124 inferences are derived are proven; and (c) The combination of

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
People vs. Llaguno reasonable doubt.”
G.R. No. 91262. January 28, 1998. * 126
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. 126
WILFREDO LLAGUNO, JUDY REYES @ FLORANTE REYES @ SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
LORENZO PEDROSA and a certain “ATIS,” accused, JUDY People vs. Llaguno
REYES @ FLORANTE REYES @ LORENZO PEDROSA, Same; Same; Same; When the prosecution’s case is anchored
accused-appellant. only on circumstantial evidence, all the circumstances must be
Criminal Law; Evidence; Witnesses; Long settled in criminal consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty of the
jurisprudence is the rule that when the issue is one of crime sought to be proven, and no other, and, in addition, the
credibility of witnesses, appellate courts will not disturb the circumstances under consideration must not support any
findings of the trial court.—Long settled in criminal rational hypothesis consistent with the innocence of the
jurisprudence is the rule that when the issue is one of accused.—In the light of these unexplained questions, the trial
credibility of witnesses, appellate courts will not disturb the court erred in nonetheless holding that the circumstantial
findings of the trial court. This rule is justified by the fact that evidence presented by the prosecution shows, beyond moral
the trial court is in a better position to decide the question. certainty, that appellant was guilty of murder. In so doing, the
Having the advantage of directly observing witnesses, “the trial lower court transgressed the basic rule that “when the
judge is able to detect that sometimes thin line between fact inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more
and prevarication that will determine the guilt or innocence of interpretations, one of which is consistent with the innocence
the accused. That line may not be discernible from a mere of the accused and the other or others consistent with his guilt,
reading of the impersonal record by the reviewing court. The then the evidence, in view of the constitutional presumption of
record will not reveal those tell-tale signs that will affirm the innocence, has not fulfilled the test of moral certainty and is
truth or expose the contrivance, like the angry flush of an thus insufficient to support a conviction.” Parenthetically, when
insisted assertion or the sudden pallor of a discovered lie or the the prosecution’s case is anchored only on circumstantial
tremulous mutter of a reluctant answer or the forthright tone of evidence, all the circumstances must be consistent with the
a ready reply. The record will not show if the eyes have darted hypothesis that the accused is guilty of the crime sought to be
in evasion or looked down in confession or gazed steadily with proven, and no other. In addition, the circumstances under
a serenity that has nothing to distort or conceal. The record will consideration must not support any rational hypothesis
not show if tears were shed in anger, or in shame, or in consistent with the innocence of the accused. Consequently,
remembered pain, or in feigned innocence. Only the judge appellant may not be held criminally liable for killing the victim.
trying the case can see all these and on the basis of his Same; Complex Crimes; Kidnapping with Murder; In a complex
observations arrive at an informed and reasoned verdict.” crime, although two or more crimes are actually committed,
Same; Same; Same; The doctrinal guide that appellate courts they constitute only one crime in the eyes of the law as well as
will not disturb the findings of the trial court on the credibility in the conscience of the offender.—It must be emphasized that
of witnesses will not apply when the judge who penned the appellant was charged with the special complex crime of
Decision did not personally hear the evidence for the kidnapping with murder, not of two independent charges of
prosecution.—The records reveal, however, that this doctrinal kidnapping and murder. “In a complex crime, although two or
guide should not apply in this instance, for the judge who more crimes are actually committed, they constitute only one
penned the Decision did not personally hear the evidence for crime in the eyes of the law as well as in the conscience of the
the prosecution. Judge Jose P. Burgos, the ponente, started offender.” Hence, in deciding this appeal, the Court is not
presiding at the trial only on January 9, 1989 after confined to the conviction for murder; rather, the scope of its
_______________ review encompasses the offense charged in the information,
* THIRD DIVISION. which the prosecution sought to prove.
Same; Same; Same; Appeals; When an accused appeals, he
125 stands for a new trial of the whole case—an appeal “throws the
whole case wide open for review and empowers (even
VOL. 285, JANUARY 28, 1998 obligates) the appellate court to correct such errors as may be
125 found in the appealed judgment even if they have not been
People vs. Llaguno assigned.”—It is a well-settled doctrine that an appeal “throws
the first witness for the defense had been presented. Hence, he the whole case wide open for review and
did not personally observe or assess any of the prosecution 127
witnesses. Thus, as an exception to the rule, we meticulously
reviewed the evidence to determine for ourselves the VOL. 285, JANUARY 28, 1998
credibility of the witnesses and the sufficiency of the evidence 127
to sustain the judgment of conviction. People vs. Llaguno
Same; Same; Same; Affirmative testimony has greater value empowers (even obligates) the appellate court to correct such
than a negative one, for the reason that one who denies a errors as may be found in the appealed judgment even if they
certain fact may not remember exactly the circumstances on have not been assigned.” When an accused appeals, he stands
which he bases his denial.—Furthermore, appellant’s self- for a new trial of the whole case.
serving negative defense of denial cannot be given greater Same; Same; Same; Same; Where the information charges the
weight than the declaration of credible witnesses who testified complex crime of kidnapping with murder, the acts constituting
on affirmative matters. Jurisprudence teaches us that slight illegal detention are necessarily included.—Since the
“affirmative testimony has greater value than a negative one, information charged the complex crime of kidnapping with
for the reason that he who denies a certain fact may not murder, the acts constituting slight illegal detention were
remember exactly the circumstances on which he bases his necessarily included in the information, and may thus be
denial.” validly taken into account in the resolution of the present
Same; Same; Same; Inconsistencies in the testimonies of appeal. Manifestly, appellant was fairly apprised of the nature
prosecution witnesses with respect to minor details and of the crime of slight illegal detention and granted a fair
collateral matters do not affect the substance, veracity or opportunity to defend himself.
weight of their declarations—au contraire, such discrepancies Same; Same; Same; Illegally detaining a victim for at least one
serve to add credence and veracity to their categorical, day constitutes slight illegal detention.—At this juncture, we
straightforward and spontaneous testimonies.—Again, we hold deem it significant to reiterate that the trial court merely made
that these insignificant lapses do not taint the credibility of the a finding that appellant could not be convicted of serious illegal
witnesses. Inconsistencies in the testimonies of prosecution detention for the sole reason that the victim’s detention did not
witnesses with respect to minor details and collateral matters exceed five days. The court a quo, however, found that
do not affect the substance, veracity or weight of their appellant illegally detained the victim for at least one day,
declarations. In fact, these inconsistencies reinforce rather which act by itself constitutes slight illegal detention. Besides,
than weaken their credibility, for they lessen the prospect of a the trial court appreciated the act constituting slight illegal
rehearsed testimony. Au contraire, such discrepancies serve to detention as a qualifying circumstance, i.e., employing means
add credence and veracity to their categorical, straightforward to weaken the defense. While we find no proof beyond
and spontaneous testimonies. reasonable doubt to sustain a conviction for murder, the
Same; Same; Circumstantial Evidence; Requisites for records indisputably prove culpability for slight illegal
Conviction.—Because there were no eyewitnesses to the detention.
killing, the trial court’s resort to circumstantial evidence was APPEAL from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu
inevitable. A conviction may rest purely on circumstantial City, Branch XVII.
evidence, provided the following requisites concur: “(a) There The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
is more than one circumstance; (b) The facts from which the      The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Page 1 of 71
     Astorga, Macamay, Rebong & Villacete for accused- People vs. Llaguno
appellant. objected on the ground that the remaining accused, Judy
PANGANIBAN, J.: Reyes, was detained, adding that a previous warning had
When the information charges a complex crime and the already been given to the prosecution in the last hearing
prosecution’s evidence is insufficient to support a conviction during which it also failed to present any witness. Thus, the
128 trial court provisionally dismissed the case:9
128 “In view of this, the instant case as against JUDY REYES is
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED hereby ordered provisionally dismissed. The accused Judy
People vs. Llaguno Reyes, @ Florante Reyes is hereby ordered released from the
for such complex crime or for one of its component offenses, BBRC10 unless he is also detained for another case.”
the accused may still be convicted of the other component Two days after, on October 29, 1987, Atty. Ramon B. Ceniza 11
offense which may have been sufficiently proven. Conformably, representing the Citizens Legal Assistance Society of the
when an accused who is charged with the complex crime of Philippines (CLASP) as private prosecutor, and with the
kidnapping with murder is erroneously convicted of murder by “conforme” of Asst. Fiscal Labra, filed a Motion for
the trial court, he may on appeal be relieved from his Reconsideration praying for the reinstatement of the case
erroneous conviction but still be found liable for slight illegal
against the appellant.12 In an Order dated November 2, 1987,
detention, because the elements of the latter crime are
the trial court granted the motion and trial thereafter ensued.
necessarily included in the information for the complex one.
After the evidence from both parties had been presented, the
Statement of the Case
assailed Decision penned by Judge Jose P. Burgos was
On appeal before this Court is the Decision1 of the Regional promulgated, the dispositive portion of which reads as
Trial Court2 of Cebu City, Branch XVII, in Criminal Case No. CBU follows:13
50414, dated July 25, 1989, convicting Judy Reyes of murder. “WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, this
Appellant Judy Reyes, together with two others, was charged in Court finds the accused Judy Reyes alias Florante Reyes guilty
an Information dated February 16, 1987, which reads as beyond reasonable doubt, not of the complex crime as charged
follows:3 in the information but of the offense of MURDER defined and
“The undersigned 3rd Asst. Fiscal of the City of Cebu 4 accuses penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code with the
BOY LLAGUNO, JUDY REYES @ FLORANTE REYES and a certain aggravating circumstances of employing means to weaken the
“ATIS” of the crime of KIDNAPPING WITH MURDER, committed defense or means to insure or afford impunity, the use of a
as follows: motor vehicle, commission of the offense at nighttime and in
“That on or about the 4th day of February, 1987, at about 8:00 an uninhabited place and sentence is hereby rendered ordering
o’clock in the evening, in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and the accused to serve the penalty of reclusion perpetua
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said together with the accessory penalties under the
accused, armed with firearm, conniving and confederating _______________
together and mutually helping with (sic) one another, with 9 Record, p. 95
deliberate intent, did then and there kidnap and detain one 10 Bagong Buhay Rehabilitation Center located at Lahug, Cebu
Bienvenido Mercado, and while under detention, with intent to City.
kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and
11 Husband of one of the witnesses for the prosecution, Dr.
there suddenly and unexpectedly shot said Bienvenido
Jovita Ceniza.
Mercado with said firearm, hitting him on the vital part of
_______________ 12 Record, pp. 96-97.
1 Penned by Judge Jose P. Burgos. 13 Rollo, pp. 25-26.
131
2 Rollo, pp. 15-26.
VOL. 285, JANUARY 28, 1998
3 Rollo, p. 5. 131
4 Rodolfo V. Perez. People vs. Llaguno
129 law, to indemnify the heirs of Bienvenido Mercado the sum of
VOL. 285, JANUARY 28, 1998 Thirty [Thousand] (P30,000.00) Pesos and [to] pay the costs.”
129 On September 26, 1989, the accused through Counsel
People vs. Llaguno Cabahug filed a Notice erroneously appealing the judgment to
his body, thereby inflicting upon him the following physical the Court of Appeals.14 Correcting the lapse,15 the Court of
injuries (sic):
Appeals in a letter dated December 6, 198916 forwarded the
‘GUNSHOT WOUND THROUGH AND THROUGH FROM FRONTAL
records of the case to this Court. After this Court’s receipt of all
AREA OF THE HEAD TO OCCIPITAL AREA.’
as a consequence of which, Bienvenido Mercado died a few pleadings and documents, the case is now ripe for resolution. 17
The Facts According to the Prosecution
days later.”5
The solicitor general’s summary of the facts is as follows:
Arraigned on June 11, 1987, Accused Wilfredo (Boy) Llaguno
“On February 5, 1987 at 8:30 o’clock in the morning, the
and Judy Reyes, assisted by Counsel Ernesto Amores, pleaded
appellant Judy Reyes, chief security and rattan controller at GF
not guilty to the charge.6 Accused “Atis” was at large; hence, International Export, Inc., Cebu City, informed Tomas Banzon,
he was not arraigned. the company duty guard, that he caught a thief on February 4,
A consolidated Motion to Remand Case for Reinvestigation and 1987 (TSN, November 24, 1987, p. 26). Appellant then took
Motion to Quash Warrant of Arrest alleging lack of preliminary Banzon to his room where a person named Bienvenido
investigation was filed by Llaguno and Reyes through Counsel Mercado was found tied to a wooden post in the room.
Rolando M. Lim on February 23, 1987.7 The motion was Appellant told Banzon that Mercado was the thief he caught
granted and the records were returned to the City Fiscal’s (TSN, November 24, 1987, p. 28).
Office. Subsequently, in an Order dated September 23, 1987, At 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon of February 6, 1987, Dr. Jovita
the trial court, then presided by Judge Mario M. Dizon, Ceniza, manager of the company, called up Banzon by phone
dismissed the case against Wilfredo “Boy” Llaguno:8 inquiring if there was any unusual incident. Banzon replied that
“It appearing from the Reinvestigation Report & he would give a report after two (2) hours, and when appellant
Recommendation dated September 14, 1987, filed by 3rd Asst. learned of this, he warned Banzon to keep quiet about
Fiscal Rodolfo V. Perez and duly approved by the City Fiscal, Mercado’s detention or be killed (TSN, November 24, 1987, p.
that the State has no evidence to present against, and secure 31). Appellant at the time was armed with a .45 caliber pistol
the conviction of accused WILFREDO ‘BOY’ LLAGUNO, as (TSN, November 24, 1987, p. 31). When Dr. Ceniza went to the
prayed for, the instant case against said accused is ordered company’s office later in the afternoon, she met the appellant
DISMISSED, and, accordingly, he is ordered immediately who told her it was all finished and that he
released, unless he is also detained for another cause. x x x” _______________
On October 26, 1987, Fiscal Generosa Labra requested a 14 Record, p. 269.
resetting of the case because no witness for the prosecution 15 Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 122.
was available. Atty. Vicente Cabahug, the appellant’s counsel,
16 Rollo, p. 2.
_______________
17 The case was deemed submitted for resolution upon receipt
5 It was not proven that Bienvenido Mercado, after being shot
by this Court on February 6, 1996 of the confirmation of
“through and through” his head, was still able to survive a few
appellant’s confinement at the NBP.
days after the shooting.
132
6 Record, p. 54. 132
7 Ibid., pp. 13-19. SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
8 Ibid., p. 77. People vs. Llaguno
130 was going to Santo Niño to confess as he had killed someone
130 (TSN, December 7, 1987, p. 28).
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Page 2 of 71
At 9:00 o’clock in the morning of February 7, 1987 Banzon February 5, 1987, the day when accused ordered for no
inquired from appellant as to the whereabouts of Mercado and overtime work in the GF premises to better perpetuate the
appellant replied that he already disposed of him (TSN, offense of killing the victim in Sogod, Cebu with hands tied
November 24, 1987, p. 33). Banzon, at that time, noticed that using a .45 caliber pistol.”22
appellant’s arm had teeth marks, and when Banzon inquired as Although herein appellant was charged with “kidnapping with
to the cause thereof, appellant replied that he was hit by a murder,” the trial court convicted him only of “murder defined
piece of wood (TSN, November 24, 1987, p. 33). and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code with
Also on February 7, 1987, the body of Bienvenido Mercado was the aggravating circumstances of employing means to weaken
found by the police in Sogod, Cebu, which showed a gunshot the defense or means to insure or afford impunity, the use of a
wound on the forehead and multiple abrasions in the arms and motor vehicle, commission of the offense at nighttime and in
body (TSN, November 24, 1987, p. 11).”18 an uninhabited place.”23 The trial court, however, did not find
In the place where they found the body, the police also found him liable for serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the
an empty shell of a .45 caliber bullet.19 Revised Penal Code because the victim was detained only for
According to Banzon, on February 5, 1987, he noted that the one day.
company-owned Datsun pickup was still sporting its gray The Issues
corduroy seat covers, but on February 7, the seat covers were In his brief, appellant imputes the following “errors” to the trial
gone. Banzon asked Cirilo Eric Medico, the guard who relieved court, viz.:
him, what happened to the seat covers, and Medico replied “I.
that they had been taken by one Boy Saragoza to have them The trial court erred in lending credence to the testimonial
washed as they had been bloodstained. Feeling anxious and evidence of the prosecution.
suspicious, he called up the Security Agency and asked for II.
permission to take a leave of absence on February 8.20 The trial court erred in holding that the testimonies of
Version of the Defense appellant and his witnesses were mere denials.
On the other hand, appellant narrates the facts as follows: III.
1 “1. Therefore, the trial court erred in finding the existence in this
Appellant is of legal age, single and a resident of GF case of circumstances sufficient to sustain a conviction.”
International Export, Inc. compound located at H. Abellana _______________
Street, Basak, Mandaue City. 22 Decision, p. 11; rollo, p. 25.
1 1.1. 23 Ibid., pp. 11-12; rollo, pp. 25-26.
At the time of his arrest, appellant was employed as a Rattan 135
Controller of GF International Export, Inc. VOL. 285, JANUARY 28, 1998
_______________ 135
18 Appellee’s Brief, pp. 3-4; rollo, pp. 126-127. People vs. Llaguno
19 Decision, p. 5; rollo, p. 19. The foregoing boil down to the following issues: (1) the
20 TSN, November 24, 1987, pp. 33-35. credibility of witnesses and (2) the sufficiency of the
133 prosecution’s evidence.
VOL. 285, JANUARY 28, 1998 The Court’s Ruling
133 The appeal is partly meritorious. The Court finds appellant
People vs. Llaguno liable only for slight illegal detention, not for murder or
1 2. kidnapping with murder.
Sometime evening of 4 February 1987, one Bienvenido First Issue: Credibility of Witnesses
Mercado, while in the presence of his mother and common-law Long settled in criminal jurisprudence is the rule that when the
wife, was invited by Atis and a certain Alex to join a drinking issue is one of credibility of witnesses, appellate courts will not
spree with the latter. disturb the findings of the trial court. This rule is justified by the
1 2.1. fact that the trial court is in a better position to decide the
At the time of the aforesaid invitation, the aforenamed question.24 Having the advantage of directly observing
Bienvenido Mercado was wearing a blue t-shirt and an orange witnesses, “the trial judge is able to detect that sometimes thin
short pants. line between fact and prevarication that will determine the
1 3. guilt or innocence of the accused. That line may not be
Unfortunately, however, Bienvenido Mercado was last seen discernible from a mere reading of the impersonal record by
alive during the aforementioned invitation. the reviewing court. The record will not reveal those tell-tale
2 4. signs that will affirm the truth or expose the contrivance, like
In the meantime, on the same evening of 4 February 1987, the angry flush of an insisted assertion or the sudden pallor of
appellant was, all the while, within the premises of GF a discovered lie or the tremulous mutter of a reluctant answer
International Export, Inc. or the forthright tone of a ready reply. The record will not show
3 5. if the eyes have darted in evasion or looked down in confession
Moreover, at around 6:00 o’clock in the morning of the or gazed steadily with a serenity that has nothing to distort or
following day, or more appropriately, on 5 February 1987, conceal. The record will not show if tears were shed in anger,
appellant, from his sleeping quarter, proceeded to take a bath or in shame, or in remembered pain, or in feigned innocence.
at a place near the guardhouse of GF International Export, Inc. Only the judge trying the case can see all these and on the
and, thereafter, proceeded to dress up and prepare for work on basis of his observations arrive at an informed and reasoned
the said day. 6. On 7 February 1987, at around 5:43 o’clock in verdict.”25
the afternoon, the body of a dead person and an empty _______________
caliber .45 shell were recovered. 24 People vs. So, 247 SCRA 708, 716, August 28, 1995, per
4 7. Kapunan, J.
After the aforestated recovery, a Post-Mortem Examination was 25 People vs. De Guzman, 188 SCRA 405, 410-411, August 7,
immediately conducted. 1990, per Cruz, J.
5 8. 136
While in his hut, appellant was arrested for Illegal Possession 136
Of Firearm on 12 February 1987. SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
6 9. People vs. Llaguno
On 15 February 1987, the previously-mentioned recovered The records reveal, however, that this doctrinal guide should
body was identified to be that of forenamed Bienvenido not apply in this instance, for the judge who penned the
Mercado.”21 Decision did not personally hear the evidence for the
Ruling of the Trial Court prosecution. Judge Jose P. Burgos, the ponente, started
The trial court held the appellant liable for murder, stating: presiding at the trial only on January 9, 198926 after the first
“It is clear from the established evidence on record that after witness for the defense had been presented.27 Hence, he did
the victim was detained by the accused for a day in his rest not personally observe or assess any of the prosecution
house at the compound of GF International, he brought the witnesses. Thus, as an exception to the rule, we meticulously
victim with the use of Datsun pick-up to Sogod, Cebu for reviewed the evidence to determine for ourselves the
salvaging in the evening of credibility of the witnesses and the sufficiency of the evidence
_______________ to sustain the judgment of conviction.
21 Appellant’s Brief filed by Atty. Bert M. Vega, pp. 5-6; rollo, Buttressing his defense of denial, appellant propounds several
pp. 58-59. challenges to the credibility of the prosecution account. He
134 maintains that Banzon was in no position to witness the alleged
134 detention. He also denies that he had confided to Banzon and
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED to Dr. Ceniza that the victim was in his custody and that he
People vs. Llaguno
Page 3 of 71
intended to “salvage” or kill him. He posits further that there He showed me the person that he hanged. He was tied in both
were several inconsistencies in the testimonies of prosecution hands and raised upwards to a wooden brace of the house.
witnesses. We will deal with each of these contentions. Q—
In his Brief, appellant assails the testimony of Banzon that he What was the tenor of your conversation if any to Lorenzo or
saw the victim hanging by his hands at eight o’clock in the between Lorenzo and you?
evening of February 5, 1987 and for thirty minutes thereafter. A—
He contends that Banzon was “in no position to have witnessed I asked him why he brought this [sic] here. He told me that is
the purported detention” of Victim Mercado, because Banzon’s [sic] a prison cell for those who have committed a crime.
work shift ended at eight o’clock in the evening and the Q—
endorsement of his duties to the relief guard took only a few Where was the room of Judy Reyes?
minutes.28 A—
We are not convinced. It was not proven that Witness Banzon Inside the premises of the company GF International, Inc.
left at exactly eight o’clock that evening, or right after he had Q—
turned over his responsibilities to the relieving guard. In fact, a Was that all that transpired in your conversation on that
reasonable allowance of time may be considered in the occasion?
turnover of responsibility by one guard to another; Banzon A—
could still have been inside the GF premises at 8:30 in the I asked why he brought this person here and he answered me
_______________ that Boy Saragoza will come back for him and I asked him what
26 Records, p. 165. has he done and he said, he is a robber. He has stolen
27 Ibid., p. 156. something.
Atty. Ceniza:
28 Rollo, pp. 62-63.
A—
137
Was that all that transpired in your conversation?
VOL. 285, JANUARY 28, 1998
A—
137
Yes, sir.
People vs. Llaguno
Q—
evening of February 5, 1987. Banzon himself testified that he
What else?
was invited to appellant’s room at 8:10 that evening.29 Thus, A—
we find appellant’s attack on Witness Banzon’s allegation that      
he was at the GF premises on February 5, 1987 to be I asked that person who was hanged. I asked him what was his
insignificant. name and he said his nickname was Ben and his full name is
Appellant further contends that it is unbelievable that he would Bienvenido Mercado and he is a resident of Tabo-an and a
confide to Banzon the following: that he had detained Victim ‘cargador.’ ”
Mercado, that he had intended to “salvage” the latter, or that The testimony of Dr. Ceniza confirmed Banzon’s account that
he had already done so. He maintains that it has not been appellant detained and planned to kill the victim. As in the case
shown that Banzon enjoyed his confidence.30 He raises the of Banzon, Ceniza’s testimony was not objected to by
same arguments in respect to the revelations he allegedly appellant. Thus:33
made to Dr. Ceniza. He states that he and Dr. Ceniza were _______________
already at odds with each other prior to February 1987. 31 33 TSN, December 7, 1987, pp. 25-26.
It must be stressed, however, that during the trial appellant 139
never denied the statements of Banzon. In spite of the VOL. 285, JANUARY 28, 1998
damaging accusations of Banzon, appellant, on the stand, did 139
not dispute the former’s presence at the GF premises. Only in People vs. Llaguno
his appeal brief did he do so. We find appellant’s denial a mere “Atty. Ceniza:
afterthought, and thus undeserving of credence. The testimony Q—
of Banzon clearly shows appellant’s penchant for boasting:32 And what was the answer of Lorenzo (Pedrosa or Judy Reyes)?
“Atty. Ceniza: A—
Q— And then he said, you know that if I had to narrate (it) all it will
What transpired on the occasion of your meeting of [sic] the take more than one hour.
accused? Q—
A— Please limit you answer. Particularly, what Lorenzo told you
He said they were able to catch a robber in the evening of about?
February 4 but I did not believe him because I have not seen A—
(the robber). He asked permission[;] he wanted to use the Datsun because
Q— he was going to salvage a man. He wanted to finish him before
What else transpired in your conversation: the next day. At this point I plead [sic] with him. “Please don’t
A— do it.” And I said, I told him that Dong if that is your problem, I
No more. will help you. Just don’t ‘salvage.’
Q— Q—
In the evening of February 5, 1987 what did you do? And what did Lorenzo told [sic] you?
A— A—
      He said that he was going to use the Datsun to salvage a man
About 8:10 in the evening of February 5 he brought me to his because he said he wanted to finish him before the next day.
room. At this point I said, ‘Dong don’t do that. If you have a problem I
_______________ will go there and I will talk to you.’ To the extent I also told him,
29 TSN, November 24, 1987, p. 26. ‘We will give money. I will not do anything to you.’ But he said
30 Rollo, p. 63. (that) he has to finish this man because if the man will not be
31 Ibid., p. 68. eliminated he will be in hot water. It was a very long
32 TSN, November 24, 1987, pp. 26-28. conversation.
138 Atty. Ceniza:
138 Q—
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED By the way, what did Lorenzo tell you about this man hanging
People vs. Llaguno in one of the buildings of the company?
Atty. Ceniza: A—
Q—      
Who is that he? He said he is [sic] a thief. So I said, ‘But why did you have to
Witness: bring him there?’ and he said, ‘He has stolen something.’ I
A— said, ‘Why did you not ask the assistance of the security guard
Lorenzo Pedrosa. instead of you yourself handling that fellow?’ Then he did not
Q— say anything. So I shifted [the topic], I told him ‘I will be the
That means Judy Reyes? one to take care if he will just release him.’ He said, ‘No, I will
A— have to salvage him.’ ”
Yes, sir. Furthermore, appellant’s self-serving negative defense of
Q— denial cannot be given greater weight than the declaration of
What was the purpose of Judy Reyes in bringing you to his credible witnesses who testified on affirmative matters. 34
room? _________________
A— 34 People vs. Ballagan, 247 SCRA 535, 547, August 23, 1995,
per Romero, J.

Page 4 of 71
140 to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty
140 person, that is, the circumstances proved must be consistent
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the
People vs. Llaguno accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with any
Jurisprudence teaches us that “affirmative testimony has other hypothesis except that of guilty.”43
greater value than a negative one, for the reason that he who Let us consider the chain of circumstances proven by the
denies a certain fact may not remember exactly the prosecution. Banzon testified that appellant detained Mercado
circumstances on which he bases his denial.”35 in his (appellant’s) room by tying his hands to a brace in the
Appellant also cites inconsistencies in the version of the ceiling with the apparent intention of “salvaging” or killing the
prosecution. Banzon insisted that Victim Mercado was in yellow victim, a suspected robber. Appellant threatened Banzon and
short pants when he last saw the latter alive; when recovered, warned him not to report the incident to Dr. Ceniza. Appellant
Mercado was in orange short pants.36 Appellant further points took the Datsun pickup on February 6, 1987 and claimed the
out the following inconsistencies: there was a discrepancy in next day that he had already “disposed” of the man. Banzon
the names of those who invited Mercado to a drinking session; saw the Datsun pickup stained with blood. He also noticed
the duty shift of Banzon was actually 8:00 p.m. to midnight; traces of blood on the canal near the parked Datsun. Appellant
appellant was arrested on February 11, 1987, not February 12, himself asked permission from Dr. Ceniza to use the pickup in
1987; and Banzon called up the security agency regarding the order to “salvage” a man. He later told Dr. Ceniza that he was
matter of bloodstains on February 7, 1987, not February 14, going to confess because he was feeling bad after he had killed
1987 as testified to by him.37 a man.44
Again, we hold that these insignificant lapses do not taint the These circumstances, at first glance, may create a strong
credibility of the witnesses. Inconsistencies in the testimonies suspicion that appellant did commit the alleged killing.
of prosecution witnesses with respect to minor details and Nevertheless, a closer examination reveals that the facts from
collateral matters do not affect the substance, veracity or which this inference was derived do not prove beyond
weight of their declarations. In fact, these inconsistencies reasonable doubt that appellant was the author of the killing.
reinforce rather than weaken their credibility, for they lessen Appellant draws attention to the conflict between the
the prospect of a rehearsed testimony. Au contraire, such testimonies of Dr. Ceniza and Banzon45 regarding the time
discrepancies serve to add credence and veracity to their when the victim was taken out of the GF premises and the time
categorical, straightforward and spontaneous testimonies. 38 when he was killed. According to Dr. Ceniza, appellant told her
Appellant next assails the credibility of Dr. Ceniza. He alleges on February 6, 1987 that he was going to confession in the
that Dr. Ceniza’s behavior towards the incident was surprising, afternoon because he was feeling bad. Dr. Ceniza took
for upon learning of the presence of the victim inside the appellant’s statement to mean that the victim had already
company premises, she did her usual rounds at the hospital been
instead of checking on the unusual occurrence. 39 _______________
_______________ 43 People vs. Binamira, G.R. No. 110397, pp. 17-18, August 14,
35 People vs. Palomar, G.R. Nos. 108183-85, p. 18, August 21, 1997, per Panganiban, J.; citing People vs. Adofina, 239 SCRA
1997, per Panganiban, J.; citing People vs. Acuña, 248 SCRA 67, 76-77, December 8, 1994. See also People vs. Payawal, 247
668, 667, October 2, 1995, per Romero, J. SCRA 424, 431, August 16, 1995, per Vitug, J.
36 People vs. Mendoza, 236 SCRA 666, 673, September 22, 44 TSN, December 7, 1987, p. 28.
1994, per Regalado, J. 45 See Appellant’s Brief, pp. 15-16; rollo, pp. 68-69.
37 Rollo, pp. 63-64. 143
38 Ibid., pp. 70-71. VOL. 285, JANUARY 28, 1998
143
39 Rollo, p. 67.
People vs. Llaguno
141
taken out of the GF premises and killed. Banzon, on the other
VOL. 285, JANUARY 28, 1998
hand, testified that appellant told him in the morning of that
141
same day that the victim was still in the company premises.
People vs. Llaguno
Furthermore, he testified that it was only around four o’clock in
Admittedly, Company President Ceniza’s reaction at a time of
the afternoon of February 6, 1987 when appellant brought the
crisis is open to criticism. However, this does not lessen the
pickup out of the premises of GF. In other words, Banzon’s
weight of her testimony. Different people react differently to
testimony sought to establish that the victim was taken out of
startling occurrences. In any event, she did testify that she
kept in touch with the personnel at GF at that time. the GF premises after office hours on February 6, 1987. 46 The
Second Issue: Sufficiency of the Prosecution’s Evidence inconsistencies in their testimonies are evident from the
In deciding this appeal, we emphasize that the burden of proof following:47
in criminal cases is on the prosecution. Thus, a finding of guilt “Atty. Ceniza:
must rest on the strength of the prosecution’s own evidence, Q—
not on the weakness or even absence of evidence for the How about on the following day, February 6, 1987, do you
defense.40 recall anything unusual that happened relative to that man
Circumstantial Evidence Sufficient hanging behind the GF International Building?
to Convict Appellant of Murder? [Dr. Ceniza]
Because there were no eyewitnesses to the killing, the trial A—
court’s resort to circumstantial evidence was inevitable. A      
conviction may rest purely on circumstantial evidence, The first thing that I know that one of the supervisors told me
that the man was no longer there. On the 6th I went to the
provided the following requisites concur:41
office and proceeded upstairs. Then when I was upstairs we
1 “(a)
met, Lorenzo and I, upstairs and he followed up (sic) and then
There is more than one circumstance;
he told me it is all finished. So, I said then I asked him, ‘What
2 (b)
about the rattan?’ because we have to look for rattan. Then he
The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven;
followed me to my office and then I sat down my office and he
and
sat in one of the chairs and he said, ‘I will go to Sto. Nono (sic)
3 (c)
because I am going to confess. Because I feel bad. That is the
The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce
way when you have killed. This afternoon I will go to Sto. Nino
a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.”42 tp (sic) confess.’ ”
Hence, the Supreme Court has held: Based on the above, appellant was assumed to have killed
“x x x a judgment of conviction based on circumstantial Mercado in the morning of February 6, 1987. However, this was
evidence can be upheld only if the circumstances proven
contradicted by Banzon:48
constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and
_______________
reasonable conclusion which points
_______________ 46 Rollo, pp. 68-69.
40 See People vs. Paguntalan, 242 SCRA 753, 779, March 27, 47 TSN, December 7, 1987, pp. 27-28.
1995, per Melo, J. 48 TSN, November 24, 1987, pp. 29-33.
41 People vs. Fulinara, 247 SCRA 28, 43-44, August 3, 1995, 144
per Romero, J. 144
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
42 Section 5, Rule 133, Rules of Court.
People vs. Llaguno
142
“Atty. Ceniza:
142
Q—
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
That was February 5 in the evening. On February 6, 1987 in the
People vs. Llaguno
morning do you recall any unusual incident that happened?

Page 5 of 71
A— Kidnapping Was Sufficiently Proven
Yes, sir. On the following day that was February 6, I was The trial court did not find appellant liable for serious illegal
already on duty at 8:00 o’clock and after a while he (appellant) detention under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code on the
about 9:00 o‘clock Lorenzo Pedorsa (sic) passed and I asked ground that the period of detention was less than five days.
him, ‘Boss, is the man still there?’ and he said, ‘Yes.’ (sic) This Court, however, finds that the totality of the evidence
because Boy Saragoza did not come back for him.’ presented by the prosecution sufficiently proves beyond
Atty. Ceniza: reasonable doubt that appellant is guilty of the crime of slight
Q— illegal detention under Article 268 of the Revised Penal Code.
What else transpired in your conversation? Article 268 of the Code provides:
A— “ART. 268. Slight illegal detention.—The penalty of reclusion
I asked if it is not dangerous for him and he said it is not. temporal shall be imposed upon any private individual who
Q— shall commit the crimes described in the next preceding article
What else transpired? without the attendance of any of the circumstances
  enumerated therein. The same penalty shall be incurred by
x x x      x x x anyone who shall furnish the place for the perpetration of the
Q— crime.
Was there any other unusual incident that happened in the If the offender shall voluntarily release the person so
evening of February 6? kidnapped or detained within three days from the
A— commencement of the detention, without having attained the
I don’t know anything. purpose intended, and before the institution of criminal
Q— proceedings against him, the penalty shall be prision mayor in
How about the following day, February 7, 1987, do you recall its minimum and medium periods and a fine not exceeding 700
anything unusual that happened? pesos.”
A— The evidence presented by the prosecution, which was
      sustained by the trial court, clearly established that appellant
On February 7 when I was on duty again Lorenzo passed by had in fact detained the victim without authority to do so.
about 9:00 o’clock in the guardhouse. And then I asked Banzon testified that he witnessed the victim hanging by the
Lorenzo what happened to him, and he said, ‘I had already arms in appellant’s room. Banzon’s testimony significantly jibes
disposed of him.’ And I said, What ‘happened to your arm? with the physical evidence showing that the victim sustained
There is showing that it was bitten by human teeth.’ ” multiple abrasions in both arms.51 Furthermore, Dr. Ceniza
This Court cannot rest easy with this discrepancy. Such glaring narrated that several employees called her up in the
and material inconsistency creates a reasonable doubt whether _______________
it was appellant himself who took Mercado, the victim, out of 51 See testimony of Dr. Romeo Pregado who conducted the
the GF premises and consummated the killing. post mortem examination on the deceased, TSN, p. 6,
The two testimonies are clearly inconsistent. It is possible to November 24, 1987.
conjecture that the victim was killed between the time when 147
Banzon spoke with Appellant Reyes that morning of February 6, VOL. 285, JANUARY 28, 1998
1987 about 9:00 a.m. and the time when appellant told Dr. 147
Ceniza that he would go to confession in the afternoon of that People vs. Llaguno
day because he felt guilty about having killed the victim. morning of February 5, 1987 asking for permission to go home,
However, we find this thought difficult to accept, because the because there was a “man hanging at the back in one of the
prosecution failed to establish the time buildings of GF International.”52 Dr. Ceniza’s testimony was
145 unrebutted. All these ineludibly prove beyond reasonable doubt
VOL. 285, JANUARY 28, 1998 that the victim was deprived of his liberty by appellant.
145 It must be emphasized that appellant was charged with the
People vs. Llaguno special complex crime of kidnapping with murder, not of two
when Dr. Ceniza talked to appellant. Furthermore, from the independent charges of kidnapping and murder. “In a complex
supposition of the prosecution, it would follow that the victim crime, although two or more crimes are actually committed,
was killed inside the GF premises and that, after office hours, they constitute only one crime in the eyes of the law as well as
the body was transported from the premises with the use of
in the conscience of the offender.”53 Hence, in deciding this
the Datsun. It is undisputed, however, that a spent .45 caliber
appeal, the Court is not confined to the conviction for murder;
shell was found beside the body, indicating that the victim was
rather, the scope of its review encompasses the offense
shot in the place where his body was found, i.e., outside the GF
charged in the information, which the prosecution sought to
premises. Clearly, there are unexplained missing links in the
prove. It is a well-settled doctrine that an appeal “throws the
prosecution account. Where was the victim killed? Inside or
whole case wide open for review and empowers (even
outside the GF premises? Was he dead or alive when his body
obligates) the appellate court to correct such errors as may be
was taken out of the premises? Who took the victim out of the
found in the appealed judgment even if they have not been
GF premises? Was the Datsun pickup used in transporting the
victim from the premises? Where was appellant between the assigned.”54 When an accused appeals, he stands for a new
time he talked to Banzon and the time he talked to Dr. Ceniza trial of the whole case.55 Since the information charged the
on February 6, 1987? Who actually killed Mercado? complex crime of kidnapping with murder, the acts constituting
In the light of these unexplained questions, the trial court erred slight illegal detention were necessarily included in the
in nonetheless holding that the circumstantial evidence information, and may thus be validly taken into account in the
presented by the prosecution shows, beyond moral certainty, resolution of the present appeal. Manifestly, appellant was
that appellant was guilty of murder. In so doing, the lower fairly apprised of the nature of the crime of slight illegal
court transgressed the basic rule that “when the inculpatory detention and granted a fair opportunity to defend himself. At
facts and circumstances are capable of two or more this juncture, we deem it significant to reiterate that the trial
interpretations, one of which is consistent with the innocence court merely made a finding that appellant could not be
of the accused and the other or others consistent with his guilt, convicted of serious illegal detention for the sole reason that
then the evidence, in view of the constitutional presumption of the victim’s detention did not exceed five days.56 The court a
innocence, has not fulfilled the test of moral certainty and is quo, however, found that appellant illegally detained the victim
thus insufficient to support a conviction.”49 Parenthetically, for
when the prosecution’s case is anchored only on circumstantial _______________
evidence, all the circumstances must be consistent with the 52 See TSN, pp. 20-21, December 7, 1987.
hypothesis that the accused is guilty of the crime sought to be 53 Reyes, J., The Revised Penal Code, p. 653, Book One (1993).
proven, and no other. In addition, the circumstances under 54 People vs. Alejandro, 225 SCRA 347, 350, August 17, 1993,
consideration must not support any rational hypothesis per Cruz, J.
consistent with the innocence of the accused.50 Consequently, 55 Francisco, Rules on Criminal Procedure, p. 496.
_______________ 56 Decision, p. 11; rollo, p. 25.
49 People vs. Agustin, 246 SCRA 673, 681, July 18, 1995, per 148
Regalado, J. 148
50 See People vs. Casingal, 243 SCRA 37, 44, March 29, 1995, SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
per Quiason, J. People vs. Llaguno
146 at least one day,57 which act by itself constitutes slight illegal
146 detention. Besides, the trial court appreciated the act
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED constituting slight illegal detention as a qualifying
People vs. Llaguno circumstance, i.e., employing means to weaken the defense.
appellant may not be held criminally liable for killing the victim. While we find no proof beyond reasonable doubt to sustain a

Page 6 of 71
conviction for murder, the records indisputably prove there are cases where the death and intervention of the
culpability for slight illegal detention. criminal agency that caused it may be presumed or established
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is MODIFIED. by circumstantial evidence.
Appellant Judy Reyes is hereby CONVICTED of slight illegal Same; Same; Same; Same.—However, the ruling in the Sasota
detention and SENTENCED to the indeterminate penalty of ten case cannot be applied to the case at bench. In the Sasota
years of prision mayor medium, as minimum, to seventeen case, the prosecution witnesses saw the four (4) armed
years and four months of reclusion temporal medium, as accused forcibly take the victim from his house to a lake,
maximum. He is acquitted of murder. No costs. beating him up all the way to the beat. While sailing, the
SO ORDERED. accused continued ill-treating the victim until the latter died.
     Narvasa (C.J., Chairman), Romero, Melo and Francisco, JJ., The body of the victim was never found.
concur. Same; Same; Same; At no point during the trial was it ever
Appealed decision modified. established that any of the eight accused beat up the victim or
Notes.—A mere denial constitutes self-serving negative laid a violent hand on him.—In this case, however, the
evidence which cannot be accorded greater weight than the prosecution witnesses testified that they merely saw one of the
declaration of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative accused, Carlos Daguing, tie up the hands of Moronia. He was
matters. (People vs. Rosalijos, 238 SCRA 362 [1994]) then taken in the direction of barangay Monterico and was
Affirmative testimony is stronger than a negative one. (People never seen or heard from since. At no point during the trial was
vs. Tan, Jr., 264 SCRA 425 [1996]) it ever established that any of the eight (8) accused beat up
——o0o—— Moronia or in any way laid a violent hand on him. Nogalada
_______________ even testified that he did not hear any shot fired by any of the
57 Ibid. eight (8) armed accused so as to warrant a reasonable
149 conclusion that Moronia was killed by accused-appellant or any
© Copyright 2020 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved. of his co-conspirators. Indeed, even the possible motive of
accused-appellant and his group for abducting Moronia was not
446 definitively established. To be sure, the circumstances proved
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED are insufficient to produce a conviction
People vs. Roluna 448

G.R. No. 101797. March 24, 1994.* 448

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
ABUNDIO ROLUNA, accused-appellant, CARLOS People vs. Roluna
DAGUING, PATERNO DAGUING, MAMERTO ASMOLO, beyond reasonable doubt for the serious crime of kidnapping
TEODULFO DAGUING, FEDERICO SIMPRON, BIENVENIDO with murder.
SIMPRON and DIDOC BONGCALOS (all at large), Criminal Law; Kidnapping with Murder; The conviction of
accused. accused-appellant for the serious crime of kidnapping with
murder cannot be allowed to rest on the vague and nebulous
Evidence; Corpus Delicti; Corpus delicti has been defined as facts established by the prosecution.—There being no evidence
the body or substance of the crime and refers to the fact that a to the contrary, the disputable presumption under Section 5 (x)
crime has actually been committed. As applied to particular (3), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court would apply, but only insofar
offense, it means the actual commission by someone of the as to establish the presumptive death of Moronia. Whether
particular crime charged.—Corpus delicti has been defined as accused-appellant is responsible for the death of Moronia is a
the body or substance of the crime and, in its primary sense, different matter. The Rules did not authorize that from this
refers to the fact that a crime has been actually committed. As disputable presumption of death, it should be further presumed
applied to a particular offense, it means the actual commission that the person with whom the absentee was last seen shall be
by someone of the particular crime charged. responsible for the subsequent unexplained
Same; Same; Corpus delicti is a compound fact made up of two absence/disappearance of the latter. The conviction of
things, viz: the existence of a certain act of result forming the accused-appellant for the serious crime of kidnapping with
basis of the criminal charge, and the existence of a criminal murder cannot be allowed to rest on the vague and nebulous
agency as the cause of this act or result.—The corpus delicti is facts established by the prosecution. As discussed earlier, the
a compound fact made up of two (2) things, viz: the existence evidence presented by the prosecution surrounding the events
of a certain act or result forming the basis of the criminal of that fateful day are grossly insufficient to establish the
charge, and the existence of a criminal agency as the cause of alleged liability of accused-appellant for the death of Moronia.
this act or result. Same; Evidence; It is a well entrenched principle in criminal law
Same; Same; Presumption of Death; Sec. 5 (3) of Rule 131.— that an accused is presumed innocent until proven otherwise.—
Insofar as the death of Moronia is concerned, the fact that he It is a well-entrenched principle in criminal law that an accused
was last seen on May 27, 1984 with his hands tied at the back is presumed innocent until proven otherwise. No less than
and accompanied by eight (8) armed men undoubtedly shows proof beyond reasonable doubt is required to convict him. On
that his life was then in danger or peril. Coupled with the fact the whole, the evidence adduced by the prosecution would not
that Moronia has been absent and prove beyond a shadow of a doubt that accused-appellant
________________ should be convicted for the serious crime of kidnapping with
murder.
* SECOND DIVISION. APPEAL from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Baybay,
447 Leyte, Br 14 Redubla, J.

VOL. 231, MARCH 24, 1994 The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
447      The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
People vs. Roluna      Ernesto D. Labastida, Sr. for accused-appellant.
unheard from since that time until the trial of this case (or a PUNO, J.:
total of six years), a presumption of death was sufficiently
raised. This is in consonance with Section 5 (x) (3), Rule 131 of In an Information dated June 26, 1990, eight (8) persons were
the Rules of Court, viz: “The following shall be presumed dead charged with the crime of Kidnapping with Murder before the
for all purposes, including the division of the estate among the 449
heirs: x x x (3) A person who has been in danger of death
under other circumstances and his existence has not been VOL. 231, MARCH 24, 1994
known for four (4) years.” 449
Same; Same; Criminal Law; Murder and Homicide; In case of People vs. Roluna
murder or homicide it is not necessary to recover the body of Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Baybay, Leyte.1 They were
the victim or show where it can be found. It is enough that the Abundio Roluna, Carlos Daguing, Paterno Daguing, Mamerto
death and the criminal agency causing death is proven. There Asmolo, Teodulfo Daguing, Federico Simpron, Bienvenido
are cases where the death and intervention of the criminal Simpron and Didoc Bongcalos. The Information against them
agency that caused it may be presumed or established by reads:
circumstantial evidence.—In the early case of People v. Sasota, “That on or about the 27th day of May, 1984, in the
the Court affirmed the conviction of the accused for murder municipality of Baybay, Province of Leyte, Philippines and
although the body of the victim was not found or recovered. In within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above
said case, we ruled that in case of murder or homicide, it is not named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually
necessary to recover the body of the victim or show where it helping with (sic) one another, with the use of firearms and
can be found. It is enough that the death and the criminal taking advantage of superior strength, did then and there
agency causing death is proven. The Court recognized that wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously hogtie and kidnap one

Page 7 of 71
Anatalio Moronia and take him away to a place unknown up be punished with the maximum of the more serious crime,
(to) this time whereat said victim was killed. hereat the supreme penalty of death. Considering that the
“CONTRARY TO LAW.” Constitution of 1987 does not allow the imposition of the death
Only accused Abundio Roluna was arrested, tried and penalty, however, herein accused is hereby sentenced to life
convicted. The other seven (7) accused remain at large. imprisonment or reclusion perpetua, with the accessory
The prosecution presented two (2) witnesses, namely, Conrado penalties of the law, and to indemnify the heirs of Anatalio
Sombilon and Buenaventura Nogalada, both of whom were Moronia the sum of P30,000.00. He is credited with the full
residents of barangay Amguhan, Baybay, Leyte. period of his detention in accordance with Article 29 of the
CONRADO SOMBILON testified that on May 27, 1984, at around Revised Penal Code, as amended, except if he did not sign an
seven o’clock in the morning, he was on his way to sitio agreement to obey the prison laws, rules and regulations at the
Bungabungan in barangay Amguhan to attend to the pasture of inception.
his carabao. At a distance of thirty (30) meters, he saw his “SO ORDERED.”
neighbor, Anatalio Moronia, stopped in his tracks and taken Hence this appeal.
captive by accused Abundio Roluna. Roluna was then In his brief, accused-appellant charges that the trial court erred
accompanied by seven (7) other persons, viz: Didoc Bongcalos, in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Federico Simpron, Bienvenido Simpron, Teodulfo Daguing, Kidnapping with Murder. Accused-appellant points and stresses
Carlos Daguing, Mamerto Asmolo and Paterno Daguing. that the corpus delicti was not duly proved by the prosecution.
Accused Roluna was armed with an armalite while his He submits, inter alia, that considering that the body of
companions were carrying short firearms Using an abaca strip, Anatalio Moronia was never found, Moronia’s questionable and
he saw Carlos Daguing tie up the hands of Moronia at the back. unexplained absence and disappearance should not be blamed
Frightened, he did not shout for help and proceeded on his on him for the alleged victim, in all probability, may still be
way. With the exception of his wife, he did not inform anyone alive.
about what he saw that fateful day.2 In its brief, the People contends that the fact of Moronia’s
_______________ death and the culpability of accused-appellant were sufficiently
established by the evidence. The People relies on the
1 Docketed as Criminal Case No. B-1610 Original Records p. disputable presumption provided under Section 5 (x)(3), Rule
114. 131 of the Rules of Court, viz:
2 TSN, December 20, 1990, pp 5 20. _______________
450
5 Id., pp. 62-65, 68-70.
450 6 Penned by Judge Teofilo R. Redubla, Rollo, pp. 11-17.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 452
People vs. Roluna
BUENAVENTURA NOGALADA corroborated in substance the 452
testimony of Sombilon. He testified that on said day, at around SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
nine o’clock in the morning, he came from his farm in barangay People vs. Roluna
Monterico, Baybay and was on his way home to barangay “The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes,
Amguhan. At a distance of about twenty-five (25) meters, he including the division of the estate among the heirs:
saw Moronia walking along a human trail in barangay xxx
Amguhan, with his hands tied by a rope behind his back. (3) A person who has been in danger of death under other
Moronia was followed by accused Roluna, Carlos Daguing and circumstances and his existence has not been known for four
five (5) other persons whom he did not recognize. Accused (4) years.”
Roluna was carrying an armalite while Carlos Daguing was Undoubtedly, the victim, Moronia, was last seen on that fateful
armed with a pistol. Frightened, Nogalada immediately left the day of May 27, 1984. During this time, Moronia, with his hands
place.3 tied at the back, was accompanied by eight (8) armed men.
From that time on, both witnesses testified that Moronia was Clearly, he was then in danger of death. Since that day until
never seen or heard from. the date of the trial (or for a span of six years), Moronia has not
At the trial, accused Roluna hoisted the defense of denial and been seen or heard from. The People urges that these
alibi. Roluna claimed that on May 24, 1984, Danilo Noroño, a circumstances raised a presumption that Moronia has been
cousin of his wife, went to their house in barangay Amguhan. killed by accused-appellant and his companions.
They were informed by Danilo that Iluminada Cortines y The pivotal issues are: (a) whether or not the circumstances
Noroño, his wife’s grandmother, was bedridden and seriously proved by the prosecution are sufficient to establish the death
ill. He and his wife immediately proceeded to Iluminada’s of Anatalio Moronia, and; (b) if in the affirmative, whether or
house in barangay Banahaw, Baybay, Leyte. As soon as they not accused-appellants and his companions could be held liable
arrived, he gathered some herbal plants for Iluminada. He therefor.
boiled these plants and regularly applied them on Iluminada’s Corpus delicti has been defined as the body or substance of the
body. He and his wife attended to Iluminada for three (3) crime and, in its primary sense, refers to the fact that a crime
weeks. After Iluminada recuperated from her illness, they has been actually committed. As applied to a particular
returned to their home in barangay Amguhan.4 His testimony offense, it means the actual commission by someone of the
was corroborated in substance by his wife, Teresita Roluna and particular crime charged.7 The corpus delicti is a compound
his grandmother-in-law, Iluminada Cortines de Noroño. fact made up of two (2) things, viz: the existence of a certain
Accused Roluna charged that prosecution witnesses Sombilon act or result forming the basis of the criminal charge, and the
and Nogalada, harboring ill-feelings against him, testified existence of a criminal agency as the cause of this act or
falsely and implicated him in the disappearance of Anatalio result.8
Moronia. He claimed that in 1983, he and Sombilon had a Were the two (2) aspects of the corpus delicti proved in this
dispute over a cara y cruz game held in their barangay. case?
Sombilon was then drunk and he, as chairman of the Insofar as the death of Moronia is concerned, the fact that he
Kabataang Barangay, tried to pacify Sombilon but the latter got was last seen on May 27, 1984 with his hands tied at the back
mad at him. Since then, they have not talked with each other. and accompanied by eight (8) armed men undoubtedly shows
Nogalada, on the other hand, also had a grudge against him. In that his life was then in danger or peril. Coupled with the fact
1982, they had an altercation that Moronia has been absent and unheard from since that
_______________ time until the trial of this case (or a total of six years), a
presumption of death was sufficiently raised. This is in
3 TSN, January 3, 1991, pp. 26-38. consonance with Section 5 (x) (3), Rule 131 of the Rules of
4 Id., pp. 59-62. Court, viz:
451 _______________

VOL. 231, MARCH 24, 1994 7 23 C.J.S. 623-624.

451 8 Id., p. 264.
People vs. Roluna 453
during a volleyball game held during the barangay fiesta.5
After the trial, the court a quo promulgated its decision,6 the VOL. 231, MARCH 24, 1994
dispositive portion of which reads: 453
“WHEREFORE, this Court finds accused Abundio Roluna y Elhig People vs. Roluna
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of “The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes,
Kidnapping With Murder. As kidnapping (and serious illegal including the division of the estate among the heirs:
detention) is penalized with reclusion perpetua to death and xxx
murder with reclusion temporal in its maximum period to
death, under Article 48 of the Code, the herein accused should
Page 8 of 71
(3) A person who has been in danger of death under other 455
circumstances and his existence has not been known for four People vs. Roluna
(4) years.” IN VIEW WHEREOF, the appealed decision is hereby MODIFIED.
However, the circumstances presented by the prosecution Accused-appellant Abundio Roluna is found guilty of slight
would not be enough to hold accused-appellant responsible for illegal detention and is meted an indeterminate sentence from
the death of Moronia. twelve (12) years of prision mayor as minimum to twenty (20)
In the early case of People v. Sasota,9 the Court affirmed the years of reclusion temporal as maximum.13 Costs against
conviction of the accused for murder although the body of the accused-appellant.
victim was not found or recovered. In said case, we ruled that SO ORDERED.
in case of murder or homicide, it is not necessary to recover      Narvasa (C.J., Chairman), Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.
the body of the victim or show where it can be found. It is Appealed decision modified.
enough that the death and the criminal agency causing death Notes.—In a serious charge as murder, the guilt of the accused
is proven. The Court recognized that there are cases where the cannot be predicated on delayed and even inconclusive
death and intervention of the criminal agency that caused it testimonies of alleged eyewitness which manifest signs of
may be presumed or established by circumstantial evidence. fabrication (People vs. Quiratan, 197 SCRA 32).
However, the ruling in the Sasota case cannot be applied to the Where no particulars are known as to the manner in which the
case at bench. In the Sasota case, the prosecution witnesses aggression was made or how the act which resulted in the
saw the four (4) armed accused forcibly take the victim from death of the victim began and developed, it cannot established
his house to a lake, beating him up all the way to the boat. from mere suppositions, drawn from circumstances prior to the
While sailing, the accused continued ill-treating the victim until very moment of the aggression that an accused perpetrated
the latter died. The body of the victim was never found. the killing with treachery (People vs. Nerit, 197 SCRA 334).
In this case, however, the prosecution witnesses testified that ——o0o——
they merely saw one of the accused, Carlos Daguing, tie up the
hands of Moronia. He was then taken in the direction of _______________
barangay Monterico and was never seen or heard from since.
At no point during the trial was it ever established that any of 13 Section 1 of Act No. 4103 (Indeterminate Sentence Law), as
the eight (8) accused beat up Moronia or in any way laid a amended.
violent hand on him. Nogalada even testified that he did not 456
hear any shot fired by any of the eight (8) armed accused10 so
as to warrant a reasonable conclusion that Moronia was killed © Copyright 2020 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
by accused-appellant or any of his co-conspirators. Indeed, People vs. Roluna, 231 SCRA 446, G.R. No. 101797 March 24,
even the possible motive of accused-appellant and his group 1994
for abducting Moronia was not definitively established. To be
sure, the circumstances proved are insufficient to produce a VOL. 278, SEPTEMBER 1, 1997
conviction beyond reason- 393
_______________ People vs. Dadles

9 No. L-3544, April 18, 1952, 91 Phil. 111. G.R. Nos. 118620-21. September 1, 1997.*
10 TSN, January 3, 1991, p. 39. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
454 NARITO @ “NARING” DADLES, accused-appellant.

