, but simply an
opportunity or right to be heard. One may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also, and perhaps many times
more creditably and predictable than oral argument, through pleadings. In administrative proceedings moreover,
technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied; administrative process cannot be fully equated with
due process in its strict judicial sense. Indeed, deprivation of due process cannot be successfully invoked where a party
was given the chance to be he rd on his motion for reconsideration. (Emphasis supplied)
As to the ruling that petitioner s ineligible to run for office on the ground of citizenship, the COMELEC First Division,
discoursed as follows:
"x x x for respondent to reacquire her Filipino citizenship and become eligible for public office the law requires that she
must have accomplished the following acts: (1) take the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before the

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Consul-General of the Philippine Consulate in the USA; and (2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of her American
citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.
In the case at bar, there s no showing that respondent complied with the aforesaid requirements. Early on in the
proceeding, respondent hammered on petitioner's lack of proof regarding her American citizenship, contending that it is
petitioner's burden to present a case. She, however, specifically denied that she has become either a permanent resident
or naturalized citizen of the USA.
Due to petitioner's submission of newly-discovered evidence thru a Manifestation dated February 7, 2013, however,
establishing the fact that respondent is a holder of an American passport which she continues to use until June 30 2012
petitioner was able to substantiate his allegations. The burden now shifts to respondent to present substantial evidence to
prove otherwise. This, the respondent utterly failed to do, leading to the conclusion inevitable that respondent falsely
misrepresented in her COC that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen. Unless and until she can establish that she had
availed of the privileges of RA 9225 by becoming a dual Filipino-American citizen, and thereafter, made a valid sworn
renunciation of her American citizenship, she remains to be an American citizen and is, therefore, ineligible to run for and
hold any elective public office in the Philippines." (Emphasis in the original.)
Let us look into the events that led to this petition: In moving for the cancellation of petitioner's COC, respondent
submitted records of the Bureau of Immigration showing that petitioner is a holder of a US passport, and that her status is
that of a balikbayan. At this point, the burden of proof shifted to petitioner, imposing upon her the duty to prove that she
is a natural-born Filipino citizen and has not lost the same, or that she has re-acquired such status in accordance with the
provisions of R.A. No. 9225. Aside from the bare allegation that she is a natural-born citizen, however, petitioner
submitted no proof to support such contention. Neither did she submit any proof as to the inapplicability of R.A. No. 9225
to her.
Notably, in her Motion for Reconsideration before the COMELEC En Bane, petitioner admitted that she is a holder of a US
passport, but she averred that she is only a dual Filipino-American citizen, thus the requirements of R.A. No. 9225 do not
apply to her. Still, attached to the said motion is an Affidavit of Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship dated 24 September
2012. Petitioner explains that she attached said Affidavit if only to show her desire and zeal to serve the people and to
comply with rules, even as a superfluity. We cannot, however, subscribe to petitioner's explanation. If petitioner executed
said Affidavit if only to comply with the rules, then it is an admission that R.A. No. 9225 applies to her. Petitioner cannot
claim that she executed it to address the observations by the COMELEC as the assailed Resolutions were promulgated
only in 2013, while the Affidavit was executed in September 2012. 1âwphi1

Moreover, in the present petition, petitioner added a footnote to her oath of office as Provincial Administrator, to this
effect: This does not mean that Petitioner did not, prior to her taking her oath of office as Provincial Administrator, take
her oath of allegiance for purposes of re-acquisition of natural-born Filipino status, which she reserves to present in the
proper proceeding. The reference to the taking of oath of office is in order to make reference to what is already part of the
records and evidence in the present case and to avoid injecting into the records evidence on matters of fact that was not
previously passed upon by Respondent COMELEC. This statement raises a lot of questions -Did petitioner execute an oath
of allegiance for re-acquisition of natural-born Filipino status? If she did, why did she not present it at the earliest
opportunity before the COMELEC? And is this an admission that she has indeed lost her natural-born Filipino status?
To cover-up her apparent lack of an oath of allegiance as required by R.A. No. 9225, petitioner contends that, since she
took her oath of allegiance in connection with her appointment as Provincial Administrator of Marinduque, she is deemed
to have reacquired her status as a natural-born Filipino citizen.