454 Evidence; Witnesses; Delay in Reporting a Crime; Lapse of

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED considerable length of time before a witness comes forward to
People vs. Roluna reveal the identity of the perpetrators of the crime does not
able doubt for the serious crime of kidnapping with murder. taint the credibility of the witness and his testimony were such
There being no evidence to the contrary, the disputable delay is satisfactorily explained.—This court finds neither of the
presumption under Section 5 (x) (3), Rule 131 of the Rules of aforementioned circumstances sufficient to detract from the
Court would apply, but only insofar as to establish the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. It has been held in a
presumptive death of Moronia. Whether accused-appellant is large number of cases that the lapse of a considerable length
responsible for the death of Moronia is a different matter. The of time before a witness comes forward to reveal the identity of
Rules did not authorize that from this disputable presumption the perpetrators of the crime does not taint the credibility of
of death, it should be further presumed that the person with the witness and his testimony where such delay is satisfactorily
whom the absentee was last seen shall be responsible for the explained. Also, this court has had occasion to observe that
subsequent unexplained absence/disappearance of the latter. delay in reporting the occurrence of a crime or other unusual
The conviction of accused-appellant for the serious crime of events in rural areas is well known and should thus, not be
kidnapping with murder cannot be allowed to rest on the vague taken against the witness.
and nebulous facts established by the prosecution. As Same; Same; Same; It is of common human experience that
discussed earlier, the evidence presented by the prosecution people overcome by great fear, not only for their lives but also
surrounding the events of that fateful day are grossly of those of their loved ones, will choose to remain tight-lipped
insufficient to establish the alleged liability of accused- about an incident and suffer in silence rather than expose to
appellant for the death of Moronia. risk their own safety and of those for whom they care.—It is
It is a well-entrenched principle in criminal law that an accused evident that the prosecution witnesses were overcome by fear
is presumed innocent until proven otherwise. No less than that the appellant and his companions would make good their
proof beyond reasonable doubt is required to convict him. On threat the moment they report the incident to the police. This
the whole, the evidence adduced by the prosecution would not is undoubtedly the same fear which deterred them from
prove beyond a shadow of a doubt that accused-appellant confronting the appellant despite their many opportunities to
should be convicted for the serious crime of kidnapping with do so. The prosecution witnesses were well aware that the
murder. appellant did not act alone but was aided by several other men
Since none of the circumstances mentioned in Article 267 of and that they all possessed firearms. Furthermore, the
the Revised Penal Code (kidnapping with serious illegal appellant lived in the same barangay as the witnesses and had
detention) was proved and only the fact of kidnapping of easy access to them. Under the circumstances, the witnesses
Anatalio Moronia was established, we find that the crime could not be blamed for reporting the incident only after they
committed is slight illegal detention under Article 268 of the were already able to transfer residence to another barangay.
Revised Penal Code. In the execution of the crime, more than Contrary to appellant’s allegation, such a reaction is natural,
three (3) armed malefactors acted together in its commission. spontaneous and logical in view of the witnesses’ first impulse
Thus, since the generic aggravating circumstance of band11 for self-preservation. It is of common human experience that
attended the commission of the crime and there being no people overcome by great fear, not only for their lives but also
mitigating circumstance present, the penalty of reclusion of those of their loved ones, will choose to
temporal in its maximum period as maximum and prision _________________
mayor as minimum should be imposed on accused-
appellant.12 * THIRD DIVISION.
______________ 394

11 Article 14 (6), Revised Penal Code. 394

12 Article 268 in relation to Article 64 (3) of the Revised Penal SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Code. People vs. Dadles
455 remain tight-lipped about an incident and suffer in silence
rather than expose to risk their own safety and of those for
VOL. 231, MARCH 24, 1994 whom they care.
Page 9 of 71
Same; Same; Positive Identification of Accused; Alibi; View that convinced. That the victims’ hands were not tied nor guns
the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive poked at their sides when they were taken by the appellant’s
identification of the accused by the prosecution witnesses who group do not conclusively preclude the deprivation of their
had no untoward motive to falsely testify against accused.— liberty. The circumstances surrounding the taking of Salvador
Anent the appellant’s defense, suffice it to state that his alibi and Antonio,
even if supported by the testimonies of his friends, deserves 396
the barest consideration. This court has held time and again
that the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive 396
identification of the accused by the prosecution witnesses who SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
had no untoward motive to falsely testify against him. Relevant People vs. Dadles
is the fact that there appears to be no motive on the part of the particularly the appellant and his companions’ previous
prosecution witnesses to fabricate a criminal charge against conduct in kidnapping victims Alipio and Dionisio, plainly
the appellant who is admittedly an acquaintance and whom demonstrate their intent to likewise deprive Salvador and
they have welcomed in their respective households several Antonio of their liberty.
times in the past. It must be noted that the prosecution Same; Admissibility of Evidence; The general rule is that
witnesses in this case are immediate relatives of the victims evidence is not admissible which shows or tends to show, that
whose natural interest in obtaining justice and redress by the accused in a criminal case has committed a crime wholly
securing the conviction of the parties responsible for the crime independent of the offense for which he is on trial.—True it is
would deter them from implicating persons other than the real that “evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at one
culprits. time is not admissible to prove that he did or did not do the
Same; Same; Alibi; For alibi to offset the evidence of the same or similar thing at another time.” However, “it may be
prosecution demonstrating the guilt of the accused, he must received to prove a specific intent or knowledge, identity, plan,
establish not only that he was somewhere else when the crime system, scheme, habit, custom or usage, and the like.” Thus
was committed but also that it was physically impossible for we have held that: “The general rule is that evidence is not
him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time it was admissible which shows or tends to show, that the accused in a
committed.—Just as oft-repeated is the rule that for alibi to criminal case has committed a crime wholly independent of the
offset the evidence of the prosecution demonstrating the guilt offense for which he is on trial. It is not competent to prove
of the accused, he must establish not only that he was that he committed other crimes of a like nature for the purpose
somewhere else when the crime was committed but also that it of showing that he would be likely to commit the crime charged
was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of in the indictment. A man may be a notorious criminal, but this
the crime at the time that it was committed. The defense has fact may not be shown to influence a jury in passing upon the
failed to meet the requisites of time and place. Nowhere from question of his guilt or innocence of the particular offense for
the testimonies of the defense witnesses nor from the which he is on trial. A man may have committed many crimes
circumstances of the case may we infer that it was physically and still be innocent of the crime charged in the case on trial.
impossible for the appellant to be at the scene of the crime at To permit proof of other crimes would naturally predispose the
the alleged time of its commission. minds of the jurors against the defendant. One who commits
Same; Same; Same; The absence of public transportation does one crime may be more likely to commit another; yet logically,
not negate the possibility that the appellant availed of other one crime does not prove another, nor tend to prove another,
modes of transportation present at that hour. Thus, it was not unless there is such a relation between them that proof of one
totally improbable for the appellant to have hitched a ride in tends to prove the other.”
one of the many trucks plying that route.—Rogelio’s testimony APPEAL from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of
succeeds only in establishing that the appellant slept in his Himamaylan, Negros Occidental, Br. 55.
house on the night of May 24, 1989.
395 The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
VOL. 278, SEPTEMBER 1, 1997      Public Attorney’s Office for accused-appellant.
395 FRANCISCO, J.:
People vs. Dadles
Rogelio who slept in another room could not have known if This case involves the alleged kidnapping of two farmers, Alipio
appellant left his house sometime during the night after Tehidor and Salvador Alipan and their respective sons, Dionisio
everyone else had fallen asleep. Furthermore, from the and Antonio from their homes in Barangay Amontay,
appellant’s own admission, Barangay Amontay is only 30 Binalbagan, Negros Occidental on May 24, 1989. For the said
kilometers away from Barangay San Pedro. The defense’s 397
theory that as there was no longer any public transportation
available after six o’clock in the evening, it was impossible for VOL. 278, SEPTEMBER 1, 1997
the appellant to have been able to reach Barangay Amontay 397
fails to persuade. The absence of public transportation does People vs. Dadles
not negate the possibility that the appellant availed of other kidnapping, appellant Narito alias “Naring” Dadles was charged
modes of transportation present at that hour. Thus, it was not in two separate informations, to wit:
totally improbable for the appellant to have hitched a ride in “That on or about the 24th day of May, 1989, in the
one of the many trucks plying that route. Municipality of Binalbagan, Province of Negros Occidental,
Same; Same; Same; The opinion of the trial court as to who Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
among the witnesses should be believed is entitled to great the first above-named accused, in company of his five (5) other
respect, the latter having had the unequalled opportunity to co-accused, whose true names are still unknown and herein
directly observe the witnesses and to determine by their designated only as “Ka Morito,” “Ka Willy,” “Ka Dindo,” “Ka
demeanor on the stand the probative value of their Mike” and “Ka Juanito,” who are all still at large, armed with
testimonies.—As the core issue in the appellant’s first assorted firearms of unknown calibers, conspiring,
assignment of error is ultimately the credibility of the confederating and mutually helping one another, by means of
prosecution vis-a-vis the defense witnesses, it may not be force, violence and intimidation, did then and there, wilfully,
amiss to state herein the well-settled doctrine that the opinion unlawfully and feloniously take, kidnap, detain, and keep
of the trial court as to who of them should be believed is ALIPIO TEHIDOR and DIONISIO TEHIDOR under guard, from
entitled to great respect, the latter having had the unequalled their residence at Brgy. Amontay of the abovenamed
opportunity to directly observe the witnesses and to determine municipality, and bring them somewhere in the hinterlands of
by their demeanor on the stand the probative value of their said municipality, under restraint and against their will, without
testimonies. And none of the recognized exceptions to the rule, proper authority thereof, thereby depriving said victims of their
that is, where the record shows that facts and circumstances of civil liberties since then up to the present.”1
weight and influence have been overlooked, misunderstood or and
misapplied by the trial court which, if considered, would have
affected the result of the case, and when such findings are “That on or about the 24th day of May, 1989, in the
arbitrary, exist in the case at bench. Municipality of Binalbagan, Province of Negros Occidental,
Same; Same; Same; That the victims’ hands were not tied nor Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
guns poked at their sides when they were taken by the the first abovenamed accused, in company of his nine (9) other
appellant’s group do not conclusively preclude the deprivation co-accused, whose true names are still unknown and herein
of their liberty.—As regards the victims Salvador and Antonio designated only as “Ka Dindo,” “Ka Morito,” “Ka Tiwi,” “Ka
Alipan, the appellant points out that the testimony of Amay,” “Ka Bobby,” “Ka Pedro,” “Ka Juanito,” “Ka Bernardo”
Luzviminda who witnessed the alleged kidnapping demonstrate and “Ka Mike” who are all still at large, armed with assorted
that the victims were not deprived of their liberty because they firearms of unknown caliber, conspiring, confederating and
went with the appellant and his companions peacefully without mutually helping one another, by means of force, violence and
being subjected to threats and coercion. The court is not intimidation, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
Page 10 of 71
feloniously take, kidnap, detain, and keep Salvador Alipan alias in the house of defense witness Rogelio Ariola sleeping soundly
“Bado” and Antonio Alipan under guard, from their residence at after a round of beer with the latter and his other guests.
Barangay Amontay of the above-named municipality, and bring The appellant who was engaged in the business of selling fruits
them somewhere in the hinterlands of said municipality, under claimed that he delivered fruits to one of his usual customers,
restraint and against their will, without proper authority Rogelio, on May 23, 1989 in Barangay San Pedro,
thereof, ____________________
_________________
4 Ibid., pp. 5-7; Rollo, pp. 64-66.
1 INFORMATION in Criminal Case No. 478, November 21, 1991; 5 Ibid., pp. 3-5; Rollo, pp. 62-64.
Records, p. 18. 400
398
400
398 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED People vs. Dadles
People vs. Dadles Binalbagan, Negros Occidental. As Rogelio was not able to pay
thereby depriving said victims of their civil liberties since then appellant on the said date, the former allowed the appellant to
up to the present.”2 sleep over in his house until the following morning. However,
Of the several accused named in the aforequoted informations, Rogelio was able to pay the appellant only at around 6:00
only appellant was arraigned while the cases against the other o’clock in the evening of the next day. Thus, upon the advice of
accused who remain at large up to the present have been Rogelio, the appellant decided to stay and sleep in the former’s
temporarily archived until their apprehension. At the house for another night. He went home to Barangay Amontay
arraignment, the appellant pleaded not guilty to both counts of at around 7:00 o’clock the following morning.6
kidnapping. Upon joint manifestation of the Public Prosecutor Rogelio Ariola who is a Minister of the Apostolic Church and a
and the defense counsel, both cases were ordered resident of Barangay San Pedro, Binalbagan, Negros Occidental
consolidated and were jointly tried.3 testified that on May 24, 1989, there was an occasion in their
On the abduction of victims Alipio and Dionisio Tehidor, church and he went home at around 6:00 o’clock in the
prosecution witnesses Francisca Tehidor and Danilo Tehidor evening to attend to his guests, some of whom were members
testified as follows: of his church. The appellant was also in his house as he had
On May 24, 1989 at around 11:00 o’clock in the evening, the delivered fruits to Rogelio the previous day and was waiting to
appellant Narito alias “Naring” Dadles together with five (5) be paid therefor. It was customary for the appellant to sleep in
others, namely Dindo, Mike, Willy, Morito, and Juanito arrived Rogelio’s house whenever the latter could not immediately pay
at the residence of one of the victims, Alipio Tehidor, in him for the fruits delivered. Since Rogelio paid the appellant
Barangay Amontay, Binalbagan, Negros Occidental. Alipio, his only at around 6:00 o’clock in the evening of May 24, the latter
wife, Francisca, and their two sons Dionisio and Danilo were was no longer able to go home to Barangay Amontay. Rogelio
awakened from their sleep when the appellant and his invited the appellant to sleep in his house again that night and
companions called Alipio from downstairs. The group which the latter accepted.7
was known to the Tehidor family because they used to visit the In the meantime, Rogelio entertained his guests by buying
latter’s house to ask for rice was allowed to enter by Francisca. Gold Eagle Beer for them to drink. Their drinking session lasted
Once inside, they told Francisca that they wanted to talk to until 10:00 o’clock in the evening, after which, his visitors went
Alipio downstairs. Francisca asked them not to bring Alipio home leaving behind the appellant who then slept in one of the
outside and to just talk to him upstairs but her request went rooms in Rogelio’s house.8
unheeded. Then Morito, assisted by the appellant, tied the Finding the alibi of the appellant insufficient to controvert his
hands of Alipio and Dionisio. When Francisca protested, the positive identification by the prosecution witnesses, Branch 55
appellant’s group told her that they would free Alipio and of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Himamaylan, Negros
Dionisio if they surrender the firearms of their two other sons, Occidental rendered a decision convicting the appellant of two
Logenio and Jenny, both of whom were members of the Civilian (2) counts of kidnapping and serious illegal detention. He was
Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGU). Unable to surrender sentenced to suffer the penalty of “double life
the said firearms which were not in the possession ___________________
_________________
6 Ibid., pp. 9-10; Rollo, pp. 68-69.
2 INFORMATION in Criminal Case No. 479, November 21, 1991; 7 Ibid., pp. 8-9; Rollo, pp. 67-68.
Records, p. 19. 8 Ibid.
3 DECISION in Criminal Cases Nos. 478 & 479, March 29, 1994, 401
p. 3; Rollo, p. 62.
399 VOL. 278, SEPTEMBER 1, 1997
401
VOL. 278, SEPTEMBER 1, 1997 People vs. Dadles
399 imprisonment” and to indemnify the families of the victims in
People vs. Dadles the amount of one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00)
of the spouses Tehidor, the appellant’s group forced Alipio and each without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.9
Dionisio to walk with them to an unknown place. Since then Hence the present appeal before this Court where the
and up to the present, Francisca has not heard from either her appellant raises the following assignment of errors:
husband or her son.4 I
On the other hand, prosecution witnesses Luzviminda Alipan
and Vicente Alipan narrated the alleged kidnapping of Salvador THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING MUCH WEIGHT AND
and Antonio Alipan in this wise: CREDENCE ON (sic) THE EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION
On May 24, 1989 at around 11:30 in the evening while AND IN DISREGARDING THE EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENSE.
Salvador, his wife, Luzviminda and their sons, Vicente and II
Antonio were in their house in Barangay Amontay, Binalbagan,
Negros Occidental, they heard somebody calling them from THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-
outside. Luzviminda lighted a lamp and opened the door. She APPELLANT NARITO DADLES OF TWO (2) COUNTS OF
saw the appellant and his nine (9) companions namely, Dindo, KIDNAPPING AND SERIOUS ILLEGAL DETENTION.10
Morito, Amay, Pedro, Juanito, Bernardo, Tiwi, Mike and Bobby In assailing the credibility of the prosecution witnesses, the
who were all armed. The appellant and Dindo went upstairs appellant asseverates that their failure to confront him about
and told Salvador to go with them downstairs as they have the disappearance of the victims despite several opportunities
something to talk about. Salvador who was apparently to do so after the alleged incident casts a doubt on the
acquainted with the group acceded and followed the appellant truthfulness of their accusation. The appellant brands as
and Dindo downstairs. Then the appellant told Luzviminda, incredulous the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses that
“Nay, we will borrow Tatay, we will return him tomorrow.” although they would see the appellant during Sundays which is
When Luzviminda refused, the appellant assured her saying, the market day in Barangay Amontay, they did not ask him
“Nay, don’t worry, just let Tatay go with us together with your about their missing relatives.11 According to the appellant,
son because they will be returned tomorrow.” Thereafter, likewise puzzling is the failure of the prosecution witnesses to
Salvador and Antonio left with the group to an unknown report the incident to the authorities immediately when their
destination. And like Francisca, Luzviminda never saw her respective husbands and sons failed to return the following
husband and son again after that night.5 morning as promised by the appellant and his companions.12
Appellant denied the charges against him and interposed an This court finds neither of the aforementioned circumstances
alibi. The defense attempted to prove that on the said date and sufficient to detract from the credibility of the prosecution
time of the alleged kidnapping of the victims, the appellant was witnesses. It has been held in a large number of cases that the
lapse of a considerable length of time before a wit-
Page 11 of 71
________________ QUESTION:
     
9 Ibid., p. 14; Rollo, p. 73. Who among your (sic) members of the family being (sic)
10 BRIEF FOR THE ACCUSED APPELLANT, p. 1; Rollo, p. 27. warned by Narito Dadles or his group not to report the matter
11 Ibid., pp. 22-23; Rollo, pp. 48-49. to the police?
12 Ibid., p. 23; Rollo, p. 49. ATTY. LABIS:
402      
No basis. There was no answer that this witness was warned
402 not to report to the police.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED COURT:
People vs. Dadles      
ness comes forward to reveal the identity of the perpetrators of Guarded only.
the crime does not taint the credibility of the witness and his PROSECUTOR AREVALO:
testimony where such delay is satisfactorily explained.13 Also, QUESTION:
this court has had occasion to observe that delay in reporting      
the occurrence of a crime or other unusual events in rural How do(sic) you know that you and any members (sic) of your
areas is well known and should thus not be taken against the family is (sic) being guarded from the moment you tried to go
witness.14 out from your place?
In the instant case, the testimonies of the prosecution ANSWER:
witnesses reveal that it was their overriding fear of reprisal      
from the appellant’s group that prevented them from seeking They sent us a letter warning us that if ever we report the
the aid of the authorities. Thus, Vicente Alipan testified as matter to the authorities they will kill all of us.
follows: QUESTION:
“QUESTION:      
      Who sent the letter to your family?
Now, after the alleged incident, did you ever report this matter 404
to the police authority or any military personnel in your area, if
any? 404
ANSWER: SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
      People vs. Dadles
I was not able to report this matter to the authorities. ANSWER:
           
x x x      x x x      x x x Dindo.
QUESTION: QUESTION:
           
And you did not likewise report the incident to any of the Whom (sic) did Dindo send the letter?
military personnel who were patrolling at your area, is that ANSWER:
correct?      
ANSWER: The letter was sent to my mother through a child courier.”16
      (Italics supplied.)
We were not able to report the matter to the military authority It is evident that the prosecution witnesses were overcome by
because we were warned by these people not to report fear that the appellant and his companions would make good
because if we will report they will kill us all.”15 (Italics their threat the moment they report the incident to the police.
supplied.) This is undoubtedly the same fear which deterred them from
Danilo Tehidor likewise testified that the appellant and his confronting the appellant despite their many opportunities to
companions threatened their family with execution should they do so. The prosecution witnesses were well aware that the
report the matter to the authorities: appellant did not act alone but was aided by several other men
______________________ and that they all possessed firearms. Furthermore, the
appellant lived in the same barangay as the witnesses and had
13 People vs. Reoveros, 247 SCRA 628, 633 [1995]; People vs. easy access to them. Under the circumstances, the witnesses
Dominguez, et al., 217 SCRA 170 [1993]; People vs. Villanueva, could not be blamed for reporting the incident only after they
242 SCRA 47 [1995]; People vs. Vallena, 244 SCRA 685 [1995]. were already able to transfer residence to another barangay.
14 People vs. Carizo, 233 SCRA 687, 700 [1994]; People vs. Contrary to appellant’s allegation, such a reaction is natural,
Belen, 194 SCRA 447 [1991]. spontaneous and logical in view of the witnesses’ first impulse
15 TSN, Vicente Alipan, August 20, 1992, p. 14. for self-preservation. It is of common human experience that
403 people overcome by great fear, not only for their lives but also
of those of their loved ones, will choose to remain tight-lipped
VOL. 278, SEPTEMBER 1, 1997 about an incident and suffer in silence rather than expose to
403 risk their own safety and of those for whom they care.17
People vs. Dadles Anent the appellant’s defense, suffice it to state that his alibi
“QUESTION: even if supported by the testimonies of his friends, deserves
      the barest consideration.18 This court has held time and again
Immediately after that incident when your father and your that the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive
brother were forcibly taken by Naring and his group, why did identification of the accused by the prosecution witnesses who
you not immediately report the matter to the police? ___________________
ANSWER:
      16 TSN, Danilo Tehidor, March 25, 1993, pp. 12-13.
Because at that time we were warned not to report, they were 17 People vs. Reoveros, supra.
guarding us. 18 People vs. Gamiao, 240 SCRA 254, 262 [1995].
QUESTION: 405
     
Who were guarding you? VOL. 278, SEPTEMBER 1, 1997
ANSWER: 405
      People vs. Dadles
The companions of the accused. had no untoward motive to falsely testify against him.19
QUESTION: Relevant is the fact that there appears to be no motive on the
      part of the prosecution witnesses to fabricate a criminal charge
Why after the incident were there occasions that this Narito against the appellant who is admittedly an acquaintance and
Dadles and his companions visited you in your house or have whom they have welcomed in their respective households
seen you elsewhere, were there instances? several times in the past. It must be noted that the prosecution
ANSWER: witnesses in this case are immediate relatives of the victims
      whose natural interest in obtaining justice and redress by
Yes, sir. securing the conviction of the parties responsible for the crime
QUESTION: would deter them from implicating persons other than the real
      culprits.20
Do (sic) they visit your house after that incident? Just as oft-repeated is the rule that for alibi to offset the
ANSWER: evidence of the prosecution demonstrating the guilt of the
      accused, he must establish not only that he was somewhere
Not in the house, only in a certain market place. else when the crime was committed but also that it was
Page 12 of 71
physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the Was he assisted by any of his companions?
crime at the time that it was committed.21 The defense has ANSWER:
failed to meet the requisites of time and place. Nowhere from      
the testimonies of the defense witnesses nor from the Yes, sir.
circumstances of the case may we infer that it was physically QUESTION:
impossible for the appellant to be at the scene of the crime at      
the alleged time of its commission. Who among his companions?
Rogelio’s testimony succeeds only in establishing that the ANSWER:
appellant slept in his house on the night of May 24, 1989.      
Rogelio who slept in another room could not have known if Narito and Mike, only the two of them.
appellant left his house sometime during the night after QUESTION:
everyone else had fallen asleep. Furthermore, from the      
appellant’s own admission, Barangay Amontay is only 30 While these persons you mentioned were hogtying your
kilome- husband, what did you do?
___________________ ANSWER:
     
19 People vs. Morales, 241 SCRA 267, 275 [1995]; People vs. I did not do anything. I asked them why they hogtied their
Daquipil, 240 SCRA 314 [1995]; People vs. Rivera, 242 SCRA “tatay.” They answered, “we will free ‘tatay’ if he will surrender
26; People vs. Bracamonte, et al., G.R. No. 95939, June 17, the firearm because we knew (sic) that the firearm of your son
1996. is with you.”
20 People vs. Danilo Layno, et al., G.R. No. 110833, November QUESTION:
21, 1996.      
21 People vs. Paredes, G.R. No. 115217, November 21, 1996; In spite of your plea, these persons, who tied your husband, did
People vs. Benitez, G.R. No. 116618, November 21, 1996; not hear (sic) to your request?
People vs. Umali, 241 SCRA 17 [1995]; People vs. De Roxas, ANSWER:
241 SCRA 369 [1995].      
406 No, sir, they did not.
QUESTION:
406      
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED While hogtying your husband, what happened?
People vs. Dadles ANSWER:
ters away from Barangay San Pedro.22 The defense’s theory      
that as there was no longer any public transportation available They said that if my husband will surrender to them the
after six o’clock in the evening, it was impossible for the firearm, they will free my husband and my son.
appellant to have been able to reach Barangay Amontay fails QUESTION:
to persuade. The absence of public transportation does not      
negate the possibility that the appellant availed of other modes Why, you said awhile ago that it was only your husband Alipio
of transportation present at that hour. Thus, it was not totally Tehidor, why what happened to your son?
improbable for the appellant to have hitched a ride in one of ANSWER:
the many trucks plying that route.      
As the core issue in the appellant’s first assignment of error is They were two, my husband and my son were hogtied.
ultimately the credibility of the prosecution vis-a-vis the QUESTION:
defense witnesses, it may not be amiss to state herein the      
well-settled doctrine that the opinion of the trial court as to The two of them were hogtied?
who of them should be believed is entitled to great respect, the 408
latter having had the unequalled opportunity to directly
observe the witnesses and to determine by their demeanor on 408
the stand the probative value of their testimonies. And none of SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
the recognized exceptions to the rule, that is, where the record People vs. Dadles
shows that facts and circumstances of weight and influence ANSWER:
have been overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied by the      
trial court which, if considered, would have affected the result Yes, sir.”25 (Italics supplied.)
of the case, and when such findings are arbitrary, exists in the The foregoing was corroborated by another eyewitness to the
case at bench.23 crime, Danilo who testified as follows:
We now go to the appellant’s second assignment of error “QUESTION:
where he posits that the testimonies of the prosecution      
witnesses fail to make out a case of kidnapping. It is argued At around that time on that date, May 24, 1989 at around
that the prosecution was unable to indubitably prove that the 11:00 o’clock in the evening, could you recall if there was any
purpose of the appellant and his companions in taking the untoward incident that happened?
victims was to deprive them of their liberty.24 We disagree. ANSWER:
Nothing else is clearer from the testimony of Francisca than      
that her husband, Alipio and son, Dionisio were taken by the Yes, sir.
appellant’s group by force and against their will. Thus: QUESTION:
________________      
What was that unusual incident that happened?
22 Supra, p. 31; Rollo, p. 57. ANSWER:
23 People vs. Paredes, supra; People vs. Danilo Balamban, et      
al., G.R. No. 119591, November 21, 1996; People vs. Nuestro, My father and brother were taken by them on that evening.
240 SCRA 221 [1995]; People vs. Flores, 243 SCRA 374 [1995]. QUESTION:
24 Supra, p. 28; Rollo, p. 54.      
407 When you said, “taken by them,” whom (sic) are you referring,
who took your brother and father?
VOL. 278, SEPTEMBER 1, 1997 ANSWER:
407      
People vs. Dadles Narito Dadles.
“QUESTION: QUESTION:
           
After that what happened? When you said they took your brother and father was Narito
ANSWER: Dadles accompanied by other members of his group?
      ATTY. LABIS:
My husband was hogtied downstairs.      
QUESTION: The question is leading.
      PROSECUTOR AREVALO:
Personally, who hogtied your husband?      
ANSWER: I was just confronting the witness. That was the statement of
      the witness.
Morito. COURT:
QUESTION:      
      Witness may answer.
Page 13 of 71
ANSWER: identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or usage, and the
      like.”29 Thus we have held that:
Yes, sir, his companions were Dindo, Mike, Narito (sic), Willy “The general rule is that evidence is not admissible which
and Juanito. shows or tends to show, that the accused in a criminal case has
PROSECUTOR AREVALO: committed a crime wholly independent of the offense for which
QUESTION: he is on trial. It is not competent to prove that he committed
      other crimes of a like nature for the purpose of showing that he
There were five of them? would be likely to commit the crime charged in the indictment.
___________________ A man may be a notorious criminal, but this fact may not be
shown to influence a jury in passing upon the question of his
25 TSN, Francisca Tehidor, July 22, 1992, pp. 8-9. guilt or innocence of the particular offense for which he is on
409 trial. A man may have committed many crimes and still be
innocent of the crime charged in the case on trial. To permit
VOL. 278, SEPTEMBER 1, 1997 proof of other crimes would naturally predispose the minds of
409 the jurors against the defendant. One who commits one
People vs. Dadles _________________
ANSWER:
           
Yes, sir. x x x      x x x      x x x
QUESTION: COURT:
       
How did they take your brother and father? When they were taken by the ten men as alleged, were their
ANSWER: hands tied?
  ANSWER:
Their hands were tied at the back.      
QUESTION: No, sir.
  COURT:
The two of them, your father and your brother?      
ANSWER: Were firearm poked at them?
  ANSWER:
Yes, sir.”26 (Italics supplied.)      
As regards the victims Salvador and Antonio Alipan, the No, sir, they were just walking.” (TSN, Luzviminda Alipan,
appellant points out that the testimony of Luzviminda who February 12, 1992, pp. 21-24.)
witnessed the alleged kidnapping demonstrate that the victims 28 Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
were not deprived of their liberty because they went with the 29 Ibid.
appellant and his companions peacefully without being 411
subjected to threats and coercion.27 The court is not
convinced. VOL. 278, SEPTEMBER 1, 1997
_______________ 411
People vs. Dadles
26 TSN, Danilo Tehidor, March 25, 1993, pp. 4-5. crime may be more likely to commit another; yet logically, one
27 crime does not prove another, nor tend to prove another,
“QUESTION: unless there is such a relation between them that proof of one
      tends to prove the other.”30
And while they were there they requested your husband just to In the early case of United States v. Evangelista,31 the accused
come down and talk, is that correct? was convicted of arson after the trial court admitted evidence
ANSWER: that he had earlier attempted to set fire to the same premises.
  Ruling on the admissibility of the said evidence, we said that:
When they first called us that was what they told us. “x x x While it was not the fire charged in the information, and
QUESTION: does not by any means amount to direct evidence against the
  accused, it was competent to prove the intent of the accused in
So, upon the request of these persons, you have mentioned, setting the fire which was charged in the information.
your husband was already obliged to go with them downstairs? “x x x      x x x      x x x
ANSWER: “x x x: ‘Where a person is charged with the commission of a
  specific crime, testimony may be received of other similar acts,
They went downstairs. committed about the same time, for the purpose only of
QUESTION: establishing the criminal intent of the accused.’ ”32 (Italics
  supplied.)
And a few moments later these alleged persons, whom you In this case we find that there is such a relation between both
have just mentioned, and your husband and son left your incidents of kidnapping charged in the two informations that
house peacefully? “proof of one tends to prove the other,” and evidence of similar
ANSWER: acts committed about the same time establishes the criminal
  intent of the appellant to deprive Salvador and Alipan of their
Yes, sir, because they took them. liberty. First of all, both incidents happened almost
QUESTION: simultaneously. The kidnapping of Alipio and Dionisio occurred
  only some thirty (30) minutes before Salvador and Antonio
But they left peacefully without any trouble? were taken from their home. The appellant and his companions
ANSWER: were apparently well acquainted with the Tehidors and the
  Alipans who readily allowed them entrance into their
Yes, sir, nothing happened but they told me not to inform respective houses on the fateful night of May 24, 1989. Alipio
anybody. and Dionisio were taken by the appellant’s group on the
410 pretext that they wanted to talk to Alipio. Similarly, the
appellant claims that they took Salvador and Antonio only
410 ____________________
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Dadles 30 People vs. Asinas, 53 Phil. 59, pp. 67-68 [1929].
That the victims’ hands were not tied nor guns poked at their 31 24 Phil. 453 [1913].
sides when they were taken by the appellant’s group do not 32 Ibid., p. 457.
conclusively preclude the deprivation of their liberty. The 412
circumstances surrounding the taking of Salvador and Antonio,
particularly the appellant and his companions’ previous 412
conduct in kidnapping victims Alipio and Dionisio, plainly SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
demonstrate their intent to likewise deprive Salvador and People vs. Dadles
Antonio of their liberty. because they wanted to talk to the former. Alipio’s wife was
True it is that “evidence that one did or did not do a certain warned not to tell the authorities about the incident. The same
thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did or did warning was given to Salvador’s wife.
not do the same or similar thing at another time.”28 However, Moreover, as correctly pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor
“it may be received to prove a specific intent or knowledge, General (OSG), circumstances exist to further warrant the

Page 14 of 71
conclusion that it was the appellant’s criminal intent to deprive ——o0o——
the victims of liberty, to wit:
“First. If appellant’s group merely wanted to talk to Salvador © Copyright 2020 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
Alipan, they could just have talked to him then and there at the People vs. Dadles, 278 SCRA 393, G.R. Nos. 118620-21
house of the latter without necessarily taking him together with September 1, 1997
his son.
“Second. Appellant’s group could have elicited the required
information from Salvador in just a matter of hours. Hence, G.R. No. 121519. October 30, 1996.*
they should have returned Salvador and his son the following PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
day as promised. To this date, however, no trace of the two (2) VICENTE TY and CARMEN TY, accused-appellants.
can be found.
“Third. If they did not have any ill-motive against the duo, why Criminal Law; Kidnapping and Failure to Return a Minor;
did they warn the family of the victims not to report the Elements; The essential element of the crime is that the
incident to anybody or they will be killed? Clearly, this behavior offender is entrusted with the custody of the minor but what is
betrays the falsity of their alleged intention.”33 actually punishable is not the kidnapping of the minor but
The court therefore finds the appellant guilty beyond rather the deliberate failure or refusal of the custodian of the
reasonable doubt of kidnapping the victims, Salvador Alipan, minor to restore the latter to his parents or guardians.—Before
Antonio Alipan, Alipio Tehidor and Dionisio Tehidor. However, a conviction for kidnapping and failure to return a minor under
“since none of the circumstances mentioned in Article 267 of Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code can be had, two
the Revised Penal Code (kidnapping with serious illegal elements must concur, namely: (a) the offender has been
detention) was proved and only the fact of kidnapping x x x entrusted with the custody of the minor, and (b) the offender
was established, we find that the crime committed is slight deliberately fails to restore said minor to his parents or
illegal detention under Article 268 of the Revised Penal Code. x guardians. The essential element herein is that the offender is
x x.”34 Moreover, in the execution of the crime against the first entrusted with the custody of the minor but what is actually
two (2) victims, Salvador and Antonio Alipan, more than three punishable is not the kidnapping of the minor, as the title of
(3) armed malefactors acted together in its commission.35 the article seems to indicate, but rather the deliberate failure
Thus, since the generic aggravating circumstance of band36 or refusal of the custodian of the minor to restore the latter to
attended the commission of the crime and there being his parents or guardians. Said failure or refusal, however, must
___________________ not only be deliberate but must also be persistent as to oblige
the parents or the guardians of the child to seek the aid of the
33 Supra, p. 30; Rollo, p. 121. courts in order to obtain custody. The key word therefore of
34 People vs. Roluna, 231 SCRA 446, 454 [1994]. this element is deliberate.
35 Prosecution witness Vicente Alipan testified that the Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Essentially, the word
appellant and his nine (9) companions were all armed. deliberate as used in Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code
36 Article 14(6), Revised Penal Code. must imply something more than mere negligence — it must
413 be premeditated, obstinate, headstrong, foolishly daring or
intentionally and maliciously wrong.—Essentially, the word
VOL. 278, SEPTEMBER 1, 1997 deliberate as used in the article must imply something more
413 than mere negligence; it must be premeditated, obstinate,
People vs. Dadles headstrong, foolishly daring or intentionally and maliciously
no mitigating circumstance present, the penalty is reclusion wrong.
temporal in its maximum period. For the slight illegal detention APPEAL from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan
of the latter two (2) victims, Alipio and Dionisio Tehidor, the City, Br. 123.
aggravating circumstance that the crime was committed by a    The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
band as alleged in the information finds no sufficient factual _______________
basis since the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses do not
disclose that at least four (4) of the malefactors were armed.37 * FIRST DIVISION.
Hence there being no aggravating nor mitigating circumstance 746
attendant in the commission of the crime, the penalty of
reclusion temporal should be imposed in its medium period. 746
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby MODIFIED. SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Appellant Narito Dadles is found guilty of two counts of slight People vs. Ty
illegal detention and is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate   The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
penalty of ten (10) years of prision mayor as minimum to   Feliciano C. Tumale for accused-appellants.
twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal maximum as maximum KAPUNAN, J.:
for the slight illegal detention of Salvador and Antonio Alipan, Vicente Ty and Carmen Ty were charged with the crime of
and the indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision kidnapping and failure to return a minor in an information filed
mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) by 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor of Kalookan City Rosauro J.
months of reclusion temporal medium as maximum for the Silverio, the accusatory portion of which reads:
slight illegal detention of Alipio and Dionisio Tehidor, both That on or about the month of April 1989, in Kalookan City,
penalties to be served successively according to Article 70 of Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
the Revised Penal Code on successive service of sentences. Court, the above-named accused, being then the owners,
Appellant is likewise ordered to indemnify the families of the proprietors, managers and administrators of Sir John Clinic and
victims in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS as such said accused had the custody of Arabella Sombong, a
(P100,000.00) each without subsidiary imprisonment in case of minor, conspiring together and mutually helping one another
insolvency. and with deliberate intent to deprive the parents of the child of
SO ORDERED. her custody, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
     Narvasa (C.J., Chairman), Davide, Jr., Melo and Panganiban, feloniously fail to restore the custody of said Arabella Sombong
JJ., concur. to her parents by giving said custody of subject minor to
Judgment modified. another person without the knowledge and consent of her
____________________ parents.
Contrary to Law.1
37 The prosecution failed to establish the aggravating Both accused were arrested, and then arraigned on October
circumstance of band, as alleged in the information, in the 27, 1992 when they pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.
kidnapping of Alipio and Dionisio Tehidor. Prosecution witness After trial, on May 31, 1995, a decision was rendered by the
Danilo Tehidor testified that only the appellant and two (2) of Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City, Branch 123, the decretal
his companions were armed; People v. Pelones, 230 SCRA 379, portion of which disposes as follows:
390 [1994]. WHEREFORE, this Court finds both accused Spouses Vicente Ty
414 and Carmen Ty guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
kidnapping a minor and failure to return the same as defined
414 and penalized by Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code and
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED hereby sentences them to suffer imprisonment of reclusion
Golangco vs. Villanueva perpetua. The accused are hereby ordered to pay the private
Note.—Where no improper motive on the part of the complainant the sum of P100,000.00 by way of moral damages
prosecution witnesses to testify falsely against the appellants caused by anxiety, by her being emotionally drained coupled
or falsely implicate them in the commission of a crime, the by the fact that up to this date
logical conclusion is that no such improper motive existed and _______________
that their testimonies are worthy of full faith and credit.
(People vs. Pija, 245 SCRA 80 [1995]) 1 Rollo, p. 5.
Page 15 of 71
747 considered, hence, Dr. Mallonga gave the child to her aunt,
Lilibeth Neri.8
VOL. 263, OCTOBER 30, 1996 In 1992, complainant came back to claim the daughter she
747 abandoned some five (5) years back.
People vs. Ty When her pleas allegedly went unanswered, she filed a petition
she could not determine the whereabouts of her child Arabella for habeas corpus against accused-appellants with the
Sombong. Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Said petition was however
SO ORDERED.2 denied due course and was summarily dismissed without
The accused now interpose this appeal alleging the ensuing prejudice on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, the alleged
assignment of errors, viz: detention having been perpetrated in Kalookan City.
I Thereafter, the instant criminal case was filed against accused-
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT APPELLANTS appellants.
‘DELIBERATELY FAILED TO RESTORE THE CHILD TO HER Complainant likewise filed an administrative case for
MOTHER,’ AND CONVICTING THEM UNDER ART. 270 OF THE dishonorable conduct against accused-appellant Dr. Carmen Ty
REVISED PENAL CODE, AND SENTENCING THEM TO before the Board of Medicine of the Professional Regulation
‘RECLUSION PERPETUA;’ Commission. This case was subsequently dismissed for failure
II to prosecute.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE CRIME On October 13, 1992, complainant filed a petition for habeas
COMMITTED, IF ANY, IS THAT DEFINED AND PENALIZED UNDER corpus with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, this time
ART. 277 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE; against the alleged guardians of her daughter, namely,
III Marietta Neri Alviar and Lilibeth Neri. On January 15, 1993, the
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT RECOMMENDING EXECUTIVE trial court rendered a decision granting the petition and
CLEMENCY PURSUANT TO PRECEDENT IN ‘PEOPLE vs. ordering the guardians to immediately deliver the person of
GUTIERREZ,’ 197 SCRA 569; and Cristina Grace Neri to the complainant, the court having found
IV Cristina to be the complainant’s child. On appeal to the Court
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ‘COMPLAINANT THE of Appeals, however, said decision was reversed on the ground
SUM OF P100,000.00 BY WAY OF MORAL DAMAGES.’3 that the guardians were not unlawfully withholding from the
The relevant antecedents surrounding the case are as follows: complainant the rightful custody of Cristina after finding that
On November 8, 1987, complainant Johanna Sombong brought Cristina and complainant’s daughter are not one
her sick daughter Arabella, then only seven (7) _______________
_______________
8 Id., at 16, 19-21.
2 Id., at 31. 750
3 Id., at 48.
748 750
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
748 People vs. Ty
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED and the same person. On January 31, 1996, this Court in
People vs. Ty Sombong v. Court of Appeals9 affirmed the Court of Appeals’
months old, for treatment to the Sir John Medical and Maternity decision.
Clinic located at No. 121 First Avenue, Grace Park, Kalookan In this appeal, accused-appellants would want us to take a
City which was owned and operated by the accused-appellants. second look and resolve the issue of whether or not they are
Arabella was diagnosed to be suffering bronchitis and diarrhea, guilty of kidnapping and failure to return a minor. Accused-
thus complainant was advised to confine the child at the clinic appellants of course contend that they are not guilty and the
for speedy recovery. About three (3) days later, Arabella was Solicitor General agrees. In its Manifestation and Motion in lieu
well and was ready to be discharged but complainant was not of Appellee’s Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General
around to take her home. A week later, complainant came back recommends their acquittal.
but did not have enough money to pay the hospital bill in the We agree.
amount of P300.00. Complainant likewise confided to accused- As we have mentioned above, this Court in Sombong v. Court
appellant, Dr. Carmen Ty that no one would take care of the of Appeals10 affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals
child at home as she was working. She then inquired about the reversing the trial court’s ruling that complainant has rightful
rate of the nursery and upon being told that the same was custody over the child, Cristina Grace Neri, the latter not being
P50.00 per day, she decided to leave her child to the care of identical with complainant’s daughter, Arabella. The Court
the clinic nursery. Consequently, Arabella was transferred from discoursed, thusly:
the ward to the nursery.4 Petitioner does not have the right of custody over the minor
Thereafter, hospital bills started to mount and accumulate. It Cristina because, by the evidence disclosed before the court a
was at this time that accused-appellant Dr. Ty suggested to the quo, Cristina has not been shown to be petitioner’s daughter,
complainant that she hire a “yaya” for P400.00 instead of the Arabella. The evidence adduced before the trial court does not
daily nursery fee of P50.00. Complainant agreed, hence, a warrant the conclusion that Arabella is the same person as
“yaya” was hired. Arabella was then again transferred from the Cristina.
nursery to the extension of the clinic which served as residence x x x
for the hospital staff.5 In the instant case, the testimonial and circumstantial proof
From then on, nothing was heard of the complainant. She establishes the individual and separate existence of
neither visited her child nor called to inquire about her petitioner’s child, Arabella, from that of private respondents’
whereabouts. Her estranged husband came to the clinic once foster child, Cristina.
but did not get the child. Efforts to get in touch with the We note, among others, that Dr. Trono, who is petitioner’s own
complainant were unsuccessful as she left no address or witness, testified in court that, together with Arabella, there
telephone number where she can be reached. This were several babies left in the clinic and so she could not be
development prompted Dr. Ty to notify the barangay captain of certain whether it was Arabella or some other baby that was
the child’s abandonment.6 Eventually, the hospital staff took given to private respondents. Petitioner’s own evidence shows
turns in taking care of Arabella.7 that, after the confinement of Arabella in the clinic in 1987, she
_______________ saw her daughter again only in 1989 when she visited the
clinic. This corroborates the
4 TSN, April 8, 1994, pp. 4-13. _______________
5 Ibid.
6 Exhibit 8. 9 G.R. No. 111876, January 31, 1996.
7 See Note 4, supra, pp. 14-17. 10 Ibid.
749 751

VOL. 263, OCTOBER 30, 1996 VOL. 263, OCTOBER 30, 1996
749 751
People vs. Ty People vs. Ty
Sometime in 1989, two (2) years after Arabella was abandoned testimony of petitioner’s own witness, Dra. Ty, that Arabella
by complainant, Dr. Fe Mallonga, a dentist at the clinic, was physically confined in the clinic from November, 1987 to
suggested during a hospital staff conference that Arabella be April, 1989. This testimony tallies with her assertion in her
entrusted to a guardian who could give the child the love and counter-affidavit to the effect that Arabella was in the custody
affection, personal attention and caring she badly needed as of the hospital until April, 1989. All this, when juxtaposed with
she was thin and sickly. The suggestion was favorably the unwavering declaration of private respondents that they
obtained custody of Cristina in April, 1988 and had her
Page 16 of 71
baptized at the Good Samaritan Church on April 30, 1988, thereon; that he carefully considers all these, and that the act
leads to the conclusion that Cristina is not Arabella. is not suddenly committed. It implies that the perpetrator must
Significantly, Justice Lourdes K. Tayao-Jaguros, herself a mother be capable of the exercise of such mental powers as are called
and the ponente of the herein assailed decision, set the case into use by deliberation and the consideration and weighing of
for hearing on August 30, 1993 primarily for the purpose of motives and consequences.13
observing petitioner’s demeanor towards the minor Cristina. Similarly, the word deliberate is defined in Corpus Juris
She made the following personal but relevant manifestation: Secundum as:
The undersigned ponente as a mother herself of four children, DELIBERATE.
wanted to see how petitioner as an alleged mother of a missing As a Verb
child supposedly in the person of Cristina Neri would react on The word is derived from two Latin words which mean literally
seeing again her long lost child. The petitioner appeared in the ‘concerning’ and ‘to weigh’; it implies the possession of a mind
scheduled hearing of this case late, and she walked inside the capable of conceiving a purpose to act, and the exercise of
courtroom looking for a seat without even stopping at her such mental powers as are called into use by the consideration
alleged daughter’s seat; without even casting a glance on said and weighing of the motives and the consequences of the act;
child, and without even that tearful embrace which and has been defined as meaning to consider, reflect, take
characterizes the reunion of a loving mother with her missing counsel, or to weigh the arguments for and against a proposed
dear child. Throughout the proceedings, the undersigned course of action; to consider and examine the reasons for and
ponente noticed no signs of endearment and affection against, consider maturely, ponder, reflect upon, or weigh in
expected of a mother who had been deprived of the embrace the mind; to reflect, with a view to make a choice; to weigh the
of her little child for many years. The conclusion or finding of motives for an act and its consequences, with a view to a
undersigned ponente as a mother, herself, that petitioner- decision thereon.
appellee is not the mother of Cristina Neri has been given As an Adjective
support by aforestated observation x x x. The word, used adjectively, implies action after thought and
x x x reflection, and relates to the end proposed; indicates a purpose
Since we hold that petitioner has not been established by formed in a mind capable of conceiving a purpose; and is
evidence to be entitled to the custody of the minor Cristina on based upon an intention accompanied by such circumstances
account of mistaken identity, it cannot be said that private as evidence a mind fully conscious of its own purpose and
respondents are unlawfully withholding from petitioner the design. It has been defined as meaning carefully considered;
rightful custody over Cristina. At this juncture, we need not circumspect; entered upon after deliberation and with fixed
inquire into the validity of the mode by which private purpose, formed after careful considera-
respondents acquired custodial rights over the minor, Cristina. _______________
x x x
752 13 Black, Fifth Edition, 1979, p. 384.
754
752
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 754
People vs. Ty SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Under the facts and ruling in Sombong, as well as the evidence People vs. Ty
adduced in this case accused-appellants must perforce be tion, and fully or carefully considering the nature or
acquitted of the crime charged, there being no reason to hold consequences of an act or measure; maturely reflected; not
them liable for failing to return one Cristina Grace Neri, a child sudden or rash, carefully considering the probable
not conclusively shown and established to be complainant’s consequences of a step; premeditated; slow in determining;
daughter, Arabella. weighing facts and arguments with a view to a choice of
The foregoing notwithstanding, even if we were to consider decision; well-advised.
Cristina Grace Neri and Arabella Sombong as one and the same Under some circumstances, it has been held synonymous with,
person, still, the instant criminal case against the accused- or equivalent to, ‘intentional,’ ‘premeditated,’ and ‘willful.’
appellants must fall. Under other circumstances, however, it has been compared
Before a conviction for kidnapping and failure to return a minor with or distinguished from, ‘premeditated,’ ‘sudden,’ and
under Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code can be had, two ‘willful.’14
elements must concur, namely: (a) the offender has been Essentially, the word deliberate as used in the article must
entrusted with the custody of the minor, and (b) the offender imply something more than mere negligence; it must be pre-
deliberately fails to restore said minor to his parents or meditated, obstinate, headstrong, foolishly daring or
guardians. The essential element herein is that the offender is intentionally and maliciously wrong.
entrusted with the custody of the minor but what is actually In the case at bar, it is evident that there was no deliberate
punishable is not the kidnapping of the minor, as the title of refusal or failure on the part of the accused-appellants to
the article seems to indicate, but rather the deliberate failure restore the custody of the complainant’s child to her. When the
or refusal of the custodian of the minor to restore the latter to accused-appellants learned that complainant wanted her
his parents or guardians.11 Said failure or refusal, however, daughter back after five (5) long years of apparent wanton
must not only be deliberate but must also be persistent as to neglect, they tried their best to help herein complainant find
oblige the parents or the guardians of the child to seek the aid the child as the latter was no longer under the clinic’s care.
of the courts in order to obtain custody.12 The key word Accused-appellant Dr. Ty did not have the address of Arabella’s
therefore of this element is deliberate and Black’s Law guardians but as soon as she obtained it from Dr. Fe Mallonga
Dictionary defines deliberate as: who was already working abroad, she personally went to the
Deliberate, adj. Well advised; carefully considered; not sudden guardians’ residence and informed them that herein
or rash; circumspect; slow in determining. Willful rather than complainant wanted her daughter back. Dr. Ty testified as
merely intentional. Formed, arrived at, or determined upon as follows:
a result of careful thought and weighing of considerations, as a Q: Now, since you said a while ago that when you placed the
deliberate judgment or plan. Carried on coolly and steadily, child under the (sic) guardianship, you are (sic) aware that the
especially according to a preconceived design; given to natural mother will get back the child, why did you not return
weighing facts and arguments with a view to a choice or the minor to the natural mother?
decision; careful in considering the A: During that time mam, the resident physician who will (sic)
_______________ discharged the baby was not present because she was abroad.
Q: But then madam witness, are you aware where the child
11 Section 5 of Republic Act No. 18 amending Article 270 of the was and to whom it was given?
Revised Penal Code. _______________
12 Cuello Calon II, p. 701 cited in Gregorio, Fundamentals of
Criminal Law Review, 1988, 8th Edition, p. 496. 14 26 C.J.S. 689-690.
753 755

VOL. 263, OCTOBER 30, 1996 VOL. 263, OCTOBER 30, 1996
753 755
People vs. Ty People vs. Ty
consequences of a step; slow in action; unhurried; A: The exact address was not given to me, mam, before the
characterized by reflection; dispassionate; not rash. People v. resident physician left for abroad so, I asked the PAO to give
Thomas, 25 Cal. 2d 880, 156 P.2d 7, 17, 18. me one month to have (sic) a long distance call to this doctor
By the use of this word, in describing a crime, the idea is and asked her for the whereabout(s) of the child.
conveyed that the perpetrator weighs the motives for the act Q: And where you granted the thirty-day period by the Officer
and its consequences, the nature of the crime, or other things of the PAO?
connected with his intentions, with a view to a decision A: Yes, mam.
Page 17 of 71
Q: What happened if any during that thirty-day period? WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from
A: I was able to talk to Fe Mallonga in Bahrain and she told me is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, accused-
the exact address of the guardian, mam. appellants VICENTE TY and CARMEN TY are hereby ACQUITTED
Q: Were (sic) you informed (of) the exact address of the of the crime charged and are ordered to be released
guardian, did you informed (sic) the PAO? immediately unless they are being detained for other lawful
A: Yes, mam. causes. Costs de oficio.
ATTY. WARD: SO ORDERED.
Q: Then, what happened next, madam witness? Padilla (Chairman), Bellosillo, Vitug and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ.,
A: I was the one who went to the address to be sure that the concur.
child was really there, mam. Judgment reversed and set aside. Accused-appellants
Q: And did you see the child? acquitted.
A: Yes, mam. Notes.—Even if the purpose of the kidnapping alleged by the
Q: What did you do with the child? defense be accepted — that is, to compel payment of the
A: I just tell (sic) the child, ‘Ay ang laki mo na pala,’ I just told hospitalization expenses of the brother of one of the accused
the child like that and I’ve (sic) talked also to the guardian — under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
during that time, mam. Republic Act No. 1084, the offense is still kidnapping for
Q: And what did you tell the guardian? ransom. (People vs. Akiran, 18 SCRA 239 [1966])
A: I told the guardian that the rightful mother was claiming for Intention to sell the minor for profit is not an element of
the child and that we should talked (sic) with each other at the kidnapping and failure to return a minor under Art. 270 of the
PAO for the decision, mam. Revised Penal Code. (People vs. Bondoc, 232 SCRA 478 [1994])
Q: Did the guardian bring the child to the PAO’s Office (sic)? For kidnapping to exist, there must be indubitable proof that
A: No mam, she did not appear. the actual intent of the malefactor was to deprive the offended
Q: Why? party of her liberty. (People vs. Godoy, 250 SCRA 676 [1995])
A: They told me first that they are (sic) going to contract a ——o0o——
lawyer but for (sic) several days, she did not respond anymore, © Copyright 2020 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
mam.15 People vs. Ty, 263 SCRA 745, G.R. No. 121519 October 30,
When the guardians refused to return the child, accused- 1996
appellant Dr. Ty sought the assistance of the National Bureau
of Investigation (NBI) which conducted a conference among 420
_______________ SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Astorga
15 TSN, August 17, 1994, pp. 18-21.
756 G.R. No. 110097. December 22, 1997.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
756 ARNULFO ASTORGA, accused-appellant.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Ty Criminal Law; Kidnapping; Grave Coercion; Evidence;
the parties but since a case was yet to be filed, the custody of Witnesses; Testimonies of the prosecution witnesses cannot be
the minor remained with the guardians. This fact is evident expected to be uniform to the last detail.—We hold, however,
from the following testimony, thus: that inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses concerning
Q: You testified on cross-examination that you located the minor details and collateral matters, like the examples cited by
whereabouts of the child sometime later, what steps did you appellant, do not affect the substance, veracity or weight of
take up (sic) after you found the child? their declarations. These inconsistencies reinforce, rather than
A: I explained to the guardian that the verbal agreement weaken, their credibility, for different witnesses of startling
between the supposed to be guardianship was only a plain events usually perceive things differently. Indeed, the
guardianship and not as an adoption, sir. testimonies of the prosecution witnesses cannot be expected
Q: You said you went to the NBI after you found the child, why to be uniform to the last detail.
did you go to the NBI? Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Delay or vacillation in
A: Because the guardian are (sic) not willing to surrender the making a criminal accusation does not necessarily weaken the
child to the PAO’s Office (sic), that is why I asked their help, credibility of a witness where such delay is satisfactorily
sir.16 explained.—The charge is not belied by the one-week delay in
x x x the filing of the complaint. It has been held that delay or
Q: Now, when you informed the present custodian that the vacillation in making a criminal accusation does not necessarily
natural mother is now claiming the child, why were you not weaken the credibility of a witness where such delay is
able to get the minor? satisfactorily explained. In the present case, one week
A: I was not able to get the minor so I asked the help of the _______________
NBI to have the child surrender (sic), mam.
ATTY. WARD: * THIRD DIVISION.
Q: And what happened when you get (sic) the assistance of 421
the NBI?
A: They were the ones who asked the guardian to surrender VOL. 283, DECEMBER 22, 1997
the child, mam. 421
Q: You stated a while ago that there was no written People vs. Astorga
agreement between you or your hospital and the guardian of was reasonable, considering that the victim was a resident of
the minor, is that correct? Binuangan and that the case was filed in Tagum, Davao.
A:  Yes, mam. Same; Same; Same; Same; Motive; Motive is totally irrelevant
Q: For what reason if you know, why (did) the guardian did when ample direct evidence sustains the culpability of the
(sic) not follow you or obey you when you want (sic) to get accused beyond reasonable doubt.—Motive is not an element
back the child? of the crime. Furthermore, motive becomes material only when
A: I don’t know of any reason, mam.17 the evidence is circumstantial or inconclusive, and there is
The efforts taken by the accused-appellants to help the some doubt on whether a crime has been committed or
complainant in finding the child clearly negate the finding that whether the accused has committed it. Indeed, motive is
there was a deliberate refusal or failure on their part to totally irrelevant when ample direct evidence sustains the
_______________ culpability of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Elements of Kidnapping.—Under
16 Id., at 37. Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of
17 Id., at 27-29. kidnapping are as follows: “1. That the offender is a private
757 individual. 2. That he kidnaps or detains another, or in any
other manner deprives the latter of his liberty. 3. That the act
VOL. 263, OCTOBER 30, 1996 of detention or kidnapping must be illegal. 4. That in the
757 commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances
People vs. Ty is present: (a) That the kidnapping or detention lasts for more
restore the child to her mother. Evidence is simply wanting in than five (5) days; or (b) That it is committed simulating public
this regard. authority; or (c) That any serious physical injuries are inflicted
It is worthy to note that accused-appellants’ conduct from the upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him
moment the child was left in the clinic’s care up to the time the are made; or (d) That the person kidnapped or detained is a
child was given up for guardianship was motivated by nothing minor, female, or a public officer.”
more than an earnest desire to help the child and a high regard Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The Spanish version of
for her welfare and well-being. Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code uses the term “lockup”
Page 18 of 71
rather than “kidnap.”—The Spanish version of Article 267 of Penal Code, [he] is hereby sentenced to Reclusion Perpetua to
the Revised Penal Code uses the term “lockup” (encerrar) be served at the National Penitentiary, [Muntinlupa].”
rather than “kidnap” (secuestrar or raptar). Lockup is included _______________
in the broader term of “detention,” which refers not only to the
placing of a person in an enclosure which he cannot leave, but 1 Penned by Judge Marcial L. Fernandez.
also to any other deprivation of liberty which does not 2 Original Records, p. 1; rollo, p. 5.
necessarily involve locking up. Likewise, the Revised Penal 3 Atty. Fortunato M. Maranian; records, p. 34. The Public
Code was originally approved and enacted in Spanish. Attorney’s Office, however, filed Appellant’s Brief before this
Consequently, the Spanish text is controlling in cases of conflict Court.
with the English version, as provided in Section 15 of the 4 Records, pp. 60-66; rollo, pp. 13-19.
Revised Administrative Code. 5 Ibid., p. 66; rollo, p. 19.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Appellant cannot be convicted of 424
kidnapping under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code.—This
narration does not adequately establish actual confinement or 424
restraint of the victim, which is the primary element of SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
kidnapping. Appel- People vs. Astorga
422 This appeal was filed directly with this Court in view of the
penalty imposed.6
422 The Facts
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Evidence for the Prosecution
People vs. Astorga The evidence for the prosecution was narrated in the Decision
lant’s apparent intention was to take Yvonne against her will of the trial court, as follows:7
towards the direction of Tagum. Appellant’s plan did not “Prosecution witnesses extant from their testimonies
materialize, however, because Fabila’s group chanced upon categorically assert that around 6:30 P.M. children of neighbors
them. The evidence does not show that appellant wanted to were near the store of the grandparents of Yvonne Traya.
detain Yvonne; much less, that he actually detained her. Incidentally, there was a brown out that evening hence candle
Appellant’s forcible dragging of Yvonne to a place only he knew was used. The daughter and nephew of her aunt Bebeth were
cannot be said to be an actual confinement or restriction on quarelling [sic] about the possession of a flashlight until the
the person of Yvonne. There was no “lockup.” Accordingly, glass got lost. Accused or ‘Boy’ Astorga, went near and asked
appellant cannot be convicted of kidnapping under Article 267 her daughter Jane what happened. Glenda or Bebeth grabbed
of the Revised Penal Code. her baby and went home.
Same; Same; Same; Elements of Grave Coercion.—Rather, the Accused told Yvonne to go with him to buy candy. She did not
felony committed in this case is grave coercion under Article answer and accused immediately grabbed and hold [sic] her
286 of the same code. Grave coercion or coaccion grave has hand. Accused placed his hand on her shoulder and covered his
three elements: (a) that any person is prevented by another [sic] mouth.
from doing something not prohibited by law, or compelled to Yvonne was only eight (8) years old on 29 December 1991
do something against his or her will, be it right or wrong; (b) when she was brought by the accused allegedly to buy candy.
that the prevention or compulsion is effected by violence, Some stores were closed; others were opened. Accused never
either by material force or such a display of it as would produce went inside the store to buy candy. Instead she [sic] held and
intimidation and, consequently, control over the will of the dragged Yvonne until they went inside the compound of Maco
offended party; and (c) that the person who restrains the will Elementary School. They were walking inside the perimeter
and liberty of another has no right to do so or, in other words, fence, [while the accused was] holding closely the child. Later,
that the restraint is not made under authority of a law or in the there being no person around the gate, accused brought her
exercise of any lawful right. out to the highway and walked towards the direction of Tagum.
APPEAL from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Tagum, Yvonne stays with her grandparents and so with her parents at
Davao, Branch 1. Sitio Binuangan, Maco. She asked him where they were going
and
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. _______________
     The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
     Public Attorney’s Office for accused-appellant. 6 The case was deemed submitted for resolution upon receipt
PANGANIBAN, J.: by the Court on January 16, 1996 of the letter of the Bureau of
Corrections dated January 11, 1996 confirming the confinement
Actual detention or “locking up” is the primary element of of the appellant at the New Bilibid Prisons.
kidnapping. If the evidence does not adequately prove this 7 Decision, pp. 1-3; rollo, pp. 13-15.
element, the accused cannot be held liable for kidnapping. In 425
the present case, the prosecution merely proved that appellant
forcibly dragged the victim toward a place only he knew. There VOL. 283, DECEMBER 22, 1997
being no actual detention or confinement, the appellant may 425
be convicted only of grave coercion. People vs. Astorga
423 accused answered that they were going home. She told him
that they were already on the opposite direction because her
VOL. 283, DECEMBER 22, 1997 grandparent’s house is at Binuangan, while their route was
423 going towards Tagum. Indeed, it was an opposite direction.
People vs. Astorga Notwithstanding the assertion of Yvonne that they were on the
The Case wrong direction, accused placed his hands on her shoulder and
The foregoing principle is used by this Court in resolving the dragged her. She cried and protested that she must go home.
appeal of Arnulfo Astorga challenging the March 31, 1993 Accused did not heed her plea and while she was forced to
Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court of Tagum, Davao walk she continued crying.
convicting him of kidnapping. While accused and Yvonne were walking in the situation as
In an Information2 dated March 24, 1992 and docketed as described, somewhere near the Luponlupon bridge they met
Criminal Case No. 8243, Appellant Arnulfo Astorga was charged some group of men. Having met on their opposite direction, the
with violation of Article 267, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal two, were noticed by the group of youngsters. The group were
Code, allegedly committed as follows: bound to Maco Catholic Church to see a drama. Having met the
“That on or about December 29, 1991 in the Municipality of two and as noticed by the group accused keep [sic] on looking
Tagum, Province of Davao, Philippines, and within the back at them. The group were suspicious about the man who
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, was bringing a child. The group decided to follow them.
with deliberate intent and by means of force, did then and Accused hurriedly walked fast with Yvonne, and to prevent
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap Yvonne Traya, from being overtaken, he carried the victim and ran. They were
a minor, 8 years of age, thereby depriving her of her liberty chased. After a distance of half a kilometer they were
against her will, to the damage and prejudice of said offended overtaken.
party.” Edwin Fabila declared that Jonathan, one of his companions
Arraigned on February 24, 1993, Appellant Astorga, duly with others in chasing, asked the accused where they were
assisted by his counsel,3 pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial bound. He answered towards Binuangan. The group noticed
on the merits ensued. The dispositive portion of the assailed something suspicious because their destination was already
Decision4 reads as follows:5 towards Tagum which is an opposite direction to Binuangan.
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the guilt of accused When asked who is the child, accused answered Traya.
ARNULFO ASTORGA having been proven beyond reasonable Jonathan one of those who chased knew the family. He got
doubt, pursuant to Article 267, paragraph 4 of the Revised from the accused Yvonne who showed some resistance.
Nevertheless, the group brought her home at Binuangan.
Page 19 of 71
Likewise, accused was also brought by them to Yvonne’s home. of youngsters were chasing him, he carried Yvonne and ran
The house of accused and Yvonne were five (5) meters away. until they covered a distance of half a kilometer in chasing
Accused wanted to talk to the parents of the victim, but he was them, until they had overtaken him.
driven by her aunt and adviced [sic] to leave otherwise he will If he was that intoxicated, being under stupor and weakened
be stabbed by Yvonne’s father. He left and never talked with by liquor, he could not ran that fast carrying Yvonne for half a
the family.” kilometer.
Evidence for the Defense Moreover, Yvonne categorically in straight forward testimony
The facts as viewed by the defense are presented in the asserted that she did not smell liquor on the accused.
Appellant’s Brief,8 dated December 10, 1993: Accused, naivety [sic], that because of his intoxication, he got
_______________ lost and was not able to proceed with Yvonne to Binuangan
was a shallow afterthought.
8 At pp. 5-7; rollo, pp. 40-42. It must be recalled that Yvonne told him they were already
426 going at opposite direction from home. Instead they were
heeding towards Tagum. Accused did not change course.
426 _______________
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Astorga 9 Decision, pp. 3-7; rollo, pp. 15-19.
“The defense consisted of the testimonies of Arbeth Nalcot and 428
the accused-appellant himself.
Arbeth Nalcot, a resident of Tagum, Davao, testified tht [sic] in 428
the afternoon of December 29, 1991, she was at the Municipal SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Hall of Maco, Davao. She saw Astorga with two (2) companions. People vs. Astorga
They were drinking Red Horse and were already drunk. When x x x      x x x      x x x
they finished drinking, she went with Astorga to the latter’s Again, not only force was employed in having Yvonne as
house. (TSN, pp. 7-8 and 18, March 23, 1993). The house of captive by dragging, slapping her mouth and was holding her
Astorga is about 5 meters away from the house of the tight, but accused also used psychological means of scaring
complainant[.] Yvonne came and asked money from the her about a red eyed ghost.
accused to buy candy. The two went together and she was left Through this means and efforts, Yvonne was deprived of her
behind. She told them to hurry up. When they failed to return, liberty and was by force prevented to go home to her parents.
she looked for them, but because it was already dark, she did On rebuttal, Yvonne denied that she asked money from
not find them. She went back to the house of the accused. accused to buy candy. She also denied as testified by defense
(Ibid., pp. 10-11). witness Arbeth Nalcot that she went to the house of the
Arnulfo Astorga, a resident of Maco, Davao and a gold panner accused on 29 December 1991 or on any other dates to ask
testified that ‘at around 1:00 P.M. of December 29, 1991, he money from Astorga for candy.
arrived at Maco from Tagum. Upon arrival his two friends, Defense evidence are [sic] punctured with unbelievability in his
Vicvic and Anding were already at his home. They decided to off tangent and incredible theory of drunkardness. His alleged
drink, hence they proceeded to Adecor Cottage and drank two being lost in the direction of Binuangan in spite of Yvonne’s
gallons of Tuba. At around 2:00 P.M., they were at the market insistence and that of the person they met that he was on the
place and drink beer grande. At 5:00 P.M. on the same day, the wrong way considering that there are no criss crossing roads
three proceeded near the municipal hall and with some except the highway, is preposterous.”
persons, they again continued their drinking spree taking up The Issues
Red Horse wine.’ (Decision, p. 3). Appellant imputes the following errors to the trial court:10
At about 6:00 P.M., he was already drunk and he went home. “I
Yvonne approached him and asked him money to buy candy.
He told her that they will buy. They were not able to buy The trial court erred in giving credence to the testimonies of
because the two stores where they went were already closed. the prosecution’s witnesses which were replete with
(TSN, pp. 12 and 13, March 24, 1993). He took her for a stroll inconsistencies and contradictions.
for his drunkeness [sic] to subside. They walked inside the II
school premises which was about 20 meters away from the
second store. They went out of the school compound going The trial court erred in convicting the appellant despite the fact
towards Lupon-lupon because due to his drunkneness [sic], he that Yvonne Traya was not detained, locked-up or deprived of
thought it was the way towards their house. (Ibid., pp. 14-15) her liberty.
They reached Lupon-lupon bridge, crossed it twice thinking _______________
that it was the bridge near the municipal hall. After reaching
Purok, they met several persons, he was asked were (sic) they 10 Appellant’s Brief, p. 1; rollo, p. 36; original text in upper
were heading, and he answered to Tagumpay, but he was told case.
that they [sic] way was already going to Tagum. He requested 429
those persons to guide them to Tagumpay. They asked him
who was the child he was carrying. He answered that it was VOL. 283, DECEMBER 22, 1997
Traya’s child. (Ibid, pp. 16-17). He was carrying the child 429
because he was already crying as she already wanted to go People vs. Astorga
home. The group of persons, men and women, guided them. III
Yvonne was being held by the women. They arrived at
427 The trial court erred in convicting the appellant despite the fact
that appellant had no motive to kidnap Yvonne Traya.”
VOL. 283, DECEMBER 22, 1997 In the main, appellant challenges the credibility of the
427 prosecution witnesses and the legal characterization of the
People vs. Astorga acts imputed to him.
Yvonne’s house. He talked to the auntie of the child and told The Court’s Ruling
her that he would converse with her but he was advised to go The appeal is partly meritorious. Appellant should be convicted
away because the father of Yvonne might hack him. So he only of grave coercion, not kidnapping.
went home. (Ibid., pp. 18-19)” First Issue: Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses
The Trial Court’s Ruling Appellant contends that the testimonies of the prosecution
The trial court justified its finding of guilt with the following witnesses are not worthy of credence because they were
discussion:9 inconsistent and improbable. He cites the following:
“Accused insisted [that] he was already drunk hence when he “Glenda Chavez testified that she was present when the
took Yvonne to buy candy, he strolled with her so that his accused told Yvonne that they will buy candy. She sensed that
drunkenness be subsided. the accused was drunk. (TSN, pp. 10-11, March 10, 1993).
All these defense version was rebutted by Yvonne when she These testimonies were contradicted by Yvonne Traya when
categorically declared that she did not smell liquor on the she declared that Glenda Chavez had already went [sic] inside
accused. their house when [the] accused told her that they will buy
His defense of intoxication has no leg to stand [on]. candy (TSN, pp. 10, March 16, 1993). She testified that she did
Consider these facts. not smell liquor on the accused. (Decision, pp. 3-4).
Never did he present Vicvic and Anding to corroborate that he Edwin Fabila testified that their group was able to overtake the
was intoxicated that afternoon and at dusk because of their accused at a distance of 2 fathoms and they [sic] him about 15
drinking spree from 1:00 P.M. until 5:00 P.M. to 20 meters (TSN, p. 35, March 10, 1993). Arnel Fabila, on the
He did not rebut the testimonies of Fabila that when they other hand, testified that they overtook the accused after
noticed his actions suspicious bringing with him a child, he chasing him at a distance of half kilometer (TSN, p. 10, March
walked fast dragging Yvonne. When he noticed that the group 11, 1993).
Page 20 of 71
Yvonne Traya testified that the accused could not ran fast e) That the accused was not hurt by the group of youngsters
carrying her because she was heavy. (TSN, p. 19, March 16, who allegedly rescued the child, nor was immediately brought
1993). However, Arnel Fabila declared that they were able to to the municipal hall which was just near the house of the
overtake the accused only after chasing him at a distance of victim for the filing of the necessary charge; this [sic]
half kilometer (TSN, p. 10, March 11, 1993) meaning accused actuations only confirm the
was running fast.”11 _______________
_______________
driaga, 211 SCRA 698, 712, July 23, 1992; People vs. Custodio,
11 Ibid., pp. 8-9; rollo, pp. 43-44. 197 SCRA 538, May 27, 1991; People vs. Cabato, 160 SCRA 98,
430 107, April 15, 1988; People vs. Salufrania, 159 SCRA 401, 416,
March 30, 1988.
430 17 TSN, March 11, 1993, p. 10.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 18 Appellant’s Brief, pp. 11-12; rollo, pp. 46-47.
People vs. Astorga 432
We hold, however, that inconsistencies in the testimonies of
witnesses concerning minor details and collateral matters, like 432
the examples cited by appellant, do not affect the substance, SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
veracity or weight of their declarations. These inconsistencies People vs. Astorga
reinforce, rather than weaken, their credibility, for different fact that the accused merely sought their help in guiding them
witnesses of startling events usually perceive things home, and
differently.12 Indeed, the testimonies of the prosecution f) That it took more than one week for the complainant and her
witnesses cannot be expected to be uniform to the last detail. parents to file the case at the Fiscal’s Office.”
The testimony of Glenda Chavez that the accused was drunk at We cannot sustain these contentions. The charge is not belied
that time allegedly contradicted Yvonne’s statement that the by the one-week delay in the filing of the complaint. It has
accused did not smell of liquor. This does not detract from the been held that delay or vacillation in making a criminal
credibility of either witness. Yvonne, then an eight-year-old accusation does not necessarily weaken the credibility of a
child,13 and her Aunt Glenda, then twenty-seven years old,14 witness where such delay is satisfactorily explained.19 In the
do not have the same experiences or level of maturity; hence, present case, one week was reasonable, considering that the
their perceptions of events differ. More important, whether the victim was a resident of Binuangan and that the case was filed
accused was drunk or not is an insignificant detail that does in Tagum, Davao.
not substantially affect the testimonies of these witnesses. Furthermore, the group whom appellant met did not hurt or
Further, the discrepancy in the witnesses’ estimate—of the bring him to the municipal hall, because they deemed it more
distance covered by the men who chased appellant does not urgent at the time to rescue Yvonne and to bring her home,
render their testimonies incredible.15 Quite the contrary, such which they actually did.20 There is no settled rule on how a
discrepancy shows their candor and sincerity, demonstrating group of young men should react upon seeing a young girl
that their testimonies were unrehearsed.16 Yvonne testified snatched by an older man. Verily, violence is not the only
_______________ normal reaction of young men who see a girl being forcibly
taken.
12 People vs. De Leon, 248 SCRA 609, 619, September 28, Appellant’s claim that he and Yvonne were merely strolling and
1995; People vs. Buka, 205 SCRA 567, 583, January 30, 1992. walking casually does not negate the fact that Yvonne was
13 TSN, March 16, 1993, p. 5. deprived of her will. As noted by the trial court, appellant used
14 TSN, March 10, 1993, p. 5. physical force and psychological means in restraining her.21
15 People vs. Nicolas, 241 SCRA 67, 74, February 1, 1995 citing Despite her young age, Yvonne was able to clearly recount the
People vs. Payumo, G.R. No. 81761, July 2, 1990, 187 SCRA 64; events that transpired on that fateful night.
People vs. Irenea, 164 SCRA 121, August 5, 1988; People vs. Moreover, there is no merit in the argument that the people
Cariño, 165 SCRA 664, September 26, 1988; People vs. De travelling or living along the highway should have noticed
Gracia, 18 SCRA 197, September 29, 1966; People vs. Muñoz, _______________
166 SCRA 730, July 29, 1988; Cordial vs. People, 166 SCRA 17,
September 27, 1988. 19 People vs. Dabon, 216 SCRA 656, 667, December 16, 1992;
16 People vs. Padilla, 242 SCRA 629, 642, March 23, 1995 People vs. Banayo, 195 SCRA 543, March 22, 1991; People vs.
citing People vs. Lase, 219 SCRA 584 [1993]; People vs. Yambao, 193 SCRA 571, February 6, 1991; People vs. Santiago,
Jumamoy, 221 SCRA 333, April 7, 1993; People vs. Ducay, 225 197 SCRA 556, May 28, 1991; People vs. Canciller, 206 SCRA
SCRA 1, August 2, 1993; People vs. De Guzman, 188 SCRA 407, 827, 831, March 4, 1992; People vs. Baysa, 172 SCRA 706,
411, August 7, 1990; People vs. Gadiana, 195 SCRA 211, March April 25, 1989.
13, 1991; People vs. Ma 20 TSN, March 16, 1993, pp. 20-21.
431 21 Decision, pp. 6-7; rollo, pp. 18-19.
433
VOL. 283, DECEMBER 22, 1997
431 VOL. 283, DECEMBER 22, 1997
People vs. Astorga 433
that when appellant noticed the group of men following them, People vs. Astorga
he carried her and ran. Yvonne’s testimony is in accord with appellant and Yvonne. The fact is that a group of men actually
that of Arnel Fabila—a member of the group who chased noticed and ultimately chased them.
appellant—that they were able to overtake appellant after All in all, appellant utterly fails to justify a departure from the
chasing him half a kilometer.17 long settled rule that the trial court’s assessment of the
Appellant’s challenge to the credibility of the prosecution credibility of witnesses should be accorded great respect on
account is also premised on the alleged failure of the trial court appeal.22
to consider the following points:18 Second Issue: No Motive to “Kidnap”
“a) that the alleged victim admitted that she and the accused Petitioner contends that “[t]here was no evidence presented to
casually moved around the school premises, as if they were prove why the accused should kidnap Yvonne Traya.” He
strolling; That when they were already in the highway, they submits that “the prosecution had failed to prove [any] motive
were also walking openly and casually until they were met by a to support the alleged kidnapping incident, thus, making the
group of youngster[s]. Edwin Fabila, one of the prosecution’s theory of the defense more credible and believable.”23
witnesses, corroborated the fact that the two were walking The contention is insignificant. Motive is not an element of the
casually along the highway when he first saw them; crime. Furthermore, motive becomes material only when the
b) That it is highly incredible that accused and the alleged evidence is circumstantial or inconclusive, and there is some
victim will not be seen or noticed by the people travelling or doubt on whether a crime has been committed or whether the
those persons residing along the highway if it was true that the accused has committed it. Indeed, motive is totally irrelevant
accused was dragging her and she was continuously crying when ample direct evidence sustains the culpability of the
from her residence up to a distance of more than one accused beyond reasonable doubt.24 In this case, the identity
kilometer; of appellant is not in question. He himself admitted having
c) That the accused and the alleged victim were travelling at a taken Yvonne to Maco Central Elementary School.
very slow pace; a distance of barely a kilometer for a period of Third Issue: Kidnapping or Coercion?
more than two hours; Appellant contends that the prosecution failed to prove one
d) That the accused was very drunk, having been drinking essential element of kidnapping—the fact of detention or the
different kinds of intoxicating liquors from 1:00 p.m. to 5:00 deprivation of liberty. The solicitor general counters that
p.m., causing him to be confused on which way they should deprivation of liberty is not limited to imprisoning or placing
take in going home. _______________

Page 21 of 71
22 People vs. Ramos, 240 SCRA 191, 201, January 18, 1995; What school did Boy Astorga bring you? What is the name of
People vs. Dolar, et al., 231 SCRA 414, 422-423, March 24, the school?
1994; People vs. De Guzman, 216 SCRA 754, 759-760, A
December 21, 1992. Maco Central Elementary School.
23 Appellant’s Brief, p. 13; rollo, p. 48. _______________
24 People vs. Sta. Agata, 244 SCRA 677, 684, June 1, 1995
citing People vs. Cayetano, 223 SCRA 770; People vs. Magpayo, 28 Aquino, The Revised Penal Code, 1988 ed., Vol. III, pp. 1-2
226 SCRA 13; People vs. Joya, 227 SCRA 9. citing Groizard and Cuello Calon.
434 29 Aquino, The Revised Penal Code, 1988 ed., Vol. I, pp. 3-4,
citing People vs. Manaba, 58 Phil. 665; People vs. Mesias, 65
434 Phil. 267; People vs. Yabut, 58 Phil. 479; People vs. Balubar, 60
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Phil. 698; People vs. Abilong, 82 Phil. 172; Cadiz, 1 ACR and
People vs. Astorga other cases; Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Criminal Law,
the victim in an enclosure. Citing People vs. Crisostomo,25 he Twelfth Edition, 1981, Book One, pp. 17-18.
argues: 30 TSN, March 16, 1993, pp. 10-18.
‘(T)he act proven in the record constitutes (kidnapping). It is no 436
argument against this conclusion that the accused deprived
the offended party of her liberty without placing her in an 436
inclosure; because illegal detention, as defined and punished in SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
our Code, may consist not only in imprisoning a person but also People vs. Astorga
in detaining her or depriving her in any manner of her Q
liberty.”26 How far is Maco Central Elementary School from your house?
We agree with appellant’s contention this time. A
Under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code,27 the elements of A little bit near.
kidnapping are as follows: Q
“1. That the offender is a private individual. When Boy Astorga brought you to school, was it dark?
2. That he kidnaps or detains another, or in any other manner A
deprives the latter of his liberty. Yes, sir.
3. That the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal. Q
4. That in the commission of the offense, any of the following Exactly where in Maco Elementary School did Boy Astorga
circumstances is present: bring you?
(a) That the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than five (5) A
days; or Inside the gate, sir.
(b) That it is committed simulating public authority; or Q
(c) That any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the And once inside the gate what did he do to you?
person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; A
or We were going around the school?
(d) That the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female,  
or a public officer.” x x x      x x x      x x x
The Spanish version of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code Q
uses the term “lockup” (encerrar) rather than “kidnap” Do you know why you were going around the school?
(secuestrar or raptar). Lockup is included in the broader term A
of “detention,” which refers not only to the placing of a person Yes, sir.
in an enclosure which he cannot leave, but also to any other Q
_______________ Why, what did he do?
A
25 46 Phil. 775 (1923). We were going around and when he saw that there is noperson
26 Appellee’s Brief, p. 13, rollo, p. 81. in the gate we passed at that gate.
27 Prior to its amendment by Section 8, RA No. 7659, effective Q
December 31, 1993. The crime happened in 1991. And where did he go after passing that gate?
435 A
Towards Lupon-lupon, sir.
VOL. 283, DECEMBER 22, 1997  
435 x x x      x x x      x x x
People vs. Astorga Q
deprivation of liberty which does not necessarily involve What about you, did you talk to him?
locking up.28 Likewise, the Revised Penal Code was originally A
approved and enacted in Spanish. Consequently, the Spanish I asked him where we were going and he told me that we are
text is controlling in cases of conflict with the English version, going home and I told him that this is not the way to our house,
as provided in Section 15 of the Revised Administrative and we did not pass this way. (Witness gesturing a certain
Code.29 direction).
A review of the events as narrated by the prosecution Q
witnesses ineluctably shows the absence of “locking up.” And so when you said that that is not the way, when you said
Victim Yvonne Traya testified:30 that is not the way because our house is towards
“Q Binuangan . . .
And after that what happened next?  
A By the way, you said you were going to Lupon-lupon, do you
When Auntie Bebeth went inside her house she was already know to what direction is going to Lupon-lupon, to what place
bringing her child and bringing with her candle. And Arnulfo is Lupon-lupon going to?
Astorga told me that we will buy candy, sir. A
Q Yes, sir.
And after that? Q
A Where?
And while I was not answering the question he immediately A
grabbed me. Going to my place.
  Q
x x x      x x x      x x x Do you know the place where it was going? What is that place?
Q A
And after that, after he held your hand, what did he do next? On the road going to Tagum.
A 437
He placed his hands on my shoulder and also covering [sic] my
mouth. VOL. 283, DECEMBER 22, 1997
  437
x x x      x x x      x x x People vs. Astorga
Q Q
And after that what did he do next? Now, what about your house, where is it going?
A A
He brought me to the school. To Binuangan.
Q Q
Page 22 of 71
And so when you . . . what did he do next when you said that is A
not the place going to your house? He continued dragging me and after that we met plenty of
A persons and I shouted for help and at that instance, he slapped
We continued walking and he also placed his hands on my my mouth and after a few steps he already carried me.
shoulder and dragged me, sir.  
Q x x x      x x x      x x x
What about you, what did you do when he was dragging you? A
A He continued walking and I also continued crying and I told him
I was crying, sir. that I want to go home and he told me that we are heading
Q towards home, but I told him that the way we are going to is
Did you say any word to him when you were crying? not the way to our house.
A Q
Yes, I told him that we are going home. By the way, when you shouted [for] help, was it loud?
Q A
And what did Boy Astorga say? Yes, sir.
A Q
He told me that we will be going home, and told me not to So, what happened next?
make any noise because if I will make any noise we will be lost A
on our way. He continued running and he stopped several vehicles but they
Q did not stop, so, we just continued walking.
And so, what did you do? 439
A
I continued crying, sir. VOL. 283, DECEMBER 22, 1997
Q 439
And after that, what happened? People vs. Astorga
A Q
We continued walking and we met a person and he asked Boy After that, what happened next?
Astorga where we are going, sir. A
Q He moved closer to the banana plants. He looked back and he
What did that man ask Boy Astorga? saw that persons were already chasing him and after that he
A carried me and ran.”
The man asked Boy Astorga where are you going, and Boy From the foregoing, it is clear that the appellant and the victim
Astorga answered, to Binuangan, but the man continued to say were constantly on the move. They went to Maco Elementary
that this way is going to Tagum and not to Binuangan any School and strolled on the school grounds. When nobody was
more. at the Luponlupon bridge, appellant took the victim to the
Q highway leading to Tagum, Davao. At that time, Yvonne
What else did the man ask, if any? pleaded with appellant that she really wanted to go home to
A Binuangan, but appellant ignored her pleas and continued
I further said that we will already leave, and we will be the ones walking her toward the wrong direction. Later on, the group of
to go to Binuangan, and after that, Boy Astorga put me down Witness Arnel Fabila spotted them. Appellant Astorga carried
because he urinated. So, at that instance, I ran, but, after he the victim and ran, but Fabila’s group chased and caught up
urinated, he already took hold of me not to run any more with them.
because there is a ghost. This narration does not adequately establish actual
Q confinement or restraint of the victim, which is the primary
When you said you ran away after Boy Astorga left you when element of kidnapping.31 Appellant’s apparent intention was to
he urinated, where did you run? take Yvonne against her will towards the direction of Tagum.
A Appellant’s plan did not materialize, however, because Fabila’s
Towards Binuangan, sir. group chanced upon them. The evidence does not show that
Q appellant wanted to detain Yvonne; much less, that he actually
Towards the direction of your house? detained her. Appellant’s forcible dragging of Yvonne to a place
A only he knew cannot be said to be an actual confinement or
Yes, sir. restriction on the person of Yvonne. There was no “lockup.”
438 Accordingly, appellant cannot be convicted of kidnapping
under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code.
438 Rather, the felony committed in this case is grave coercion
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED under Article 286 of the same code. Grave coercion or coaccion
People vs. Astorga _______________
Q
And you were overtaken again by Boy Astorga? 31 People vs. Godoy, 250 SCRA 676, 728, December 6, 1995;
A People vs. Cua, 232 SCRA 507, 516, May 25, 1994; People vs.
Yes, sir. Puno, 219 SCRA 85, 93-94; February 17, 1993; United States
Q vs. Ancheta, 1 Phil. 165 (1902); United States vs. De Leon, 1
What did he do to you when you were overtaken by Boy Phil. 163 (1902); People vs. Remalate, 92 Phil. 48 (1952);
Astorga. People vs. Guerrero, 103 Phil. 1136 (1958); People vs. Ong, et
A al., 62 SCRA 174, January 30, 1975; People vs. Ty Sui Wong, et
He took hold of me again and he told me, he threatened me al., 83 SCRA 125, May 12, 1978; People vs. Jimenez, et al., 105
that there is [sic] a red eyes but I answered him that is [sic] not SCRA 721, July 24, 1981.
a red eyes of the ghost but that is a light coming from the 440
vehicle.
Q 440
Now, what happened next? SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
A People vs. Astorga
He placed a necklace on me, sir. grave has three elements: (a) that any person is prevented by
x x x      x x x      x x x another from doing something not prohibited by law, or
A compelled to do something against his or her will, be it right or
He was dragging me and I was crying when he was dragging wrong; (b) that the prevention or compulsion is effected by
me. violence, either by material force or such a display of it as
Q would produce intimidation and, consequently, control over the
While you were being dragged did you make any plea to him? will of the offended party; and (c) that the person who restrains
A the will and liberty of another has no right to do so or, in other
Yes, I told him that I will go home. words, that the restraint is not made under authority of a law
Q or in the exercise of any lawful right.32 When appellant forcibly
And what did he say? dragged and slapped Yvonne, he took away her right to go
A home to Binuangan. Appellant presented no justification for
He said that we will go home but I know [sic] that that place we preventing Yvonne from going home, and we cannot find any.
are [sic] heading to is [sic] not a way to our home but it is [sic] The present case should be distinguished from People vs.
the opposite. Rosemarie de la Cruz.33 Here, Appellant Astorga tricked
Q Yvonne to go with him by telling her that they were going to
So, what happened next? buy candy. When Yvonne recognized the deception, she
Page 23 of 71
demanded that she be brought home, but appellant refused 37 Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code pertinently provides:
and instead dragged her toward the opposite direction against “Article 29. Period of preventive imprisonment deducted from
her will. While it is unclear whether Appellant Astorga intended term of imprisonment.—Offenders or accused who have
to detain or “lock up” Yvonne, there is no question that he undergone preventive imprisonment shall be credited in the
forced her to go with him against her will. In Rosemarie de la service of their sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty,
Cruz, Victim Whiazel voluntarily went with accused. with the full time during which they have undergone preventive
Furthermore, the accused in that case failed to consummate imprisonment if the detention prisoner agrees voluntarily in
the crime of kidnapping because of the timely intervention of writing to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon
the victim’s neighbor. Thus, the Court held in that case:34 convicted prisoners, except in the following cases:
“In a prosecution for kidnapping, the intent of the accused to 1. When they are recidivists, or have been convicted previously
deprive the victim of the latter’s liberty, in any manner, needs twice or more times of any crime; and
to be established by indubitable proof (People vs. Puno, 219 2. When upon being summoned for the execution of their
SCRA 85 [1993]). The acts held by the trial court, and sentence they have failed to surrender voluntarily.
maintained by the People, as consummating the crime of x x x      x x x      x x x
kidnapping in this case are those when accused-appellant held Whenever an accused has undergone preventive imprisonment
the victim’s hand and refused to let go when the victim asked for a period equal to or more than the possible maximum
to go over to her neighbor, who by then imprisonment of the offense charged to which he may be
_______________ sentenced and his case is not yet terminated, he shall be
released immediately without prejudice to the continuation of
32 Aquino, supra, pp. 66-67. the trial thereof or the proceeding on appeal, if the same is
33 G.R. No. 120988, August 11, 1997, per Melo, J. under review. In case the maximum penalty to which the
34 At pp. 7-8. accused may be sentenced is destierro, he shall be released
441 after thirty (30) days of preventive imprisonment. (As amended
by RA No. 6127, and further amended by EO No. 214, prom.
VOL. 283, DECEMBER 22, 1997 July 10, 1987).”
441 443
People vs. Astorga
already saw what was happening. This happened for only a VOL. 283, DECEMBER 22, 1997
very brief span of time and the evidentiary record shows that 443
there were a good number of people present at that time, that People vs. Santos
a guard was stationed at the gate, and that there was at least five days from receipt of this Decision, of the actual date the
a teacher nearby. The child could have just as easily shouted appellant is released. No costs.
for help. While it does not take much to scare the wits out of a SO ORDERED.
small child like Whiazel, under the attendant circumstances, we      Narvasa (C.J., Chairman), Romero, Melo and Francisco, JJ.,
cannot say with certainty that she was indeed deprived of her concur.
liberty. It must further be noted that up to that brief moment Appeal partially granted; Appellant convicted only of grave
when Cecilia saw them, and the child asked to be let go, the coercion.
victim had gone with accused-appellant voluntarily. Without Note.—The essence of the offense of kidnapping is the actual
any further act reinforcing the inference that the victim may deprivation of the victim’s liberty coupled with intent of the
have been denied her liberty, even taking cognizance of her accused to effect it. (People vs. Villanueva, 253 SCRA 155
minority, the Court hesitates to find that kidnapping in the case [1996])
at bar was consummated. While it is a well-entrenched rule ——o0o——
that factual findings of trial courts, especially when they
concern the appreciation of testimony of witnesses, are © Copyright 2020 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
accorded great respect, by exception, when the judgment is People vs. Astorga, 283 SCRA 420, G.R. No. 110097 December
based on a misapprehension of facts, as we perceive in the 22, 1997
case at bar, the Court may choose to substitute its own
findings (People vs. Padua, 215 SCRA 266 [1992]).” VOL. 378, FEBRUARY 27, 2002
The Information, dated March 24, 1992, filed against Astorga 157
contains sufficient allegations constituting grave coercion, the People vs. Santos
elements of which were sufficiently proved by the prosecution. VOL. 378, FEBRUARY 27, 2002
Hence, a conviction for said crime is appropriate under Section 157
4, Rule 120 of the 1988 Rules on Criminal Procedure: People vs. Santos
“Section 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation
and proof.—When there is variance between the offense
G.R. No. 140074. February 27, 2002.*
charged in the complaint or information, and that proved or
THE PEOPLE OF PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
established by the evidence, and the offenses as charged is
JOSEPHINE “JOSIE” SANTOS, MANNY BALTAZAR, JOHN
included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the
DOE, PETER DOE AND ROGER DOE, accused-appellants.
accused shall be convicted of the offense proved included in
that which is charged, or of the offense charged included in
Criminal Law; Grave Coercion; Elements; Words and Phrases;
that which is proved.”
Grave coercion is committed when a person prevents another
At the time the felony was committed on December 29, 1991,
from doing something not prohibited by law or compels him to
the penalty imposed by law for grave coercion was arresto
do something to do something against his will, whether it be
mayor and a fine not exceeding five hundred pesos.35 The
right or wrong, and without any authority of law, by means of
_______________
violence, threats or intimidation.—The circumstances that have
surfaced instead warrant a conviction for grave coercion. Grave
35 Article 286 was amended by R.A. No. 7890 on February 20,
coercion is committed when a person prevents another from
1995.
doing something not prohibited by law or compelling him to do
442
something against his will, whether it be right or wrong, and
without any authority of law, by means of violence, threats or
442
intimidation. Its elements are—First, that the offender has
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
prevented another from doing something not prohibited by law,
People vs. Astorga
or that he has compelled him to do something against his will,
Indeterminate Sentence Law does not apply here because the
be it right or wrong; second, that the prevention or compulsion
minimum penalty does not exceed one year.36 However,
is effected by violence, either by material force or such display
appellant has been imprisoned for more than six (6) months.
of force as would produce intimidation and control over the will
He has more than served the penalty imposable for such an
of the offended party; and, third, that the offender who has
offense.37
restrained the will and liberty of another did so without any
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED.
right or authority of law.
Appellant is CONVICTED only of grave coercion and is
Same; Same; Criminal Procedure; An accused may be
sentenced to six (6) months of arresto mayor. Unless he is
convicted of a lesser offense proved if included in the offense
being detained for any other valid cause, his IMMEDIATE
charged.—Where there is a variance between the offense
RELEASE is herewith ordered, considering that he has more
charged in the complaint or information and that proved and
than served the maximum penalty imposable upon him. The
the offense charged necessarily includes the lesser offense
director of prisons is DIRECTED to inform this Court, within
established in evidence, the accused can be convicted of the
_______________
offense proved.
AUTOMATIC REVIEW of a decision of the Regional Trial Court of
36 Section 2 of Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act No. 4103 as
Tayag, Pangasinan, Br. 51.
amended by Act No. 4225).
Page 24 of 71
 “Captain, we already got Nida.” The group proceeded towards
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. the direction of Carmen, Pangasinan, passing through San
     The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. Leon, and finally progressing towards Kennon Road.
     Public Attorney’s Office for accused-appellant J. Santos. Somewhere in the long stretch of the Kennon Road, the group
     Jose Antonio M. Guillermo for accused-appellant M. Baltazar. stopped at the Twin Peaks, a hub of commercial
_______________ establishments where Baguio-bound passengers would casually
stop for refreshments. Leonida, from her seat at the passenger
* EN BANC. side of the jeepney, heard Josephine and Baltazar telling the
158 men from the jeepney to step down from the vehicle and to
partake of some refreshments. Josephine and one unidentified
158 companion came up to her and tried to force her to sign a
VOL. 378, FEBRUARY 27, 2002 document
People vs. Santos 160
VITUG, J.:
160
It is not unknown that a debtor occasionally would suffer from VOL. 378, FEBRUARY 27, 2002
the malady of selective amnesia. The case is a tale of one People vs. Santos
unfortunate creditor who might have sought to rouse her forfeiting her property in favor of Josephine in satisfaction of
absent-minded debtor from the haze of forgetfulness. the unpaid loan. Leonida balked at the suggestion. Failing to
On 10 December 1996, at six o’clock in the morning, Leonida convince Leonida to sign the document, the group decided to
de la Peña was at home in Barangay Resurreccion, Umingan, continue with their journey.
Pangasinan, with her eight-year old niece, Christine Lovely Mae In Baguio City, the group proceeded to a building along the
Delanos, when a passenger jeepney arrived. Five decently Naguillan Road which Leonida recognized to be Precinct I of the
dressed men stepped down from the vehicle and entered the Baguio City police. She saw Josephine and Baltazar enter the
house. The first, who was attired in a business suit, introduced police precinct. Later emerging from the police station, the duo
himself as Rocky Alberto and his companions as agents of the told their companions to alight from the jeepney. Baltazar then
Criminal Investigation Service (“CIS”).1 Alberto asked Leonida took over the wheel of the passenger jeepney while Josephine
about her unpaid obligation to Josephine Santos. Leonida seated herself beside Leonida in the passenger seat of the
answered that she had already paid the debt before the vehicle. The latter had no idea where they were heading. It was
barangay captain of Umingan. Moments later, another vehicle, only much later, upon seeing several tombs within the vicinity,
a brown colored car, stopped in front of the house. Henry when she realized that they had taken her to the local
Salimbay (the barangay captain of Umingan), Josephine Santos, cemetery. Leonida overheard Josephine and her companions,
Manny Baltazar and two unidentified males and one while they were alighting from the vehicle, say that they were
unidentified female, alighted. Leonida rushed to confront “going to kill her at 8:00 (that) evening.” Rocky Alberto then
Salimbay, telling him that Josephine had sent the CIS agents to showed up, and he was ordered to watch Leonida while
demand payment of her debt and that it was Josephine who Josephine and Baltazar said they would go elsewhere to take
should instead be accosted. Sensing an escalating tension something to eat.
between the two women, the barangay captain decided to Left alone with Alberto, Leonida begged for mercy. Alberto
leave, telling the parties that it was best for both of them to proved to be a good Samaritan and helpfully handed over to
just amicably settle their differences. her a steel pipe from a narrow opening in the rear door of the
It would seem that the association between Leonida de la Peña jeepney. Armed with the steel pipe, Leonida hit the glass front
and Josephine Santos was one of friendship turned awry. On 22 window of the passenger vehicle and made her exit. She and
March 1992, Josephine appeared to have given a one-year loan Alberto then flagged down a taxicab, which took them to the
to Leonida but the latter was unable to timely pay the debt. For Dagupan bus station where, after relating her harrowing
the next four years, Josephine would be unsuccessful in experience to the bus personnel, she and Alberto were able to
securing payment from her delinquent debtor. Josephine and hitch a ride on a Manila-bound passenger bus. Alighting at the
Manny Baltazar, both residents of Baguio City, would travel all Carmen junction, they took a tricycle for the remaining leg of
the way to Resurreccion, Pangasinan, to seek payment from their journey home.
Leonida but, in all The next day, accompanied by Rocky Alberto, Leonida filed a
_______________ complaint before the Umingan Police Station. Alberto, upon
giving his official statement before the Umingan authorities,
1 Records show that the agency was alternately known as was unable to produce any document to prove his being a CIS
Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) and Criminal Investigation agent.
Group (CIG), Records, p. 151. Felizarda Saturnino, an aunt of Leonida, sought to corroborate
159 the statement of her niece. According to Felizarda, the
commonlaw husband of Leonida, a certain “Itong,” arrived
VOL. 378, FEBRUARY 27, 2002 shortly after the group had left. Upon learning what had
159 happened to Leonida, Itong made inquiries. Barangay captain
People vs. Santos Salimbay informed him
these instances, Leonida would refuse to see Josephine and 161
ignore the summons issued by the barangay captain. This
unease between the two women was further heightened when VOL. 378, FEBRUARY 27, 2002
Leonida subsequently filed a case for estafa against Josephine. 161
The eventful 10th of December 1996 was the scheduled People vs. Santos
conference between debtor and creditor before Henry that a warrant of arrest had been issued against Leonida.
Salimbay, the barangay captain, and the already irate Later, when she and Itong went to the Umingan police station,
Josephine, anticipating another rebuff from Leonida, decided to to report the abduction, they were instructed to first ascertain
personally go to her house with Salimbay in tow. Leonida whether a warrant of arrest was indeed issued against Leonida.
stubbornly maintained her having already settled the account. A subsequent examination by Dr. Maria L. Chan showed that
At this obstinate insistence, an enraged Josephine Santos Leonida had sustained multiple abrasions and hematoma in
shouted invectives at Leonida and began hurling things inside both upper extremities secondary to mauling.
the house, scattering the palay and hitting, in the process, On 19 March 1997, an accusatory information for the crime of
Felizarda Saturnino, an aunt of Leonida with a wood-carving. Kidnapping was filed against Josephine Santos, Manny Baltazar
Josephine and Baltazar held Leonida, handcuffed her and, with and three other unidentified persons—
the help of their companions, dragged her towards the parked “That on or about the 10th day of December, 1996, in the
passenger jeepney and forced her to board it. She described morning, at Bgy. Resurreccion, municipality of Umingan,
the passenger jeepney as having a locked door at its passenger province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
rearend portion and two doors on either side at the driver’s of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, including
seat, with side glass windows which were about 1/2 foot high three (3) Does whose identities have not yet been established,
and 1 foot wide, too small for a person her size to pass being a private individual and without any legal justification
through. Leonida was flanked by Rocky Alberto and one and simulating public authority, and by means of force,
unidentified male in the passenger seat of the vehicle. On the conspiring, confederating and helping one another, did then
front seat of the passenger jeepney were three other men. and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take and handcuff
Josephine, along with Baltazar and three other companions, both hands of one LEONIDA DE LA PEÑA, then load her to a
rode in the car. passenger jeepney and brought her to a public cemetery at
The two vehicles traveled, the brown car leading the way and Naguillan Road, Baguio City, thereby depriving her of her
the passenger jeepney closely following behind. The convoy liberty by detaining inside a passenger jeepney and
first made a stopover at the house of barangay captain threatening her with death but was able to escape, to the
Salimbay where Leonida heard Josephine and Baltazar call out, damage and prejudice of said LEONIDA DELA PEÑA.
Page 25 of 71
“Contrary to Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code.”2 Pangasinan to collect the debt of Leonida ‘Nida’ dela Peña
The accused pled “not guilty” to the offense charged. amounting to P87,000.00. Before they proceeded to Leonida’s
Josephine Santos and Manny Baltazar have vehemently denied house they sought the assistance of Barangay captain Henry
the accusation. The defense version is narrated by the Public Salimbay who previously summoned Leonida before his office
Attorney’s Office in its brief for accused-appellant Josephine to settle her indebtedness.
Santos. “Josie Santos and Captain Salimbay entered the house of
“Manny Baltazar, testified that in the early morning of Leonida while her companions were left in the parked car.
December 10, 1996 he together with his co-accused Josie When they entered the house, she noticed the presence of five
Santos, Ester Dino, Leo Badecao and Sheriff William Baden, left (5) alleged CIS members, one of whom was Rocky Alberto
Baguio City on board a Toyota Crown car on their way to talking to Leonida. She informed Leonida that she was
Caranglaan, Nueva Ecija to pick-up fifty (50) cavans of rice and collecting her indebtedness to which the latter replied, ‘I
visit his 3 1/2 hectare land. Since they were passing by already paid my indebtedness on you. Vulva of your mother. I
Umingan, Pangasinan, accused Josie Santos suggested that will have a warrant against you’. She also replied, ‘You did not
they dropped by Resur- pay even a cent’. Thereafter, an altercation ensued between
_______________ them. The barangay captain left them arguing. While they were
altercating, Manny Baltazar arrived and pulled her to the
2 Rollo, p. 10. parked car. When they were leaving, Leonida and the five (5)
162 men also left on board the passenger jeepney.
“On their way to Nueva Ecija, they dropped by at Captain
162 Salimbay’s house informing the tetter’s wife that they were not
VOL. 378, FEBRUARY 27, 2002 able to collect Leonida’s debt. The passenger jeepney overtook
People vs. Santos them infront of Salimbay’s house. While they were cruising
reccion, Umingan, Pangasinan to collect unpaid debts of towards the national highway, they chanced upon Leonida’s
Leonida dela Peña. Before proceeding to the house of Leonida, father-in-law, Leoncio. They offered him a ride and dropped
they sought the help of Resurreccion Barangay Captain Henry him at the highway going to Balungao. Along the highway, they
Salimbay. Captain Salimbay accompanied them to the house of passed upon a tuba vendor and they drank. After drinking, they
Leonida. They reached Leonida’s house at around 6:00 o’clock decided to cancel their trip to Nueva Ecija and returned to
in the morning. Baguio City.
“He parked the car near the yard of Kagawad Dumaguing as “In the highway between Urdaneta and Binalonan, one of the
the vehicle could not get through the alley leading to the house CIS companions (Rocky Alberto) of Leonida flagged them down.
of Leonida because a passenger jeepney blocked the way, She alighted and talked to Rocky Alberto who informed her that
while Josie and Captain Salimbay proceeded to the house of Leonida was willing to deliver fifty (50) cavans of palay in
Leonida. After five (5) minutes Captain Salimbay left the place. payment of her obligation. They returned to Resurreccion but
Thereafter, he heard Leonida and Josie quarreling inside the Leonida’s husband refused to give the palay. Unable to get the
house. He immediately proceeded to Leonida’s house, pulled palay, they proceeded to Baguio City via Kennon Road.
Josie and brought her to the parked car. Then, he returned to 164
Leonida’s house and plead to the latter to settle their
differences between themselves to avoid trouble but she 164
(Leonida) denied that she was indebted. Then, the four (4) men VOL. 378, FEBRUARY 27, 2002
inside the house handcuffed Nida and left. People vs. Santos
“He informed Josie that Leonida could not pay. Thus, they left At Twin Peaks along Kennon Road, Rocky Alberto flagged them
the place and dropped by at Captain Salimbay’s place and down again. Rocky asked why they did not have the palay to
informed the letter’s wife that they were leaving. which she replied that Leonida’s husband refused to give.
“On their way to Carmen, Rosales, Pangasinan, they took the Rocky suggested that they proceed to his house in Baguio City
national highway in Balungao where they saw Leonida’s father- to settle the problem, but she insisted that they should instead
in-law, Leoncio dela Peña. They offered a ride to Leoncio and proceed to the police. Rocky agreed. While she and Rocky were
dropped him at Balungao district jail. Since it was already late, talking, Leonida was eating inside the canteen at Twin Peaks.
they cancelled their plan to go to Nueva Ecija and drank tuba “From Twin Peaks, they proceeded to the Central Police Station
at a nearby store. Thereafter, they proceeded to Baguio City. of Baguio City to file an estafa case against Leonida but they
“Along the highway at Binalonan, Pangasinan, somebody were referred to a sub-station in Naguillan Road. They were not
flagged them down. He pulled over beside the passenger able to settle their differences nor filed a complaint for estafa
jeepney which was previously parked in front of Leonida’s because Nida and the five (5) alleged CIS men hurriedly left the
house. A man from the jeepney approached them and invited police sub-station.
Josie for a conversation in the jeepney. After 20 minutes, Josie “She denied all the criminal imputations made by Leonida
returned and told them to go back to Resurreccion because against her. The private complainant visited her in jail and
Leonida would give them the palay. Tehy returned to made a proposal for her to pay the former P500,000.00 as a
Resurreccion. Unfortunately, they were not able to get the settlement. (TSN pp. 3-12; December 7, 1998; pp. 3-13;
palay because Leonida’s husband was not around, so they left February 22, 1999; p. 11 April 12, 1999).”3
the place and proceeded to Baguio City via the Kennon Road. The defense failed to convince the court aquo; on 09 July 1999,
“While they were approaching Twin Peaks at Kennon Road, the the court convicted the accused on the ground that the
man who flagged them down in Binalonan signaled again. He deprivation of private complainant Leonida de la Peña of her
parked the car near the passenger jeepney. Josie, Leonida and liberty, regardless of its purpose and although lasting for less
the alleged CIS agent took their snacks in the canteen while he than twenty-four hours, was sufficient to support the charge of
remained in the car. After 30 minutes, Josie returned and kidnapping. Finding then Josephine Santos and Manny Baltazar
instructed him to proceed to a police station near the city hall guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping, the
for she was going to file a complaint for estafa against Leonida. trial court imposed the extreme penalty of death—
However, a policeman instructed them to proceed to Precinct “WHEREFORE, as mandated by law, and having found the
No. 1 at Naguillan Road. He accompanied Josie to the precinct accused Josephine Santos @ ‘Josie’ of Irisan, Baguio City and
but the policemen also told them that since the transaction the accused Manny Baltazar @ ‘Candro’ of 197 Marcos
was consummated in Resur- Highway, Baguio City GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
163 crime of kidnapping Leonida de la Peña, a female, on
December 10, 1996, attended with a host of aggravating
VOL. 378, FEBRUARY 27, 2002 circumstances with none to mitigate as above noted, the Court
163 hereby sentences them to each suffer the penalty of DEATH,
People vs. Santos aside from the accessory penalties imposed under Article 40 of
reccion, the case should be filed in Pangasinan. Incidentally, the Revised Penal Code.
when accused-appellants were inside the precinct, Leonida was “Additionally, the subject accused are hereby ordered to
inside the parked passenger jeepney. When they were about to indemnify Leonida de la Peña, her heirs, assigns or successors-
go home, Rocky Alberto approached Josie. After few minutes of in-interest for moral damages in the sum of P30,000.00 and to
conversation, they agreed to go home, leaving behind Leonida pay the costs.”4
and the alleged CIS agent. _______________
“Furthermore, he denied all the allegations made by Leonida
and branded them as pure lies. (TSN pp. 4-12; June 9, 1998; 3 Rollo, pp. 105-109.
TSN pp. 2-15; July 14, 1998). 4 Rollo, p. 66.
“Josephine ‘Josie’ Santos, testified that in the early morning of 165
December 10, 1996, she together with her driver, accused
Manny Baltazar, Ester Dino, Leo Badecao and William Baden VOL. 378, FEBRUARY 27, 2002
were on their way to Caranglaan, Nueva Ecija. Upon her 165
insistence, they dropped by at Resurreccion, Umingan, People vs. Santos
Page 26 of 71
Hence, the automatic appeal, and central to it is the staunch “Q.
denial made by appellants of any responsibility for the alleged What did you do when they told [you] that it was station 1 of
kidnapping incident. Baguio police which has jurisdiction over the case of Josie?
While appellants admitted having gone to the house of Leonida “A.
on 10 December 1996, they, however, strongly denied having We went to station 1, sir.
abducted her. It was true, according to them, that they did “COURT:
chance upon the CIS agents two times on their way to Baguio— “Q.
the first at a point between Urdaneta and Binalonan and the Is this station 1 located beside the cemetery?
second time at the Twin Peaks by the Kennon Road—but that “A.
these encounters were “purely accidental.” It is far, sir.
The trial court had well-founded reasons to conclude that the 167
socalled “encounters” between the CIS agents and Josephine
Santos and company were indeed far from being “purely VOL. 378, FEBRUARY 27, 2002
accidental.” The time of arrival of the two groups at the 167
residence of Leonida de la Peña on the early morning of 10 People vs. Santos
December 1996 was only a matter of minutes of each other. “Q.
The CIS agents evidently knew and, in fact, inquired about How far, if you know?
Leonida’s existing account with Josephine Santos. At least “A.
twice later on the same day, the CIS agents and the group of About 200 meters, sir.
Josephine Santos met at stopovers on the way to Baguio City.  
Appellant Josephine Santos even said that, at a point between “x x x      x x x      x x x
Urdaneta City and Binalonan, they were flagged down by the “Q.
CIS agents in order to tell her that Leonida de la Peña had What happened then at police station no. 1?
finally consented to allow Josephine to get the palay in “A.
payment of Leonida’s debt. I parked my car in front of the station 1 and I accompanied
But that is just about all. Nothing else can be gathered to Josie to the station, sir.
support the charge of kidnapping. “Q
That there was an existing debt, and that the same remained What happened when you were inside the station with Josie?
unpaid as of 10 December 1996, would seem certain. Leonida “A.
de la Peña herself acknowledged that no less than Henry When we went inside station 1 a companion of Nida who has
Salimbay, the barangay captain, accompanied appellants to an amputated hand told us that this is the place where you can
her residence for the purpose of collecting payment. The file your complaint and I will leave you.
complainant claimed that appellants had dragged and forced “ATTY. GUILLERMO:
her to board the passenger jeepney but, strangely enough, the “Q.
incident had failed to attract the attention of neighbors, among Up to now, do you know the name of this man with an
whom was a kagawad, who could have somehow lent a helping amputated arm who told you that [he] will leave you?
hand to the hapless hostage. The group was then said to have “A.
made a stopover at the house of barangay captain Salimbay What I know, sir, is Rocky.
and later at the police station at the Baguio City Hall and “Q.
subsequently at a police station along Do you know this Rocky Alberto?
166 “A.
Yes, sir.
166 “Q.
VOL. 378, FEBRUARY 27, 2002 Is he one of the men who rode in that jeepney with Nida
People vs. Santos according to you?
Naguillan. It was rather unusual for would-be kidnappers to “A.
request the intervention of the local barangay captain, and Yes, sir.
then, with their hostage in tow, to brazenly stop at a police “Q.
station not just once but twice; the first at the police station at How about Nida de la Peña, did you see her while you were in
the Baguio City Hall and the second at a police station by the the police station?
Naguillan Road. The complainant was neither bound nor “A.
gagged and the jeepney where she allegedly was being held She was inside the jeep, sir.
hostage had been parked just meters away from the police  
station. “x x x      x x x      x x x
The testimony given by Baltazar and Santos would seem to be “Q
more plausible than what Leonida asseverated. Josephine What happened when Rocky Alberto left you at precinct No. 1
Santos and her group, with the assistance of CIS agents, of the Baguio police with Josie Santos?
brought complainant to Baguio City in order to surrender her to “A.
the custody of Baguio City authorities where Josephine Santos I talked to the police that Josie will be going to file a case.
thought she could rightly seek redress. She was advised, “Q.
however, that it was in the province of Pangasinan, not Baguio And what happened after that?
City, where a case could be lodged. According to Manny “A.
Baltazar— When Josie was about to file a case, they were talking to each
“Q. other and they found out that the money which was given to
Where in Baguio did you proceed? Nida was received at Resurreccion and therefore the station
“A. has no jurisdiction.
At the police department of the city hall. “Q.
“Q. What happened after that?
Do you know the reason why you went to the police station of “A.
Baguio? When the station did not accept the complaint, I advised her
“A. that we must have to go home.”5
Josie said that it is better to file an estafa case against Nida.  
“Q.  
Did she actually go to the police station against Nida?  
“A.  
I accompanied Nida at precinct 7, sir. _______________
“Q.
Is that the police station near the city hall? 5 TSN, 14 July 1998, pp. 7-9.
“A. 168
Yes, sir.
“Q. 168
What happened? VOL. 378, FEBRUARY 27, 2002
“A. People vs. Santos
When she went to precinct 7 the officer said that the case is in Similarly, Josephine Santos declared thusly:
the jurisdiction of station 1. “A.
“Q. After that he told me that we will just proceed to my house in
Where is this station 1? Baguio and we would talk the matter over.
“A. “Q.
Naguillan Road, sir.
Page 27 of 71
What did you do when you were told that you were going to You did not answer my question. My question was did you tell
Baguio? the barangay captain that Rocky Alberto your companion was
“A. one of those who kidnapped you earlier on December 10, 1996,
I questioned him why in my house why not at the police station please answer the question.
so that things would be legal because my claim consist of her “A.
account and I do not know about your claim, anyway she was I did not tell that anymore, sir.
with you.  
  “x x x      x x x      x x x
“x x x     x x x     x x x “COURT
“ATTY. GUILLERMO “Q.
“Q. You did not tell the barangay captain that Rocky Alberto was
What happened next after that? one of those who kidnapped you because as a matter of fact
“A. Rocky Alberto did not kidnap you?
We went to the Baguio police station to wait for them. “A.
“Q. I was not able to tell that, sir.
Were you able to reach Baguio City?  
“A.  
Yes, sir. _______________
“Q
You said you were supposed to go to the police station were 7 See “Sinumpaang Salaysay” of Rocky Alberto before the
you able to reach the police station? Umingan Police executed on 11 December 1996, Records, p.
“A. 14.
Yes, sir. 170
“Q
Where in Baguio is that police station? 170
“A. VOL. 378, FEBRUARY 27, 2002
We first went to the main police headquarters but the main People vs. Santos
office advised us to report to sub-station I which had “Q.
jurisdiction. Answer the question. You did not tell the barangay captain that
“Q. your companion Rocky Alberto was one of those who earlier
Where was this police station? kidnapped you because in point of fact you were never
“A. kidnapped by Rocky Alberto—that is the question, do you
Naguillan Road, sir. understand?
“COURT “A.
“Q. That is true, sir.
Is that near the cemetery? “Q.
“A. So it is clear that Rocky Alberto never kidnapped you?
Yes, sir. “A.
“ATTY. GUILLERMO No, sir.”8
“Q. The circumstances that have surfaced instead warrant a
When you were told to go to the police sub-station, did you go? conviction for grave coercion.9 Grave coercion is committed
“A. when a person prevents another from doing something not
Yes, sir. prohibited by law or compelling him to do something against
“Q. his will, whether it be right or wrong, and without any authority
Who were your companions? of law, by means of violence, threats or intimidation. Its
“A. elements are—First, that the offender has prevented another
Manny, sir.”6 from doing something not prohibited by law, or that he has
Rocky Alberto, in his own sworn statement before the Umingan compelled him to do something against his will, be it right or
authorities a day after the incident, corroborated the version of wrong; second, that the prevention or compulsion is effected
appellants— by violence, either by material force or such display of force as
_______________ would produce intimidation and control over the will of the
offended party; and, third, that the offender who has restrained
6 TSN, Josephine Santos, 22 February 1999, pp. 12-13. the will and liberty of another did so without any right or
169 authority of law. Where there is a variance between the offense
charged in the complaint or information and that proved and
VOL. 378, FEBRUARY 27, 2002 the offense charged necessarily includes the lesser offense
169 established in evidence, the accused can be convicted of the
People vs. Santos offense proved.10 Grave coercion
“Q. _______________
Ano pa ang sumunod na pangyayari, noong hindi pumayag na
pumirma si De la Peña? 8 TSN, Leonida de la Peña, 04 November 1997, pp. 4-5.
“A. 9 Article 286. Grave coercions.—The penalty of prision
Kami po ay nagtuloy sa Baguio City at tumuloy kami sa correccional and a fine not exceeding Six thousand pesos shall
Precinct 1 ng PNP sa Naguillan Road, at noong huminto ang be imposed upon any person who, without any authority of law,
sasakyan nina Josie ay bumaba siya (Josie) at si Manny Baltazar shall, by means of violence, threats, or intimidation, prevent
at umalis na ang sasakyan nina Josie at pumasok sina Manny at another from doing something not prohibited by law, or compel
Josie sa loob ng prisinto kung kaya sumunod ako sa loob at him to do something against his will, whether it be right or
doon ay nalaman ko na gustong mag-file ng estafa case laban wrong.
kay Leonida de la Peña at doon ko pa lang nalaman na walang If the coercion be committed in violation of the exercise of the
kasong nakafile at wala ring warrant of arrest laban kay right of suffrage, or for the purpose of compelling another to
Leonida de la Peña. At dahil ayaw naman pumayag ang mga perform any religious act, or to prevent him from exercising
pulis doon na gawin ang gusto nina Josie Santos ay lumabas na such right or from so doing such act, the penalty next higher in
kaming tatlo nina Josie, at doon ay kinausap ko sina Josie degree shall be imposed. (As amended by RA No. 7890,
Santos na ako ay pupunta sa aming opisina at pagkatapos ay approved Feb. 20, 1995.)
babalik ako at iuuwi ko si De la Peña dahil wala naman pala 10 Section 4, Rule 120, Rules of Court—
siyang kaso, kung kaya umalis na ako at iniwan ko si Leonida 171
de la Peña sa aming sasakyan.”7
On the witness stand, complainant herself identified Rocky VOL. 378, FEBRUARY 27, 2002
Alberto as being one of the cohorts in her abduction; yet, she 171
categorically denied that Alberto had kidnapped her. She People vs. Santos
testified: carries the penalty of prision correccional and a fine not
“Q. exceeding P6,000.00. There being no aggravating or mitigating
Did you also tell the barangay captain that Rocky Alberto was circumstance, the penalty shall be imposed in its medium term.
one of the CIS people who helped kidnap you? Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law the minimum that
“A. can be imposed is anywhere from one (1) month and one (1)
I just told him that he is the one who accompanied me home, day to six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, and from
sir. two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years
“Q. and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum.