50
This contention is misplaced. For one, this issue is being presented for the first time before this Court, as it was never
raised before the COMELEC. For another, said oath of allegiance cannot be considered compliance with Sec. 3 of R.A. No.
9225 as certain requirements have to be met as prescribed by Memorandum Circular No. AFF-04-01, otherwise known as
the Rules Governing Philippine Citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 and Memorandum Circular No. AFF-05-002 (Revised
Rules) and Administrative Order No. 91, Series of 2004 issued by the Bureau of Immigration. Thus, petitioner s oath of
office as Provincial Administrator cannot be considered as the oath of allegiance in compliance with R.A. No. 9225.
These circumstances, taken together, show that a doubt was clearly cast on petitioner s citizenship. Petitioner, however,
failed to clear such doubt.7
11. It may need pointing out that there is no conflict between the COMELEC and the HRET insofar as the
petitioner s being a Representative of Marinduque is concerned. The COMELEC covers the matter of petitioner s
certificate of candidacy, and its due course or its cancellation, which are the pivotal conclusions that determines
who can be legally proclaimed. The matter can go to the Supreme Court but not as a continuation of the
proceedings in the COMELEC, which has in fact ended, but on an original action before the Court grounded on
more than mere error of judgment but on error of jurisdiction for grave abuse of discretion. At and after the
COMELEC En Bane decision, there is no longer any certificate cancellation matter than can go to the HRET. In
that sense, the HRET s constitutional authority opens, over the qualification of its MEMBER, who becomes so
only upon a duly and legally based proclamation, the first and unavoidable step towards such membership. The
HRET jurisdiction over the qualification of the Member of the House of Representatives is original and exclusive,
and as such, proceeds de novo unhampered by the proceedings in the COMELEC which, as just stated has been
terminated. The HRET proceedings is a regular, not summary, proceeding. It will determine who should be the
Member of the House. It must be made clear though, at the risk of repetitiveness, that no hiatus occurs in the
representation of Marinduque in the House because there is such a representative who shall sit as the HRET
proceedings are had till termination. Such representative is the duly proclaimed winner resulting from the
terminated case of cancellation of certificate of candidacy of petitioner. The petitioner is not, cannot, be that
representative. And this, all in all, is the crux of the dispute between the parties: who shall sit in the House in
representation of Marinduque, while there is yet no HRET decision on the qualifications of the Member.
12. As finale, and as explained in the discussion just done, no unwarranted haste can be attributed, as the dissent
does so, to the resolution of this petition promulgated on 25 June 2013. It was not done to prevent the exercise
by the HRET of its constitutional duty. Quite the contrary, the speedy resolution of the petition was done to pave
the way for the unimpeded performance by the HRET of its constitutional role. The petitioner can very well
invoke the authority of the HRET, but not as a sitting member of the House of Representatives. 8
The inhibition of this ponente was moved for. The reason for the denial of the motion was contained in a letter to the
members of the Court on the understanding that the matter was internal to the Court. The ponente now seeks the Courts
approval to have the explanation published as it is now appended to this Resolution.
The motion to withdraw petition filed AFTER the Court has acted thereon, is noted. It may well be in order to remind
petitioner that jurisdiction, once acquired, is not lost upon the instance of the parties, but continues until the case is
terminated.9 When petitioner filed her Petition for Certiorari jurisdiction vested in the Court and, in fact, the Court
exercised such jurisdiction when it acted on the petition. Such jurisdiction cannot be lost by the unilateral withdrawal of
the petition by petitioner.
More importantly, the Resolution dated 25 June 2013, being a valid court issuance, undoubtedly has legal consequences.
Petitioner cannot, by the mere expediency of withdrawing the petition, negative and nullify the Court's Resolution and its

51
legal effects. At this point, we counsel petitioner against trifling with court processes. Having sought the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court, petitioner cannot withdraw her petition to erase the ruling adverse to her interests. Obviously, she
cannot, as she designed below, subject to her predilections the supremacy of the law.
WHEREFORE, The Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED. The dismissal of the petition is affirmed. Entry of Judgment is
ordered.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
See Separate Concurring Opinion
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice

See Dissenting Opinion (NO PART)

ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice

See: Dissent.
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

No Part No part
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice Associate Justice

(On official leave) See Concurring opinion

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO* ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice Associate Justice

I join J. Carpio in his Dissent No part

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice Associate Justice

No Part
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

See dissenting opinion

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13 Article VIII of the Constitution it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Resolution
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

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MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice

Footnotes
* On official leave.
1
 Rollo, p. 325.
2
 Id. at 9.
3
 "The concept of 'final' judgment, as distinguished from one which has become final (or 'executory' as of right
[final and executory]), is definite and settled. A 'final' judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case,
leaving nothing more to be done by the Court in respect thereto, e.g., an adjudication on the merits which, on the
basis of the evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties
are and which party is in the right; or a judgment or order that dismisses an action on the ground, for instance,
of res adjudicata or prescription. Once rendered, the task of the Court is ended, as far as deciding the
controversy or determining the rights and liabilities of the litigants is concerned. Nothing more remains to be
done by the Court except to await the parties' next move (which among others, may consist of the filing of a
motion for new trial or reconsideration, or the taking of an appeal) and ultimately, of course, to cause the
execution of the judgment once it becomes 'final' or, to use the established and more distinctive term, 'final and
executory. ' See Investments Inc v Court o Appeals 231 Phil. 302, 307 (1987).
Thus, when the COMELEC En Bane rendered its Resolution dated 14 May 2013, such was a final
judgment the issue of petitioner's eligibility was already definitively disposed of and there was no
longer any pending case on petitioner's qualifications to run for office, and the COMELEC's task of
ruling on the propriety of the cancellation of petitioner's COC has ended. This final judgment, by
operation of Sec. 3, Rule 37 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, became final and executory on 19 May
2013, or five days from its promulgation, as it was not RJ restrained by the Supreme Court. See rollo pp.
163-165.
4
 Rollo p. 5.
Parenthetically, the surrounding facts of the case show that the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC), as well
as the parties, already had notice of the COMELEC En Bane Resolution dated 14 May 2013 before petitioner was
proclaimed. As alleged in the Comment on the Motion for Reconsideration, and which was not disputed by
petitioner, the COMELEC En Bane found that On May 15 2013, the Villa PBOC was already in receipt of the May
14 2013 Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration of petitioner thereby affirming the March 27, 2013
Resolution of the First Division that cancelled petitioner's COC. The receipt was acknowledged by Rossini M.
Ocsadin of the PBOC on May 15,2013. On May 16,2013, Atty. Nelia S. Aureus, petitioner's counsel of record,
received a copy of the same resolution. On May 18 2013, the PBOC under ARED Ignacio is already aware of the
May 14,2013 Resolution of the Commission En Bane which is already on file with the PBOC. Furthermore, PBOC
members Provincial Prosecutor Bimbo Mercado and Magdalena Lim knew of the 14 May 2013 Resolution since
they are the original members of the Villa PBOC. However, while counsel for petitioner, Atty. Aureus, already
received a copy of said resolution on May 16, 2013, the counsel for petitioner, Atty. Ferdinand Rivera (who is an
UNA lawyer), who appeared before the Ignacio PBOC on May 18,2013, misrepresented to said PBOC that

53
 [petitioner] has not received a copy of the said May 14 2013 Resolution of this Commission. This has mislead the
Ignacio PBOC in deciding to proclaim petitioner believing that petitioner is not yet bound by the said resolution.
See rollo pp. 392-393.
5
 In the case at bar, as the PBOC and the parties all had notice of the COMELEC En Bane Resolution dated 14 May
2013, the PBOC should have, at the very least, suspended petitioner's proclamation. Although COMELEC
Resolution No. 9648 or the General Instructions for the Board of Canvassers on the Consolidation/Canvass and
Transmission of Votes in Connection with the 3 May 2013 National and Local Elections authorizes the PBOC to
proclaim a winning candidate if there is a pending disqualification or petition to cancel COC and no order of
suspension was issued by the COMELEC, the cancellation of petitioner's COC, as ordered in the COMELEC En
Banc Resolution dated 14 May 2013, is of greater significance and import than an order of suspension of
proclamation. The PBOC should have taken the COMELEC En Bane s cue. To now countenance this precipitate
act of the PBOC is to allow it to render nugatory a decision of its superior. Besides, on 18 May 2013, there was no
longer any pending case as the COMELEC En Bane Resolution dated 14 May 2013 is already a final judgment.
6
 Beluso v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 180711, 22 June 2010, 621 SCRA 450, 456.
In De Ia Cruz v COMELEC and Pacete the Court ruled that the COMELEC being a specialized agency
tasked with the supervision of elections all over the country, its factual findings, conclusions, rulings
and decisions rendered on matters falling within its competence shall not be interfered with by this
Court in the absence of grave abuse of discretion or any jurisdictional infirmity or error of law. (G.R.
No. 192221, 13 November 2012, 685 SCRA 347, 359).
In Mastura v. COMELEC, the Court ruled that the rule that factual findings of administrative bodies will
not be disturbed by the courts of justice except when there is absolutely no evidence or no substantial
evidence in support of such findings should be applied with greater force when it concerns the
COMELEC, as the framers of the Constitution intended to place the COMELEC -created and explicitly
made independent by the Constitution itself -on a level higher than statutory administrative organs.
The COMELEC has broad powers to ascertain the true results of the election by means available to it.
For the attainment of that end, it is not strictly bound by the rut of evidence. (G R. No. 124 521, 29
January 1998, 285 SCRA 493, 499).
7
 Rollo, pp. 181-184.
8
 Petitioner before the HRET, can manifest what she desires in this Motion for Reconsideration concerning the
existence of Identification Certificate No. 05-05424 issued by the Bureau of Immigration dated 13 October 2005,
ostensibly recognizing her as a citizen of the Philippines as per (pursuant) to the Citizenship Retention and Re-
acquisition Act of 2003 (R.A. 9225) in relation to Administrative Order No. 91, S. of 24 and Memorandum
Circular No. AFF-2004-01 per order of this no. CRR No. 05-10/03-5455 AFF No. 05-4961 signed by
Commissioner ALIPIO F. FERNANDEZ dated October 6 2005. Petitioner belatedly submitted this manifestation
in her Motion for Reconsideration for the stated reason that her records with the Bureau of Immigration has
been missing. Fortunately, her Index Card on file at the Fingerprint Section was found and it became the basis,
together with Petitioner's copy of the certificate which she just unearthed lately, for the issuance of a certified
true copy of her Identification Certificate No. 05-05424." See rollo, pp. 364 and 311.
9
 Office of the Ombudsman v. Rodriguez G.R. No. 172700,23 July 2010, 625 SCRA 299, 307.

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