Page 28 of 71
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction under review is engineering manager of TPI, and Victor Callueng, TPI head of
MODIFIED. Appellants Josephine Santos and Manny Baltazar are security, together with several armed guards, disconnected the
ACQUITTED of the crime of Kidnapping; instead, said appellants electricity in the stalls occupied by Push-Thru Marketing.
are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of grave
coercion, and sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of Aggrieved, petitioner filed a criminal complaint for Grave
from six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to three (3) Coercion against TPI and its officers, David Go, Robert
years and six (6) months of prision correccional medium, as Castanares, Buddy Mariano, Art Brondial, and herein private
maximum, and to pay a fine of P3,000.00. Costs de oficio. respondents before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila.
SO ORDERED. [4] The complaint dated July 13, 1999 alleged that TPI and its
     Davide, Jr. (C.J.), Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Kapunan, Mendoza, officers cut off the electricity in petitioner's stalls "in a violent
Panganiban, Quisumbing, Buena, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr., and intimidating manner"[5] and by unnecessarily employing
Sandoval-Gutierrez and Carpio, JJ., concur. "several armed guards to intimidate and frighten"[6] petitioner
Judgment modified. and his employees and agents.
_______________
The respondents in the criminal complaint filed separate
Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. counter-affidavits[7] which presented a common defense: that
When there is variance between the offense charged in the the July 1, 1999 cutting off of electrical supply was done
complaint or information, and that proved or established by the peacefully; that it was an act performed in the lawful
evidence, and the offense as charged is included in or performance of their assigned duties, and in accordance with
necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be the covenants set forth in the written agreements previously
convicted of the offense proved included in that which is executed between petitioner and TPI; that petitioner was not
charged, or of the offense charged included in that which is present when the alleged acts were committed; and that
proved. petitioner had outstanding accumulated unpaid rentals, CUSA
Section 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court provides— billings, electrical and water bills, unpaid interest and penalty
When an offense includes or is included in another. An offense charges (from June 1998 to May 1999) in the amount of
charged necessarily includes that which is proved, when some P267,513.39 for all his rented stalls, as reflected in three
of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as this is Interest-Penalty Reports[8] duly sent to him. Petitioner was
alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter. likewise given demand letter-notices in writing at least three
And an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense times wherein it was stated that if he did not settle his arrears
proved, when the essential ingredients of the former constitute in full, electricity would be cut.[9] Of the total amount due from
or form a part of those constituting the latter. him, petitioner paid only P127,272.18 after receipt of the third
172 notice. Accordingly, private respondents proceeded with the
power cut-off, but only after sending a "Notice of Disconnection
172 of Utilities"[10] to petitioner's stalls informing him of the
VOL. 378, FEBRUARY 27, 2002 impending act.
Jose Clavano, Inc. vs. Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
Notes.—There is piracy, not grave coercion, where, as part of Private respondents also pointed out that aside from the above
the act of seizing their boat, the occupants of the vessel were arrears, petitioner has outstanding accountabilities with
compelled to go elsewhere other than their place of respect to "Priority Premium Fees" in the amount of
destination. (People vs. Catantan, 278 SCRA 761 [1997]) P5,907,013.10.[11]
An information for illegal detention will not bar the accused
from being convicted of grave coercion, instead of the original They likewise stressed that their Agreement[12] with petitioner
charge, since the offense of grave coercion is necessarily contains the following stipulations:
included in illegal detention. (People vs. Villamar, 298 SCRA
398 [1998]) CONTRACT OF LEASE
Grave coercion is not the same as the crime of robbery with
violence or intimidation of person, and neither is it an attempt Prime Block Cluster Stall
to commit the latter or a frustration thereof. (Sarabia vs.
People, 361 SCRA 652 [2001]) xxxx
——o0o——
PRIORITY PREMIUM : P *2,367,750.00
© Copyright 2020 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
People vs. Santos, 378 SCRA 157, G.R. No. 140074 February xxx
27, 2002
RENT PER MONTH : P *******378.00 per sq. m (Plus
ROBERTO BARBASA, Petitioner, versus HON. ARTEMIO P*******37.80 10% VAT)
G. TUQUERO, in his capacity as Secretary of the
Department of Justice, GRACE GUARIN, NESTOR xxxx
SANGALANG, VICTOR CALLUENG, Respondents.
OTHER FEES AND EXPENSES CHARGEABLE TO THE LESSEE:
DECISION
xxxx

QUISUMBING, J.: B. COMMON USAGE AND SERVICE AREA (CUSA) CHARGES

Petitioner assails the Decision[1] dated July 29, 2003 and the Minimum rate of P190.00/sq. m./mo. to cover expenses
Resolution[2] dated May 21, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in stipulated in Section 6 hereof, subject to periodic review and
CA-G.R. SP No. 62610, which dismissed his petition for adjustment to reflect actual expenses.
certiorari and denied his motion for reconsideration,
respectively. The appellate court had found no reason to C. INDIVIDUAL UTILITIES
reverse the Resolution[3] of the Secretary of Justice ordering
the City Prosecutor of Manila to move for the dismissal of ELECTRIC CONSUMPTION : metered + reasonable service
Criminal Case No. 336630 against private respondents.
charge (meter to be provided by the LESSOR, for the account
Petitioner avers that he is the president of Push-Thru of the LESSEE)
Marketing, Inc., which leases commercial stalls CS-PL 05, 19
and 30 in Tutuban Center, owned by Tutuban Properties, Inc., OTHER SERVICES : metered and/or reasonable
(TPI). On June 30, 1999, Angelina Hipolito, merchandising
officer of Push-Thru Marketing, received a notice of service charge
disconnection of utilities from private respondent Grace Guarin,
the Credit and Collection Manager of TPI, for failure of Push- xxxx
Thru Marketing to settle its outstanding obligations for
Common Usage and Service Area (CUSA) charges, utilities, 7. PAYMENTS
electricity and rentals.
xxxx
Petitioner settled the charges for CUSA, utilities and electricity, In cases where payments made by the LESSEE for any given
which payment was accepted by private respondent Guarin, month is not sufficient to cover all outstanding obligations for
but petitioner failed to pay the back rentals. Thus, on July 1, said period, the order of priority in the application of the
1999, private respondents Guarin, Nestor Sangalang, payments made is as follows:
Page 29 of 71
 made under authority of law or in the exercise of any lawful
a. Penalties right.[17]

b. Interests Petitioner's appeal gives us no sufficient reason to deviate from

what has already been found by the Secretary of Justice and
c. Insurance the Court of Appeals.

d. CUSA Charges The records show that there was no violence, force or the
display of it as would produce intimidation upon petitioner's
e. Rent employees when the cutting off of petitioner's electricity was
effected. On the contrary, it was done peacefully and after
f. Priority Premium written notice to petitioner was sent. We do not subscribe to
petitioner's claim that the presence of armed guards were
xxxx calculated to intimidate him or his employees. Rather, we are
more inclined to believe that the guards were there to prevent
21. PENALTY CLAUSE any untoward or violent event from occurring in the exercise of
TPI's rights under the lease agreements. If the respondents
xxxx desired a violent result, they would have gone there
unannounced or cut petitioner's electricity through less
It is also expressly agreed that in case the LESSEE fails to pay desirable and conspicuous means.
at any time the installments on the priority premium, lease
rentals or CUSA and utility charges corresponding to a total of It is likewise clear from the penalty clause in the Contracts of
three (3) months, even if not consecutively incurred, the Lease entered into by the parties that TPI is given the option to
LESSOR is hereby granted the option to cut off power and other cut off power and other utility services in petitioner's stalls in
utility services to the LESSEE until full payment of said charges, case petitioner fails to pay at any time the installments on the
expenses, penalty and interest is made, without prejudice to priority premium, lease rentals or CUSA and utility charges
any other remedies provided under this Contract, including the corresponding to a total of three months until full payment of
termination of this Contract. said charges, expenses, penalty and interest is made.[18] The
stipulation under said clause is clear; there is no ambiguity in
x x x x (Emphasis supplied.) what is stated. There could be no grave coercion in the private
respondents' act of exercising in behalf of TPI a right afforded
Petitioner filed his Reply Affidavit,[13] claiming that Go, to TPI under the solemn and unequivocal covenants of a
Castanares, Mariano, Brondial, Guarin and Sangalang, while not contract to which petitioner had agreed and which he did
personally present at the scene at the time, were to be held execute and sign.
liable as the authors of the criminal design since they were the
ones who ordered the cutting off of petitioner's electricity. As held by this Court in a previous case which we find
Petitioner admitted that none of the armed personnel drew his instructive:
gun, much more aimed or fired it, but insisted that he was
unduly prevented from using electricity to the detriment of his Contracts constitute the law between the parties. They must be
business and his person. He claimed that the officers of TPI read together and interpreted in a manner that reconciles and
were unable to show the amount and extent of his unpaid bills; gives life to all of them. The intent of the parties, as shown by
that as to the electric bills, the same were paid; and that there the clear language used, prevails over post facto explanations
was an ongoing negotiation with respect to the matter of that find no support from the words employed by the parties or
rentals and for reformation of the lease agreements.[14] from their contemporary and subsequent acts showing their
understanding of such contracts.[19]
The Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila, through Prosecutor
Venus D. Marzan, dismissed the complaint against David Go, We could not see how the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Roberto Castanares, Buddy Mariano and Art Brondial but found Manila, through Prosecutor Venus D. Marzan, could have made
probable cause against private respondents Grace Guarin, a finding of probable cause to file a criminal case for grave
Nestor Sangalang and Victor Callueng. On January 13, 2000, an coercion against private respondents, in light of the evidence
Information[15] for grave coercion was filed in court, but then and now prevailing, which will show that there was a
proceedings therein were deferred when the private mutual agreement, in a contract of lease, that provided for the
respondents filed an appeal to the Secretary of Justice. cutting off of electricity as an acceptable penalty for failure to
abide faithfully with what has been covenanted. Although the
On August 23, 2000, the Secretary of Justice reversed the City propriety of its exercise may be the subject of controversy,
Prosecutor's Resolution, as follows: mere resort to it may not so readily expose the lessor TPI to a
charge of grave coercion. Considering that petitioner owed TPI
WHEREFORE, the assailed resolution is hereby REVERSED and the total amount of more than P5 million, which was
SET ASIDE. The City Prosecutor is directed to move, with leave undisputed, we find that the resort to the penalty clause under
of court, for the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 336630 of the the lease agreements was justified. As held in Pryce
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila and to report the action Corporation v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation:
taken within ten (10) days from receipt hereof.
A penal clause is "an accessory obligation which the parties
SO ORDERED.[16] attach to a principal obligation for the purpose of insuring the
performance thereof by imposing on the debtor a special
His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner prestation (generally consisting in the payment of a sum of
assailed the Resolution of the Secretary of Justice before the money) in case the obligation is not fulfilled or is irregularly or
Court of Appeals through a petition for certiorari, which was, inadequately fulfilled."
however, dismissed by the appellate court for lack of merit.
The appellate court likewise denied his motion for Quite common in lease contracts, this clause functions to
reconsideration. Hence this petition. strengthen the coercive force of the obligation and to provide,
in effect, for what could be the liquidated damages resulting
Petitioner raises the sole issue of whether private respondents' from a breach. There is nothing immoral or illegal in such
act of disconnecting the supply of electricity to petitioner's indemnity/penalty clause, absent any showing that it was
stalls and the manner by which it was carried out constitute forced upon or fraudulently foisted on the obligor.[20]
grave coercion. (Emphasis supplied.)

After carefully considering petitioner's appeal, we are in In this connection, counsels must be reminded that equally
agreement to deny it for utter lack of merit. important, as their duty to clients, is their duty as officers of
the court to see to it that the orderly administration of justice is
The crime of grave coercion has three elements: (a) that a not unduly impeded or delayed. Counsel needs to advise a
person is prevented by another from doing something not client, ordinarily a layman unaccustomed to the intricacies and
prohibited by law, or compelled to do something against his or vagaries of the law, concerning the objective merit of his case.
her will, be it right or wrong; (b) that the prevention or If counsel finds that his client's cause lacks merit, then it is his
compulsion is effected by violence, either by material force or bounden duty to advise accordingly. Indeed a lawyer's oath to
such a display of it as would produce intimidation and, uphold the cause of justice may supersede his duty to his
consequently, control over the will of the offended party; and client's cause; for such fealty to ethical concerns is
(c) that the person who restrains the will and liberty of another indispensable to the success of the rule of law.[21]
has no right to do so; in other words, that the restraint is not
Page 30 of 71
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision objective merit of his case. If counsel finds that his client’s
dated July 29, 2003 and the Resolution dated May 21, 2004 of cause lacks merit, then it is his bounden duty to advise
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 62610 are hereby accordingly. Indeed a lawyer’s oath to uphold the cause of
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. justice may supersede his duty to his client’s cause; for such
fealty to ethical concerns is indispensable to the success of the
SO ORDERED. rule of law.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution
of the Court of Appeals.
   The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
G.R. No. 163898. December 23, 2008.*   The Law Firm of Coluso Chica and Associates for petitioner.
ROBERTO BARBASA, petitioner, vs. HON. ARTEMIO G.   Villaraza & Angangco Law Offices for private respondents.
TUQUERO, in his capacity as Secretary of the QUISUMBING, J.:
Department of Justice, GRACE GUARIN, NESTOR 1
SANGALANG, VICTOR CALLUENG, respondents. Petitioner assails the Decision dated July 29, 2003 and the
2
Resolution dated May 21, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
Criminal Law; Grave Coercion; Elements.—The crime of grave G.R. SP No. 62610, which dismissed his petition for certiorari
coercion has three elements: (a) that a person is prevented by and denied his motion for reconsideration, respectively. The
another from doing something not prohibited by law, or 3
appellate court had found no reason to reverse the Resolution
compelled to do something against his or her will, be it right or
of the Secretary of Justice ordering the City Prosecutor of
wrong; (b) that the prevention or compulsion is effected by
Manila to move for the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 336630
violence, either by material force or such a display of it as
against private respondents.
would produce intimidation and, consequently, control over the
Petitioner avers that he is the president of Push-Thru
will of the offended party; and (c) that the person who restrains
Marketing, Inc., which leases commercial stalls CS-PL 05, 19
the will and liberty of another has no right to do so; in other
and 30 in Tutuban Center, owned by Tutuban Properties, Inc.,
words, that the restraint is not made under authority of law or
(TPI). On June 30, 1999, Angelina Hipolito, merchandising
in the exercise of any lawful right.
officer of Push-Thru Marketing, received a notice of dis-
Same; Same; Preliminary Investigation; Contracts; Leases;
_______________
Penal Clauses; The Court could not see how the Office of the
1 Rollo, pp. 32-38. Penned by Associate Justice Oswaldo D.
City Prosecutor could have made a finding of probable cause to
Agcaoili, with Associate Justices Perlita J. Tria-Tirona and
file a criminal case for grave coercion against private
Rosalinda Asuncion-Vicente, concurring.
respondents, in light of the evidence then and now prevailing,
2 Id., at pp. 28-31. Penned by Associate Justice Rosalinda
which will show that there was a mutual agreement, in a
Asuncion-Vicente, with Associate Justices Perlita J. Tria-Tirona
contract of lease, that provided for the cutting off of electricity
and Noel G. Tijam, concurring.
as an acceptable penalty for failure to abide faithfully
3 Id., at pp. 41-44. Dated August 23, 2000.
_______________
105
* SECOND DIVISION.
VOL. 575, DECEMBER 23, 2008
103
105
VOL. 575, DECEMBER 23, 2008
Barbasa vs. Tuquero
103
connection of utilities from private respondent Grace Guarin,
Barbasa vs. Tuquero
the Credit and Collection Manager of TPI, for failure of Push-
with what has been covenanted; A penal clause is “an
Thru Marketing to settle its outstanding obligations for
accessory obligation which the parties attach to a principal
Common Usage and Service Area (CUSA) charges, utilities,
obligation for the purpose of insuring the performance thereof
electricity and rentals.
by imposing on the debtor a special prestation (generally
Petitioner settled the charges for CUSA, utilities and electricity,
consisting in the payment of a sum of money) in case the
which payment was accepted by private respondent Guarin,
obligation is not fulfilled or is irregularly or inadequately
but petitioner failed to pay the back rentals. Thus, on July 1,
fulfilled.”—We could not see how the Office of the City
1999, private respondents Guarin, Nestor Sangalang,
Prosecutor of Manila, through Prosecutor Venus D. Marzan,
engineering manager of TPI, and Victor Callueng, TPI head of
could have made a finding of probable cause to file a criminal
security, together with several armed guards, disconnected the
case for grave coercion against private respondents, in light of
electricity in the stalls occupied by Push-Thru Marketing.
the evidence then and now prevailing, which will show that
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a criminal complaint for Grave
there was a mutual agreement, in a contract of lease, that
Coercion against TPI and its officers, David Go, Robert
provided for the cutting off of electricity as an acceptable
Castanares, Buddy Mariano, Art Brondial, and herein private
penalty for failure to abide faithfully with what has been 4
covenanted. Although the propriety of its exercise may be the respondents before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila.
subject of controversy, mere resort to it may not so readily The complaint dated July 13, 1999 alleged that TPI and its
expose the lessor TPI to a charge of grave coercion. officers cut off the electricity in petitioner’s stalls “in a violent
Considering that petitioner owed TPI the total amount of more 5
and intimidating manner” and by unnecessarily employing
than P5 million, which was undisputed, we find that the resort 6
to the penalty clause under the lease agreements was justified. “several armed guards to intimidate and frighten” petitioner
As held in Pryce Corporation v. Philippine Amusement and and his employees and agents.
Gaming Corporation, 458 SCRA 164 (2005): A penal clause is The respondents in the criminal complaint filed separate
7
“an accessory obligation which the parties attach to a principal counter-affidavits which presented a common defense: that
obligation for the purpose of insuring the performance thereof the July 1, 1999 cutting off of electrical supply was done
by imposing on the debtor a special prestation (generally peacefully; that it was an act performed in the lawful
consisting in the payment of a sum of money) in case the performance of their assigned duties, and in accordance with
obligation is not fulfilled or is irregularly or inadequately the covenants set forth in the written agreements previously
fulfilled.” Quite common in lease contracts, this clause executed between petitioner and TPI; that petitioner was not
functions to strengthen the coercive force of the obligation and present when the alleged acts were committed; and that
to provide, in effect, for what could be the liquidated damages petitioner had outstanding accumulated unpaid rentals, CUSA
resulting from a breach. There is nothing immoral or illegal in billings, electrical and water bills, unpaid interest and pen-
such indemnity/penalty clause, absent any showing that it was _______________
forced upon or fraudulently foisted on the obligor. 4 Id., at pp. 74-75.
Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Counsel needs to advise a client, 5 Id., at p. 21.
ordinarily a layman unaccustomed to the intricacies and 6 Id., at p. 23.
vagaries of the law, concerning the objective merit of his case 7 Id., at pp. 83-99.
—if counsel finds that his client’s cause lacks merit, then it is 106
his bounden duty to advise accordingly.—Counsels must be 106
reminded that equally important, as their duty to clients, is SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
their duty as officers of the court to see to it that the orderly Barbasa vs. Tuquero
administration of justice is not unduly impeded or delayed. alty charges (from June 1998 to May 1999) in the amount of
Counsel needs to advise a client, ordinarily a layman P267,513.39 for all his rented stalls, as reflected in three
unaccustomed to the intricacies and vagaries of the law, 8
Interest-Penalty Reports duly sent to him. Petitioner was
concerning the
likewise given demand letter-notices in writing at least three
104
times wherein it was stated that if he did not settle his arrears
104 9
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED in full, electricity would be cut. Of the total amount due from
Barbasa vs. Tuquero him, petitioner paid only P127,272.18 after receipt of the third
notice. Accordingly, private respondents proceeded with the

Page 31 of 71
power cut-off, but only after sending a “Notice of Disconnection Roberto Castanares, Buddy Mariano and Art Brondial but found
10 probable cause against private respondents Grace Guarin,
of Utilities” to petitioner’s stalls informing him of the
impending act. Nestor Sangalang and Victor Callueng. On January 13, 2000, an
15
Private respondents also pointed out that aside from the above Information for grave coercion was filed in court, but
arrears, petitioner has outstanding accountabilities with proceedings therein were deferred when the private
respect to “Priority Premium Fees” in the amount of respondents filed an appeal to the Secretary of Justice.
11 _______________
P5,907,013.10.
12 13 Id., at pp. 101-105.
They likewise stressed that their Agreement with petitioner 14 A civil case was ultimately filed by the petitioner against the
contains the following stipulations: private respondents with respect to the matter of rentals, but
CONTRACT OF LEASE the status of the same is unclear. As far as the records reveal,
Prime Block Cluster Stall an injunction against the private respondents was issued, but
x x x x only after the petitioner’s electricity was already cut. The
PRIORITY PREMIUM         P *2,367,750.00 determination of the legality or illegality, therefore, of the
x x x x cutting off of petitioner’s electricity could not be made to rest
RENT PER MONTH           P *******378.00 per sq. m on the subsequent issuance of the injunction.
                                          (Plus P*******37.80 10% VAT) 15 CA Rollo, p. 100.
x x x x 109
OTHER FEES AND EXPENSES CHARGEABLE VOL. 575, DECEMBER 23, 2008
TO THE LESSEE: 109
x x x x Barbasa vs. Tuquero
_______________
8  Id., at pp. 424-426. On August 23, 2000, the Secretary of Justice reversed the City
9  Id., at p. 86. Prosecutor’s Resolution, as follows:
10 Id., at pp. 428-430. “WHEREFORE, the assailed resolution is hereby REVERSED and
11 Records, Vol. I, p. 436. SET ASIDE. The City Prosecutor is directed to move, with leave
12 Rollo, pp. 326-384. of court, for the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 336630 of the
107 Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila and to report the action
VOL. 575, DECEMBER 23, 2008 taken within ten (10) days from receipt hereof.
107
SO ORDERED.”16
Barbasa vs. Tuquero
His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner
assailed the Resolution of the Secretary of Justice before the
B. COMMON USAGE AND SERVICE AREA (CUSA)
Court of Appeals through a petition for certiorari, which was,
      CHARGES
however, dismissed by the appellate court for lack of merit.
Minimum rate of P190.00/sq. m./mo. to cover expenses
The appellate court likewise denied his motion for
stipulated in Section 6 hereof, subject to periodic review and
reconsideration. Hence this petition.
adjustment to reflect actual expenses.
Petitioner raises the sole issue of whether private respondents’
C. INDIVIDUAL UTILITIES
act of disconnecting the supply of electricity to petitioner’s
ELECTRIC CONSUMPTION : metered + reasonable service
stalls and the manner by which it was carried out constitute
charge (meter to be provided by the LESSOR, for the account
grave coercion.
of the LESSEE)
After carefully considering petitioner’s appeal, we are in
OTHER SERVICES: metered and/or reasonable service charge
agreement to deny it for utter lack of merit.
x x x x
The crime of grave coercion has three elements: (a) that a
7. PAYMENTS
person is prevented by another from doing something not
x x x x
prohibited by law, or compelled to do something against his or
In cases where payments made by the LESSEE for any given
her will, be it right or wrong; (b) that the prevention or
month is not sufficient to cover all outstanding obligations for
compulsion is effected by violence, either by material force or
said period, the order of priority in the application of the
such a display of it as would produce intimidation and,
payments made is as follows:
consequently, control over the will of the offended party; and
a. Penalties
(c) that the person who restrains the will and liberty of another
b. Interests
has no right to do so; in other words, that the restraint is not
c. Insurance
made under authority of law or in the exercise of any lawful
d. CUSA Charges 17
e. Rent right.
f. Priority Premium _______________
x x x x 16 Id., at p. 154.
21. PENALTY CLAUSE 17 People v. De Lara, G.R. No. 124703, June 27, 2000, 334
x x x x SCRA 414, 433-434; People v. Villamar, G.R. No. 121175,
It is also expressly agreed that in case the LESSEE fails to pay November 4, 
at any time the installments on the priority premium, lease 110
rentals or CUSA and utility charges corresponding to a total of 110
three (3) months, even if not consecutively incurred, the SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
LESSOR is hereby granted the option to cut off power and other Barbasa vs. Tuquero
utility services to the LESSEE until full payment of said charges,
expenses, penalty and interest is made, without prejudice to Petitioner’s appeal gives us no sufficient reason to deviate from
any what has already been found by the Secretary of Justice and
108 the Court of Appeals.
108 The records show that there was no violence, force or the
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED display of it as would produce intimidation upon petitioner’s
Barbasa vs. Tuquero employees when the cutting off of petitioner’s electricity was
other remedies provided under this Contract, including the effected. On the contrary, it was done peacefully and after
termination of this Contract. written notice to petitioner was sent. We do not subscribe to
x x x x (Emphasis supplied.) petitioner’s claim that the presence of armed guards were
13
Petitioner filed his Reply Affidavit, claiming that Go, calculated to intimidate him or his employees. Rather, we are
more inclined to believe that the guards were there to prevent
Castanares, Mariano, Brondial, Guarin and Sangalang, while not
any untoward or violent event from occurring in the exercise of
personally present at the scene at the time, were to be held
TPI’s rights under the lease agreements. If the respondents
liable as the authors of the criminal design since they were the
desired a violent result, they would have gone there
ones who ordered the cutting off of petitioner’s electricity.
unannounced or cut petitioner’s electricity through less
Petitioner admitted that none of the armed personnel drew his
desirable and conspicuous means.
gun, much more aimed or fired it, but insisted that he was
It is likewise clear from the penalty clause in the Contracts of
unduly prevented from using electricity to the detriment of his
Lease entered into by the parties that TPI is given the option to
business and his person. He claimed that the officers of TPI
cut off power and other utility services in petitioner’s stalls in
were unable to show the amount and extent of his unpaid bills;
case petitioner fails to pay at any time the installments on the
that as to the electric bills, the same were paid; and that there
priority premium, lease rentals or CUSA and utility charges
was an ongoing negotiation with respect to the matter of
14 corresponding to a total of three months until full payment of
rentals and for reformation of the lease agreements. 18
said charges, expenses, penalty and interest is made. The
The Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila, through Prosecutor
stipulation under said clause is clear; there is no ambiguity in
Venus D. Marzan, dismissed the complaint against David Go,

Page 32 of 71
what is stated. There could be no grave coercion in the private 20 G.R. No. 157480, May 6, 2005, 458 SCRA 164, 180-181.
respondents’ act of exercising in behalf of TPI a right afforded 21 Cf. Cobb-Perez vs. Lantin, No. L-22320, July 29, 1968, 24
to TPI under the solemn and unequivocal covenants of a SCRA 291, 298.
contract to which petitioner had agreed and which he did © Copyright 2020 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
execute and sign.
As held by this Court in a previous case which we find VOL. 10, MARCH 31, 1964
instructive: 483
_______________ Arive, Sr. vs. Tuason
1998, 298 SCRA 398, 405; Timoner v. People, No. L-62050, No. L-16152. March 31, 1964.
November 25, 1983, 125 SCRA 830, 834. RENATO BALEROS, JR., Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
18 Rollo, pp. 340-341. PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
111 G.R. No. 138033 | 2006-02-22
VOL. 575, DECEMBER 23, 2008 D E C I S I O N 
111  
Barbasa vs. Tuquero GARCIA, J.: 
 
“Contracts constitute the law between the parties. They must In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioner Renato
be read together and interpreted in a manner that reconciles Baleros, Jr. assails and seeks the reversal of the January 13,
and gives life to all of them. The intent of the parties, as shown 1999 decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No.
by the clear language used, prevails over post facto 17271 as reiterated in its March 31, 1999 resolution[2] denying
explanations that find no support from the words employed by petitioner's motion for reconsideration. 
the parties or from their contemporary and subsequent acts  
showing their understanding of such contracts.”19 The assailed decision affirmed an earlier decision of the
We could not see how the Office of the City Prosecutor of Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 2, in Criminal Case
Manila, through Prosecutor Venus D. Marzan, could have made No. 91-101642 finding petitioner Renato Baleros, Jr. y David
a finding of probable cause to file a criminal case for grave (CHITO) guilty of attempted rape.[3] 
coercion against private respondents, in light of the evidence  
then and now prevailing, which will show that there was a The accusatory portion of the information[4] dated December
mutual agreement, in a contract of lease, that provided for the 17, 1991 charging petitioner with attempted rape reads as
cutting off of electricity as an acceptable penalty for failure to follow: 
abide faithfully with what has been covenanted. Although the  
propriety of its exercise may be the subject of controversy, That about 1:50 in the morning or sometime thereafter of 13
mere resort to it may not so readily expose the lessor TPI to a December 1991 in Manila and within the jurisdiction of this
charge of grave coercion. Considering that petitioner owed TPI Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by forcefully
the total amount of more than P5 million, which was covering the face of Martina Lourdes T. Albano with a piece of
undisputed, we find that the resort to the penalty clause under cloth soaked in chemical with dizzying effects, did then and
the lease agreements was justified. As held in Pryce there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commenced the
Corporation v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation: commission of rape by lying on top of her with the intention to
‘A penal clause is “an accessory obligation which the parties have carnal knowledge with her but was unable to perform all
attach to a principal obligation for the purpose of insuring the the acts of execution by reason of some cause or accident
performance thereof by imposing on the debtor a special other than his own spontaneous desistance, said acts being
prestation (generally consisting in the payment of a sum of committed against her will and consent to her damage and
money) in case the obligation is not fulfilled or is irregularly or prejudice. 
inadequately fulfilled.”  
Quite common in lease contracts, this clause functions to Upon arraignment on February 5, 1992, petitioner, assisted by
strengthen the coercive force of the obligation and to provide, counsel, pleaded "Not Guilty."[5] Thereafter, trial on the merits
in effect, for what could be the liquidated damages resulting ensued. 
from a breach. There is nothing immoral or illegal in such  
indem- To prove its case, the prosecution presented thirteen (13)
_______________ witnesses. Among them were private complainant Martina
19 Cruz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126713, July 27, 1998, Lourdes Albano (Malou), and her classmates, Joseph Bernard
293 SCRA 239, 243. Africa, Rommel Montes, Renato Alagadan and Christian Alcala.
112 Their testimonies, as narrated in some detail in the decision of
112 the CA, established the following facts: 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED  
Barbasa vs. Tuquero Like most of the tenants of the Celestial Marie Building
nity/penalty clause, absent any showing that it was forced (hereafter "Building", ...) along A.H. Lacson Street, Sampaloc,
Manila, MALOU, occupying Room 307 with her maid, Marvilou
upon or fraudulently foisted on the obligor.’20 (Emphasis
Bebania (Marvilou), was a medical student of the University of
supplied.)
Sto. Tomas [UST] in 1991. 
In this connection, counsels must be reminded that equally
 
important, as their duty to clients, is their duty as officers of
In the evening of December 12, inside Unit 307, MALOU retired
the court to see to it that the orderly administration of justice is
at around 10:30. Outside, right in front of her bedroom door,
not unduly impeded or delayed. Counsel needs to advise a
her maid, Marvilou, slept on a folding bed. 
client, ordinarily a layman unaccustomed to the intricacies and
 
vagaries of the law, concerning the objective merit of his case.
Early morning of the following day, MALOU was awakened by
If counsel finds that his client’s cause lacks merit, then it is his
the smell of chemical on a piece of cloth pressed on her face.
bounden duty to advise accordingly. Indeed a lawyer’s oath to
She struggled but could not move. Somebody was pinning her
uphold the cause of justice may supersede his duty to his
down on the bed, holding her tightly. She wanted to scream for
client’s cause; for such fealty to ethical concerns is
21
help but the hands covering her mouth with cloth wet with
indispensable to the success of the rule of law. chemicals were very tight (TSN, July 5, 1993, p. 33). Still,
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision MALOU continued fighting off her attacker by kicking him until
dated July 29, 2003 and the Resolution dated May 21, 2004 of at last her right hand got free. With this ...the opportunity
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 62610 are hereby presented itself when she was able to grab hold of his sex
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. organ which she then squeezed. 
SO ORDERED.  
Carpio-Morales, Tinga, Velasco, Jr. and Brion, JJ., concur. The man let her go and MALOU went straight to the bedroom
door and roused Marvilou. xxx. Over the intercom, MALOU told
Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed. S/G Ferolin that: "may pumasok sa kuarto ko pinagtangkaan
ako" (Ibid., p. 8). Who it was she did not, however, know. The
Notes.—The stipulation on attorney’s fees contained in the only thing she had made out during their struggle was the feel
Deed constitutes what is known as penal clause. (Trade & of her attacker's clothes and weight. His upper garment was of
Investment Development Corporation of the Philippines vs. cotton material while that at the lower portion felt smooth and
Roblett Industrial Construction Corporation, 474 SCRA 510 satin-like (Ibid, p. 17). He ... was wearing a t-shirt and shorts ...
[2005]) Original Records, p. 355). 
Courts may equitably reduce a stipulated penalty in the  
contracts in two instances: (1) if the principal obligation has To Room 310 of the Building where her classmates Christian
been partly or irregularly complied with; and (2) even if there Alcala, Bernard Baptista, Lutgardo Acosta and Rommel Montes
_______________ were staying, MALOU then proceeded to seek help. xxx. 
Page 33 of 71
  belonging to them in their Unit. While they were outside Room
It was then when MALOU saw her bed ... topsy-turvy. Her 310 talking with the authorities, Rommel Montes (Loyloy),
nightdress was stained with blue ... (TSN, July 5, 1993, pp. 13- another roommate of his, went inside to search the Unit. Loyloy
14). Aside from the window with grills which she had originally found (TSN, January 12, 1993, p. 6) a gray "Khumbella" bag
left opened, another window inside her bedroom was now cloth type (Ibid, pp. 44-45) from inside their unit which they did
open. Her attacker had fled from her room going through the not know was there and surrender the same to the
left bedroom window (Ibid, Answers to Question number 5; Id), investigators. When he saw the gray bag, Christian knew right
the one without iron grills which leads to Room 306 of the away that it belonged to CHITO (Ibid, p. 55) as he had seen the
Building (TSN, July 5, 1993, p.6).  latter usually bringing it to school inside the classroom (Ibid, p.
  45). 
xxx xxx xxx   
  In their presence, the CIS opened the bag and pulled out its
Further, MALOU testified that her relation with CHITO, who was contents, among others, a white t-shirt with a Taunu (sic)
her classmate ..., was friendly until a week prior to the attack. Sigma Phi sign (Ibid, p. 7), a Black Adidas short pants, a
CHITO confided his feelings for her, telling her: "Gusto kita, handkerchief , three (3) white T-shirts, an underwear, and
mahal kita" (TSN, July 5, 1993, p. 22) and she rejected him. .... socks (Ibid). 
(TSN, July 5, 1993, p. 22).   
  Christian recognized the t-shirt (Exhibit "D-4"), the Adidas short
Meanwhile, according to S/G Ferolin, while he was on duty, pants (Exhibit "D-5"), and the handkerchief (Exhibit "D-3) to be
CHITO arrived at the Building at 1:30 in the early morning of CHITO's because CHITO had lent the very same one to him ....
December 13, 1991, wearing a white t-shirt with "'...a marking The t-shirt with CHITO's fraternity symbol, CHITO used to wear
on the front of the T-shirt T M and a Greek letter (sic) SF' and on weekends, and the handkerchief he saw CHITO used at least
below the quoted letters the word '1946' 'UST Medicine and once in December. 
Surgery'" (TSN, October 9, 1992, p. 9) and black shorts with the  
brand name "Adidas" (TSN, October 16, 1992, p.7) and That CHITO left his bag inside Room 310 in the morning of
requested permission to go up to Room 306. This Unit was December 13, 1991, was what consisted mainly of Renato R.
being leased by Ansbert Co and at that time when CHITO was Alagadan's testimony. 
asking permission to enter, only Joseph Bernard Africa was in  
the room.  xxx xxx xxx. 
   
He asked CHITO to produce the required written authorization The colored gray bag had a handle and a strap, was elongated
and when CHITO could not, S/G Ferolin initially refused [but to about 11/4 feet and appeared to be full but was closed with
later, relented] .... S/G Ferolin made the following entry in the a zipper when Renato saw it then (Ibid, pp. 19-20). At that time
security guard's logbook ...:  Christian, Gary, Bernard, and Renato went back to Room 310
  at around 3 to 4 o'clock that afternoon along with some CIS
"0130H Baleros Renato Jr. is a visitor of Ansbert Co who has not agents, they saw the bag at the same place inside the
have (sic) a Request letter from our tenant of Unit #-306 bedroom where Renato had seen CHITO leave it. Not until later
Ansbert, but still I let him inter (sic) for the reason that he will that night at past 9 o'clock in Camp Crame, however, did
be our tenant this coming summer break as he said so I let him Renato know what the contents of the bag were. 
sign it here   
  xxx xxx xxx. 
(Sgd.) Baleros Renato Jr."   
  The forensic Chemist, Leslie Chambers, of the Philippine
(Exhibit "A-2")  National Police Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame, having acted
  in response to the written request of PNP Superintendent Lucas
That CHITO arrived at Room 306 at 1:30 A.M. of December 13, M. Managuelod dated December 13, 1991, (Exhibit "C";
1991 was corroborated by Joseph Bernard Africa (Joseph), ....  Original Records, p. 109.) conducted laboratory examination on
  the specimen collated and submitted.... Her Chemistry Report
xxx xxx xxx  No. C-487-91 (Exhibit "E"; Ibid., p. 112) reads in part, thus: 
   
Joseph was already inside Room 306 at 9 o'clock in the evening "SPECIMEN SUBMITTED: 
of December 12, 1991. xxx by the time CHITO's knocking on  
the door woke him up, .... He was able to fix the time of xxx xxx xxx: 
CHITO's arrival at 1:30 A.M. because he glanced at the alarm  
clock beside the bed when he was awakened by the knock at 1) One (1) small white plastic bag marked 'UNIMART' with the
the door ....  following: 
   
Joseph noticed that CHITO was wearing dark-colored shorts and xxx xxx xxx 
white T-shirt (Ibid., p. 23) when he let the latter in. .... It was at  
around 3 o'clock in the morning of December 13, 1991 when Exh 'C' - One (1) night dress colored salmon pink. 
he woke up again later to the sound of knocking at the door,  
this time, by Bernard Baptista (Bernard), ....  2) One (1) small white pl astic bag marked 'JONAS' with the
  following: 
xxx. With Bernard, Joseph then went to MALOU's room and  
thereat was shown by Bernard the open window through which Exh. 'D' - One (1) printed handkerchief. 
the intruder supposedly passed.   
  Exh. 'E' - One (1) white T-shirt marked 'TMZI'. 
xxx xxx xxx   
  Exh. 'F' - One (1) black short (sic) marked 'ADIDAS'. 
Later, at about 6 to 6:30 in the morning of December 13, 1991,  
Joseph was finally able to talk to CHITO .... He mentioned to the PURPOSE OF LABORATORY EXAMINATION: 
latter that something had happened and that they were not  
being allowed to get out of the building. Joseph also told CHITO To determine the presence of volatime (sic), non-volatile
to follow him to Room 310.  and/or metallic poison on the above stated specimens. 
   
CHITO did just that. He followed after Joseph to Unit 310, FINDINGS: 
carrying his gray bag. xxx. None was in Room 310 so Joseph  
went to their yet another classmate, Renato Alagadan at Room Toxicological examination conducted on the above stated
401 to see if the others were there. xxx.  specimens gave the following results: 
   
People from the CIS came by before 8 o'clock that same Exhs. 'C' and 'D' - POSITIVE to the test for chloroform, a volatile
morning .... They likewise invited CHITO and Joseph to go with poison. 
them to Camp Crame where the two (2) were questioned ....   
  Exhs. 'A', 'B', 'E' and 'F' are insufficient for further analysis. 
An occupant of Room 310 ... Christian Alcala (Christian)  
recalled in Court that in the afternoon of December 13, 1991, CONCLUSION: 
after their 3:30 class, he and his roommates, Bernard Baptista  
and Lutgardo Acosta (Gary) were called to the Building and Exhs. 'C' and 'D' contain chloroform, a volatile poison."[6]
were asked by the CIS people to look for anything not (Words in bracket added) 
Page 34 of 71
  xxx xxx xxx 
For its part, the defense presented, as its main witness, the  
petitioner himself. He denied committing the crime imputed to The CIS men looked inside the bedroom and on the windows.
him or making at any time amorous advances on Malou. Joseph was told to dress up and the two (2) of them, CHITO and
Unfolding a different version of the incident, the defense Joseph, were brought to Camp Crame. 
sought to establish the following, as culled from the same  
decision of the appellate court:  When they arrived at Camp Crame ..., Col. Managuelod asked
  Joseph inside his room and talked to him for 30 minutes. xxx.
In December of 1991, CHITO was a medical student of ... (UST). No one interviewed CHITO to ask his side. 
With Robert Chan and Alberto Leonardo, he was likewise a  
member of the Tau Sigma Phi Fraternity .... MALOU, ..., was xxx xxx xxx 
known to him being also a medical student at the UST at the  
time.  Both CHITO and Joseph were taken to Prosecutor Abesamis
  who later instructed them to undergo physical examination at
From Room 306 of the Celestial Marie Building ..., CHITO, the Camp Crame Hospital ..... At the hospital, ... CHITO and
wearing the prescribed barong tagalog over dark pants and Joseph were physically examined by a certain Dr. de Guzman
leather shoes, arrived at their Fraternity house located at ... who told them to strip .... 
Dos Castillas, Sampaloc, Manila at about 7 o'clock in the  
evening of December 12, 1991. He was included in the xxx xxx xxx 
entourage of some fifty (50) fraternity members scheduled for  
a Christmas gathering at the house of their senior fraternity CHITO had left his gray bag containing, among others, the
brother, Dr. Jose Duran, at No. 3 John Street, North Greenhills, black striped short pants lent to him by Perla Duran (Exhibit "8-
San Juan. xxx.  A", Original Records, p. 345), inside Room 310 at more/less
  6:30 to 7 o'clock in the morning of December 13, 1991. The
The party was conducted at the garden beside [the] swimming next time that he saw it was between 8 to 9 P.M. when he and
pool .... Soon after, ... the four (4) presidential nominees of the Joseph were brought before Fiscal Abesamis for inquest. One of
Fraternity, CHITO included, were being dunked one by one into the CIS agents had taken it there and it was not opened up in
the pool. xxx.  his presence but the contents of the bag were already laid out
  on the table of Fiscal Abesamis who, however, made no effort
xxx CHITO had anticipated his turn ... and was thus wearing his to ask CHITO if the items thereat were his. 
t-shirt and long pants when he was dunked. Perla Duran, ...,  
offered each ... dry clothes to change into and CHITO put on The black Adidas short pants purportedly found in the bag,
the white t-shirt with the Fraternity's symbol and a pair of black CHITO denied putting in his gray bag which he had left at Room
shorts with stripes. xxx .  306 in the early evening of December 12, 1991 before going to
  the fraternity house. He likewise disavowed placing said black
Again riding on Alberto's car and wearing "barong tagalog over Adidas short pants in his gray bag when he returned to the
a white t-shirt with the symbol TAU Sigma Phi, black short apartment at past 1:00 o'clock in the early morning of
pants with stripe, socks and shoes" (TSN, April 25, 1994, p. 15), December 13, 1991 (TSN, June 16, 1994, p. 24), nor when he
CHITO left the party with Robert Chan and Alberto at more or dressed up at about 6 o'clock in the morning to go to school
less past 1 A.M. of December 13, 1991 and proceeded to the and brought his gray bag to Room 310 (Ibid. 25). In fact, at any
Building which they reached at about 1:30 A.M. (Ibid., p. 19). time on December 13, 1991, he was not aware that his gray
He had left his gray traveling bag containing "white t-shirt, bag ever contained any black short Adidas pants (Ibid). He only
sando, underwear, socks, and toothbrush (Ibid., pp. 17-18) at found out for the first time that the black Adidas short pants
room 306 in the afternoon of the previous day ....  was alluded to be among the items inside his gray bag late in
  the afternoon, when he was in Camp Crame. 
At the gate of the Building, CHITO knocked and ..., S/G Ferolin,  
looking at his watch, approached. Because of this, CHITO also Also taking the witness stand for the defense were petitioner's
looked at his own watch and saw that the time was 1:30 (Ibid., fraternity brothers, Alberto Leonardo and Robert Chan, who
p. 26). S/G Ferolin initially refused CHITO entry .... xxx.  both testified being with CHITO in the December 12, 1991
  party held in Dr. Duran's place at Greenhills, riding on the
S/G Ferolin called Unit 306 .... xxx. When S/G Ferolin finally let same car going to and coming from the party and dropping the
him in, already about ten (10) minutes had lapsed since CHITO petitioner off the Celestial Marie building after the party. Both
first arrived (Ibid., p. 25).  were one in saying that CHITO was wearing a barong tagalog,
  with t-shirt inside, with short pants and leather shoes at the
CHITO went up the floor, found the key left for him by Joseph time they parted after the party.[7] Rommel Montes, a tenant
behind the opened jalousie window and for five (5) minutes of Room 310 of the said building, also testified seeing CHITO
vainly tried to open the door until Rommel Montes, ... between the hours of 1:30 and 2:00 A.M. of December 13,
approached him and even commented: "Okey ang suot mo ha, 1991 trying to open the door of Room 306 while clad in dark
di mo mabuksan ang pinto (Ibid., pp. 26-29). Rommel tried to short pants and white barong tagalog. 
open the door of Unit 306 ... but was likewise unsuccessful.  
CHITO then decided to just call out to Joseph while knocking at On the other hand, Perla Duran confirmed lending the
the door.  petitioner the pair of short pants with stripes after the dunking
  party held in her father's house.[8] Presented as defense
It took another (5) minutes of calling out and knocking before expert witness was Carmelita Vargas, a forensic chemistry
Joseph, ..., at last answered the door. Telling him, "Ikaw na ang instructor whose actual demonstration in open court showed
bahala diyan" Joseph immediately turned his back on CHITO that chloroform, being volatile, evaporates in thirty (30)
and went inside the bedroom. CHITO , ...changed to a thinner seconds without tearing nor staining the cloth on which it is
shirt and went to bed. He still had on the same short pants applied.[9] 
given by Perla Duran from the fraternity party (TSN, June 16,  
1994, p. 20).  On December 14, 1994, the trial court rendered its
  decision[10] convicting petitioner of attempted rape and
At 6 o'clock in the morning of December 13, 1991, CHITO woke accordingly sentencing him, thus: 
up .... He was already in his school uniform when, around 6:30  
A.M, Joseph came to the room not yet dressed up. He asked the WHEREFORE, under cool reflection and prescinding from the
latter why this was so and, without elaborating on it, Joseph foregoing, the Court finds the accused Renato D. Baleros, Jr.,
told him that something had happened and to just go to Room alias "Chito", guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
310 which CHITO did.  attempted rape as principal and as charged in the information
  and hereby sentences him to suffer an imprisonment ranging
At Room 310, CHITO was told by Rommel Montes that from FOUR (4) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY of
somebody, whom MALOU was not able to identify, went to the Prision Correctional, as Minimum to TEN (10) YEARS of Prision
room of MALOU and tried to rape her (TSN, April 25, 1994, p. Mayor as Maximum, with all the accessory penalties provided
36). xxx.  by law, and for the accused to pay the offended party Martina
  Lourdes T. Albano, the sum of P50,000.00 by way of Moral and
Joseph told him that the security guard was not letting anybody exemplary damages, plus reasonable Attorney's fees of
out of the Building .... When two (2) CIS men came to the unit P30,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
asking for Renato Baleros, CHITO presented himself. insolvency, and to pay the costs. 
Congressman Rodolfo B. Albano, father of MALOU, then asked  
him for the key to Room 306....  SO ORDERED. 
   
Page 35 of 71
Aggrieved, petitioner went to the CA whereat his appellate b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven;
recourse was docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 17271.  and 
   
As stated at the threshold hereof, the CA, in its assailed c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to
Decision dated January 13, 1999, affirmed the trial court's produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. 
judgment of conviction, to wit:   
  In the present case, the positive identification of the petitioner
WHEREFORE, finding no basis in fact and in law to deviate from forms part of circumstantial evidence, which, when taken
the findings of the court a quo, the decision appealed from is together with the other pieces of evidence constituting an
hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against appellant.  unbroken chain, leads to only fair and reasonable conclusion,
  which is that petitioner was the intruder in question. 
SO ORDERED.[11]   
  We quote with approval the CA's finding of the circumstantial
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but his motion was evidence that led to the identity of the petitioner as such
denied by the CA in its equally assailed resolution of March 31, intruder: 
1999.[12]   
  Chito was in the Building when the attack on MALOU took
Petitioner is now with this Court, on the contention that the CA place. He had access to the room of MALOU as Room 307
erred -  where he slept the night over had a window which allowed
  ingress and egress to Room 306 where MALOU stayed. Not only
1. In not finding that it is improbable for petitioner to have the Building security guard, S/G Ferolin, but Joseph Bernard
committed the attempted rape imputed to him, absent Africa as well confirmed that CHITO was wearing a black
sufficient, competent and convincing evidence to prove the "Adidas" shorts and fraternity T-shirt when he arrived at the
offense charged.  Building/Unit 307 at 1:30 in the morning of December 13,
  1991. Though it was dark during their struggle, MALOU had
2. In convicting petitioner of attempted rape on the basis made out the feel of her intruder's apparel to be something
merely of circumstantial evidence since the prosecution failed made of cotton material on top and shorts that felt satin-
to satisfy all the requisites for conviction based thereon.  smooth on the bottom. 
   
3. In not finding that the circumstances it relied on to convict From CHITO's bag which was found inside Room 310 at the
the petitioner are unreliable, inconclusive and contradictory.  very spot where witness Renato Alagadan saw CHITO leave it,
  were discovered the most incriminating evidence: the
4. In not finding that proof of motive is miserably wanting in his handkerchief stained with blue and wet with some kind of
case.  chemicals; a black "Adidas" satin short pants; and a white
  fraternity T-shirt, also stained with blue. A different witness,
5. In awarding damages in favor of the complainant despite the this time, Christian Alcala, identified these garments as
fact that the award was improper and unjustified absent any belonging to CHITO. As it turned out, laboratory examination
evidence to prove the same.  on these items and on the beddings and clothes worn by
  MALOU during the incident revealed that the handkerchief and
6. In failing to appreciate in his favor the constitutional MALOU's night dress both contained chloroform, a volatile
presumption of innocence and that moral certainty has not poison which causes first degree burn exactly like what MALOU
been met, hence, he should be acquitted on the ground that sustained on that part of her face where the chemical-soaked
the offense charged against him has not been proved beyond cloth had been pressed. 
reasonable doubt.   
  This brings the Court to the issue on whether the evidence
Otherwise stated, the basic issue in this case turns on the adduced by the prosecution has established beyond
question on whether or not the CA erred in affirming the ruling reasonable doubt the guilt of the petitioner for the crime of
of the RTC finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of attempted rape. 
the crime of attempted rape.   
  The Solicitor General maintained that petitioner, by pressing on
After a careful review of the facts and evidence on record in Malou's face the piece of cloth soaked in chemical while
the light of applicable jurisprudence, the Court is disposed to holding her body tightly under the weight of his own, had
rule for petitioner's acquittal, but not necessarily because there commenced the performance of an act indicative of an intent
is no direct evidence pointing to him as the intruder holding a or attempt to rape the victim. It is argued that petitioner's
chemical-soaked cloth who pinned Malou down on the bed in actuation thus described is an overt act contemplated under
the early morning of December 13, 1991.  the law, for there can not be any other logical conclusion other
  than that the petitioner intended to ravish Malou after he
Positive identification pertains essentially to proof of identity attempted to put her to an induced sleep. The Solicitor
and not per se to that of being an eyewitness to the very act of General, echoing what the CA said, adds that if petitioner's
commission of the crime. There are two types of positive intention was otherwise, he would not have lain on top of the
identification. A witness may identify a suspect or accused as victim.[15] 
the offender as an eyewitness to the very act of the  
commission of the crime. This constitutes direct evidence. Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, rape is committed
There may, however, be instances where, although a witness by a man who has carnal knowledge or intercourse with a
may not have actually witnessed the very act of commission of woman under any of the following circumstances: (1) By using
a crime, he may still be able to positively identify a suspect or force or intimidation; (2) When the woman is deprived of
accused as the perpetrator of a crime as when, for instance, reason or otherwise unconscious; and (3) When the woman is
the latter is the person or one of the persons last seen with the under twelve years of age or is demented. Under Article 6, in
victim immediately before and right after the commission of relation to the aforementioned article of the same code, rape is
the crime. This is the second type of positive identification, attempted when the offender commences the commission of
which forms part of circumstantial evidence.[13] In the rape directly by overt acts and does not perform all the acts of
absence of direct evidence, the prosecution may resort to execution which should produce the crime of rape by reason of
adducing circumstantial evidence to discharge its burden. some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous
Crimes are usually committed in secret and under condition desistance.[16] 
where concealment is highly probable. If direct evidence is  
insisted under all circumstances, the prosecution of vicious Expounding on the nature of an attempted felony, the Court,
felons who committed heinous crimes in secret or secluded speaking thru Justice Claro M. Recto in People vs. Lamahang,
places will be hard, if not well-nigh impossible, to prove.[14]  [17] stated that "the attempt which the Penal Code punishes is
  that which has a logical connection to a particular, concrete
Section 4 of Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides the offense; that which is the beginning of the execution of the
conditions when circumstantial evidence may be sufficient for offense by overt acts of the perpetrator, leading directly to its
conviction. The provision reads:  realization and consummation." Absent the unavoidable
  connection, like the logical and natural relation of the cause
Sec. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient - and its effect, as where the purpose of the offender in
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if -  performing an act is not certain, meaning the nature of the act
  in relation to its objective is ambiguous, then what obtains is
a) There is more than one circumstance;  an attempt to commit an indeterminate offense, which is not a
  juridical fact from the standpoint of the Penal Code.[18] 
 
Page 36 of 71
There is absolutely no dispute about the absence of sexual by then Justice Ramon C. Aquino, there is no need to allege
intercourse or carnal knowledge in the present case. The next malice, restraint or compulsion in an information for unjust
question that thus comes to the fore is whether or not the act vexation. As it were, unjust vexation exists even without the
of the petitioner, i.e., the pressing of a chemical-soaked cloth element of restraint or compulsion for the reason that this term
while on top of Malou, constitutes an overt act of rape.  is broad enough to include any human conduct which, although
  not productive of some physical or material harm, would
Overt or external act has been defined as some physical unjustly annoy or irritate an innocent person.[25] The
activity or deed, indicating the intention to commit a particular paramount question is whether the offender's act causes
crime, more than a mere planning or preparation, which if annoyance, irritation, torment, distress or disturbance to the
carried out to its complete termination following its natural mind of the person to whom it is directed.[26] That Malou, after
course, without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the incident in question, cried while relating to her classmates
the voluntary desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and what she perceived to be a sexual attack and the fact that she
necessarily ripen into a concrete offense.[19]  filed a case for attempted rape proved beyond cavil that she
  was disturbed, if not distressed by the acts of petitioner. 
Harmonizing the above definition to the facts of this case, it  
would be too strained to construe petitioner's act of pressing a The penalty for coercion falling under the second paragraph of
chemical-soaked cloth in the mouth of Malou which would Article 287 of the Revised Penal Code is arresto menor or a fine
induce her to sleep as an overt act that will logically and ranging from P5.00 to P200.00 or both. 
necessarily ripen into rape. As it were, petitioner did not  
commence at all the performance of any act indicative of an WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
intent or attempt to rape Malou. It cannot be overemphasized affirming that of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, is hereby
that petitioner was fully clothed and that there was no attempt REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one entered ACQUITTING
on his part to undress Malou, let alone touch her private part. petitioner Renato D. Baleros, Jr. of the charge for attempted
For what reason petitioner wanted the complainant rape. Petitioner, however, is adjudged GUILTY of light coercion
unconscious, if that was really his immediate intention, is and is accordingly sentenced to 30 days of arresto menor and
anybody's guess. The CA maintained that if the petitioner had to pay a fine of P200.00, with the accessory penalties thereof
no intention to rape, he would not have lain on top of the and to pay the costs. 
complainant. Plodding on, the appellate court even anticipated  
the next step that the petitioner would have taken if the victim SO ORDERED. 
had been rendered unconscious. Wrote the CA: 
  G.R. No. 113006. November 23, 2000.*
The shedding of the clothes, both of the attacker and his ONG CHIU KWAN, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS
victim, will have to come later. His sexual organ is not yet and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
exposed because his intended victim is still struggling. Where
the intended victim is an educated woman already mature in Courts; Judgments; Memorandum Decisions; Although a
age, it is very unlikely that a rapist would be in his naked glory memorandum decision is permitted under certain conditions, it
before even starting his attack on her. He has to make her lose cannot merely refer to the findings of fact and the conclusions
her guard first, or as in this case, her unconsciousness.[20]  of law of the lower court—the court must make a full findings of
  fact and conclusion of law of its own.—The Constitution
At bottom then, the appellate court indulges in plain requires that “[N]o decision shall be rendered by any court
speculation, a practice disfavored under the rule on evidence in without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and
criminal cases. For, mere speculations and probabilities cannot the law on which it is based.” The 1985 Rules of Criminal
substitute for proof required to establish the guilt of an Procedure, as amended, provides that “[T]he judgment must
accused beyond reasonable doubt.[21]  be written in the official language, personally and directly
  prepared by the judge and signed by him and shall contain
In Perez vs. Court of Appeals,[22] the Court acquitted therein clearly and distinctly a statement of the facts proved or
petitioner of the crime of attempted rape, pointing out that:  admitted by the accused and the law upon which the judgment
  is based.” Although a memorandum decision is permitted
xxx. In the crime of rape, penetration is an essential act of under certain conditions, it cannot merely refer to the findings
execution to produce the felony. Thus, for there to be an of fact and the conclusions, of law of the lower court. The court
attempted rape, the accused must have commenced the act of must make a full findings of fact and conclusion of law of its
penetrating his sexual organ to the vagina of the victim but for own.
some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous Same; Same; Judges; Judges disposed to pay lip service to their
desistance, the penetration, however, slight, is not completed.  work must rethink their place in the judiciary or seriously take
  refresher courses on decision writing.—The decision of the
xxx xxx xxx  regional trial court is a nullity. Very recently, speaking of a
  similarly worded decision of a regional trial court, we said: “[I]t
Petitioner's act of lying on top of the complainant, embracing is starkly hallow, otiosely written, vacuous in its content and
and kissing her, mashing her breasts, inserting his hand inside trite in its form. It achieved nothing and attempted at nothing,
her panty and touching her sexual organ, while admittedly not even at a simple summation of facts which could easily be
obscene and detestable acts, do not constitute attempted rape done. Its inadequacy speaks for itself.” Judges similarly
absent any showing that petitioner actually commenced to disposed to pay lip service
force his penis into the complainant's sexual organ. xxx.  _______________
 
Likewise in People vs. Pancho,[23] the Court held:  * FIRST DIVISION.
  587
xxx, appellant was merely holding complainant's feet when his
Tito Onio arrived at the alleged locus criminis. Thus, it would be VOL. 345, NOVEMBER 23, 2000
stretching to the extreme our credulity if we were to conclude 587
that mere holding of the feet is attempted rape.  Ong Chiu Kwan vs. Court of Appeals
  to their work must rethink their place in the judiciary or
Lest it be misunderstood, the Court is not saying that petitioner seriously take refresher courses on decision writing. We warn
is innocent, under the premises, of any wrongdoing them of stiff sanctions for such lackadaisical performance.
whatsoever. The information filed against petitioner contained Criminal Law; Unjust Vexation; Where the accused admitted
an allegation that he forcefully covered the face of Malou with having ordered the cutting of the electric, water and telephone
a piece of cloth soaked in chemical. And during the trial, Malou lines of the complainant’s business, without any necessary
testified about the pressing against her face of the chemical- permits or authorization to relocate the lines, and timing the
soaked cloth and having struggled after petitioner held her interruption of electric, water and telephone services during
tightly and pinned her down. Verily, while the series of acts peak hours of the operation of business of the complainant, he
committed by the petitioner do not determine attempted rape, is liable for unjust vexation.—Petitioner admitted having
as earlier discussed, they constitute unjust vexation punishable ordered the cutting of the electric, water and telephone lines of
as light coercion under the second paragraph of Article 287 of complainant’s business establishment because these lines
the Revised Penal Code. In the context of the constitutional crossed his property line. He failed, however, to show evidence
provision assuring an accused of a crime the right to be that he had the necessary permits or authorization to relocate
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation,[24] it the lines. Also, he timed the interruption of electric, water and
cannot be said that petitioner was kept in the dark of the telephone services during peak hours of the operation of
inculpatory acts for which he was proceeded against. To be business of the complainant. Thus, petitioner’s act unjustly
sure, the information against petitioner contains sufficient annoyed or vexed the complainant. Consequently, petitioner
details to enable him to make his defense. As aptly observed Ong Chiu Kwan is liable for unjust vexation.
Page 37 of 71
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of The Court notes that in the decision of the Regional Trial Court
Appeals. which the Court of Appeals affirmed peremptorily without
noticing its nullity, the Regional Trial Court merely quoted the
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. decision of the Municipal Trial Court in full and added two
     Roberto C. Leong and Juanito S. Amihan, Jr. for petitioner. paragraphs, thus:
     William Su for private respondent. “This Court, in accordance with the rules, required the parties
PARDO, J.: to submit their corresponding memorandum or brief. The
prosecution filed its memorandum, and also with the defense.
What is before the Court for consideration is the decision of the “After a careful perusal of the record of the case and
Court of Appeals affirming the conviction of accused Ong Chiu evaluating the evidence thereto and exhibits thereof, this Court
Kwan, for unjust vexation.1 finds no ground to modify, reverse or alter the above-stated
On January 31, 1991, Assistant City Prosecutor Andres M. decision and hereby affirms the decision of the lower court in
Bayona of Bacolod filed with the Municipal Trial Court, Bacolod toto.”13
City an information charging petitioner with unjust vexation for The Constitution requires that “[N]o decision shall be rendered
cutting the electric wires, water pipes and telephone lines of by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly
“Crazy the
_______________ _______________

1 In CA-G.R. CR No. 14209, promulgated on August 16, 1993, 8 Ibid.

TayaoJaguros, J., ponente, de Pano, Jr. and Isnani, JJ., 9 Manifestation, Annex “D,” Rollo, pp. 119-128; also Comment,
concurring. Rollo, pp. 47-51. Annex “C,” Rollo, pp. 179-190. Judge Emma C. Labayen,
588 presiding.
10 Docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 14209.
588 11 Petition, Annex “C,” Rollo, pp. 47-51.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 12 Petition filed on January 14, 1994, Rollo, pp. 8-40. On March
Ong Chiu Kwan vs. Court of Appeals 1, 2000, we gave due course to the petition. Rollo, pp. 392-
Feet,” a business establishment owned and operated by 393.
Mildred Ong.2 13 Rollo, p. 128.
On April 24, 1990, at around 10:00 in the morning, Ong Chiu 590
Kwan ordered Wilfredo Infante to “relocate” the telephone,
electric and water lines of “Crazy Feet,” because said lines 590
posed as a disturbance.3 However, Ong Chiu Kwan failed to SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
present a permit from appropriate authorities allowing him to Ong Chiu Kwan vs. Court of Appeals
cut the electric wires, water pipe and telephone lines of the facts and the law on which it is based.”14 The 1985 Rules of
business establishment.4 Criminal Procedure, as amended, provides that “[T]he
After due trial, on September 1, 1992, the Municipal Trial Court judgment must be written in the official language, personally
found Ong Chiu Kwan guilty of unjust vexation,5 and sentenced and directly prepared by the judge and signed by him and shall
him to “imprisonment for twenty days.”6 The court also contain clearly and distinctly a statement of the facts proved or
ordered him to pay moral damages, finding that the wrongful admitted by the accused and the law upon which the judgment
act of abruptly cutting off the electric, water pipe and is based.”15
telephone lines of “Crazy Feet” caused the interruption of its Although a memorandum decision is permitted under certain
business operations during peak hours, to the detriment of its conditions, it cannot merely refer to the findings of fact and the
owner, Mildred Ong. The trial court also awarded exemplary conclusions of law of the lower court. The court must make a
damages to complainant “as a deterrent to the accused not to full findings of fact and conclusion of law of its own.16
follow similar act in the future and to pay attorney’s fees.”7 Consequently, the decision of the regional trial court is a
The trial court disposed of the case as follows: nullity. Very recently, speaking of a similarly worded decision
“IN VIEW THEREOF, this Court finds the accused guilty beyond of a regional trial court, we said:
reasonable doubt of the offense of unjust vexation provided “[I]t is starkly hallow, otiosely written, vacuous in its content
under Article 287, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code and and trite in its form. It achieved nothing and attempted at
sentences him to suffer a penalty of imprisonment of twenty nothing, not even at a simple summation of facts which could
(20) days and to pay private complainant the following: easily be done. Its inadequacy speaks for itself.”17
P 10,000.00—moral damages Judges similarly disposed to pay lip service to their work must
P 5,000.00—exemplary damages rethink their place in the judiciary or seriously take refresher
P 5,000.00—attorney’s fees and to pay the cost of this suit.” courses on decision writing. We warn them of stiff sanctions for
_______________ such lackadaisical performance.
Consequently, the case may be remanded to the lower court
2 Information, Rollo, p. 113. for compliance with the constitutional requirement of contents
3 Motion for Reconsideration etc., Annex “D,” Rollo, pp. 119- of a decision. However, considering that this case has been
128, at p. 122. pending for sometime, the ends of justice will be fully served if
4 Ibid., at p. 127. we review the evidence and decide the case.
5 In Crim. Case No. 48294, Decision, dated September 1, 1992, Petitioner admitted having ordered the cutting of the electric,
Judge Rafael O. Penuela, presiding, Comment, Annex “B,” water and telephone lines of complainant’s business
Rollo, pp. 171-178. establishment because these lines crossed his property line. He
6 The term “imprisonment for twenty days” is wrong. The court failed, however, to show evidence that he had the necessary
must use the terminology of the Revised Penal Code, namely, permits or authorization
twenty days of arresto menor. (People v. Palomar, 278 SCRA _______________
114, 151-152 [1997]).
7 Comment, Annex “B,” Rollo, at p. 178. 14 Article VIII, Section 14, 1987 Constitution,
589 15 Rule 120, Sec. 2, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as
amended.
VOL. 345, NOVEMBER 23, 2000 16 Yao v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 132428, October 24, 2000,
589 344 SCRA 202; Francisco v. Permskul, 173 SCRA 324, 335
Ong Chiu Kwan vs. Court of Appeals (1989).
SO ORDERED. 17 Yao v. Court of Appeals, supra, Note 16.
Bacolod City, Philippines, September 1, 1992. 591
(SGD.) RAFAEL O. PENUELA
Judge”8      VOL. 345, NOVEMBER 23, 2000
On appeal to the Regional Trial Court, Bacolod City, the latter 591
court in a decision dated December 8, 1992, simplistically Ong Chiu Kwan vs. Court of Appeals
adopted the decision of the lower court in toto, without stating to relocate the lines. Also, he timed the interruption of electric,
the reasons for doing so.9 water and telephone services during peak hours of the
On April 22, 1993, by petition for review, Ong Chiu Kwan operation of business of the complainant. Thus, petitioner’s act
elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.10 On August 16, unjustly annoyed or vexed the complainant. Consequently,
1993, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision dismissing petitioner Ong Chiu Kwan is liable for unjust vexation.
the appeal,11 agreeing with the lower court’s finding that Regarding damages, we find the award of moral and exemplary
petitioner was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of unjust damages and attorney’s fees to be without basis. Moral
vexation. damages may be recovered if they were the proximate result
Hence, this petition for review.12 of defendant’s wrongful act or omission.18 An award of
exemplary damages is justified if the crime was committed
Page 38 of 71
with one or more aggravating circumstances.19 There is no these acts to facilitate his killing, not because they intended to
evidence to support such award. Hence, we delete the award of detain or confine him. As soon as they arrived at the locus
moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees. criminis, appellants wasted no time in killing him. That
WHEREFORE, the decisions of the lower courts are REVERSED appellants’ intention from the beginning was to kill the victim is
and SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, accused Ong Chiu Kwan is confirmed by the conversation which Sumipo heard in the car
hereby sentenced to pay a fine of P200.00, and the costs. The in which Maritess said that a knife would be used to kill him so
award of moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees is that it would not create noise. The subsequent demand for
hereby deleted. ransom was an afterthought which did not qualify appellants’
SO ORDERED. prior acts as kidnapping. People v. Padica, 221 SCRA 362
     Davide, Jr. (C.J., Chairman), Puno, Kapunan and (1993), instructs: We have consistently held that where the
YnaresSantiago, JJ., concur. taking of the victim was incidental to the basic purpose to kill,
Judgment reversed and set aside. the crime is only murder, and this is true even if, before the
Notes.—Court decisions are based on facts and reasoned killing but for purposes thereof, the victim was taken from one
arguments, not on surveys of popular sentiments. (People vs. place to another. Thus, where the evident purpose of taking
Lotoc, 307 SCRA 471 [1999]) the victims was to kill them, and from the acts of the accused it
The elements of unjust vexation do not form part of the crime cannot be inferred that the latter’s purpose was actually to
of rape as defined in Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code. detain or deprive the victims of their liberty, the subsequent
(People vs. Contreras, 338 SCRA 622 [2000]) killing of the victims constitute the crime of murder, hence the
——o0o—— crime of kidnapping does not exist and cannot be considered
as a component felony to produce the complex crime of
_______________ kidnapping with murder. In fact, as we held in the aforecited
case of Masilang, et al., 142 SCRA 673 (1986), although the
18 Article 2217, Civil Code. accused had planned to kidnap the victim for ransom but they
19 Article 2230, Civil Code. first killed him and it was only later that they demanded and
592 obtained the money, such demand for ransom did not convert
the crime into kidnapping since no detention or deprivation of
592 liberty was involved, hence the crime committed was only
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED murder.
Llorente vs. Court of Appeals Evidence; Witnesses; State Witnesses; Requisites.—The
© Copyright 2020 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved. conditions for the discharge of an accused as a state witness
Ong Chiu Kwan vs. Court of Appeals, 345 SCRA 586, G.R. No. are as follows: (a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony
113006 November 23, 2000 of the accused whose discharge is requested; (b) There is no
other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of
Resolutions reversed and set aside. the offense committed, except
Note.—The issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment is 428
conditioned on the filing of a bond unless the applicant is the
State, in which case, the filing of attachment bond is excused. 428
(Republic vs. Garcia, 527 SCRA 495 [2007]) SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
——o0o—— People vs. Estacio, Jr.
  the testimony of said accused; (c) The testimony of said
accused can be substantially corroborated in its material
points; (d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty;
G.R. No. 171655. July 22, 2009.* and (e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. PABLO L. offense involving moral turpitude.
ESTACIO, JR. and MARITESS ANG, appellants. Same; Same; Error in the discharge of an accused as a state
witness would not affect the competency and quality of his
Appeals; The Supreme Court need not thus pass upon the testimony.—Even assuming arguendo that the discharge of
findings of fact of the trial court, especially if they have been Sumipo as a state witness was erroneous, such error would not
affirmed on appeal by the appellate court.—Findings of fact of affect the competency and quality of his testimony.
the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of witnesses, AUTOMATIC REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
and its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as    The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
its conclusions anchored on said findings are accorded high   The Solicitor General for appellee.
respect, if not conclusive effect, by this Court because of the   Public Attorney’s Office and Florimond C. Rous for appellants.
trial court’s unique advantage in observing and monitoring at CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
close range the demeanor, deportment, and conduct of the Appellant Maritess Ang (Maritess) was charged before the
witnesses as they testify. This Court need not thus pass upon Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City with kidnapping for
the findings of fact of the trial court, especially if they have ransom, allegedly committed as follows:
been affirmed on appeal by the appellate court, as in the “That on or about the 10th of October 1995, in Quezon City,
present case. Nevertheless, the Court combed through the Philippines, the above-named accused conspiring together,
records of the case and found no ground to merit a reversal of confederating with two (2) other persons whose true names,
appellants’ conviction. identities and whereabouts have not as yet been ascertained
Criminal Law; Kidnapping with Murder; Complex Crimes; In a and mutually helping one another did then and there, willfully,
special complex crime, the prosecution must prove each of the unlawfully and feloniously kidnap one CHARLIE CHUA, a
component offenses with the same precision that would be businessman, from the Casa Leonisa Bar located at Examiner
necessary if they were made the subject of separate Street, Quezon City and brought him to an unknown place and
complaints.—Appellants were eventually charged with and detained him up to the present for the purpose of extorting
convicted of the special complex crime of kidnapping with ransom money in the amount of P15,000,000.00, Philippine
murder, defined in the last paragraph of Article 267 of the Currency, thereby depriving him of his liberty from October 10,
Revised Penal Code. In a special complex crime, the 1995 up to the present, to the damage and prejudice of said
prosecution must prove each of the component offenses with offended party.”1
the same _______________
_______________
1 Information, Records, p. 1.
* EN BANC. 429
427
VOL. 593, JULY 22, 2009
VOL. 593, JULY 22, 2009 429
427 People vs. Estacio, Jr.
People vs. Estacio, Jr. The Information was subsequently amended to implead the
precision that would be necessary if they were made the other appellant, Pablo Estacio, Jr. (Estacio), and to change the
subject of separate complaints. charge from kidnapping for ransom to kidnapping with murder.
Same; Same; Where the evident purpose of taking the victim The accusatory portion of the Amended Information reads:
was to kill him, and from the acts of the accused it cannot be “That on or about the 11th day of October, 1995, in Quezon
inferred that the latter’s purpose was actually to detain or City, Philippipnes, the above-named accused, conspiring,
deprive the victim of his liberty, the subsequent killing of the confederating with another person whose true name and
victim constitute the crime of murder—the crime of kidnapping identity has not as yet been ascertained and mutually helping
does not exist.—In the case at bar, kidnapping was not one another, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
sufficiently proven. Although appellants bound and gagged feloniously kidnap one CHARLIE MANCILLAN CHUA, a
Chua and transported him to Bulacan against his will, they did businessman, with the use of motor vehicle from Casa Leonisa
Page 39 of 71
Bar located at Examiner Street, Quezon City and brought him In the afternoon of the same day, Maritess and Estacio went to
to BRGY. STO. CRISTO, San Jose, del Monte, Bulacan and Sumipo’s residence again where Estacio again called up the
thereafter with intent to kill, qualified by evident victim’s mother, this time lowering the ransom demand to
premeditation, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and P10,000,000 which she still found to be too steep. Sumipo
feloniously repeatedly stab said CHARLIE MANCILLAN CHUA on expressed his misgivings about future calls, as they might get
the different parts of his body with the use of [a] fan knife, caught, but Estacio and Maritess assured him that that call
thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal wounds, which would be the last.
were the direct and immediate cause of his death, to the The group then went to Greenhills where Estacio still again
damage and prejudice of the heirs of said Charlie Mancillan called up the victim’s mother, still lowering the ransom
Chua.”2 (Underscoring in the original.) demand to P5,000,000, P1,000,000 of which should be
Still later, the Information was further amended to additionally advanced. The victim’s mother having agreed to the demand,
implead one Hildo Sumipo (Sumipo)3 who was, however, Maritess and Estacio directed her to place the money in a
subsequently discharged as state witness.4 garbage can near Pizza Hut in Greenhills at 11:30 in the
The evidence for the prosecution presents the following version evening. Estacio and Sumipo later proceeded to Pizza Hut, and
of events:5 as they were seated there, a patrol car passed by, drawing
_______________ them to leave and part ways.
Sumipo soon learned that Maritess and Estacio sold Chua’s
2 Id., at p. 49. gun, watch, and necklace from the proceeds of which he was
3 Id., at p. 52. given P7,000.
4 Id., at p. 167. On May 16, 1996, Sumipo surrendered to the National Bureau
5 Vide TSN, September 24, 1996, pp. 2-75; TSN, September 30, of Investigation. On May 23, 1996, Estacio surrendered
1996, pp. 2-59; TSN, October 8, 1996, pp. 2-84; TSN, October 432
14, 1996, pp. 2-56; TSN, October 22, 1996, pp. 3-34; TSN,
November 4, 1996, pp. 2-47; TSN, November 7, 1996, pp. 3-91; 432
TSN, November 11, 1996, pp. 3-27; TSN, December 4, 1996, SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
pp. 2-32; TSN, January 15, 1997, pp. 3-81; TSN, February 24, People vs. Estacio, Jr.
1997, pp. 3-77; TSN, March 5, 1997, pp. 3-45; TSN, April 14, to the police. The police then informed the victim’s mother that
1997, pp. 2-35; TSN, May 5, 1997, pp. 2-30; RTC Records, pp. Estacio had admitted having killed her son, and that he offered
171-241, 243. to accompany them to the crime scene.
430 The police, accompanied by the victim’s mother and Estacio,
went to the crime scene and recovered the remains of the
430 victim who was identified by his mother by the clothes
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED attached to his bones. The victim’s dentist found his teeth to
People vs. Estacio, Jr. match his dental record.
At around 10:00 in the evening of October 10, 1995, Maritess, Sumipo explained in an affidavit,9 which he identified in open
together with Estacio and Sumipo, arrived at Casa Leonisa, a court,10 that Maritess got angry with the victim after he lent
bar-restaurant at Examiner Street, Quezon City where the money to her husband, one Robert Ong,11 enabling him to
three of them would meet with Charlie Mancilla Chua (the leave the country without her knowledge, while Estacio was
victim). Maritess had earlier told Sumipo that she would settle jealous of the victim with whom Maritess had a relationship.12
her debt to the victim and then “deretsong dukot na rin x x x  In his affidavit13 which he identified in open court, Estacio
kay Charlie [the victim].”6 Sumipo assumed, however, that claimed that a quarrel broke out in the car between the victim
Maritess was just joking. and Maritess about a debt to the victim; that he tried to pacify
After the victim arrived past midnight and talked to Maritess the two, but the victim got angry at him, prompting him to
for a short while, the group boarded his car, Maritess taking the point a fan knife at his neck; and that he then asked Sumipo to
seat beside the victim who was driving, as Estacio and Sumipo drive the car up to Barangay Sto. Cristo, San Jose del Monte,
took the backseat. Bulacan where he dragged the victim away from the car and
Not long after, Estacio pulled out a gun and ordered the victim accidentally stabbed him.
to pull the car over. As the victim complied, Estacio, with a gun When asked on cross-examination why the stabbing was
pointed at him, pulled him to the backseat as Maritess accidental, Estacio replied that he and Maritess originally
transferred to the backseat, sat beside the victim, tied the planned to leave the victim in Bulacan, but since there was talk
victim’s hands behind his back, and placed tape on his mouth. of the victim getting back at them, he “got confused and so it
Estacio then directed Sumipo to take over the wheels as he happened.”14
did.7 Maritess for her part denied15 having conspired with Estacio.
While Sumipo tried to dissuade appellants from pursuing their She claimed that while on board the car, the victim took
plan, they replied that they would kill the victim so that he _______________
would not take revenge.8 Thereupon, the victim told Maritess,
“bakit mo nagawa sa akin ito sa kabila ng lahat?,” to which she 9  Records, pp. 237-240.
replied, “Bayad na ako sa utang ko sa iyo ngayon.” 10 TSN, January 15, 1997, pp. 61-62.
On Estacio’s instruction, Sumipo drove towards San Jose del 11 TSN, Oct. 13, 1997, p. 93.
Monte, Bulacan and on reaching a secluded place, Estacio 12 Records, p. 237.
ordered Sumipo to stop the car as he did. Maritess and Estacio 13 Exhibit “AA,” supra note 9.
then brought the victim to a grassy place. Estacio with bloodied 14 TSN, July 16, 1997, p. 10.
hands later resurfaced. 15 Vide TSN, October 13, 1997, pp. 3-146.
The three then headed towards Malinta, Valenzuela, Bulacan. 433
On the way, Estacio and Maritess talked about how they
_______________ VOL. 593, JULY 22, 2009
433
6 TSN, January 15, 1997, p. 12. People vs. Estacio, Jr.
7 TSN, Jan. 15, 1997, p. 25. issue with her “friendship” with Estacio, whom he insulted.
8 Id., at pp. 26-29. Incensed, Estacio grabbed the victim by the collar, prompting
431 the victim to pull out a gun from under the driver’s seat which
he aimed at Estacio.
VOL. 593, JULY 22, 2009 Continuing, Maritess claimed that she tried to pacify the
431 quarreling men; that the car stopped at San Jose del Monte and
People vs. Estacio, Jr. the three men alighted; that Sumipo returned to the car and
killed the victim, Estacio telling Maritess, “Honey, wala na was later followed by Estacio who said “Masama raw ang
tayong problema dahil siguradong patay na si Charlie sa dami nangyari,”16 he adding that he did not intend to stab the
ng saksak na nakuha niya.” victim.
On Estacio’s and Maritess’ directive, Sumipo stopped by a drug Branch 219 of the Quezon City RTC found both Estacio and
store where Maritess bought alcohol to clean their hands. Along Maritess guilty of “kidnapping on the occasion of which the
the way, Maritess and Estacio threw out the victim’s attaché victim was killed,” disposing as follows:
case. Maritess later told Estacio “Honey, sana hindi muna natin “WHEREFORE, finding accused Pablo Estacio, Jr. and Maritess
pinatay si Charlie para makahingi pa tayo ng pera sa mga Ang guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping
magulang [niya].” on the occasion of which the victim was killed, the court hereby
The three later abandoned the car in Malinta. sentences each of them to suffer the maximum penalty of
The following morning, Estacio went to the residence of Sumipo Death; to jointly and severally pay the heirs of Charlie Chua the
where he called up by telephone the victim’s mother and amount of P200,000.00, as actual damages, and
demanded a P15,000,000 ransom. The mother replied, P1,000,000.00, as moral damages; and to pay the costs.
however, that she could not afford that amount. SO ORDERED.”17 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Page 40 of 71
The case was forwarded to this Court for automatic review.18 24 CA Rollo, pp. 245-246.
However, the Court referred it to the Court of Appeals for 25 Rollo, pp. 26-27.
intermediate review following People v. Mateo.19 26 Vide Nombrefia v. People, G.R. No. 157919, January 30,
Estacio faulted the trial court for: 2007, 513 SCRA 369, 376-377.
I 27 First Corporation v. Former Sixth Division of the Court of
x x x FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF HEREIN ACCUSED- Appeals, G.R. No. 171989, July 4, 2007, 526 SCRA 564, 575.
APPELLANT FOR THE CRIME CHARGED WAS PROVEN BEYOND 436
REASONABLE DOUBT.
_______________ 436
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
16 Id., at p. 54. People vs. Estacio, Jr.
17 Records, p. 402. would be necessary if they were made the subject of separate
18 Rollo, p. 1. complaints.28
19 G.R. Nos. 147678-87, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 640, 656. Vide In the case at bar, kidnapping was not sufficiently proven.
Rollo, p. 2. Although appellants bound and gagged Chua and transported
434 him to Bulacan against his will, they did these acts to facilitate
his killing, not because they intended to detain or confine him.
434 As soon as they arrived at the locus criminis, appellants wasted
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED no time in killing him. That appellants’ intention from the
People vs. Estacio, Jr. beginning was to kill the victim is confirmed by the
II conversation which Sumipo heard in the car in which Maritess
x x x CONVICTING HEREIN ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME said that a knife would be used to kill him so that it would not
CHARGED DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE create noise.29 The subsequent demand for ransom was an
THE INDISPENSABLE ELEMENTS OF DETENTION AND “LOCK afterthought which did not qualify appellants’ prior acts as
UP.”20 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) kidnapping.
  People v. Padica30 instructs:
As for Maritess, she faulted the trial court for: “We have consistently held that where the taking of the victim
“A. x x x Discharging Sumipo as State Witness and in Relying was incidental to the basic purpose to kill, the crime is only
on His Testimony for the Conviction of Appellant Ang.21 murder, and this is true even if, before the killing but for
  x x x purposes thereof, the victim was taken from one place to
B. x x x Finding That There was Kidnapping with Murder and another. Thus, where the evident purpose of taking the victims
That Appellant Ang is Guilty Thereof. was to kill them, and from the acts of the accused it cannot be
C. x x x Not Concluding that the Crime Committed was Plain inferred that the latter’s purpose was actually to detain or
Homicide, and That Accused Estacio is Solely Responsible deprive the victims of their liberty, the subsequent killing of the
Therefor.”22 (Emphasis and underscoring in the original)  victims constitute the crime of murder, hence the crime of
By Decision23 of May 12, 2005, the Court of Appeals affirmed, kidnapping does not exist and cannot be considered as a
with modification, the trial court’s decision, disposing as component felony to produce the complex crime of kidnapping
follows: with murder. In fact, as we held in the aforecited case of
“WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the decision of the Masilang, et al., although the accused had planned to kidnap
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in Criminal Case No. Q-95- the victim for ransom but they first killed him and it was only
63818 finding accused-appellants Maritess Ang and Pablo later that they demanded and obtained the money, such
Estacio, Jr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of demand for ransom did not convert the crime into kidnapping
kidnapping with murder and sentencing them to each suffer since no detention or deprivation of liberty was involved, hence
the penalty of DEATH, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. the crime committed was only murder.
Accused-appellants are ordered to pay, jointly and severally, _______________
the heirs of the deceased the
_______________ 28 People v. Larrañaga, G.R. Nos. 138874-75, February 3,
2004, 421 SCRA 530, 580.
20 CA Rollo, pp. 161-162. 29 TSN, February 24, 1997, p. 70-71.
21 Id., at p. 54. 30 G.R. No. 102645, April 7, 1993, 221 SCRA 362.
22 Id., at p. 56. 437
23 Penned by Court of Appeals Associate Justice Eliezer R. De
los Santos, with the concurrence of Associate Justices Eugenio VOL. 593, JULY 22, 2009
S. Labitoria and Arturo D. Brion. CA Rollo, pp. 225-246. 437
435 People vs. Estacio, Jr.
That from the beginning of their criminal venture appellant and
VOL. 593, JULY 22, 2009 his brothers intended to kill the victim can be readily deduced
435 from the manner by which they swiftly and cold-bloodedly
People vs. Estacio, Jr. snuffed out his life once they reached the isolated sugarcane
amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; P25,000.00 as plantation in Calamba, Laguna. Furthermore, there was no
exemplary damages and P500,000.00 as moral damages. evidence whatsoever to show or from which it can be inferred
In view of the death penalty imposed, let the entire records of that from the outset the killers of the victim intended to
this case be forwarded to the Honorable Supreme Court for exchange his freedom for ransom money. On the contrary, the
further review. demand for ransom appears to have arisen and was
SO ORDERED.”24 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) consequently made as an afterthought, as it was relayed to the
Appellants manifested before this Court that supplemental victim’s family very much later that afternoon after a sufficient
pleadings would not be necessary, all relevant matters having interval for consultation and deliberation among the felons who
already been taken up.25 had killed the victim around five hours earlier.
Findings of fact of the trial court, its calibration of the x x x The fact alone that ransom money is demanded would
testimonies of witnesses, and its assessment of the probative not per se qualify the act of preventing the liberty of
weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said movement of the victim into the crime of kidnapping, unless
findings are accorded high respect, if not conclusive effect, by the victim is actually restrained or deprived of his liberty for
this Court because of the trial court’s unique advantage in some appreciable period of time or that such restraint was the
observing and monitoring at close range the demeanor, basic intent of the accused. Absent such determinant intent
deportment, and conduct of the witnesses as they testify.26 and duration of restraint, the mere curtailment of freedom of
This Court need not thus pass upon the findings of fact of the movement would at most constitute coercion.”31
trial court, especially if they have been affirmed on appeal by (Underscoring supplied)
the appellate court, as in the present case.27 Nevertheless, the The crime committed was thus plain Murder. The killing was
Court combed through the records of the case and found no qualified by treachery. The victim was gagged, bound, and
ground to merit a reversal of appellants’ conviction. taken from Quezon City to an isolated place in Bulacan against
The Court finds, however, that the offense of which appellants his will to prevent him from defending himself and to facilitate
were convicted was erroneously designated. the killing.
Appellants were eventually charged with and convicted of the This Court’s finding that the offense committed is Murder
special complex crime of kidnapping with murder, defined in notwithstanding, the resulting penalty is the same. Under
the last paragraph of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code. In Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, murder shall be
a special complex crime, the prosecution must prove each of punished by reclusion perpetua to death. The use of a motor
the component offenses with the same precision that vehicle, having been alleged in the Information and proven,
_______________ can be appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance.
There being one generic aggravating circumstance, the
Page 41 of 71
resulting penalty is death. In view, however, of the enactment © Copyright 2020 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
of Republic Act No. 9346 on June 24, 2006 prohibiting the People vs. Estacio, Jr., 593 SCRA 426, G.R. No. 171655 July 22,
imposi- 2009
_______________

31 Id., at pp. 371-372. G.R. Nos. 138874-75. February 03, 2004.*

438 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. FRANCISCO
JUAN LARRAÑAGA alias “PACO”; JOSMAN AZNAR;
438 ROWEN ADLAWAN alias “WESLEY”; ALBERTO CAÑO alias
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED “ALLAN PAHAK”; ARIEL BALANSAG; DAVIDSON
People vs. Estacio, Jr. VALIENTE RUSIA alias “TISOY TAGALOG”; JAMES
tion of death penalty, the penalty is reduced to reclusion ANTHONY UY alias “WANG-WANG”; and JAMES ANDREW
perpetua, without eligibility for parole. UY alias “MM,” appellants.
Respecting the assigned error in discharging Sumipo as a state
witness, the same does not lie. Criminal Law; Due Process; In evaluating a due process claim,
The conditions for the discharge of an accused as a state the court must determine whether life, liberty or property
witness are as follows: interest exists, and if so, what procedures are constitutionally
“(a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the required to protect that right.—Due process of law is the
accused whose discharge is requested; primary and indispensable foundation of individual freedoms; it
(b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper is the basic and essential term in the social compact which
prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of defines the rights of the individual and delimits the powers
said accused; which the State may exercise.In evaluating a due process
(c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially claim, the court must determine whether life, liberty or
corroborated in its material points; property interest exists, and if so, what procedures are
(d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and constitutionally required, to protect that right. Otherwise
(e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any stated, the due process clause calls for two separate inquiries
offense involving moral turpitude.”32 in evaluating an alleged violation: did the plaintiff lose
These conditions were established by the prosecution. Sumipo something that fits into one of the three protected categories
was the only person other than appellants who had personal of life, liberty, or property?; and, if so, did the plaintiff receive
knowledge of the acts for which they were being prosecuted. the minimum measure of procedural protection warranted
Only he could positively identify appellants as the perpetrators under the circumstances?
of the crime. He does not appear to be the most guilty. He did Same; Same; Section 14, Article III of our Constitution
not participate in planning the commission of the crime. He in catalogues the essentials of due process in a criminal
fact at first thought that Maritess was joking when she said, prosecution.—Section 14, Article III of our Constitution
“Diretsong dukot na rin kay Charlie.” He tried to dissuade catalogues the essentials of due process in a criminal
appellants from pursuing their plan. He did not participate in prosecution, thus: “SEC. 14. (1) No person shall be held to
the actual stabbing. And he tried to extricate himself from the answer for a criminal offense without due process of law. (2) In
attempts to extract ransom from the victim’s family. all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed
Sumipo’s testimony was corroborated on material points. The innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right
victim’s mother testified regarding the demands for ransom.33 to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the
Cesar Moscoso, an employee of Casa Leonisa, testified to nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a
seeing the victim, Estacio, and Maritess at the bar- speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face
_______________ to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the
attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his
32 Rules of Court, Rule 119, Section 17. behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed
33 TSN, September 30, 1996, pp. 5-18. notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he
439 has been notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.”
Same; Same; Right to Counsel; There is no denial of the right to
VOL. 593, JULY 22, 2009 counsel where a counsel de oficio was appointed during the
439 absence of the accused’s counsel de parte, pursuant to the
People vs. Estacio, Jr. court’s desire to finish the case as early as practicable under
restaurant on the day and at the time in question.34 Henry the continuous trial system.—Anent the right
Hong, the victim’s cousin who arrived at Pizza Hut, Greenhills _______________
ahead of the victim’s brother during the scheduled delivery of
the ransom, testified to seeing Estacio there with * EN BANC.
companions.35 And the victim’s skeletal remains were found at 531
the scene of the crime upon Estacio’s information and
direction. VOL. 421, FEBRUARY 3, 2004
And there is no proof that Sumipo had, at any time, been 531
convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. People vs. Larrañaga
Even assuming arguendo that the discharge of Sumipo as a to counsel, appellants fault the trial court: first, for appointing
state witness was erroneous, such error would not affect the counsel de oficio despite their insistence to be assisted by
competency and quality of his testimony.36 counsel of their own choice; and second, for refusing to
Finally, the Court brushes aside Maritess’ disclaimer of suspend trial until they shall have secured the services of new
participation in killing the victim. It was she who bound the counsel. Appellants cannot feign denial of their right to
hands and gagged the victim. When Estacio, in Maritess’ counsel. We have held that there is no denial of the right to
company, brought the victim to the scene of the crime and counsel where a counsel de oficio was appointed during the
thereafter returned to the car, her and Estacio’s hands were absence of the accused’s counsel de parte, pursuant to the
bloodied. court’s desire to finish the case as early as practicable under
Parenthetically, prosecution witness Arlene Francisco, Maritess’ the continuous trial system.
friend who visited her in prison, testified that Maritess admitted Same; Same; Same; An examination of the provisions of the
having killed Chua.37 And the prosecution presented letters Constitution concerning the right to counsel shows that the
from Maritess to Estacio, written from prison, where she “preference in the choice of counsel” pertains more aptly and
admitted the deed.38 specifically to a person under investigation rather than an
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals of May 12, accused in a criminal prosecution.—At any rate, the
2005 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The Court finds appointment of counsel de oficio under such circumstances is
appellants Maritess Ang and Pablo Estacio, Jr. guilty beyond not proscribed by the Constitution. An examination of its
reasonable doubt of Murder, with the generic aggravating provisions concerning the right to counsel shows that the
circumstance of use of motor vehicle. And in view of “preference in the choice of counsel” pertains more aptly and
_______________ specifically to a person under investigation rather than an
accused in a criminal prosecution. And even if we are to extend
34 TSN, October 14, 1996, pp. 6-56. the application of the concept of “preference in the choice of
35 TSN, November 7, 1996, pp. 3-24. counsel” to an accused in a criminal prosecution, such
36 Vide People v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 118670, February 22, preferential discretion is not absolute as would enable him to
2000, 326 SCRA 131, 141. choose a particular counsel to the exclusion of others equally
37 TSN, September 24, 1996, p. 14. capable. We stated the reason for this ruling in an earlier case:
38 Exhibit “N-4,” (transcript), pp. 209-210. Original: Exhibit “C- “Withal, the word ‘preferably’ under Section 12 (1), Article 3 of
5,” Records, p. 185. the 1987 Constitution does not convey the message that the
choice of a lawyer by a person under investigation is exclusive
Page 42 of 71
as to preclude other equally competent and independent violation of the latter’s constitutional right. Considering that
attorneys from handling his defense. If the rule were otherwise, appellants had several lawyers, it was just imperative for the
then, the tempo of a custodial investigation, will be solely in trial court to impose a time limit on their cross-examination so
the hands of the accused who can impede, nay, obstruct the as not to waste its time on repetitive and prolix questioning.
progress of the interrogation by simply selecting a lawyer, who Indeed, it is the right and duty of the trial court to control the
for one reason or another, is not available to protect his cross-examination of witnesses, both for the purpose of
interest. This absurd scenario could not have been conserving its time and protecting the witnesses from
contemplated by the framers of the charter.” prolonged and needless examination. Where several accused
Same; Same; Same; If the chosen counsel deliberately makes are being tried jointly for the same offense, the order in which
himself scarce, the court is not precluded from appointing a de counsel for the several defendants shall cross-examine the
oficio counsel whom it considers competent and independent state’s witnesses may be regulated by the court and one of
to enable the trial to proceed until the counsel of choice enters them may even be denied the right to cross-examine
his appearance.—In the same breath, the choice of counsel by separately where he had arranged with the others that counsel
the accused in a criminal prosecution is not a plenary one. If of one of them should cross-examine for all. In People vs.
the chosen counsel deliberately makes himself scarce, the Gorospe, we ruled: “While cross-examination is a right
court is not precluded from appointing a de oficio counsel available to the adverse party, it is not absolute in the sense
whom it considers competent and independent to enable the that a cross-examiner could determine for himself the length
trial to proceed until the counsel of choice enters his and scope of his cross-examination of a witness. The court has
appearance. Otherwise, the pace of a criminal prosecution will always the discretion to limit the cross-examination and to
be entirely dictated by the accused to the detriment of the consider it terminated if it would serve the ends of justice.”
eventual resolution of the case. Same; Same; Right to Impartial Trial; A judge may properly
532 intervene during trial to promote expeditious proceeding,
prevent unnecessary waste of time and dilly-dallying of counsel
532 or clear up obscurities.—Canon 14 of the Canons of Judicial
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Ethics states that a judge may properly intervene during trial to
People vs. Larrañaga promote expeditious proceeding, prevent unnecessary waste of
Same; Same; Same; An application for a continuance in order time and dilly-dallying of counsel or clear up obscurities. The
to secure the services of counsel is ordinarily addressed to the test is whether the intervention of the judge tends to prevent
discretion of the court, and the denial thereof is not ordinarily the proper presentation of a cause or the ascertainment of the
an infringement of the accused’s right to counsel.—Neither is truth in the matter where he interposes his questions or
there a violation of appellants’ right to counsel just because comments.
the trial court did not grant their request for suspension of the Same; Same; Same; Remarks which merely manifest a desire
hearing pending their search for new counsel. An application to confine the proceedings to the real point in issue and to
for a continuance in order to secure the services of counsel is expedite the trial do not constitute a rebuke of counsel.—
ordinarily addressed to the discretion of the court, and the Surely, we cannot fault Judge Ocampo for exhaustively
denial thereof is not ordinarily an infringement of the accused’s reminding appellants’ counsel of the parameters of alibi to
right to counsel. The right of the accused to select his own ensure that there will be an orderly and expeditious
counsel must be exercised in a reasonable time and in a presentation of defense witnesses and that there will be no
reasonable manner. time wasted by dispensing with the testimonies of witnesses
Same; Same; Same; The constitutional right to representation which are not relevant. Remarks which merely manifest a
by counsel does not mean that the accused may avoid trial by desire to confine the proceedings to the real point in issue and
neglecting or refusing to secure assistance of counsel and by to expedite the trial do not constitute a rebuke of counsel.
refusing to participate in his trial; The court may deny an Same; Same; Same; A trial judge is not a wallflower during trial
accused’s application to discharge his counsel where it appears —it is proper for him to caution and admonish witnesses when
that such application is not made in good faith but is made for necessary and he may rebuke a witness for levity or for other
purposes of delay.—In the present case, appellants requested improper conduct.—Suffice it
either one (1) month or three (3) weeks to look for new 534
counsel. Such periods are unreasonable. Appellants could have
hired new lawyers at a shorter time had they wanted to. They 534
should have been diligent in procuring new counsel. SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Constitutional guaranty of right to representation by counsel People vs. Larrañaga
does not mean that accused may avoid trial by neglecting or to state that after going over the pertinent transcript of
refusing to secure assistance of counsel and by refusing to stenographic notes, we are convinced that Judge Ocampo’s
participate in his trial. It has been held that where the accused comments were just honest observations intended to warn the
declined the court’s offer to appoint counsel and elected to witnesses to be candid to the court. He made it clear that he
defend himself, the denial of his motion made toward the end merely wanted to ascertain the veracity of their testimonies in
of the trial for a continuance so that he could obtain counsel of order to determine the truth of the matter in controversy. That
his own choice was not an infringement of his constitutional such was his purpose is evident from his probing questions
rights. While the accused has the right to discharge or change which gave them the chance to correct or clarify their
his counsel at any time, this right is to some extent subject to contradictory statements. Even appellants’ counsel de parte
supervision by the trial court, particularly after the trial has acknowledged that Judge Ocampo’s statements were mere
commenced. The court may deny accused’s application to “honest observations.” If Judge Ocampo uttered harsh words
discharge his counsel where it appears that such application is against those defense witnesses, it was because they made a
not made in good faith but is made for purposes of delay. mockery of the court’s proceedings by their deliberate lies. The
Same; Same; Same; Attorneys; Lawyers, being officers of the frequency with which they changed their answers to Judge
court whose duty is to assist in administering justice, may not Ocampo’s clarificatory questions was indeed a challenge to his
withdraw or be permitted to withdraw as counsel in a case if patience. A trial judge is not a wallflower during trial. It is
such withdrawal will work injustice to a client or frustrate the proper for him to caution and admonish witnesses when
ends of justice.—Appellants’ counsel de parte ought to know necessary and he may rebuke a witness for levity or for other
that until their withdrawal shall have been approved by the improper conduct. This is because he is called upon to
appellants, they still remain the counsel of record and as such, ascertain the truth of the controversy before him.
they must do what is expected of them, that is, to protect their Same; Same; Same; Judicial Notice; Due process of law is not
interests. They cannot walk out from a case simply because denied by the exclusion of irrelevant, immaterial, or
they do not agree with the ruling of the judge. Being officers of incompetent evidence, or testimony of an incompetent
the court whose duty is to assist in administering justice, they witness; It is a known practice of students who are temporarily
may not withdraw or be permitted to withdraw as counsel in a residing in Metro Manila to return to their provinces once in a
case if such withdrawal will work injustice to a client or while to spend time with their families.—In the same way, we
frustrate the ends of justice. cannot fault the trial court for not allowing the defense to
533 continue with the tedious process of presenting additional
witnesses to prove Larrañaga’s enrollment at the Center for
VOL. 421, FEBRUARY 3, 2004 Culinary Arts, located at Quezon City, from June 18, 1997 to
533 July 30, 1997 considering that it would not also prove that he
People vs. Larrañaga was not in Cebu on July 16 to 17, 1997. It is a known practice of
Same; Same; Right of Confrontation; Where the accused have students who are temporarily residing in Metro Manila to return
several lawyers, it is just imperative for the trial court to to their provinces once in a while to spend time with their
impose a time limit on their cross-examination so as not to families. To prove that Larrañaga was enrolled during a certain
waste its time on repetitive and prolix questioning.—That the period of time does not negate the possibility that he went
trial court imposed limitation on the length of time counsel for home to Cebu City sometime in July 1997 and stayed there for
appellants may cross-examine Rusia cannot be labeled as a a while. Due process of law is not denied by the exclusion of
Page 43 of 71
irrelevant, immaterial, or incompetent evidence, or testimony been at the place where the crime was committed at the time
of an incompetent witness. It is not error to refuse evidence of its commission. These requirements of time and place must
which although admissible for certain purposes, is not be strictly met. A thorough examination of the evidence for the
admissible for the purpose which counsel states as the ground defense shows that the appellants failed to meet these settled
for offering it. requirements. They failed to establish by clear and convincing
Same; Witnesses; State Witnesses; Although the trial court evidence that it was physically impossible for them to be at the
may have erred in discharging an accused to become state Ayala Center, Cebu City when the Chiong sisters were
witness, such error would not affect the competency and the abducted. What is clear from the evidence is that Rowen,
quality of the testimony of said defendant.—The fact that Rusia Josman, Ariel, Alberto, James Anthony and James Andrew were
was convicted of third degree burglary in Minessotta does not all within the vicinity of Cebu City on July 16, 1997.
render his testimony inadmissible. In People vs. De Guzman, Same; Same; Witnesses; It is but natural, although morally
we held that although the trial court may have erred in unfair, for a close relative to give weight to blood ties and close
discharging the accused, such error would not affect the relationship in times of dire needs especially when a criminal
competency and the quality of the testimony of the defendant. case is involved.—Appellants attempted to establish their
In Mangubat vs. Sandiganba- defense of alibi through the testimonies of relatives and friends
535 who obviously wanted them exculpated of the crimes charged.
Naturally, we cannot but cast an eye of suspicion on their
VOL. 421, FEBRUARY 3, 2004 testimonies. In People vs. Ching, we ruled that it is but natural,
535 although morally unfair, for a close relative to give weight to
People vs. Larrañaga blood ties and close relationship in times of dire needs
yan, we ruled: “Anent the contention that Delia Preagido especially when a criminal case is involved.
should not have been discharged as a state witness because of Same; Same; Same; The settled rule is that positive
a ‘previous final conviction’ of crimes involving moral turpitude, identification of an accused by credible witnesses as the
suffice it to say that ‘this Court has time and again declared perpetrator of the crime demolishes alibi, the much abused
that even if the discharged state witness should lack some of sanctuary of felons.—Rusia positively identified the appellants.
the qualifications enumerated by Section 9, Rule 119 of the The settled rule is that positive identification of an accused by
Rules of Court, his testimony will not, for that reason alone, be credible witnesses as the perpetrator of the crime demolishes
discarded or disregarded. In the discharge of a co-defendant, alibi, the much abused sanctuary of felons. Rusia’s testimony
the court may reasonably be expected to err; but such error in was corroborated by several disinterested witnesses who also
discharging an accused has been held not to be a reversible identified the appellants. Most of them are neither friends,
one. This is upon the principle that such error of the court does relatives nor acquaintances of the victims’ family. As we
not affect the competency and the quality of the testimony of reviewed closely the transcript of stenographic notes, we could
the discharged defendant.” not discern any motive on their part why they should testify
Same; Same; Same; Evidence; Physical evidence is an falsely against the appellants. In the same vein, it is
evidence of the highest order—it speaks more eloquently than improbable that the prosecu-
a hundred witnesses.—More importantly, what makes Rusia’s 537
testimony worthy of belief is the marked compatibility between
such testimony and the physical evidence. Physical evidence is VOL. 421, FEBRUARY 3, 2004
an evidence of the highest order. It speaks eloquently than a 537
hundred witnesses. The presence of Marijoy’s ravished body in People vs. Larrañaga
a deep ravine at Tan-awan, Carcar with tape on her mouth and tion would tirelessly go through the rigors of litigation just to
handcuffs on her wrists certainly bolstered Rusia’s testimony destroy innocent lives.
on what actually took place from Ayala Center to Tan-awan. Same; Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention; Elements.—
Indeed, the details he supplied to the trial court were of such The elements of the crime defined in Art. 267 above are: (a)
nature and quality that only a witness who actually saw the the accused is a private individual; (b) he kidnaps or detains
commission of the crimes could furnish. What is more, his another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (c)
testimony was corroborated by several other witnesses who the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (d) in
saw incidents of what he narrated. the commission of the offense, any of the four (4)
Same; Same; Same; Double Jeopardy; The discharge of an circumstances mentioned above is present.
accused to become a state witness has the effect of acquittal, Same; Same; Special Complex Crimes; Where the victim is
and a recall of that discharge may place the said accused in killed or died as a consequence of the detention, or is raped or
double jeopardy; The fact that not all the requisites for the subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, this gives rise to the
discharge of a state witness are present is not a ground to special complex crime of kidnapping with murder or homicide
recall the discharge order.—Rusia’s discharge has the effect of or rape.—Article 267 states that if the victim is killed or died as
an acquittal. We are not inclined to recall such discharge lest a consequence of the detention, or is raped or subjected to
he will be placed in double jeopardy. Parenthetically, the order torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be
for his discharge may only be recalled in one instance, which is imposed. In People vs. Ramos, citing Parulan vs. Rodas, and
when he subsequently failed to testify against his co-accused. People vs. Mercado, we held that this provision gives rise to a
The fact that not all the requisites for his discharge are present special complex crime.
is not a ground to recall the discharge order. Unless and until it Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Dehumanization
is shown that he failed or refused to testify against his co- means deprivation of human qualities, such as compassion.—
accused, subsequent proof showing that any or all of the The prosecution was able to prove that Marijoy was pushed to
conditions listed in Sec. 9 of Rule 119 were not fulfilled would a ravine and died. Both girls were raped by the gang. In
not wipe away the resulting acquittal. committing the crimes, appellants subjected them to
Same; Same; Settled is the rule that the assessment of the dehumanizing acts. Dehumanization means deprivation of
credibility of witnesses is left largely to the trial court.—Settled human qualities, such as compassion. From our review of the
is the rule that the assessment of the credibility of witnesses is evidence presented, we found the following dehumanizing acts
left largely to the trial court because of its opportunity, not committed by appellants: (1) Marijoy and Jacqueline were
available to the appellate court, to see the witnesses on the handcuffed and their mouths mercilessly taped; (2) they were
stand and determine by their demeanor whether they are beaten to severe weakness during their detention; (3)
536 Jacqueline was made to dance amidst the rough manners and
lewd suggestions of the appellants; (4) she was taunted to run
536 and forcibly dragged to the van; and (5) until now, Jacqueline
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED remains missing which aggravates the Chiong family’s pain. All
People vs. Larrañaga told, considering that the victims were raped, that Marijoy was
testifying truthfully or lying through their teeth. Its evaluation killed and that both victims were subjected to dehumanizing
of the credibility of witnesses is well-nigh conclusive on this acts, the imposition of the death penalty on the appellants is in
Court, barring arbitrariness in arriving at his conclusions. order.
Same; Alibi; For the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused Same; Same; Same; Same; Where the law provides a single
must show that he was in another place at such a period of penalty for two or more component offenses, the resulting
time that it was physically impossible for him to have been at crime is called a special complex crime.—A discussion on the
the place where the crime was committed at the time of its nature of special complex crime is imperative. Where the law
commission.—Appellants proffered the defense of denial and provides a single penalty for two or more component offenses,
alibi. As between their mere denial and the positive the resulting crime is called a special complex crime. Some of
identification and testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, we the special complex crimes under the Revised Penal Code are
are convinced that the trial court did not err in according (1) robbery with homicide, (2) robbery with rape, (3)
weight to the latter. For the defense of alibi to prosper, the kidnapping with serious physical injuries, (4) kidnapping with
accused must show that he was in another place at such a murder or homicide, and (5) rape with homicide. In a special
period of time that it was physically impossible for him to have
Page 44 of 71
complex crime, the prosecution must necessarily prove each of Responsibility of a conspirator is not confined to the
the component offenses with the same precision that would be accomplishment of a particular purpose of conspiracy but
538 extends to collateral acts and offenses incident to and growing
out of the purpose intended.—Clearly, the argument of Rowen,
538 Ariel and Alberto that they were not part of the “conspiracy” as
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED they were merely present during the perpetration of the crimes
People vs. Larrañaga charged but not participants therein, is bereft of merit. To hold
necessary if they were made the subject of separate an accused guilty as co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he
complaints. As earlier mentioned, R.A. No. 7659 amended must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code by adding thereto this furtherance of the complicity. There must be intentional
provision: “When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance
of the detention, or is raped, or is subjected to torture or of the common design and purpose. Responsibility of a
dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed; conspirator is not confined to the accomplishment of a
and that this provision gives rise to a special complex crime. particular purpose of conspiracy but extends to collateral acts
Same; Same; Same; Where it appears from the overwhelming and offenses incident to and growing out of the purpose
evidence that there is a “direct relation, and intimate intended. As shown by the evidence for the prosecution,
connection” between the kidnapping, killing and raping of the Rowen, Ariel and Alberto were not merely present at the scene
victim, rape cannot be considered merely as an aggravating of the crime.
circumstance but as a component offense forming part of the Same; Same; Penalties; Mitigating Circumstances; Minority;
special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal The imposable penalty on an accused by reason of his minority
detention with homicide and rape.—Considering that the is one degree lower than the statutory penalty.—Indeed, all
prosecution was able to prove each of the component offenses, appellants, except James Anthony who was 16 years old when
appellants should be convicted of the special complex crime of the crimes charged were committed, share the same degree of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention with homicide and responsibility for their criminal acts. Under Article 68 of the
rape. It appearing from the overwhelming evidence of the Revised Penal Code, the imposable penalty on James Anthony,
prosecution that there is a “direct relation, and intimate by reason of his minority, is one degree lower than the
connection” between the kidnapping, killing and raping of statutory penalty. This
Marijoy, rape cannot be considered merely as an aggravating 540
circumstance but as a component offense forming part of the
herein special complex crime. It bears reiterating that in People 540
vs. Ramos, and People vs. Mercado, interpreting Article 267, SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
we ruled that “where the person killed in the course of the People vs. Larrañaga
detention, regardless of whether the killing was purposely means that he stands to suffer the penalty of reclusion
sought or was merely an afterthought, the kidnapping and perpetua in Criminal Case No. CBU-45303 and twelve (12)
murder or homicide can no longer be complexed under Article years of prision mayor in its maximum period, as minimum, to
48, nor be treated as separate crimes, but shall be punished as seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal in its medium
a special complex crime under the last paragraph of Article period, as maximum, in Criminal Case No. CBU-45304. The
267.” The same principle applies here. The kidnapping and penalty for the special complex crime of kidnapping and
serious illegal detention can no longer be complexed under serious illegal detention with homicide and rape, being death,
Article 48, nor be treated as separate crime but shall be one degree lower therefrom is reclusion perpetua. On the other
punished as a special complex crime. At any rate, the technical hand, the penalty for simple kidnapping and serious illegal
designation of the crime is of no consequence in the imposition detention is reclusion perpetua to death. One degree lower
of the penalty considering that kidnapping and serious illegal from the said penalty is reclusion temporal. There being no
detention if complexed with either homicide or rape, still, the aggravating and mitigating circumstance, the penalty to be
maximum penalty of death shall be imposed. imposed on James Anthony is reclusion temporal in its medium
Same; Same; Same; Right to be Informed; Consistent with the period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he should be
accused’s right to be informed of the nature and cause of the sentenced to suffer the penalty of twelve (12) years of prision
accusation against him, attendant circumstances or component mayor in its maximum period, as minimum, to seventeen (17)
offenses must be specifically pleaded or alleged with certainty years of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum.
in the information and proven during the trial, otherwise they Same; Same; Same; We must be reminded that justice is not
cannot give rise to a special complex crime.—Anent Criminal ours to give according to our sentiments or emotions—at times
Case No. CBU-45304 wherein Jacqueline is the victim, the we may show compassion and mercy but not at the expense of
penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon appellants the broader interest of fair play and justice.—As for the rest of
considering that the above-mentioned component offenses the appellants, the foregoing established facts call for the
were not alleged in the Information as required under Sections imposition on them of the death penalty in Criminal Case No.
8 and 9, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. CBU-45303 and reclusion perpetua in Criminal Case No. CBU-
Consistent with appellants’ right to be informed of the nature 45304. It is therefore clear that the trial court erred in merely
and cause of the accusation against him, these attendant imposing “two (2) Reclusiones Perpetua,” rationalizing that
circumstances or component offenses must be specifically justice must be tempered with mercy. We must be reminded
539 that justice is not ours to give according to our sentiments or
emotions. It is in the law which we must faithfully implement.
VOL. 421, FEBRUARY 3, 2004 At times we may show compassion and mercy but not at the
539 expense of the broader interest of fair play and justice. While
People vs. Larrañaga we also find it difficult to mete out the penalty of death
pleaded or alleged with certainty in the information and proven especially on young men who could have led productive and
during the trial. Otherwise, they cannot give rise to a special promising lives if only they were given enough guidance,
complex crime, as in this case. Hence, the crime committed is however, we can never go against what is laid down in our
only simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention. statute books and established jurisprudence.
Same; Same; Conspiracy; Well settled is the rule that in APPEAL from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu
conspiracy, direct proof of a previous agreement to commit a City, Br. 7.
crime is not necessary—it may be deduced from the mode and
manner by which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
the acts of the accused themselves when such point to a joint      The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
design and community of interest.—From the evidence of the      Eric S. Carin for accused J. Andrew Uy and James Anthony S.
prosecution, there is no doubt that all the appellants conspired Uy.
in the commission of the crimes charged. Their concerted      Francisco L. Chavez for accused J. Aznar.
actions point to their joint purpose and community of intent.      Ferdinand C. Baylon for accused-appellants.
Well settled is the rule that in conspiracy, direct proof of a 541
previous agreement to commit a crime is not necessary. It may
be deduced from the mode and manner by which the offense VOL. 421, FEBRUARY 3, 2004
was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused 541
themselves when such point to a joint design and community People vs. Larrañaga
of interest. Otherwise stated, it may be shown by the conduct       Haydee B. Yorac and Zandra Marte Olasco-Coronel for
of the accused before, during, and after the commission of the accused Larrañaga.
crime. Appellants’ actions showed that they have the same PER CURIAM:
objective to kidnap and detain the Chiong sisters.
Same; Same; Same; To hold an accused guilty as co-principal For most of the Cebuanos, the proceedings in these cases will
by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed always be remembered as the “trial of the century.” A reading
an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity; of the voluminous records readily explains why the unraveling
Page 45 of 71
of the facts during the hearing before the court below proved 4 Id., at p. 531.
transfixing and horrifying and why it resulted in unusual media 543
coverage.
These cases involve the kidnapping and illegal detention of a VOL. 421, FEBRUARY 3, 2004
college beauty queen along with her comely and courageous 543
sister. An intriguing tale of ribaldry and gang-rape was followed People vs. Larrañaga
by the murder of the beauty queen. She was thrown off a cliff berto Caño, James Andrew and James Anthony Uy pleaded not
into a deep-forested ravine where she was left to die. Her sister guilty.5 Appellant Francisco Juan Larrañaga refused to plead,
was subjected to heartless indignities before she was also hence, the trial court entered for him the plea of “not guilty.”6
gang-raped. In the aftermath of the kidnapping and rape, the Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
sister was made to disappear. Where she is and what further In the main, the prosecution evidence centered on the
crimes were inflicted upon her remain unknown and unsolved testimony of Rusia.7 Twenty-one witnesses8 corroborated his
up to the present. testimony on major points. For the defense, appellants James
Before us is an appeal from the Decision1 dated May 5, 1999 of Anthony Uy and Alberto Caño took the witness stand. Appellant
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Cebu City in Criminal Cases Francisco Juan Larrañaga was supposed to testify on his
Nos. CBU 45303-45304, finding Rowen Adlawan alias “Wesley,” defense of alibi but the prosecution and the defense, through a
Josman Aznar, Ariel Balansag, Alberto Caño alias “Allan Pahak,” stipulation approved by the trial court, dispensed with his
Francisco Juan Larrañaga alias “Paco,” James Andrew Uy alias testimony. Nineteen witnesses testified for the appellants,
“MM,” and James Anthony Uy alias “Wang-Wang,” appellants corroborating their respective defenses of alibi.
herein, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of The version of the prosecution is narrated as follows:
kidnapping and serious illegal detention and sentencing each On the night of July 16, 1997, sisters Marijoy and Jacqueline
of them to suffer the penalties of “two (2) reclusiones Chiong, who lived in Cebu City, failed to come home on the
perpetua” and to indemnify the heirs of the victims, sisters expected time. It was raining hard and Mrs. Thelma Chiong
Marijoy and Jacqueline Chiong, jointly and severally, the thought her daughters were simply having difficulty getting a
amount of P200,000.00 as actual damages and P5,000,000.00 ride. Thus, she instructed her sons, Bruce and Dennis, to fetch
as moral and exemplary damages. their sisters. They returned home without Marijoy and
The Fourth Amended Informations2 for kidnapping and illegal Jacqueline. Mrs. Chiong was not able to sleep that night.
detention dated May 12, 1998 filed against appellants and Immediately, at 5:00 o’clock in the morning, her entire family
David- started the search for her daughters, but there was no trace of
_______________ them. Thus, the family sought the assistance of the police who
continued the search. But still, they could not find Marijoy and
1 Penned by Judge Martin A. Ocampo (now deceased). Jacqueline.9
2 It was on September 17, 1997 when the two original _______________
Informations for kidnapping and serious illegal detention were
filed against Davidson Rusia and all the appellants. (Records, 5 Davidson Rusia and brothers James Andrew and James
Vol. I at 1 and 1-A) docketed as CBU-45303 and CBU-45304, Anthony Uy were arraigned on June 19, 1998 (Records, Vol. I at
the two Informations were amended four times. Appellant 562); Josman Aznar, Rowen Adlawan, Alberto Caño and Ariel
Francisco Juan Larrañaga, Jozman Aznar, Rowen Adlawan, Balansag were arraigned on October 14, 1997 (Records, Vol. I
Alberto Caño, and Ariel Balansag were the first ones to be at p. 207).
named in 6 Larrañaga was arraigned on July 16, 1998. (Records, Vol. I at
542 p. 684)
7 Rusia testified on August 12, 13, 17 and 20, 1998 and on
542 October 1, 5, 6 and 12, 1998.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 8 They were Sheila Singson, Analie Konahap, Rolando Dacillo,
People vs. Larrañaga Williard Redobles, Benjamin Molina, Miguel Vergara, Mario
son Rusia alias “Tisoy Tagalog,” the discharged state witness, Minoza, Manuel Camingao, Alfredo Duarte, Rosendo Rio, Arturo
read as follows: Unabia, Manuel Rodriguez, Dionisio Enad, SPO1 Alexis Elpusan,
1)For Criminal Case No. CBU-45303:3 P/Ins. Edgardo Lenizo, Dr. Nestor Sator, Jude Daniel Mendoza,
“x x x Thelma Chiong, SPO3 Ramon Ortiz Camilo Canoy, Neptali
“That on the 16th day of July, 1997, at about 10:00 o’clock Cabanos, and P/Ins. Leodegardo Acebedo.
more or less in the evening, in the City of Cebu, Philippines and 9 TSN, August 18, 1998 at pp. 57-62.
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said 544
accused, all private individuals, conniving, confederating and
mutually helping with one another, with deliberate intent, did 544
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap or SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
deprive one Marijoy Chiong, of her liberty and on the occasion People vs. Larrañaga
thereof, and in connection, accused, with deliberate intent, did Meanwhile, in the morning of July 18, 1997, a certain Rudy
then and there have carnal knowledge of said Marijoy against, Lasaga reported to the police that a young woman was found
her will with the use of force and intimidation and subsequent dead at the foot of a cliff in Tan-awan, Carcar, Cebu.10 Officer-
thereto and on the occasion thereof, accused with intent to kill, in-Charge Arturo Unabia and three other policemen proceeded
did then and there inflict physical injuries on said Marijoy to Tan-awan and there, they found a dead woman lying on the
Chiong throwing her into a deep ravine and as a consequence ground. Attached to her left wrist was a handcuff.11 Her pants
of which, Marijoy Chiong died. were torn, her orange t-shirt was raised up to her breast and
“CONTRARY TO LAW.” her bra was pulled down. Her face and neck were covered with
2)For Criminal Case CBU-45304:4 masking tape.12
“x x x On July 19, 1996, upon hearing the news about the dead
“That on the 16th day of July, 1997, at about 10:00 o’clock woman, Mrs. Chiong’s son Dennis and other relatives
more or less in the evening, in the City of Cebu, Philippines, proceeded to the Tupaz Funeral Parlor at Carcar, Cebu to see
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said the body. It was Marijoy dressed in the same orange shirt and
accused, all private individuals, conniving, confederating and maong pants she wore when she left home on July 16, 1997.
mutually helping with one another, with deliberate intent, did Upon learning of the tragic reality, Mrs. Chiong became frantic
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap or and hysterical. She could not accept that her daughter would
deprive one Jacqueline Chiong of her liberty, thereby detaining meet such a gruesome fate.13
her until the present. On May 8, 1998, or after almost ten months, the mystery that
“CONTRARY TO LAW.” engulfed the disappearance of Marijoy and Jacqueline was
On separate arraignments, state witness Davidson Rusia and resolved. Rusia, bothered by his conscience and recurrent
appellants Rowen Adlawan, Josman Aznar, Ariel Balansag, Al- nightmares,14 admitted before the police having participated
_______________ in the abduction of the sisters.15 He agreed to re-enact the
commission of the crimes.16
the two original Informations. (Records, Vol. I at pp. 1-4) On August 12, 1998, Rusia testified before the trial court how
Davison Rusia was identified as Tisoy Tagalog in both the the crimes were committed and identified all the appellants as
original and the first two amended Informations, (Records, Vol. the perpetrators. He declared that his conduit to Francisco Juan
I at 1-4, 87, 90-A, 187 and 191), as David Florido in the third Larrañaga was Rowen Adlawan whom he met together with
(Records, Vol. I at 462 and 478) and by his real name in the brothers James Anthony and James Andrew Uy five months
Fourth Amended Informations. (Records, Vol. I at 518 and 531) before the commission of the crimes charged.17 He has known
Brothers James Anthony and James Andrew, both surnamed Uy, Josman Aznar since 1991. He met Alberto Caño and Ariel
were impleaded as additional accused. (Records, Vol. I at 518 Balansag only in the evening of July 16, 1997.
and 531). _______________
3 Records at p. 518.
Page 46 of 71
10 TSN, September 17, 1998 at p. 5. precipice25 where they drank and had a pot session. Later,
11 Id., at p. 16. they pulled Jacqueline out of the van and told her to dance as
12 Id., at p. 10. they encircled her. She was pushed from one end of the circle
13 TSN, August 18, 1998 at p. 62; August 19, 1998 at pp. 57 to the other, ripping her clothes in the process. Meanwhile,
and 60. Josman told Larrañaga to start raping Marijoy who was left
14 TSN, August 12, 1998 at p. 76. inside the van. The latter did as told and after fifteen minutes
15 Records at p. 759. emerged from the van saying, “who wants next?” Rowen went
16 TSN, October 6, 1998 at p. 23. in, followed by James Anthony, Alberto, the driver, and Ariel,
17 TSN, August 12, 1998 at pp. 30-35. the conductor. Each spent a few minutes inside the van and
545 afterwards came out smiling.26
Then they carried Marijoy out of the van, after which Josman
VOL. 421, FEBRUARY 3, 2004 brought Jacqueline inside the vehicle. Josman came out from
545 the van after ten minutes, saying, “whoever wants next go
People vs. Larrañaga ahead and hurry up” Rusia went inside the van and raped
On July 15, 1997, while Rusia was loafing around at the Cebu Jacqueline, fol-
Plaza Hotel, Cebu City, Rowen approached him and arranged _______________
that they meet the following day at around 2:00 o’clock in the
afternoon.18 When they saw each other the next day, Rowen 24 Id., at p. 69.
told him to stay put at the Ayala Mall because they would have 25 TSN, August 12, 1998 at p. 78.
a “big happening” in the evening. All the while, he thought that 26 Id., at pp. 69-74.
Rowen’s “big happening” meant group partying or scrounging. 547
He thus lingered at the Ayala Mall until the appointed time
came.19 VOL. 421, FEBRUARY 3, 2004
At 10:30 in the evening, Rowen returned with Josman. They 547
met Rusia at the back exit of the Ayala Mall and told him to People vs. Larrañaga
ride with them in a white car. Rusia noticed that a red car was lowed by James Andrew. At this instance, Marijoy was to
following them. Upon reaching Archbishop Reyes Avenue, breathe her last for upon Josman’s instruction, Rowen and Ariel
same city, he saw two women standing at the waiting shed.20 led her to the cliff and mercilessly pushed her into the ravine27
Rusia did not know yet that their names were Marijoy and which was almost 150 meters deep.28
Jacqueline. As for Jacqueline, she was pulled out of the van and thrown to
Josman stopped the white car in front of the waiting shed and the ground. Able to gather a bit of strength, she tried to run
he and Rowen approached and invited Marijoy and Jacqueline towards the road. The group boarded the van, followed her and
to join them.21 But the sisters declined. Irked by the rejection, made fun of her by screaming, “run some more.” There was a
Rowen grabbed Marijoy while Josman held Jacqueline and tricycle passing by. The group brought Jacqueline inside the
forced both girls to ride in the car.22 Marijoy was the first one van. Rowen beat her until she passed out. The group then
to get inside, followed by Rowen. Meanwhile, Josman pushed headed back to Cebu City with James Andrew driving the white
Jacqueline inside and immediately drove the white car. Rusia car. Rusia got off from the van somewhere near the Ayala
sat on the front seat beside Josman. Center.29
Fourteen (14) meters from the waiting shed, Jacqueline There were other people who saw snippets of what Rusia had
managed to get out of the car. Josman chased her and brought witnessed. Sheila Singson,30 Analie Konahap31 and Williard
her back into the car. Not taking anymore chances, Rowen Redobles32 testified that Marijoy and Jacqueline were talking
elbowed Jacqueline on the chest and punched Marijoy on the to Larrañaga and Josman before they were abducted. Roland
stomach, causing both girls to faint.23 Rowen asked Rusia for Dacillo33 saw Jacqueline alighting and running away from a
the packaging tape under the latter’s seat and placed it on the white car and that Josman went after her and grabbed her back
girls’ mouths. Rowen also handcuffed them jointly. The white to the car. Alfredo Duarte34 testified that he was at the
and red cars then proceeded to Fuente Osmeña, Cebu City. barbeque stand when Rowen bought barbeque; that Rowen
At Fuente Osmeña, Josman parked the car near a Mercury Drug asked where he could buy Tanduay; that he saw a white van
Store and urged Rusia to inquire if a van that was parked and he heard therefrom voices of a male and female who
nearby was for hire. A man who was around replied “no” so the seemed to be quarreling; that he also heard a cry of a woman
group which he could not understand because “it was as if the voice
_______________ was being controlled;” and that after Rowen got his order, he
boarded the white van which he recognized to be previously
18 Id., at p. 34. driven by Alberto Caño. Meanwhile, Mario Miñoza,35 a tricycle
19 Id., at p. 35; TSN, August 13, 1999 at p. 39. driver plying the route of Carcar-Mantalongon, saw Jacqueline
20 Id., at p. 36. running towards Mantalongon. Her blouse was torn and her
21 Id., at pp. 38-39. hair was disheveled. Trailing her was a white van where a very
22 Id., at p. 40. loud rock music could be heard. Manuel Camingao36 recounted
23 Id., at pp. 53-54. that on
546 _______________

546 27 Id., at pp. 75-81.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 28 TSN, September 17, 1998 at p. 7.
People vs. Larrañaga 29 TSN, August 12, 1998 at pp. 82-84.
immediately left. The two cars stopped again near Park Place 30 TSN, September 3, 1998 at pp. 13-33.
Hotel where Rusia negotiated to hire a van. But no van was 31 TSN, September 7, 1998 at pp. 8-18.
available. Thus, the cars sped to a house in Guadalupe, Cebu 32 TSN, September 10, 1998 at pp. 8-31.
City known as the safehouse of the “Jozman Aznar Group.” 33 TSN, September 8, 1998 at pp. 9-30.
Thereupon, Larrañaga, James Anthony and James Andrew got 34 TSN, September 15, 1998 at pp. 16-48.
out of the red car. 35 TSN, September 16, 1998 at pp. 5-24.
Larrañaga, James Anthony and Rowen brought Marijoy to one 36 Id., at pp. 26-35.
of the rooms, while Rusia and Josman led Jacqueline to another 548
room. Josman then told Rusia to step out so Rusia stayed at the
living room with James Andrew. They remained in the house for 548
fifteen (15) to twenty (20) minutes. At that time, Rusia could SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
hear Larrañaga, James Anthony, and Rowen giggling inside the People vs. Larrañaga
room. July 17, 1997, at about 5:00 o’clock in the morning, he saw a
Thereafter, the group brought Marijoy and Jacqueline back to white van near a cliff at Tan-awan. Thinking that the passenger
the white car. Then the two cars headed to the South Bus of the white van was throwing garbage at the cliff, he wrote its
Terminal where they were able to hire a white van driven by plate number (GGC-491) on the side of his tricycle.37
Alberto. Ariel was the conductor. James Andrew drove the Still, there were other witnesses38 presented by the
white car, while the rest of the group boarded the van. They prosecution who gave details which, when pieced together,
traveled towards south of Cebu City, leaving the red car at the corroborated well Rusia’s testimony on what transpired at the
South Bus Terminal. Ayala Center all the way to Carcar.
Inside the van, Marijoy and Jacqueline were slowly gaining Against the foregoing facts and circumstances, the appellants
strength. James Anthony taped their mouths anew and Rowen raised the defense of alibi, thus:
handcuffed them together. Along the way, the van and the Larrañaga, through his witnesses, sought to establish that on
white car stopped by a barbeque store. Rowen got off the van July 16, 1997, he was in Quezon City taking his mid-term
and bought barbeque and Tanduay rhum. They proceeded to examinations at the Center for Culinary Arts. In the evening of
Tan-awan.24 Then they parked their vehicles near a that day until 3:00 o’clock in the morning of July 17, 1997, he
Page 47 of 71
was with his friends at the R & R Bar and Restaurant, same several friends were at Josman’s house in Cebu. They ate their
city. Fifteen witnesses testified that they were either with dinner there and afterwards drank “Blue Label” They stayed at
Larrañaga or saw him in Quezon City at the time the crimes Josman’s house until 11:00 o’clock in the evening. Thereafter,
were committed. His friends, Lourdes Montalvan,39 Charmaine they proceeded to BAI Disco where they drank beer and
Flores,40 Richard Antonio,41 Jheanessa Fonacier,42 Maharlika socialized with old friends. They stayed there until 1:30 in the
Shulze,43 Sebastian Seno,44 Francisco Jarque,45 Raymond morning of July 17, 1997. Thereafter, they transferred to DTM
Garcia,46 Cristina Del Gallego,47 Mona Lisa Del Gallego,48 Bar. They went home together at about 3:00 o’clock in the
Paolo Celso49 and Paolo Manguerra50 testified that they were morning. Their friend, Jonas Dy Pico, dropped Josman at his
with him at the R & R Bar on the night of July 16, 1997. The house.60
celebration was a “despedida” for him as he was leaving the Concerning state witness Rusia, on August 7, 1998, when the
_______________ prosecution moved that he be discharged as an accused for the
purpose of utilizing him as a state witness,61 Larrañaga and
37 TSN, September 16, 1998, at pp. 26-35. Manuel Camingao brothers James Anthony and James Andrew opposed the
was the Chief of the Barangay Tanod of Poblacion I, Carcar, motion on the ground that he does not qualify as a state
Cebu, He intended to report the presence of the white van at witness under Section 9, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court
the Tan-awan cliff thinking that if it threw garbage again, it on Criminal Procedure.62 On August 12, 1998, the trial court
could easily be intercepted. allowed the prosecution to present Rusia as its witness but
38 Rosendo Rio, Benjamin Molina and Miguel Vergara testified deferred resolving its motion to discharge until it has
on September 14 and 15, 1998. completely presented its evidence.63 On the same date, the
39 TSN, November 19, 1998 at pp. 9-127. prosecution finished conducting Rusia’s direct examination.64
40 TSN, November 24, 1998 at pp. 71-117. The defense lawyers cross-examined him on August 13, 17,
41 TSN, November 25, 1998 at pp. 53-128. and 20, 1998.65 On the last date, Judge Ocampo provisionally
42 TSN, December 3, 1998 at pp. 4-62. terminated the cross-examination due to the report that there
43 TSN, December 2, 1998 at pp. 2-88. was an attempt to bribe him and because of his deteriorating
44 TSN, December 1, 1998 at pp. 4-16. health.66
45 TSN, December 7, 1998 at pp. 4-24. Resenting the trial court’s termination of Rusia’s cross-
46 TSN, December 14, 1998 at pp. 11-78. examination, the defense lawyers moved for the inhibition of
47 TSN, December 8, 1998 at pp. 4-19. Judge
48 TSN, December 9, 1998 at pp. 4-20. _______________
49 TSN, January 5, 1999 at pp. 17-26.
50 TSN, January 18, 1999 at pp. 9-22. 56 TSN, January 12, 1999 at pp. 28-35.
549 57 TSN, February 9, 1999 at pp. 13-24.
58 TSN, January 26, 1999 at pp. 8-20.
VOL. 421, FEBRUARY 3, 2004 59 TSN, January 13, 1999 at pp. 14-33.
549 60 TSN, January 21, 1999 at pp. 5-31.
People vs. Larrañaga 61 Id., at pp. 753-755.
next day for Cebu and a “bienvenida” for another friend. 62 Id., at pp. 765 and 771.
Larrañaga’s classmate Carmina Esguerra51 testified that he 63 Id., at pp. 781-783.
was in school on July 16, 1997 taking his mid-term 64 Id., at p. 790.
examinations. His teacher Rowena Bautista,52 on the other 65 Id., at pp. 792, 795 and 803-805.
hand, testified that he attended her lecture in Applied 66 Id., at pp. 803-804.
Mathematics. Also, some of his neighbors at the Loyola Heights 551
Condominium, Quezon City, including the security guard,
Salvador Boton, testified that he was in his condo unit in the VOL. 421, FEBRUARY 3, 2004
evening of July 16, 1997. Representatives of the four airline 551
companies plying the route of Manila-Cebu-Manila presented People vs. Larrañaga
proofs showing that the name Francisco Juan Larrañaga does Ocampo.67 When he informed the defense lawyers that he
not appear in the list of pre-flight and post-flight manifests would not inhibit himself since he found no “just and valid
from July 15, 1997 to about noontime of July 17, 1997. reasons” therefor, the defense lawyers withdrew en masse as
Meanwhile, James Anthony Uy testified that on July 16, 1997, counsel for the appellants declaring that they would no longer
he and his brother James Andrew were at home in Cebu City attend the trial. Judge Ocampo held them guilty of direct
because it was their father’s 50th birthday and they were contempt of court. Thus, defense lawyers Raymundo Armovit,
celebrating the occasion with a small party which ended at Edgar Gica, Fidel Gonzales, Ramon Teleron, Alfonso de la Cerna
11:30 in the evening.53 He only left his house the next day, and Lorenzo Paylado were ordered jailed.
July 17, 1997 at about 7:00 o’clock in the morning to go to In the Order dated August 25, 1998, the trial court denied the
school.54 The boys’ mother, Marlyn Uy, corroborated his motion for inhibition of the defense lawyers and ordered them
testimony and declared that when she woke up at 2:00 o’clock to continue representing their respective clients so that the
in the morning to check on her sons, she found them sleeping cases may undergo the mandatory continuous trial. The trial
in their bedrooms. They went to school the next day at about court likewise denied their motion to withdraw as appellants’
7:00 o’clock in the morning.55 counsel because of their failure to secure a prior written
Clotilde Soterol testified for Alberto and Ariel. She narrated that consent from their clients. On August 26, 1998, appellants filed
on July 16, 1997, at around 7:00 o’clock in the evening, Alberto their written consent to the withdrawal of their counsel.
brought the white Toyota van with Plate No. GGC-491 to her Thereafter, Larrañaga, Josman and brothers James Anthony and
shop to have its aircon repaired. Alberto was accompanied by James Andrew moved for the postponement of the hearing for
his wife Gina Caño, co-appellant Ariel, and spouses Catalina several weeks to enable them to hire the services of new
and Simplicio Paghinayan, owners of the vehicle. Since her counsel.68 On August 31, 1998, the trial court denied
(Clotilde’s) husband was not yet around, Alberto just left the appellants’ motions on the ground that it could no longer delay
vehicle and promised to return the next morning. Her husband the hearing of the cases. On September 2, 1998, the trial court
arrived at 8:30 in the evening and started to repair the aircon directed the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO) to act as counsel de
at 9:00 o’clock of the same evening. He finished the work at oficio for all the appellants.69
10:00 o’clock the following morning. At 11:00 o’clock, Alberto Trial resumed on September 3, 1998 with a team of PAO
and his wife Gina, Ariel and lawyers assisting appellants. Larrañaga objected to the
_______________ continuation of the direct examination of the prosecution
witnesses as he was not represented by his counsel de parte.
51 TSN, January 6, 1999 at pp. 4-25. The trial court overruled his objection. The prosecution
52 TSN, January 4, 1999 at pp. 34-72. witnesses testified continuously from September 3, 1998 to
53 TSN, January 27, 1999 at pp. 21-22. September 24, 1998. Meanwhile, the cross-examination of said
54 Id., at pp. 23-26. witnesses was deferred until the appellants were able to secure
55 TSN, January 20, 1999 at pp. 20-27. counsel of their choice. On the same date, September 24,
550 1998, Atty. Eric C. Villarmia entered his appearance as counsel
for Larrañaga, while Atty. Eric S. Carin appeared as counsel for
550 brothers James Anthony and James Andrew.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED _______________
People vs. Larrañaga
Catalina returned to the shop to retrieve the vehicle.56 67 Motion for Inhibition dated August 24, 1998. Id., at pp. 807-
Alberto,57 Gina58 and Catalina59 corroborated Clotilde’s 816.
testimony. 68 Records at pp. 848, 909 and 925.
To lend support to Josman’s alibi, Michael Dizon recounted that 69 Id., at p. 918.
on July 16, 1997, at about 8:00 o’clock in the evening, he and 552
Page 48 of 71
 “IV
552
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN LENDING CREDENCE TO
People vs. Larrañaga THE CORROBORATIVE TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION
Thereafter, or on October 1, 1998, the defense lawyers started WITNESSES.
cross-examining Rusia. The cross-examination continued on 554
October 5, 6, 12 and 13, 1998.
Eventually, acting on the prosecution’s motion to discharge 554
Rusia to be a state witness, the trial court required the SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
opposing parties to submit their respective memoranda. On People vs. Larrañaga
November 12, 1998, the trial court issued an omnibus order “V
granting the prosecution’s motion discharging Rusia as an
accused and according him the status of a state witness. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT
On May 5, 1999, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision, AZNAR HIS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AND IN DEPRIVING HIM OF
the dispositive portion of which reads: THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF AN ACCUSED.
“WHEREFORE, all the accused Francisco Juan Larrañaga, “VI
Josman Aznar, James Andrew Uy, James Anthony Uy, Rowen
Adlawan, Alberto Caño, and Ariel Balansag are hereby found THE TRIAL JUDGE VIOLATED AZNAR’S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS
Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two crimes of Kidnapping WHEN THE TRIAL JUDGE REFUSED TO INHIBIT HIMSELF AND
and Serious Illegal Detention and are hereby sentenced to PROCEEDED WITH THE TRIAL DESPITE GLARING BADGES OF
imprisonment of Two (2) Reclusiones Perpetua each—which HIS PARTIALITY AND BIAS FOR THE PROSECUTION.
penalties, however, may be served by them simultaneously “VII
(Article 70, Revised Penal Code). Further, said accused are
hereby ordered to indemnify the heirs of the two (2) victims in THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN DISCREDITING AND
these cases, jointly and severally, in the amount of DISREGARDING THE DEFENSE OF APPELLANT AZNAR.
P200,000.00 in actual damages and P5,000,000.00 byway of “VIII
moral and exemplary damages.
“SO ORDERED.” THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING APPELLANT
Hence, the instant separate appeals. Appellants Rowen, Alberto AZNAR ON THE BASIS OF PROSECUTING EVIDENCE MAINLY
and Ariel ascribe to the trial court the following errors: ANCHORED ON RUSIA’S TESTIMONY WHICH FAILED TO EVINCE
“I PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF APPELLANT AZNAR’S
CRIMINAL LIABILITY.”
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE In his 145-page appellant’s brief, Larrañaga alleges that the
UNTRUSTWORTHY, INCONSISTENT, CONTRADICTORY AND trial court committed the following errors:
INCREDULOUS TESTIMONY OF (DAVIDSON) VALIENTE RUSIA. “6.1 THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IGNORING AND VIOLATING
“II DUE PROCESS RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED.
6.2 THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE DISCHARGE OF
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN ADMITTING THE TESTIMONY OF ACCUSED DAVIDSON RUSIA.
THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES, NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT 6.3 THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING PARTIAL CREDIBILITY
THAT THE DEFENDANTS WERE NOT DULY REPRESENTED BY TO THE TESTIMONY OF DAVIDSON RUSIA.
COUNSELS OF THEIR OWN CHOICE DURING THE TIME THESE 6.4 THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING THE
WITNESSES WERE PRESENTED. TESTIMONIES OF THE OTHER WITNESSES.
“III 6.5 THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE
TESTIMONIES OF OTHER WITNESSES.
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS 6.6 THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
CONSPIRACY IN THE CASE AT BAR. PROSECUTION HAS OVERCOME THE CONSTITUTIONAL
553 PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE.
6.7 THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING AND
VOL. 421, FEBRUARY 3, 2004 REJECTING, EVEN AT DIRECT TESTIMONY STAGE, THE
553 ACCUSED-APPELLANT’S DEFENSE OF ALIBI.”
People vs. Larrañaga 555
“IV
VOL. 421, FEBRUARY 3, 2004
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE 555
TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES. People vs. Larrañaga
“V For their part, brothers James Anthony and James Andrew, in
their 147-page appellants’ brief, bid for an acquittal on the
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN DISPLAYING MANIFEST ANIMOSITY following grounds:
TOWARDS THE DEFENSE’S WITNESSES WHICH CLEARLY “A) THE TRIAL COURT BELOW GRIEVOUSLY FAILED TO
SHOWED ITS PREJUDICE AND BIAS IN DECIDING THE CASE. OBSERVE, AND THUS DENIED ACCUSED JAMES ANTHONY S. UY
“VI AND JAMES ANDREW S. UY THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO
DUE PROCESS OF LAW, TO BE PRESUMED INNOCENT, TO HAVE
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT ALLOWING SOME DEFENSE COUNSEL OF THEIR OWN CHOICE, TO HAVE AN IMPARTIAL
WITNESSES TO TESTIFY. JUDGE, TO MEET WITNESSES FACE TO FACE, AND TO PRODUCE
“VII EVIDENCE ON THEIR BEHALF;
B) THE PROSECUTION EVIDENCE HAS ABSOLUTELY NOTHING
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONSIDERING ROWEN TO SUPPORT THE CONVICTION OF ACCUSED JAMES ANTHONY
ADLAWANTO HAVE WAIVED PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE IN S. UY AND JAMES ANDREW S. UY IN THESE CASES THUS THE
HIS BEHALF.” TRIAL COURT BELOW SERIOUSLY AND GRIEVOUSLY ERRED
For his part, Josman raises the following assignments of error: WHEN IT RENDERED THE 5 MAY 1999 JUDGMENT OF
“I CONVICTION AGAINST THEM.”70
Appellants’ assignments of error converge on four points, thus:
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN DISCHARGING (1) violation of their right to due process; (2) the improper
DAVIDSON VALIENTE RUSIA AS STATE WITNESS IN GROSS AND discharge of Rusia as an accused to be a state witness; (3) the
BLATANT DISREGARD OF THE RULES ON DISCHARGE OF STATE insufficiency of the evidence of the prosecution; and (4) the
WITNESS. trial court’s disregard and rejection of the evidence for the
“II defense.
The appeal is bereft of merit.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO I. Violation of Appellants’ Right to Due Process
RUSIA’S TESTIMONY DESPITE CLEAR SHOWING THAT HIS Due process of law is the primary and indispensable foundation
CRIMINAL RECORD—AS AN EX-CONVICT, DRUG ADDICT AND of individual freedoms; it is the basic and essential term in the
GANGSTER—AND HIS SUICIDAL TENDENCIES—SERIOUSLY social compact which defines the rights of the individual and
IMPAIR HIS CREDIBILITY AND INNATE CAPACITY FOR TRUTH, delimits the powers which the State may exercise.71 In
HONESTY AND INTEGRITY. evaluating a due process claim, the court must determine
“III whether life, liberty or property interest exists, and if so, what
procedures are constitutionally required, to protect that
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN LENDING CREDENCE TO right.72 Otherwise stated, the due process clause calls for two
RUSIA’S TESTIMONY REPLETE AS IT WAS WITH separate inquiries in evaluating an alleged violation: did the
INCONSISTENCIES, FALSEHOODS AND LIES.
Page 49 of 71
plaintiff lose something that fits into one of the three protected Anent the right to counsel, appellants fault the trial court: first,
categories of life, liberty, or property?; and, if for appointing counsel de oficio despite their insistence to be
_______________ assisted by counsel of their own choice; and second, for
refusing to suspend trial until they shall have secured the
70 Rollo at p. 613. Prepared by Atty. Eric S. Carin. services of new counsel.
71 16B Am Jur 2d § 895. Appellants cannot feign denial of their right to counsel. We
72 Bzdzuich vs. U.S. Drug Enforcement Admin., 16 F 3d 738, have held that there is no denial of the right to counsel where a
1996 FED App. 59P (6th Cir. 1996). counsel de oficio was appointed during the absence of the
556 accused’s counsel de parte, pursuant to the court’s desire to
finish the case as early as practicable under the continuous
556 trial system.74
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Indisputably, it was the strategic machinations of appellants
People vs. Larrañaga and their counsel de parte which prompted the trial court to
so, did the plaintiff receive the minimum measure of appoint counsel de oficio. The unceremonious withdrawal of
procedural protection warranted under the circumstances?73 appel-
For our determination, therefore, is whether the minimum _______________
requirements of due process were accorded to appellants
during the trial of these cases. 74 People vs. Macagaling, G.R. Nos. 109131-33, October 3,
Section 14, Article III of our Constitution catalogues the 1994, 237 SCRA 299.
essentials of due process in a criminal prosecution, thus: 558
“SEC. 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal
offense without due process of law. 558
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right People vs. Larrañaga
to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the lants’ counsel de parte during the proceedings of August 24,
nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a 1998, as well as their stubborn refusal to return to the court for
speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face trial undermines the continuity of the proceedings. Considering
to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the that the case had already been dragging on a lethargic course,
attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his it behooved the trial court to prevent any further dilatory
behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed maneuvers on the part of the defense counsel. Accordingly, it
notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he was proper for the trial court to appoint counsel de oficio to
has been notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.” represent appellants during the remaining phases of the
Rule 115 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure casts the proceedings.
foregoing provision in a more detailed manner, thus: At any rate, the appointment of counsel de oficio under such
“SECTION 1. Rights of accused at the trial.—In all criminal circumstances is not proscribed by the Constitution. An
prosecutions, the accused shall be entitled to the following examination of its provisions concerning the right to counsel
rights: shows that the “preference in the choice of counsel” pertains
(a) To be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved more aptly and specifically to a person under investigation75
beyond reasonable doubt. rather than an accused in a criminal prosecution.76 And even if
(b) To be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation we are to extend the application of the concept of “preference
against him. in the choice of counsel” to an accused in a criminal
(c) To be present and defend in person and by counsel at every prosecution, such preferential discretion is not absolute as
stage of the proceedings, from arraignment to promulgation of would enable him to choose a particular counsel to the
the judgment. The accused may, however, waive his presence exclusion of others equally capable. We stated the reason for
at the trial pursuant to the stipulations set forth in his bail, this ruling in an earlier case:
unless his presence is specifically ordered by the court for “Withal, the word ‘preferably’ under Section 12 (1), Article 3 of
purposes of identification. The absence of the accused without the 1987 Constitution does not convey the message that the
justifiable cause at the trial of which he had notice shall be choice of a lawyer by a person under investigation is exclusive
considered a waiver of his right to be present thereat. When an as to preclude other equally competent and independent
accused under custody escapes, he shall be deemed to have attorneys from handling his defense. If the rule were otherwise,
waived his right to be present on all subsequent trial dates then, the tempo of a custodial investigation, will be solely in
until custody over him is regained. Upon motion, the accused the hands of the accused who can impede, nay, obstruct the
may be allowed to defend himself in person when it sufficiently progress of the interrogation by simply selecting a lawyer, who
appears to the court that he can properly protect his rights for one reason or another, is not available to protect his
without the assistance of counsel. interest. This absurd scenario could not have been
_______________ contemplated by the framers of the charter.”77
_______________
73 16B Am Jur § 902.
557 75 The 1987 Constitution Art. III, Sec. 12(1) “Any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the
VOL. 421, FEBRUARY 3, 2004 right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have
557 competent and independent counsel preferably of his own
People vs. Larrañaga choice. If the person cannot afford the service of counsel, he
(d) To testify as a witness in his own behalf but subject to must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived
cross-examination on matters covered by direct examination. except in writing and in the presence of counsel.” (Emphasis
His silence shall not in any manner prejudice him. supplied)
(e) To be exempt from being compelled to be a witness against 76 Amion vs. Chiongson, A.M. No. RTJ-97-1371, January 22,
himself. 1999, 301 SCRA 614.
(f) To confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him at 77 People vs. Barasina, G.R. No. 109993, January 21, 1994, 229
the trial. Either party may utilize as part of its evidence the SCRA 450.
testimony of a witness who is deceased, out of or cannot with 559
due diligence be found in the Philippines, unavailable, or
otherwise unable to testify, given in another case or VOL. 421, FEBRUARY 3, 2004
proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the same 559
parties and subject matter, the adverse party having the People vs. Larrañaga
opportunity to cross-examine him. In the same breath, the choice of counsel by the accused in a
(g) To have compulsory process issued to secure the criminal prosecution is not a plenary one. If the chosen counsel
attendance of witnesses and production of other evidence in deliberately makes himself scarce, the court is not precluded
his behalf. from appointing a de oficio counsel whom it considers
(h)To have speedy, impartial and public trial. competent and independent to enable the trial to proceed until
(i) To appeal in all cases allowed and in the manner prescribed the counsel of choice enters his appearance. Otherwise, the
by law.” pace of a criminal prosecution will be entirely dictated by the
Of the foregoing rights, what appellants obviously claim as accused to the detriment of the eventual resolution of the
having been trampled upon by the trial court are their: (a) right case.78
to be assisted by counsel at every stage of the proceedings; (b) Neither is there a violation of appellants’ right to counsel just
right to confront and cross-examine the prosecution witnesses; because the trial court did not grant their request for
(c) right to produce evidence on their behalf; and (d) right to an suspension of the hearing pending their search for new
impartial trial. counsel. An application for a continuance in order to secure the
A. Right to Counsel services of counsel is ordinarily addressed to the discretion of
Page 50 of 71
the court, and the denial thereof is not ordinarily an appellants in the proceeding before the trial court and
infringement of the accused’s right to counsel.79 The right of unceasingly represent them in the appellate courts. Indeed, in
the accused to select his own counsel must be exercised in a doing so, they made a mockery of judicial process and certainly
reasonable time and in a reasonable manner.80 delayed the hearing before the court below. In Lacambra vs.
In the present case, appellants requested either one (1) month Ramos,86 we ruled:
or three (3) weeks to look for new counsel. Such periods are “The Court cannot help but note the series of legal maneuvers
unreasonable. Appellants could have hired new lawyers at a resorted to and repeated importunings of the accused or his
shorter time had they wanted to. They should have been counsel, which resulted in the protracted trial of the case, thus
diligent in procuring new counsel.81 Constitutional guaranty of making a mockery of the judicial process, not to mention the
right to representation by counsel does not mean that accused injustice caused by the delay to the victim’s family.”
may avoid trial by neglecting or refusing to secure assistance Furthermore, appellants’ counsel de parte ought to know that
of counsel and by refusing to participate in his trial.82 It has until their withdrawal shall have been approved by the
been held that where the accused declined the court’s offer to appellants, they still remain the counsel of record and as such,
appoint counsel and elected to defend himself, the denial of his they must do what is expected of them, that is, to protect their
motion made toward the end of the trial for a interests.87 They cannot walk out from a case simply because
_______________ they do not agree with the ruling of the judge. Being officers of
the court whose duty is to assist in administering justice, they
78 People vs. Mallari, G.R. No. 94299, August 21, 1992, 212 may not withdraw or be permitted to withdraw as counsel in a
SCRA 777. case if such withdrawal will work injustice to a client or
79 23 C.J.S. §979[5], citing MacKenna vs. Ellis, C.A. Tex, 263 F. frustrate the ends of justice.88
2d 35; Ball vs. State, 42 So. 2d. 626, 252 Ala. 686, 70 S. Ct. B. Right to Confront and Cross-Examine the Prosecution
625, 339 U.S. 929, 94 L.Ed. 1350; People vs. Chessman, 341 P. Witnesses.
2d. 679, 52 C 2d 467, 80 S Ct. 296, 361 U.S. 925, 4 L. Ed. 2d, Appellants also fault the trial court for depriving them of the
241; Neufield vs. U.S., 118 F 2d 375, 73 App. D.C. 174; Ruben right to cross-examine Rusia and the other prosecution
vs. U.S., 62 S Ct. 580, 315 U.S. 798, 86 L.Ed. 1199; Stanfield vs. witnesses. Appellants’ assertion has no factual and legal
State, 212 S.W. 2d 516, 152 Tex. Cr. 324. anchorage. For one, it is not true that they were not given
80 23 C.J.S. §979 (5); People vs. Mullane, App., 6 Cal. Rptr. 341; sufficient opportunity to cross-examine Rusia. All of appellants’
Commonwealth vs. Novak, 150 A. 2d 102, 395 Pa. 199; counsel de parte had a fair share of time in grilling Rusia
Commonwealth vs. De Marco, 163 A 2d. 700, 193 Pa. Super. concerning his background to the kidnapping of Marijoy and
16. Jacqueline. The records reveal the following dates of his cross-
81 23 C.J.S. §979 (5), citing Zucker vs. People, 2 Cal. Rptr. 112 examination:
—People vs. Adamson, 210 P. 2d 13, 34 C.2d 320. _______________
82 State vs. Longo, 41 A 2d 317, 132 N.J. law 515, affirmed 44
A 2d 349, 133 N.J. Law 301. (i) Complaint before the Office of the Court Administrator dated
560 August 28, 1998, filed by Attys. Edgar Gica, Fidel Gonzales,
Rafael Armovit, Ramon Teleron and Lorenzo Paylado.
560 86 G.R. No. 100359, May 20, 1994, 232 SCRA 435.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 87 See Orcino vs. Gaspar, Adm. Case No. 3773, September 24,
People vs. Larrañaga 1997, 279 SCRA 379; see also Wack-Wack Golf and Country
continuance so that he could obtain counsel of his own choice Club, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 106 Phil. 501 (1959).
was not an infringement of his constitutional rights.83 While 88 Ledesma vs. Climaco, G.R. No. L-23815, June 28, 1974, 57
the accused has the right to discharge or change his counsel at SCRA 473.
any time, this right is to some extent subject to supervision by 562
the trial court, particularly after the trial has commenced. The
court may deny accused’s application to discharge his counsel 562
where it appears that such application is not made in good SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
faith but is made for purposes of delay.84 People vs. Larrañaga
Significantly, parallel to the hearing at the trial court were also Lawyers
petitions and motions involving several incidents in these cases Dates of Cross-examination
filed with the Court of Appeals and this Court. The appellants, 1. Armovit (for Larrañaga)
particularly Larrañaga, were represented there by the same August 13 and 17, 1998
counsel de parte.85 Certainly, it is wrong for these lawyers to 2. Gonzales (for Larrañaga)
abandon August 20, 1998
_______________ 3. Gica (for Josman)
August 20, 1998
83 People vs. Guber, 113 N.Y.S. 2d 192, 201 Misc. 852, 4. Paylado (for James Anthony and James Andrew)
affirmed 150 N.Y.S. 2d 543, 1 A.D. 2d 876. August 20, 1998
84 23 C.J.S. §979[7], citing Polito vs. State, 282 p 2d 801, 71 5. De la Cerna (for Rowen, Alberto and Ariel)
Nev. 135; Commonwealth vs. Novak, Quar. Sess., 45 Del Co. 45 August 20, 1998
—Commonwealth vs. Helwig, Quar. Sess., 39 Erie Co. 140. 6. Villarmia (for Larrañaga)
85 (a) Petition for Issuance of the Writ of Habeas Corpus (C.A. October 1, 1998
G.R. SP. No. 48733) filed on August 25, 1998 by Attys. Rafael 7. Andales (for Josman)
Armovit, Ramon Teleron, Edgar Gica, Lorenzo Paylado, and October 5 and 6, 1998
Fidel Gonzales. (Records at pp. 878-892) 8. Carin (for James Andrew and James Anthony)
(b) Petition-in-intervention to C.A. G.R. SP. No. 48733 dated October 5, 1998
August 26, 1998, filed by Attys. Ramon Teleron and Lorenzo 9. Debalucos (for Rowen, Caño and Balansag)
Paylado. (Records at pp. 849-863) October 12, 1998
(c) Petitioner’s Memorandum dated September 10, 1998 by 10. De Jesus (for Rowen, Alberto and Ariel)
Atty. Rafael Armovit. (Records at pp. 970-999) October 12, 1998
(d) Amended Petition dated September 3, 1998 by Atty. Miguel 11. Ypil (for Rowen, Alberto and Ariel)
Armovit. (Records at pp. 1028-1044) October 12, 199889
(e) Motion for an Early Resolution and/or Writ of Preliminary That the trial court imposed limitation on the length of time
Injunction or at least a Restraining Order dated September 11, counsel for appellants may cross-examine Rusia cannot be
1998, filed by Atty. Edgar Gica. (Records at pp. 1051-1056) labeled as a violation of the latter’s constitutional right.
(f) Motion for Prompt Resolution in C.A. G.R. SP. No. 48738 Considering that appellants had several lawyers, it was just
(Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus) dated September 9, imperative for the trial court to impose a time limit on their
1998. Filed by the Law Firm of Atty. Raymundo Armovit. cross-examination so as not to waste its time on repetitive and
(Records at pp. 1072-1077) prolix questioning.
(g) Urgent Motion to Admit in C.A. G.R. SP. No. 48733 dated Indeed, it is the right and duty of the trial court to control the
September 18, 1998 by Atty. Rafael Armovit. (Records at pp. cross-examination of witnesses, both for the purpose of
1105-1106) conserving its time and protecting the witnesses from
(h) Motion to Strike Out (C.A. G.R. SP. No. 48733) dated prolonged and needless examination.90 Where several
September 18, 1998 by Atty. Rafael Armovit. (Records at pp. accused are being tried jointly for the same offense, the order
1109-1112) in which counsel for the several defendants shall cross-
561 examine the state’s witnesses may be regulated by the
court91 and one of them may even be denied the right to
VOL. 421, FEBRUARY 3, 2004 cross-examine separately where he had arranged with the
561 others that
People vs. Larrañaga _______________
Page 51 of 71
 Appellants impute bias and partiality to Judge Ocampo when he
89 Brief for the Appellee (Solicitor General), Rollo at p. 1149. asked questions and made comments when the defense
90 98 C.J.S. § 404, citing State vs. Stone, 36 S.E. 2d 704, 226 witnesses were testifying.
N.C. 97. Canon 14 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics states that a judge
91 98 C.J.S. § 402, citing State vs. Howard, 14 S.E. 481, 35 S.C. may properly intervene during trial to promote expeditious
197. proceeding, prevent unnecessary waste of time and dilly-
563 dallying of counsel or clear up obscurities. The test is whether
the intervention of the judge tends to prevent the proper
VOL. 421, FEBRUARY 3, 2004 presentation of a cause or the ascertainment of the truth in the
563 matter where he interposes his questions or comments.
People vs. Larrañaga Records show that the intervention by way of comment of
counsel of one of them should cross-examine for all.92In Judge Ocampo during the hearing was not only appropriate but
People vs. Gorospe,93 we ruled: was necessary. One good illustration is his explanation on alibi.
“While cross-examination is a right available to the adverse Seeing that the appellants’ counsel were about to present
party, it is not absolute in the sense that a cross-examiner additional wit-
could determine for himself the length and scope of his cross- 565
examination of a witness. The court has always the discretion
to limit the cross-examination and to consider it terminated if it VOL. 421, FEBRUARY 3, 2004
would serve the ends of justice.” 565
The transcript of stenographic notes covering Rusia’s cross- People vs. Larrañaga
examination shows that appellants’ counsel had ample chance nesses whose testimonies would not establish the impossibility
to test his credibility. of appellants’ presence in the scene of the crime, Judge
Records show that the failure of the PAO lawyers to cross- Ocampo intervened and reminded appellants’ counsel of the
examine some of the prosecution witnesses was due to requisites of alibi, thus:
appellants’ obstinate refusal. In its Order94 dated September “Well, I’m not saying that there is positive identification. I’m
8, 1998, the trial court deferred the cross-examination in view only saying that in proving your alibi you must stick by what
of appellants’ insistence that their new counsel de parte will the Supreme Court said that it was impossible if they are telling
conduct the cross-examination. So as not to unduly delay the the truth, di ba? Now with these other witnesses na hindi
hearing, the trial court warned the appellants that if by naman ganoon to that effect it does not prove that it was
September 24, 1998, they are not yet represented by their new impossible, e, what is the relevance on that? What is the
counsel de parte, then it will order their counsel de oficio to materiality? Iyon ang point ko. We are wasting our time with
conduct the cross-examination. Lamentably, on September 24, that testimony. Ilang witnesses and epe-present to that effect.
1998, appellants’ counsel de parte entered their appearances Wala rin namang epekto. It will not prove that it was not
merely to seek another postponement of the trial. Thus, in impossible for him to go to Cebu at 10:30 P.M., of July 16, e,
exasperation, Judge Ocampo remarked: papano yan? We are being criticized by the public already for
“Every time a defense counsel decides to withdraw, must an taking so long a time of the trial of these cases which is
accused be granted one (1) month suspension of trial to look supposed to be finished within 60 days. Now from August,
for such new counsel to study the records and transcripts? September, Octo-ber, November, December and January,
Shall the pace of the trial of these cases be thus left to the will magse-six months na, wala pa and you want to present so
or dictation of the accused—whose defense counsels would just many immaterial witnesses.”
suddenly withdraw and cause such long suspensions of the trial Surely, we cannot fault Judge Ocampo for exhaustively
while accused allegedly shop around for new counsels and reminding appellants’ counsel of the parameters of alibi to
upon hiring new counsels ask for another one month trial ensure that there will be an orderly and expeditious
suspension for their new lawyers to study the records? While presentation of defense witnesses and that there will be no
all the time such defense counsels (who allegedly have already time wasted by dispensing with the testimonies of witnesses
withdrawn) openly continue to ‘advise’ their accused-clients which are not relevant. Remarks which merely manifest a
and even file ‘Manifestations’ before this Court and Petitions for desire to confine the proceedings to the real point in issue and
Certiorari, Injunction and Inhibition on behalf of accused before to expedite the trial do not constitute a rebuke of counsel.95
the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court? Appellants also decry the supposed harshness of Judge
“What inanity is this that the accused and their lawyers are Ocampo towards the witnesses for the defense, namely:
foisting upon this Court? In open defiance of the provisions of Lourdes Montalvan, Michael Dizon, Rebecca Seno, Clotilde
SC A.O. No. 104-96 Soterol, Salvador Boton, Catalina Paghinayan and Paolo Celso.
_______________ With respect to Lourdes Montalvan, Judge Ocampo expressed
surprise on “how a 17-year-old girl could go to a man’s
92 Roberts vs. State, U Ga. 18, 21. apartment all alone.” He said that such conduct “does not
93 G.R. No. L-51513, May 15, 1984, 129 SCRA 233. seem to be a reasonable or a proper behavior for a 17-year-old
94 Records, Vol. II at p. 1062. girl to do.” These statements do not really indicate bias or
564 prejudice against the defense witnesses. The transcript of
stenographic notes reveals that Judge Ocampo uttered them,
564 not to cast doubt on the moral
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED _______________
People vs. Larrañaga
that these heinous crimes cases shall undergo ‘mandatory 95 U.S. vs. Siden, D.C Minn., 293 F. 422; Doss vs. State, 139
continuous trial and shall be terminated within sixty (60) So. 290, 224 Ala. 90; Ball vs. Commonwealth, 16 S.W. 2d 793,
days’?” 229 Ky. 139; State vs. Brodt, 185 N.W. 645, 150 Minn. 431.
Still, in its Order dated October 8, 1998, the trial court gave 566
appellants’ new counsel de parte a period until October 12,
1998 to manifest whether they are refusing to cross-examine 566
the prosecution witnesses concerned; if so, then the court shall SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
consider them to have waived their right to cross-examine People vs. Larrañaga
those witnesses. During the hearing on October 12, 1998, character of Lourdes Montalvan, but merely to determine the
Larrañaga’s new counsel de parte, Atty. Villarmia, manifested credibility of her story, thus:
that he would not cross-examine the prosecution witnesses “x x x But what I wanted to point out is the question of
who testified on direct examination when Larrañaga was credibility. That is what we are here for. We want to determine
assisted by counsel de oficio only. The next day, the counsel de if it is credible for a 17-year-old college student of the Ateneo
parte of Josman, and brothers James Anthony and James who belongs to a good family, whose father is a lawyer and
Andrew adopted Atty. Villarmia’s manifestation. Counsel for who could afford to live by herself in a Condominium Unit in
Rowen, Alberto and Ariel likewise refused to cross-examine the Quezon City and that she would go to the Condominium Unit of
same witnesses. Thus, in its Order dated October 14, 1998, the a man whom he just met the previous month, all alone by
trial court deemed appellants to have waived their right to herself at night and specifically on the very night July 16, 1997.
cross-examine the prosecution witnesses. x x x That is the question that I would like you to consider. x x
It appears, therefore, that if some of the prosecution witnesses x I assure you I have no doubts at all about her moral character
were not subjected to cross-examination, it was not because and I have the highest respect for Miss Montalvan. x x x”
appellants were not given the opportunity to do so. The fact Strong indication of Judge Ocampo’s lack of predilection was
remains that their new counsel de parte refused to cross- his acquiescence for Lourdes Montalvan to clarify during
examine them. Thus, appellants waived their right “to confront redirect examination why she found nothing wrong with being
and cross-examine the witnesses” against them. alone at Larrañaga’s unit. We quote the proceedings of
C. Right to Impartial Trial November 19, 1998, thus:
ATTY. VILLARMIA:
Page 52 of 71
Q prevent the defense from presenting adequately its side of the
When you went up you said you were alone. What was your cases.
feeling of going up to that room alone or that unit alone? D. Right to Produce Evidence
PROS. GALANIDA Appellants assail the trial court’s exclusion of the testimonies
  of four (4) airlines personnel104 which were intended to prove
We object, not proper for re-direct. That was not touched that Larrañaga did not travel to Cebu from Manila or from Cebu
during the cross. That should have been asked during the to Manila on July 16, 1997. The trial court’s exclusion of the
direct-examination of this witness, Your Honor. testimonies is justified. By an alibi, Larrañaga attempted to
ATTY. VILLARMIA: prove that he was at a place (Quezon City) so distant that his
  participation in the crime was impossible. To prove that he was
We want to clarify why she went there alone. not in the pre-flight and post-flight of the four (4) major airlines
COURT: flying the route of Cebu to Manila and Manila to Cebu on July
  15 and 16, 1997 would not prove the legal requirement of
Precisely, I made that observation that does not affect or may “physical impossibility” because he could have taken the flight
affect the credibility of witness the fact that she went there from Manila to Cebu prior to that date, such as July 14, 1997.
alone. And so, it is proper to ask her, di ba? According to Judge Ocampo, it was imperative for appellants’
  counsel to prove that Larrañaga did not take a flight to Cebu
xxx before July 16, 1997.
COURT: In the same way, we cannot fault the trial court for not allowing
  the defense to continue with the tedious process of presenting
What was your purpose? Ask her now—what was your purpose? additional witnesses to prove Larrañaga’s enrollment at the
/to the witness: Center for Culinary Arts, located at Quezon City, from June 18,
Q 1997 to July 30, 1997 considering that it would not also prove
Will you answer the question of the Court/ What was your that he was not in Cebu on July 16 to 17, 1997. It is a known
spurpose or intention in going in Paco’s room that night alone? practice of students who are temporarily residing in Metro
567 Manila to return to their provinces once in a while to spend
time with their families. To prove that Larrañaga was enrolled
VOL. 421, FEBRUARY 3, 2004 during a certain period of time does
567 _______________
People vs. Larrañaga
WITNESS: 102 People vs. Knocke, 270 P 468, 94 C.A. 55; York vs. State,
A 156 S.E. 733, 42 Ga., App, 453; State vs. Barnes, 29 S.W. 2d
My purpose for going there was to meet Richard, sir, and to 156, 325 Mo. 545; State vs. Boyd, 119 S.E. 839, 126 S.C. 300.
follow-up whether we will go out later that night or not. The 103 People vs. Malabago, G.R. No. 115686, December 2, 1996,
purpose as to going there alone, sir, I felt, I trusted Paco. 265 SCRA 198.
PROS. DUYONGCO: 104 Titus Fabian of Philippine Air Lines; Jesus Trinidad of Grand
  Air; Ivy Ortega of Cebu Pacific and Rommel Gonzales of Air
May we ask the witness not to elaborate, Your Honor. Philippines.
ATTY. VILLARMIA: 569
 
That is her feeling. VOL. 421, FEBRUARY 3, 2004
COURT: 569
  People vs. Larrañaga
That was her purpose. It is proper.”96 not negate the possibility that he went home to Cebu City
Appellants consider as violation of their right to due process sometime in July 1997 and stayed there for a while.
Judge Ocampo’s remarks labeling Rebecca Seno’s and Catalina Due process of law is not denied by the exclusion of irrelevant,
Paghinayan’s testimony as “incredible;”97 Clotilde Soterol as a immaterial, or incompetent evidence, or testimony of an
“totally confused person who appears to be mentally incompetent witness.105 It is not error to refuse evidence
imbalanced;”98 and Salvador Boton and Paulo Celso as which although admissible for certain purposes, is not
“liars.”99 admissible for the purpose which counsel states as the ground
Suffice it to state that after going over the pertinent transcript for offering it.106
of stenographic notes, we are convinced that Judge Ocampo’s To repeat, due process is satisfied when the parties are
comments were just honest observations intended to warn the afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their
witnesses to be candid to the court. He made it clear that he respective sides of the controversy.107 In the present case,
merely wanted to ascertain the veracity of their testimonies in there is no showing of violation of due process which justifies
order to determine the truth of the matter in controversy.100 the reversal or setting aside of the trial court’s findings.
That such was his purpose is evident from his probing II. The Improper Discharge of Rusia as an Accused to be a State
questions which gave them the chance to correct or clarify Witness
their contradictory statements. Even appellants’ counsel de Appellants argue that Rusia is not qualified to be a state
parte acknowledged that Judge Ocampo’s statements were witness under paragraphs (d) and (e) of Section 9, Rule 119 of
mere “honest observations.”101 If Judge Ocampo uttered the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, which reads:
harsh words against those defense witnesses, it was because “Sec. 9.Discharge of the accused to be state witness.—When
they made a mockery of the court’s proceedings by their two or more persons are jointly charged with the commission of
deliberate lies. The frequency with which they changed their any offense, upon motion of the prosecution before resting its
answers to Judge Ocampo’s clarificatory questions was indeed case, the court may direct one or more of the accused to be
a challenge to his patience. discharged with their consent so that they may be witness for
_______________ the state when after requiring the prosecution to present
evidence and the sworn statement of each proposed state
96 TSN, November 19, 1998 at pp. 10-13. witness at a hearing in support of the discharge, the court is
97 TSN, January 11, 1999 at p. 54; TSN, January 13, 1999 at pp. satisfied that:
59-62. xxx
98 TSN, January 12, 1999 at pp. 82-83. (d) Said accused does not appear to be most guilty;
99 TSN, January 14, 1999 at p. 77; TSN, January 5, 1999 at pp. (e) Said accused has not at anytime been convicted of any
43-44. offense involving moral turpitude.
100 TSN, January 14, 1999 at pp. 3-4; TSN, January 13, 1999 at _______________
p. 59.
101 TSN, January 13, 1999 at p. 59. 105 16A C.J.S. § 589, citing Chaplinsky vs. State of New
568 Hampshire, 62 S. Ct. 766, 315 U.S. 568, 86 L. Ed. 1031; U.S. vs.
Butler, C.CA. Okl., 156 F. 2d 897.
568 106 23 C.J.S. § 1030, citing Cotney vs. State, 26 So. 2d 603,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 248 Ala. 1; State vs. Quinn, 69 A. 349, 80 Conn. 546; Fairbanks
People vs. Larrañaga vs. U.S., 226 F 2d 251, 96 U.S. App. D.C. 345.
A trial judge is not a wallflower during trial. It is proper for him 107 Factoran, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 93540,
to caution and admonish witnesses when necessary and he December 13, 1999, 320 SCRA 530; Navarro III vs. Damasco,
may rebuke a witness for levity or for other improper G.R. No. 101875, July 14, 1995, 246 SCRA 260; Roces vs.
conduct.102 This is because he is called upon to ascertain the Aportadera, Admin. Case No. 2936, March 31, 1995, 243 SCRA
truth of the controversy before him.103 108.
It bears stressing at this point that the perceived harshness 570
and impatience exhibited by Judge Ocampo did not at all
Page 53 of 71
570
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 109 Supra.
People vs. Larrañaga 110 Supra.
x x x” 111 TSN, August 12, 1998 at p. 76.
Appellants claim that Rusia was the “most guilty of both the 112 People vs. Sacabin, G.R. No. L-36638, June 28, 1974, 57
charges of rape and kidnapping” having admitted in open court SCRA 707; People vs. Demeterio, G.R. No. L-48255, September
that he raped Jacqueline. Furthermore, Rusia admitted having 30, 1983, 124 SCRA 914.
been previously convicted in the United States of third degree 572
burglary.
It bears stressing that appellants were charged with kidnapping 572
and illegal detention. Thus, Rusia’s admission that he raped SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Jacqueline does not make him the “most guilty” of the crimes People vs. Larrañaga
charged. Moreover, far from being the mastermind, his barbeque and Tanduay at Nene’s Store while the white van,
participation, as shown by the chronology of events, was driven by Alfredo Caño, was waiting on the side of the road and
limited to that of an oblivious follower who simply “joined the he heard voices of “quarreling male and female” emanating
ride” as the commission of the crimes progressed. It may be from the van; (3) Manuel Camingao testified on the presence of
recalled that he joined the group upon Rowen’s promise that Larrañaga and Josman at Tan-awan, Carcar at dawn of July 17,
there would be a “big happening” on the night of July 16, 1997. 1997; and lastly, (4) Benjamin Molina and Miguel Vergara
All along, he thought the “big happening” was just another recognized Rowen as the person who inquired from them
“group partying or scrounging.” In other words, he had no where he could find a vehicle for hire, on the evening of July
inkling then of appellants’ plan to kidnap and detain the Chiong 16, 1997. All these bits and pieces of story form part of Rusia’s
sisters. Rusia retained his passive stance as Rowen and Josman narration. With such strong anchorage on the testimonies of
grabbed Marijoy and Jacqueline at the waiting shed of Ayala disinterested witnesses, how can we brush aside Rusia’s
Center. He just remained seated beside the driver’s seat, not testimony?
aiding Rowen and Josman in abducting the Chiong sisters. Rusia’s discharge has the effect of an acquittal.113 We are not
When Jacqueline attempted to escape 14 meters away from inclined to recall such discharge lest he will be placed in double
the waiting shed, it was Josman who chased her and not Rusia. jeopardy. Parenthetically, the order for his discharge may only
Inside the car, it was Rowen who punched and handcuffed the be recalled in one instance, which is when he subsequently
Chiong sisters. At the safehouse of the “Josman Aznar Group,” failed to testify against his co-accused. The fact that not all the
Rusia stayed at the living room while Larrañaga, James requisites for his discharge are present is not a ground to recall
Anthony, Rowen, and Josman molested Marijoy and Jacqueline the discharge order. Unless and until it is shown that he failed
on separate rooms. At Tan-awan, it was Josman who ordered or refused to testify against his co-accused, subsequent proof
Rowen and Ariel to pushed Marijoy into the deep ravine. And showing that any or all of the conditions listed in Sec. 9 of Rule
Rusia did not even know what ultimately happened to 119 were not fulfilled would not wipe away the resulting
Jacqueline as he was the first to leave the group. Clearly, the acquittal.114
extent of Rusia’s participation in the crimes charged does not III. Appreciation of the Evidence for the Prosecution and the
make him the “most guilty.” Defense
The fact that Rusia was convicted of third degree burglary in Settled is the rule that the assessment of the credibility of
Minessotta does not render his testimony inadmissible.108 In witnesses is left largely to the trial court because of its
People opportunity, not available to the appellate court, to see the
_______________ witnesses on the stand and determine by their demeanor
whether they are testifying truthfully or lying through their
108 See Mangubat vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. L-60613-20, teeth. Its evaluation of the credibility of witnesses is well-nigh
August 29, 1986, 143 SCRA 681 and People vs. De Guzman, conclusive on this Court, barring arbitrariness in arriving at his
G.R. No. 118670, February 22, 2000, 326 SCRA 131, citing conclusions.115
People vs. Jamero, 24 SCRA 206 (1968). We reviewed the records exhaustively and found no compelling
571 reason why we should deviate from the findings of fact and
conclu-
VOL. 421, FEBRUARY 3, 2004 _______________
571
People vs. Larrañaga 113 Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 119, Sec. 10.
vs. De Guzman,109 we held that although the trial court may 114 People vs. De los Reyes, G.R. No. 44112, October 22,
have erred in discharging the accused, such error would not 1992, 215 SCRA 63, 74-75; Bogo-Medellin Milling Co., Inc. vs.
affect the competency and the quality of the testimony of the Son, G.R. No. 80268, May 27, 1992, 209 SCRA 329.
defendant. In Mangubat vs. Sandiganbayan,110 we ruled: 115 People vs. Belga, G.R. Nos. 94376-77, July 11, 1996, 258
“Anent the contention that Delia Preagido should not have SCRA 583.
been discharged as a state witness because of a ‘previous final 573
conviction’ of crimes involving moral turpitude, suffice it to say
that ‘this Court has time and again declared that even if the VOL. 421, FEBRUARY 3, 2004
discharged state witness should lack some of the qualifications 573
enumerated by Section 9, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, his People vs. Larrañaga
testimony will not, for that reason alone, be discarded or sion of law of the trial court. Rusia’s detailed narration of the
disregarded. In the discharge of a co-defendant, the court may circumstances leading to the horrible death and disappearance
reasonably be expected to err; but such error in discharging an of Jacqueline has all the earmarks of truth. Despite the rigid
accused has been held not to be a reversible one. This is upon cross-examination conducted by the defense counsel, Rusia
the principle that such error of the court does not affect the remained steadfast in his testimony. The other witnesses
competency and the quality of the testimony of the discharged presented by the prosecution corroborated his narration as to
defendant.” its material points which reinforced its veracity.
Furthermore, it may be recalled that Rusia was extremely Appellants proffered the defense of denial and alibi. As
bothered by his conscience and was having nightmares about between their mere denial and the positive identification and
the Chiong sisters, hence, he decided to come out in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, we are convinced
open.111 Such fact alone is a badge of truth of his testimony. that the trial court did not err in according weight to the latter.
But, more importantly, what makes Rusia’s testimony worthy For the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must show that
of belief is the marked compatibility between such testimony he was in another place at such a period of time that it was
and the physical evidence. Physical evidence is an evidence of physically impossible for him to have been at the place where
the highest order. It speaks eloquently than a hundred the crime was committed at the time of its commission.116
witnesses.112 The presence of Marijoy’s ravished body in a These requirements of time and place must be strictly met.117
deep ravine at Tan-awan, Carcar with tape on her mouth and A thorough examination of the evidence for the defense shows
handcuffs on her wrists certainly bolstered Rusia’s testimony that the appellants failed to meet these settled requirements.
on what actually took place from Ayala Center to Tan-awan. They failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that
Indeed, the details he supplied to the trial court were of such it was physically impossible for them to be at the Ayala Center,
nature and quality that only a witness who actually saw the Cebu City when the Chiong sisters were abducted. What is
commission of the crimes could furnish. What is more, his clear from the evidence is that Rowen, Josman, Ariel, Alberto,
testimony was corroborated by several other witnesses who James Anthony and James Andrew were all within the vicinity of
saw incidents of what he narrated, thus: (1) Rolando Dacillo Cebu City on July 16, 1997.
and Mario Minoza saw Jacqueline’s two failed attempts to Not even Larrañaga who claimed to be in Quezon City satisfied
escape from appellants; (2) Alfredo Duarte saw Rowen when he the required proof of physical impossibility. During the hearing,
bought it was established that it takes only one (1) hour to travel by
_______________ plane from Manila to Cebu and that there are four (4) airline
Page 54 of 71
companies plying the route. One of the defense witnesses Applied Mathematics on July 16, 1997 from 8:00 o’clock to
admitted that there are several flights from Manila to Cebu 11:30 in the morning.119 This runs counter to Larrañaga’s
each morning, afternoon and evening. Taking into account the affidavit120 stating that on the said date, he took his mid-term
mode and speed of transportation, it is therefore within the examinations in the subject Fundamentals of Cookery from
realm of possibility for Larrañaga to be in Cebu City prior to or 8:00 o’clock in the morning to 3:30 o’clock in the afternoon.
exactly on July 16, 1997. Larrañaga’s mother, Margarita With respect to Larrañaga’s friends, the contradictions in their
Gonzales-Larrañaga, testified that his son was scheduled to testimonies, painstakingly outlined by the Solicitor General in
take a flight from Manila to Cebu on July 17, 1997 at 7:00 the appellee’s brief, reveal their unreliability. To our mind,
o’clock in the evening, but he was able to take an earlier flight while it may be possible that Larrañaga took the mid-term
at 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon. Margarita therefore claimed examinations in Fundamentals of Cookery and that he and his
that friends attended a party at the R and R Bar and Restaurant,
_______________ also in Quezon City, however it could be that those events
occurred on a date other than July 16, 1997.
116 People vs. Azugue, G.R. No. 110098, February 26, 1997, Clotilde Soterol, in defense of Ariel and Alberto (the driver and
268 SCRA 711. the conductor of the van) attempted to discredit Rusia’s
117 People vs. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 108180, February 8, 1994, testimony by testifying that the white van with plate no. GGC-
229 SCRA 754. 491 could not have been used in the commission of the crimes
574 on the night of July 16, 1997 because it was parked in her shop
from 7:00 o’clock
574 _______________
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Larrañaga 119 TSN, January 4, 1999 at p. 76.
his son was in Cebu City at around 6:00 o’clock in the evening 120 Counter-Affidavit dated May 28, 1998, Evidence for the
of July 17, 1997 or the day after the commission of the crime. Prosecution, Exhibit “BBBB” at pp. 1821-1822.
However, while Larrañaga endeavored to prove that he went 576
home to Cebu City from Manila only in the afternoon of July 17,
1997, he did not produce any evidence to show the last time 576
he went to Manila from Cebu prior to such crucial date. If he SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
has a ticket of his flight to Cebu City on July 17, 1997, certainly, People vs. Larrañaga
he should also have a ticket of his last flight to Manila prior in the evening of the same date until 11:00 o’clock in the
thereto. If it was lost, evidence to that effect should have been morning of July 17, 1997. What makes Soterol’s testimony
presented before the trial court. doubtful is her contradicting affidavits. In the first affidavit
Indeed, Larrañaga’s presence in Cebu City on July 16, 1997 dated July 28, 1997, or twelve (12) days from the occurrence of
proved to be not only a possibility but a reality. No less than the crime, she stated that Alberto took the van from her shop
four (4) witnesses for the prosecution identified him as one of at 3:00 o’clock in the afternoon of July 16, 1997 and returned it
the two men talking to Marijoy and Jacqueline on the night of for repair only, on July 22, 1997.121 But in her second affidavit
July 16, 1997. Shiela Singson testified that on July 16, 1997, at dated October 1, 1997, she declared that Alberto left the van in
around 7:20 in the evening, she saw Larrañaga approach her shop at 7:00 o’clock in the evening of July 16, 1997 until
Marijoy and Jacqueline at the West Entry of Ayala Center. The 11:00 o’clock in the morning of July 17, 1997.122 Surely, we
incident reminded her of Jacqueline’s prior story that he was cannot simply brush aside the discrepancy and accept the
Marijoy’s admirer. She (Shiela) confirmed that she knows second affidavit as gospel truth.
Larrañaga since she had seen him on five (5) occasions. Analie Appellants attempted to establish their defense of alibi through
Konahap also testified that on the same evening of July 16, the testimonies of relatives and friends who obviously wanted
1997, at about 8:00 o’clock, she saw Marijoy and Jacqueline them exculpated of the crimes charged. Naturally, we cannot
talking to two (2) men at the West Entry of Ayala Center. She but cast an eye of suspicion on their testimonies. In People vs.
recognized them as Larrañaga and Josman, having seen them Ching,123 we ruled that it is but natural, although morally
several times at Glicos, a game zone, located across her office unfair, for a close relative to give weight to blood ties and close
at the third level of Ayala Center. Williard Redobles, the relationship in times of dire needs especially when a criminal
security guard then assigned at Ayala Center, corroborated the case is involved.
foregoing testimonies of Shiela and Analie. In addition, Rusia positively identified the appellants. The settled rule is
Rosendo Rio, a businessman from Cogon, Carcar, declared that that positive identification of an accused by credible witnesses
he saw Larrañaga at Tan-awan at about 3:30 in the morning of as the perpetrator of the crime demolishes alibi, the much
July 17, 1997. The latter was leaning against the hood of a abused sanctuary of felons.124 Rusia’s testimony was
white van.118 corroborated by several disinterested witnesses who also
Taking the individual testimonies of the above witnesses and identified the appellants. Most of them are neither friends,
that of Rusia, it is reasonable to conclude that Larrañaga was relatives nor acquaintances of the victims’ family. As we
indeed in Cebu City at the time of the commission of the reviewed closely the transcript of stenographic notes, we could
crimes and was one of the principal perpetrators. not discern any motive on their part why they should testify
Of course, we have also weighed the testimonial and falsely against the appellants. In the same vein, it is
documentary evidence presented by appellants in support of improbable that the prosecution would tirelessly go through
their respective alibi. However, they proved to be wanting and the rigors of litigation just to destroy innocent lives.
incredible. _______________
_______________
121 TSN, January 12, 1999 at p. 55.
118 TSN, September 15, 1998 at pp. 26-47. 122 Id., at p. 56.
575 123 G.R. No. 103800, January 19, 1995, 240 SCRA 267.
124 People vs. Sugano, G.R. No. 127574, July 20, 1999, 310
VOL. 421, FEBRUARY 3, 2004 SCRA 728; People vs. Pelen, G.R. No. 131827, September 3,
575 1999, 313 SCRA 683; People vs. Mosqueda, G.R. Nos. 131830-
People vs. Larrañaga 34, September 3, 1999, 313 SCRA 694; People vs. Francisco,
Salvador Boton, the security guard assigned at the lobby of G.R. No. 110873, September 23, 1999, 315 SCRA 114; People
Loyola Heights Condominium, testified on the entry of vs. Fajardo, G.R. Nos. 105954-55, September 28, 1999, 315
Larrañaga’s name in the Condominium’s logbook to prove that SCRA 283; and People vs. Rabang, Jr., G.R. No. 105374,
he was in Quezon City on the night of July 16, 1997. However, a September 29, 1999, 315 SCRA 451.
cursory glance of the entry readily shows that it was written at 577
the uppermost portion of the logbook and was not following the
chronological order of the entries. Larrañaga’s 10:15 entry was VOL. 421, FEBRUARY 3, 2004
written before the 10:05 entry which, in turn, was followed by a 577
10:25 entry. Not only that, the last entry at the prior page was People vs. Larrañaga
10:05. This renders the authenticity of the entries doubtful. It Meanwhile, appellants argue that the prosecution failed to
gives rise to the possibility that the 10:15 entry was written on prove that the body found at the foot of a deep ravine in Tan-
a later date when all the spaces in the logbook were already awan, Carcar was that of Marijoy. We are not convinced. Rusia
filled up and thus, the only remaining spot was the uppermost testified that Josman instructed Rowen “to get rid” of Marijoy
portion. Surprisingly, the alleged arrival of Larrañaga and his and that following such instruction, Rowen and Ariel pushed
friend Richard Antonio at the Loyola Heights Condominium in her into the deep ravine. Furthermore, Inspector Edgardo
the early evening of July 16, 1997 was not recorded in the Lenizo,125 a fingerprint expert, testified that the fingerprints of
logbook. the corpse matched those of Marijoy.126 The packaging tape
Rowena Bautista, a teacher at the Center for Culinary Arts, and the handcuff found on the dead body were the same items
Quezon City, testified that Larrañaga attended her lecture on placed on Marijoy and Jacqueline while they were being
Page 55 of 71
detained.127 The body had the same clothes worn by Marijoy Trial was had and the accused was sentenced to suffer two
on the day she was abducted.128 The members of the Chiong months and one day of arresto mayor, to pay a fine of 400
family personally identified the corpse to be that of Marijoy129 pesetas, and costs. From this judgment the present appeal was
which they eventually buried. They erected commemorative taken.
markers at the ravine, cemetery and every place which Two witnesses for the prosecution, Lucia Matias and Daniel
mattered to Marijoy. Indeed, there is overwhelming and Alvarado, testify as to how the accused entered the room on
convincing evidence that it was the body of Marijoy that was the day in question. The former stated that she was inside the
found in the ravine. room, the door of which was closed, when the accused pushed
Appellants were charged with the crime of kidnapping and the door; and that she, upon seeing him already inside, asked
serious illegal detention in two (2) Informations and were him: "Why did you enter without permission?" to which the
convicted thereof. Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as accused answered: "I need something in this room," and Lucia
amended by Section 8 of R.A. 7659, reads: Matias told him not to take away the glass because Toledo was
“Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention.—Any absent. The second witness, Daniel Alvarado, states that he
private individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any was inside the room cleaning a phonograph when the accused
other manner deprive him of liberty, shall suffer the penalty or struck the door and he heard a strong blow which he believes
reclusion perpetua to death; was a kick against the door given by the accused.
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than On the other hand, two witnesses for the defense, Bernardo
three days. Bildad and Bonifacio Viloria testify similarly that the accused on
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority. the day in question, between half past ten
_______________ 71

125 Inspector Lenizo finished Law and Criminology. He worked VOL. 42, AUGUST 18, 1921
for the crime laboratory of the Philippine National Police where 71
he was trained in finger-print examination and where he People vs. De Peralta
conducted around 500 finger-print examinations, 30 of which and eleven in the morning, entered the room of Toledo looking
involved dead persons. At the time he testified, Inspector for the desk glass in question, accompanied by Lucia Matias
Lenizo was head of the Fingerprint Identification Branch of the whom he found outside.
PNP Crime Laboratory, Region 7. After a careful study of the testimony given in the case, we are
126 TSN, September 22, 1998 at pp. 31-40. People vs. of the opinion that the accused, after calling at or near the
Larrañaga, 421 SCRA 530, G.R. Nos. 138874-75 February 03, door, pushed it and without the permission of the occupants
2004 entered the room with the object of taking away the desk
glass. There is no evidence that Toledo had expressed his will
VOL. 42, AUGUST 18, 1921 in the sense of prohibiting the accused Peralta from entering
69 his room, and the mere fact that the latter entered it, without
the permission of the occupant, does not constitute the offense
People vs. De Peralta of trespass to dwelling provided for and penalized in article 491
that the penalty imposed in the lower court should be modified of the Penal Code. In order that this crime may exist it is
and that the defendant should be sentenced in accordance necessary that the entrance should be against the express or
with the provisions of paragraph 5 of article 535 in relation with presumed prohibition of the occupant, and the lack of
paragraph one of article 534 of the Penal Code, in the medium permission should not be confused with prohibition. In the
degree of arresto mayor, or with the penalty of two months and decisions of the courts of Spain, as well as in those of this
one day and to pay the costs. With that recommendation of the jurisdiction, it has been held uniformly that this crime is
Attorney-General we also agree. Therefore, the sentence of the committed when a person enters another's dwelling against
lower court is hereby modified and it is hereby ordered and the will of the occupant, but not when the entrance is effected
decreed that the defendant be sentenced to be imprisoned for without his knowledge or opposition.
a period of two months and one day of arresto mayor and to As Groizard says in his commentaries on article 504 of the
pay the costs. So ordered. Penal Code of Spain, corresponding to article 491 of that of the
Araullo, Street, Avanceña, and Villamor, JJ., concur. Philippines: "It is not necessary, in the ordinary life of men, in
Judgment modified. order to call at the door of a house or enter it, to obtain
—————————— previous permission from the owner who lives in it. With the
[No. 17332. August 18, 1921] utmost good faith may a person, to whom entrance has not
been denied beforehand, suppose that the owner of the room
The People of the Philippine Islands, plaintiff and ap- has no objection to receiving him in it." And in the present case
pellee, vs. Olimpio de Peralta, defendant and appellant. it is to be supposed that the members of the "Philippine Marine
Union," among them the accused, had some familiarity which
  warrants entrance into the room occupied by the president of
Trespass to Dwelling.—In order that this crime may exist, it is the association, particularly when we consider the hour at
necessary that the entrance should be against the presumed or which the act in question happened
express prohibition of the occupant, and the lack of permission © Copyright 2020 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
should not be confused with prohibition. It has been uniformly People vs. De Peralta, 42 Phil., 69, No. 17332 August 18, 1921
maintained in the decisions of the courts of Spain just as in
those of the courts of this jurisdiction that this crime is com- [No. 43530. August 3, 1935]
mitted when a person enters another's dwelling against the will THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff and
of the occupant; but the mere fact of entering another's appellee, vs. AURELIO LAMAHANG, defendant and
dwelling without the knowledge or without opposition of the appellant.
occupant does not constitute this offense. 1.CRIMINAL LAW; ATTEMPT TO COMMIT AN INDETERMINATE
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of CRIME.—The attempt which the Penal Code punishes is that
Manila. Concepcion, J. which has a logical relation to a particular, concrete offense;
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court. that, which is the beginning of the execution thereof by overt
Fred Castro for appellant. acts of the perpetrator leading directly to its realization and
Acting Attorney-General Tuason for appellee. consummation. The attempt to commit an indeterminate
70 offense, inasmuch as its nature in relation to its objective is
70 ambiguous, is not a juridical fact from the standpoint of the
PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED Penal Code.
People vs. De Peralta 704
Villamor, J.:
About the month of October, 1919, and for sometime 704
previously Cecilio Toledo held the position of president of the PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
"Philippine Marine Union," and in such capacity, he had the People vs. Lamahang
privilege of occupying, as his dwelling, a room of house No. 2.ID.; ID.—It is not sufficient, for the purpose of imposing penal
507 of Jaboneros Street of this city, which was rented to said sanction, that an act objectively performed should constitute a
association. About the middle of said month of October, Toledo mere beginning of execution; it is necessary to establish its
was discharged from the position of president and was unavoidable relation, like the logical and natural relation of the
succeeded by Olimpio de Peralta. The latter, for the purpose of cause and its effect, to the deed which, upon its
looking for a desk glass which he believed was the property of consummation, will ripen into one of the crimes defined and
the union, entered the room in question in the morning of the punished by the Code; it is necessary to prove that such
16th of the same month. This gave rise to the information for beginning of execution, if carried to its complete termination
trespass to dwelling against Peralta, in which it is alleged that following its natural course, without being frustrated by
he entered the room of Toledo against the will of the occupant. external obstacles nor by the voluntary desistance of the
Page 56 of 71
perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete
offense. offense. Thus, in case of robbery, in order that the simple act of
3.ID.; ID.; ATTEMPTED ROBBERY.—In order that a simple act of entering by means of force or violence another person's
entering by means of force or violence another person's dwelling may be considered an attempt to commit this offense,
dwelling may be considered as attempted robbery, it must be it must be shown that the offender clearly intended to take
shown that the offender clearly intended to take possession, possession, for the purpose of gain, of some personal property
for the purpose of gain, of some personal property belonging to belonging to another. In the instant case, there is nothing in
another. In the present case, there is no evidence' in the record the record from which such purpose of the accused may
from which such purpose of the accused may reasonably be reasonably be inferred. From the fact established and stated in
inferred. the decision, that the accused on the day in question was
4.ID.; ID.; ID.—From the fact established and stated in the making an opening by means of an iron bar on the wall of Tan
decision, that the accused on the day in question was making Yu's store, it may only be inferred as a logical conclusion that
an opening by means of an iron bar on the wall of T. Y.'s store, his evident intention was to enter by means of force said store
it may only be inferred as a logical conclusion that his evident against the will of its owner. That his final objective, once he
intention was to enter by means of force said store against the succeeded in entering the store, was to rob, to cause physical
will of its owner. That his final objective, once he succeeded in injury to the inmates, or to commit any other offense, there is
entering the store, was to rob, to cause physical injury to its nothing in the record to justify a concrete finding.
occupants, or to commit any other offense, there is nothing in "It must be borne in mind (I Groizard, p. 99) that in offenses not
the record to justify a concrete finding. consummated, as the material damage is wanting, the nature
5.ID.; ATTEMPTED TRESPASS TO DWELLING.—The fact under of the action intended (acción fin) cannot exactly be
consideration does not constitute attempted robbery but ascertained, but the same must be inferred from the nature of
attempted trespass to dwelling (People vs. Tayag and Morales, the acts executed (acción medio). Hence, the
59 Phil., 606, and decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain 707
therein cited). The accused may be convicted and sentenced
for an attempt to commit this crime, in accordance with the VOL. 61, AUGUST 3, 1935
weight of the evidence and the allegations contained in the 707
information. People vs. Lamahang
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo. necessity that these acts be such that by their very nature, by
Paredes, J. the facts to which they are related, by the circumstances of the
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court. persons performing the same, and by the things connected
Honesto K. Bausa for appellant. therewith, they must show without any doubt, that they are
Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee. aimed at the consummation of a crime. Acts susceptible of
705 double interpretation, that is, in favor as well as against the
culprit, and which show an innocent as well as a punishable
VOL. 61, AUGUST 3, 1935 act, must not and can not furnish grounds by themselves for
705 attempted nor frustrated crimes. The relation existing between
People vs. Lamahang the facts submitted for appreciation and the offense which said
RECTO, J.: facts are supposed to produce must be direct; the intention
must be ascertained from the facts and therefore it is
The defendant Aurelio Lamahang is before this court on appeal necessary, in order to avoid regrettable instances of injustice,
from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, finding that the mind be able to directly infer from them the intention
him guilty of attempted robbery and sentencing him to suffer of the perpetrator to cause a particular injury. This must have
two years and four months of prisión correccional and to an been the intention of the legislator in requiring that in order for
additional penalty of ten years and one day of prisión mayor f an attempt to exist, the offender must commence the
or being an habitual delinquent, with the accessory penalties of commission of the felony directly by overt acts, that is to say,
the law, and to pay the costs of the proceeding. that the acts performed must be such that, without the intent
At early dawn on March 2, 1935, policeman Jose Tomambing, to commit an offense, they would be meaningless."
who was patrolling his beat on Delgado and C. R. Fuentes Viada (Vol. I, p. 47) holds the same opinion when he says that
streets of the City of Iloilo, caught the accused in the act of "the overt acts leading to the commission of the offense, are
making an opening with an iron bar on the wall of a store of not punishable except when they are aimed directly to its
cheap goods located on the last named street. At that time the execution, and therefore they must have an immediate and
owner of the store, Tan Yu, was sleeping inside with another necessary relation to the offense."
Chinaman. The accused had only succeeded in breaking one "Considering—says the Supreme Court of Spain in its decision
board and in unfastening another from the wall, when the of March 21, 1892—that in order to declare that such and such
policeman showed up, who instantly arrested him and placed overt acts constitute an attempted offense it is necessary that
him under custody. their objective be known and established, or that said acts be
The fact above stated was considered and declared of such nature that they themselves should obviously disclose
unanimously by the provincial fiscal of Iloilo, the trial judge and the criminal objective necessarily intended, said objective and
the Solicitor-General, as constituting attempted robbery, which finality to serve as ground for the designation of the offense: *
we think is erroneous. *      *."
It is our opinion that the attempt to commit an offense which In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion, and so hold that
the Penal Code punishes is that which has a logical relation to a the fact under consideration does not constitute
particular, concrete offense; that, which is the beginning of the 708
execution of the offense by overt acts of the perpetrator,
leading directly to its realization and consummation. The 708
attempt to commit an indeterminate offense, inasmuch as its PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
nature in relation to its objective is ambiguous, is not a juridical People vs. Lamahang
fact from the standpoint of the Penal Code. There is no doubt attempted robbery but attempted trespass to dwelling (People
that in the case at bar it was the intention of the accused to vs. Tayag and Morales, 59 Phil., 606, and decisions of the
enter Tan Yu's store by means of violence, passing through the Supreme Court of Spain therein cited). Under article 280 of the
opening which he had started to make on the wall, in order to Revised Penal Code, this offense is committed when a private
commit person shall enter the dwelling of another against the latter's
706 will. The accused may be convicted and sentenced for an
attempt to commit this offense in accordance with the
706 evidence and the following allegation contained in the
PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED information: "* * * the accused armed with an iron bar forced
People vs. Lamahang the wall of said store by breaking a board and unf astening
an offense which, due to the timely arrival of policeman another f or the purpose of entering said store * * * and that
Tomambing, did not develop beyond the first steps of its the accused did not succeed in entering the store due to the
execution. But it is not sufficient, for the purpose of imposing presence of the policeman on beat Jose Tomambing, who upon
penal sanction, that an act objectively performed constitute a hearing the noise produced by the breaking of the wall,
mere beginning of execution; it is necessary to establish its promptly approached the accused * * *." Under the
unavoidable connection, like the logical and natural relation of circumstances of this case the prohibition of the owner or
the cause and its effect, with the deed which, upon its inmate is presumed. (U. S. vs. Ostrea, 2 Phil., 93; U. S. vs.
consummation, will develop into one of the offenses defined Silvano, 31 Phil., 509; U. S. vs. Ticson, 25 Phil., 67; U. S. vs.
and punished by the Code; it is necessary to prove that said Mesina, 21 Phil., 615; U. S. vs. Villanueva, 18 Phil., 215; U. S.
beginning of execution, if carried to its complete termination vs. Panes, 25 Phil., 292.) Against the accused must be taken
following 'its natural course, without being frustrated by into consideration the aggravating circumstances of nighttime
external obstacles nor by the voluntary desistance of the and former convictions,—inasmuch as the record shows that
Page 57 of 71
several final judgments for robbery and theft have been as Marcela had discovered the accused in the house she awoke
rendered against him—and in his favor, the mitigating Alejo and his wife; that immediately after the accused were in
circumstance of lack of instruction. The breaking of the wall the house, one of them wounded, by means 01 a bolo, Alejo
should not be taken into consideration as an aggravating Tiongson, the owner of the house; that the accused
circumstance inasmuch as this is the very fact which in this appropriated to their own use a certain quantity of money; that
case constitutes the offense of attempted trespass to dwelling. the accused took and carried away out of the said house
The penalty provided by the Revised Penal Code for the toward the fields the said Marcela San Andres and illtreated
consummated offense of trespass to dwelling, if committed her.
with force, is prisión correccional in its medium and maximum 383
periods and a fine not exceeding P1,000 (art. 280, par. 2);
therefore the penalty corresponding to attempted trespass to VOL. 3, MARCH 5, 1904
dwelling is two degrees lower (art. 51), or, 383
709 United States vs. Arceo
The evidence on the part of the defense tended to prove an
VOL. 61, AUGUST 7, 1935 alibi. The court below found that this testimony was not to be
709 believed. We find no occasion, from the proof, to change this
Davao Saw Mill Co. vs. Castillo finding of fact.
arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods. Because of The court below found that the defendants were each guilty of
the presence of two aggravating circumstances and one the crime of entering the house of another, with violence and
mitigating circumstance the penalty must be imposed in its intimidation, which crime is punishable under subsection 2 of
maximum period. Pursuant to article 29 of the same Code, the article 491 of the Penal Code, and sentenced each of them to
accused is not entitled to credit for one-half of his preventive be imprisoned for the term of three years six months and
imprisonment. twenty-one days of prisión correccional, and also imposed upon
Wherefore, the sentence appealed from is revoked and the each a fine of 271 pesos and costs. In reaching this conclusion
accused is hereby held guilty of attempted trespass to the court took into consideration the aggravating circumstance
dwelling, committed by means of force, with the aforesaid of nighttime and the extenuating circumstance provided for in
aggravating and mitigating circumstances and sentenced to article 11 of the Penal Code.
three months and one day of arresto mayor, with the accessory Article 491 of the Penal Code provides that—
penalties thereof and to pay the costs. "He who shall enter the residence (dwelling house) of another
Avanceña, C. J., Abad Santos, Hull, and Vickers, JJ., concur. against the will of the tenant thereof shall be punished with the
Judgment revoked and defendant found guilty of attempted penalty of arresto mayor and a fine of from 325 to 3,250
trespass to dwelling. pesetas."
___________ Subsection 2 provides that—
"If the act shall be executed with violence or intimidation the
© Copyright 2020 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved. penalty shall be prisión correccional in the medium and
People vs. Lamahang, 61 Phil., 703, No. 43530 August 3, 1935 maximum grade, and a fine of from 325 to 3,250 pesetas."
Under the facts presented in this case, was the trial court
VOL. 3, MARCH 5, 1904 justified in finding that the accused were guilty of the crime of
381 entering the residence of another against his will and with
United States vs. Arceo violence or intimidation? We think that it was. We are not of
[No. 1491. March 5, 1904.] the opinion that the statute relates simply to the method by
which one may pass the threshold of the residence of another
THE UNITED STATES, complainant and appellee, vs. without his consent. We think it relates also to the conduct,
LoRENZO ARCEO ET AL., defendants and appellants. immediately after entrance, of him who enters the house of
another without his consent. He who being armed with deadly
1.CRIMINAL LAW; FORCIBLE ENTRY.—The law which forbids a weapons enters the residence of another in the nighttime,
forcible entry into the dwelling of another relates not only to without consent, and immediately commits acts of violence
the method by which one may pass the threshold of the and intimidation, is guilty of entering the house of another with
dwelling of another without his consent but also to the conduct violence and intimidation and is punishable under subsection 2
immediately after entrance of one who so enters. of article 491 of the Penal Code. (See Viada, vol 3,
2.ID.; ID.; INVIOLABILITY OF THE DWELLING; POLICE POWER.— 384
The right to be free from unauthorized entrances into one's
dwelling is one of 384
382 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
United States vs. Arceo
382 p. 303; Gazette of Spain of the 28th of March, 1883; Viada, vol
PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED 6, p. 363; Gazette of Spain of the 19th of May, 1892, p. 165.)
United States vs. Arceo The inviolability of the home is one of the most fundamental of
the most sacred personal rights secured by the law, and its all the individual rights declared and recognized in the political
only limitation is found in the necessary exercise of the police codes of civilized nations. No one can enter into the home of
power, under which this private right must yield to the public another without the consent of its owners or occupants.
welfare. The privacy of the home—the place of abode, the place where
3.ID.; ID.; EXPRESS PROHIBITION.—It is not necessary to a a man with his family may dwell in peace and enjoy the
conviction of the offense of forcible entry that there should be companionship of his wif e and children unmolested by anyone,
an express prohibition to enter; no one may enter the dwelling even the king, except in rare cases—has always been regarded
of another without rendering himself liable under the law by civilized nations as one of the most sacred personal rights to
unless the one seeking entrance comes within some of the which men are entitled. Both the common and the civil law
exceptions dictated by the law or public policy. guaranteed to man the right of absolute protection to the
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of privacy of his home. The king was powerful; he was clothed
Bulacan. with majesty; his will was the law, but, with few exceptions, the
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court. humblest citizen or subject might shut the door of his humble
Crispin Oben, for appellants. cottage in the face of the monarch and defend his intrusion
Solicitor-General Araneta, for appellee. into that privacy which was regarded as sacred as any of the
JOHNSON, J.: kingly prerogatives. The poorest and most humble citizen or
subject may, in his cottage, no matter how frail or humble it is,
The defendants were charged with entering the house of one bid defiance to all the powers of the state; the wind, the storm
Alejo Tiongson on the night of February 20, 1903, armed with and the sunshine alike may enter through its weather-beaten
deadly weapons, against the will of the said Alejo Tiongson. parts, but the king may not enter against its owner's will; none
The evidence shows that Alejo Tiongson lived in his house in of his forces dare to cross the threshold of even the humblest
company with his wife, Alejandra San Andres, and his wife's tenement without its owner's consent.
sister, Marcela San Andres. On the night of the 20th of "A man's house is his castle/' has become a maxim among the
February, 1903, between 8 and 9 o'clock at night, the accused, civilized peoples of the earth. His protection therein has
one of whom was armed with a gun and the other two each become a matter of constitutional protection in England,
with a bolo, entered the house of the said Alejo Tiongson America, and Spain, as well as in other countries.
without first obtaining the permission of any person. It appears However, under the police power of the state the authorities
from the proof that there was a light burning in the house at may compel entrance to dwelling houses against the will of the
the time the accused entered, which was immediately put out owners for sanitary purposes. The government has this right
by one of the accused; that Alejo and his wife had retired for upon grounds of public policy. It has a right to protect the
the night; that Marcela was still sitting up sewing, that as soon health and lives of all its people. A man can not insist upon the
Page 58 of 71
privacy of his home when a question of the health and life of while the inmates are asleep, although there was no express
himself, his family, and prohibition to enter, in the absence of proof that the entry was
385 made with the knowledge of or by invitation of some inmate of
the house, he commits the crime of forcible entry. Under such
VOL. 3, MARCH 5, 1904 circumstances, entry against the will of the occupants is
385 presumed.
United States vs. Arceo APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Nueva
that of the community is involved. This private right must be Ecija. Hurd, J.
subject to the public welfare. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
It may be argued that one who enters the dwelling house of Antonio Sanz, for appellant.
another is not liable unless he has been forbidden—i. e., the Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee.
phrase "against the will of the owner" means that there must TORRES, J.:
have been an express prohibition to enter. In other words, if An appeal raised by the defendant from a judgment of
one enters the dwelling house of another without the conviction rendered in this case by the Honorable Judge
knowledge of the owner he has not entered against his will. George N. Hurd.
This construction is certainly not tenable, because entrance is On the night of the 18th until the early morning of the 19th of
forbidden generally under the spirit of the law unless May, 1910, Elena Llanera was asleep in her house situated in
permission to enter is expressly given. To allow this the pueblo of Aliaga, Nueva Ecija, her husband, Emilio Soriano,
construction would destroy the very spirit of the law. Under the being at the time absent in this city; she was sleeping under a
law no one has the right to enter the home of another without mosquito netting in the parlor of the house with her three
the other's express consent. Therefore, to say that when one minor children and the women Damiana Collado and Elena
enters the home of another without his knowledge he does not Molina, and in the dining room of the said house the men
enter against the will of the owner, is to say that one's home is named Cenon and Luis Pascual, with
open for the entrance of all who are not expressly forbidden. 616
This is not the rule. The statute must not be given that
construction. No one can enter the dwelling house of another, 616
in these Islands, without rendering himself liable under the law, PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
unless he has the express consent of the owner and unless the United States vs. Mesina.
one seeking entrance comes within some of the exceptions their respective wives, were also asleep. At about 4 o'clock in
dictated by the law or by a sound public policy. the morning Llanera was awakened by the noise produced on
So jealously did the people of England regard this right to the floor by a man's steps, in the direction of her feet; she
enjoy, unmolested, the privacy of their houses, that they might therefore awoke Damiana and, on raising one of the sides of
even take the life of the unlawful intruder, if it be nighttime. the mosquito netting, they saw and recognized Faustino
This was also the sentiment of the Romans expressed by Tully: Mesina, for there was then a light in the house; the latter
"Quid enim sanctius quid omni religione munitius, quam domus hurriedly went into another room followed by the three women
uniuscu jusque civium." who then saw the said party go out of the window, which on
It may be argued that the offense punishable under article 491 that occasion was open, and from there alight on the ground by
of the Penal Code corresponds to the crime of burglary at the supporting himself upon a window of the ground floor. The
common law. It is true that the offense of entering the house of inmates of the house testified that bef ore going to bed that
another without the latter's consent and the common-law night they had closed all the windows and doors of the house.
crime of burglary are both offenses against the habitation of The provincial fiscal, therefore, on September 22, 1910, filed
individuals. But these crimes are distinctively different. The an information with the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija,
punishment for burglary is "to prevent the breaking and charging Faustino Mesina with the crime of forcible entry, and,
entering of a dwelling house of another in the nighttime for the this cause having been instituted, the court in view of the
purpose evidence and on the 23rd of November following rendered
386 judgment by sentencing the defendant to the penalty of four
months of arresto mayor, to pay a fine of 500 pesetas, with
386 subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and the costs.
PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED From this judgment the defendant appealed.
Fernando vs. Villalon The facts related, duly proved in this cause, certainly constitute
of committing a felony therein," while the object of article 491 the crime of forcible entry, performed without violence or
is to prevent entrance into the dwelling house of another at intimidation, provided for and punished in article 491,
any time, either by day or by night, for any purpose, against paragraph 1, of the Penal Code, inasmuch as, from the
the will of its owner. testimony of three eyewitnesses, it was fully proven that, on
In burglary there must have existed an intent to enter for the the owner of the house, Elena Llanera, being awakened, early
purpose of committing a felony, while under article 491 of the in the morning of the 19th of May, by the sound of the steps of
Penal Code entrance against the will, simply, of the owner is a person who was walking inside of the house near her bed
punishable. Under the provisions of the Penal Code entrance in which was covered with a mosquito netting, both she and her
the nighttime can only be regarded as an aggravation of the companions who were sleeping with her under the same
offense of entering. We are of the opinion, under all of the facts netting on raising one side of the same saw and recognized the
in the case, that the extenuating circumstance provided for in said person, by the light there was in the house, as being the
article 11 of the Penal Code should not be considered in favor defendant, Faustino Mesina, who, on observing that the said
of these defendants. women had awakened and had seen him, immediately and
We find that the defendants are guilty of the crime of entering hastily entered the small room of the
the house of another with violence and intimidation, without 617
the consent of the owner, with the aggravating circumstance of
nocturnity, and hereby impose the maximum degree of prisión VOL. .21, OCTOBER 19, 1911.
correccional, and the fine provided for in subsection 2 of article 617
491 of the Penal Code should be imposed. United States vs. Mesina.
The sentence of the court below is therefore modified, and house, followed by them, and went down out of the building
each of the said defendants is hereby sentenced to be through one of the windows of the said room, which at that
imprisoned for the term of six years of prisión correccional, and moment was open, by supporting himself on a window of the
each to pay a fine of 271 pesos and the costs of this suit or In entresol, located thereunder, which must have been the way
default thereof to suffer subsidiary imprisonment. he got in, for the inmates of the house had closed that room
Arellano, C. J., Torres, Willard, and Mapa, JJ., concur. Cooper window and all the others in the house the night previous
and McDonough, JJ., dissent. before retiring.
Judgment modified. The defendant's denial, his exculpatory allegations and the
______________ testimony of his witnesses were unsuccessful in overthrowing
the very positive evidence of the prosecution, for his allegation
© Copyright 2020 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved. that he was at the said house on the morning of the day
United States vs. Arceo, 3 Phil., 381, No. 1491 March 5, 1904 aforementioned, for the purpose of making some requests to
the husband of the offended woman, Elena Llanera, who, as
[No. 6717. October 19, 1911.] she was in the granary nearby, had to be called and on arriving
at her house he had a long conversation with her and not until
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff and appellee, vs. after she had had her breakfast did he leave for the sitio of
FAUSTINO MESINA, defendant and appellant. Bibiclat, was not corroborated by the testimony of his two
witnesses, Buenaventura Maligsi and Eusebio Landicho, the
FORCIBLE ENTRY.—When a person enters the dwelling of first of whom testified that he was engaged that morning in
another at night, through a window but without violence and hauling rice to the warehouse of Elena Llanera, who was then
Page 59 of 71
inside of this building, and the second witness, that he was Antonio Sanz for Appellant.
near the warehouse waiting for his neighbor named Julio; they
then saw the defendant enter the house of the offended party Attorney-General VIllamor for Appellee.
and after a short while, during which the latter, called by a little
girl, returned to the house, these witnesses saw the defendant SYLLABUS
come down out of the house. This testimony, far from proving
the defendant's statements, completely disproves them and 1. FORCIBLE ENTRY. — When a person enters the dwelling of
belies the fact affirmed by Mesina relative to the long another at night, through a window but without violence and
conversation; besides, the offended party denied that the def while the inmates are asleep, although there was no express
endant was in her house that morning. prohibition to enter, in the absence of proof that the entry was
Moreover, the testimony of the municipal policeman, Timoteo made with the knowledge of or by invitation of some inmate of
Palis, corroborates the evidence of the prosecution. This the house, he commits the crime of forcible entry. Under such
witness testified that while he was on guard duty at the circumstances, entry against the will of the occupants is
municipal building a short while before 4 o'clock on the presumed.
morning of the said date, the defendant passed by and advised
him that the policemen should be ready who were to
accompany him, Mesina, to the sitio of Bibiclat, and that DECISION
618

618 TORRES, J.:

PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
United States vs. Mesina.
the defendant immediately left and witness did not know An appeal raised by the defendant from a judgment of
where the latter went. This testimony, combined with that of conviction rendered in this case by the Honorable Judge
the offended party and her two witnesses, and all taken as a George N. Hurd.
whole, produce in the mind a thorough conviction that the
defendant did commit the crime under prosecution. It is to be On the night of the 18th until the early morning of the 19th of
presumed that after passing by the municipal building the May, 1910, Elena Llanera was asleep in her house situated in
defendant went to the house where the crime was committed the pueblo of Aliaga, Nueva Ecija, her husband, Emilio Soriano,
and climbed up into it through the window, for this was not being at the time absent in this city; she was sleeping under a
very high up. mosquito netting in the parlor of the house with her three
For the reasons stated, the testimony of the wife of the minor children and the women Damiana Collado and Elena
defendant can not be considered as proof of an alibi in his Molina, and in the dining room of the said house the men
behalf, to the effect that at the hour and on the date named Cenon and Luis Pascual, with their respective wives,
mentioned her husband was in his house and that Elena were also asleep. At about 4 o’clock in the morning Llanera
Llanera, subsequent to the denunciation of the crime, had was awakened by the noise produced on the floor by a man’s
talked with her in order that she might feel no resentment— steps, in the direction of her feet; she therefore awoke
inasmuch as such statements were not proved and the Damiana and, on raising one of the sides of the mosquito
offended party denied that she had had any conversation netting, they saw and recognized Faustino Mesina, for there
whatever with Marcelina Santiago, the defendant's wife. was then a light in the house the latter hurriedly went into
Article 491, aforecited, provides that any private person who another room followed by the three women who then saw the
shall enter the dwelling of another against the latter's will shall said party go out of the window, which on that occasion was
incur the penalty specified therein, and although the inmates open, and from there alight on the ground by supporting
of the house did not forbid the defendant to enter the same, himself upon a window of the ground floor. The inmates of the
nevertheless and withal when one enters a house by climbing house testified that before going to bed that night they had
up into it and passing through a window thereof which had closed all the windows and doors of the house.
been closed and was opened by the perpetrator of the crime
for the purpose of his entry, even though no violence was The provincial fiscal, therefore, on September 22, 1910, filed
employed in doing so, it is unquestionable that the entry into an information with the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija,
the house, by taking advantage of the darkness and when all charging Faustino Mesina with the crime of forcible entry, and,
the inmates thereof were asleep, bears the character of the this cause having been instituted, the court in view of the
crime of forcible entry, for the reason that, under such evidence and on the 23d of November following rendered
circumstances, it is not necessary that there should have been judgment by sentencing the defendant to the penalty of four
a previous prohibition to enter by the inmates, since this is months of arresto mayor, to pay a fine of 500 pesetas, with
presumed, and because the entry into the premises was subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and the costs.
effected against the will of the occupants thereof, there being From this judgment the defendant appealed.
no proof that the defendant entered the same with the
permission or the consent of any of them. The facts related, duly proved in this cause, certainly constitute
619 the crime of forcible entry, performed without violence or
intimidation, provided for and punished in article 491,
VOL. 21, OCTOBER 24, 1911. paragraph 1, of the Penal Code, inasmuch as, from the
619 testimony of three eyewitnesses, it was fully proven that, on
Gregorio vs. Cosio. the owner of the house, Elena Llanera, being awakened, early
In the commission of the crime there is no extenuating in the morning of the 19th of May, by the sound of the steps of
circumstance whatever to be considered, but there is the a person who was walking inside of the house near her bed
aggravating one of nocturnity, since the defendant perpetrated which was covered with a mosquito netting, both she and her
the crime by taking advantage of the silence and darkness of companions who were sleeping with her under the same
the night: therefore, the penalty fixed by law of arresto mayor netting on raising one side of the same saw and recognized the
should be imposed upon him in its maximum degree. said person, by the light there was in the house, as being the
For the foregoing reasons it is our opinion that the judgment defendant, Faustino Mesina, who, on observing that the said
appealed from should be affirmed; provided, however, that the women had awakened and had seen him, immediately and
defendant shall be sentenced to the penalty of five months of hastily entered the small room of the house, followed by them,
arresto mayor, to the other penalties of the judgment of the and went down out of the building through one of the windows
lower court, and to the costs of this instance. So ordered. of the said room, which at that moment was open, by
Mapa, Johnson, Carson, and Moreland, JJ., concur. supporting himself on a window of the entresol, located
Judgment affirmed; penalty modified. thereunder, which must have been the way he got in, for the
________________ inmates of the house had closed that room window and all the
others in the house the night previous before retiring.
© Copyright 2020 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
United States vs. Mesina., 21 Phil. 615, No. 6717 October 19, The defendant’s denial, his exculpatory allegations and the
1911 testimony of his witnesses were unsuccessful in overthrowing
the very positive evidence of the prosecution, for his allegation
that he was at the said house on the morning of the day
[CA-No. 507. November 19, 1945] aforementioned, for the purpose of making some requests to
[G.R. No. 6717. October 19, 1911.] the husband of the offended woman, Elena Llanera, who, as
she was in the granary nearby, had to be called and on arriving
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FAUSTINO at her house he had a long conversation with her and not until
MESINA, Defendant-Appellant. after she had her breakfast did he leave for the sitio of Bibiclat,
was not corroborated by the testimony of his two witnesses,
Page 60 of 71
Buenaventura Maligsi and Eusebio Landicho, the first of whom paragraph of article 280 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal
testified that he was engaged that morning in hauling rice to intent inheres in the unwelcome visit of a trespasser.
the warehouse of Elena Llanera, who was then inside of this APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of
building, and the second witness, that he was near the Laguna. Amador, J.
warehouse waiting for his neighbor named Julio; they then saw The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
the defendant enter the house of the offended party and after 477
a short while, during which the latter, called by a little girl,
returned to the house, these witnesses saw the defendant VOL. 75, NOVEMBER 19, 1945
come down out of the house. This testimony, far from proving 477
the defendant’s statements, completely disproves them and
belies the fact affirmed by Mesina relative to the long People vs. Uy Almeda
conversation; besides, the offended party denied that the      Bausa &, Ampil and Ramon Diokno for appellant.
defendant was in her house that morning.      Solicitor General De la Costa and Solicitor Avanceña
for appellee.
Moreover, the testimony of the municipal policeman, Timoteo
Palis, corroborates the evidence of the prosecution. This PARÁS, J.:
witness testified that while he was on guard duty at the
municipal building a short while before 4 o’clock on the This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance
morning of the said date, the defendant passed by and advised Of Laguna, convicting the appelIant, Anacleto Uy Almeda, of
him that the policemen should be ready who were to the offense of qualified trespass to dwelling and sentencing
accompany him, Mesina, to the sitio of Bibiclat, and that the him to undergo imprisonment for the indeterminate period of
defendant immediately left and witness did not know where from four months and one day of arresto mayor to two years,
the latter went. This testimony, combined with that of the four months and one day of prisión correccional, with the
offended party and her two witnesses, and all taken as a accessories of the law and one-third of the costs.
whole, produce in the mind a thorough conviction that the The facts established during the trial are substantially as
defendant did commit the crime under prosecution. It is to be follows: On the morning of November 13, 1940, the appellant,
presumed that after passing by the municipal building the in company with other persons, arrived at the house of
defendant went to the house where the crime was committed Honorata Limpo in the municipality of Biñan, Province of
and climbed up into it through the window, for this was not Laguna. The latter was thereupon informed by appellant's
very high up. companion, Potenciano Villano, that they were going to
demolish and repair her house, to which Honorata Limpo
For the reasons stated, the testimony of the wife of the objected, specially in view of the absence of her husband at
defendant can not be considered as proof of an alibi in his the time. Unheeding this opposition, and upon express orders
behalf, to the effect that at the hour and on the date of the appellant, his companions Potenciano Villano and
mentioned her husband was in his house and that Elena Antonio Dysionglo proceeded to gain entry into the house by
Llanera, subsequent to the denunciation of the crime, had means of two ladders which they placed against the front wall
talked with her in order that she might feel no resentment — and to remove some boards and iron sheets that served to
inasmuch as such statements were not proved and the cover the front side. Appellant's designs were put to a stop,
offended party denied that she had any conversation whatever however, only by the arrival of Honorata's son named
with Marcelina Santiago, the defendant’s wife. Francisco, who called a policeman to the scene.
It appears that the house in question was built on a lot inclosed
Article 491, aforecited, provides that any private person who by a stone fence having an iron grill gate. On the same lot the
shall enter the dwelling of another against the latter’s will shall appellant had a warehouse; and as he had freely used said
incur the penalty specified therein, and although the inmates gate in going to his property, it is now contended that his entry
of the house did not forbid the defendant to enter the same, into the yard of Honorata Limpo, which was a part of her
nevertheless and withal when one enters a house by climbing "dwelling," could not have been unathorized or against her will,
up into it and passing through a window thereof which had so as to warrant
been closed and was opened by the perpetrator of the crime 478
for the purpose of his entry, even though no violence was
employed in doing so, it is unquestionable that the entry into 478
the house, by taking advantage of the darkness and when all PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
the inmates thereof were asleep, bears the character of the People vs. Uy Almeda
crime of forcible entry, for the reason that, under such his conviction under article 280 of the Revised Penal Code.
circumstances, it is not necessary that there should have been Appellant's argument would require some inquiry if the lot on
a previous prohibition to enter by the inmates, since this is which Honorata's house was erected were exclusively hers and
presumed, and because the entry into the premises was the appellant had not admittedly used its gate in common with
effected against the will of the occupants thereof, there being Honorata, and if said argument would not "f urther lead to a
no proof that the defendant entered the same with the plainly unacceptable, nay undesirable, result that simply
permission or the consent of any of them. because he had free entry into and passage on the common
lot, he could have the same right as regards Honorata's house.
In the commission of the crime there is no extenuating Another defense pressed in this appeal is that the opposition
circumstance whatever to be considered, but there is the registered by Honorata Limpo was directed against the
aggravating one of nocturnity, since the defendant perpetrated demolition or repair of her house and not against the original
the crime by taking advantage of the silence and darkness of entry of the appellant and his companions into the yard or
the night: therefore, the penalty fixed by law of arresto mayor premises of her dwelling, and that although the removal of
should be imposed upon him in its maximum degree. some boards and iron sheets, done by the appellant through
his companions after their lawful entry, may constitute an
For the foregoing reasons it is our opinion that the judgment independent offense, the said subsequent act cannot be the
appealed from should be affirmed; provided, however, that the trespass defined and penalized by article 280 of the Revised
defendant shall be sentenced to the penalty of five months of Penal Code. This contention is of course partly disposed of in
arresto major, to the other penalties of the judgment of the the preceding paragraph. It is only necessary to add that
lower court, and to the costs of this instance. So ordered. Honorata could not have consented to appellant's intrusion into
the house, which made him a trespasser, for the very purpose
Mapa, Johnson, Carson, and Moreland, JJ., concur. already objected to by her. Moreover, the method employed by
appellant's men in effecting entry suggests prior refusal on the
[CA-No. 507. November 19, 1945] part of Honorata to admit them through its stairs. Neither is
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff and appellee, vs. there any point in appellant's pretense that, one week before
ANACLETO UY ALMEDA ET AL., defendants. ANACLETO UY the occasion in question, he had notified Honorata about the
ALMEDA, appellant. intended repairs, because said notice did and could not mean
1.CRIMINAL LAW; TRESPASS TO DWELLING; CASE AT BAR.—The her subsequent conformity.
house in which the offended party lived was built on a lot The appellant next tries to exculpate himself by maintaining
inclosed by a stone fence having an iron grill gate and on which that there is absolutely no proof as to his criminal intent in
appellant had a warehouse. Although the latter had free entry entering the yard or even the house of Honorata. Indeed, it is
into and passage on the common lot, his unauthorized insisted that he merely wanted to repair said house over which
intrusion into the house of the offended party made him a he was claiming ownership. Appellant thus pretended to have
trespasser. bought the house for P70 from the estranged wife of
2.ID. ; ID. ; CRIMINAL INTENT.—What is intended to be Honorata's son against whose father he
protected and preserved by the law is the privacy of one's 479
dwelling, and, except in those cases enumerated in the third
Page 61 of 71
VOL. 75, NOVEMBER 26, 1945 articles and boxes in said store, they found the can of opium,
479 previously placed therein, and Teofilo Osorio, aided by Navarro,
Jayme vs. Gamboa began to intimidate the Chinaman who owned the store by
subsequently filed a suit to recover the premises. This case telling him that he would be arrested, charged with illegal
was however, decided against him. We are of the opinion that possession of opium and taken to jail, unless he produced the
the alleged ownership is immaterial, for even supposing that sum of P1,000. But later, through the mediation or intercession
the house belonged to the appellant, that fact alone did not of other Chinamen, friends of Yap Buyco, Osorio finally
authorize him to do anything with or enter the house against consented to reduce the sum demanded to P300, and it was
the will of its actual occupant. He could have invoked the aid of forthwith paid by the Chinaman to the sham officers, Osorio
the court for the exercise or protection of his alleged and Navarro. Osorio then told Yap Buyco not to worry about the
proprietary rights. What is intended to be protected and opium found in his store, because he himself would be
preserved by the law is the privacy of one's dwelling, and, responsible, and they went away. Osorio kept the P300, merely
except in those cases enumerated in the third paragraph of giving P10 to the other policeman, Bartolome Dicdiquin, who
article 280 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal intent inheres in had stood guard at the door of the store during the search.
the unwelcome visit of a trespasser. An information was accordingly filed by the provincial fiscal
The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs. against Teofilo Osorio and Mateo Navarro, charging them with
     Moran, C. J., Jaranilla, Feria, Pablo, and Briones, JJ., concur. the crime of robbery; but later, at the fiscal's request, the court
Judgment affirmed. dismissed the case against Mateo Navarro
_____________ 239

© Copyright 2020 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved. VOL. 21, JANUARY 17, 1912.
People vs. Uy Almeda, 75 Phil. 476, CA-No. 507 November 19, 239
1945 United States vs. Osorio.
and tried only the case against Teofilo Osorio. Judgment
therein was rendered on September 2, 1910, sentencing the
[No. 6660. January 17, 1912.] defendant to the penalty of three years, eight months and one
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff and appellee, vs. TEOFILO day of prisión correccional, with costs. From this judgment the
OSORIO, defendant and appellant. defendant appealed.
The facts stated, and duly proven in this case, point to the
1.ROBBERY; INTIMIDATION.—Intimidation, which characterizes crime of robbery, committed by means of intimidation of the
as robbery the seizure of the personal property of another, is person of the Chinaman Yap Buyco, which is provided for and
present whenever, to obtain the same, acts are performed punished by articles 502 and 503, No. 5, of the Penal Code; for
which, in their own nature or by reason of the circumstances by threatening the person of the injured party the thief
under which they are executed, restrict or hinder the free succeeded in securing the sum of P300, delivered through the
exercise of the will of the victim or inspire him with fear. former's fear that if he did not do so, he would be arrested and
2.ID.; ID.—A Chinaman was startled by the finding of opium in turned over to the courts as a smuggler and possessor of
his store, when he knew that he did not have any such article opium, which the defendant claimed to have found in his store.
or similar drug therein. It is only natural that he was overcome The crime prosecuted is not estafa, but, as has been said,
with fright at the thought that he had incurred the personal and robbery with intimidation of the person of the injured party.
pecuniary penalties provided by law and was seized with dread The facts are analogous to those which led to a case wherein
that he would be tried, sent to prison, ruined in his business judgment was rendered on appeal, dated June 24, 1875, as
and finally punished as a smuggler, in spite of the fact that the follows: An individual presented himself in the houses of
opium, found by the individuals who appeared in his store and various residents and demanded money on the pretext that it
searched it with the character and appearance of officers of the was for a gang of outlaws in the neighboring hills, for which he
law, was not his; therefore he felt obliged to accede to their had been commissioned by the gang; and he accordingly
demands by delivering to them the money which would induce received various sums of money from those people. The
them to agree not to arrest him and that the mock arrest supreme court of Spain declared that the facts related
should not be reported. The Chinaman was placed in the same constitute the crime of robbery with intimidation of the
position as persons who give money, through fear of injury persons, and stated that: The essential element in the crime of
from a gang of outlaws, in whose behalf the demand is made. estafa is the artful cunning employed by a person who is
Nor can any great distinction be made between the procedure endeavoring thereby to deceive his intended victim, and
of sham officers of the law and outlaws who commit a robbery, accordingly such astuteness or cunning excludes all idea of
because the latter jeopardize life by their attempt, while the intimidation, violence or other means of like nature which
former by their acts deprive the injured parties of their restricts or hinders the exercise of the will, as it remains free
property and commit the crime by inducing the belief that they and independent, however it may be unsettled and confused
represent the law. by suggestions, circumstances which also concur in the frauds
3.ID.; ID.; MATERIAL VIOLENCE NOT ESSENTIAL—Material provided for by the Penal Code.
violence is not indispensable to the commission of the crime of "The defendant, in demanding the sums he succeeded in
robbery. When the crime consists in the taking possession or 240
securing of money or other property, through the effect of fear
or fright, such action constitutes the crime of robbery with 240
intimidation defined in article 502 of the Penal Code. PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu. United States vs. Osorio.
Wislizenus, J. securing from different parties, whether or not the existence of
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court. such a gang was a fact, accomplished his purpose by means of
Maximino Mina, for appellant. threats of the injury the outlaws might cause the persons to
Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee. whom he applied if they did not contribute what he asked."
238 Intimidation was present, and the acts he performed can not
legally be held to constitute estafa or fraud.
238 In another judgment, November 3, 1882, the same supreme
PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED court held that: According to article 515 of the Penal Code of
United States vs. Osorio. Spain, identical with 502 for the Philippines, robbery is
TORRES, J.: committed by persons who, for the sake of gain, take
Appeal by Teofilo Osorio from a judgment rendered by the possession of the personal property of others with violence or
Honorable Adolph Wislizenus. intimidation of the persons. Intimidation, which characterizes
On February 14, 1910, in the town of Dalaguete, Cebu, Teofilo as robbery the seizure of the personal property of another, is
Osorio, clerk of the Cebu police force, entered into a scheme present whenever to obtain the same acts are performed
with Mateo Navarro, municipal policeman of Cebu, and which, either in their own nature or by reason of the
Bartolome Dicdiquin, municipal policeman of Dalaguete, for the circumstances under which they are executed, inspire fear in
purpose of getting money by intimidation from a Chinaman, the persons against whom they are directed.
Yap Buyco or Yap Buya. To do this, the defendant arranged The Chinaman Yap Buyco or Yap Buya was startled by the
that his younger brother, Simplicio Osorio, should put a can, finding of a quantity of opium in his store, when he knew that
with some opium in it, in the said Chinaman's store. After this he did not have any such article therein, and it is natural that
had been done, Teofilo Osorio at once repaired to said store he was overcome with fright, foreseeing that as a prisoner
with the two policemen, Navarro and Dicdiquin, pretending that charged with smuggling he would, after the trouble incident to
he was the chief of police. Navarro was at the time carrying a a trial of greater or less length, incur the personal and
revolver. They proceeded immediately to search said store, pecuniary penalties provided by law. So it is not strange that
without being provided with the necessary search warrant or he was seized with dread that he would be tried, sent to prison,
warrant of arrest. After having moved and examined various ruined in his business and finally punished as a smuggler, in
Page 62 of 71
spite of the fact that the opium found by the individuals, who
appeared in his store and searched it with the character and VOL. 21, JANUARY 18, 1912.
appearance of officers of the law, was not his; and so he felt 243
obliged to accede to their demands by delivering to them the Oria vs. McMicking.
sum which would induce them to agree that he should not be © Copyright 2020 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
arrested and that the mock arrest for possession of opium be United States vs. Osorio., 21 Phil. 237, No. 6660 January 17,
not reported to the proper authorities. The Chinaman was 1912
therefore placed in the same position as the persons who had
to give money through fear of the injury 686
241 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Reyes vs. People
VOL. 21, JANUARY 17, 1912.
241 Nos. L-21528 & L-21529. March 28, 1969.
United States vs. Osorio. ROSAURO REYES, petitioner, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE
that might be done them by outlaws, in whose name the PHILIPPINES, respondent.
demand for the money was made.
With reference to the influence exerted upon and the intense Criminal procedure; Amendment of complaint; May not be
fear produced in the mind of the victim, no great distinction made after plea if it will touch substantial matters.—ln
can be made between the procedure of sham officers of the substantial amendment of inf ormation, the rule is that af ter
law and outlaws who commit a robbery; the latter jeopardize the accused has pleaded the information may be amended as
life by their attempt, while the former by their acts deprive the to all matters of form by leave and at the discretion of the
injured parties of their property and commit the crime through court, when the same can be done without prejudice to the
the respect inspired by the belief that they represent the law. rights of the defendant (Section 13, Rule 110, New Rules of
Neither can the crime in question be characterized as threats, Court). Amendments that touch upon matters of substance
because such crime depends upon the moral pressure which cannot be permitted after the plea is entered.
threat of future injury exerts upon a person to obtain, at some Criminal law; Grave threats; Where all elements present in the
future time, the end sought. When the crime consists in case at bar.—All the elements of the crime of grave threats as
materially taking possession of or securing, on the spot, the defined in Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code and .penalized
delivery of the money or other personal property, through the by its paragraph 2 were alleged in the original information
effect of fear or fright which imminence of the injury namely: (1) that the offender threatened another person with
threatened produces in the mind of the person intimidated, the the infliction upon his person of a wrong; (2) that such wrong
nature of the penal act is altered and constitutes, not threats amounted to crime; and (3) that the threat was not subject to a
but the crime of robbery with intimidation defined by article condition. Hence, petitioner could have been convicted
515 of the Penal Code of Spain, identical with 502 for the thereunder.
Philippines; and the facts should be so characterized. Such is Crimmal procedure; Same; Where deletion of the word “orally”
the principle established by the supreme court of Spain in a did not affect nature of charge.—The particular manner in
judgment of June 16, 1900. which the threat is made not a qualifying ingredient of the
Robbery then is unquestionably the proper classification for the offense, such that the deletion of the word “orally” did not
crime committed against said Chinaman, from whom sham affect the nature and essence of the crime as charged
officers of the law succeeded in securing the sum of P300, originally. Neither did it change the basic theory of the
under pressure and menace of arrest, indict ment and trial for prosecution that the accused threatened to kill the complainant
violation of the opium law, for such procedure constitutes so as to require the petitioner to undergo any material change
intimidation. or modification in his defense. The deletion of the world
In spite of the defendant's denial and his plea of not guilty, the “orally” was effected in order to make the information
case affords decisive and conclusive evidence of his guilt as conformable to the evidence to be presented during the trial. It
principal, and he is fully convicted of the crime of robbery was merely a formal amendment which in no way prejudiced
under consideration. He was unable to refute such conclusive petitioner’s rights.
and satisfactory evidence as appears in the case, and his Same; Same; Amendment; Where amendment not substantial,
statements in his own defense are absolutely groundless. He no second plea, necessary.—Petitioner’s contention that even
confesses to have gone with assuming that the amendment was properly allowed, the trial
242 court committed a reversible error in proceeding with the trial
on the merits without first requiring him to enter his plea to the
242 amended information. Considering, however, that the
PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED amendment was not substantial, no second plea was necessary
United States vs. Osorio. at all.
others into the injured party's store in order to make a search Same; Same; Where defendant guilty of grave threat as shown
for opium. Although he imputes the whole operation to Mateo by the facts of the case.—The demonstration led by petitioner
Navarro, with the admission that they all pretended that they against the complainant in front of the main gate of the naval
were policemen, yet none of them was authorized to make a station; the fact that placards with threatening statements
search of said store, and he took the part of leader in were carried by the demonstrators conducted in front thereof,
performing the penal act. Mateo Navarro avers that upon going culminating in repeated threats flung by petitioner in a loud
with another person to said store the defendant Osorio voice, give rise to only one conclusion; that the threats were
represented himself to be the chief of police; that it was Osorio 687
who took charge of the P300 delivered by the Chinaman and
that he gave P10 to the policeman of Dalaguete, Bartolome VOL. 27, MARCH 28, 1969
Dicdiquin, who had stood guard at the door of the store during 687
the search, and adds that, after committing the deed, Osorio Reyes vs. People
told him in the road that he would give him a part of said sum made “with the deliberate purpose of creating in the mind of
in Cebu, as it was dangerous to do so in that town, and that he the person threatened the belief that the threat would be
also had to give another share to his brother Simplicio. From all carried into effect.”
this it appears that the principal part which the defendant Same; Oral defamation; Where the expression “putang ina
Osorio took in the crime of robbery at bar is beyond all doubt. mo“is not considered slanderous.—The words, “Agustin,
The presence of the aggravating circumstance, that the crime putang ina mo” is a common ‘expression in the dialect that is
was committed in the dwelling of the injured party, must be often employed not really to slander but rather to express
admitted, without any mitigating circumstance to counteract anger or displeasure. It is seldom, if ever, taken in its literal
its effect, and the penalty prescribed by No. 5 of article 503 of sence by the hearer, that is, as a reflection on the virtue of a
the Penal Code must be imposed in its maximum degree. mother. In the instant case, it should be viewed as part of the
For the foregoing reasons, whereby the errors assigned are threats voiced by appellant against the complainant evidently
refuted, it is our opinion that the judgment should be modified to make the same more emphatic.
so as to sentence and we hereby sentence Teófilo Osorio to the APPEAL by certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals.
penalty of seven years of presidio mayor, with the accessories The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
prescribed by article 57 of the code, to restitution of the sum of      Jose F. Mañacop for petitioner.
P300 to the injured Chinaman, Yap Buyco or Yap Buya, without      Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, owing to the Pacifico P. de Castro and Solicitor Antonio M. Martinez for
nature of the penalty, and to the costs in both instances. respondent.
Arellano, C. J., Mapa, Johnson, Carson, Moreland, and Trent, JJ., MAKALINTAL, J.:
concur.
Judgment modified; penalty increased. This case is before us on appeal by certiorari from the decision
243 of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the municipal court of
Page 63 of 71
Cavite City, convicting Rosauro Reyes of the crimes of grave BY: (SGD.) BUEN N. GUTIERREZ     
threats and grave oral defamation, and sentencing him, in the Special Counsel”          
first case (Criminal Case No. 2594), to four (4) months and ten “The undersigned complainant, after being duly sworn to an
(10) days of arresto mayor and to pay a fine of P300, with oath in accordance With law, accuses Rosauro Reyes of the
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and in the crime of Grave Oral Defamation, as defined and penalized by
second case (Criminal Case No. 2595), to an indeterminate Article 358 of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:
penalty of from four (4) months of arresto mayor to one (1) “That on or about June 6, 1961, in the City of Cavite, Republic
year and eight (8) months of prision correccional, and to pay of the Philippines and within ‘the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Agustin Hallare the sum of P800 as moral damages, with costs Court, the above named accused, without any justifiable
in both cases. motive but with the intention to cause dishonor, discredit and
The petitioner herein, Rosauro Reyes, was a former civilian contempt to the undersigned complainant, in the presence of
employee of the Navy Exchange, Sangley Point, Cavite City, and within hearing of several persons, did then and there,
whose services were terminated on May 6, 1961. In the willfully, unlawfully and feloniously utter to the undersigned
afternoon of June 6, 1961, he led a group of about 20 to 30 complainant the following insulting and serious defamatory
persons in a demonstration staged in front of the main gate of remarks, to wit: “AGUSIN, PUTANG INA MO". which if
the United States Naval Station at Sangley Point. They carried 690
placards bearing state-
688 690
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
688 Reyes vs. People
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED transated into English are as follows: “Agustin, Your mother is a
Reyes vs. People whore.”
ments such as, “Agustin, mamatay ka;” “To, alla boss con Contrary to law;
Nolan;” “Frank do not be a common funk;” “Agustin, Cavite City, July 25, 1961.
mamamatay ka rin;” “Agustin, Nolan for you;” “Agustin, alla (SGD.) AGUSTIN HALLARE     
bos con Nolan;” “Agustin, dillega, el dia di quida rin bo Complainant                    
chiquiting;” and others. The base commander, Capt. McAllister, “Subscribed and sworn to before me this 25th day of July,
called up Col. Patricio Monzon, who as Philippine Military 1961, in the City of Cavite, Philippines.
Liaison Officer at Sangley Point was in charge of preserving (SGD.) BUEN N, GUTIERREZ     
harmonious relations between the personnel of the naval Special Counsel”               
station and the civilian population of Cavite City. Capt. Upon arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty to both
McAllister requested Col. Monzon to join him at the main gate charges and the cases were set for joint trial. On the day of the
of the base to meet the demonstrators. Col. Monzon went to hearing the prosecution moved to amend the information in
the place and talked to Rosauro Reyes and one Luis Criminal Case No. 2594 for grave threats by deleting therefrom
Buenaventura. Upon learning that the demonstration was not the word “orally”. The defense counsel objected to the motion
directed against the naval station but against Agustin Hallare on the ground that the accused had already been arraigned on
and a certain Frank Nolan for their having allegedly caused the the original information and that the amendment “would affect
dismissal of Rosauro Reyes from the Navy Exchange, Col. materially the interest of the accused.” Nevertheless, the
Monzon suggested to them to demonstrate in front of Hallare’s amendment was allowed and the joint trial proceeded.
residence, but they told him that they would like the people in From the judgment of conviction the accused appealed to the
the station to know how they felt about Hallare and Nolan. Court of Appeals, which returned a verdict of affirmance. A
They assured him, however, that they did not intend to use motion for reconsideration having been denied, the accused
violence, as “they just wanted to blow off steam.” brought this appeal by certiorari.
At that time Agustin Hallare was in his office inside the naval Petitioner avers that the Court of Appeals erred: (1) in affirming
station. When he learned about the demonstration he became the proceedings in the lower court allowing the substantial
apprehensive about his safety, so he sought Col. Monzon’s amendment of the information for grave threats after
protection. The colonel thereupon escorted Hallare, his brother, petitioner had been arraigned on the original information; (2) in
and another person in going out of the station, using his proceeding with the trial of the case of grave threats without
(Monzon’s) car for the purpose. Once outside, Col. Monzon first requiring petitioner to enter his plea on the amended
purposedly slowed down to accommodate the request of information; (3) in convicting petitioner of both offenses when
Reyes. He told Hallare to take a good look at the he could legally be convicted of only one offense, thereby
demonstrators and at the placards they were carrying. When putting him in jeopardy of being penalized twice for the same
the demonstrators saw Hallare they shouted, “Mabuhay si offense; (4) in convicting petitioner of grave threats when the
Agustin.” Then they boarded their jeeps and followed the car. evidence adduced and considered by the court tend to
One jeep overtook and passed the car while the other two establish the offense of light threats only; and (5) in convicting
trailed behind. After Hallare and his companions had alighted petitioner of grave oral defamation when the evidence tend to
in front of his residence at 967 Burgos St., Cavite City, Col. establish that of simple slander only.
Monzon sped away. 691
The three jeeps carrying the demonstrators parked in
689 VOL. 27, MARCH 28, 1969
691
VOL. 27, MARCH 28, 1969 Reyes vs. People
689 On the first error assigned, the rule is that after the accused
Reyes vs. People has pleaded the information may be amended as to a 1
front of Hallare’s residence after having gone by it twice. matters of form by leave and at the discretion of the court,
Rosarro Reyes got off his jeep and posted himself at the gate, when the same can be done without prejudice to the rights of
and with his right hand inside his pocket and his left holding the defendant (Section 13, Rule 110, New Rules of Court).
the gate-door, he shouted repeatedly, “Agustin, putang ina mo. Amendments that touch upon matters of substance cannot be
Agustin, mawawala ka. Agustin lumabas ka, papatayin kita.” permitted after the plea is entered.
Thereafter, he boarded his jeep and the motorcade left the After a careful consideration of the original information, we find
premises. Meanwhile, Hallare, frightened by the demeanor of that all the elements of the crime of grave threats as defined in
Reyes and the other demonstrators, stayed inside the house. Article 2821 of the Revised Penal Code and penalized by its
On the basis of the foregoing events Rosauro Reyes was paragraph 2 were alleged therein namely: (1) that the offender
charged on July 24 and 25, 1961 with grave threats and grave threatened another person with the infliction upon his person
oral defamation, respectively (Criminal Cases Nos. 2594 and of a wrong; (2) that such wrong amounted to a crime; and (3)
2595, Municipal Court of Cavite City), as follows; that the threat was not subject to a condition. Hence, petitioner
“The undersigned City Fiscal of the City of Cavite accuses could have been convicted thereunder. It is to be noted that
Rosauro Reyes of the crime of Grave Threats, as defined by under the aforementioned provision the particular manner in
Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code and penalized by which the threat is made not a qualifying ingredient of the
paragraph 2 of the same Article, committed as follows: offense, such that the deletion of the word “orally” did not
“That on or about June 6, 1961, in the City of Cavite, Republic affect the nature and essence of the crime as charged
of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable originally. Neither did it change the basic theory of the
Court, the above named accused, did then and there, willfully, prosecution that the accused threatened to kill Rosauro Reyes
unlawfully and feloniously, orally threaten to kill, one Agustin so as to require the petitioner to undergo any material change
Hallare. or modification in his defense. Contrary to his claim, made with
Contrary to law. the concurrence of the Solic-
Cavite City, July 24, 1961. ________________
DEOGRACIAS S. SOLIS               
City Fiscal                         
Page 64 of 71
1 ART. 282. Grave threats.—Any person who shall threaten more important and serious offense committed by the accused.
another with the infliction upon the person, honor or property Under the circumstances the Court believes, after the study of
of the latter or of his family of any wrong amounting to a crime, the whole letter, that the offense committed therein is clearly
shall suffer: and principally that of threats and that the statements therein
1. The penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law derogatory to the person named do not constitute an
for the crime he threatened to commit, if the offender shall independent crime of libel, for which the writer maybe
have made the threat demanding money or imposing any other prosecuted separately from the threats and which should be
condition, even though not unlawful, and said offender shall considered as part of the more important offense of threats.
have attained his purpose. If the offender shall not have The foregoing ruling applies with equal force to the facts of the
attained his purpose, the penalty lower by two degrees shall be present case.
imposed. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed
If the threat be made in writing or through a middleman, the and petitioner is acquitted, with costs de oficio, insofar as
penalty shall be imposed in its maximum period. Criminal Case No. 2595 of the Court a quo (for oral defamation)
2. The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 500 is concerned; and affirmed with respect to Criminal Case No.
pesos, if the threat shall not have been made subject to a 2594, for grave threats, with costs against petitioner.
condition.      Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Zaldivar, San-
692 694

692 694
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Reyes vs. People Reyes vs. People
itor General, petitioner was not exposed after the amendment chez, Fernando, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., concur.
to the danger of conviction under paragraph 1 of Article 282,      Castro and Capistrano, JJ., did not take part.
which provides for a different penalty, since there was no Decision in first case reversed and petitioner acquitted; second
allegation in the amended information that the threat was case affirmed.
made subject to a condition. In our view the deletion of the © Copyright 2020 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
word “orally” was effected in order to make the information Reyes vs. People, 27 SCRA 686, Nos. L-21528 March 28, 1969
conformable to the evidence to be presented during the trial. It
was merely a formal amendment which in no way prejudiced [CA—No. 762. February 6, 1946]
petitioner’s rights.
Petitioner next contends that even assuming that the THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff and appellee,
amendment was properly allowed, the trial court committed a vs. SILVERIO NEBREJA ET AL., defendants. SILVERIO
reversible error in proceeding with the trial on the merits NEBREJA, appellant.
without f irst requiring him to enter his plea to the amended
information. Considering, however, that the amendment was CRIMINAL LAW; COERCION; FORCIBLE EJECTMENT OF
not substantial, no second plea was necessary at all. OCCUPANT OF LAND BY OWNER OR LATTER'S "ENCARGADO."—
The third and fourth issues are related and will be discussed The contention of attorney for the appellant that the latter,
together. Petitioner avers that the appellate court erred in being an "encargado" of the owner of the land, had the right to
affirming the decision of the trial court convicting him of grave eject forcibly the offended party from the land and prevent him
threats and of grave oral defamation when he could legally be from plowing it, does not deserve serious consideration, for no
convicted of only one offense, and in convicting him of grave person may take the law into his own hands.
threats at all when the evidence adduced and considered by APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of
the court indicates the commission of light threats only. Batangas. Luna, J.
The demonstration led by petitioner against Agustin Hallare in The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
front of the main gate of the naval station; the fact that Ceferino Inciong for appellant.
placards with threatening statements were carried by the Acting Assistant Solicitor General Barcelona for appellee.
demonstrators; their persistence in trailing Hallare in a FERIA, J.:
motorcade up to his residence; and the demonstration
conducted in front thereof, culminating in repeated threats The appellant Silverio Nebreja was charged with several others
flung by petitioner in a loud voice, give rise to only one and found guilty of the crime of grave coercion by
conclusion: that the threats were made “with the deliberate 120
purpose of creating in the mind of the person threatened the
belief that the threat would be carried into effect."2 Indeed, 120
Hallare became so apprehensive of his safety that he sought PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
the protection of Col. Monzon, who had to escort him home, People vs. Nebreja
wherein he stayed while the demonstration was going on. It the Court of First Instance of Batangas, and Sentenced to suffer
cannot be imprisonment of four (4) months of arresto mayor. with the
_______________ accessories of the law, to pay a fine of P100 with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay one-seventh of
2 U.S. vs. Sevilla, 1 Phil. 143; U.S. vs. Paguirigan, 14 Phil. 450. the costs. The other accused pleaded guilty of light coercion
693 and were sentenced to serve the corresponding penalty and
did not appeal.
VOL. 27, MARCH 28, 1969 The following facts are established in this case. The appellant
693 was an encargado of Mateo Maniñgat, an hacendero of
Reyes vs. People Balayan, Batangas, who bought the Lian Estate, situated in
denied that the threats were made deliberately and not merely Lian, Batangas, from the corporation El Cole-gio de San José,
in a temporary fit of anger, motivated as they were by the but the buyer could not take possession of a portion' of the
dismissal of petitioner one month before the incident. We, land due to opposition of the -occupants, among them the
therefore, hold that the appellate court was correct in offended party Nicomedes Jonson. In the morning of October 5,
upholding petitioner’s conviction for the offense of grave 1942, while Nicomedes Jonson, assisted by Felipe Balbal,
threats. Marcelo Jonson and Alfonso Jonson, was plowing a parcel of the
The charge of oral defamation stemmed from the utterance of said land claimed by him and in his possession, the seven def
the words, “Agustin, putang ina mo”. This is a common enough endants led by the appellant, all armed with bolos except the
expression in the dialect that is often employed, not really to appellant and Mariano Magno, ordered Nicomedes Jonson to
slander but rather to express anger or displeasure. It is seldom, stop plowing the land because the defendants would plow it.
if ever, taken in its literal sense by the hearer, that is, as a ref Nicomedes Jonson answered that he had a right to continue
lection on the virtues of a mother. In the instant case, it should plowing the land as it was still in his possession, and that while
be viewed as part of the threats voiced by appellant against it was involved in a litigation there was as yet no decision and
Agustin Hallare, evidently to make the same more emphatic. In order of the court to deliver possession thereof to somebody
the case of Yebra, G.R. No. L-14348, Sept. 30, 1960, this Court else. The appellant retorted that if they (Nicomedes Jonson and
said: his companions) did not stop plowing they would get hurt, and
“The letter containing the allegedly libelous remarks is more grabbed the rope of the carabao of Nicomedes Jonson, while
threatening than libelous and the intent to threaten is the his co-accused, with their hand on the handles of their bolos,
principal aim and object to the letter. The libelous remarks surrounded Nicomedes Jonson and his companions. Cowed by
contained in the letter, if so they be considered, are merely this hostile attitude of the defendants, Nicomedes Jonson and
preparatory remarks culminating in the final threat. In other his companions had to stop plowing, thus enabling the
words, the libelous remarks express the heat of passion which defendants to take possession of and plow the land. Nicomedes
engulfs the writer of the letter, which heat of passion in the Jonson immediately reported the matter to the local
latter part of the letter culminates into a threat. This is the authorities, and returned with Sergeant of Police Amando
Page 65 of 71
Caraig and five policemen. Upon arriving at the place, they the town, merely implemented the aforesaid recommendation
found Silverio Nebreja standing on the land while three of the of the Municipal Health Officer. Having then acted in good faith
defendants were in the performance of his duty, petitioner incurred no criminal
121 liability.
Same; Same; Grave coercion, nature and elements of; Mayor
VOL. 76, FEBRUARY 6, 1946 not guilty of grave coercion as the element that the restraint
121 made by the Mayor upon complainant, owner of the
People vs. Nebreja barbershop, was not made under authority of law or in the
plowing and the rest were standing guard. Sergeant Caraig exercise of a lawful right, is absent in case at bar.—Grave
approached and asked the appellant if it was true that he had coercion is committed when “a person who, without authority
stopped Nicomedes Jonson from plowing the land, to which the of law, shall by means of violence, prevent another from doing
latter answered in the affirmative, stating that it was he who something not prohibited by law or compel to do something
should plow the land. The Sergeant then warned the appellant against his will, either it be right or wrong.” The three elements
that if he and his men did not stop the plowing they would be of grave coercion are : [1] that any person be prevented by
taken to the municipal building; and as the defendants refused another from doing something not prohibited by law, or
to stop and the appellant said that he was ready for any compelled to do something against his will, be it right or wrong;
eventuality, they were arrested and taken to the municipal jail. [2] that the prevention or compulsion be effected by violence,
Appellant's defense is an alibi, that is, that in the morning of either by material force or such display of it as would produce
October 5, 1942, when the alleged crime was committed, he intimidation and control the will of the offended party, and [3]
was at the Central Azucarera, Don Pedro in Nasugbu, Batangas, that the person who restrained the will and liberty of another
talking with a certain Captain Mauchi, and that when he had no right to do so, or, in other words, that the restraint was
returned to Lian, Batangas, in the afternoon of the same day, not made under authority of law or in
he was arrested and thrown in jail. _______________
This alibi set up by the appellant has no probative value,
because it is not supported by evidence, for neither Captain * SECOND DIVISION.
Mauchi nor any one from the sugar central was presented to 831
support it. The negative testimony of some of his co-
defendants, who pleaded guilty and were convicted, to the VOL. 125, NOVEMBER 25, 1983
effect that the appellant was not in the land when they were 831
arrested are not strictly in support of the alibi that the Timoner vs. People
appellant was in said sugar central, and is contradicted by the exercise of a lawful right. The third element being absent in
Arsenio Nebreja, one of his co-accused who was presented as a the case at bar, petitioner cannot be held guilty of grave
witness for the defense, who categorically testified that the coercion.
appellant was among those arrested in the place where the PETITION to review the decision of the Court of Appeals.
offense was committed in the morning of October 5, 1942, and
by the positive testimony to that effect of the off ended party, The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Felipe Balbal and Sergeant Caraig. Besides, considering the      Marciano C. Dating, Jr. and Jose S. Fuentebella for petitioner.
short distance between the municipality of Lian and Nasugbu      The Solicitor General for respondents.
and the available means of transportation, it was not ESCOLIN, J.:
impossible for the appellant, according to the lower court which
took judicial notice of that fact, to have been in the sugar Petition for review of the affirmance in toto by the Court of
central at Nasugbu in the morning of October 5, 1942, and to Appeals, now the Intermediate Appellate Court, of the
have returned to Lian in the same morning in time to commit judgment of conviction handed down by the then Municipal
the offense charged. Court of Daet, Camarines Norte, in Criminal Case No. 4281,
122 entitled “People of the Philippines vs. Jose Timoner,” finding
petitioner guilty of the crime of grave coercion, as follows:
122 “WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused JOSE ‘PEPITO’
PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED TIMONER guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Grave
Somera Vda. de Navarro vs. Navarro Coercion as penalized under Art. 286 of the Revised Penal
The contention of attorney for the appellant that the latter, Code, and hereby sentences the said accused pursuant to the
being an "encargado" of the owner of the land, had the right to provision of Rule 64, Par. 3, to suffer SIX MONTHS OF
eject forcibly the offended party from the land and prevent him IMPRISONMENT OF ARRESTO MAYOR IN ITS MAXIMUM PERIOD,
from plowing it, does not deserve serious consideration, for no to pay a fine of P300.00 and to pay the offended party in the
person may take the law into his own hands. amount of P5,000.00 as damages, without subsidiary liability in
In view of the foregoing, we hold that the evidence shows case of insolvency. The other accused SAMUEL MORENA and
beyond reasonable doubt the appellant's guilt of the crime ERNESTO QUIBRAL are hereby ordered ACQUITTED.”
charged and of which he was convicted, and that the penalty The salient facts are not disputed. At about 10:00 in the
imposed is in conformity with the law, and, therefore, the evening of December 13, 1971, petitioner, then Mayor of Daet,
sentence appealed from is hereby affirmed with costs to the Camarines Norte, accompanied by two uniformed policemen,
appellant. So ordered. Samuel Morena and Ernesto Quibral, and six laborers, arrived
Morán, C. J., Parás, Jaranilla, Pablo, and Briones, JJ., concur. in front of the stalls along Maharlika highway, the main
Judgment affirmed. thoroughfare of the same town. Upon orders of petitioner,
_________________ these laborers proceeded to nail together rough lumber slabs
to fence off the stalls which protruded into the sidewalk of the
© Copyright 2020 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved. Maharlika highway. Among the structures thus barricaded were
People vs. Nebreja, 76 Phil. 119, CA—No. 762 February 6, 1946 the barbershop of Pascual Dayaon, the complaining witness,
and the store belonging to one Lourdes Pia-
830 832
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Timoner vs. People 832
No. L-62050. November 25, 1983.* SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Timoner vs. People
JOSE “PEPITO” TIMONER, petitioner, vs. THE PEOPLE OF Rebustillos. These establishments had been recommended for
THE PHILIPPINES AND THE HONORABLE COURT OF closure by the Municipal Health Officer, Dra. Alegre, for
APPEALS, IV DIVISION, respondents. noncompliance with certain health and sanitation
requirements.
Criminal Law; Grave Coercion; Civil Law; Nuisance; Abatement Thereafter, petitioner filed a complaint in the Court of First
of public nuisance without judicial proceedings; Municipal Instance of Camarines Norte against Lourdes Pia-Rebustillos
Mayor not criminally liable when he acted in good faith in and others for judicial abatement of their stalls. The complaint,
authorizing the fencing of a barbershop for being a public docketed as Civil Case No. 2257, alleged that these stalls
nuisance because it occupied a portion of the sidewalk of the constituted public nuisances as well as nuisances per se.
poblacion’s main thoroughfare.—But even without this judicial Dayaon was never able to reopen his barbershop business.
pronouncement, petitioner could not have been faulted for Subsequently, petitioner and the two policemen, Morena and
having fenced off said barbershop. Paragraph 3, Article 699 of Quibral, were charged with the offense of grave coercion
the Civil Code authorizes the abatement of a public nuisance before the Municipal Court of Daet. As already noted, the said
without judicial proceedings. The remedies against a public court exonerated the two policemen, but convicted petitioner
nuisance are: [1] A prosecution under the Penal Code or any of the crime charged as principal by inducement.
local ordinance; or [2] A civil action; or [3] Abatement, without On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in full the judgment of
judicial proceedings. In the case at bar, petitioner, as mayor of the trial court. Hence, the present recourse. Petitioner
Page 66 of 71
contends that the sealing off of complainant Dayaon’s restraint was not made under authority of law or in the
barbershop was done in abatement of a public nuisance and, exercise of a lawful right.2
therefore, under lawful authority. The third element being absent in the case at bar, petitioner
We find merit in this contention. Unquestionably, the cannot be held guilty of grave coercion.
barbershop in question did constitute a public nuisance as WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
defined under Article Nos. 694 and 695 of the Civil Code, to wit: No. 19534-CR, is hereby set aside and petitioner is acquitted of
“ART. 694. A nuisance is any act, omission, establishment, the crime charged. Costs de oficio.
business, condition of property, or anything else which: SO ORDERED.
(1) Injures or endangers the health or safety of others; or      Makasiar (Chairman), Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero,
(2) Annoys or offends the senses; or Abad Santos and De Castro, JJ., concur.
(3) Shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; or Decision set aside.
(4) Obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public _______________
highway or street, or any body of water; or
(5) Hinders or impairs the use of property. 1 Article 286, Revised Penal Code.
“ART. 695. Nuisance is either public or private. A public 2 Justice Ramon C. Aquino, The Revised Penal Code, Book II,
nuisance affects a community or neighborhood or any 1976, p. 1392.
considerable number of persons, although the extent of the 835
annoyance, danger or damage upon individuals may be
unequal. A private nuisance is one that is not included in the VOL. 125, NOVEMBER 25, 1983
foregoing definition.” 835
833 Vda. de Sy-Quia vs. Court of Appeals
Notes.—A noise may constitute an actionable nuisance, but it
VOL. 125, NOVEMBER 25, 1983 must be a noise which affects injuriously the health or comfort
833 of ordinary people in the vicinity to an unreasonable extent.
Timoner vs. People (Velasco vs. Manila Electric Co., 40 SCRA 342.)
The barbershop occupied a portion of the sidewalk of the A public nuisance per se may be abated without judicial
poblacion’s main thoroughfare and had been recommended for proceedings under the Civil Code. (Homeowners Assn. of El
closure by the Municipal Health Officer. In fact, the Court of Deposito vs. Lood, 47 SCRA 174.)
First Instance of Camarines Norte, in its decision in Civil Case The police power of the State justifies the abatement or
No. 2257, declared said barbershop as a nuisance per se. Thus: destruction by summary proceedings of public nuisances per
“Under the facts of the case, as well as the law in point, there se. (Ibid.)
is no semblance of any legality or right that exists in favor of Action to avoid possible nuisance is premature when the
the defendants to build a stall and conduct their business in a bidding for materials for the incinerator is still going on and
sidewalk, especially in a highway where it does not only where no incinerator has yet actually existed. (San Rafael
constitute a menace to the health of the general public passing Homeowners Assn. vs. City of Manila, 46 SCRA 40.)
through the street and also of the unsanitary condition that is As a general rule, everyone is bound to bear the habitual or
bred therein as well as the unsightly and ugly structures in the customary inconveniences that result from the proximity of
said place. Moreover, even if it is claimed and pretended that others, and so long as this level is not surpassed, he may not
there was a license, permit or toleration of the defendants’ complain against them. (Velasco vs. Manila Electric Co., 40
makeshift store and living quarters for a number of years does SCRA 342.)
not lend legality to an act which is a nuisance per se. Such ——o0o——
nuisance affects the community or neighborhood or any
considerable number of persons and the general public which © Copyright 2020 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
posed a danger to the people in general passing and using that Timoner vs. People, 125 SCRA 830, No. L-62050 November 25,
place, for in addition, this is an annoyance to the public by the 1983
invasion of its rights—the fact that it is in a public place and
annoying to all who come within its sphere [Baltazar vs. VOL. 201, SEPTEMBER 6, 1991
Carolina Midland, Ry. Co., 54 S.C. 242, 32 S.B. 258, cited in 11 405
Tolentino’s Civil Code of the Philippines, p. 375; Kapisanan Lee vs. Court of Appeals
Lingkod ng Bayan, Inc. vs. Lacson, CA-G.R. No. 27260-R, March
25, 1964; 61 O.G. 2487]. G.R. No. 90423. September 6, 1991.*
x      x      x      x      x      x FRANCIS LEE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND PELAGIA PANLINO DE
“IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby declares that CHIN, respondents.
the structures subject of this complaint as well as those
occupied by the impleaded defendants are nuisances per se, Criminal Law; Coercion; Evidence; Generally, the findings of
and therefore orders the defendants to demolish the stall and facts of the Court of Appeals command utmost respect;
vacate the premises immediately x x x.” Exception.—As a general rule, the findings of facts of the Court
But even without this judicial pronouncement, petitioner could of Appeals command utmost respect, However, such findings
not have been faulted for having fenced off said barbershop. are disregarded if there appears in the record some fact or
Paragraph 3, Article 699 of the Civil Code authorizes the circumstance of weight and influence which has been
abatement of a public nuisance without judicial proceedings. overlooked or the significance of which has been
“ART. 699. The remedies against a public nuisance are: [1] A misinterpreted that, if considered, would affect the result of the
prosecution under the Penal Code or any local ordinance; or case.
834 Same; Same; Same; There is nothing unlawful on the threat to
sue.—In the light of the foregoing circumstances, petitioner’s
834 demand that the private respondent return the proceeds of the
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED check accompanied by a threat to file criminal charges was not
Timoner vs. People improper. There is nothing unlawful on the threat to sue.
[2] A civil action; or Same; Same; Same; Court finds that complainant’s lengthy
[3] Abatement, without judicial proceedings.” stay at the bank was not due to the petitioner’s threat.—We
In the case at bar, petitioner, as mayor of the town, merely find that complainant’s lengthy stay at the bank was not due to
implemented the aforesaid recommendation of the Municipal the petitioner’s threat. It was rather due to her desire to prove
Health Officer. Having then acted in good faith in the her innocence.
performance of his duty, petitioner incurred no criminal Same; Same; Same; Same; It is not farfetched for the Court to
liability. think that the complainant voluntarily but grudgingly returned
Grave coercion is committed when “a person who, without the money to show good faith.—In her insistence to clear up
authority of law, shall by means of violence, prevent another her name, it is not farfetched for Us to think that the
from doing something not prohibited by law or compel to do complainant voluntarily but grudgingly returned the money to
something against his will, either it be right or wrong.”1 The show good faith. Thus, it was she who informed the petitioner
three elements of grave coercion are: [1] that any person be about the existence of the RCBC Time Deposit Certificate (Exh.
prevented by another from doing something not prohibited by “A", pp. 4–5, Records). The allegation that she did so because
law, or compelled to do something against his will, be it right or of petitioner’s threats came from the complainant herself. She
wrong; [2] that the prevention or compulsion be effected by has not been able to present any other witness to buttress her
violence, either by material force or such display of it as would claim.
produce intimidation and control the will of the offended party, Same; Same; Same; The most telling proof of the absence of
and [3] that the person who restrained the will and liberty of intimidation was the fact that the complainant refused to sign
another had no right to do so, or, in other words, that the the promissory note in spite of the alleged threats of the

Page 67 of 71
petitioner.—The most telling proof of the absence of said bank, the complainant, who was five (5) months in the
intimidation was the fact that the complainant family way, was watched by the bank’s employees and security
________________ guards. It was about six o’clock in the afternoon of the same
day when the complainant was able to leave the bank
* FIRST DIVISION. premises.
406 “Upon the other hand, the petitioner, 37 years old, presented
his version, basically a denial of the charges, to wit: he was the
406 Branch Bank Manager of Pacific Banking Corporation. After
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED having been informed that Midland National Bank Cashier
Lee vs. Court of Appeals Check No. 3526794 was dishonored for being spurious, he
refused to sign the promissory note in spite of the alleged examined the relevant bank records and discovered that
threats of the petitioner (TSN, January 8, 1985, p. 48; Records, complainant Maria Pelagia Paulino de Chin was instrumental in
p. 139). American authorities have declared that "(t)he force inducing their bank to accept the subject
which is claimed to have compelled criminal conduct against 408
the will of the actor must be immediate and continuous and
threaten grave danger to his person during all of the time the 408
act is being committed. That is, it must be a dangerous force SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
threatened ‘in praesent.’ It must be a force threatening great Lee vs. Court of Appeals
bodily harm that remains constant in controlling the will of the dollar check and was also the one who withdrew the proceeds
unwilling participant while the act is being performed and from thereof, by utilizing a withdrawal slip purportedly signed by
which he cannot then withdraw in safety.” Honorio Carpio. Petitioner, thru Atanacio Lumba, invited the
Same; Same; Same; Same; Court holds that coercion did not complainant to his office. Responding to his invitation, the
exist in this case.—Against this backdrop, We hold that complainant arrived at the bank before noon of June 20,1984,
coercion did not exist in this case. Consequently, the petitioner but was not attended to immediately as the petitioner had to
should be acquitted. attend to other bank clients. The complainant was merely
PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of informed about the Subject fake dollar check that was
Appeals. deposited with said bank upon her assurance that it was
genuine. The complainant was not compelled into signing the
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. withdrawal slip, but she acted freely and voluntarily in
     Arturo S. Santos for petitioner, executing her affidavit and in returning the money equivalent
MEDIALDEA, J.: of the subject check. There was nothing unusual during her
lengthy stay in the bank.” (pp. 44–45, Rollo)
This is a petition for review on certiorari to set aside the The sole issue posed in this petition is whether or not the acts
decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 29, 1989 which of petitioner in simply “shouting at the complainant with
reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), piercing Iooks” and “threats to file charges against her” are
National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 129 at Caloocan City, sufficient to convict him of the crime of grave coercion (p. 6,
Metro Manila, and reinstated as well as affirmed in toto the Rollo).
decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), Branch 2, same Article 286 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
city. The RTC decision found the petitioner guilty of the crime “ART. 286. Grave coercions.—The penalty of arresto mayor and
of light coercion, the dispositive portion of which reads: a fine not exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed upon any
“IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from person who, without authority of law, shall, by means of
is hereby modified. The accused Francis Lee is hereby found violence, prevent another from doing something not prohibited
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of light coercion, by law, or compel him to do something against his will,
as penalized under paragraph 2 of Article 287 of the Revised whether it be right or wrong.
Penal Code and he is hereby sentenced to suffer a penalty of “If the coercion be committed for the purpose of compelling
TWENTY (20) DAYS of ARRESTO MENOR and to pay one-third another to perform any religious act or to prevent him from so
(1/3) of the costs.” (p. 40, Rollo) doing, the penalty next higher in degree shall be imposed.”
On the other hand, the MTC decision convicted the petitioner of Considering that the present case does not involve violence but
the offense of grave coercion, the pertinent portion of the same intimidation, the provisions of Article 1335 of the New Civil
is hereby quoted as follows: Code on intimidation are relevant. It states:
407 “Art. 1335. x x x.
“There is intimidation when one of the contracting parties is
VOL. 201, SEPTEMBER 6, 1991 compelled by a reasonable and well-grounded fear of an
407 imminent and grave evil upon his person or property, or upon
Lee vs. Court of Appeals the person or property of his spouse, descendants or
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the ascendants, to give his consent.
accused Francis Lee, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the “To determine the degree of the intimidation, the age, sex and
offense of Grave Coercion, as charged, defined and penalized condition of the person shall be borne in mind.
under Art. 286 of the Revised Penal Code, and is hereby “A threat to enforce once’s claim through competent authority,
sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of THREE (3) MONTHS, of if the claim is just or legal, does not vitiate consent.”
arresto mayor, medium, and to pay a fine of P250.00, with 409
cost.
“The accused is further ordered to indemnify the offended VOL. 201, SEPTEMBER 6, 1991
party, Pelagia Paulino de Chin, by way of civil liability the sum 409
of P5,000.00 as moral damages and the sum of P2,000.00 as Lee vs. Court of Appeals
exemplary damages. As a general rule, the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals
“x x x.” (p. 33, Rollo) command utmost respect. However, such findings are
The facts as stated by the respondent Court of Appeals are disregarded if there appears in the record some fact or
undisputed, thus: circumstance of weight and influence which has been
“At about 10:00 o’clock in the morning of June 20, 1984, the overlooked or the significance of which has been
complainant Maria Pelagia Paulino de Chin, 23 years old, was misinterpreted that, if considered, would affect the result of the
fetched from her house at 112 BLISS Site, 8th Avenue, case (see San Sebastian College v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R.
Caloocan City by Atanacio Lumba, a bank employee, upon the No. 84401, May 15, 1991).
instruction of the petitioner Branch Manager Francis Lee of While the appellate court emphasized the pregnancy and
Pacific Banking Corporation (hereinafter referred to as bank). feminine gender of the complainant, it overlooked other
Upon arriving at the office of Pacific Banking Corporation significant personal circumstances which are material in
located at Caloocan City, petitioner Francis Lee did not attend determining the presence of coercion in this case.
to her immediately. After an hour later, the petitioner The records show that complainant is a highly educated person
confronted the complainant about a forged Midland National who is familiar with banking procedures. She is a graduate of
Bank Cashier Check No. 3526794, which the latter allegedly Business Administration major in Banking and Finance from
deposited in the account of Honorio Carpio. During the said NCBA. She also finished one semester of MA in graduate
confrontation, the petitioner Francis Lee was shouting at her school. In 1983, complainant worked with the Insular Bank of
with piercing looks and -threatened to file charges against her Asia and America as a bank teller (TSN, November 20, 1984,
unless and until she returned all the money equivalent of the pp. 5–7; Records, pp. 96–98),
subject cashier check. Accordingly, the complainant was Likewise, it appears that complainant actively participated in
caused to sign a prepared withdrawal slip, and later, an the deposit and withdrawal of the proceeds of the controversial
affidavit prepared by the bank’s lawyer, where she was made check. We find that she told Honorio Carpio (Carpio, for short),
to admit that she had swindled the bank and had return the a relative and payee of the check; to open a savings account
money equivalent of the spurious check. During her stay at the with the Pacific Banking Corporation (Bank, for short) and
Page 68 of 71
accompanied him; that subsequently, she presented a Midland The circumstances of this case reveal that the complainant,
National Bank Cashier’s check payable to Carpio in the sum of despite her protestations. indeed voluntarily. albeit reluctantly,
$5,200.00 to Mr. Lamberto R. Cruz (Cruz, for short), PRO consented to do all the aforesaid acts.
Manager, Foreign Department; that she claimed that she was Bearing in mind her involvement in the deposit and
requested by her uncle to deposit the check for collection; that encashment of the check, the complainant admitted to being
she was a bank depositor and she “knew somebody nervous upon being informed that the check was spurious
downstairs”; that she assured Cruz that the check would be (TSN, November 20,1984, p. 15; Record, p. 106)
honored between banks (TSN, April 15, 1985, pp. 89–92; We find that complainant’s lengthy stay at the bank was not
Records, 180–183); that on June 11,1984, the bank, after the due to the petitioner’s threat. It was rather due to her desire to
usual clearing period, sent out a notice to Carpio that the prove her innocence. Her testimony on this point is a
proceeds of the check were already credited to his account but revelation:
the same was returned to the bank because the address was “Atty. Dizon: (counsel for petitioner)
false or not true; that the total amount of the check in pesos  
was P92,557.44; that the total deposit of Carpio was You are always talking of signing the withdrawal slip by force,
P92,607.44, his initial deposit of P50.00 being added to the is it not that earlier you admitted that no actual force was
amount of the check; that on the same day, complainant employed upon you in connection with the signing of this
personally inquired from the bank whether the proceeds of the document and the force that you are claiming was the alleged
410 shouting against .you coupled with the statement that you
could not leave?
410 “A
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Yes, sir.
Lee vs. Court of Appeals “Q
check have already been credited to Carpio’s account (TSN, When Mr. Lee was requiring you to sign the withdrawal slip did
June 11, 1985, p. 163, records, p. 163); that upon an it not occur to you to leave the bank?
affirmative answer, the bank records show that on that day, 412
the complainant withdrew the sum of P12,607.00 thru a
withdrawal slip purportedly signed by Carpio; that in the 412
interim, Carpio allegedly left abroad (Annex C, p. 17, Records); SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
that on June 13, 1984, she withdrew the sum of P80,000.44 Lee vs. Court of Appeals
from Carpio’s account by means of a withdrawal slip allegedly “Atty. Pangilinan:
signed by Carpio and then, she closed his account; that put of  
the said amount, she redeposited the sum of P50,000.00 to her The question has already been answered she said she cann ot
own savings account and received in cash the remaining leave because she is being threatened,
balance of P30,000.44; and on June 15 and 18, 1984, “Atty. Dizon:
complainant withdrew the amounts of P2,000.00 and P1  
8,000.00, respectively from her savings account (Exh. “3", That was during the time when she first met Mr. Lee.
Records, p. 15, in relation to TSN, October 8, 1985, pp. 194– “Court: ;
195, Records, pp. 286–287).  
In the light of the foregoing circumstances, petitioner’s Witness may answer.
demand that the private respondent; return the proceeds of “A
the check accompanied by a threat to file criminal charges was When I was about to sign the withdrawal slip I inquired from
not improper. There is nothing unlawful on the threat to sue. In him If I signed it I can leave already but he insisted that I
the case of Berg v. National City Bank of New York (102 Phil. should not leave, Sir.
309, 316), We ruled that: “Q
“x x x It is a practice followed not only by banks but even by When he told you that did it not occur to you to stand up and
individuals to demand payment of their accounts with the go out of the bank?
threat that upon failure to do so an action would be instituted “A
in court. Such a threat is proper within the realm of the law as No, Sir.
a means to enforce collection. Such a threat cannot constitute “Q
duress even if the claim proves to be unfounded so long as the Why?
creditor believes that it was his right to do so.” “A
The Solicitor General argues that the complainant was He was insisting that I return the amount I have withdrawn
intimidated and compelled into disclosing her time deposit, especially on June 18 when I withdrew P18,000.00, Sir.
signing the typewritten withdrawal slip and the affidavit by the “COURT:
petitioner’s threat to detain her at the bank.  
At this point, there is a need to make a distinction between a The question is why did you not leave and disregarded him?
case where a person gives his consent reluctantly and against “A
his good sense and judgment and where he gives no consent Because I cannot just leave him that way, Your Honor.
at all, as where he acts against his will under a pressure he “Atty. Dizon:
cannot resist. Thus, in Vales v. Villa (35 Phil. 769, 789), We  
ruled: Why? What was the reason that you cannot leave him?
411 “A
Because he is insisting that the responsibility of one person be
VOL. 201, SEPTEMBER 6, 1991 my responsibility and at that time I was feeling nervous and he
411 did not tell me to stand up and leave, Sir.” (ibid, pp. 18–20,
Lee vs. Court of Appeals Records, pp. 109–111)
“x x x It is clear that one acts as voluntarily and independently In her insistence to clear up her name, it is not farfetched for
in the eye of the law when he acts reluctantly and with Us to think that the complainant voluntarily but grudgingly
hesitation as when he acts spontaneously and joyously. Legally returned the money to show good ‘faith. Thus, it was she who
speaking he acts as voluntarily and freely when he acts wholly informed the petitioner about the existence of the RCBC Time
against his better sense and judgment as when he acts in Deposit Certificate (Exh. “A", pp. 4–5, Records). The allegation
conformity with them. Between the two acts there is no that she did so because of petitioner’s threats came from the
difference in law. But when his sense, judgment, and his will complainant herself. She has not been able to present any
rebel and he refuses absolutely to act as requested, but is other witness to buttress her claim.
nevertheless overcome by force or intimidation to such an Further, We find that contrary to complainant’s allegations in
extent that he becomes a mere automation and acts her affidavit (ibid, p. 5) it was not the petitioner who suggested
mechanically only, a new element enters, namely, a the encashment of the RCBC Time Deposit Certificate but her
disappearance of the personality of the actor. He ceases to sister; and that again, it was not the petitioner who agreed to
exist as an independent entity with faculties and judgment, the sister’s suggestion but Cruz, the PRO Manager, Foreign
and in his place is substituted another—the one exercising the Department of the bank (TSN, January 8, 1985, pp. 40–41,
force or making use of the intimidation. While his hand signs, Records, pp. 131–132).
the will which moves it is another’s. While a contract is made, it 413
has, in reality and in law, only one party to it; and, there being
only one party, the one using the force or the intimidation, it is VOL. 201, SEPTEMBER 6, 1991
unenforceable for lack of a second party. 413
“From these considerations it is clear that every case of Lee vs. Court of Appeals
alleged intimidation must be examined to determine within Moreover, while complainant claimed that her freedom of
which class it falls. If it is within the first class it is not duress in movement was restrained, she, however, was able to move
law, if it falls in the second, it is.” about freely unguarded from the office of the petitioner
Page 69 of 71
situated at the ground floor to the office of Cruz at the So it is your bounded (sic) duty to recover money which was
mezzanine floor where her sister found her (ibid, pp. 39–40, paid to someonelse (sic) which payment is not due to him, am I
Records, pp. 130–131). Undoubtedly, during that time, there correct?
were many bank clients who transacted business with the bank 415
(TSN, November 20,1984, p. 21; Records, p. 112). The bank
security guards then were at their posts. Complainant herself VOL. 201, SEPTEMBER 6, 1991
admitted that they manifested no overt acts to prevent her 415
from leaving despite the alleged loud threats of the petitioner Lee vs. Court of Appeals
(ibid, pp. 20–21, Records, pp. 111–112) which could be heard “A
considering that the door to petitioner’s office was kept open It is the duty of our lawyer to recover it, Sir.
(TSN, October 8, 1985, p. 184, Records, p. 276). Given such “Q
atmosphere, the complainant still did not leave the bank. Is it not a fact that your lawyer is only your agent?
The respondent court cited the prepared typewritten “Atty. Dizon:
withdrawal slip and the non-presentation of the complainant’s  
passbook as indicators of her involuntary acts. I think we are going top far, it has nothing to do with the
We disagree. The petitioner testified that the general rule particular incident subject matter of the criminal offense.
was.that the bank requires the presentation of the passbook “Court:
whenever withdrawals are made. However, there was an  
exception to this rule, i.e. when the depositor is a regular I see the point of the defense but the witness is very
customer in depositing or withdrawing money in the bank (TSN, intelligent, I can see the point of counsel, because in order not
October 8, 1985, pp. 189–190, Records, pp. 281–282). The to effect his integrity he resorted to this, for example in case of
prosecution failed to submit evidence to rebut his contentions. a bank employee who stole P500.00 and the other one is
Besides, the trial court’s conclusion that the withdrawal slip P200.00, it could have the same mistake which is supposed to
was typewritten was without basis considering that the be admonished by removal. You answer.
complainant merely averred that the withdrawal slip was “A
already prepared when she signed it (Exh. “A", Records, p. 4). Yes that is the same case whether it is small or big but when it
We also take exception to the following ruling of the appellate comes to the Manager the Head Office is very understanding
court: when it comes to bogus checks and of course my work is a
“It must be noted that the position of a bank manager is one of supervisory. Sir.” (ibid, pp. 170–171; Records, pp. 263–264)
prestige and dignity and when the said bank was cheated or The most telling proof of the absence of intimidation was the
swindled it certainly reflects on the capability and efficiency of fact that the complainant refused to sign the promissory note
the manager and one can just imagine the kind of mental in spite of the alleged threats of the petitioner (TSN, January 8,
attitude and feeling of anger the latter would have towards the 1985, p. 48; Records, p. 139). American authorities have
alleged swindler. Shouting, raising of voice and dagger looks declared that "(t)he force which is claimed to have compelled
are common characteristics of an angry man and that was criminal conduct against the will of the actor must be
what accused Lee exhibited to a fragile weaker sex and immediate and continuous and threaten grave danger to his
pregnant offended party. It would be natural to get angry with person during all of the time the act is being committed. That
someone who had victimized you. Naturalness, however is not is, it must be a dangerous force threatened ‘in praesenti.’ It
always must be a force threatening great bodily harm that remains
414 constant in controlling the will of the unwilling participant while
the act is being performed and from which he cannot then
414 withdraw in safety.” (State v. Hood, 165 NE 2d, 28, 31–32,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Italics ours).
Lee vs. Court of Appeals The complainant proferred excuses for her action. For one, she
righteous. It is like taking the law into your hands and that was claimed that her sister’s presence helped her recover her
what the accused Lee did.” (CA Decision, pp. 11–12, Rollo, pp. composure (TSN, November 20, 1984, p. 29, Records, p. 120).
52–53) We are not persuaded. If indeed she had recovered her
This pronouncement creates an impression that the petitioner composure because of her sister’s presence, she could have
had made a personal case out of the situation. However, the just left the premises in a huff without encashing the RCBC
evidence does not support this view. We find that at the time Time Deposit Certificate or if they (complainant and sister)
the check was deposited and encashed, the petitioner was then were already at the RCBC, they could have desisted from
on leave (TSN, June 11, 1985, p. 156; Records, p. 248). Under encashing the check and then could have left for home
this circumstance, it is not fair to consider the bank’s mistake notwithstanding the alleged presence of Mr. Lumba who was
in accepting and paying the check as the petitioner’s mistake no longer in his own bank but
which could militate against his efficiency. The petitioner 416
attributed the mistake in the payment of the forged check to
the usual risks in banking business. He stated: 416
Atty. Pangilinan, Private prosecutor (authorized by the Fiscal to SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
prosecute the case in the latter’s stead) Lee vs. Court of Appeals
“Q among the RCBC clients or she could have refused to sign the
So you no longer consider him (Carpio) as entitled in (sic) the affidavit which was handed to her first before the promissory
proceeds of the chek (sic) and therefore at that point of (sic) note. Yet, she did neither of these logical possibilities;
time you will now concede that the payment made by you to Secondly, she averred that she refused to sign the promissory
him was a big mistake? note because she was able to read its contents unlike the
“A affidavit and she realized that she would have a great
When we were asking for the respondent and we were locating responsibility to return the amount taken by Carpio "(ibid, pp.
Honorio Carpio and we cannot locate him, I consider that a 27–28, Records, pp. 118–119).
mistake, Sir. Such an excuse is flimsy and weak. It is strange that
“Q complainant’s sister, who was with her, failed to corroborate
It was a big mistake as a matter of fact? her statement that she was denied the opportunity to read the
“A affidavit. Her bare assertion simply confirms the voluntariness
When it comes to the falling of the business considering the big of her actions. All her disputed acts were geared towards
amount I would say big mistake but only a mistake, it was a proving her good faith. Complainant was willing to return the
usual risk in banking business, Sir. sum of P48,000.00 she took since it was only up to this amount
“Q where her involvement lies. However, as soon as she realized
But of course Mr. Lee, being a mistake that mistake will harm that she would have the enormous task of reimbursing the
and tense your personality as a Bank Manager? bank the balance of the proceeds of the forged check allegedly
“A taken by Carpio, she refused to cooperate any further.
It is up to our Manager to decide but when it comes to other Notwithstanding the alleged threats of petitioner, she did not
transactions I am handling Three Million plus and considering budge. Thus, We find it as a logical consequence that she
that check I don’t think with all modesty it will affect me, Sir. merely asked for the receipt of the P18,000.00 she deposited
“Q rather than the cancellation of her earlier withdrawal. On this
But you are called upon to try to recover any money which was point, complainant claimed that after her refusal to sign the
in your judgment was unlawfully taken from you by anybody? document, she no longer insisted on the return of the money
“A because she felt that it was the only way she could leave the
When it comes to procedure I don’t think it was unlawfully bank premises (TSN, November 20, 1984, p. 31, Records, p.
taken, as a matter of fact it was our bank who credited this 120). This pretense, however, was belied by her subsequent
account, Sir. actuations. We find that she and her sister left the bank
“Q unescorted to eat their snack; that they were required by the
Page 70 of 71
petitioner to come back; and that they decided not to eat but
instead went home (TSN, November 20,1984, pp. 31–32,
Records, pp. 122–123 and January 8, 1965, pp. 49–50, Records,
pp. 140–141). With such behavior, We are at a loss to
understand how coercion could attach in this case. Obviously,
the complainant has not been cowed into submission.
Against this backdrop, We hold that coercion did not exist in
this case. Consequently, the petitioner should be acquitted.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed from is hereby
REVERSED and a new one hereby entered ACQUITTING the
417

VOL. 201, SEPTEMBER 6, 1991

417
Gonzaga vs. Sandiganbayan
accused of the crime of grave coercion.
SO ORDERED.
     Narvasa (Chairman), Cruz and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.
Decision reversed.
——o0o——

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Lee vs. Court of Appeals, 201 SCRA 405, G.R. No. 90423
September 6, 1991

Page 71 of 71